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## Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt

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### About this record

The file contains correspondence, memoranda, reports, and newspaper cuttings relating to the political situation in Egypt. The memoranda are written by officials at the War Office, Admiralty, Colonial Office, and Foreign Office and mostly concern military policy in Egypt and the defence of the Suez Canal. The Annual Report on Egypt for the year 1921, written by Field Marshall Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, High Commissioner of Egypt, is also included. The report covers matters such as politics, finance, agriculture, public works, education, justice, and communications. Some correspondence from Ernest Scott, Acting High Commissioner in Egypt, to Lord Curzon can also be found within the file.

**Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [1r]  
(1/176)**

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**Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [1v]  
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Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [2r]  
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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. July 1923

MOST SECRET.

438-B.

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY  
OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE  
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, AFTER  
MEETING AT WHICH CONSIDERED.

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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

LIABILITY OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO BLOCKING ATTACK.

NOTE BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

THE attached paper on the liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack was originally prepared by the Naval Staff for the information of the Defence of Ports Sub-Committee of the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee.

2. As, however, the paper deals with large questions of policy, in the execution of which other Government Departments are largely interested, it has been deemed more appropriate to forward it for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

3. It is, therefore, requested that the paper may be placed before the latter Committee with a view to its consideration at an early date.

*Admiralty, July 24, 1923.*

(Initialled) L. S. A.

NOTE BY NAVAL STAFF.

*Preamble.*

1. In the attached paper, the various considerations which determine the "Liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack" have been analysed on the assumption that the British Empire is faced with the possibility of a war with Japan.

2. The liability of the Suez Canal to be blocked depends on—

- (a) The degree to which such an enterprise is likely to benefit the strategy of and prove attractive to the potential enemy.
- (b) The extent to which the actual difficulties of blocking the Canal can be overcome by careful preparation.
- (c) The preventive measures which can be organised by the Canal Company and Powers concerned to deter the potential enemy from carrying out his object.

3. As regards (a), the conclusion is reached that the benefits which Japanese strategy would derive from a block of the Suez Canal immediately prior to the outbreak of war are of such a striking nature that she would spare no pains to accomplish this object.

The restriction on British sea-power of being denied the use of the Canal during the earliest stages of a war would be disastrous and would seriously imperil our chances of ever being able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. One of the first results would be the wholesale destruction of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean and Australasian waters.

As regards (b), a close examination of the question shows that, in the absence of adequate deterrents, the difficulties are such as could be overcome by an enterprising and determined nation.

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4. In making suggestions in regard to the precautionary measures that can be organised by the Canal Company and Powers concerned to prevent a vessel being sunk in the Canal, the Naval Staff feel that the question should be approached, in the first instance, from the point of view of Imperial policy and defence.

5. The Canal has always been an important link in our Imperial communications; the rise of a strong Power in the East and the shifting of the strategic centres to distant waters has made it a link of such vital importance that it is difficult to envisage the possibility of our embarking on a war in the East unless we were quite certain that it could not be severed.

6. The Naval Staff cannot but feel that the success or failure of diplomatic action and British policy in the East may depend in the last resort upon our being able to use the Canal without let or hindrance.

7. This being so, the status of the Canal ceases to be a question of purely domestic concern between this country, Egypt and the other signatories of the Suez Canal Convention, and should take its place as a major question of Imperial Defence.

8. While recognising the difficulties which would confront us in attaining a recognised and explicit power of control in the Suez Canal Zone, the Naval Staff feel that British policy should be directed towards this end.

It would appear that much could be achieved if Great Britain were formally given the responsibilities for the measures outlined in Article 9 of the Suez Canal Convention, which are there given to Egypt and the Imperial Ottoman Government.

In any case, Article 9 is, for historical reasons, obsolete in its present form; again, the position of Egypt, in consequence of its final detachment from Turkey, has to be discussed with the Powers, and the occasion of such a discussion would appear opportune for pressing British responsibilities in the Canal Zone as the heir to the Turkish and Egyptian jurisdiction.

*Proposed Policy.*

9. The following is an outline of some of the measures that are suggested to minimise the danger of blocking attack:—


- (i.) Make sure that all Treaties we conclude with Egypt, Turkey, or other Powers, do not in any way circumscribe the power of Great Britain to take emergency action to maintain free navigation of the Suez Canal for all Nations.
- (ii.) Maintain liaison with the Canal Company through the British Government representative on the Board of Directors—Sir Ian Malcolm—and ascertain through him what steps the Canal Company propose to take in the event of suspicions being aroused that someone intends to try to block the Canal.
- (iii.) When information on this point is available, it might be possible to advise Sir Ian Malcolm or Lord Incheape what additional steps we consider necessary, and ascertain what additional assistance, if any, the Canal Company require to create a structure on which a sound precautionary organisation might be built up.

We have perfectly legitimate reason for doing this by reason of—

- (a.) The dominating shareholding power of the British Government.
  - (b.) Dominant British shipping interests—amounting to 64 per cent. of total traffic.
  - (c.) Our position *vis-à-vis* Egypt.
  - (d.) Suez Canal is a vital link between the Wings of the Empire.
- (iv.) Suggest, through the British Representative, that the number of British pilots in the Canal Service should gradually be increased at the expense of Greeks and Italians.

The Dutch Director would probably support the proposal that the number of British and Dutch pilots should bear some relation to volume of British and Dutch shipping, Great Britain and Holland being the greatest users of the Canal. The process would naturally be a gradual one, as vacancies are infrequent.

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- (v.) Inaugurate an intelligence system in the Canal Zone as well as in Japan, &c., to watch loading, &c., of Japanese shipping.
- (vi.) Encourage the Canal Company to organise a simple minesweeping system which could be put into force during periods of strained international relations.
- (vii.) When Eastern International situation becomes clouded, consider the question of providing and equipping small craft to assist in the mine-sweeping of the Canal.
- (viii.) Put into force special measures for reporting movements of Japanese shipping *when war becomes possible*.

10. As soon as British Naval, Military and Air Forces are in occupation of the Canal Zone, the preservation of free passage through the Canal would not be a difficult matter to ensure.

An indication of some of the measures that might be necessary is given in paragraph 117 under the heading *Conclusions*.

11. This does not, however, minimise the grave danger that would exist before this physical occupation, with its attendant closer co-operation with the Canal administration, takes place, or in the event of other considerations making such occupation impossible.

*Naval Staff, July 2, 1923.*

THE LIABILITY OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO BLOCKING ATTACK.

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I.—Strategical Importance of the Suez Canal to the British Empire, and the Ease with which this Delicate Link can be Severed in the Event of a War with Japan becoming Possible.

1. In a memorandum on Naval strategy as affected by the proposed future status of Egypt, forwarded to the Cabinet by the First Lord on the 29th October, 1920, the Chief of the Naval Staff remarked as follows :—

- “(1.) In view of the far-reaching proposals with regard to the future Government of Egypt which are now before the Cabinet, it is desirable that the Naval aspect of this question should be clearly stated, as the decision which will be taken is one of vital importance to our Naval strategy.
- “(2.) The control of the sea communications of the Empire is the duty of the Navy, and one of the main arteries of these communications, connecting the United Kingdom with India, Australia and our other territories in the Far East, passes through the heart of Egypt. The diversion of traffic to the Cape route in the event of the Canal not being available would be a very grave disadvantage.
- “(3.) The safety of the Suez Canal Route to the East is a matter of more urgent importance at the present time than ever before, for the reason that we are called upon to face a Naval situation which has never previously arisen.
- “(4.) Up to the time of the late war, the principal foreign Naval Power was concentrated in Europe, and necessitated a similar concentration of our Naval forces. At the present time our only two serious rivals on the sea—Japan and the U.S.A.—are to be found in widely separated quarters of the Globe, and it is impracticable to keep the Fleet at sufficient strength to effect the double concentration at home and in the East which would enable us to meet the situation satisfactorily.
- “(5.) The Fleet must, therefore, make up for its lack of preponderance in all oceans by its mobility, that is to say, its capacity for effecting a quick passage to any threatened portion of the Empire.
- “(6.) In this question of mobility the Suez Canal plays a vital part. The alternative route to the East, viâ the Cape, is far longer, and time may be of the utmost importance; the security or loss of an outpost of Empire like Hong Kong may be decided by the availability of the Canal route.
- “(7.) The Suez Canal and its approaches are the most delicate link in the chain of Naval communications with the East, since the narrow and shallow nature of these waterways renders them more easily open to interruption by attack from land or sea than any other portion of the route.
- “(8.) It is essential to our Naval strategy that the safety of the Canal route is assured to us.”

2. The liability of the Suez Canal to be blocked depends on :—

- (a.) The extent to which the strategy of a belligerent or potential belligerent would be favourably affected by the blocking of the Canal, and conversely the unfavourable influence which a block would exert on the strategy of her potential opponent. In other words, the degree to which such an enterprise is likely to prove attractive.
- (b.) The physical difficulties involved in organising an effective block.
- (c.) The precautions taken by the Canal Company and Powers concerned to prevent the Canal being blocked.

An attempt will be made in the remarks which follow to analyse these various factors in relation to a hypothetical conflict between Great Britain and Japan, and, in so far as it lies within the competence of the Admiralty, to indicate what steps are necessary to reduce to a minimum the liability of the Canal to be blocked.

3. Should the British Empire ever have to face the probability of war with Japan, the safety of the Suez Canal from interference will at once become a cause of grave anxiety.

This anxiety will be greatly increased if the British Government, acting on its own initiative, or through the Suez Canal Company, finds itself unable to take such



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appropriate precautions during the period of strained relations as will ensure for the Canal a reasonable degree of immunity from interference by the potential enemy.

4. Unless the mentality of the Japanese undergoes some profound change it is only reasonable to suppose that she will repeat the tactics of the Russo-Japanese campaign, and, when she feels that war can no longer be averted, will anticipate its actual declaration by some act aimed at securing for herself a striking initial advantage.

The blocking of the Suez Canal would not be difficult of accomplishment, and would commend itself to a nation whose traditional policy is to strike first and declare war afterwards.

Such a prelude to the declaration of war would be almost too tempting to resist, securing as it would strategical advantage of the first magnitude.

5. The strategical problem stated in the most general terms is that the armed forces on which in the last resort the success of our Imperial policy may depend are divided from their potential theatre of operations by a channel so narrow that it can easily be blocked by the sinking of a single ship.

The problem is comparable to that of the United States of America and the Panamá Canal, and to a lesser extent to that of Germany and the Kiel Canal during the late war

6. The analogy breaks down, however, when the means by which the United States and Germany have guaranteed the security of these two canals are examined.

Whereas the Governments of these two nations exercised complete control over the waterways, the approaches thereto, and for the time being over the ships that used them, Great Britain is only able to influence to a minor degree the course of events in the Suez Canal, unless, as during the late war, she assumes complete physical control of the waterway and its banks, thereby infringing Egyptian neutrality and Article 4 of the Suez Canal Convention.

7. The Naval Staff view with apprehension a state of affairs by which the fruition of our Naval Imperial Strategy is dependent on the forbearance of a potential enemy and the goodwill of a commercial company and a neutral and possibly unfriendly State. They feel, moreover, that the knowledge that our initial Naval movements can so easily be hampered by an act of sabotage which we are powerless to prevent is in the end bound to limit appreciably the force and efficiency of British diplomatic representations which might conceivably be called for in the Far East.

8. By appending her signature to Article XIX of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments the U.S.A. has voluntarily renounced her power of intervention with armed forces in the Western Pacific, leaving to the British Empire the task of countering with the requisite Naval forces any aggressive tendencies on the part of Japan.

9. Under present conditions, however, it would appear that the pressure of British sea power could at a critical moment be neutralised, and preparations, such as the establishment of oil-fuel reserves and Naval bases in the East, rendered abortive by a simple act on the part of Japan requiring little preparation or foresight. The time factor would be all-important, and the delay imposed on our Fleet by the blocking of the Canal might admit of the Japanese scoring such striking initial triumphs, such as the seizure or destruction of Singapore and Hong Kong, as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for us to wage war with any prospect of success.

## II.—Requirements to Secure an Effective Block.

10. The desiderata in order to secure an effective "block" of the Suez Canal are—

- (a.) The arrangements should be such as will ensure the ship being sunk at the correct time, *i.e.*, when negotiations between this country and Japan have reached an advanced stage, but before we have passed our Fleet through the Canal.
- (b.) The ship should be scuttled at a spot in the Canal where the bottom and sides are rocky.
- (c.) The Pilot would have to be overpowered, intimidated or suborned

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- (d.) The ship should be manœuvred correctly at the last moment, otherwise the block may only be partial.
- (e.) The blockship should be fitted with some means by which she can be rapidly scuttled.
- (f.) The scuttling of the ship should be controlled by the Captain from the bridge.
- (g.) The blockship should be loaded with some heavy cargo, such as stone, cement, ore, railway iron, &c.

III.—Consideration of the Requirements Necessary to Secure an Effective Block, as Outlined in Section II.

(a.) *The arrangements should be such as will ensure the ship being sunk at the correct time, i.e., when negotiations between this country and Japan have reached an advanced stage, but before we have passed our Fleet through the Canal.*

11. The chief requirements are :—

- (a.) Reliable Captain and personnel.
- (b.) A reliable system of communications between Japan and the Captain of the ship.
- (c.) A sufficient number of suitable ships normally traversing the Canal to ensure a certain latitude as regards exact time of sinking.

(a.) Should not present any difficulty.

It cannot be doubted that the men could be found who would be ready to sacrifice their liberty, and, if necessary, their lives, in such a cause.

The Captains and Officers of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha are partly drawn from the ranks of a body analogous to our Royal Naval Reserve.

(b.) Could be easily arranged.

As regards (c), two steamers of the Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, or Osaka Shosen Kabushiki Kaisha, traverse the Canal on the average each way every week.

The average dimensions of these vessels are :—

Gross tonnage	...	...	...	7,000 to 10,000
Length	...	...	...	450 to 500 feet.
Breadth	...	...	...	54 to 59 feet.
Draught	...	...	...	26 to 29 feet.

*Conclusion.*

12. It is considered that the Japanese would have at their disposal at any given time in the Eastern Mediterranean or Red Sea steamers suitable, as regards characteristics and command, for blocking the Canal.

(b.) *The ship should be scuttled at a place where the sides and bottom are rocky.*

13. The soil through which the Canal was excavated is composed for the most part of pure sand and sandy clay. There are, however, certain exceptions, notably just north of Lake Timsah, where the Canal passes through a range of low hills, and is intersected by bands of hard and soft rock.

14. For the purposes of this paper, the Canal may be divided into three sections :—

(A.) Sections where the banks are low and sandy.

These are the characteristics that are met with in the Northern portion of the Canal as far as kilom. 40 approximately and in certain portions south of the Bitter Lake.

It would be possible to dredge a channel round a large ship sunk in one of these sections. Estimates of time that would be taken to dredge such a channel vary from one to three weeks.

(B.) Sections where the banks are higher and the sand compacted.

These are the characteristics of the Canal between kilom. 40 approximately and the Bitter Lakes, and of certain sections in the southern part of the Canal.

A channel could be dredged round a ship sunk in one of these sections, but it would take longer, not only on account of the height of dry bank that would have to be cut away, but also by reason of the more compacted nature of the sand.

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(C.) Sections where the bottom and banks are rocky and in some places high.

These are the characteristics at kilom. 100, and elsewhere in the southern portion of the Canal.

The cutting of a channel round a ship sunk in one these sections would involve blasting operations of considerable magnitude and would take at least six months.

It would probably be simpler and quicker to attempt to salve or demolish the ship, but even then the block would take months to remove.

Experience at Zeebrugge and Ostend has shown the difficulty of saving ships that have been prepared and sunk with the deliberate intention of blocking a fairway. The difficulties of salvage in the Suez Canal would be greatly increased by absence of any considerable tidal rise and fall, and of any adjacent place to which portions of the ship could be moved clear of the fairway as the operation progressed.

*Conclusion.*

15. The Captain of a blockship would prefer to scuttle his ship in one of the rocky portions of the Canal. These portions are well known to those who habitually navigate the Canal, and in the case of the defile north of Lake Timsah are obvious on account of the height and nature of the banks.

The difficulty of salving, demolishing, or cutting a channel round a ship deliberately and effectually scuttled in a rocky portion of the Canal would be considerable, and many months would elapse before the waterway would be passable for Capital Ships.

(c.) *The pilot would have to be overpowered, intimidated or suborned.*

16. Suez Canal pilots are recruited from the mercantile marine officers of the principal maritime nations, and experience during the war has shown them to be, on the whole, a reliable and conscientious body of men.

17. The qualifications of a deep-sea Master's Certificate of their own country are essential, and candidates must have commanded or been second in command of a large steamship, or held an important post.

18. The following are the numbers and nationalities of the pilots in April 1923 :—

(1)	(2)	Percentage of Total.	Percentage of number of ships of each nationality to total tonnage using Canal. (11 months of 1922.)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
British ... ..	29	27	64
French ... ..	26	24	5
Greek ... ..	20	19	Less than 1
Italian ... ..	18	17	5.5
Jugo-Slav ... ..	6	6	Less than 1
Dutch ... ..	4	4	11
Danish ... ..	2	2	1
Swedish ... ..	1	1	1.5
Total ... ..	106		

It will be seen that the percentage of pilots of each nationality bears no fixed relation to the percentage of shipping owned by each nation, and that in this respect Great Britain and Holland are very inadequately represented.

19. The following extract from a memorandum by Sir Malcolm McIlwraith, from the office of the Judicial Adviser, Cairo (*vide* C.I.D. Paper 80-B of the 16th July, 1906) on the difficulties which arise as regards the application of the International Convention for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, shows that importance was attached to the capability of the pilot in preventing the wrecking of ships in the Canal :—

“ In conformity with the rule that a neutral State may not give aid or assistance to the belligerents, either directly or indirectly, it must not furnish pilots to their ships of war.

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“Aliter, as regards the pilots necessary to take the ships through the Canal. That is a consequence of the provision declaring the Canal free at all times for navigation. Indeed, it is necessary in order to ensure the neutrality of the Canal, for the wrecking of a ship in the Canal might, by obstructing navigation, assist the strategy of one of the belligerents. The employment of official pilots (belonging to the Government or the Company) ought therefore to be imposed, especially on ships of war.”

20. Should the suspicions of the pilot be aroused, there are a variety of ways in which he could delay the ship, or communicate his suspicions to the Canal authorities through an official at one of the sidings.

It is by no means certain, however, that his suspicions *would* be aroused, although, if they were, it is felt that the majority of pilots would do all in their power to prevent the ships of which they were in charge being wrecked or run ashore.

21. Bribery of pilots might be resorted to, but it is doubtful whether it would be worth while, bearing in view the suspicions which might be aroused if attempts at bribery proved abortive and became known.

Moreover, there can be no assurance that the particular pilots who had been approached and bribed would be in charge of the particular ship or ships detailed to carry out the act of sabotage.

*Conclusion.*

22. The conclusion is reached that the honesty and conscientiousness of the Canal pilots on the whole is of a high standard, and that their presence would exercise a deterrent effect in certain cases. If the ship were, however, once committed to the passage of the Canal, nothing could be done to prevent the pilot being overpowered as an immediate preliminary to the scuttling of the ship, and it is quite conceivable that nothing need necessarily happen to arouse his suspicions prior to his removal from charge.

The possibility of pilots being bribed is by no means remote, and should not be lost sight of. It would, however, appear that the desired end could be reached without resort to bribery.

(d.) *The ship should be manoeuvred correctly at the last moment, otherwise the block may be only partial.*

23. The dimensions of a typical merchant ship of the kind that might be employed for this operation may be taken to be 450 feet by 58 feet by 27 feet.

It will be seen by reference to secret chart F 054\* that, in order to block the Canal to anything but the smallest craft, a ship of the above dimensions would have to be placed at an angle athwart the Canal with her bows resting on the gradient of one bank and her stern on the gradient of the other. It would not necessarily be sufficient if she remained in a fore and aft position in relation to the channel.

Correct manipulation of the helm and engines would, immediately prior to the ship being blown up, place her in the required position, due allowance being made for the prevailing wind and current.

(e.) *The blockship should be fitted with some means by which she can be rapidly scuttled.*

(f.) *The scuttling of the ship should be controlled by the Captain from the Bridge.*

(g.) *The blockship should be loaded with some heavy cargo, such as stone, cement, ore, railway iron, &c.*

24. These desiderata could be achieved in a variety of ways.

The following is a brief outline of the sort of thing that might conceivably happen:—

There are no material difficulties, and the secret purpose of the preparations need only be known to a very few people, who could be relied upon implicitly.

25. Several years before Japan anticipates being in a position to commence hostilities, the Head of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha is approached quietly by the Government and a plan is proposed by which one or two vessels of the N.Y.K. Fleet are to be fitted out as blockships in the most secret manner possible.

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It is suggested to him that, during their next refits, work might be carried out on stiffening for guns as armed escorts, and on fitting of hydrophones as a defence against submarines, and for navigational purposes during fog, &c.

Information might be allowed to get about that, for the general safety of their vessels and passengers, and owing to the prevalence of fog in Japanese and English waters, these ships were going to be fitted with all the latest improvements, &c.

26. Actually, what would be done would be to provide for the placing of blowing charges in, say, six different positions, arranged one or two in each main compartment of the ship, so as to flood each compartment simultaneously on the firing of the charges. The charges themselves would not be actually placed, but the space necessary would be boxed off and circuits would be run to the bridge. To people not in the know, the ship would merely have been fitted with six hydrophones, and listeners provided on the bridge.

The Officers of these two ships would be carefully chosen for their character, patriotism, and public spirit, in order to avoid any compromising of the secrecy of the scheme as the result of bribes, &c.

One, or perhaps two, of them would be entrusted with the job of placing the actual charges in place at the most convenient time, say, when loading cargo at the last port of call before Port Said on the way to the East.

These ships of the N.Y.K. are in constant passage through the Canal, and would be quite well known; probably in time the pilots, or certain of them, would get to know the Officers personally, and these latter would be to all appearances straightforward and friendly.

