تقارير إدارية من الخليج العربي ١٨٨٣/١٨٨٤ – ١٩٠٤/١٩٠٥ [و‎‎٣‎٦] (٦٠٢/٧٦)

EESIDENCT AND MUSCAT POLITICAL AGENCY FOE 1884-85.
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found himself unable to carry out, as Shehab-ul-Dm was too vigilant aud well guarded, until
the arrival of Jorge D'Albuquerque, who, being on his way out from Lisbon with a fleet of ten
ships, had received instructions at Mozambique from the Viceroy to meet him at Muscat, and who
at this juncture put in at Kilhat. A stratagem devised by Duarte Mendes was agreed to by
Albuquerque, and a small force having been landed in the town, the Governors house was
attacked in the night. The plan, however, failed. The Portuguese were repulsed by the Persians
and overpowered, and the house in which they took refuge was set on fire. After a severe
struggle aud heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, they were rescued by a fresh party
from the fleet. Shehab-ul-Dm remained uncaptured and triumphant.
Shortly after, in the beginning of the following year, 1520, the Viceroy, Diago Lopes de
Siqueira, anchored at Muscat, and after an enquiry censured and condemned the whole proceed
ings, and put Duarte Mendes in irons. The Viceroy then proceeded on to Hormuz with a few
galleys, leaving Albuquerque in charge of the major portion of the fleet at Muscat. Fifteen
Portuguese, who had been taken prisoners and carried inland from Kilhat, were recovered by
Albuquerque in wretched plight, but no attempt seems to have been made to avenge the disaster.
In the next year, only seven years after the fall of Hormuz and the death of the great con
quistador, a concerted insurrection took place at Hormuz and along the Arabian shores from
Bahrein to Kilhat, and the garrisons were taken so completely by surprise that it was only by
chance and by their own marvellous valour that their entire annihilation was not accomplished.
The cause of this revolt, according to the Portuguese officers on the spot, was the dissatisfaction
felt by the King at their interference in the arrangements of the Customs House and general
supervision of the revenue, a measure lately introduced under orders from Lisbon. By this
control a number of favourites and parasites lost their sinecures, and a good deal of wasteful
expenditure and peculation was no doubt prevented. But the proximate and predominating
cause was without question the greed, insolence, and oppression of the Portuguese officials,
who made no scruple of taking advantage of their strength and of helping themselves as they
pleased. The plan of the massacre was elaborately worked out and decided upon by the King
and his ministers, and when all was ready, letters were despatched to the Persian Governors of
dependencies on the Arab coast with orders to rise against the Portuguese in their towns on
the appointed day and spare none. The rising was therefore general, and from its taking place
simultaneously, there was no opportunity of the Portuguese fleeing from one point to another.
A stratagem was devised to get rid of the Portuguese armada constantly stationed at Hormuz
to support the Commandant. The King, pretending that the dependencies on the Oman coast
were being ravaged by pirates, requested Dom Garcia to despatch the armada to protect them ;
this was on the eve of the rising, and the Commandant unsuspectingly issued the necessary
orders to the Captain-Major, Manoel deSouza Tavares. The latter, however, took two only out
of the four ships at his disposal and set sail for Muscat. The revolt occurred on the 30th Novem
ber 1521, and commenced with an attack by the Shah Bandar on the two vessels left in the
harbour at midnight. The crews were overcome, and a fire signal having been lighted in board
the captured vessels, a massacre ensued of the Portuguese residents in the city, who were asleep on
their beds, unsuspicious of evil. About sixty Portuguese were slain and captured by the Persian
troops and populace, and the remainder took refuge in the fort, which was bravely defended by
the garrison until succour arrived from India. In the dependencies the King's plan was faith
fully carried out by the Governors. At Bahrein the Christians were attacked, and the factor
Buy Bale was tortured and crucified. At Sohar very few, if any, escaped the massacre that took
place. In Muscat alone the Portuguese found friends and protection. The attitude of the
Arab Governor, Sheikh Rashid, who was favourably inclined to them and doubtless foresaw
their ultimate triumph, kept the Persians in check and prevented a rising; and when the chief
factor of Kilhat, Vas deVeiga, arrived shortly after, he threw off his allegiance and declared for
the Portuguese, in which he was joined by the chief Arab inhabitants. At Kilhat the
Portuguese appear to have received warning from the Commandant of Hormuz of the revolt,
and, collecting their valuables, made a start for their boats in the harbour, but they were inter
cepted by the Governor and the Persian garrison, who attacked and.killed several and captured
others. The factor, T. Vas deVeiga, then set out for Muscat, where be found Captain-Major
Manoel deSouza Tavares, with whom he sailed at once for the relief of Hormuz.
At Hormuz, immediately on the occurrence of the revolt, the Commandant had hired a
vessel which he entrusted to Joao deMeira, and directed him to sail at once to India with
the news for the Viceroy, and to touch at Muscat and Kilhat on the way. This Joao deMeira
did, and was thus instrumental in warning his countrymen at those two places of the intended
massacre. The number of Portuguese killed in this insurrectionary movement was about 120.