"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [‎٢‎٣] (٣٢/٢٥)

17. At the beginning of June, Fakhri reporte l that the supplies of the 2nd Composite Force and th-
Heiaz Expeditionary Force would be exhausted at the end ot June and duly lespectivey, w n e i<
Medina date crop (known to be about 2,000,000 kilos) would not be available until >epteni kt .
18. At the beginning of July, when reporting the evacuation of Mudowere to Damascus, bakhn
explained that, in his opinion,- the low morale of the troops, which could alone account for such m urnous
conduct, was due primarily to the non-arrival of reinforcements and to the lailure ol the lurkish Uighei
ilJommand to reopen railway communication between the Ilejaz Fxpeditionarv 1 ok earn 1 it nuit i, , ,,
19. About the same date, Fakhri reported that it was his opinion that the Medina orct ung it jus >o (
out to the beginning of September (new date harvest), but he feared that the 2nd Composite 1 oice would be
unable to do so. lie complained' bitterly of the fact that, no attempt had yet been made to reopen bis
communications with the north, and could only look forward to the futme wiih t i O !-,i<i\est .inxu a.
20. At the middle of July, Fakhri was ordered to take over with his mounted troops the Maan—
Modowere section of the railway, but refused on the grounds that no further reduction could be ma(.e with
safety in the Medina garrison where his mounted troops were his only mobile reserve ; that until the railway
was repaired mobile troops could not be maintained in the Maan—Mudowere area where was neither water
nor grazing, and, lastly, that the animals of these troops were earmarked as Medina s last reserve ot tood.
21. On the 17th July, Fakhri made a strong appeal to Liman von Sanders, General Omcer ( ommanding.
Yelderem, in the course of which he asked that the llnd Army Corps should be temporarily put under his
command, and that the Damascus line of communication railway transport department and the ilejaz
railway administration should be placed definitely and directly under his orders. He cons.dered that, only
by the prompt adoption of these measures could the present very critical situation be saved, and was o.
the opinion thai his force had b^en disgracefully neglected. , . f
22. At the beginning of August, Fakhri reported that the Hejaz Expeditionary l orce were so sh< rt o
fuel that even if the railway was repaired it was doubtful if trains would get through to Medina.
23. On the 10th August, Fakhri despatched a message of farewell, as m yiew of the fall of Mudowere
(captured by two companu s Imperial Camel Corps on the 8th August), he considered Medina oome .
21. On the 11th August, the purchasing officer of the Hejaz Expeditionary torce in Damascus received
orders (from Fakhri ?) to dose his accounts and make no further purchases. _
On the same day, Fakhri was very despondent of the situation of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and
considered disaster was pending. This he attributed to shortage of fuel, slowness in repairing the railway
north of Maan, lack of decision regarding the Maan—Mudowere section, the fact that \elderem had omitted
to send reinforcements and had not placed the llnd Army Corps under his orders, lack of barley, wheat and
money, and his inability to reinforce any of his garrisons to the north owing to shortage ot troops in
Medina. ^ in , the next few mon ths no improvement was likely. The cnly mobile troops at his
disposal were a camel mounted regiment and machine-gun company (310 combatants and 29- camels) and a
mule mounted regiment and machine-gun company (195 combatants, 29 mules, /8 camels). hese could not
be spared for duty north of Tebuk. as they were the only reserve leit tor the Medina area. He prelcried to
surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Arabs at Medina. ^ 11
The above message was apparently despatched to Enver Fash a, who replied sharing 1-aklins views on
the difficulty of the Ileiaz Kxneditionary Force undertaking active operations and consi ieied that the onus
of responsibility of reopening the railway was on Yelderem, and not the Hejaz Expeditionary l orce, and
owing to the comparative calm on the Falestine front this should not be impossible.
G kneral S taff,
ols< August, 1918.
APPENDIX N.
ENEMY CASUALTIES.
The following figures of enemy casualties since the outbreak of the revolt up to the end of
August, 1918, are taken from various sources, but mainly based on Arab claims:
Killed.
W ounded.
Prisoners.
Guns.
Machine guns.
Officers.
Rank and file.
4,697
871
230
8,919
50
59
With reference to the number of prisoners captured. General Wingate reported that since the outbreak
of the revolt to the end of July, 1918, 5,827 prisoners of war had been sent from the Hejaz lor internment
The Arabs claim the following destruction to the railway line up to the end of August:
Engines.
Trucks.
Kails.
Bridges and culverts.
15
29 (?)
28,692
207