File 4722/1918 Pt 8 'Mesopotamia: Situation' [‎143r] (296/995)

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on by propaganda from Najaf and by the preachings of men like Saiyid Nur.
I do not think they themselves mind at all how many of their serfs are killed,
but the heavy losses the Arabs are suffering are bound to tell in the end and
there are signs already that some tribes have had about enough.
The unity of purpose and lack of dissensions between the big Shaikhs and
Sarkals is curious and points to some strong controlling personality behind the
movement. Nearly all bur Shaikhs have been drawn in. Our levies however
are doing excellent patrol work under Boyle and are full of enthusiasm.
Telegram.
From—Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
To—Secretary of State for India, London.
No. 9700.
Bated 12th August, 1920.
My telegram of the 5th August, 9450, dealt with more immediate causes
and objectives of the present rising on the Middle Euphrates, the most impor
tant factor in which was propaganda from Baghdad. I did not deal with the
reasons underlying the loss by the Civil Administration of that degree of popu
larity which it first enjoyed.
(1) In the light of our experience of the past three months I think we must
plead guilty of going too fast in various administrative matters affecting tribes
people. The blame for this must be distributed about equally between the
Administration and the Shaikhs and other tribal leaders. We have as a matter
of policy backed the Shaikhs and supported their authority. They in their turn
have tried to place too great a burden on their tribesmen with the laudable in
tention of improving cultivation and ensuring good crops by extensive work
on clearing canals and making bunds, and incidentally have lined their own
pockets very substantially. The Shaikhs have discovered too late that they
did not possess the influence that they were supposed to have over their tribes
men and are suffering accordingly.
(2) Another fact, not peculiar to Mesopotamia, which has tended to cause
discontent is the gradual appearance in Mesopotamia of what may be called
post war conditions. High prices, shortages of certain necessaries, etc. These
are neutralized in the case of certain classes of the population by the wealth
which is brought into the country by the Army of Occupation, but large classes
feel the pinch, and we as the victors in the world war have in Mesopotamia
as elsewhere to bear the odium, of having brought these conditions about.
(3) But perhaps first in order of relative importance comes perception of
our military weakness. To kick a man when he is down is the most popular
pastime in the East sanctioned by centuries of precept and practice.
(4) Adverse influence of Shi‘ah Mujtahids who have been against all
Governments since the da- of the Caliphs.
(5) President Wilson’s 14 points and agitation created thereby and stimu
lated by Sharifian, Turkish and Bolshevistic agencies both voluntary and paid.
( 6 ) Difference of race and religion between British and Arab, used more
as an excuse than as a cause of itself.
( 7 ) Delay in defining status of Mesopotamia and in consequence mainten
ance of direct British Administration long after armistice. If my recollec
tion serves me right as recently as October, 1919, I was warned against taking
any action or making any announcement such as would give the impression
that we had been given or would accept the mandate for Mesopotamia.
( 8 ) The influence opSyria where liberal British subsidy enabled Sharifian
Government to pay to its officials particularly in the Army emoluments far in
excess of those which this or any other Administration organized on a self
supporting basis could afford.
(9) Demands for labour on flood banks. The Arab would rather risk a
flood, an act of God, than do heavy work on flood banks, the work of the
Enolish In this matter circumstances of military occupation have been part
ly responsible. We have throughout been and indeed still are, subjected to
considerable legitimate pressure from the military authorities to maintain
bunds in such a state of efficiency as will preclude any risk of railways being
cut or cantonment areas being flooded. It was on this condition that the Irri
gation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration.
(10) Collection of land revenue and other taxes.
(11) Fear of exploitation by Western commercialism.
(12) Use of aeroplanes against recalcitrants.
(13) Disappointment of landed interests, who reject the idea that land
lords have duties as well as rights and resent as “ illegal any attempt to with
hold the full measure of their pound of flesh from cultivators who m their turn
resent any attempt on the part of Government to use forces of law and order for
the recovery of dues on behalf of the landlords. Complexities of Turkish law
on this subject often make position of Political Officers exceedingly difficult.