27. It is suggested that the sequence of events might very possibly be as follows:—

In the autumn of one year the Japanese General Staff come to the conclusion that they cannot postpone offensive action any longer. It is decided that a pretext for breaking off relations must be arranged for to be used in the summer of the following year, so that hostilities may commence during the S.W. Monsoon, which would make the passage of the Indian Ocean difficult for small vessels, and facilitate disembarkation of a raiding force on the East Coast of Malaya. The Head of the N.Y.K. Line is then approached, and asked to arrange the sailing of his line so as to have both of his "blockships" in the Mediterranean area, on their passage home, at the beginning of June. They should have a heavy cargo, such as railway material, cement, ore, &c., and it would be arranged that one follows the other by a fortnight or some such interval.

28. All being in readiness in Japan for an immediate outbreak of hostilities, the captain of one of the "blockships" is instructed through his agents, by means of a suitable code, to "carry out his programme."

He sails from Marseilles (or some such port) and arrives at Port Said. The Examination Service can find nothing wrong with his papers or his cargo, or, at any rate, they have no reason to stop him passing through the Canal, however much they may wish to do so.

The captain and officers are all familiar to the Canal authorities and officials.

The vessel is passed into the Canal in charge of the usual pilot, who has had confidential instructions to be on his guard, and to keep his eyes open.

29. All goes well until a likely spot is reached, say the rocky portion just North of Ismailia, or south of the Little Bitter Lake, when one of the officers on the bridge, going into the charthouse, lifts the hydrophone headpiece off its hook.

Explosions follow and the ship commences to settle; in fifteen minutes she is securely wedged across the channel on the floor of the Canal, with six large holes in her sides.

*Conclusion.*

30. In the absence of adequate deterrents and intelligence system, the preparation and scuttling of a suitable ship in the Canal does not present insuperable difficulties.

**IV.—Possible Courses of Action Open to Japan.**

31. Japan's object would be to block the Canal so effectively before the outbreak of war that our Fleet would be unable to use it for at least a month. In order to achieve this object she might arrange—

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- (a.) For a Japanese merchantman to sink herself in the Canal at a selected time and place.
  - (b.) For a neutral merchantman to sink herself in the Canal at a selected time and place.
  - (c.) For a specially fitted ship to sow mines in the Canal at selected points in the hope that either a merchant ship or one of our larger men-of-war would strike the mine and thus block the Canal.
  - (d.) For the surreptitious laying of mines from the banks of the Canal with the same object as (c).
- The object might also be achieved—
- (e.) By placing a considerable force, including guns, on the banks, and sinking any vessel attempting to pass.
  - (f.) By "sniping" at a passing vessel, killing the helmsman, and causing her to run ashore.
  - (g.) By sinking one of the large Canal dredgers.

**V.—Blocking of the Canal by the Sinking of a Merchant Ship.**

32. The list of requirements in paragraph 10 looks, at first sight, somewhat formidable; it is not, however, thought that it would be difficult for the Japanese to secure its fulfilment, bearing in mind their natural secretiveness and patriotism, their capacity for minute detailed organisation, and the policy which found such striking expression in the attempts to block Port Arthur before the official declaration of war.

The various factors which make for the success of this operation were examined in detail in Section III.

33. Although it might be possible to arrange for a neutral to sink herself, the operation, from the point of view of the Japanese Naval Staff, would lack the element of reliability which is so essential to ensure its successful execution, and although the possibility of neutral action in this respect should not be ignored, it is considered that the chief danger lies in attempted blocking by a Japanese merchant ship, two of which on the average pass through the Canal each way per week.

**VI.—Laying of Mines from a Merchant Ship.**

34. As regards (c), the sowing of mines from a specially equipped merchantman would be an indirect, and far less reliable method of securing the same result as that aimed at by (a) or (b)—the blocking of the Canal.

35. Referring to Section III, it will be seen that nearly all the factors required to ensure a successful block are lacking, and that this form of attack possesses, in a marked degree, the element of unreliability.

36. Moreover, considerations over which the enemy has no control, would decide the selection of the pilot for and nationality and type of ship which strikes the mine, assuming, for a moment, that the presence of the latter has not already been discovered and suitable precautions taken.

37. Certain visible above-water fittings would be necessary in a ship adapted for laying mines, and the actual laying of the mine would entail some unusual activity on the part of the crew which would be bound to arouse the suspicions of the pilot, especially if the latter were warned what to look out for. The actual dropping of a heavy object into the water could hardly escape the notice of the pilot, whose collusion would be required in order to ensure suppression of the fact that the dropping of the mine had been detected.

38. In the above connection it can probably be assumed that the Canal Authorities will take all precautions that are within their power on the strength of representations made by the British Government.

**VII.—Surreptitious Laying of Mines Transported to the Canal by Land.**

39. During the late war, five mines were laid in the Canal after being transported to the Asiatic side across the Sinai Peninsula by camel or other means. Of these, only one was struck by a ship—the steamship "Teiresias"—with the result that the Canal was blocked for several days.

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40. The conditions, however, were peculiar, as Germany or her allies had direct access to the Eastern shore of the Canal, across Turkish territory and the Sinai Peninsula until early in 1916, when more extended military defences, covering the Eastern approaches to the Canal, were organised.

These conditions are not likely to recur so long as Great Britain holds the mandate for, and is in effective occupation of, Palestine.

41. At the same time, ingenuity and a free use of money might secure the same end by different means, and it would be unwise entirely to neglect precautions against this form of attack.

42. The detection of the actual laying of the mine would be more difficult than in the case of a mine laid from a merchant ship, but this method of minelaying would be equally unreliable in securing the attainment of the object aimed at.

43. The defences against this form of attack partake more of a military than of a Naval character, but the patrol and the minesweeping of the Canal by motor launches and light craft which would be organised as a matter of common precaution, together with a system of traffic control, would ensure a certain degree of immunity from the consequences of this and other forms of minelaying.

**VIII.—Placing a Considerable Force, including Guns, on the Banks and Sinking any Vessel attempting to Pass.**

44. This was considered a likely form of attack in 1910, when the Committee of Imperial Defence was considering the question of the responsibility of the Navy and Army for the defence of the Suez Canal (C.I.D. Paper 115B of the 2nd June, 1910), but it would appear to be too remote in the case of a war with Japan to merit consideration in this paper.

**IX.—Sniping at a Passing Vessel, Killing the Helmsman, and Causing her to Run Ashore.**

45. This form of attack might be secured by a remote enemy if we were not in effective occupation of the banks of the Canal, but it can be effectually countered, as it was during the late war, by erecting sand-bag protection on the bridges of all ships.

**X.—By Sinking One of the Large Canal Dredgers.**

46. This could not be done without some sort of collusion with the personnel employed in Suez Canal craft, and is overshadowed by the much greater and more effective threat of a merchantman sinking herself.

**XI.—Effect of Blocking the Canal on British Imperial Strategy.**

47. The effectiveness with which British Imperial policy is upheld in distant waters relies in the last resort upon the effectiveness of Naval intervention, which in turn is dependent on the mobility of the Fleet.

48. The Washington Conference has placed the British Empire in the position of being the only Power which can counter, with adequate Naval Forces, any aggressive tendencies on the part of Japan.

49. Should a situation arise which called for our active intervention in the Far East, it would be necessary to despatch a Fleet of sufficient size to defeat or neutralise the Japanese Navy.

50. The apparent superiority of the British Fleet over that of Japan is largely discounted by factors inherent in a campaign conducted at a great distance from our main sources of supply.

51. These difficulties at present exist in an aggravated form, but will gradually be eliminated or minimised as the Government policy of building up reserves of oil fuel on the route to the East, and creating a Naval Repair Establishment, supply and oil-fuel depot at Singapore matures.

52. Fixed and mobile local armaments are also required at Singapore and elsewhere to defend the means whereby the Fleet is rendered mobile and maintained in a state of constant readiness for action.

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Defences also perform the important function of denying the enemy the use of our anchorages and maintenance facilities during periods when our local maritime supremacy is not secured.

53. The scale of defence of Singapore against seaborne attack and seaborne land attack must be such as to make it impossible for the enemy to seize and retain the port, or occupy it temporarily with a view to rendering it useless as a Naval Base, during the period which will elapse before we can challenge local sea supremacy, *i.e.*, the period before relief.

54. That Japan would be fully aware of the importance of early arrival of our Fleet in the East and its bearing on the capacity of Singapore to withstand organised attack is axiomatic.

That she will do all in her power to impede the passage of our Fleet can also be taken for granted.

55. As pointed out in C.I.D. Paper 190-C, such action might take the form of—

- (a.) Mining of routes.
- (b.) Attacks on oilers and oil tanks.
- (c.) Attempts at interference with the Suez Canal.

56. In C.I.D. Paper 190-C it was also pointed out that another likely course of action would consist in attacks on our trade and communications, especially with a view to holding up the transport of military reinforcements from India to Malaya, and that the necessary deterrent to such action would be found in the despatch of a fast mobile force of battle cruisers and attendant light craft ahead of the Fleet, which would operate in the Bay of Bengal, using Trincomali as their base.

57. Of all the courses of action open to Japan on, or in the anticipation of, the outbreak of war, the blocking of the Suez Canal would appear to be not only the simplest, but also the one most fruitful of results.

58. By doing so, she could not only hold back our Main Fleet, but could also deny us the means of safeguarding with our advanced forces our trade, communications, oil depots and bases in the Indian Ocean.

59. The Admiralty recommendations regarding "scales of attack against which provision should be made" in C.I.D. 169-C (which have been noted and approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence), were based on the assumption that our Main Fleet would make the passage to the East via the Suez Canal.

60. In this connection, special attention is invited to the following extract from C.I.D. 169-C:—

"19. With regard to certain important ports in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, such as Colombo, Bombay and Aden,\* and to a lesser degree ports in Australia and the Cape, the chances of attack by Capital Ship vary according to the degree of mobility attained by the Fleet, and by the ability of Singapore to resist all attack.

"In recommending provision against a minor scale of attack at these places, it is assumed that all measures deemed essential by the Admiralty for the mobility of the Fleet, and by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry for the defence of Singapore will be carried out, and, in this case, serious attack on the ports situated in the areas mentioned above becomes a danger too remote to justify extensive local measures."

\* Trincomali should now be added, see C.I.D. 190-C.

61. Assuming that the Canal was blocked "effectively," that is, that a heavy ship was scuttled in one of the rocky portions; assuming also that the scuttling of the ship was well-timed with reference to the position of our Fleet and the state of Japanese preparations; the effect on the operations of the British and Japanese forces would appear to be as follows:—

62. The Main British Fleet would be distributed between the Mediterranean and Home Waters, and, in anticipation of trouble, it is reasonable to suppose that the Battle Cruiser Squadron would be cruising in the neighbourhood of Malta or the Aegean, on some pretext connected with Mediterranean affairs, or simply in the course of its periodical cruise.

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63. Japanese Naval Forces would be distributed between bases in the south of Japan and the defended base in the Pescadores, and there is nothing to prevent some of her light forces having been sent to Port Malakal or other anchorage in the Pelew or Caroline Islands.

64. The information that the Canal had been "effectively" blocked would be the signal for declaration of war by Japan and for the commencement of operations against our bases, trade, communications and oil depots in the Indian Ocean and Far East.

65. Japan's object would be to deprive our Fleet of the oil supplies and maintenance facilities which had been gradually built up at Singapore and on the route to the East during years of peace.

66. With this object in view, she could deliver heavy attacks against our trade and naval resources at such places as Trincomali, Colombo, and even Aden, at the same time making a military descent in overwhelming force on Singapore in the certain knowledge of being able to achieve her object, or at least do considerable material damage before the British Fleet could intervene.

The British Naval forces normally maintained in the East in peace time would be unable to offer prolonged resistance, although they might at first impose additional precautions on the enemy, which would sensibly delay operations against Singapore.

67. *Considerations of the possible Courses of Action open to the British Fleet would be governed by—*

- (a.) Uncertainty as to the time which would elapse before the block was removed.
- (b.) The difficulty, almost amounting to impossibility, of sending an adequate Fleet to the East via the Cape in time to be of any practical help in relieving the situation.
- (c.) Doubt as to the fate of our Naval bases and resources in the East, and especially of Singapore, which would be exposed to heavy attack without possibility of early relief.
- (d.) The moral effect of such a striking reverse on the outbreak of war, not only on the Fighting Services, but on public opinion in belligerent and neutral countries. The public outcry and press campaign directed against the Admiralty and Government which would inevitably follow such an initial success by the enemy might severely hamper our policy and have a disastrous effect on the prosecution of the war.

68. *As regards (a)*, the tendency is usually to underestimate the time taken to complete salvage, demolition and dredging operations, as unforeseen difficulties are apt to arise. Naval, Military and diplomatic action might be delayed in the hope that the block would be cleared in three weeks or so, and a confused and hopeless situation would arise as the end of this period approached without this hope showing promise of being fulfilled.

69. *As regards (b)*, this difficulty is due to the following factors:—

- (i.) Lack of large oil depots on the Cape route; it will be remembered that until 1931 all our efforts are being concentrated on the creation of oil depots on the route to the East via the Suez Canal.
- (ii.) Delay in procuring and distributing the enormously increased numbers of tankers on which the progress of the Fleet will be dependent in the absence of shore oil installations.
- (iii.) Distance to be traversed is nearly half as much again as via the Suez Canal, *i.e.*, United Kingdom to Singapore is 8,000 odd miles via Suez, and 11,000 odd miles via the Cape of Good Hope.
- (iv.) Great distances between suitable fuelling ports in British territory *en route*, in some cases exceeding the endurance of existing Light Craft. In this connection it should be observed that technical considerations debar oil-burning ships from taking in fuel at sea or in unsheltered anchorages with anything like the same degree of speed and reliance as was possible in the case of coal-burning ships.
- (v.) Reduction in average speed due to—
  - (i.) Limited capabilities of tankers, *i.e.*, 10 knots.
  - (ii.) Need for economical steaming due to long distances between fuelling ports.

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Parenthetically it should be observed that the longer the "carry" the less oil fuel will there be available at its termination on account of consumption by the oilers themselves during the passage, *e.g.*, 1,200,000 tons shipped at Abadan is only equivalent to a million tons available at Singapore.

(vi.) Reduction of speed due to causes outlined above deprives ships of one of their best defences against submarine attack during the latter part of the voyage.

70. *As regards (c)*, the whole of our Far Eastern strategy is based on the existence of a large reserve of fuel at Singapore, *i.e.*, close to the Fleet. The increase in the "period before relief" of Singapore to two and a half or three months would bring us within measurable distance of having to contemplate the loss of Singapore, or at least the destruction of its Naval supply and maintenance facilities.

*Effect of Loss of Singapore Oil Reserve.*

71. The loss of Singapore oil installation would at once destroy the mobility of the Fleet, and render effective operations against Japan from Singapore impossible. We should be dependent on oil brought in tankers along a long and vulnerable line of communications. In this connection, the Admiralty would again point out that, apart from the limitations of the world's oil supplies, the world's tanker tonnage is inadequate to supply a Fleet operating in such distant waters, and for this reason the establishment of the Singapore and other installations in the East has become part of the Government policy.

*Effect of Loss of Oil Reserves on Route to the East.*

72. The loss of oil installations at such places as Trincomali, Colombo and Aden would impose a further strain on our already inadequate tanker tonnage and further prolong the period before relief at Singapore.

*Effect of Loss of Naval Repair Facilities.*

73. The loss of Naval repair facilities at Singapore would be equally disastrous.

74. The strength of a Fleet can only be measured in terms of ships capable of taking the sea and performing their functions up to the full limit of their fuel endurance.

Distances in the Pacific are enormous, and the endurances of our ships are even now barely sufficient. Under the conditions assumed a twofold process will set in :—

- (a.) Material will deteriorate, and at a more rapid rate than in temperate climates, and there will be little chance of reviving it without detaching ships to far distant ports such as Bombay, Sydney, Durban and Malta.
- (b.) The bottoms of ships will become fouled, and their speed and endurance thereby decreased.

75. Deterioration of material, or detaching of ships to distant dockyards will both result in reducing the number of vessels available to meet the enemy and impose our will on Japan.

The number of ships actually available for service will thus from one cause or another gradually shrink to a number approximating to the number we can repair and keep efficient.

We cannot count on having the repair facilities of Hong Kong available, as it is only reasonable to suppose that, having plenty of time to accomplish her object, Japan would concentrate on reducing Hong Kong also.

76. The shortage of docks, as revealed by a close examination of requirements compared with facilities existing within 2,000 miles of Singapore, is as follows :—

	Shortage.	Per cent.
Bulged Capital Ships	...	100
Light Cruisers and Various	...	20
Destroyers	...	90
Submarines	...	100

77. The normal repair and refitting requirements are, however, entirely overshadowed by the situation that would arise after a Fleet action.

A badly damaged ship can often only be saved by putting her into dock.

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It will be seen from the above percentages that this would be impossible in the case of Capital Ships, as, *with the exception of one projected commercial dock at Hong Kong, there will not exist in the Eastern theatre of operations any docks capable of taking a modern Capital Ship.*

Fouling of bottoms will result in decrease of speed, decrease of endurance and increase of fuel consumption, and will affect profoundly both the tactical and strategical situation *vis-à-vis* the Japanese.

*Conclusion.*

78. The effect of Japan effectually blocking the Canal immediately prior to the outbreak of war, and before our Fleet had passed Suez, would be so disastrous as seriously to imperil our chances of being able to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

**XII.—The Effect of the Blocking of the Suez Canal on Imperial Trade.**

79. The importance of the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom may be best illustrated by the following figures for the year 1922 of the principal imports into the United Kingdom from sources east of the Canal.

80. Over two million tons of mineral oil transited the Canal northwards from Persia, mainly destined for the United Kingdom. This represents 15 per cent. of the northbound cargoes for 1922, and this figure is likely to be improved upon in the future.

81. A large proportion of this would, of course, be deflected to the East for Fleet consumption in the event of war in the East.

82. In 1922, 941,000 tons of Manganese Ore went north through the Canal from India, bound for various destinations, including the United Kingdom.

83.

Country received from.	Commodity.	Quantity.	Percentage of United Kingdom Imports.
		Tons.	Per cent.
India and British East Indies	Tea ... ..	111,760	90
	Rice ... ..	64,241	46
	Jute ... ..	148,889	100
	Raw wool ... ..	24,758	5
	Raw cotton ... ..	19,720	3
	Wheat ... ..	24,380	1
	Cotton-seed ... ..	136,928	28
	Linseed ... ..	158,231	33
	Rapeseed ... ..	32,630	100
Mauritius ... ..	Sugar ... ..	194,580	15
Australia ... ..	Frozen meat ... ..	107,535	12
	Wheat and wheatflour	905,655	17
	Wool ... ..	204,403	41
	Lead ... ..	72,208	39
New Zealand ... ..	Frozen meat ... ..	179,819	20
Philippines ... ..	Hemp ... ..	40,746	53
Straits Settlements and Free Malay States ... ..	Rubber ... ..	39,269	61

84. The wheat movement from India to Europe is spasmodic, depending upon the seasons, but India exports wheat to the European continent in a good season.

85. The southward bound stream of traffic includes :—

*From United Kingdom to India.*

Coal—765,851 tons (1922).

Large quantities of textiles (India being Britain's best customer for textiles).

Iron and steel.

Machinery.

Railway materials.

Miscellaneous manufactures.

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*from United Kingdom to Australia.*

Metal manufactures.  
Textiles.  
Miscellaneous manufactures.

86. China and Japan have not been considered above, as the imports into the United Kingdom from these sources are not vital.

87. From the above analysis it will be seen that economically it is essential for the United Kingdom to obtain supplies from the sources in question.

88. In the event of the Suez Canal being blocked for any extended period, the alternative route via the Cape would have to be used. Roughly speaking, in a voyage from the United Kingdom to Bombay, this means a distance of 10,450 miles against 6,050 miles via Suez. In the case of Singapore, the distance from the United Kingdom would be 11,569 miles against 8,066 miles via Suez.

89. This increased length of route would, in any case, disorganise normal traffic, so far as the protection of shipping was concerned, and might also have one of the two following effects:—

(a.) The increased freight causing higher prices might have the effect of reducing trade, with consequent distress in British exporting manufacturing industries,

or

(b.) If the volume of trade remained steady, or increases, a larger amount of tonnage would be required, and this, at a time when tonnage is likely to be in great demand (*i.e.*, in war-time).

90. It is thought likely that the second alternative is the more probable, as the United Kingdom demand for supplies from the East would tend to increase on the outbreak of war, and, in consequence, more tonnage space would be required, irrespective of whether exports from the United Kingdom declined or not.

In either event the increased freights would be bound to react upon prices.

91. As regards Persian oil supplies, about 40 per cent. of the output can, at present, be refined at Abadan (1,000,000 tons per annum). This refinery will be capable of dealing with increasing amounts of crude oil as time progresses, but in 1921, 300,000 tons of the crude petroleum were shipped from Persia to the United Kingdom, and the South Wales Refinery is drawing an increasing supply from this source. On the other hand, a refinery for Persian oil is also being established in Australia, and in the event of war in the East, not only would the Persian output be deflected East for Fleet consumption, but a supplementary supply for this purpose would in all probability transit the Canal in an easterly direction from the United Kingdom stocks. The tanker tonnage would be fully employed in this emergency, and would probably be insufficient to cope with the increased length of voyage via the Cape in the event of the Suez Canal being blocked.

**XIII.—Great Britain's Obligation to Preserve the Neutrality of the Canal and to Intervene to Prevent Violation of its Neutrality.**

92. In Appendix II to this paper will be found some observations by the Foreign Office (Appendix III to C.I.D. 115-B of June 2, 1910), written in 1910, regarding the obligations of Powers\* signatory to the Suez Canal Convention of the 29th October, 1888, and of Great Britain in particular, to preserve the neutrality of the Suez Canal.

93. Although these remarks were made at a time when the Committee of Imperial Defence were investigating the problem of the defence of the Suez Canal against Turkish aggression from the East, it would appear that they would apply with even greater force in relation to the problem now under review—"The liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack in the event of war with Japan," for the following reasons:—

- (a.) Japan was not a signatory to the Suez Canal Convention, and the blocking of the Canal even in peace time would cause her little inconvenience.
- (b.) Japan would be unable to resist the temptation to interfere with the Suez Canal in the event of war with this country.

\* Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, Holland, Russia, Turkey.

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94. In this connection the Admiralty would invite the attention to the following extracts from Foreign Office note quoted above:—

“It appears to the Foreign Office, after careful consideration, that, by virtue of the Convention of the 29th October, 1888, respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal, signed by all the Powers and accepted by His Majesty's Government in 1904, Great Britain, in common with the other Signatory Powers (of whom Turkey is one), is under a joint and several obligation to preserve the neutrality of the Suez Canal.”

“Our ground of interference, however, would not be the protection of Egypt against attack, but the protection of the Canal against violation. So far as we claim to intervene under the Convention, our intervention should be strictly confined to such measures as are necessary to prevent the violation of the neutrality of the Canal.”

“Our interference with force sufficient to protect and preserve this neutrality for the benefit of the world at large does not, however, entail interference to preserve Egypt so long as the neutrality of the Canal is assured.”

“The neutrality guaranteed, however, is really in the nature of a passage without let or hindrance through the Canal for the shipping of all nations, and this would obviously meet with interference from bodies of armed men forcing a way across the Canal and fighting on its banks, to the danger of the passing shipping.”

95. It would appear, by virtue of its traditional practice and obligation, that the British Government should, on the grounds of maintaining the freedom of passage of the Canal *to the world's shipping*, take the necessary steps during a period of strained relations to preserve the utility of the Canal by keeping it open for the passage of ships, or, in other words, to prevent either ships or ill-disposed persons doing anything to impede the passage of ships through the Canal.

96. As the first visible act of interference would be the actual blocking of the Canal, it would be necessary to institute the necessary precautions on the strength of suspicions that such an act was in contemplation based on information received from secret and other sources.

97. It may be argued that in taking any preventive steps we should be actuated by “interested” motives, but it would, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be a mistake to allow reflections as to the interpretation other nations might put on our actions unduly to influence our policy when so much is at stake.

98. Our “interests” are indeed of such a striking nature that, even if the 1888 Convention did not enforce on us a moral obligation to take certain steps, possibly of a seemingly high-handed nature, in the interests of the world's shipping, they alone would constitute a sufficient justification for doing all in our power to preserve the utility of the canal.

99. Briefly, those “interests” appear to be—

(a.) The overwhelmingly high percentage of British tonnage using the Canal compared to all other nations.

In 1922, the British percentage was 64 compared with Dutch 10 per cent., Japan 4 per cent., United States of America 3 per cent. and France 4 per cent.

(b.) The revenue Great Britain derives from the 176,602 out of the 400,000 original shares in the Canal Company, a shareholding capacity which gives us a clear majority over any other individual shareholder and a dominating interest in the prosperity of the Canal as a commercial undertaking.

(c.) Our special status *vis-à-vis* the Government of Egypt.

(d.) The extreme vulnerability of this delicate link in our Imperial communications, and the profound effect which its rupture would exert on our strategy if we were ever faced with the possibility of war with Japan.

**XIV.—The Attitude of the Suez Canal Company and its Effect on the Passage of a Large Fleet through the Canal in the Event of a War with Japan.**

100. The Canal was commenced in 1858 and opened to traffic in 1869 (November). By an international convention, signed the 24th October, 1887, it was declared

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neutralised, and vessels of all nations, whether armed or not, may pass through in peace or war.

101. The Suez Canal Company is registered under Egyptian Law as an Egyptian Company with headquarters at Paris. At first the Administration was entirely French, but owing to the preponderance of British ships and the acquisition by His Majesty's Government in 1875 of shares to the value of 4 millions, British Directors were admitted on the board, and the Council of Administration now consists of thirty-two Directors, of whom ten are British and the remainder French. Of the British, three represent His Majesty's Government and seven the ship owners.

102. In 1915 the Commander-in-Chief, East India and Egypt, remarked as follows:—

“The position of the Canal Company is in many respects unique. They are an international Corporation and in ordinary times practically enjoy extra-territorial rights, acknowledging no authority in the conduct of their own business, other than that of their Directors. It is, therefore, easily to be understood that it must have been galling to them to have to submit to outside control when the Canal became the scene of hostilities. It entailed a complete reversal of their usual habit of mind, and it is a great testimonial to the loyal co-operation with which they have accepted the situation that our relations with them should have been all through so uniformly cordial.”

103. During the war, however, the Canal administration got used to the idea of British control, and gradually got more and more into the habit of relying on the assistance of the British for assistance in emergency.

The extent of this reliance can be gauged by perusal of the Foreign Office Memorandum on the Suez Canal Convention dated the 1st July, 1922 (F.O. Paper, E. 6536/1/16), attached as Appendix III to this paper.

The result is that most cordial relations were established between the British authorities in the Canal Zone, and the Suez Canal Administration. It is understood that the relations at Paris between the British representatives at Paris and the Suez Canal Directorate are equally good.

104. The following extract from a letter from Sir Ian Malcolm to the Foreign Office, dated the 11th December, 1922 (F.O. Paper, E. 13999/391/16), throws light on this question:—

“1. In conversation with our principal agent in Egypt, Comte de Serrionne, K.C.M.G., I learned that he found it increasingly difficult to do business with the Egyptian Government now that British officials of the highest class are retiring from the Egyptian Service. He assures me that, at every turn, he finds the British officials replying in these terms: ‘We are out of it now, so it is no use your coming to us’; whilst the Egyptians say: ‘We are not yet entirely independent, therefore you cannot expect us to do anything to help you.’ A further difficulty, arising from the present transition stage in Egyptian administration, is caused by the fact that the Suez Canal work has been transferred from the Finance Minister (who dealt with it until the beginning of the present year) to a new Ministry of Transport and Communications, which has not yet made itself acquainted with our affairs, and which is inclined to treat the Suez Canal (and this is probably the real reason for the transfer) merely as an Egyptian waterway.”

105. It is in connection with the passage of a large British Fleet through the Suez Canal on or before the outbreak of war and the precautionary steps necessary to ensure that the free passage of the Canal is not impaired, that the attitude of the “Canal Administrative” authorities calls for special consideration.

106. The Canal Administration is essentially French, and is manned almost exclusively by French personnel. The higher posts are filled entirely by Frenchmen and admission to these posts is confined to a comparatively small ring.

It is only in the Pilot Service that men of other than French nationality are found in any numbers.

107. During the late war our alliance with France ensured as a general rule the cordial official co-operation of the Canal Administration. National sympathy, mutual tact, and the imminence of a common threat from the East cemented this co-operation and ensured all our requirements being readily met.

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108. During a hypothetical war in the future the following appear to be the three conditions that require consideration:—

- (a.) France an ally or a sympathetic neutral.
- (b.) France an unsympathetic neutral.
- (c.) France hostile.

No difficulty is anticipated in case (a).

As regards case (b), it would be within the power of the Canal Administration to impede the passage of the Fleet and its attendant auxiliaries in a variety of ways. There are innumerable difficulties than can be raised and exaggerated if the authorities wish to be obstructive, which would disappear if they are sympathetic.

The fact of the Canal Zone being under British martial law would not necessarily make the functioning of the canal organisation easier—rather the reverse, as it might irritate French *amour-propre*.

109. As regards (c), it might be necessary for us to take over the running of the Canal altogether, making full use of loyal or sympathetic personnel. This would be a difficult, but not an impossible task.

It does not, however, arise in connection with the problem under discussion, which presupposes that Japan is the only enemy.

110. In either case (b) or (c) the more British personnel that can be employed in the Canal Service the better; and a possible line of action is suggested in the inflation of numbers of British personnel in the Pilot Service.

111. The British Directors of the Suez Canal Company might be approached with a view to establishing the principle that the number of pilots of each nationality should bear some definite relation to the tonnage of that nationality using the Canal. This would involve the number of British and Dutch pilots being increased concurrently with a corresponding decrease in Greeks and Italians. Frenchmen presumably hold a privileged position, but reference to the Table in paragraph 18 shows that the number of Greeks and Italians is quite disproportionate. Such a measure, if carried out gradually, should eventually ensure us a substantial majority and a useful nucleus in war time in the event of our having to take over the running of the Canal from the French.

112. It would appear from Sir Ian Malcolm's despatches that the Committee of Management at Paris are generally able to meet any suggestions put forward by the British representatives, but as a last resort it would seem from the following extract from his despatch dated the 3rd July, 1922, that we hold the trump card:—

“As regards the British representation on the Board, it would seem to be sufficient. In the event of any grave difference of opinion arising (such as has not arisen since 1883), it would always be possible for nominees of His Majesty's Government, holding shares in their name, to produce a majority of votes at a General Meeting.”

#### XV.—Conclusions and Proposed Action.

113. The effect on British Imperial Strategy of the effectual blocking of the Suez Canal immediately prior to the outbreak of war with Japan would be so disastrous as seriously to imperil our chance of being able to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

Not only would the safety of our Eastern bases, and with them the means of maintaining our Fleet in an efficient and mobile state be seriously imperilled, but British Imperial trade, communications and territories in the East would be laid open to heavy attack, and denied protection over an indefinite period.

114. The difficulties of blocking the Canal, in the absence of suitable deterrents, are such as could be overcome by an enterprising nation.

115. The difficulty of organising suitable deterrents is chiefly due to the limitations inherent in our relations towards Egypt and our position in the Suez Canal Zone, and *vis-à-vis* the Suez Canal Company. These difficulties might, however, to some extent be overcome by pursuing, so far as possible, the policy based on the following principles:—

- (i.) Make sure that all Treaties we conclude with Egypt, Turkey, or other Powers do not in any way circumscribe the power of Great Britain

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to take emergency action to maintain free navigation of the Suez Canal for all Nations.

- (ii.) Maintain liaison with the Canal Company through the British Government Representative on the Board of Directors—Sir Ian Malcolm—and ascertain through him what steps the Canal Company propose to take in the event of suspicions being aroused that someone intends to try to block the Canal.
- (iii.) When information on this point is available, it might be possible to advise Sir Ian Malcolm or Lord Inchcape what additional steps we consider necessary, and ascertain what additional assistance, if any, the Canal Company require to create a structure on which a sound precautionary organisation might be built up.
  - We have perfectly legitimate reason for doing this by reason of :—
  - (a.) The dominating shareholding power of the British Government.
  - (b.) The Dominant British shipping interests, amounting to 64 per cent. of total traffic.
  - (c.) Our position *vis-à-vis* Egypt.
  - (d.) Suez Canal being a link between the Wings of the Empire.

- (iv.) Suggest, through the British Representative, that the number of British Pilots in the Canal Service should gradually be increased at the expense of Greeks and Italians.

The Dutch Director would probably support the proposal that the number of British and Dutch Pilots should bear some relation to volume of British and Dutch shipping, Great Britain and Holland being the greatest users of the Canal.

The process would naturally be a gradual one as vacancies are infrequent.

- (v.) Inaugurate intelligence system in Canal Zone as well as in Japan, to watch loading, &c., of Japanese shipping.
- (vi.) Encourage the Canal Company to organise a simple minesweeping system which could be put into force during periods of strained International relations.
- (vii.) When Eastern International situation becomes clouded, consider the question of providing and equipping small craft to assist in the minesweeping of the Canal.
- (viii.) Put into force special measures for reporting movements of Japanese shipping *when war becomes possible*.

116. If the British Government and British armed forces were in physical occupation of the Canal, as was the case during the war, the organisation of measures designed with the object of preventing the Canal being blocked would not be difficult.

117. The following are typical of the precautions that would be taken in collaboration with the Canal Administration :—

- (i.) Special Examination Service.
- (ii.) Searching of ships not considered altogether trustworthy.
- (iii.) Armed Guards and specially selected double Pilots on board ships sailing under neutral colours or those which for any reason are considered suspicious.
- (iv.) Tugs kept in readiness in vicinity of rocky portions of the Canal to move ships that have been run aground.
- (v.) Augmentation of salvage plant and staff maintained in vicinity of the Canal.
- (vi.) Rocky portions only to be passed during daylight hours.
- (vii.) Sandbag protection to pilots and helmsmen.
- (viii.) Special arrangements for clearing the Canal of shipping prior to the passage of the larger portions of the Fleet.
- (ix.) Precautionary minesweeping prior to the passage of portions of the Fleet.



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APPENDIX I.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY TO THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE ON  
"THE POSITION OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN TIME OF WAR."

(Extract from C.I.D. 98-B of February 12, 1907.)

1. The case in question—the menace of the Canal by a Turkish force desiring to invade Egypt—does not appear to be provided for by the Convention of 1888.
2. In such a case Egypt would clearly not possess the means of securing the neutrality of the Canal, even if the Government of Egypt wished to secure it, and the Porte, being the aggressor, could not be invoked.
3. The duty of "taking proper steps to secure the protection and the free use "of the Canal" must therefore devolve on some other Power, the right accorded to Turkey by the Convention (Article IX) being transferred to that Power.
4. The Power on which this duty is most likely to fall would be Great Britain, who is responsible for maintaining order in Egypt, that country being *ex hypothesi* in a condition certain to lead to disorder, if the Turkish invasion were successful. Great Britain would, moreover, possess belligerent rights owing to her troops in Egypt being threatened with attack, and could not apparently be prevented from taking such measures as would be required.
5. Having regard to the situation created by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, it may be concluded that "the other Signatory Powers" would, in their own interests, necessarily look to Great Britain to maintain the neutrality of the Canal, which, in the circumstances, postulated in C.I.D. Paper 89-B, would entail the measures suggested. These measures would not "obstruct the free navigation of "the Canal," but would have for their object the maintenance of the freedom of navigation for all Powers.
6. In 1882, when, owing to the Egyptian Army having revolted under Arabi, the Canal was in danger, we seized it from end to end and held it for a short time, thereby causing some inconvenience to traffic. We were then acting as agents of the Khedive, who was, of course, powerless. In the hypothetical case, the Khedive having no Navy, would also be powerless, even if he were not unwilling, to act.
7. It does not appear unreasonable to assume that the precedent of 1882 would hold good in the case of an attempted invasion of Egypt by Turkey from the East, and that the risk of objection by other Powers to our assuming the responsibility of taking the measures for keeping open the traffic in the Canal would be infinitely less now than it then was.

APPENDIX II.

REPORT AND APPENDICES OF AN ENQUIRY BY THE STANDING SUB-COMMITTEE OF  
THE C.I.D. INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAVY AND ARMY RESPECTIVELY  
FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

(Extract from C.I.D. 115-B of June 2, 1910.)

*Note by the Foreign Office.*

In connection with the enquiry into the responsibility of the Navy and Army respectively for the defence of the Suez Canal, the question has been submitted to the Foreign Office whether, in view of Treaty engagements, naval action inside the limits of the Canal is legitimate at all.

It appears to the Foreign Office, after careful consideration, that, by virtue of the Convention of the 29th October, 1888, respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal, signed by all the Powers and accepted by His Majesty's Government in 1904, Great Britain, in common with the other signatory Powers (of whom Turkey is one), is under a joint and several obligation to preserve the neutrality of the Suez Canal.

Supposing that Turkey, as part of a hostile movement against Egypt, were to project a raid of armed men across the Canal for the purpose of attacking Egypt on

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the western bank, Egypt would undoubtedly do all in her power to repel the attack by force when the Turkish troops were attempting to cross the Canal. The result would obviously be a violation of the neutrality of the Canal by Turkey, and this violation we, in common with all the other signatory Powers, are bound to stop. Our ground of interference, however, would not be the protection of Egypt against attack, but the protection of the Canal against violation. So far as we claim to intervene under the Convention, our intervention should be strictly confined to such measures as are necessary to prevent the violation of the neutrality of the Canal.

The question of whether we are also bound or entitled to protect Egypt herself against attack by Turkey is an entirely different question, which must be kept apart from that of the preservation of the neutrality of the Canal, an international obligation practically shared by the concert of Europe.

Our interference with force sufficient to protect and preserve this neutrality for the benefit of the world at large does not, however, entail interference to preserve Egypt so long as the neutrality of the Canal is assured.

Turkey, by violating the neutrality of the Canal, would, of course, violate the Treaty to which she is a party, and this would be an outrageous proceeding on her part, but it would not release the other parties to the Treaty from their obligations thereunder to see that the neutrality of the Canal is maintained.

It is possible that Turkey might argue that she cannot violate the neutrality of the Canal if her object be merely to punish her rebellious or contumacious vassal, who has no belligerent rights and no separate international status apart from Turkey. The neutrality guaranteed, however, is really in the nature of a passage without let or hindrance through the Canal for shipping of all nations, and this would obviously meet with interference from bodies of armed men forcing a way across the Canal and fighting on its banks, to the danger of the passing shipping.

APPENDIX III.

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM ON THE SUEZ CANAL CONVENTION OF 1888,  
DATED JULY 1, 1922.

There have been clear indications ever since our declaration to Egypt of the 15th March that the French intend to accuse us of a breach of our international engagements in the matter of the maintenance of troops on the Suez Canal.

The Embassy at Paris are anxious for some indication of the lines on which we will deal with such charges when they are made, and, though it is difficult to prepare a detailed defence of our position without knowing the form which the attack will take, it may not be inopportune to examine the whole situation in order to discover whether that position is as vulnerable as the French seem to believe.

The "neutrality" of the Suez Canal first attracted attention in 1882, when Lord Wolseley used Lake Timsah as a base for his advance on Tel-el-Kebir. His right to do so was violently opposed by M. de Lesseps and the Administration of the Company, but their pretensions were described, in a written opinion of the Lord Chancellor (Lord Selbourne), dated the 14th September, 1882, as preposterous, being based on Article 14 of the Company's concession of the 15th January, 1856, which merely declares that the Canal and its dependent ports shall "always be open, as neutral passages, to all merchant-vessels passing from one sea to the other, without distinction, exclusion or preference of persons or nations." Lord Selbourne observes, with reference to the above passage, that "a stipulation more irrelevant to warlike measures, taken by the Khedive or his allies for the defence of the Government of Egypt against foreign or domestic enemies cannot well be conceived."

Some three months after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, Lord Granville addressed a circular to the Powers on the Egyptian situation, and, *inter alia*, alluded to the arrangements which should for the future be adopted in connection with the "free navigation" (an expression which he preferred to "neutrality") of the Suez Canal.

Nothing further happened till 1885, when, at the instance of the French Government, it was decided to assemble at Paris a Commission composed of representatives of the Great Powers, as well as of Spain and Holland, "to establish by a conventional act a definite system for guaranteeing at all times and to all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal."

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The majority of the Commission were bent on the internationalisation rather than the neutralisation of the Canal. This we resolutely opposed, with the result that nothing definite was accomplished, and it was not until 1888 that the convention which now holds the field was concluded, subject to the important proviso on which we insisted that it should not come into force so long as the British occupation of Egypt lasted.

This was the position till 1904, when, as a result of the Anglo-French Agreement, we agreed to put the 1888 convention into force, with the exception of those portions of Article 8 providing for the creation of a local international board to watch over the execution of the convention.

There are certain omissions in that instrument which are at present of special interest. In the first place, no mention occurs of any territorial "zone" in which "no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the "free navigation of the Canal shall be committed," the phrase used being "the Canal "and its ports of access" (articles 4, 5 and 7). In the second place, although the diplomatic agents in Egypt of the signatory Powers are enjoined (article 8) to "demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either "bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty "and the entire security of the navigation," from the fact that "the suppression or "the dispersion" were, by articles 9 and 10, left to the Khedive and the Sultan of Turkey, it is unlikely that the signatories contemplated that the bodies to be suppressed or dispersed would consist of the troops of one of the parties to the convention.

The convention having become operative in 1904, its working may be considered under three periods, viz., 1904 to 1914, the war and from the armistice to the present time.

The first period calls for little comment, for neither Egyptian nor British troops were stationed anywhere near the Canal, and the terms of the convention were strictly observed during the Turco-Italian and Balkan wars.

With the outbreak of the European war in August 1914, German and Austrian merchant-ships attempted to use the Canal as a port of refuge, and whilst there they committed acts of hostility by using their wireless to report the movements of Allied vessels.

The local authorities, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, detained the ships and removed their wireless sets, thereby provoking a *pro forma* protest from the Canal Company, who, however, on learning the reasons which had led to this action, expressed themselves as entirely satisfied that the Egyptian Government had in reality been acting in virtue of the Convention of 1888.

Subsequently the enemy ships were turned out of the Egyptian territorial waters, after which they were formally captured by a British cruiser. This episode left the Canal Company unmoved.

Later in the same year the Board of the Company recorded the formal decision that, in view of the threatened Turkish invasion of Egypt, they held it to be their duty to afford the British Army of Occupation every facility for the use of the plant and material of the company in order to assist in the defence of the Canal.

During the first Turkish attack in 1915 French warships stationed in the Canal assisted the British troops in the defence, whilst aerial observation of enemy movements was assumed by French seaplanes.

In the last stages of the war Port Said was the base for small French force which took part, under Lord Allenby's orders, in the operations in Palestine and Syria, and some months after the armistice a considerable number of French troops were still encamped in the outskirts of that town within a few hundred yards of the Canal.

The serious disturbances which occurred in Egypt in the early part of 1919 followed closely on the suspension of active military operations, and in May of that year the Suez Canal Company's workpeople went on strike, with the result that the Canal and commercial services could only be maintained with British Naval and Military assistance.

In October 1920 a similar situation threatened to arise, and the Canal Company gladly welcomed a suggestion that they should be enabled to assure the transit service by means of British sailors, but they made the proviso that those of their employees who were willing to work should be protected from molestation. The Canal Company warned His Majesty's Government through Sir Ian Malcolm that if a strike broke out it would almost certainly spread to their European personnel, and that an

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eventuality of this nature must be contemplated. There has been, in fact, no hesitation on their part in welcoming military co-operation whenever they were in difficulties.

Ever since the armistice the number of British troops on the Canal has been steadily reduced, until to-day there is only the equivalent of a weak brigade at Ismailia, and, with the exception of one company guarding stores at Kantara, no other Canal towns are occupied.

