'تقارير إدارية عن الخليج الفارسي، ١٩٤٥ [-١٩٤٦]' [و‎‎٢‎٦] (٤١٤/٦٢)

was a Major-General his departure freed the commanders of the Army
and Gendarmerie from the restraint that his higher rank placed
upon them.
8. Brigadier Khosrudad who commands the Gendarmerie is a rogue
but doubtless no worse than any other Persian officer similarly
placed (it is said in his excuse that he is constantly subject to
pressure to send greater and greater pickings to Tehran). From
j our point of view he has the advantage of being pleasant to deal
with and apparently anxious to co-operate. The tribes 1 objection
to him is that he has been in Fars so long that he knows not only
all the ropes but all the tricks as well.
9. In colonel Himmat the army has an officer of ability, out
standing honesty and devotion to his duties and a reputation for
courage in the field. His extensive knowledge and experience of
Fars and of its tribes stand him in good stead. There is an armed
truce between him and the Qashqai but the tribes without exception
speak of Himmat with respect.
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1 i 10. The Qashqai in particular stood to gain by the general pardon
of the tribes in Fars announced by the Shah but the effect of this
act of clemency was overshadowed by the turn of events in the north.
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: 11. The Khamseh, who are the smaller of the two larger groups of
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tribes in Fars, have been well-behaved. Under their new supervisor,
the Governor of Fasa,(a relative of Qavara ul Mulk) their conditions
' !f l n of life and general outlook have improved. By this good handling
of Khamseh affairs the Supervisor has built himself such a reputation
that he claims he could disarm and settle the Khamseh without any
: o 9rii: difficulty. It is a pity that the Government are unable or not
sufficiently interested to produce the money tb cover the cost of
^ i settling the Khamseh and so not only make a start in tackling the
' ^ question of the migratory tribes but also make it sagaciously. The
Khamseh are not rich enough to settle themselves. Qavam ul Mulk
•do t pi might be induced to put up the necessary money but the objection
. to turning to Qavam for assistance is that it would strengthen the
hold on the tribe that he has particularly been able to resume
through the appointment and good work of the supervisor.
19 gliOI'K'
i: 12. The Qashqai, who are the other main tribal group in Fars, but
- greater and richer than the Khamseh, have had their loyalty to their
o' 'oJ leader, Nasir Khan Qashqai, assailed but managed to maintain it
unimpaired. The first attack on Naser's position came from his
uncl^ All Khan, his uncle's two sons Shengiz and Amir Mansur and
9 r from the sons of another uncle., Sardar Ehtesham. These severally
i. went out in tribal country but seem to have enlisted little or no
support and so could whip up no real challenge to Naser ! s
authority. But Naser, who, wrongly attributed their activities to
spurrings from the Government and from Seyyed Zia seems to have
been sufficiently moved to consider buying them off.
13. A second and much more serious challenge to his position arose
from Nase^s sending an impetuous telegram to the Prime Minister
saying that in disgust at the Governments suppression of newspapers,
parties, associations and freedom in general he renounced his leader
ship of the Qashqai. Naser's telegram gave the general impression .
that he had gone over to the Russians because the newspapers and
parties suppressed were Tudeh. But -the later corrected this impress
ion and quickly changed his mind about leading the Qashqai when his
uncle All Khan said he would assume charge in Naser's place. Naser
was obliged to beat up the kalantars to wire Tehran to say that they
would have none other than him. His telegram was a further source
of embarrassment to Naser when the situation in Azerbaijan started
boiling up and he was then at some pains to convince Tehran of his
loyalty.
14. In general the conditions of the Qashqai show improvement.
/ The