"تقارير إدارية ١٩٢٠-١٩٢٤" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٨] (٤١٢/٣٢١)

6S
annttal report op the
reforms into the administration. It was felt that misrule having reached such
a pitch, our failure (as protecting power) to correct abuses, might be unfavour
ably commented upon in neighbouring Shia countries.
In the meantime the Sunni tribes, together with most of the ruling family,
had determined to make desperate efforts to coerce the Shias into submis
sion. An armed, and entirely unprovoked attack took place upon the Shi a
village of Barbar, carried out by the Dowasir tribe. Several persons were
wounded, property was looted, and women molested.
The Ruler made no attempt to obtain redress for the injured, and leaders
of the Shia community who appealed to him were threatened with further re
prisals should agitation continue. Outrages on Shias, continued in the out
lying villages, for which nobody was punished or arrested. Religious hatred,
always most acute in Bahrain, not unnaturally became intensified. The Persian
community sympathised with their co-religionists the Baharaneh, while the
Najdi community were bitterly opposed to them.
In May, riots occurred in the T^wn of Manameh between Najdis and
Persians, resulting in several deaths and many wounded. It was established
that the riots were, without doubt, premeditated- and instigated by one Abdulla
A1 Qosaibi who was acting temporarHy (in the absence of his brother Abdul
Aziz Qosaibi) as the Agent in Bahrain of the Sultan" of Nejd. There were
strong grounds for supposing that he would not have dared to adopt such a line
without being assured of, at least, the tacit approval of the Sultan.
ft was firmly believed by Shaik Easa and others that, in view of Abdulla>
Qosaibi's position as the Sultan's agent, no action would be taken against him.
Had this, in fact, been the case, the door would have been opened to Najdis to
combine with the Sunnis to coerce Shias and to interfere, in innumertble ways,,
in the internal affairs of Bahrain..
Such action would have the approval of the Sultan of Najd, ostensibly
on religious grounds, inasmuch as it would assist his co-religionists, but in
reality, in furtherance of what has manifestly become his policy in regard to
Arab states in the Gulf r namely to gradually reduce them to a state of subser-
vince to Najd by interference in their internal affairs. Qatar has become,
for all practical purposes, a province of Najd, by such means and signs have not
been lacking of a smilar policy at Oman and elsewhere.
During the disturbances in Manameh, the Dowasir tribe again took the
law into their hands, and in pursuance of the- policy advocated by Shaik Easa
and his wife, carried out an unprovoked attack on the village-of AIL The
attack took place by day with flags flying, and not attempt at concealment.
Several persons were killed, the village looted and women raped.
The situation was not devoid of serious possibilities, it being impossible
to guage to what extent Najd support might be forthcoming for the Dowasir,
who had let it be known, that they had been promised assistance. Shaik Hamad,
who had at his disposal no more than a handful of ill-armed fidaWis, themselves
Najdis, was obviously unable to take any steps to control the situation.
On May 17th the Honourable the Political Resident arrived in .the mail,
and His Majesty 's Ships " Thiad " and " Crocus " also reached Bahrain. ^ Pro
tracted negotiations took place with the Ruler, Shaik Easa bin 'Ali. In view of
the Shaik's advanced age, and manifest inability to rule, lit alone deal with the
difficulties inseparable from the introduction of reforms. His Majesty's Govern
ment desired that Shaik Easa should hand over full powers^ including control
of the Revenue, to his heir-apparent, Shaik Hamad bin Easa, retaining, as a
matter of courtesy, the little of ruber. Shaik Easa as had been his custom
1'or years past, proved quite intractable and resolutely refused advice tendered'
him both by the Resident and his own sons. He was finally informed that
Government had no recourse, in the interests of his country, and the peace of
the islands, but to transfer the active conduct of affairs together with control
of the Revenues, to Shaik Hamad.
Shaik Easa accepted the situation with an ill grace; and has never ceased
to associate himself with all who are opposed to Shaik Hamad, and to en
courage discontented members of the family and the Sunni Headmen, in any
form of agitation, or attempts to coerce the Shias to assist him, which action
he fondly imagines, may force Government to once more place the conduct ot
affairs in his hands, a contingency which is manifestly impossible, but which
Shaik Easa, and still more, his wife, are incapable of realising to be the case.