"تقارير إدارية ١٩٠٥-١٩١٠" [ظ‎‎٦‎٠] (٦١٦/١٢٥)

10
REVIEW BY THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF»
succeeded in establishing himself at the coast, could not the British Government
he argued, come to an understanding with him which would give him the
benefit of the maritime Truce of which they were the time-honoured custodians
and as in the case of Shaikh Mubarak, afford him immunity against attack
from the Turks by sea? As for the interior he expressed himself sanguine of his
ability to cope with any attempted Turkish advance, whether from Shammar in
the north or the Hejaz in the west.
With fresh experience of the great trepidation inevitably caused among
the Chiefs of the Trucial Coast by threatened or actual attempts on the part
of an unfriendly Wahabi Ruler in Nejd to re-establish the position of his forebears
in Oman, and the practical difficulties resulting therefrom to the "Residency and
the Grovemment of India, of which last year's Administration reports record suffi-
cient indication and while deprecating the conclusion of any specific agreement with
the Wahabi on the lines now desired by him, the Resident would have welcomed
from some points of view the inauguration of such friendly intercourse as would
have made possible the exchange of friendly and informal communications with Bin
Saood when occasion arose, whether in regard to Trucial Coast matters, piracies
or other commercial or administrative questions in connection with which
the Arab might be expected to be concerned or helpful. His Majesty's Govern-
ment however after fully considering the problem decided that there was not
sufficient justification for any departure from the policy of absolute aloofness
hitherto pursued by them in regard to the affairs of Nejd, and determined to make
no specific response to Bin Saood's present representation. The Political Agents
at Koweit and Bahrein were accordingly directed to let Shaikhs Mubarak and
Jasim bin Thani know when opportunity offered, that the overtures of Bin Saood
received through them, were not such as could be entertained by His Majesty's
Government.
It will be noted from Major Knox's report that for the present Nejd is almost
clear of Turkish troops; and indeed the same ill success which the Porte has
experienced in Yemen may be said to have hitherto attended them on a smaller
scale in Central Arabia.
But the rapid advance of the Hejaz Railway Line is gradually outflanking
Nejd from the west, while the darkening shadow of the Baghdad Railway threa
tens from the north. So it is difficult to see at present how in the absence of
gome diversion in its favour. Central Arabia is to escape ultimate absorption by
the Turk. This is a problem upon which it is perhaps needless to speculate
here, suffice it to say that the fortunes of Bin Saood and of Nejd will as time goes
on be watched with lively and increasing concern by every native ruler on the
shore of the Arab Peninsula from Maskat to Koweit.
A review of Koweit affairs can hardly be complete without a reference to
the Arms Traffic, of which however the Political Agent's report gives no special
details. It is one of those important questions, a convenient juncture for promi
nently raising which, for the reasons before stated, has not yet arrived. There is un
fortunately no room for doubt that the Shaikh's prohibition is entirely a dead
letter, and that the introduction of arms into Koweit is actively encouraged;
but the problem cannot be considered or dealt with independently of the cog
nate question originating with Maskat, and probably pending the meeting
of the promised conference of 1908 it will be wisest to postpone any formal dis
cussion of the question with the Shaikh. The results of that conference will
doubtless demonstrate the lines on which future measures for the suppression
of the traffic can best be directed. 1
P. Z. COX, Major,
Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.