"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢] (٤٢٤/٤٩)

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The 30th Brigade and 63rd Battery K. F. A. were then withdrawn,
to Basra.
Lack of dry ground in Basra was said to be one reason for not with
drawing the Cavalry Brigade. But General Nixon determined to use
General Gorringe's force to demonstrate to Bisaitin, as if prepared to
advance on Amara, in connection with the forthcoming operations
of the 6th Division.
The authorities at Home and in India seem, at this time, to have
been rather at cross-purposes with regard to the role of I. E. F. " D."
On the 23rd May, the Indian Government wired to the Secretary
of State saying that Sir J. Nixon proposed to take the offensive up the
Tigris at Qurna : that he would not advance beyond Amara without
the Secretary of State's sanction : and requesting permission for the
proposed move.
On the same day the Secretary of State wired his sanction. But
he appears to have been annoyed with General Nixon. " Arrange
ments for the move in question must have been made some days back,
and I am of opinion that General Nixon should have submitted his pro
posals before the last moment."
General Nixon was also to understand that no reinforcements were
available. This was rather hard perhaps on General Nixon, who had
been discussing the proposed move with India for some weeks.
The two telegrams were repeated to General Nixon. He, not unna
turally, thought the orders of the Secretary of State and of the Indian
Government did not seem to tally. Accordingly on the 25th, he sent
a long wire to India asking for definite orders as to whether the occu
pation of Nasiriya and Amara was to be carried out, in order to obtain
control of the Basra Vilayet; because the orders given to him on assump
tion of command and the policy now laid down by the Secretary of
State did not appear to agree.
He ended up by stating that it was not his intention to advance
beyond Nasiriya and Amara. The reply from India was to the effect
that it was not considered that the orders were conflicting but rather
that the Secretary of State wished to emphasise that no reinforcements
would be sent.
General Nixon then continued with his preparations for the Qurna
poerations.
The force was under the command of Major-General C. V. Townshend,,
C.B., D.S.O., who had by now assumed command of the 6th Division.
The country for some distance to the north of Qurna was under water.
Only here and there a yellow sandhill stood up above the flood. The
main Turkish position was on a sand ridge at Abu Aran, some 8 miles,
from our advanced position at Qurna. In front of this position was a
curtain of small islands more or less on the line of a creek known as the