"ملف 7/4 شؤون الطيران وسلاح الجوّ" [ظ‎‎٦‎٥] (٥٠٦/١٣٧)

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Air operations, when carried out against an enemy whose existence is not
dependent on a highly organised civilisation, are liable if unduly protracted to creat
an attitude of sullen resignation. Consequently, as soon as there is reason to beliet 6
that the morale of the enemy is affected by the interference with his normal mode )f
life, then offensive air action should be temporarily suspended. An opportunity i
thus created for the enemy formally or informally to indicate whether the operation^
have effected a change in his attitude. If that is the case it should be our policy
to take immediate advantages of this change of heart to avoid any unnecessary
prolongation of air warfare. Otherwise the next stages in active operations are
more difficult since the enemy will probably leave his towns and villages and live in
the open or in caves. Air operations then become more difficult to undertake and
require a longer time to achieve results.
It is not, perhaps, appreciated that the air arm under these conditions exerts
pressure on an enemy in very much the same way as diplomacy. The power of the
• diplomat and of the air arm alike rest on the fact that the enemy does not know how
far we are prepared to go in order to attain our ends; nor does he know what steps
we will take to attain them. This close connection between political force and air
power entails the necessity for the most intimate co-operation between the political
authority and the Air Officer Commanding.
3. The Importance of 11 Intelligence."
Just as early and accurate information based on a sound intelligence organisation I
is essential to political authorities to enable them to achieve results, so the Air Officer i
Commanding is dependent on his intelligence service if he is to obtain a quick,
economical and humane success.
When land forces are employed for punitive operations, their movements are
probably limited to the speed of a camel, or of a horse or a man. If air forces are
employed, moving 20 times faster than the older arms, then it is essential that the
speed with which they receive information should be similarly accelerated. To make
the fullest use of air power, an enemy or a disturber of the peace living 200 or 300
miles away from an air force, must be made to feel that any act of insurrection or
violence will meet with retribution within 12 to 24 hours of its commission. The
offender must not be allowed to feel, as he will if land forces are employed, that s
punishment will tarry and that he may be able to use the interval to evade it. Even
if the case is one in which the Political authority decides that bombing would not be
justified, the air arm should still be made use of, to enable the Political authorities
to reach the scene of the trouble and to deal with the matter on the spot within a few
hours of it arising. If full use is made of air communications to speed up the
diplomatic and administrative action, much can be done to obviate the trouble
spreading, and a small misdemeanour can be prevented from developing into a rising
on a large scale, and this speeding up is dependent upon a fullv organized intelligence
system.
4. Necessity for swiftness of decision and action in times both of negotiations and
active operations.
The essential characteristic of the air arm is rapidity of action; this depends
not only upon a quick and accurate Intelligence Service, but also on quick decision to
initiate air action. It is of the highest importance once the necessary authority is
obtained that the local political officer should come to a prompt decision, in 1
conjunction with the Air Officer Commanding, both on the initiation of air action
and on its extension when the situation demands it within the limit of his
instructions.
5. Limitations of Air power.
The air arm is essentially an offensive weapon and can do little towards
defenaing a country if its actions are confined to the tactical defensive. For the
success of air operations aircraft must have room for manoeuvre, and so be in a
position to locate and attack an enemy some hours before he has reached a position
where he can do harm. It is, therefore, important, once it has been decided to
initiate air action, not to tie down the aircraft to narrow geographical limits.
Air Staff, November 21, 1928.