"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [‎١‎٢] (٣٢/١٤)

12
2, All Hejaz wished it as a proof of independence, and as such it would help the Arab cause in general.
8. It was desirable to distinguish the new regime at Mecca from the old.state of dependence on the
Turks, and emphasize the return to the prior state of Sherilial independence. The Emir did not mean his new
title to imply any lordsbip over, or interference with, other Arabian Princes, and he loyally held to all
agreements with Great Britain. If the latter had any doubts of his good faith, he would demonstrate it by
not pressing his request. ^
There were obvious objections to His Majesty's Government recognizing a " King of the Arab nation."'
while that nation was still m posse only, and the prince who claimed such recognition, was very far
from being in a position to substantiate his pretension. Not only were our actual treaties and agreements
with other Arab princes a bar, but we could hardly have been expected to give what amounted to
a blank cheque on the political organization of Arabia in the future. Feeling that this title was a matter
about which consultation with our Allies (and especially the French Government) had to take place, before any
formal recognition in explicit terms could be given, and also that our relations to other Moslem princes and
peoples had to be considered carefully. His Majesty's Government instructed Colonel Wilson merely to send
a congratulatory telegram to Sherif Hussein. Finally the title recognized by His Majesty's Government
after discussion with their Allies was King of Ilejaz, and Hussein was not to be addresied as " His Majesty "
but as " His Lordship."
In January, lvU8, King Hussein again raised the question of his title and sought the recognition of His
Majesty's Government to the title of King of the Arabs, stating such recognition would benefit his cause
and help to refute enemy propaganda about the annexationist aims of the Entente Powers in Arab countries.
Karly in February, His Majesty's Government replied to this request by stating they were much touched
at the readiness and frankness with which King Hussein had caused to 'be forwarded to the High Com
missioners in Egypt a message from Jemal Pasha I. to Sherif Feisal and Gaafar Pasha {see Appendix 1).),
and that the policy of His Majesty's Government and their Allies was to stand for the cause of the liberation
of the oppressed nations and that they were determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for
the reconstrnctioa of an Arab world in which law should once again replace Ottoman violence. But tl e
actual question at issue was waived.
With reference to the letters of Jemal I. to King Hussein there appears to be no doubt that practically
since the outbreak of the Arab revolt the Turks had been despatching messages to Hussein and his son.^.
Whether all these messages duly arrived at their destination or not is unknown, but the first information
received by British authorities of such correspondence was in January, 11)18, when Hussein forwarded to the
High Commissioner in Cairo the letters from Jemal Pasha I. above mentioned. Hussein left the answer to
the High Commissioner, but informed his son Feisal that the official answer to the Turks should be that the
sword must be the sole arbiter between the Arabs and the Turks.
In June, 1918, Hussein informed the High Commissioner that an emissary bearing a letter from
Jemal II. had arrived at Feisal's headquarters stating that the writer was instructed by his Government to
communicate with the Arabs and accept just demands from them. King Hussein had telegraphed to
Feisal instructing him to reply in the same sense as on the occasion of the previous peace overtures, i.e., that
the " sword must decide." There is. however, irrefutable evidence that Sherif Feisal replied at once to thi?*
letter and was prepared to enter into " conversation " with Jemal II. This may merely have indicated a
desire to temporise.
In Jun», 1916, the Porte issued a proclamation deposing Sherif Hussein from the Emirate of Mecca and
on the 1st July, 1916, appointed in his place fcherif Ali Haidar (of the family pf Abd el Mutailib, Emir. i85i-56.
and 1881-82, and of the Dhuwwi Zeid clan, hostile to Hussein's clan of the Abaddah. Ali Haidar proceeded
to Damascus where he interested himself chiefly in propaganda work, he then proceeded to Medina where he
arrived on the 26th July, 1916, and on the 9th August issued a long diatribe against Hussein for having
thrown off the Turkish yoke, and on the 13th August wrote to Ibn Saud inciting him to take measures against
the Sherif Hussein.
Iu November, 1916, a literary deputation from Constantinople visited Medina.
Early in March, 1917, Ali Haidar left Medina with his three sons and made good his return to
Damascus.
ATiout April, 1918, information was received that a special mission to King Hussein was contemplated
by the Tuiks, its leader to be either the late or the present Sheikh el Islam. It was to go down to Medina
and thence try and get into touch with Mecca and make certain propositions to Hussein in the name of
Islam. Not much importance was attached to this mission by British authorities as it was realized that
owing to the state of the railway it had practically no chance of getting through, and no member is
believed to have proceeded beyond Deraa. The Sheikh el Islam returned home. The Grand Mufti of
Damascus who was a member of the mission and who probably knew better than his colleagues the state
of the railway opportunely fell ill and made no attempt to start for the south.
•APPENDIX B.
IBN SAUD, EMIR OF NEJD.
The Principality of Nejd was founded about 1745 by Mohammed ibn Saud, said to be of the Hasanah
tribe of the Anazah, and of honourable lineage. .He was the earliest important convert made by Mohammed
ibn Ahd el Wahhab, the ascetic levivalist of Hareimlah (Ayaina), and it was with his sword that Wahabism
was propagated throughout the Nejdean oases.
His son, Abd el Aziz, and his grandson, Saud, pushed religious conquest afield. Between 1784 and
1804 under Ibn Sand's ancestor Abdul Aziz, the Wahabis pillaged Iraq and Kerbela, exacted tribute from
Bahrein, threatened Oman, captured and purged Mecca, and pillaged Medina driving out the Turkish
representative. The sacking of Hodeida in the south was the furthest extension of the Wahabi power,
but in 1H10 a Wahabi army ravaged the Hauran and all but reached Damascus, whilst Sand's son, Abdul,
raided almost to Baghdad.
When Saud died in 1814 he was acknowledged by almost all Arabia except Yemen and the districts
south of the Great Desert. '