"تقارير إدارية ١٩٠٥-١٩١٠" [ظ‎‎٥‎٩] (٦١٦/١٢٣)

^ REVIEW BY THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULP.
the Shaikh, which is now as cordial as it is ever likely to be in the case of Shaikh
Esa ; on the other hand the atmosphere prevalent in the sphere of general politics
has made it advisable for us to postpone forward action for the time through
out the Gulf region, and, in Bahrein, to leave for a more convenient juncture
the disposal of several important questions which might otherwise have
been fpund possible of earlier adjustment.
The Political Agent's report is comprehensive and calls for little detailed
comment.
It will be noted with satisfaction that the volume of trade of the port of
Manama is still on the increase; but that the pearl market last season was very
slack, with the result that several large speculators in pearls from Bahrein and
the Arab Coast lost heavily, including Shaikh Jasim bin Thani of Katar who
is believed to have bought pearls, with borrowed money to the value of 80 lakhs
of rupees and to have burnt his fingers badly in getting rid of them.
Ahmed bin Salman, the notorious outlaw of the Bahrein family, still flourishes
undismayed, but during the past season did not succeed in effecting any serious
depredations.
It is unsatisfactory to find that Bahrein is quickly establishing its reputa
tion as a convenient entrepot for the distribution of contraband arms through
the small ports of the Persian littoral. No doubt there was always reason to
believe that a certain amount of arms did filter across from Bahrein, but the
investigations of the past year indicate that in spite of the disingenuous complaint
in connection with the Arms Trade formulated by Shaikh Esa in the memorial
submitted by him to Government in October 1906, an organised industry on a
considerable scale now exists, and even warrant the conjecture that the existence
of this lucrative contraband trade not only in arms but other highly taxed or
contraband articles is one of the main factors of Shaikh Esa's extraordinary un
willingness to allow any supervision or revision of his Customs Administration
even on terms which prima facie would be extremely advantageous to him.
Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed after repeated but ineffectual endeavours to obtain
permission to return to Bahrein appears now to have become more resigned to
exile; and certainly little interest is taken in his affairs in Bahrein itself.
X.—KOWEIT.
Hitherto our policy in regard to Koweit has necessarily been conducted
on cautious and indulgent lines, the endeavours of the local officers
being directed towards gaining the Shaikh's personal confidence and gradually
strengthening British influence with him and his subjects; rather on the prin
ciple of casting bread upon the waters that it may return to us again when
we are more in need of it. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubarak maintains his reputa
tion as the most astute and longsighted chief in these waters, and although he
is undoubtedly inclined to be capricious in business matters, it is impossible for
the Resident and Political Agent to maintain with him that influence which may
at any moment prove an important asset, except by taking the risk of imposing
a certain measure of frank confidence in his good faith and in the continued
existence in his mind of the firm belief that his interests are identical with those
of the British Government and that he must look to them for advice and support
in his difficulties. ,
So far, in spite of some minor disappointments and occasional scares, generally
emanating from Turkish sources, he has not given serious, cause for anxiety, and
though his absence from Koweit last year (ostensibly in connection with the grie
vous illness of his son) during Admiral Sir Edmund Poe's visit was no doubt
open to misconstruction, yet the exceedingly frank and substantial welcome
which he accorded to Commodore Sir George Warrender and the Resident just
after the close of the present year shows clearly enough that our relations with
him are fundamentally healthy and our policy towards him directed along the
right lines.
For the same reasons that have influenced us in other directions, all delicate
external questions affecting Koweit have been left in convenient abeyance.
Thus it is that the Shaikh's jurisdiction in the direction of the Khor Ab
dullah still remains undefined and that exiguous Turkish garrisons are still