"مذكرة قصيرة حول بدء حملة بلاد الرافدين والصعوبات التي واجهتها ونتائجها" [ظ‎‎٤] (١٠/٨)

6
i5- Iscal Feeling. —Local feeling in occup ed districts has not affected the
course of operations. Arab hostility has however been marked on all occas ons
where operations were not in our favour, has caused anxiety as to security of com
munications from time to time, and has caused a portion of the fighting forces to
be detached from time to time to deal with it.
16. Religims complications. —While local feeling can be dealt with accord
ing to the needs of the s'tuation, a feature of the campaign has been the marked
avers : on of certain sections of the Muhammadan elements of the Indian army to
fighting the Tur s. The feeling has shown itself in desertions and in refusals to
fight ; and, though by no means general, its effect has been to lower the con
fidence of both leaders and men in their Muhammadan comrades. 1 he difficu ty
has been met in part by the removal of trans-frontier Pathans to other theatres,
but it has been a source of preoccupation which has added to the difficulties of
the authorities in Mesopotamia.
* 7. The result of the operations conducted under these difficulties has been
as follows: —
The original objective was attained successfully and speed ly.
The retention of the occup ed area entailed defens ve operations, which
eventually led to the effective occupation of the Basrah Yitayet, after a series of
unbroken though hardly-won successes.
The advance to Baghdad, never contemplated in the org'nal policy, and
therefore carried out with insufficient preparation, fa led after a we 1 conducted
advance, a hard fought action, and Withdrawal to Kut in the face of superior
numbers. Nevertheless th s operation resu ted strategically in so reducing the
Turkish force in the Caucasus as to assist materially the Russian advance on
Erzerum ; and politically in placing Persia on our side and keeping Afghanistan
quiet.
The operations for the relief of Kut, though unsuccessful and costly, have
ended by leaving our forces on the Tigns in a forward position which—
(j) Effectually protects Nasiriyah from attack, except by a difficult and
hitherto unused line
{it) Thereby secures the who^ of the Basrah Viloyct.
(Hi) Prevents Turkish access to Southern Pusht-i-Kuh and the
oilfields.
(*») Places us in a posit on now to hold the enemy's forces opposite us,
to prevent undue detachment of force towards Persia or the
Caucasus and to take full advantage of any opportunity for a
forward move, thus co-operating effectually with the Russians.
That greater results were not attained may, it is considered, be found, not
in physical or strategical difficulties (which appear in some form or other in
every theatre) but in the lack of definite policy which has hampered preparation
and execution.
18. To sum up—in the first instance the limited object of the Mesopotamian
campaign was successfully attained. After the failure of the Gallipoli undertaking,
the greater importance of the Mesopotamian operations and the policy then and
since adopted of keeping as high up the Tigris as possible has produced strategi
cal results of great advantage to British interests in the East, while ensuring
effective co-operation with our Russian allies and in a thoroughly effective way
preserving tranquillity in India and on its border.
The result has only been secured by the employment of Indian military
resources to an extent which, as shown above, created real risks in India for the
whole period since the commencement of the war, during the most critical period
of which India also carried out the most successful and extensive operations
undertaken on the frontier since 1897.
SiQtQGSB—roo—9-9-16—C1CBP Ritnla