The War Office have been asked to examine the question of retaining the troops at Ismailia, and, though they have not as yet replied officially, it is understood that they have no special desire to occupy the Canal *per se* so long as there is no question of withdrawing the British garrison from the interior of Egypt.

In the light of this brief historical summary, it will not be particularly easy for the French to prove that we have infringed, or are infringing, the Convention of 1888, and until they advance more specific charges than they have hitherto done, there is nothing to be gained by attempting to elaborate our defence.

(Signed) J. MURRAY.

APPENDIX IV.

PROJECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SUEZ CANAL.

It is anticipated that improvements will allow ships of 32 feet draught to use the Canal early in 1923 and 33 feet by the 1st January, 1924.

The opinion was expressed by "Dominions Royal Commission" in 1921 that the Canal should be deepened, widened and improved so as to allow of the passage of ships of dimensions 1,000 feet by 100 feet by 38 feet draught.

Other authoritative opinions, however, placed the maximum draught that would be required to traverse the Canal at 35 feet, for which a depth of water of 41 feet would, in the opinion of the Canal authorities, be required.

The present programme involves the deepening of the Canal to 12 metres (39½ feet).

The Canal Company propose to widen the Canal throughout its entire length to 197 feet, of which a width of 137½ feet will have a depth of 42½ feet, an increase of depth of 1 metre over the present programme.

This widening should allow of ships being "gared up" at any point in the Canal.

An important consideration in connection with the passage of very long ships is the modification of some of the bad bends.

Increases in the dimensions of the Canal have progressed normally for many years, the relation between the sectional dimensions of the Canal and the size of the largest ship using it year by year having varied only slightly since 1870.

The prolongation of Port Said pier to prevent silting of the entrance to the Canal would also have to be undertaken.

The total cost of the improvements is estimated at 100 million Egyptian francs, spread over a period of six to eight years, commencing 1921.

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APPENDIX V.

APPROXIMATE AMOUNTS SHIPS WOULD REQUIRE LIGHTENING FROM DEEP LOAD TO ENABLE THEM TO PASS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL.

(1.)	Mean Deep Load Draught.	1923, Permitted Draught, 32 feet.		1924, Permitted Draught, 33 feet.		1925, Permitted Draught (estimated), 33½ feet.		1929, Permitted Draught (estimated), 35 feet.	
	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)	(5.)	(6.)	(7.)	(8.)	(9.)	(10.)
Lightening required to pass through Canal on draughts shown in column 2.									
	Feet.	Feet.	Tons.	Feet.	Tons.	Feet.	Tons.	Feet.	Tons.
New ships*	34½	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Royal Oak (bulged)*	31	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Ramillies, Resolution, Royal Sovereign, Revenge	32½	½	600	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Queen Elizabeth class	34½	2½	3,000	1½	1,800	1	1,200	Nil	Nil
Iron Duke class	33½	1½	1,700	Nil	600	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
King George V class	32	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	..	..
Hood	32½	½	750	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Repulse	31½	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Tiger	32½	½	600	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

\* Estimated.

- Notes—(i.) In 1921 "Malaya" passed through the Canal, drawing 1 foot more than the greatest draught officially allowed.  
(ii.) Draughts are shown to nearest ½ foot.  
(iii.) It is assumed that ships will have adjusted their longitudinal trim before reaching the Canal.  
(iv.) Figures for "Tiger" are for authorised maximum fuel only.  
(v.) The draught given in column 2 is the maximum that any particular ship of the class is likely to attain.

APPENDIX VI.

MINING OF STEAMSHIP "TEIRESIAS" AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE LITTLE BITTER LAKE ON JUNE 30, 1915.

The "Teiresias," a Blue Funnel Steamer bound for Japan, struck a mine at the southern curve of the Little Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal at 5 A.M. on the 30th June, 1915. By the action of the current she drifted broadside on, and completely blocked the Canal. Fortunately she righted herself during the course of the day under the action of the changing current. If it had not been for this piece of good luck, the situation would have been extremely grave.

2. It is practically certain that the mine had been brought from the desert. South of the southern curve of the Little Bitter Lake there is a stretch of sand standing out on the Asiatic coast towards the Canal and allowing easy access thereto. The point is therefore a dangerous one, a fact to which one or two previous incidents had called attention. As a result of an attempt on part of the Suez Canal Company's apparatus, a guard of a few men had been installed there. Unfortunately, this guard had been withdrawn before the accident, owing to pressure of other duties. There were a few patrols out during the night with armed bearer, but they were very few and there was plenty of time for a minelayer to do his work without being disturbed by them. After the accident the tracks of about a dozen men and one camel were discovered.

3. The mine that the "Teiresias" struck was laid in a section of the Canal where the bottom is rocky, and where dredging is almost impossible.

4. It was subsequently ascertained that the information which led to the mine being laid in this particular spot was given by a retired Canal pilot of German extraction who had settled in Jerusalem.

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APPENDIX VII.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN FROM 1915 TO 1918 TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF THE CANAL  
BEING MINED OR BLOCKED.

As a result of the mining of the "Teiresias," steps were taken to increase the Naval and Military defensive arrangements as soon as the necessary material and personnel were available.

2. Navigation in the southern part of the Canal where the bottom is in parts rocky, was forbidden during the hours of darkness.

3. Armed guards were placed on board, during the passage of the Canal :—

(a.) All ships under neutral colours.

(b.) Any other ship which, from the composition of the crew or other cause, the Examining Officer considered as not altogether trustworthy.

Vessels of well-known lines, sailing under British or Allied colours, were exempt from guards.

4. The duty of the armed guard was to prevent, or in any case to detect, any attempt to drop a mine into the Canal from the ship on board which they were embarked. In the event of an attempt being made to sink a ship in the Canal, they would also have been able to prevent the wreckers escaping.

5. The orders to the armed parties contained the following information and instructions :—

(i.) That the mine would necessarily have to be concealed during the stay of the ship at Port Said or Suez.

(ii.) It would have to be brought out from its place of concealment before being dropped overboard.

(iii.) The most likely place from which a mine would be dropped would be the extreme stern, but it would be possible to drop it from the side of the ship.

(iv.) An attempt is more likely to be made at night than in the daytime.

(v.) The following acts should be regarded with suspicion and prevented :—

(a.) The opening of the hatches of the holds during the passage of the Canal.

(b.) The bringing out from concealment of any bulky object which might be a mine.

(c.) The dropping overboard of anything that might be a mine.

6. In the event of (c) happening before it can be prevented, the pilot should immediately be informed, in order that the ship may be moored up, and traffic stopped until the channel can be swept.

APPENDIX VIII.

CANAL DEFENCE FLOTILLA.

The duties of the Canal Defence Flotilla are :—

1. To prevent minelaying by the enemy.

2. To sweep certain channels daily.

3. To watch those parts of East Bank not defended by the Army.

4. To guard the approaches to Port Said.

*Organisation of Patrol Craft.*

(A.)—1. Guardship is anchored in the vicinity of Kilo. 118, and with her searchlights illuminates the waters North of Kabret.

2. Hopper 34 or 35 anchored in the vicinity of Kilo. 132 and with her searchlight illuminates the Shallows between Kilo. 132 and Geneffe.

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3. Four motor launches anchored east of the channel abreast Kilos. 121, 124, 127, 130 burning their searchlight during the dark hours to light the waters between Kabret and Geneffe.

4. At daylight these four motor launches sweep the channel from Kabret and Geneffe. When the sweeping is completed the Senior Officer of Sweeping Craft will report the fact to the Officer-in-Command of Naval Hopper, who is the Senior Officer in the Little Bitter Lakes.

5. One motor launch standing off at Port Tewfik, one motor launch conveying provisions, mails, &c., from Ismailia to Little Bitter Lake. These boats take turns enabling each boat to have four days on duty and two off.

(B.) *Deversoir Patrol*.—Three motor launches, taking turns of forty-eight hours each, patrolling by night between Deversoir and a line drawn east through Southern Light of Northern Buoyed Channel by day, enforcing fishing regulations in Great Lake.

(C.) *Great Lake Patrol*.—Discontinued at present.

(D.) *Port Said Patrol*.—Six motor launches. Three always out during daylight hours patrolling certain waters in the vicinity of Port Said, arriving at their allotted station before daylight and returning to harbour after dark.

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ORDERS FOR MOTOR LAUNCHES.

*Canal Defence Flotilla.*

*Enemy Mines.*

Five enemy mines have already been accounted for. More attempts to mine the Canal or Lakes are probable. Patrol boats are therefore to exercise the utmost vigilance.

The recovered mines have all been moored, but it does not follow that all will be so.

Common sense must dictate the procedure to be adopted on discovering a mine in the Canal or Lakes. On no account is it to be man-handled, but treated with the utmost respect.

If moored, and recovered by sweep, it should be swept clear of the channel until awash and a report made to General Headquarters.

If floating, to be carefully coaxed clear of the channel to the bank, and a report made to General Headquarters. In both cases the mine must be guarded until disposed of.

It is undesirable to destroy the mine by gun-fire, as in the shallow waters of the Canal and Lakes it might still be a danger, but, should it be imperative, the range should not be under 100 yards.

Motor launches, on sighting a mine, or in sweeping for a probable mine, are to fly a red flag until it is safe for shipping to pass.

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APPENDIX IX.

SUEZ CANAL: SHIPPING STATISTICS.

Tonnage.

Net Tonnage by Flag (in 1,000 tons).

	1913.	1919.	1920.	1921.	1922.	
German .. .. .	3,852	..	15	171	735	Increasing.
American .. .. .	7	168	724	672	668	Diminishing.
British .. .. .	12,052	11,355	10,839	11,397	13,383	Increasing.
Danish .. .. .	172	315	230	232	280	Fluctuating.
French .. .. .	928	475	775	968	997	Increasing.
Italian .. .. .	291	317	606	934	858	Fluctuating.
Japanese .. .. .	344	1,450	1,601	1,042	928	Diminishing.
Netherlands .. .. .	1,287	755	1,426	2,032	2,161	Increasing.
Norwegian .. .. .	92	257	172	259	309	Increasing.
Swedish .. .. .	123	156	230	206	242	Fluctuating.
Total of above countries ..	18,649	15,248	16,618	17,913	20,561	

Mineral and vegetable oils account to some extent for the increase in British tonnage.

Number of Ships by Flag.


	December 1922.	October 1922.	January to September 1922.	Total for Eleven Months of 1922.	Percentage of Total during Eleven Months of 1922.
German .. .. .	19	12	105	136	3.6
American .. .. .	15	12	103	130	3.5
British .. .. .	266	238	1,984	2,488	63
Chinese .. .. .	1	..	1	2	..
Danish .. .. .	7	6	42	55	1
Spanish .. .. .	2	3	10	15	..
French .. .. .	16	17	154	187	5
Greek .. .. .	3	..	7	10	..
Italian .. .. .	20	17	174	211	5
Japanese .. .. .	15	14	126	155	4
Netherlands .. .. .	35	37	347	419	11
Norwegian .. .. .	7	9	56	72	2
Russian .. .. .	1	1	10	12	..
Swedish .. .. .	4	4	42	50	1.5
Egyptian .. .. .	..	1	4	5	..
Syrian .. .. .	..	2	4	6	..
Yugoslavia .. .. .	..	..	12	12	..
	411	373	3,181	3,695	..

Total ships passing through .. .. .	1920.	1921.	1922.
	4,009	3,975	4,345
Total tonnage (in million net tons) .. .. .	17.5	18.1	20.7

Notes.—(a.) Japan was sixth, with a percentage of 1.7 per cent. in 1913.  
(b.) The total tonnage for 1922 is the highest figure yet recorded.



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Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [17r]  
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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, July, 1923.

SECRET.

439 B (Revised).

[In substitution for the copy previously circulated.]

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

MILITARY POLICY IN EGYPT.

0143  
2032

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

1. I submitted to the Cabinet in February of this year a memorandum (C.P. 89 (23)) dealing with the garrison in Egypt, in connection with the provision of more suitable accommodation urgently required for the troops. In this memorandum it was pointed out that, until the final policy as regards the garrison and its location could be decided upon, we were necessarily restricted to construction of a temporary nature.
2. With the development of the Constitution in Egypt it is probable that discussion of the Reserved Subjects will not be much longer delayed. It therefore appears desirable that our military requirements in Egypt should be considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, so that the strategic aspect of the case may be placed before the Cabinet before any discussion takes place with the Egyptian Government.
3. The recent conclusion of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Suez Canal can best be defended from the Sinai Peninsula with a force based on Egypt and with advanced detachments at Rafah and Akaba (Pal./10) necessarily involves a re-examination of the views I expressed in February.
4. In this connection it would also appear that the forthcoming Imperial Conference offers a favourable opportunity to discuss the question in its Imperial aspects with the representatives of the Dominions and India.
5. Since the memorandum, referred to above, was written, the General Staff have had the opportunity of considering the views of Lieut.-General Sir R. Haking, who, having recently taken over command of the British troops in Egypt, has had the opportunity of bringing a fresh and independent mind to bear upon the question.
6. The importance of Egypt to our Imperial communications and the danger which would result from the breakdown of law and order in Egypt, or from foreign interference due to the withdrawal of British control, need no emphasis. In addition, our position in the Sudan, a question which is for discussion amongst the Reserved Subjects, cannot be considered secure unless we are able to control Egypt.
7. The actual location of the units of the British Garrison has been dealt with in the memorandum referred to above. It has frequently been pointed out by the General Staff—and this has been endorsed by Lord Allenby—that the protection of our interests in Egypt cannot be ensured by local defence of the Canal area. Internal disturbances may be caused by a sudden rising of the population, political intrigue or Bolshevism or the defection of the Egyptian army. The existing garrison, as at present located, is considered sufficient to deal with the situation arising from these causes, provided that the opportunity exists for suppressing the disturbance at its source. This can only be accomplished by retaining British troops in Cairo, where the brains and centre of disturbance will be.
8. The existence of a British garrison in Cairo is a strong deterrent to disturbance. If Cairo were evacuated, it would, in the event of serious disturbance or rising, become a first necessity to occupy the city, an operation of considerable difficulty, which would entail serious loss of life and damage to property.
9. In view of the above considerations the General Staff consider that the presence of British troops in Cairo exercises so preponderating an influence that every effort should be made to overcome political opposition in Egypt itself or elsewhere, and to bring the Egyptian Government to realize that from the existence of a British garrison in Egypt and the location of British troops in Cairo, political, commercial and military advantages will accrue to both countries.

The General Staff therefore recommend that :—

- (a) A British garrison of approximately the present strength, and including 2 squadrons Royal Air Force, should be maintained in Egypt.
- (b) British troops should be located at Cairo and its immediate vicinity, and at Moascar and Alexandria, with detachments at Port Said and Cyprus.

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10. In dealing with this question, however, it is necessary to consider not only our military requirements in Egypt but on our Imperial chain of communications. The pre-war garrison of the Mediterranean consisted of:—

Gibraltar ... ..	2 battalions.
Malta ... ..	5 battalions.
Egypt (including detachment at Cyprus)...	5 battalions (including 1 at Khartoum).
	1 Cavalry regiment.
	1 Royal Horse Artillery battery.
	1 Mountain battery.

11. The garrison which we propose should be retained on our Imperial chain of communications is not so much an increase over the pre-war garrison as a redistribution rendered advisable by the developments of the last nine years. It is still essential that our garrison in the Mediterranean should be of the approximate aggregate strength of a division at normal Colonial peace establishment. The only increases shown in the present position are in the direction of Cavalry, Artillery and Royal Air Force, which are required in order to complete the organization and to adapt it to the shifting of the centre of gravity further east.

12. The strategic reasons for this orientation are sufficiently obvious to require but little elaboration, and can be briefly tabulated as follows:—

- (a) Our post-war position *vis-a-vis* Turkey and the obligations imposed upon us by our mandate for Palestine.
- (b) The enhanced importance of the Suez Canal for the passage of our fleet to eastern waters.
- (c) The need for safeguarding the Canal against the additional dangers inherent in the change in the status of Egypt.
- (d) The liability to support Iraq so long as we remain responsible for that country as the mandatory power.

13. To these essential strategic reasons for the maintenance of our garrison in Egypt can be added the incidental advantages which that country offers as a training ground for our troops, facilities for which are peculiarly lacking in Gibraltar and Malta.

14. The permanent retention of the present garrison in Egypt would entail additional expenditure on accommodation to that foreshadowed in C.P. 89 (23), which was based on the assumption that conditions would ultimately admit of some reduction of the garrison.

It was proposed in that paper to provide temporary hutmments only at Moascar, as it was anticipated that this camp might ultimately be abandoned. To provide hutted camps of a semi-permanent type for the whole of the garrison which cannot be accommodated in existing barracks would involve the provision of accommodation for:—

- 1 Cavalry regiment.
- 1 brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
- 1 brigade, Pack Artillery.
- 3 Infantry battalions.
- Some ancillary units.

The cost of this would be approximately £510,000.

This represents an increase of £200,000 over and above the estimate of £310,000 given in C.P. 89 (23), but it should be noted that in that paper it was stated that no provision had been made for replacing the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, which we are under an honourable obligation to surrender to the Egyptian Government.

The cost of accommodation elsewhere of the troops now in the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks is estimated to be £100,000 (included in the £510,000).

Should a new depot for Ordnance stores or any considerable increase of hospital accommodation become necessary, these would be in addition. Nor is any allowance made for land purchase, the cost of which cannot be estimated till the final distribution of the garrison has been determined and the site of the camps fixed.

D.

30th July, 1923.

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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN.

[August 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 8178/1761/16]

No. 1.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

*Foreign Office Memorandum respecting Military Policy in Egypt.*

A MEMORANDUM (No. 439-B) by the Secretary of State for War has been circulated to the members of the Committee of Imperial Defence describing the military policy which the War Office consider that His Majesty's Government should follow in Egypt. Before the committee take any decision in the matter, it is desirable that careful consideration should be given to the difficulties of a political character to which the adoption of that policy must inevitably give rise.

2. From paragraph 14 of the memorandum it is clear that the War Office look to "the permanent retention of the present garrison in Egypt" and propose to spend rather over half a million sterling on providing additional accommodation. It is, *prima facie*, difficult to reconcile such intentions with the general proposition laid down by His Majesty's Government on the 12th July, in the parliamentary statement on the Ruhr, "that the indefinite occupation by one country of the territory of another "in time of peace is a phenomenon, rare and regrettable in itself, to which an "honourable end should as soon as possible be found."

3. The declaration of the 28th February, 1922 ("Egypt, No. 1, 1922." Cmd. 1592), laid down that "Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State." Even, therefore, if allowance is made for the reservation for eventual settlement by Anglo-Egyptian agreement of questions relating to (a) the security of British communications in Egypt, (b) the defence of Egypt, (c) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and (d) the Soudan, it is clear that when Egypt applies for admission to the League of Nations there can be no ground for British opposition to her candidature, and in the absence of such opposition the application is likely to be granted.

4. When the Egyptian Parliament meets in a few months' time it is only to be expected that the question of the British garrison will be raised, either by the Government of the day in an attempt to silence Opposition criticism or by the Opposition in order to embarrass the Government. When, as a result of these manoeuvres, the Government is called upon to attempt an early settlement of those of the reserved subjects which are connected with the maintenance of British troops in Egypt, it will be impossible for His Majesty's Government to refuse to open negotiations. It is, however, altogether beyond the bounds of probability that an Egyptian Government dependent upon a parliamentary majority could be induced to agree to the maintenance for an indefinite period of British garrisons in Cairo or Alexandria or their immediate neighbourhood.

5. During the negotiations which took place in 1921 with the then Egyptian Prime Minister for the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt, Adly Pasha would have been prepared to accept the following clause:—

"The sole object for the maintenance of a British military force on Egyptian territory in time of peace being the protection of British Imperial communications, all British troops shall be stationed in the zone of the Suez Canal outside the neutral zone; aerodromes and other auxiliary services shall be established in the same district, and the presence of these troops shall not constitute a military occupation of Egypt nor in any way infringe her sovereign rights.

"The rights of passage across Egyptian territory and the use of Egyptian harbours and aerodromes shall only be open to British forces in time of war, though facilities for military transport between the Canal zone and the nearest port will at all times be accorded."

Future Egyptian Governments, who will have to render an account of their proceedings to a popularly elected Parliament, cannot be expected to prove more accommodating, from the British point of view, than did Adly Pasha. In these circumstances the most that can be hoped for is some temporary arrangement liable to

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revision after a relatively short period, and the apparent willingness of the War Office to relinquish Kasr-el-Nil barracks might facilitate the negotiations, and would, at any rate, furnish evidence to Egyptian opinion of the intention of His Majesty's Government to honour their undertakings. If, on the other hand, the negotiations were to end in complete failure, it is possible that Egypt might bring the question to the notice of the League of Nations, a course which would be rendered still more probable if in the meantime she had herself become a member of that body. In taking such action the Egyptian Government could claim that they had done their best to settle the matter amicably with His Majesty's Government and had failed, owing to the latter refusing to apply the general proposition which they had themselves laid down in the case of the French occupation of the Ruhr.

6. As against this claim, His Majesty's Government could only argue that the question of the garrison was a purely Anglo-Egyptian one which must be decided in the manner laid down in the British Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, and that, until agreement was reached, the *status quo* must be maintained. It might also be possible to invoke the British intimation ("Egypt, No. 2, 1922." Cmd. 1617) to all foreign Powers following the withdrawal of the protectorate that His Majesty's Government would regard outside intervention in the affairs of Egypt as an unfriendly act. It is, however, to be feared that before an impartial court the Egyptian claim would appear to be the stronger one, and it would certainly be embarrassing for His Majesty's Government to refuse an offer of arbitration by the League or reference of the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

7. The greatly enhanced importance of the Suez Canal as a factor in imperial strategy is clearly brought out in a note by the naval staff already circulated to the Sub-Committee on the Defence of British Ports Overseas. In that paper it is shown how relatively easy it would be for the Japanese effectively to block the Canal for several months by sinking a ship in any one of several suitable places immediately before the outbreak of war.

