'Muscat Rising, from April 1917 to January 1918 & resumed from April 1920 to Oct 1920' [‎95r] (200/558)

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in the training of these men, and I would suggest that th© machine gun
contingent be trained by the machine gun officer of the regiment at Maskat
who should receive an allowance for the purpose from the Sultan.
38. To commence with, both for financial and training reasons, I would
suggest enlisting 300 Infantry only while the Sultan's 60 or 70 camelmen
might form the basis of the Camel Corps and his present Nizam the basis of
the Militia. The numbers could then be gradually raised to the total required
and the Sultan's own Askaris eliminated.
39. I now come to the point of how I propose using these men.
40. It will have been noted that in the attack of the rebels on Maskat
the enemy numbers were estimated to be 3,000 and possibly 1,000 came up too
late to join in. The defenders numbered under 700 and were without artillery.
41. The total I have allowed for is then with their machine guns and
artillery more than sufficient for any attack which can be brought against
them.
42. The tribes have no standing army beyond the few men who hold the
various forts in the valleys ; when any big action is intended it is necessary to
make a levy en masse and this takes some time to collect.
43. The Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Semail is held by two or three forts and there are two
important passes in it which make it the key to Oman, since it divides that
country into two parts.
44. My object in raising these 1,500 troops is that, when they are
sufficiently trained, they should move out and by a surprise movement capture
the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Semail and the passes leading into it. It is for this reason that
I have included a camel corps to enable rapid movements to be made. The
men now holding it could not defend it for any time nor could the forts hold
out against modern artillery, while it would be quite impossible for the
tribesmen to garrison it in any strength, for any length of time in anticipation
of this move.
45. While His Majesty's Government would possibly not be ready to
undertake an expedition into Oman for the purpose of defeating the rebels it
is probable that they would be willing to allow the regiment stationed at
Maskat to act as a support to such a movement and to hold the forts taken
until such time as the passes were wired and put into a defensive condition, the
more so since such action would be the preliminary to the permanent with
drawal of that regiment.
46. The town of Nakhl, which is some 25 miles from the ports of
Sib and Barka could not withstand a threat of bombardment and its few
defenders would be unable to do otherwise than surrender it.
47. Such yould be the ultimate decision of force but the mere raising
of a little arri/y of the nature indicated would in itself have a great effect.
It would cau^e many who are only on the Imam's side because of the weakness
of the Sultan to come over to the latter and as his strength increased so would
the nui^Ker of his adherents. Such is the history of all Eastern countries and
pBt^ss of Oman than of others. With the organisation of this force would
come the resumption of the tentatives made byiShaikh Isa and a hope of the
settlement of the question on peaceful lines. This indeed is my aim, a threat
of force if required but an intention of settlement by consent if such a
termination be possible.
48. Administration,—I anticipate that the Sultan's financial situation
will shortly again bring him to the necessity of appealing to us. On this
occasion I would propose informing him that on the occasion of the last loan
he was informed that, while willing to assist him in every way, we stated that
we must demand that he put his financial system in order, and that it is
impossible for us to go on giving loans which lead to nothing except a
chronic condition of debt, if he is able to evolve any scheme which will
lead to the improvement of his finances we shall be prepared to help him, but
otherwise the only solution possible appears to be that he should employ trained
Customs officials whom we are prepared to lend him.