"ملف 73/7 IV (D 25) المفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [و‎‎٣‎٢] (١٠٣/٧٣)

[This Docmnent is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's GovernmentJ
^ [B]
ASTATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA. [August 13.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 5.
[37422] No. 1.
India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 13.)
THE Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the
Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India, dated the 24th July, 1913, relative to El Katr.
India Office, August 12, 1913.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Government of India to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.
(Telegraphic.) P. Simla, May 29, 1913.
PLEASE advise what steps we should take to make the best of the new position
in the El Katar Peninsula, which under the convention with Turkey will be enjoyed
by us.
Enclosure 2 in No. 1.
Lieutenant'Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.
Bushire, June 22, 1913.
1 HAVE the honour to reply to Foreign Department telegram dated the 29th May,
asking my views as to the steps which can best be taken in order to enable us to obtain
full advantage from the new position which we are acquiring in relation to the Katar
Peninsula under the Anglo-Turkish Convention now on the point of conclusion.
2. At the moment, the subject is rendered a little complicated by an independent
development, namely, the expulsion of the Turks from Ifasa and Katif and the
assumption of the control of that province by Bin Saud. Meanwhile the Porte shows
no sign of removing their garrison from A1 Bidaa, and indeed I doubt whether
Sheikh Jasim would readily part with it at present, for in the absence of the Turkish
garrison or of assurances from us to supply the place oi it, he would not unnaturally
feel somewhat apprehensive of being absorbed by Bin Saud.
For this reason I am inclined to think that another meeting with him at an early
\ date is advisable, either on the part of the political agent, Bahrein, or myself, for the
^ purpose of explaining to him the gist of the Anglo-Turkish Convention so far as it
concerns Katar and Bahrein, and in order to see what we are likely to get him to accept
in the direction of closer relations with us. The inability to give him any reply on the
subject of the arms traffic subsidy will be a little inconvenient, but I think it will be
possible to make him understand that this matter is connected with our current
neo-otiations with the French Government and that the consideration of it necessarily
O
takes a long time.
It seems possible that the said negotiations with B ranee may have advanced some
what in the last few weeks, and that the horizon may be clearer tor a consideration of
the Katar question ; in any case, presuming that the convention with Turkey admits of
it, it will probably be necessary to give Sheikh Jasim a subsidy in some form.
3. As soon as the ground is sufficiently prepared, I am of opinion that we should
make a treaty with Sheikh Jasim by which we should recognise his autonomy, give him
assurances of protection (so long as he observes his obligations to us) from attack by sea,
and good offices to prevent unprovoked attack by land (by Bin Saud for instance) and
should in return require from him undertakings under the following heads, so far as
proves possible :
[1825 n—5]