Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎362r] (723/749)

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ECTION 1.
[E 9995/70/34] Copy No.
Military A ttache’s Intelligence Summary No. 47, Secret, for the Period
4ith December to §th December, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch
No. 436 of ll£A December.—(Received in Foreign Office ‘list December.)
Persian Affairs.
Political.
1 . The Persian, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not
renowned for that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance
in adverse circumstances. His vanity leads him to think that his vital interests
must be those of the entire world. He is ignorant of how democracies work and
how they conduct their diplomatic business. He was dismayed that approaches
made to the Soviet Government by the British and American Governments did not
immediately elicit favourable replies. All these factors have combined to cast a
gloom over political circles and it is not surprising that the Persian’s courage is
beginning to ooze away. The Majlis majority behind the Prime Minister, seeing
no immediate or tangible results from his policy of resistance, have begun to waver
and the minority, led by Dr. Musaddiq, with their policy of appeasement began
to gain ground. Supporters of the Qawam-us-Saltaneh began to lobby on his
behalf and some forty-five Deputies are believed to have signed a document
pledging their support of him. His policy, of which he makes no secret, is that
of appeasement in general and, in particular, that of granting the Russians an
oil concession, agreeing to hold the elections on the original date and the removal
of officials obnoxious to the Russians. Like most Persians, he is obsessed with the
idea of his own cleverness and thinks that, if he were to come into power, he could
by prevarication and procrastination keep the Russians dangling on the end of a
string until the 2nd March—a belief which few outside the ranks of his country
men would share. The recent news of the forthcoming meeting of the three Foreign
Secretaries in Moscow has slightly diminished this gloom and given the Persians
a ray of hope that their problem may yet be settled.
2. The Cabinet is said to be considering the idea of asking the three Big
Powers, and possibly France and China in addition, to supervise the next elections
so as to refute the Russian accusation that the Persian Government is reactionary.
3. The Soviet Embassy’s reply to the Persian Government’s note of the
22nd November (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary) merely referred to
the Persian Government to the Soviet Embassy’s reply of the 26th November (see
appendix to last Intelligence Summary) to which it had nothing to add. A further
note by the Persian Government dated the 4th December has not yet been answered.
4. On the 26th November the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to
His Majesty’s Embassy a memorandum of which copies had been sent to the Soviet,
American, French and Chinese Embassies in Tehran. This is reproduced as an
appendix to this Intelligence Summary.
The Majlis.
5. At the sessions of the 2nd, 4th and 6 th December the attention of Deputies
was almost entirely devoted to events in Azerbaijan. The only Majlis business
conducted was a discussion of the Prison Reform Law at the request of the
Minister for Justice and the tabling by the Minister of Finance of the Income Tax
Amendment Bill.
Internal Security.
Azerbaijan.
6 . There is a change for the worse in the situation as reported in para
graph 7 of last Intelligence Summary. News from some places, because it
concerns Democrat activities, is given in this paragraph for the sake of convenience
even though these places are outside the boundaries of Azerbaijan. Bayat, the
newly-arrived Governor-General, issued a proclamation on the 3rd December