"تقارير إدارية ١٩٠٥-١٩١٠" [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٩] (٦١٦/٤٤٣)

22
ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
on the 13tli July and conveyed to him a formal warning from their Legations
that he would be held personally responsible for the damage to foreign per
sons or property resulting from any attack on Shiraz brought about by him,
and strict orders forbidding any advance by Sowlet, Kawam or the Lari
Seyyid were obtained from him.
The immediate pressure was relieved by the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan
which was received with the greatest enthusiasm- On the 18th July, however,
the Sipahdar and Sardar Assad telegraphed announcing their own appoint
ments as Minister respectively of War and Interior, and Asaf-ed-Dowleh at
once claimed that the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan was cancelled by the revo
lution. His hopes were however shortlived, Ala-ed-Dowleh being appointed
on the 1st July. The Legation had previously been informed that it was a
sine qua non for Ala-ed-Dowleh's success that he should paralyse the opposi
tion which his appointment would certainly arouse by an immediate depar
ture for Shiraz, but unfortunately he hesitated in Tehran until too late. On
the news of his appointment Sowlet announced his determination to occupy
Shiraz, to destroy the enemies of the constitution, and maintain himself by
force of arms against his life-long enemy Ala-ed-Dowleh. On July 25th his
definite departure for Shiraz with a large force was reported from Abadeh,
and on the 26tL Kawam-ul-Muik left Shiraz for the Arab camp some 40 miles
distant.
As serious fighting in and about Shpaz appeared to be imminent, I
considered it necessary to call for reinforcements for the Consular guard,
arrangements for which had been made in anticipation, and on the same day,
the 25th, at four hours' notice, the following left Bushire for Shiraz Lieut
enant Crosthwaite, I. A., Lieutenant Lang, R.N., Assistant Surgeon White,
I.S.M.D., one Native officer, a Sergeant and three privates of the Royal
Marines with an armourer's mate, R.N., and a Maxim gun, 5 sowars and
36 sepoys.
In view of the extreme importance of the force arriving before Sowlet
reached SHiraz, it was unfortunately imperative that in spite of the extreme
heat they should press on as fast as possible, and thlis made the march, at the
worst possible season of the year, over a road the difficulty of which is pro-
verbiaf, a very severe trial of endurance, which was unfortunately not accom
plished without loss of life, two sepoys dying of heat stroke at Konartakhteh
on July 28th.
Under the- extremely adverse circumstances the arrival of the detach
ment at Shiraz, on August 2nd, must be considered a remarkably creditable
piece of work. There were only two actual invalids, both sepoys, who soon
recovered. Meanwhile, Mr. Christmas, Indo-European Telegraph Depart
ment, had gone out to endeavour to delay Sowlet's arrival until after that of
the detachment, in which he was completely successful, and after the entry
of Lhe latter, I went out to try and persuade Sowlet not to enter Shiraz at
all. He could not be brought to this, but consented to delay his entry for
three days, during which the situation became sensibly calmer, especially as
it became clear that the Arabs were not coming up to the scratch. Eventually
on August 5th, he came in with a small body of horsemen, leaving his main
body in camp some ten miles out, and after a long conversation with the
Ministers he announced the appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh as Governor-
General. This remained however unconfirmed and matters remained in statu
quo till Saham-ed-Dowleh's appointment on the 12th. During this period
Sowlet's relations with the Consulate were of a very friendly character, and
though the Kashgais made themselves unpopular by depredation on gardens
and crops, their behaviour was not bad on the whole, and there was no serious
fracas. He finally left the neighbourhood of Shiraz on the 14th, on which
date the bazaars were fully opened for the first time since the disorders
began.
From these events two conclusions, of importance may be drawn, which
are probably generally valid although circumstances might occur to modify
them. The first is that the Arabs will not fight the united Kashgais, at any
rate for the " beaux yeux " of the Kawami brothers; and the second is that the
Kashgais are at present more united in submission to Sowlet -ed-Dowleh than