8. The protection of the Canal against such an act of sabotage is admittedly of vital importance to the safety of the Empire, but it is evident from paragraph 12 of Lord Derby's memorandum that this is not the only consideration which has led the War Office to select Egypt as the most suitable *place d'armes* on the road to the East. In support of the argument that it is necessary to maintain British troops in the interior of Egypt, it is stated in paragraph 6 that "our position in the Soudan . . . cannot be considered secure unless we are able to control Egypt." The view held in the Foreign Office has been the precise converse, viz., that as long as we control the Soudan and the Canal, Egypt is at our mercy.

9. Again, in paragraph 3 of the memorandum, reference is made to the conclusion (Pal/10) of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in regard to the strategical importance of Palestine. That conclusion was based upon memoranda by the Colonial Office, Air Staff, General Staff and Naval Staff. There was a certain divergence in the views expressed, and a compromise was reached in the conclusion that "the Suez Canal can best be defended from the Sinai peninsula with "a force based on Egypt and with advance detachments at Rafeh and Akaba." But, in the view of the Colonial Office and Air Staff, "Egypt as the base for a large expeditionary force, as it was from 1914-18, is now unthinkable." In spite of this strong expression of opinion, which is shared by the Foreign Office, it is as a base for an expeditionary force that the War Office apparently wish to regard Egypt.

10. It has been shown above that rigid insistence on the permanent occupation of the interior of Egypt will sooner or later give rise to acute political difficulties with the Egyptian Government, whereas close and friendly relations, or, better still, a defensive alliance with that Government would, *ipso facto*, simplify the problem of protecting the Canal from sabotage. On the other hand, it is not suggested that the British garrison should be withdrawn from the interior of Egypt except by degrees and in virtue of agreements concluded from time to time with the Egyptian Government and approved by the Egyptian Parliament. In these circumstances it is recognised that adequate provision of a temporary nature must be made for the decent accommodation of the troops which at present constitute the garrison. It is, however, politically important that such additional accommodation should not be erected in the neighbourhood of Cairo and Alexandria, as this would be interpreted as evidence that, in spite of the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, His Majesty's Government were still determined to render Egyptian independence nugatory.

11. It must be remembered that the argument in favour of the permanent occupation of Cairo, developed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Lord Derby's memorandum,

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depends for its effectiveness on the assumption that the maintenance of the British garrison in the capital is the cheapest form of insurance against the outbreak of disorder necessitating armed British intervention. But the political difficulties inherent in such a policy may render it a most costly and embarrassing commitment, whereas, in the absence of British troops in the interior, the outbreak of grave disorder would, as in 1882, free the hands of His Majesty's Government from the restrictions which the political developments of the last few years have imposed.

12. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, therefore, the undoubted physical advantages of Egypt as a permanent *place d'armes* are discounted by the political drawbacks, and it would consequently be imprudent to count on the indefinite maintenance of the present disposition of the garrison. A standing defence scheme for the Suez Canal must take into account political as well as purely military considerations, and it is therefore suggested that the basis for such a scheme should be sought in the perpetuation of effective British control over the Soudan and Palestine and the acquisition of such control over the Sinai peninsula, including, if possible, the Port Saïd-Suez Railway, *pari passu* with the progressive withdrawal of the present garrison from the interior of Egypt.

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1923.*

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(39/176)

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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. September 1923.

SECRET.

448-B.

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY  
OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE  
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, AFTER  
MEETING AT WHICH CONSIDERED.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

MILITARY POLICY IN EGYPT.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 439-B and 446-B.)

COLONIAL OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

IN a Foreign Office Memorandum (C.I.D. Paper No. 446-B) circulated to the members of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 9th August, certain political objections are pointed out to the military policy which the War Office consider that His Majesty's Government should follow in Egypt. One important point in this Memorandum appears to call for comment from the Colonial Office. In paragraph 12 of the Memorandum it is suggested that the basis for a standing defence scheme for the Suez Canal "should be sought in the perpetuation of effective British control over the Soudan and Palestine and the acquisition of such control over the Sinai peninsula."

2. The position in Palestine is that His Britannic Majesty has accepted a Mandate for that territory under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Article provides that—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

The peculiar circumstances of Palestine have, however, always been regarded as demanding more than administrative advice and assistance, and the Principal Allied Powers agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, to entrust to the Mandatory the actual administration of the territory. This decision is quoted in the preamble to the Mandate for Palestine, as finally approved by the Council of the League of Nations, and Article 1 of that instrument provides that "the Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate." The terms of the Mandate cannot by Article 27 be modified except with the consent of the Council of the League, and this consent cannot be given if the British or any other member of the Council dissents.

It appears, then, that, so long as the British Mandate is in force, His Britannic Majesty will retain full powers of legislation and of administration in Palestine, and that effective British control can only be relaxed with the consent of His Majesty's Government.

3. There are, however, two other methods by which effective British control over Palestine could be endangered, viz., the abandonment of the Mandate by His Britannic Majesty, and its termination.

The first of these alternatives would presumably involve the transfer of mandatory control to another Power, which would then inherit full powers of legislation and of administration under Article 1 of the Mandate unless some modification of these powers were subsequently proposed and the representative on the Council of the League of the Power concerned were instructed to agree. Whatever might be the scope of any such modification, it is clear that the restoration of effective British control would in these circumstances be impossible. The second alternative is foreshadowed in Article 28 of the Mandate, which contains provision for certain rights being safeguarded in perpetuity and certain obligations being honoured "in the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory."

No indication is given of the nature of the régime which would follow this termination, but it is difficult to see how it could involve a perpetuation of British control, in view of the wording of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League.

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4. The conclusion appears to be that the perpetuation of effective British control over Palestine can only be secured by the retention in perpetuity by His Britannic Majesty of the Mandate for that territory, coupled with a consistent refusal on the part of His Majesty's Government to instruct their representative on the Council to agree to any proposed modification which would prejudice that control. This is a perfectly feasible policy. On the other hand, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government themselves to propose any modification in the Mandate which was clearly designed to further British military interests, and it is unlikely that any such proposal, however carefully disguised, would in fact be approved. We are therefore limited by the terms of the present Mandate, and it remains only to consider to what extent these justify the utilisation of Palestine as a *place d'armes* for British military forces.

5. It may be of interest to quote here the terms of Article 17 of the Palestine Mandate, and to compare them with those of the corresponding Article 2 of the approved Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon :—

*Palestine Mandate.*

"ARTICLE 17.

"The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

"Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

"The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies."

*Syrian Mandate.*

"ARTICLE 2.

"The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

"The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than the above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

"Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

"The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel."


It will be noted that for some reason there is no provision in the Palestine Article on the lines of the first sentence of the Syrian Article, which allows the Mandatory to maintain his own troops in the territory for its defence, but it may be taken from the last two sentences of the Article, which are practically identical with the last two sentences of the Syrian Article, that no question would seriously be raised of our right to maintain troops in Palestine *for its defence*.

But the utilisation of Palestine as a *place d'armes* either for the defence of the Suez Canal or for general British military purposes in the Middle East is more likely to be challenged, though there would presumably be less objection to hospitals, sanatoria and hot weather stations being established in the cooler climate of Palestine for British troops stationed in adjacent countries.

6. If, then, it is decided that the arguments advanced in the Foreign Office Memorandum render the permanent retention in Egypt of the garrison required by British military policy impossible, it appears preferable to pursue the suggestion that effective British control should be acquired over the Sinai peninsula, including, if possible, the Port Said-Suez railway. Palestine could be garrisoned to the extent necessary for the defence of that territory, and might also be used as a hot-weather station, but could not, consistently with the Mandate, be converted into a *place d'armes* for British military requirements in Egypt or the Middle East generally.

Colonial Office, S.W.,  
August 31, 1923.

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(42/176)

2

perhaps have faith that these men, though they should be elected on a Zaghluist ticket, will afterwards give evidence of that disposition. They are, as usual, waiting for the tide. It is unfortunate for this party that some of their leaders are personally most distasteful to King Fuad, and that others are suspected by him of Khedivist sympathies. It remains true that this party is distinguished by the possession of a number of able men, some of whom also are both vigorous and ambitious.

6 The Zaghluists also have lost ground, chiefly through public apathy to politics and through internal dissensions; they are active, but seem to rely more and more upon political adventurers, youthful enthusiasts and professional agitators. There is discord between Fathallah Pasha Barakat and Hamad Pasha-el-Basil, between the Moslem and Coptic members of the Wafd, and between rival candidates for the same constituency. But their position has improved since Zaghlu Pasha announced his return, and his arrival will certainly reanimate the party. Whether even he will be able to heal their dissensions for any length of time is doubtful. The ostensible foreign policy of the party remains extremist, and is characterised by violent opposition to the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, to the Act of Indemnity and to the arrangement regarding British officials. I understand that a section of the party has leanings to republicanism.


7. Saad Pasha himself is believed to be in a fairly moderate state of mind, due to a desire to maintain relations with the Palace, and to enter into early negotiations with His Majesty's Government. If this is his state of mind, he will find difficulty in persisting in it against the probable influence of the more extreme leaders of the party here. Internal dissensions are likely to result, if moderation prevails, in desertions to the Watanist party; if extremism prevails, in isolated desertions to the Adlist party and in a temporary convergence of the Zaghluists and Watanists. The latter result could hardly be agreeable to Zaghlu, in view of his bad relations with the ex-Khedive. It is very commonly believed that Zaghlu's prestige will rapidly decline after a few months; but that is a matter about which I will not speculate.

8. The Watanist party is still small, but it appears to be appreciably gaining in strength. This party at the same time endeavours to appeal to Zaghluists on lines of extremism, and invites us to a private view of a more moderate attitude. I understand that there are differences between the new president of the party, Hafez Bey Ramadan (an agreeable man of mild and urbane manners), and the Alexandrian leader, Said Bey Telemat, who is believed to enjoy the special confidence of Abbas Hilmi Pasha. The party is very anxious at present for the return to Egypt of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, who, if he returns, is to edit a newspaper for them. I may here remark that Khedivism is gaining ground more rapidly than is the party which is specifically associated with it.


9. This survey of the political forces in Egypt would be incomplete without some further allusion to Prince Omar Toussoun. He continues to be moved in a mysterious way by his manipulator, Mohammed Pasha Said, conspicuous at social functions, increasing his personal influence to the utmost possible extent, and entering into contact with one party or another as his ambitions, or their finances, may from time to time require. The average Egyptian opinion about him is that he is grasping and of limited intelligence, but a dignified figure, a good Oriental, and in many ways the best living member of the family of Mohammed Ali.

10. The matter of immediate interest is the policy of the returning leader, and, in particular, the relations which are established between him and his Sovereign are likely to have an important influence on the further trend of politics in this country. King Fuad followed a course of conduct last year which now makes it hazardous for him (since he desires to be popular, and to crush the Khedivist movement) to alienate Zaghlu. But if he encourages Zaghlu too much, Zaghlu is liable to become excessively powerful, to hold the King at his mercy, and perhaps to embroil him with His Majesty's Government. It is not improbable that the King overestimates the danger from the ex-Khedive and underestimates the danger from Zaghlu. The latter is a double danger. On the one hand is the danger of internal disorder, since the encouragement of Zaghlu may well be an encouragement of the elements of instability; and here I may observe that the recent tightening of the Penal Code was chiefly inspired by the King, and not, I presume, without regard to this danger, which His Majesty's treatment of Zaghlu might evoke, but which the Ministry must bear the burden of suppressing. On the other hand is the directly political danger. The King thinks that he can at the same time flatter Zaghlu and moderate his policy; but this depends upon a possibly erroneous view of Zaghlu's character, and the result of too much friendliness may well be that Zaghlu will find himself capable of undermining


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9. His Majesty spontaneously denied that there was any truth in the rumours that he was contemplating a Ministry under Tewfik Nessim Pasha, whom he said he had only seen once since his resignation in February.

10. He spoke in tones of considerable hostility regarding some of Adly Pasha's followers, notably Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, but not of Adly himself, who he thought was rather to be commiserated with for being surrounded by such undesirable people, whose only object was to become Ministers.

11. His Majesty seemed well and cheerful. He was most friendly throughout the interview which lasted over an hour, and he did not take any of my observations amiss. I derived the impression that he was sincere in the professions of his desire to retain the present Ministry in office.

I have, &c.  
ERNEST SCOTT,  
*Acting High Commissioner.*

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(47/176)

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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. September 1923.

SECRET.

454-B.

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY  
OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE  
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, AFTER  
MEETING AT WHICH CONSIDERED  
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

41

MILITARY POLICY IN EGYPT AND DEFENCE OF SUEZ CANAL.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 438-B, 439-B, 446-B, 448-B, 450-B and 453-B.)

REPORT PREPARED BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.

THE following report has been prepared as the result of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee held on the 28th September, 1923, in order to consider the naval, military and air aspects of the question of our military policy in Egypt and the defence of the Suez Canal. The meeting was attended by General Sir W. Congreve, lately the General Officer Commanding the Forces in Egypt. This report is agreed to by the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The most important consideration in regard to our military policy in Egypt from the point of view of Imperial Defence is to ensure the safety of the Suez Canal. The Naval Staff are of opinion that the security of the Canal, which, as shown in their Memorandum No. 438-B, is in any event a matter of difficulty, cannot possibly be secured without the actual presence of British forces in Egypt.

3. The General Staff are of opinion that in order to ensure the safety of the Canal it is essential to maintain a military hold on Cairo, as well as to control the railways and the fresh-water canal. In order to have control of the fresh-water canal, on which the water supply of the Canal zone depends, the military occupation of Abbassia, close to Cairo, is essential.

4. As regards the maintenance of internal order, the General Staff are of opinion that Cairo, and, to a less degree, Alexandria, as the main centres of population, commerce and political activity, are the places where any serious internal disorders would originate, and where the lives and property of Europeans, for which we are responsible, would be in danger. It is therefore essential to maintain sufficient troops in the immediate vicinity of these cities in order that we may be in a position to control them. In the case of Cairo, internal order can be secured by an adequate force at Abbassia. Both from the point of view of the strategical requirements for the defence of the Canal and from that of the maintenance of order, the retention of Abbassia is of importance. Should we, by the withdrawal of our troops from these areas, relinquish our control and diminish the protection which has been given in the past to the rights and property of the European residents, it appears not improbable that other nations may seek to establish a system of Legation Guards in order to safeguard the interests of their own nationals.

5. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that the Egyptian Army should it prove disloyal, though not trained as a fighting force, would nevertheless be very formidable in street fighting and once they had broken out of barracks and become dispersed amongst the native population would greatly increase the difficulties of restoring order.

6. In considering the actual location of the various units it must be remembered that at present the Royal Air Force maintain large establishments at Aboukir which are of importance not only for the Air Force stationed in Egypt, but also for the whole of the Middle East. These establishments rely for their protection on the troops at present stationed at Alexandria, and the withdrawal of the battalions from there might result in the necessity of moving the Royal Air Force establishments, on which up to the present the expenditure has been in the neighbourhood of £500,000, to some other site nearer to the new stations selected for the troops.

Negotiations are at present proceeding with regard to the hire of the existing site at Aboukir for a period of twenty-five years.


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September 29, 1923.

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
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stations in Cuba should never be used as vantage points for intervention in Cuba, but solely for defence against foreign aggression; that intervention in Cuba should not be made without the "formal action of the United States"; that Cuba should be free to make any political and mercantile treaties, so long as they did not amount to alliances impairing her independence; that Cuba need not necessarily maintain the system of sanitation already established by the United States, but merely such a system as might thereafter be mutually agreed upon; and that, in the opinion of Cuba, the Isle of Pines belonged to that Republic. All this was unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the United States, and the Cuban Convention was promptly so informed. It was explained that the Platt Amendment was an Act of Congress, which the executive branch of the Government could not modify in any way, but which it must enforce just as it stood. Accordingly, on the 12th June, the Convention by a vote of 16 to 11 added to the constitution of the Cuban Republic "the full text of the Platt Amendment without any change or qualification whatever."

The following American comments by the Professor of the History of American Foreign Relations in New York University are interesting:—

"The logic of this imposition of American conditions upon Cuba was perfectly simple. For many years this country had exercised a virtual protectorate over Cuba as a Spanish province in the interest of Spain; and it was only reasonable that it should continue the same degree of protection over it as an autonomous republic. It had assumed and maintained that attitude, of course, for the sake of our own welfare; and that welfare demanded that the same attitude should be continued. It had, finally, fought a costly war for the sake of giving Cuba good government; and it would have been incredibly and unpardonably foolish if it had failed to safeguard the results of that war against impairment or relapse. It was an act of gratuitous generosity on the part of this country, any way, that it adopted that pledge of self-abnegation and refrained from taking Cuba as the spoils of war, as any other nation would have done. Once taken, that pledge had to be fulfilled, as it was. But fulfilment of it did not mean abandonment of our long-established policy and reversal of a fundamental principle of the nation."

*Admiralty, September 28, 1923.*

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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, October, 1923.

457-B.

To be returned to the Secretary  
of the Committee of Imperial Defence,  
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1.

SECRET.

COPY No. 41

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

MILITARY POLICY IN EGYPT.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 438-B, 439-B, 446-B, 448-B, 450-B, 453-B and 454-B.)

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

0143  
2032

The general lines of military policy in Egypt which I consider necessary for our strategic requirements were submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence in my memorandum of July, 1923 (C.I.D. Paper No. 439-B, revised). Other Departments of His Majesty's Government have now expressed their views on this subject and these have been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. I am therefore in a position to carry my proposals further in the light of the recent discussions that have taken place.

2. I now assume that the Committee of Imperial Defence have definitely decided that the Canal is to be defended against all possible attack, external and internal, and that the force responsible for this task is to be based on Egypt.

3. In my previous memoranda (C.I.D. Paper No. 439-B and C.P. 89 (23)) the military reasons which necessitate the control of Cairo and Alexandria have been emphasized. So cogent are these, both tactically and strategically, that it is upon the basis of our being able to secure immediate control of Cairo that our defence scheme for the Canal is drawn up, and the present disposition of our garrison arrived at.

4. Therefore it will be convenient to recapitulate the existing distribution of troops, and note the relation between this and the task the garrison have to be prepared for. This will assist us to decide how any modifications, which circumstances may render inevitable, can be made with the least tactical and administrative disarrangement.

5. The present distribution is as follows :—

(1) Cairo area—

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| (a) Cairo. Eden Palace Hotel ;<br>Villa Victoria.      | Headquarters Command and R.A.F. Head-<br>quarters, Middle East.  |
| (b) Cairo Citadel ... ..                               | 1 infantry battalion.  |
| (c) Kasr-el-Nil Barracks ... ..                        | Headquarters, infantry brigade.<br>1 infantry battalion.   |
| (d) Abbassia (4 miles E.N.E. of<br>the Citadel).       | 2 cavalry regiments.<br>1 brigade, Royal Horse Artillery (3 bat-<br>teries).<br>1 infantry battalion.<br>1 field company, Royal Engineers.<br>1 armoured car company.<br>Wireless signal company.<br>Signal company. |
| (e) Helmieh (3½ miles north of<br>the Citadel).        | 1 pack artillery brigade (3 batteries).<br>1 cavalry regiment.   |
| (f) Heliopolis (8 miles north-east<br>of the Citadel). | 1 squadron, R.A.F.<br>1 special communication flight, R.A.F.   |
| (g) Helouan (14 miles south of<br>the Citadel).        | 1 squadron, R.A.F.   |

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(2) Alexandria Area—

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| (a) Mustapha (5 miles east of Alexandria).           | Infantry brigade headquarters.<br>1 infantry battalion (less 2 platoons at Cyprus). |
| (b) Sidi Bishir (10 miles north-east of Alexandria). | 1 infantry battalion (less 1 company at Mex, 4 miles south-west of Alexandria).     |
| (c) Aboukir (13 miles north-east of Alexandria).     | R.A.F. aircraft depot.<br>R.A.F. stores depot.                                      |

(3) Moascar Area—

- |                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| (a) Moascar ... ..  | 1 infantry battalion (less 1 platoon at Port Said).       |
| (b) Ismailia ... .. | 1 brigade, R.F.A. (3 batteries).<br>1 field company, R.E. |

6. It will be noted that the bulk of the garrison is in the Cairo area. Existing accommodation and administrative questions have contributed towards this, but the necessity of being in a position to control Cairo is the main reason. With two battalions in Cairo City, the cantonments of Helmieh and Abbassia are well placed to achieve this object and to enable dispositions to be made for the protection of the railways and the head of the Fresh Water Canal, and for the defence of the aerodromes and wireless station.

7. However, as regards Cairo City, it appears inevitable that the Kasr-el-Nil barracks will have to be given up sooner or later. Their position is an important one, being close to the Residency and the main European quarter and commanding the principal bridge over the Nile. We shall have to accept the loss of these advantages, which no other locality can give us, and we must note that the barracks in the hands of the Egyptian Army will be difficult to re-occupy. The battalion so displaced will have to be accommodated at some adjacent cantonment, the choice depending upon tactical and administrative factors which the General Officer Commanding, Egypt, can best appreciate.

8. The evacuation of the Citadel at Cairo is even more serious than that of the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, owing to its strength and commanding position. In hostile hands its capture would always be a serious undertaking. Also, it contains the main military hospital in Egypt for which other accommodation would have to be provided. If it is found absolutely essential to vacate the Citadel, the battalion and hospital would have to be accommodated in one of the adjacent cantonments, the advice of the General Officer Commanding, Egypt, being asked as regards the exact location.

9. In addition to the above, Command Headquarters would have to be transferred from Cairo to Abbassia.

10. As regards Alexandria, in addition to the control of the port and town, the Royal Air Force camp at Aboukir has to be protected. For these tasks the present garrison should be retained. It is only suggested that the Ordnance Depot at Mex should be transferred to Abbassia.

11. As regards the location of the remainder of the Egyptian garrison, no change appears necessary, and it is proposed that the troops now at Moascar and Ismailia should be left there. They are well placed for the immediate defence of the Canal, and for safeguarding the Port Said—Suez Railway.

