"تقرير الإدارة عن المقيمية السياسية في الخليج الفارسي للأعوام ١٩١٥-١٩١٩" [و‎‎٩‎٥] (٣٩٦/١٩٦)

FOR THE TEAR 1917.
17
Agent vis-h-vis the Governor-General, namely, that the former, though
he has no force at his disposal, is supposed to act as a check upon the
latter. Kurdistani was dependent on the Governor-General for the armed
sowars necessary for enforcing the payment of revenue in the districts, while
the Governor- General refused to supply him with any unless he received first
the whole or a part of the pay due to him. His Majesty's Consul was asked
to obtain a loan of Tomans 10,000 from the Imperial Bank of Persia for this
purpose, but refused. Finally it was arranged by way of compromise, that
Kurdistani should provide Tomans 2,000 on account, whereupon the Governor-
General would send out sowars accompanied by agents representing himself and
the Revenue Department. These agents would collect revenue on " hawalahs, "
or drafts issued by the Revenue Department on the dues of tbe various
districts, amounting to Tomans 37,000. The Governor-General was of course
determined that most of the proceeds of these hawalahs should go to satisfy
his own demands and those of his satellites, which amounted to the dispro
portionate sum of over Tomans 10,000 a month, while similarly the Sardar's
mental reservation was that as little revenue as possible should be collected
from his own and the Farman Farma's lands. As the Sardar's authority
among the sowars themselves was considerable, he had ample opportunities of
securing this end. It was not surprising, therefore, that the scheme in ques
tion was not particularly successful in relieving the financial straits of the
Revenue Department.
Community of interest between the Governor-General and Sardar Nusrat
as against the Revenue Department, together with Kurdistani's not over-diplo
matic methods of negotiation, resulted in the latter's complete estrangement
from the Governor-General who accordingly formed an offensive and defensive
alliance with the Sardar. During the next three months (April, May and June),
the war of intrigue continued with varying fortunes, into which it is not
necessary to go in detail. All sorts of trouble was engineered by the Sardar
for the Revenue Department, culminating in a prolonged strike on the part
of the entire staff of clerks who decamped taking with them the keys of the
office strong boxes ; while the Prince did his share by bringing continual pres
sure to bear on the Shah. So long as he was supported by the Tehran
Government, Kurdistani carried on as best he could, though all hope of re-estab
lishing the solvency of the province was at an end. Tow r ards the end of April,
however, Yossuq-ud-Dowleh's Cabinet definitely deserted him, and for the
next two months the Governor-General and Sardar Nusrat had their way and
worked the Financial Department to their own satisfaction. In June the new
Democratic Cabinet of Ala-us-Sultaneh showed signs of wishing Kurdistani to
remain in office, but the Prince defeated this by his usuiil method of sending
in his resignation and with the Sardar's help getting up an agitation in his
own favour to prevent the resignation being accepted. The agitation con
sisted of basts at the Telegraph Office, " popular " telegrams to the Persian
Government, attempts to close the bazaar, ^nd so on. As it appeared to be of a
definitely Democratic character. His Majesty's Consul brought pressure to
bear upon the Prince to put a stop to it. This he did, but not before he had
been successful in preventing the acceptance of his own resignation and in
finally ejecting Kurdistani, who was replaced by Shaikh-ul-Mulk tow r ards the
end of June and left Kerman on the 18th of the following month.
The moral of the Kurdistani episode is that under the present system, if a
Financial Agent does not conciliate, one might almost say pander to, the local
powers that be, he has no chance of success. Kurdistani indeed, if he had
been able to win over either party, might have attained his ends; but the
Sardar Nusrat was too old an enemy, while his own brusqueness and uncom
promising attitude hopelessly alienated the vain and touchy Prince, The result
was that although he had the moral support and active assistance of His
Majesty's Consulate, Kurdistani was unable to withstand the combination
against him.
Apart from the imbroglio with the local authorities, His Majesty's Consul
co-operated with Kurdistani in various other matters. One of these was the
important and still unsettled question of the rates at which revenue is payable
oniTAa/isa " lands. Nominally payable in kind, these revenues have long