"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [‎٢‎٢] (٣٢/٢٤)

APPENDIX M.
r
FAK IIllI PASHA AT MEDINA.
The followino summary of messages shows a consistent attitude of despondency on the part of l* akhri
Pasha commanding; at Medina since the autumn of It is probable that he has sometimes exagg-erated
his troubles, as the vitality of his garrison has proved, but it is obvious that he can have little hope of being
relieved in the absence of some drastic change in the situation. ^
1. On the 4th October, 1917. Fakhri informed the Oeneral Officer Commanding Syria and Western
Arabia that his wheat and food supplies were all but exhausted. Applications to the lines of communication
had not been replied to and he stated he could not rely on the Hejaz railway. Owing to the approach of
winter he considered his situation serious, and unless considerable quantities of stores were sent him forth
with would become dangerous.
In reply he was told he was responsible for the fuel in his area and in case of necessity authorised to
demolish the buildings in Medina, with the exception of the Holy buildings. On the 2fitli October Fakhri
reported he had only one month's food left in Medina, and that the date crop, on which his hopes for
supplies were based, "had been destroyed by a storm.
2. About the same time Fakhri despatched a message to the Une Commissaire General at Damascus
pointing out bow the arrangements for feeding Medina had broken down ; and that the reserve of bread at
Vledina^finished on the 2 ( Jth Octoter. He despaired of ever receiving enough supplies at Medina, and put
the whole mural responsibility for the full of Medina (if it did fall) on the lines of communication and the
Line Commissaire (General. i ,
3. About the beginning of November Fakhri pointed out to the Turkish Higher Command the futilily
of sending him anything by rail and declared himseif besieged.
4. On the 10th November Jemal I. informed Fakhri of the Turkish defeat on the Gaza—Bir Saba line
and that in the event of the fall of Jerusalem it was intended to evacuate the Uejaz Expeditionary Force
from Medina. On the 11th a further message was sent him asking how long he could hold out should the
Medina force be abandoned. Fakhri replied somewhat acridly, asking whether the decision for evacuating
Medina rested with him or the Khalif. ^ .
o. At this time there was a good deal of bitterness in the correspondence between Kakhn and Jemal 1.
\bout the end of October Fakhri informed Jemal that it was no good sending food to Medina unless the
Arabs were kept off the line; Jemal later replied that Fakhri was responsible for this, to which Fakhri
replied bitteily that if he had suflicient force left to keep the line clear he would not have sent his original
message , , . . , , , ,
C. About the middle of November Fakhri was informed that the decision had been taken to evacuate
the Hejaz Expeditionary Force With the exception of a small garrison in Medina, and shortly afterwards he
was informed of the programme for carrying out the evacuation.
7. In a messio-e dated the 25th November Fakhri protested his inability to comply with orders issued
from Dama-cus fo^the withdrawal of his mounted troops, lie piayed that Jemal 1, "will not deprive him
of his means oi defence, as he has already deprived lion of his power to take the offensive, and so let the
Medina garrisonl)e trampied under the feet ol the enemy,"
H. In the.middle of December, 1917, the heavy troop movements from Damascus to Deraa dislocated the
I lejaz' programme. On the 20th December Colonel Ffaneustoil, director of railways, arrived at Medina,
^akhri was deeply impressed with the sympathetic hearing he received from lus guest, who " unlike the
Turks and Moslems, listened to my worries with great attention." Damascus resented this message, and
replied that it was due to the " Turks and Moslems " that Ptanensteil was sent to Medina '"for the sole
purpose of enquiring into the needs of the llejaz Expeditionary Force in his capacity as highest authority in
matters of railway transport/' . . , a,- • • .i u •
9. In January, HUH, according to information obtained from the rrench Mis^on in the Hejaz, peace
overtures were initiated by thn General Officer Commanding 2nd Composite Foice. and addressed to Sherif
Feisal. The Tumsh Commander (Atif Bey) was stated to have piopo^ed a general evacuation of the whole
of Arabia, provided the Arabs guaranteed entire freedom from molestation during evacuation. This report
was received witn all reserve. Atit Bey, the General Officer Commanding 2nd Composite Force, subsequently
was replaced at his own request. . , 1 .
1U. At the end of January, 1918, it was ascertained that it had been intended to combine oftensive
action by the llejaz Expeditionary Force with a movement northward on Tail and Mecca of the 21st Asir
Division, but this was iudefiueiily posti oned
11. In the middle of February, 191-s, lailhead was established at Juruf ed Derwish (north of Maan)and
Fakhri appealed to his lines of communication plticers to despatch goods consigned to Medina in spite of
orders from the Higher Command to the contrary.
12. On the loth March, Fakhri e-timated that 5,6G0 tons of food would be necessary to maintain for one
year the garrison which it was proposed to leave in Medina if and when the eval uation ot the Hejaz took;
plaCe i3. On the 13th April, the Hejaz Expeditionary Force was ordered to take over the districts of the 1st
and 2nd Composite Forces, who were ordered north, but Fakhri replied that such a move would be the
equivalent of presenting th ■ Hejaz Railway to the Arabs. . , , .
14. On the 3id May, Fakhri appeared to fully realise the grave situation in which tne 2nd Composite
Force and the Hejaz Expeditionary Force had been placed owing to the cutting of the railway in the Maan
area. He averred the position of Medina :.nd Tebuk was desperate, and resented the way he had been
treated by his superiors to whom he had again and again appealed lor leinforcements.
15. On the oth May, Fakhti was increasingly pessimistic concerning his situation. He reported that his
reserve of wheat and barley, were almost exhausted,"and that he had no troops to spare lor the repair ot the
damaged line. He slated he had clearly explained the position and the responsibility for any future disaster
must now lie with the IVth Army authorities. . n • ,,
16 On the IHth May, Fakhri was informed by Enver Pa-ha that the Hejaz Expeditionary rorce was
placed under Yelderem and ordered to hold Medina at all costs, while Yelderem were responsible for the
repair and protection of the Hejaz Railway as well as the provisioning of Medina.