12. Thus, if re-distribution is forced upon us, the suggestions mentioned above can be summarized as follows :—

Cairo—


- Command Headquarters, from Cairo to Abbassia.
- 1 battalion from Kasr-el-Nil to Abbassia or Helmieh, or new cantonment.
- 1 battalion from Citadel to Abbassia or Helmieh, or new cantonment.
- General Hospital from Citadel to Abbassia.
- Ordnance Details from Cairo to Abbassia.

Alexandria—

- Ordnance Depot from Alexandria to Abbassia.

13. It will be seen that the above proposals contemplate no immediate reduction in the strength of the garrison in Egypt. The fighting forces (including 1,500 Royal Air Force) now total in round numbers about 11,500, which is an increase on the pre-war

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
figures. As explained in C.I.D. Paper No. 439-B, the main increase is in cavalry, artillery and Royal Air Force, and is justified by the change in the status in Egypt itself. With the grant of independence the potential dangers are obviously greater, as we shall no longer be in a position to control the Egyptian Army.

14. However, if Egyptian independence develops along favourable lines and a satisfactory solution is arrived at over the reserved subjects, some reductions may be found possible at a later date. So far as such a matter can be gauged in advance, it is considered that a maximum reduction of one infantry battalion from Alexandria and one brigade of artillery may then be practicable.


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THE WAR OFFICE,  
9th October, 1923.

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


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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN

[February 8.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 1623/10/16]

No. 1.

*Record of a Discussion with Mr. Ben Spoor and Mr. E. D. Morel.*

ON the 8th February Mr. McNeill received at the Foreign Office Mr. Ben Spoor, M.P. and Mr. E. D. Morel, M.P., who had asked for an interview in order to discuss the situation in Egypt. Mr. Murray and Mr. Cooper were also present.

Mr. SPOOR, who mentioned that he was himself leaving for Egypt on the following day for the benefit of his health, said that they had no specific proposal to put forward, but that they wished to enquire whether it was not possible at the present time to effect a reconciliation between the different parties in Egypt and to abandon the policy of repression which had been proved to be unsuccessful.

Mr. MOREL said that the Labour Party did not regard Egypt as a party question. They only desired to discover a solution of the present anomalous position in which martial law remained in force although the independence of Egypt had been recognised. There was a widespread feeling in Egypt that there was a general consensus of opinion in favour of a more liberal policy and that His Majesty's Government were not ill-disposed, but that the stumbling block in the way of progress was His Majesty's High Commissioner. In the subsequent course of the conversation he returned repeatedly to this point and added that, according to the information which reached him, Lord Allenby had at first been extremely liberal-minded, but had lately come under other influences which had entirely altered his point of view. The two changes which Mr. Morel wished to see in Egypt were the abolition of martial law and the return of Zaghul.

Mr. McNEILL said that he was not in a position to speak with any authority, and that for this reason he had at first hesitated to grant the interview. He could, however, assure Mr. Morel that he was mistaken with regard to the attitude of Lord Allenby, who was most liberal-minded and who was more anxious than anybody to see the situation regularised and martial law abolished. This, however, could not come about until the Constitution had been promulgated. In Ireland the mistake had been made of handing over the control of the country to the Free State Government before the necessary machinery existed that should have enabled that Government to deal with the situation. It was not desired to make a similar mistake in Egypt. The delay with regard to the promulgation of the Constitution was not the fault of His Majesty's Government nor of Lord Allenby. Neither they nor he had intervened in any way in the drafting of the Constitution, except when an attempt had been made under cover of the terms of the Constitution to prejudice one of the four reserved subjects, *i.e.*, the question of the Soudan. The Egyptians were themselves responsible for the delays that had occurred. The King would prefer a Constitution of an 18th century type, and it was a difference of opinion on this subject that had led to the resignation of Sarwat.

With regard to the return of Zaghul, this again must await the coming into force of the Constitution. In reply to a question by Mr. Morel, who said that he was informed that the King had lately become convinced of the necessity of Zaghul's return, Mr. McNeill said that if, when the Constitution was in force the King and the Prime Minister wished to recall Zaghul, he did not consider it likely that either His Majesty's Government or Lord Allenby would have any objection.

Mr. MOREL then asked what the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be if the King said that he could not draw up a Constitution until Zaghul returned to assist him in the task. Mr. McNeill replied that if such a plea were put forward he thought that His Majesty's Government would say that it was untrue. A Constitution could perfectly well come into force without the assistance of Zaghul, whose presence would be much more likely to prove a hindrance than a help. So long as Great Britain were responsible for maintaining order under martial law, he did not consider that the return of Zaghul should be permitted. Once the Constitution was in force it would be another matter.

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Mr. McNEILL also warned Mr. Morel not to attach too much importance to the King's alleged desire to recall Zaghlul. In Egypt, as in other countries, the coalition of parties was more often due to the expediency of the moment than to any coincidence of principle or political sympathies. Because the King was at present anxious to enlist the support of the Zaghlulists, it did not necessarily follow that at a later date he would regard with favour the return of Zaghlul.

Mr. SPOOR said that about a year ago Sir Maurice Amos had assured him and Mr. Clynes that the abolition of martial law would take place very shortly. What had prevented it? They were told that it was the desire of His Majesty's Government to dictate a Constitution.

Mr. MURRAY said that he was sure nobody regretted the delay more than Sir Maurice Amos, and that it was in no way due to His Majesty's Government, but, as had already been stated, to the Egyptians themselves, the majority of whom naturally wanted a democratic Constitution and were afraid of an absolute monarchy and a return to the days of the Khedive Ismail. This had always been the difficulty, and at the time of the Milner Mission it was even suggested by the Egyptians that the Constitution, when drafted, should be guaranteed by the British Government.

Mr. MOREL said that the attacks on British officials and others which had taken place during the last year were largely due to the severity of the measures which were taken to repress them. He instanced the case in which two men had been hanged for wounding a fellow-countryman.

Mr. MURRAY replied that in the case referred to the accused had appealed against the sentence of the military court, which had necessitated the whole evidence being referred to the Judge Advocate-General in London, who had confirmed the sentence. It did not therefore seem likely that any miscarriage of justice had taken place.

Mr. SPOOR asked whether, if Zaghlul were released, the others who were deported at the same time would also be allowed to return.

Mr. MURRAY said he did not think there would be any objection, but that, from his knowledge of the people in question, he could not agree that their presence in Egypt was necessary for the successful promulgation of the Constitution. He would be sorry for Egypt if this were the case.

Mr. McNEILL read extracts from Lord Allenby's recent telegrams, showing that the delay with regard to the Constitution was due to the King, and that Lord Allenby himself was only anxious to produce a situation which would permit of Zaghlul's return.

Before leaving, Mr. Spoor and Mr. Morel thanked Mr. McNeill for having received them.

A. D. C.

Foreign Office, February 8, 1923.

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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.  
EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [December 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 14446/3762/16]

No. 1.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 976.)

My Lord,

Cairo, December 16, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on Egypt for the year 1921.

In view of the very delicate stage reached in the political relations between Great Britain and Egypt during the period under review, my report has been written for the confidential information of His Majesty's Government and not for publication as has been the case hitherto.

The draft treaty presented by your Lordship to the Egyptian delegation on the 10th November, together with the text of the explanatory letter, dated the 3rd December, which I handed to the Sultan in accordance with my instructions, the delegation's reply of the 15th November rejecting the treaty, and Adly Pasha's report on his mission to London are annexed to chapter I of this report.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Report on Egypt for the year 1921.

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
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CHAPTER I.—POLITICAL AND GENERAL.

1. *Preparations for Negotiations with the Official Egyptian Delegation.*

THE situation at the close of 1920 was that the preliminary discussions in London between Lord Milner's Mission and Saad Pasha Zaghul had been terminated, and that Zaghul Pasha had been informed by Lord Milner that no good purpose would be served by further discussion of the Egyptian reservations and new conditions in anticipation of the formal negotiations between duly accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments.

2. Early in January the question of the appointment of an official Egyptian delegation for the purpose of concluding a treaty was taken up by His Majesty's Government, whose views were that both parties would enter upon the discussion with free hands, since His Majesty's Government had not thought it right to arrive at a final judgment on either the principle or the details of the proposals contained in the Milner Report. Moreover, the Prime Minister desired to consult the representatives of the Dominions before reaching a decision. This statement proved, however, to be an insufficient basis on which to form a delegation, for ever since the Milner proposals had been known in Egypt, they were regarded by Egyptians as concessions virtually promised, and this view was subsequently strengthened by the official publication of the Milner Report in the following month of February. It appeared, in fact, essential that Lord Milner's conclusions should form the general basis of the programme, and that discussion should be permitted on some of the reservations put forward by Zaghul Pasha in his final interview with Lord Milner. The following formula, to enable the Sultan to form the delegation, was eventually adopted:—

“His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of the protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached a final decision in respect to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with the official delegation nominated by His Highness the Sultan with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a treaty of alliance which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people.”

2. *Formation of Adly Pasha Yeghen's Cabinet.*

3. In communicating this decision to the Sultan on the 24th February, I refrained from indicating any special line of procedure, as I considered that at this important juncture the less British interference there was the less chance would there be of the delegates being branded as British nominees. I confined myself to reminding the Sultan that the wishes of His Majesty's Government were that the

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delegation should be a truly representative one, and I indicated that it would seem desirable to include Zaghul Pasha and perhaps one or two of his associates, as well as Adly Pasha Yeghen, who had been of great assistance in the conversations which had taken place with Lord Milner in London. The delegation should be sufficiently authoritative to ensure that the agreement to be concluded would be accepted by the Legislative Assembly to which it would eventually be submitted. Negotiations were thereupon opened by His Highness with Mazloun Pasha, President of the (Suspended) Legislative Assembly, Mohamed Tewfik Nessim Pasha, President of the Council, and Adly Yeghen, Mohamed Said, Hussein Rushdy, Yusuf Wahba and Ismail Sirry Pashas, with a view to the formation of a Coalition Government from which the delegation could be chosen. This scheme broke down, principally because the Sultan desired to stipulate that Mohamed Said Pasha should remain in Egypt in charge of the Ministry while the delegation was in London, a course to which Adly Pasha was resolutely opposed. In the event, Mazloun Pasha withdrew his candidature for the Presidency of the Council, and Adly Pasha was summoned to form a Ministry. Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who had administered the affairs of the country for ten months with conspicuous courage and success during a period of great anxiety and uncertainty, agreed to resign, and Adly Pasha's Ministry, composed as under, took office on the 17th March:—

Prime Minister (without portfolio) : Adly Pasha Yeghen.  
Vice-President of the Council (without portfolio) : Hussein Pasha Rushdy.  
Minister of the Interior : Abdel Khalek Pasha Sarwat.  
Minister of Education : Gafar Pasha Waby.  
Minister of Justice : Abdel Fattah Pasha Yehia.  
Minister of Communications : Ahmed Pasha Ziwer.  
Minister of Finance : Ismail Pasha Sidky.  
Minister of Agriculture : Neguib Pasha Ghali.  
Minister of Wakfs : Midhat Pasha Yeghen.  
Minister of Public Works : Mohamed Pasha Shafik.

4. There can be no doubt of the general popularity at that time of the choice of Adly Pasha as Prime Minister. The Ministry was a strongly Nationalist one, and its published programme aimed at the conclusion of an agreement with Great Britain which would "put the independence of Egypt beyond doubt." The programme was, in fact, scarcely less extreme than that of Zaghul himself, and gave rise from the first to doubts as to whether it could be realised in negotiation.

5. The following account of the negotiations between Adly Pasha and Zaghul Pasha affords an illuminating comment on the latter's claim to the character of a disinterested patriot. On accepting office, Adly Pasha immediately issued an invitation to Zaghul Pasha at Paris to collaborate with him in the formation of a delegation. In reply, Zaghul Pasha laid down the following conditions for his participation in the negotiations:—

- (1) The press censorship to be suppressed.
- (2) Martial law to be withdrawn.
- (3) The protectorate to be abolished and Zaghul's reservations accepted.
- (4) Zaghul's organisation or "Wafd" to have the presidency of the official delegation and a majority among the members.

6. At the same time Zaghul announced his impending return to Egypt, where he arrived on the 5th April and was received by the wildest display of enthusiasm. Order was, however, maintained, to a large extent owing to the good behaviour of the crowds themselves. Zaghul's conditions were, of course, quite unacceptable to His Majesty's Government, who declined to commit themselves to the extent demanded in advance of the negotiations. Condition (4) was equally unacceptable to Adly Pasha, and all hope of collaboration between the two was abandoned when Zaghul declared to a representative of the "Egyptian Gazette": "I have done all the work; I have suffered, and I have the confidence of the Egyptian people, and I will not see the credit for what I have done taken away from me by Adly Pasha or anyone else." It is pertinent in this connection to recall the fact that, such was the intractability of Zaghul Pasha in his discussions with Lord Milner's Mission in London in the summer of 1920, that without Adly Pasha's conciliating influence the discussions would never have gone beyond the initial stages. This declaration was followed by a speech in which Zaghul Pasha compared Adly Pasha

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negotiating with the British Government as "King George V. negotiating with King George V." Public excitement began to assume alarming proportions. An awkward incident occurred at Tanta on the 29th April, arising out of a Zaghulist demonstration against the Government in which the police fired on the crowd, killing five and wounding six. The Government were pressed for satisfaction, and, contrary to my advice, which was that the firmest possible attitude should be maintained, they agreed to an enquiry, with the result that reflection was cast upon the police commandant's action and the *moral* of the police force in Egypt was shaken.

3. *Alexandria Riots.*

7. This weakness had the effect which was to be expected. A fortnight later riots broke out in Cairo and Alexandria. In the latter place they lasted several days, and only ceased on the appearance of British troops. Numerous foreigners, principally Greeks, were clubbed, stoned or otherwise done to death by the fanatical mob, in most cases without the smallest provocation. In several instances petroleum was poured over the bodies, which were set fire to. Great credit is due to Ingram Bey, Acting Commandant of Police at Alexandria, who worked indefatigably and totally regardless of the extreme risks he ran in endeavouring to maintain discipline and saving the Europeans from the fury of the mob. The Greek consul officially expressed the appreciation of his Government of the invaluable services performed by the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion Sherwood Foresters, under Colonel Taylor, in saving many of his compatriots' lives. A military court of enquiry, with Judge J. F. Kershaw in attendance, was convened to report upon the origin and course of the disturbances and the measures taken to deal with them. The conclusions of the court, whose very full report was published in London ("Egypt, No. 3," 1921), were "that the Zaghul Party were determined to force the Government to repeat the Tanta incident. The Government were just as determined that it should not. In the face of the weakness of the Government, the mobs got bolder and bolder, until they got definitely out of hand and thought they might act with impunity." The court also found that there was no evidence to support the Egyptian view that the riots were caused by Greeks firing on peaceful demonstrations. 1,419 Egyptians were brought to trial, thirty-eight of them on capital charges, before a military court, with Judge Thorp, of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court, acting as assessor. Of those tried for capital offences, sixteen were executed and six commuted to penal servitude. Of the others, 189 were acquitted and the remainder sentenced to varying terms of punishment. The entire responsibility for the maintenance of order in Alexandria has remained in the hands of the British military authorities ever since.

4. *Formation of Delegation under Adly Pasha.*

8. During the weeks succeeding the advent to power of the Adly Ministry, the Residency gave such assistance as it could to facilitate the formation of the delegation, but without taking any responsibility for the Ministerial programme. The delegation was eventually formed on the basis of a letter addressed to the Sultan by Adly Pasha, the principal points of which were (1) that the object of the Egyptian negotiators would be the abolition of the protectorate, not only in respect of relations with Great Britain, but with foreign Powers as well, so that Egypt might be constituted an independent State both internally and externally; and (2) that consequently the Egyptian delegates considered themselves committed to the reservations presented by Zaghul Pasha to Lord Milner in November. It may be convenient to state here what those reservations were:—

- (i.) Formal abolition of the protectorate.
- (ii.) Suppression of the second stipulation of sub-section (a) of article 3 of the Milner Memorandum to the effect that "Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights."
- (iii.) Suppression of the clause subordinating the coming into force of the treaty to the acceptance by the Powers of the transfer of their capitulatory rights to Great Britain and to the promulgation of decrees on the subject of the reorganisation of the Mixed Courts.

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- (iv.) Preliminary discussion and approval of the proposals for the reorganisation of the Mixed Courts by the representative bodies of Egypt before promulgation.
- (v.) Participation of Egypt as a contracting party in the agreements with the Powers in regard to their capitulatory rights.
- (vi.) Suppression of the stipulation for the appointment of a British official in the Ministry of Justice. A British procurator-general would be adequate, with the powers with which he was in the ordinary course invested, to provide the necessary guarantees for foreigners.
- (vii.) Suppression of the stipulation as to the necessity for consulting the British financial official.
- (viii.) The prohibition upon Egypt to conclude international arrangements to be limited to purely political treaties.

9. There had been some important secessions from the Zaghlulist Party, and Adly Pasha had continued his efforts to induce some of the secessionists to join the delegation, but to no purpose, and on the 1st May he announced that the delegation would be composed of himself and Hussein Rushdy, Ismail Sidky and Mohamed Shafik Pashas, all three men of his own party. At this stage I offered to see Zaghlul Pasha if it would be any use, but Adly Pasha did not take up the suggestion. Neither the programme nor the party composition of the delegation augured well for the prospects of concluding an agreement which would be both acceptable to His Majesty's Government and likely to be ratified by an Egyptian Assembly. The view had been expressed more than once from Cairo that it was idle to expect any Egyptian negotiators to set their names to a treaty which gave the Egyptians less than what they regarded as complete independence, and that the only way to settle the Egyptian problem was for His Majesty's Government, after full consideration of all the issues involved, to decide what concessions they were prepared to make to Egypt and to make a unilateral declaration of policy accordingly. In spite, however, of the improbability of an agreement being reached in London, in face of Adly Pasha's programme, it was considered preferable to encourage the delegation to proceed, not only as evidence of good faith on the part of His Majesty's Government, but also because the discussions could not fail to give His Majesty's Government a full insight into the problem from the Egyptian point of view. The delegation, which had been strengthened by the inclusion of Ahmed Talaat Pasha, president of the Native Court of Appeal, and Youssef Soliman Pasha, ex-Minister and a Copt, left for England on the 1st July.

5. *Opening of Negotiations in London. Main Issues.*

10. The negotiations were formally opened at the Foreign Office on the 13th July by Lord Curzon, who was assisted by the Hon. R. C. Lindsay, Mr. R. Vansittart, Mr. J. Murray and Mr. A. Duff Cooper, and continued until the middle of November, with an interruption of some four weeks in September. From the beginning of the discussions it was apparent that the most difficult question was that of the maintenance of British troops in Egypt, and, although the draft treaty as finally presented to Adly Pasha was rejected by him *in toto*, the impression left was that questions such as foreign affairs, the powers of the Financial and Judicial Advisers and other matters might have been susceptible of adjustment if it had been possible to assure the delegation that His Majesty's Government would, within a definite time, reconsider the question of the withdrawal of the British garrisons to the canal zone so soon as conditions in Egypt had been stabilised and satisfactory arrangements made for the maintenance of order by some force other than British troops. It is true that at one period of the negotiations it was suggested to Adly Pasha that the article relating to the British troops should be open to revision by mutual consent at the end of ten years, but no such clause was finally included in the draft treaty, and it must be supposed that it did not meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government collectively.

11. As this question of the troops is likely for some time to come to be a difficult one to settle, it may be useful to go into it in some detail here. Lord Curzon's explanatory note to Adly Pasha was to the following effect:—

“The objects for which the maintenance of a British force in Egypt is required are, in the view of His Majesty's Government, four in number:—

“(1.) The protection, both in peace and war, of the imperial line of communications.

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- “(2.) Assistance to the Egyptian Government when required for the defence of the integrity of Egyptian territory against external attack.
- “(3.) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt, as will be provided for in the new treaty.
- “(4.) Assistance to the Egyptian Government, when required, for the suppression of grave disorder or the defence of public security.

“For the discharge of these obligations it is proposed that British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours. The British Government is prepared to discuss with the Egyptian Government in the most friendly way the best manner in which to carry out these requirements.”

12. In reply, Adly Pasha said that, in the opinion of the Egyptians, the occupation should cease during peace time. Egypt was prepared to admit the importance of Great Britain maintaining troops in the country for the defence of imperial communications, though their presence must naturally appear incompatible with independence. If British troops remained they must remain for strategic reasons only and in purely British interests. They must not interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt. During the conversations of 1920 it had been distinctly understood from Lord Milner that, while he refused to consider any proposal to relegate the British troops to the Asiatic side of the Suez Canal, he agreed to their not being located in the large towns such as Cairo. Adly Pasha's answer to Lord Curzon's specific points was:—

- (1.) As regards the protection of imperial communications, he agreed, so far as war conditions were concerned, but he hoped that in peace the force might be confined to a certain zone.
- (2.) He considered that it would be an interference with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt to maintain a British force in the country to defend her territory against external attack. He did not touch upon the other two points.

