"ملخص عن التدابير البحرية في الخليج العربي، ١٨٦٢-١٩٠٥" [‎١‎٥] (٦٤/٢٣)

15
received from the Commodore at Bombay on the 9th of March was, that the only
vessel at his disposal was for the moment in dock, but that it was hoped she
would be ready tor sea by the end of the month, when she would be at once des
patched to Aden to watch the progress of events.
13. In the beginning of December 1867, Colonel Pelly called the attention
Poiiticai proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 137- of Government to a serious breach of the
39 ' _ peace which had just taken place in the
Persian Gulf at the instigation of the Chiefs of Aboothabee and Bahrein. He
animadverted on the fact that the Hugh Rose, which was not able to run under
steam more than eight hours consecutively, and which was manned by a native
crew was the only vessel at hand for enforcing peace amongst his turbulent neigh
bours. Notwithstanding the weakness of his position he advised that Aboothabee
should be blockaded, in order that the Chief and his tribesmen might be debarred
from the pearl fishery, and so be put to sensible loss ; but the Government of Bom
bay at once replied that such a course, however desirable, was out of the question
when there was not the means to carry it through efficiently. Every available
ship on the station had been sent to Annesley Bay in connection with the
Abyssinian Expedition ; but the want was so imperative, that the Government of
India at once enquired from Commodore Helth whether he could not detach one
vessel from his squadron.
14. Meanwhile the Shah of Persia, who was utterly without the power to
Political Pio:eedings 1 June .868, No,. ,..-.6. P r0teCt ^ sub jeCts' property at sea, had
been cogitating over the expediency of
obtaining from Europe some small ships of war, and in the end had inclined to
the plan suggested by Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran of getting out armed
steamers at intervals from England and having them commanded by English
officers. But to this project the Supreme Government saw objections, and in
the interests of Persia, equally with those of India, recommended the establish
ment of a small marine force exclusively for operations in and about the Persian
Gulf. " Such a force," it was remarked in the despatch on the subject, " would
more effectually secure the Shah's real interest than any force of his own, while
it would give stability to our ascendancy in the Gulf, which, ever since the aboli
tion of the local navy, there has been some risk of our losing, and would exclude
all pretext for the intervention of other powers. * » « It is chiefly from
the absence of such a force that present political complications between the Gov
ernments of Persia and Maskat and between several of the maritime tribes have
arisen, and it is in our opinion impossible for the peace of the Gulf to be maintained
and trade protected unless the Resident at Bushire has at his command the
means of enforcing the terms of the maritime truce. The question is one of vital
importance to our political position in the Gulf, and it is matter of much regret to
us that, when the Indian Navy was abolished, some special arrangements were
Letter from Colonel Pelly to the i-ovemment of not made by the maintenance of a small
Bombay, No. 96 of 1808, paragraph jo. force for the protection of our interests in
these seas." The question was referred for the opinion of the Lords of the
Secret despatch No. 15, dated December ^b, Admiralty and the Secretary of State for
1868, with enc osures. Foreign Affairs, both of whom were oppos
ed to any change in the existing system. The old arguments which led to the
abolition of the Indian Navy were reiterated, and a further point was raised, that
it was of importance for vessels of war, which might at any time be brought
into contact with vessels of other European Powers visiting Indian Seas, to be
under the direct control of the Government at home, and under the responsibility
of the Senior Naval Officer of the station. The Secretary of State for India,
however, left it for the consideration of the Supreme Government whether a cer
tain number of gun-boats commissioned by the Admiralty, and manned mostly
by lascars, and native marines, but under the orders of the Indian authorities,
might not answer the purpose. He had reasons to believe that such a measure,
if acceptable to the Viceroy and his Council, would meet with no opposition at
home.
14-A. As regards the ambition of the Shah of Persia to purchase gunboats,
p..,. 1A . tC <-o M ( 0 the Minister at Teheran was told that he
Political A., jun« 1S08, Nos lio-io. 1 ^ 1 t 11^,,.,
should endeavour to dissuade the Shah from