"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٣‎٥] (٤٢٤/٧٥)

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1916 and the end of that year. Some were not ready for work till
January 1917.
If the situation in May 1915 was unsatisfactory, it was obviously
relatively much^worse in November 1915, with a greatly extended L. of C.
and the low water season. With two extra divisions coming from France
and our L. of C. extending up to Baghdad (presuming the advance to be
successful) the situation would have been impossible. To a certain
degree, this seems to have been realized ; for in November we find General
Nixon wiring to India that the transportation of the new divisions up
the river was bound to be slow. Taking these transportation difficulties
into account it is difficult to realize what induced General Nixon to
recommend the advance on Baghdad. It was a clear case of not cutting
jour coat according to your cloth. The situation was well summed up
by Sir W. Eobertson, then C. I. G. S. " In general, the operations were
■allowed, in 1915, to develop without proper regard to the vital questions
of supply and maintenance."
One other matter must be mentioned before leaving this question of
the advance on Baghdad—that of the strength and probable reinforce
ments of the Turks opposing us. It was agreed by England, India and
Mesopotamia that the Turkish troops opposing us numbered about 9,000
men.
The War Office calculated that perhaps 60,000 Turks could be opposing
us by the end of January 1916. This was wired out to India in a
^private" telegram to the Viceroy. This information was not forwarded
to General Nixon. Had it been sent on (21st October) it might have
changed General Nixon's views. The date by which the new divisions
could have arrived at Baghdad could have been worked out in detail.
It would have been a race as to whether our 2 divisions from France
•could have reached Baghdad before the Turks.
A few days before the battle of Ctesiphon, 22nd November, the War
Office wired that 30,000 troops under Khalil Pasha had left Bitlis for
Baghdad on the 16th October : and that Yon der Goltz was on his way to
Mesopotamia. General Nixon, however, refused to believe this informa
tion. To a certain extent, the news was true, for the 3rd composite
division (afterwards named the 51st) was actually present at the battle :
and by the middle of December the 52nd division had also arrived.
To sum up, the decision to advance to Baghdad seems to have been
arrived at without due consideration having been paid to essential factors.
The Home authorities were unaware of the river transport situation
and imagined it to be satisfactory : India knew the transport situation
but did not lay stress on this factor. General Nixon must have realized
the practical difficulties involved in maintaining the existing division at
the front and in transporting two new divisions to the front, but ap
parently lost sight of the difficulties in the glamour of Baghdad. The