13. Lord Curzon pointed out in reply that it was impossible to draw an arbitrary distinction between peace and war conditions, and if Great Britain was to carry out her obligations to Egypt she must maintain forces on the spot. If the proposed facilities were to be of any use in war they must be fully kept up in peace time. A long discussion ensued in which Adly Pasha pointed out that Lord Curzon's arguments were based on the idea that Egypt would never have a reliable police force or army. At this stage Lord Curzon made an observation which, if it had been carried through and given effect to by some formula in the draft treaty, might conceivably have altered the course of events. He said that the creation of a reliable force would take a little time. Egypt had good material, and it might be possible to reconsider the situation if and when a really reliable native force was in existence. At present the force was in its babyhood and during that stage British troops must be available. This subsequently led to the suggestion that the question might be reconsidered in ten years, but Adly Pasha hesitated to accept the proposal as it stood, on the ground that it gave to the presence of British troops on Egyptian territory the character of occupation in fact and was consequently not in harmony either with the conclusions of Lord Milner's Mission or with the Egyptian delegation's conception of representative opinion in Egypt. In view of this divergence of opinion it was decided to reserve further discussion of this question until other points had been examined. As a matter of fact the question does not appear to have been further dealt with in conference after the return of Adly Pasha to London early in October. Adly Pasha saw the Prime Minister early in November, and after his interview conveyed the impression that he had abandoned all hope of reaching an agreement. The draft treaty which emerged after discussion in the Cabinet was quite unacceptable to the Egyptian delegation, to whom it was communicated on the 10th November. In their reply, dated the 15th November, the delegation referred in the following terms to the question of troops:—

“Ainsi pour la question militaire, dont l'importance est capitale, le projet maintient, en aggravant même sa portée, la solution que nous avons si fortement

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combattue. La protection des communications impériales, que les conversations de l'an dernier avaient donnée pour seul objectif à la présence d'une force militaire en Egypte, ne saurait justifier cette solution. Alors qu'il eût été suffisant de déterminer, dans la région du Canal, une zone où seraient localisés, et les voies et moyens des communications impériales et la force qui les protégerait, le projet confère à la Grande-Bretagne le droit de maintenir des forces militaires en tout temps, sur n'importe quel point du territoire égyptien, et met à ses dispositions tous les moyens et voies de communications du pays. C'est là l'occupation pure et simple qui détruit toute idée d'indépendance et qui supprime jusqu'à la souveraineté intérieure. Dans le passé, l'occupation militaire, qui n'avait pourtant qu'un caractère temporaire, a suffi pour assurer à la Grande-Bretagne un contrôle absolu sur l'administration tout entière sans que besoin fût d'aucun texte de traité, d'aucune détermination de pouvoir quelconque."

The last sentence seems to indicate the reason why agreement was impossible. It suggests that His Majesty's Government were endeavouring to secure by way of a treaty the formal acquiescence of Egypt in a state of affairs to which she had from the first objected but which she had been and was still compelled by *force majeure* to tolerate. The phrase not only indicated the difficulty of dealing with the Egyptian problem by way of a treaty, but induced the reflection that what the British Government had done in the past they could do again, and, by means of their predominant power and prestige in the world, deal with Egypt in accordance with their own policy, without asking the Egyptians to agree to what they could only regard as a permanent state of servitude and, in practice, the annexation of their country.

14. The other question upon which the success or failure of the negotiations largely hung was that of the control of Egypt's foreign affairs. The delegation claimed full foreign representation abroad, and, for the protection of British interests, suggested that Egypt should undertake not to conclude political treaties prejudicial to Great Britain while retaining an entirely free hand in the matter of the conclusion of economic and commercial treaties. His Majesty's Government were prepared to agree to the restoration of an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the appointment of Egyptian diplomatic and consular representatives in London and elsewhere abroad; they desired to be represented in Egypt by a High Commissioner entitled to an exceptional position and taking precedence over the representatives of other countries; they stipulated that the Egyptian Government should not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Majesty's Government through the British High Commissioner; and they declared that they would continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers and accept the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. They undertook to confer with the Egyptian Government before formally concluding these negotiations. The Egyptian delegation took the view that the concession contained in these proposals was so hedged about with restrictions that it was largely illusory. They affirmed that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be unable freely to assume its responsibilities if it were formally bound to remain in close touch with the High Commissioner and in fact be subject to his direct control in the conduct of foreign affairs; that the obligation to obtain the consent of Great Britain to all political agreements, even to those which were not incompatible with the spirit of the anticipated alliance, gravely prejudiced the principle of external sovereignty; and that the title of High Commissioner, which it was not customary to confer upon diplomatic representatives in independent countries, was further evidence of the character of the political status proposed for Egypt. As regards the Capitulations, Egypt, as the party principally interested, claimed the right to treat direct with foreign Powers, with the diplomatic assistance of Great Britain. This question, like the military problem, was then adjourned, pending a discussion of other points.

6. *Minor Questions Discussed at the Conference.*

15. Besides these two major questions, the other matters discussed at the conference were:—

- (1) The employment of foreign officials by the Egyptian Government.
- (2) Protection of British and foreign interests in Egypt, involving—
  - (a.) A measure of British control of Egypt's finances; and
  - (b.) British control of legislation affecting foreigners.

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- (3.) Soudan.
- (4.) Suez Canal.
- (5.) Cable and wireless telegraph stations.
- (6.) Retirement and compensation of British officials.
- (7.) Protection of minorities.

16. It is not possible within the scope of this report to indicate otherwise than very briefly the course of the discussions in regard to the above matters. To take them in the order given above:—

(1.) *Employment of Foreign Officials.*

His Majesty's Government asked that, in view of the special responsibilities assumed by Great Britain and of the existing position in the Egyptian army and public services, the Egyptian Government would undertake not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of those services without the previous concurrence of the British High Commissioner. This demand was accepted in principle by the delegation, but they preferred that the clause should not appear in the treaty.

(2.) (a.) *Financial Control.*

In order to meet the Egyptian dislike for the Financial Adviser proposed in the Milner Report, His Majesty's Government proposed the formula quoted below, on the assumption that the "Caisse de la Dette" would continue as at present constituted for some years to come. As the Commissioners of the Debt are by treaty and law debarred from exercising other functions than those implied by their office, the formula merely gave the British Commissioner means to obtain information on Egyptian finances generally in order that, if necessary, he might be in a position to warn the High Commission of any impending trouble.

"The Egyptian Government agree that the British Commissioner of the Debt shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance, and shall be entitled to receive information on any matter within the purview of the Ministry of Finance.

"He shall be entitled more especially to satisfy himself that the following charges are being punctually met:—

- "(i.) The charges for the budgets of the Mixed Courts.
- "(ii.) All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.
- "(iii.) The service of the Unconsolidated Debt and of the loans charged on the Ottoman tribute."

In reply the delegation suggested the following alternative text:—

"Le Gouvernement égyptien nommera, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, un Commissaire financier, auquel seront confiés les pouvoirs actuellement exercés par les Commissaires de la Dette. Il aura, à ce titre, droit d'accès auprès du Premier Ministre et du Ministre des Finances. En raison de ses connaissances techniques, le Commissaire financier sera à la disposition du Gouvernement égyptien pour toute mission dont il voudra le charger, ou pour tout avis qu'il voudra lui demander, sans toutefois que les avis qu'il aurait à donner puissent lier en aucune façon ledit Gouvernement."

The question was further considered and Adly Pasha suggested a third alternative formula, but in the course of several conversations he conveyed the impression that the principle embodied in the British formula was not altogether unacceptable.

(2.) (b.) *Judicial Control.*

The Egyptian delegates objected to the proposal of a Judicial Adviser no less than to that of a Financial Adviser. They maintained that a British *procureur-général* of the Mixed Courts was all that His Majesty's Government could require or the delegation concede. The British negotiators therefore suggested that the original conception in the Milner Mission Report of a Judicial Adviser should be broken up into its component parts and, on the assumption that the judicial reform scheme proposed in that report could not come into operation for several years and

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that the Capitulations would meanwhile continue in force, laid the following formula before Adly Pasha on the 20th August :—

“ The Egyptian Government agree that the command of the police forces in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said shall continue, as at present, to be entrusted to European officers, with a sufficient European staff to ensure efficiency.

“ To ensure co-ordination in the work of the police in the said three cities, the Minister of the Interior will, in agreement with the High Commissioner, appoint an official, who shall not exercise any executive functions, but shall report to the Minister on matters of police administration, especially those affecting foreigners.

“ The Egyptian Government agree to appoint European legal advisers (“ Conseillers sultaniens ”) in the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior. These legal advisers shall collaborate in the preparation of all laws or regulations affecting foreigners.”

Adly Pasha was not ill-disposed towards the first paragraph of this formula, and showed signs of being prepared to accept the last paragraph, but the second paragraph, involving a British official in the Ministry of the Interior, was unpalatable.

He suggested eventually that an alternative might be found by creating a bureau in that Ministry under a British chief for watching over police matters affecting foreigners. If this solution was adopted, he was anxious to omit reference in the treaty to the three commandants, though he admitted that in practice they would have to be Englishmen, as Egyptians could not be found willing to take on the duties and be made the scapegoats of the Governors in the event of trouble. It will be observed that in the draft treaty the proposal for a Judicial Adviser is revised and the other suggestions are dropped.

(3.) *Soudan.*

Beyond a passing reference early in the proceedings, the delegation avoided any mention of the Soudan. Its status is defined by the 1899 Convention, and it was specifically excluded by Lord Milner from his recommendations. The views of His Majesty's Government are recorded in clause 7 of the draft treaty handed to Adly Pasha on the 10th November.

(4.) *Suez Canal.*

The text of the clause suggested by the Board of Trade was sent to Adly Pasha on the 19th August as follows :—

“ During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with the Suez Canal Company, frame proposals for the extension for a further period of fifty years of the concession held by the said company.

“ Any question on which the parties are unable to agree with regard to the terms on which the extension shall be granted shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be determined by an umpire appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of the company declining the extension on the terms so settled, the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government will determine in concert the status and management of the Canal after the expiration of the concession.”

This clause was omitted from the draft treaty, the delegation maintaining that it was unnecessary, as it was to Egypt's own interest to come to an agreement with the company, and the force of public opinion throughout the world would compel her to do so. But the terms and occasion of such an agreement must, they considered, be left to Egypt's own decision. The proposal put forward in 1909 to extend the lease had provoked an outburst of popular feeling, and any mention of the subject in the treaty would be fatal to its reception in Egypt.

(5.) *Cable and Wireless Rights.*

The text of certain proposals made by His Majesty's Postmaster-General, and concurred in by the Admiralty and India Office, was sent to Adly Pasha in the following terms :—

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"For the purpose of safeguarding British imperial communications, the Egyptian Government agree—

- "(i.) Not to grant permission for the landing of submarine cables or the establishment of wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt without the concurrence of His Majesty's High Commissioner.
- "(ii.) That the existing cable-landing rights and wireless concessions granted by the present Egyptian Government or their predecessors shall continue in force.
- "(iii.) The Egyptian Government accord to His Majesty's Government the right to land additional submarine cables, and to establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt.
- "(iv.) The Egyptian Government agree to grant similar facilities to telegraph companies, if so requested by His Majesty's Government, and upon such conditions as they may recommend."

Adly Pasha did not appear at the time adverse to meeting these requirements, but felt some doubt as to whether such stipulations were in place in a political treaty. In the report which he made to the Sultan upon his mission after his return to Cairo, however, he remarked that the British draft treaty contained no clause in regard to cable and wireless matters, and he assumed that the delegation's replies had led the British negotiators to renounce their claims. A fuller reference to the present situation in regard to wireless telegraphy in Egypt will be found in a later portion of this report.

(6.) *Retirement and Compensation of British Officials.*

It was assumed that the greater measure of self-government to be conceded to the Egyptians by the treaty would naturally lead to the dismissal or retirement of a certain number of British and other foreign officials in the service of the Egyptian Government, and that it would be necessary that such officials should receive special compensation. A statement showing the basic principles on which it was desired that compensation should be calculated was handed to the Egyptian delegates on the 24th August. Mr. Lindsay also undertook to give them a copy of the explanatory report drawn up by Judge Percival, president of the Native Court of Appeal, and a copy of the table of compensation prepared by the Association of British Officials in the employ of the Egyptian Government, but warned them that the latter must not be regarded as authoritative or as necessarily representing a correct application of the principles. It was in fact indicated in the statement that the table was subject to re-calculation by Sir Alfred Watson, president of the Society of Actuaries. A discussion took place in October between Judge Percival and Sidky Pasha, in which the latter subjected the scheme to considerable criticism. Subsequently Sidky Pasha put forward a scheme of compensation considerably less liberal than that proposed by the association, the principles of which had been regarded as reasonable, both by the Treasury and by Sir Alfred Watson. The latter was, however, requested to furnish his observations on both schemes, with the result that he evolved a third scheme which, so far as the total cost can be calculated—a matter of some uncertainty—may perhaps be described as somewhere about half-way between the other two and was regarded by the Foreign Office as both just and reasonable. Sir A. Watson's proposals were not, however, communicated to the Egyptians, as the termination of the negotiations prevented any further discussion of the matter. The question has since been very fully re-examined in all its bearings both at the Residency and by the Association of British Officials, who naturally attach the very greatest importance to it, and for many of them, with families dependent on them and with no means of their own, it is a matter of bare livelihood.

(7.) *Protection of Minorities.*

A formula taken from the Polish and Roumanian treaties was submitted to Adly and Sidky Pashas, who appeared to be prepared to accept it.

7. *Collapse of the Negotiations.*

17. There is little more to relate in regard to the negotiations. The conferences were adjourned during September, and, on the return of the Egyptians to London early in October it was agreed that matters had been sufficiently thrashed out and that it was time to bring them to a head. The draft treaty was, as already stated,

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communicated to the Egyptian delegates on the 10th November, and found by them to be totally unacceptable. They replied to that effect in a reasoned note on the 15th November. In his final conversation with Adly Pasha on the 19th November, Lord Curzon expressed the opinion that the Egyptian delegates had made a mistake, when they realised that their extreme demands could not be conceded, in not agreeing to give the British proposals a provisional trial, in the expectation of being able to prove, by good administration, their title to more liberal terms later. The possibility had been suggested to them on one or two occasions but they had not responded, with the regrettable result that the whole position reverted to the *status quo ante*.

8. *Situation in Egypt During the Negotiations.*

18. It may be convenient at this stage, before dealing with the situation created in Egypt by the failure of the London negotiations, to refer briefly to the course of events in Egypt after the departure of Adly Pasha and his colleagues for London on the 1st July.

19. Sarwat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, had been left in charge of the Ministry. By dint of hard work and careful organisation, backed by the strong support of the Residency, the Ministry succeeded in the course of the summer in establishing itself in the saddle. The country as a whole was beginning to look to the Ministry for a lead, and the position of Zaghul Pasha and the extremists was proportionately weakened. The visit of four Labour Members of Parliament and one Liberal member to Egypt in September, under the auspices and largely at the expense of the Zaghulist Party, embarrassed both the Administration in Egypt and the negotiations in London. Their moral support encouraged Zaghul Pasha to reopen his campaign against the Egyptian Ministry, against the British Government, against the negotiations in London, in fact against everything which appeared to him to stand in the way of his inordinate ambition to play, not the leading, but the sole part, on the stage. He planned a tour to embrace the principal towns in Lower and Upper Egypt, at which the Members of Parliament should see for themselves the populace acclaiming him as the only leader. His undoubted oratorical powers, attuned to the necessary pitch and aided by various methods of persuasion, provided the necessary setting, and the Members of Parliament, more than half convinced before they arrived, were duly impressed by large crowds of vociferous but uninstructed demonstrators. Precautions were taken by the Zaghulist organisation they that should see as little as possible of the other side of the picture, and it must be admitted that they showed little inclination to profit by the opportunities afforded them of forming an unbiased judgment. The visits were not interfered with by the authorities except where a disturbance of the peace was anticipated. Meetings were permitted at Alexandria, Cairo, Mansourah and Port Said, but that at Tanta was prohibited under an order based on martial law. Supporters of the Ministry, who pinned their hopes on a successful conclusion of the London negotiations, were with difficulty restrained from forcibly opposing these obvious attempts to wreck them. After the departure of the Members of Parliament on the 7th October, Zaghul Pasha proceeded to carry out the tour to Upper Egypt without them. At Assiout, the first place visited, the rival factions came to blows, and the remainder of the tour was prohibited. Zaghul Pasha had perhaps acquired a temporary increase of popularity among the masses, but his proceedings had evoked indignant protests from many responsible bodies, and the fiasco in which they ended brought some ridicule upon him. In this connection it is important to emphasise once more that the respective programmes of Adly Pasha and Zaghul Pasha were essentially the same. If Zaghul Pasha was sincere in his statement made in the course of the London negotiations that nobody would greet Adly Pasha more warmly than himself, if he returned victorious, why did he simultaneously do all he could to belittle and embarrass Adly's efforts and sedulously spread the report that he contemplated surrender? The answer seems to be in the statement made to the representative of the "Egyptian Gazette" by Zaghul Pasha and quoted in section 2 of this chapter.

9. *The Position in Cairo after the Failure of the Negotiations.*

20. It was generally recognised that if Adly Pasha failed in his mission his resignation would inevitably follow, and it was necessary to take thought betimes for finding a successor to him. The protectorate did not enable His Majesty's representative, aided by the British advisers, to carry on the Government of the country by means of a few hundred British officials scattered up and down the

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Administration without the machinery of an Egyptian Ministry. It gave him, it is true, greater power, notably in the realm of foreign affairs, than that exercised previously by His Majesty's agent and consul-general, but previous experience of interregna of any duration had shown the futility of expecting any adequate co-operation from Egyptian officials in the absence of Egyptian chiefs. A Ministry was essential or the entire machinery was threatened with collapse. Cabinets of Affairs, pledged not to touch important questions, had been contrived in 1919, 1920 and 1921, and the edifice had with difficulty been kept erect, but a stage had now been reached which was too critical for such makeshift arrangements, and a Ministry with a programme responding in essentials to the country's demand for independence would alone serve the occasion. There appeared to be only three possible successors to Adly Pasha, namely, Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, his *locum tenens*, Mohamed Tewfik Nessim Pasha, the late President of the Council, and Mohamed Said Pasha, also a former Prime Minister. The last named has a little deserved reputation for being the "strong man" of Egypt, and is credited with some ascendancy over the mind of his sovereign, but he is a dangerous intriguer, his tenure of power has generally been characterised by resort to somewhat reckless expedients, and his political views, though believed to be reactionary, are obscure. Some key to them may be discerned in his close association with Prince Omar Toussoun. In the opinion of those who value the qualities of courage, honesty and integrity no public man in Egypt stood higher than Tewfik Nessim Pasha, but his association with the protectorate was still too recent in men's minds to make him generally acceptable at that juncture, and when the crisis came he himself felt that there would be no advantage in his assuming office. There remained Sarwat Pasha, who had carried on the Administration with some success and had succeeded in gaining the Sultan's confidence after an inauspicious start. He had for some time been regarded as the most promising candidate, and up to the moment of rupture he had not stipulated for any conditions for taking office, probably in the belief that, even if a full agreement were not attained, liberal concessions in unilateral form would be made by His Majesty's Government. The publication on the 3rd December of the draft treaty and more particularly of the accompanying letter to the Sultan, destroyed the hopes of so easy a solution. Annexation was the only construction which the Egyptians could read into these documents, and resentment was general. If another deadlock was to be avoided a bold lead on the part of His Majesty's Government appeared to be essential. The draft treaty represented a definite policy which, while fully safeguarding British interests, accorded to the Egyptian people a distinct advance in the management of their own affairs, and in operation would have the marked advantage of placing certain responsibilities on Egyptian shoulders which they should properly bear. By carrying into effect the main provisions of the treaty as occasion arose, a Ministerial programme could be formulated, and a constructive policy set in operation. It was realised that the adoption of this course would involve the abolition of the protectorate by unilateral declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government, and consequently the relinquishment of the control of Egypt's foreign affairs and the reinstatement of an Egyptian Foreign Minister, but this appeared to be the only means of putting an end to the conditions of uncertainty and recurring disappointment which for three years had blocked all administrative progress and had kept Egypt in a state of seething discontent. The declaration of His Majesty's Government to the Sultan of the 3rd December amounted to a pronouncement of a British Monroe Doctrine in respect of Egypt and, so it appeared, sufficiently safeguarded Britain's special position *vis-à-vis* foreign Powers.

10. *Sarwat Pasha's First Programme for Forming a Ministry.*

21. His Majesty's Government, however, hesitated to adopt this course. The Prime Minister had stated in the House of Commons on the 27th October that no change would be made in the status of Egypt without consulting Parliament, and, apart from this pledge, the Cabinet had with great reluctance agreed, only as part of a general settlement including treaty guarantees from Egypt, to relinquish foreign affairs. It is not perhaps necessary to record in detail the arguments which were urged from Cairo in favour of the course indicated above and the objections to it seen in London. Adly Pasha resigned on the 8th December, and under some pressure Sarwat on the 11th December submitted a programme upon which he believed he could form a Ministry. Briefly summarised, the programme ignored the draft treaty except in respect of the offer of His Majesty's Government to

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terminate the protectorate and to recognise Egypt as a sovereign State; it affirmed the intention of Egypt to prove to Great Britain that the good faith of Egypt and respect for her undertakings would constitute the best and most effective safeguards for British and foreign interests; it looked forward to the restoration of normal conditions in Egypt which would permit a Constitution to be granted to the country; and it expressed the view that the time had come to re-establish the functions of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, temporarily suspended by the circumstances of the war. This programme having been telegraphed to London, His Majesty's Government signified their assent to it on the 15th December. The important point to note in this programme is that relating to foreign affairs. The vesting of the Ministry in the person of His Majesty's High Commissioner in 1914 was an essential part of the protectorate. Indeed, it was the only measure taken to give form to the protectorate policy. With the restoration of the Ministry to Egyptian hands there appeared to be no longer any reason for retaining the protectorate in name. On the basis of this concession negotiations ensued for the formation of a Ministry. While the concession alone did not, for reasons to be explained later, achieve the object hoped of it, it undoubtedly went far to reassure moderate opinion in the country as to the benevolent intentions of His Majesty's Government, so much so that, when it became necessary a week or two later to deport Zaghul Pasha and some of his colleagues to the Seychelles Islands for defiance of martial law, the British authorities were able to rely on the co-operation and support of the moderate men in continuing the Government of the country, with the result that the strikes in the Government offices in Cairo were of short duration and the services in the provinces were carried on without interruption. Thanks to the precautions and prompt measures of Sir Walter Congreve, General Officer Commanding, the disturbances were of comparative insignificance. The moral of the Egyptian army and of the police depends to a great extent on whether or not there is a visible Egyptian authority to obey, and it is liable to give way if put to too long a strain. On this occasion there was no complaint to make of their behaviour, and the conduct of the Guard Company of the Egyptian police, who are lodged in barracks isolated from the influence of home surroundings, was exemplary.

