"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٤‎٨] (٤٢٤/١٠١)

76
After the fall of Kut and when the War Office took over the control
of operations, the construction of the railway was put in hand. Late
in 1916 the first two lines were ready. A metre-gauge line 140 miles
in length ran from Basra to Nasariya and obviated the crossing of the
Hammar Lake. The Qurna-Amara Section relieved to some extent the
over-burdened river transport over the " Narrows."
In 1917, after the fall of Baghdad, and the advance to Samarra, our
lines of communications were more than doubled. Troops were posted
in places inaccessible by water, and an exceptionally low water level was
anticipated in the shallow stretches between Kut and Baghdad.
The work of construction of a metre-gauge track between these two
towns was pushed forward with the utmost speed, all the rails and roll
ing stock being obtained from existing stocks in India, and the first
train ran through in August 1917. The river journey from Kut to
Baghdad, 216 miles, took two days. Baghdad could be reached by
train, a distance of 108 miles, in twelve hours. There is no doubt
that this prevented the development of a situation which might have
become serious, and it may be looked upon as one of the best technical
pieces of work carried out in Mesopotamia.
Very early in the campaign the shortage of shipping reacted on the
ouestion of supply. One great difficulty was the transport of vegetables
Supplies ^ ar S es w hich were unsuitable. The barges
attached to the river steamers were filled with
potatoes for instance. Troops had to be carried on these in addition
and large consignments arrived unfit for consumption.
The supply services were not at first alive to the local resources of
the country and all supplies came from India. Large quantities of rice
were obtainable locally but it was not till the end of 1915 that Indian
troops were asked whether they would consent to eat local rice. As
the latter was of a much inferior quality, they naturally chose the
Indian rice. All fuel had to be brought from India as the palm tree
proved too wet for combustion.
The Indian ration itself proved unsuitable. It had been fixed in
1912 on a scale sufficient for short frontier campaigns and had only been
slightly modified. In 1915 it was reported that the ration had certain
intrinsic defects and an enquiry was recommended into its caloric
value, vitamine content, and anti-scorbutic properties.
The British ration was increased and varied more easily, though
articles like butter and cheese arrived at the front in a highly active state
in the hot weather.
The original organization of Force " D " was on a lower medical
Medical basis than for a frontier campaign. The medical
organization in India did not admit of very rapid