"تقرير الإدارة عن المقيمية السياسية في الخليج الفارسي للأعوام ١٩١٥-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٧] (٣٩٦/٣٠٠)

FOE THE TEA.R igig.
59
ammunition concealed in their saddles and a guard of marines and blue iaekets
was landed and some ot the camels searched, but without success. The turning
away passed off quietly and after waiting a short time to see if there was any
chance of getting goods out by driblets the caravans betook themselves to
Bin Sa ud complaining bitterly. Considerable resentment was aroused in Naid
at the time but died down owing to the sensible attitude taken up by Bin Sa'ud
who now has a properly accredited representative at Kuwait, to vouch for his
caravans. At the same time, in order to avoid the occupation of Kuwait, it was
decided to try to settle the Kuwait problem by buying up all the stocks held
in Kuwait and to limit imports in order to prevent their being replaced
The effect of the action taken on April 11th was that, on May 4th, the
Shaikh wrote a letter to the Political Agent begging that Government would
extend to him the same friendship and protection as bis predecessors had re
ceived and pledging himself to complete responsibility for anything which mi^ht
take place in his territory, while a marked improvement took place in the ffeneml
attitude of the Shaikh s officials. The Shaikh's overtures were submitted to
Government but, owing to some delay in their acceptance, the Shaikh irrew
restive and the Political Agent was authorised, on June 3rd, to inform him
that Government were giving his letter their friendly consideration and that
it was hoped that Sir Percy Cox would deliver their reply on his return to
Mesopotamia.
The purchases on behalf of Government amounted to
Rice
Wheat
Barley
Sug^ar
Coffee
Pepper
Tea
56,753 bags
1,640 „
2,900 „
7,805 „
10,6(55 ,,
350 >5
1,658 cases
to a (ot il value
of
Ra. 26,52,943-12-0
but purchasing was stopped on June 2nd at the express request of the Shaikh
to the Deputy Civil Commissioner, Basrah and the Political Agent as a
personal concession lo himself. '
It was, however, found that such enormous orders were being placed in
Iriaia and in other Gulf Ports to replace the stocks bought by Government
that further action became necessary and on June 12th the Shaikh was informed
that these goods could not be allowed to land pending the reply of Government
to his letter and that the merchants could be given the option of shipping to
Basrah under permit or selling to Government at cost price plus five per cent,
any goods which the Blockade Officer considered should not be landed at Kuwait.
On June 26th the S.S. " Zayani" was ordered to over-carry her cargo which
included more than 21,000 packages, mostly foodstuffs, for Kuwait.
On June 24th the Political Agent represented that occupation was still
the only real solution of the Kuwait question, but that if that were not
teasible the Shaikh's offer must be accepted at once as any capital we might
nope to make out of the acceptance would be lost by further delay : discontent
was rife in the town among high and low and our failure to come to a decision
was looked upon as due to the weakness of our position as regards the war.
On June 28th the Government of India issued orders that the Shaikh's
olier should be accepted on certain conditions, which decision was communi
cated to the Shaikh in the letter quoted at length hereafter, while exports from
india to Kuwait were to be prohibited except on permits signed by the
"ohtical Agent or his representative and such executive action as possible
^as to be taken to prevent exports to Kuwait from other Gulf Ports. The
following statement of policy was made: "while the Government of India
appreciate the desirability of checking trade with Kuwait they do not consider
this of sufficient importance to justify the risk of an open breach with the
Shaikh and the consequent necessity of military occupation with its possible
tar-reaching effect on other parts of Arabia."