'Muscat Rising, from April 1917 to January 1918 & resumed from April 1920 to Oct 1920' [‎91r] (192/558)

No. I. T. of 1917.
Bated Simla, the 30th October 1917 (Confidential).
From— M ajor L. H aworth , Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Maskat,
T o— D enys Bray , Esq., C .I .E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in
the Foreign and Political Department.
In accordance with the rerbal instructions of the Foreign Secretary, I
have the honour to submit the following report on the present situation and
requirements at Maskat. As I am without my files, I am unable to make
references to previous correspondence.
2. My previous reports had terminated with the hope of a meeting with
Shaikh Isa, the most important member and moving spirit of the rebel party.
3. My last letter from the latter stated that he had referred to the
Imam for permission to meet me. Just before I left Maskat Isa had left his
own country of the Sbarkiyeh and had proceeded to the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Maawal near
Bostaq where he met the Imam and the Shaikhs of Oman and discussed
with them the general lines of policy they were to adopt.
4. A certain number of those present wished to attack a sea port, for
choice Sohar a place some 80 miles north of Maskat, but wiser heads pointed
out that they could not hope to hold a sea port and that having now obtained
complete control over the interior they should rest content but that if they
wished they could later extend their power beyond their present limits in the
interior towards Baraimi, etc.
5. Before my departure the Erench Consul informed me confidentially
that his Mirza, who was present in the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Maawal when this meeting was
held, had written to say that the Arabs were convinced that Baghdad had
been retaken by the Turks and also that we had been forced to evacuate
Aden which we had burnt before leaving.
He added that Shaikh Isa was writing to me to say that the Imam would
not allow him to come to me, a fact which he, Isa, regretted. The French
Consul added that, by putting the blame on the Imam, Isa left himself open
to resume negotiations should it appear advisable.
6. In the previous letter which Isa had written me he had referred to
certain points regarding which he said I would no doubt reply to him verbally,
and I have no doubt that he intended to meet me, an intention which naturally
he would not carry out if our condition was as he was induced to believe: he
would not wish to negotiate with a power who were not in a position to
influence the situation and whose strength was on the wane. ^ (The French
Mirza, an Arab of Oman and an old intriguer against British interests, owns
property in the interior of Oman and is consequently obliged to run with the
hare and hunt with the hounds. He is a personal friend of Shaikh Isa and it
would be interesting to know what part he took in the discussion.)
7. It is evident that, unless the rebels have a wholesome fear of the
British Government and it's possible action, there is no reason for them to
wish to change their present situation; their control over Oman proper is
complete and the Sultan has no power either to chastise them or to regain that
which he has lost.
8. After consideration, however, I am of the opinion that the postpone
ment of the meeting with Shaikh Isa is all for good. Until the Sultan can
make some show of strength, the terms which the rebels would demand would
naturally be high and possibly prohibitive.
At the present minute the Sultan has no resources of any kind, he is
absolutely dependent on what we can do for him and his financial condition
is desperate.