22. Notwithstanding the approval of his programme, Sarwat Pasha declared that he was not in a position to form a Ministry, and, upon enquiry, it transpired that he had been forbidden by the Sultan to disclose his programme in Egypt. When he came to the point of forming his Cabinet he was met with a refusal to co-operate on the part of most of those on whom he had been counting for his colleagues. He was specially embarrassed by denial of support from Adly Pasha, who was still regarded as the leader of the party and considered that the concession did not go far enough to enable a stable Ministry to be formed, and to restore public confidence in the good intentions of Great Britain. Conversations between the Egyptian leaders and the Residency on the possibilities of forming a Ministry were still proceeding when the year closed.

11. *The Deportation of Zaghul Pasha and the Members of his Wafd.*

23. The lesson which Zaghul Pasha had had in the autumn had been completely thrown away upon him. His appearances in public continued, and were intended, to be the signal for disorderly demonstrations. After the publication of the note to the Sultan explaining the future policy of His Majesty's Government, demonstrations occurred in the streets of Cairo definitely attributable to the propaganda of the Wafd. The police were nightly attacked by gangs of hooligans armed with sticks and stones. Two British soldiers were shot in the street, one of whom died from his wound. Zaghul Pasha convened a large meeting for the 23rd December, which it was deemed advisable to prohibit in the interests of public security. The Pasha immediately issued an appeal to the nation, which was a defiance of the authorities. He and his principal adherents were thereupon ordered to abstain from further participation in politics and to proceed to their country residences, there to remain under the supervision of the Governor of the province. Saad Pasha Zaghul, Fathalla Pasha Barakat, Atif Bey Barakat, Amin Bey Ezz-el-Arab, Sinnot Bey Hanna and William Makram Obeid Effendi refused to obey this order, and their deportation from Egypt was decided in consequence. As there was no Egyptian Ministry in office at the time, the whole responsibility for this step was taken by the British authorities. The predominant feeling in the country was probably one of relief at the removal of what was a standing menace to law and order, but it was

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more than ever incumbent after this upon us to come forward with an offer which would respond to Egyptian hopes. Unless this were done promptly, it was likely that the minds of those who still looked for an amicable solution would react in favour of the deportees.

24. As mentioned above, the deportation order was followed by some disturbance. Directly signs of trouble were observed in Cairo the military authorities assumed control. On the 24th December the mob erected barricades in the streets, and a shot was fired at a lorry of troops. The troops were compelled to fire, killing three natives and wounding fourteen. An attempt was made to fire the railway workshops at Boulac. The schools generally went on strike and were closed by the adviser. Government officials declared a three days' strike. On the 27th December the attendance of Government officials improved again, but there were further Egyptian casualties among the mob, and political meetings were held at El Azhar University. On the 28th December there was a fire in the waggon works at Boulac and considerable damage was done, but the general situation began to improve. On the 30th December Mr. E. A. Hatton, Assistant Divisional Superintendent of the Egyptian State Railways Mechanical Department, was shot in the back and killed. His assailant escaped. Between the 24th December and the 27th December fifteen Egyptians in all were killed and twenty-four wounded.

25. At Alexandria demonstrations were held on the 22nd and 23rd December, but were dispersed without casualties. Three hundred and eighty-nine arrests were made, 233 of those arrested being boys. Numbers of seditious pamphlets were distributed. On the 25th December H.M.S. "Ceres" and "Senator" arrived. By the 26th December the situation was quiet.

26. At Port Said persistent demonstrations occurred on the 25th December, and the troops were compelled to fire on the crowd, which had refused to disperse after a warning. One Egyptian was killed and three wounded. On the 26th December the situation was still disturbed, but improved the following day.

27. Ismailia remained quiet under the protection of H.M.S. "Sparrowhawk," but at Suez the troops fired upon the demonstrators after due warning; one Egyptian was killed and three wounded. There were no further incidents. H.M.S. "Sikh" arrived there the following day.

28. Detachments of Egyptian troops were sent to the provincial capitals throughout the country. There was some trouble in Lower Egypt. Demonstrations were held at Tanta, Zagazig, Damanhour, Zifta and Fua. A British battalion was at once sent to Tanta and there were no disorders. At Zagazig order was maintained by the Egyptian Camel Corps, and at Damanhour, Zifta and Fua by Egyptian troops or police. At Zifta there were three casualties. Cairo and the Delta were patrolled by aeroplanes, and eight Nile steamers armed with machine guns and in charge of British naval officers were sent to Upper Egypt on the 26th December. Some well-known agitators, who had proceeded thither from Cairo, were arrested, including Kamel Hussein, the lawyer of the Syndicalist movement in Egypt. There was some slight disorder at Girga, but otherwise Upper Egypt was undisturbed, and the fellahen remained quiet throughout.

12. *The Ex-Khedive.*

29. When Abbas Pasha Hilmi was deposed from the Khedivate a representative of the Egyptian Government was appointed to take control of his estates. When this control appeared no longer necessary, the estates, which were heavily mortgaged, were sequestrated by the tribunals on the petition of the creditors. In 1918 the Sultan represented that the continued ownership by the ex-Khedive of so large a property was undesirable on political grounds, as it tended to keep alive in the popular mind a feeling of uncertainty as to whether Abbas Hilmi had been definitely excluded from Egypt, and he suggested that steps should be taken to liquidate it. His Majesty's Government were disposed to concur in this view, and a lengthy correspondence ensued as to how this might best be done. As a first step towards a settlement of the question, it was eventually decided that a proclamation should be issued by the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's Forces to the effect that, Abbas Pasha being excluded from the country, and he and his descendants having been by decision of His Majesty's Government definitely excluded from all rights of succession to the throne, his estates were ordered to be vested in the Public Custodian of Enemy Property. This proclamation was issued on the 4th January, 1919. A discussion as to the most appropriate manner of dealing with the property continued throughout 1919, and it was finally resolved in the spring of 1920 to make an attempt

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to come to an amicable arrangement with the ex-Khedive. He was to be invited to authorise the sale of his Egyptian properties to the Egyptian Government for a fixed sum or by the Public Custodian for what they would fetch in the open market. If he refused to be a party to any liquidation, the Public Custodian would act in virtue of proclamations under martial law and would liquidate the property on the best terms that could be obtained. In the latter event, it was proposed that the proceeds of the forced liquidation should be handed over to Abbas Hilmi, provided he signed an undertaking not to acquire or hold any property in Egypt in the future. With characteristic timidity the Egyptian Council of Ministers verbally assented to this arrangement, but declined to assume any formal responsibility.

30. These proposals were put to the ex-Khedive in May 1920 by Sir W. Hayter, Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, who went to Constantinople for the purpose. The ex-Khedive replied that he was incapacitated from authorising the sale, as all his immovable property in Egypt had been irrevocably constituted Wakfieh in Turkey in November 1914. Apart from this the price offered by the Egyptian Government (£E. 830,000) was, he said, inadequate, as he estimated the gross value of his estates at £E. 2,000,000 at least. It may be mentioned that a report on the estates drawn up in the previous February by the Public Custodian showed a surplus of assets over liabilities of £E. 844,862. As a considerable fall in the price of cotton had since taken place, which necessarily had a corresponding effect upon the value of land, the price offered by the Egyptian Government was not an unfair one. As to the alleged Wakfieh, further investigation went to prove that it had not been completed in Turkey. Moreover, so far as could be ascertained, the alleged Wakfieh had never been registered in Egypt and therefore was not valid as regards property situated in this country. An attempt to constitute a Wakf of these properties now would be an offence against the proclamation of 1916. A proclamation was therefore issued by the Commander-in-chief on the 24th November, 1920, empowering the Public Custodian to sell in any manner he thought proper all the property of the ex-Khedive under his control and to pay out of the proceeds all the mortgage debts and other debts incurred by the ex-Khedive in Egypt of which he had received notice, and a circular was sent to all cadis in Egypt calling their attention to the proclamation. On steps being taken by the Public Custodian to sell the Palaces of Koubbeh and Montaza and adjoining properties to the Ministry of Wakfs and the Sultanic Wakf Administration, notice was given to him on the 12th December, on behalf of the ex-Khedive, of an action in the Native Court of First Instance to recover the properties. It was considered that the action could have little significance as the Public Custodian had been appointed by the Commander-in-chief under martial law and was therefore immune from the jurisdiction of the court; he was, however, instructed to give the usual guarantees when effecting sales of the ex-Khedive's estates. The result of the legal action taken by the ex-Khedive would, on the other hand, probably make it impossible for any payments at all to be made to him in respect of the sales until the courts had given a final decision as to the alleged Wakf. The Public Custodian was, in fact, instructed to invest the proceeds of all sales in Government securities, and to retain the interest in his hands. On the 14th February, 1921, the case came before the Juge préparateur for the production of documents, and the Public Custodian, acting under his instructions, took no part in the proceedings. The liquidation of the estate proceeded, and by the end of May there were only three properties of importance remaining to be disposed of, viz., Ismailia, Edfina and Mariout, valued at the beginning of the year at £E. 264,500, £E. 201,250 and £E. 17,250 respectively, but since then considerably depreciated owing, as indicated above, to the fall in the market value of cotton. As to the legal proceedings, the plaintiffs had shown no inclination, up to the end of the year, to press them on, and it seems probable that the action had only been started in order to throw doubt on the title of the Public Custodian to sell the property and so to prevent any sales.

31. In December 1920 the ex-Khedive had requested His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople for a pass to enable him to go to Italy and Switzerland. This was refused. Simultaneously a letter from the ex-Khedive to Mustapha Kemal, the Turkish Nationalist leader, came to light, encouraging him in his war with the Greeks and urging him not to treat with the delegates of the Constantinople Government lest he should get into the clutches of the British. Abbas Hilmi added that he was spreading Bolshevik propaganda by publications in the press of Egypt, Syria and all Arab countries. He was also found to be intriguing with Sheikh Ahmed-el-Senoussi. In January he applied to the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople for permission to settle in Italy under Italian protection,

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promising in return to use his influence on behalf of Italian interests in Tripoli, Erithrea and the Near East generally. In March he approached the Fetva Emini under the Sheikh-ul-Islamat for a religious decree in support of his claims to the restoration of his throne. His brother, Prince Mohamed Ali, and Princes Kemal-ed-Din and Aziz Hassan were all active in his support at this time, either at Constantinople or in Egypt. His main object appeared to be the recovery of his throne, but his activities and passion for intrigue were so many-sided that it is difficult to fathom all his motives. His army of agents was growing, and he was in correspondence with his friends in Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and even America. He is next reported as aspiring to the Throne of Albania, and both he, Prince Omar Toussoun and Prince Burhameddein are mentioned as candidates for the Emirate of Syria. On being questioned on the subject by His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, however, M. Briand denied that the French Government had any such intention towards any of the three. In October Abbas Hilmi left Constantinople surreptitiously by an Italian steamer for Rome, probably with the connivance of the French and Italian authorities, or at least with that of Mgr. Dolci, Latin Apostolic delegate to Constantinople, and his assistant, Mgr. Collaro, who were both warm partisans of his cause. From Rome he went to Geneva, and also appears to have visited Germany, returning to Rome again about the middle of November. In reply to representations from His Majesty's Embassy, the Italian Government said that they would expel him from Italy if he were found to be intriguing against His Majesty's Government. Another scheme which he is said to favour is one for securing the independence of Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Khalifat.

32. In spite of all his activities, it does not appear that the ex-Khedive has advanced his cause in Egypt. The sale of his properties has considerably damaged his prestige, and there is no desire for his return except on the part of a comparatively small number who are still counted among his partisans. It was nevertheless deemed advisable in September to check what might, if passed unnoticed, have led to a revival of popular sentiment in his favour. A Watanist newspaper, "El Lewa-el-Masri," published a telegram of congratulation to the ex-Khedive on the occasion of the Mahomedan New Year above the signature of Ali Fahmi Kamel, chairman of a committee with which was associated Prince Mohamed Ali. The telegram was addressed to "His Highness our Lord the Khedive" and created a good deal of sensation in the local press. On the urgent representations of the Acting Prime Minister and of the Sultan, who considered his prestige was at stake, the paper was suspended and Ali Fahmi Kamel was expelled. It may be added that there is no evidence that the ex-Khedive's cause is supported by the Zaghlist Party.

13. *Cadre Commission.*

33. The commission appointed under the presidency of Sir Paul Harvey to examine the proposals for a new cadre for Government officials completed the first stage of its work in May 1921. The Council of Ministers approved in principle the recommendations, which included:—

- (a.) The adoption of the principle that entry into Government service should be by competitive examination, and the establishment of a Government recruiting commission.
- (b.) An increase, during the winter months, in the length of the Government working day.
- (c.) The adoption of new and simplified scales of salary applicable to all departments, together with the modifications thereby rendered necessary in the existing rules governing promotions and the grant of allowances.
- (d.) The addition of expatriation pay to the salaries of European officials.

34. The task of regrading the existing staff was entrusted to a special committee, and it is hoped that some of the departments will be placed in the new cadre in the course of this year.

35. The cost of regrading is expected to amount to an additional £E. 750,000 in the first year, and, with certain exceptions, it is intended to take effect retrospectively from the 1st April, 1921, though this intention may perhaps not be carried out.

14. *Cost of Living and Government War Bonus.*

36. In September 1919 the Council of Ministers decided to increase the salaries of Government officials in order to meet the increased cost of living. They granted

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a flat rate of increase of 20 per cent. to all salaries, with a maximum increase of £E. 300 a year, coupled with a war gratuity of 60 per cent. on the new pay, with a maximum of £E. 192, and a further maximum of £E. 300 for pay and war gratuity combined. The index figure for the cost of living at this time was estimated as 230.

37. In June 1920, when the index figure of the cost of living had risen to 272, the Council of Ministers decided to grant payments of 10 per cent. of the original annual salary to all officials on the 1st September, 1920, and the 1st March, 1921.

38. In February 1921, when the index figure had fallen to 233, and as the national finances appeared to be in a somewhat precarious state, a third of the 60 per cent. war gratuity granted in September 1919 was removed as from the 16th May. The index figure at that date was 210.

39. Finally, in March 1922, in view of the fall of the index figure to 193, and as it was hoped that the new cadre would shortly be instituted, the Council of Ministers published a decree to the effect that the remainder of the war gratuity might, at the discretion of the Government, be reduced, or removed entirely, as from the 31st May.

15. *Labour Troubles.*

40. In August of 1919 a Labour Conciliation Board was established, which, under the presidency of Dr. A. Granville, C.M.G., C.B.E., has rendered excellent service, not only in the study of labour conditions and problems, as, for instance, the best method of dealing with the unemployment of cigarette rollers, who have lost their means of livelihood by the installation of machine rollers, but also in actual intervention in trade disputes, in order to arrange a settlement between the two parties.

41. During the year under review, the Board has intervened in thirty-four disputes, most of which have been terminated to the satisfaction of both masters and workmen. In the two most serious cases, however, of the strikes of the Cairo Tramway Company and the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Company at Suez, the employees, who were clearly in the wrong and, further, alienated the sympathy of the public by their violent methods, had to return to work without their demands being granted. The former of these two strikes, as well as some others, arose from political rather than economic causes.

42. There are at present 38 workmen's syndicates in Cairo, 33 in Alexandria, 18 on the Suez Canal and 6 in other parts of Egypt. There is no cohesion among them; many enjoy an ephemeral existence, or exist only in name. There is no regular system of contributions, and the funds spasmodically collected are often put to irregular uses. Many of the syndicates are controlled by lawyers, who have no connection with the trade or industry concerned, and who are thus furnished with an excellent means for the promotion of discord for political reasons or pecuniary advantage.

43. This was notably apparent in the case of the Cairo Tramway Company, where the lawyer leader had obtained so great an ascendancy over the men that he persuaded them to sign a legal agreement requiring the company to pay the whole of their wages directly into the syndicate's account. This achievement, and the resulting legislation, are recorded hereafter in the chapter "Justice."

44. From statistics furnished to the Labour Conciliation Board by a number of leading companies it would appear that the average of workmen's wages at the end of 1921 was 86 per cent. above the average of 1913, and 20 per cent. below the highest point, which was reached in 1920.

45. Dr. Granville, in sending me a copy of the report of the Labour Conciliation Board, writes as follows:—

"The continuation of the present financial ease in Egypt appears a doubtful matter and many signs seem to point to a period of scarcity being close at hand. Egypt has continued to be relatively prosperous, whilst all sorts of troubles due to hard financial times have been prevalent in Europe. But there are signs that these good days are coming to an end, and it must be foreseen that unless the financial and work situation rapidly improves in Europe this country will also feel the pressure.

"In the large towns, and especially in Alexandria, there are large numbers of semi-skilled workmen, such as masons, carpenters and builders, who have been recently having a most prosperous time, and whose rate of pay is 40 piastres a day and upwards. They have acquired many habits of luxury and pleasure, such as the café and the cinema, which were unknown to them before.

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"It cannot be expected that these men will be willing to give up these advantages; they are a semi-educated class, most of them being able to read and write a little, soaked in Communistic ideas and very independent. As an instance, in many cases they have lately been insisting on an uniform rate of pay based on the highest for all workmen on the job, with no regard to the degree of efficiency, a degree which varies very much more, I believe, amongst Egyptians than amongst European workers.

"As I have mentioned in the report, I believe that, if the decrease of wages is gradual enough, and is accompanied by a similar decrease in the price of commodities and necessities, it is possible that the matter may adapt itself, but if, as also is possible, a sudden slump in the price and demand for labour should occur, I expect that there will be considerable trouble with the workmen, especially in the classes mentioned, whose impatience of control of any kind has become so marked lately."

16. *Drug Traffic.*

46. In view of the fact that morphia from the United Kingdom and elsewhere appeared to be reaching the Far East in quantities largely in excess of the amount required for legitimate purposes, the problem of the drug traffic was considered comprehensively during 1920 with a view to giving effect in Egypt by local legislation to a system of control similar to that provided in the International Opium Convention, it being undesirable, for political reasons, to raise the question of the adherence of Egypt to the convention.

47. The problem of the cultivation of the opium poppy in Egypt was carefully examined. Before the war the area under such cultivation in Egypt was small, averaging about 410 acres. Egyptian opium, which is grown almost exclusively in Upper Egypt in scattered patches along the Nile banks, is of an inferior quality, and the crop was almost entirely consumed locally in crude form by natives. The only existing law on the subject of drugs, the Pharmacy Law of 1904, did not touch this abuse, containing no reference to the cultivation of the opium poppy or to the production of raw opium.

48. By 1918, owing to the inflation of prices resulting from restricted import, no less than 2,543 acres in Egypt has been planted with opium; and in October of that year the Government, in view of the necessity of increasing the area under cereal crops, prohibited its cultivation altogether. This prohibition was removed in October 1919 with the disappearance of the danger of a shortage in cereals, and in 1920 some 1,660 acres, *i.e.*, more than four times the average area of before the war, were again reported to be under opium cultivation.

49. It was finally decided not to prohibit the cultivation of the poppy in Egypt, but to follow the example of India and experiment in improving it scientifically for medicinal purposes under Government control. Apart from the difficulty of enforcing prohibition in Egypt, it was felt that, at a time when the future of Egyptian cotton was so precarious, no legitimate means of increasing the economic resources of the country should be neglected. Work on the basis of plant selection was accordingly started towards the end of the year under review, under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture.

50. As regards the import and export of drugs, the practical difficulties of securing adequate control in Egypt, due mainly to her geographical configuration and to her international commitments, were found to be considerable, and a series of proposals were successively examined and rejected. It was finally recommended that the Pharmacy Law of 1904 should simply be supplemented by a decree forbidding the export or import of poisonous drugs except under licences to be issued by the Ministry of the Interior. Owing, however, to the political developments recorded elsewhere, this decree has not yet been passed by the Council of Ministers.

51. The cultivation of hashish (Indian hemp) in Egypt is the subject of a special law, of March 1884, which forbids its cultivation in Egypt, and the possession, importation or sale of the crude article. In addition to heavy fines inflicted, the hashish is confiscated and destroyed. Efforts, however, to enforce that law are only partially successful, and a large quantity of the drug is smuggled into the country. The quantities of medicinal preparations of hashish imported are small.

17. *The Cotton Seed Control Board.*

52. It was found, during the course of the 1916-17 season, that the supply of cotton seed to Allied countries was seriously impeded by scarcity of tonnage and

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high freights, and by the operations of speculators. A correspondence between the British and Egyptian Governments as to the best means of overcoming these difficulties resulted in an arrangement by which His Majesty's Government undertook to purchase at a fixed price, and ship, the whole exportable surplus of the 1917-18 crop of cotton seed.

53. A consultative commission, composed of official and unofficial experts, was appointed early in August 1917 to study the method of application of this arrangement. This commission recommended the immediate announcement of preliminary measures, and the formation, for giving effect to the arrangements, of a board composed of three representative members of the cotton and cotton seed export trade, a banker and a Government official.

54. In pursuance of these recommendations, a proclamation was issued on the 12th August, 1917, prohibiting all further dealings in futures for the 1917-18 crop; ordering the liquidation of all outstanding positions at the prices ruling at that date, viz., P.T. 107½ per ardeb for November to January deliveries, and P.T. 109½ for February/March shipments, and forbidding the purchase of any ginned seed of the 1917-18 crop, except under such regulations as might subsequently be made. This was followed by a proclamation, published on the 3rd September, 1917, creating the Cotton Seed Control Board, and appointing as its members: Messrs. Percy W. Carver (*Chairman*), Harold Carver and Henry Baker, members of export houses, B. Hornsby, Sub-Governor of the National Bank, and J. A. Tarrell, Chief Inspector, Egyptian Customs Administration. Mr. H. Bridson, Chartered Accountant, was appointed as auditor on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

55. The last-mentioned proclamation fixed standard prices for seed delivered in Alexandria as follows:—

	Per Ardeb.
	P.T.
Fayumi and Upper Egypt, f.a.q. ... ..	100
Affi, Assili, Nubari and Abbassi, f.a.q. ... ..	92
Sakellarides, f.a.q. ... ..	85

56. The board was authorised to purchase, directly or through agents, on the basis of these standard prices; to fix from time to time the f.a.q. standard of the above qualities; to fix allowances for qualities above and below the standards; to issue licences to local oil crushers for the purchase of seed, and to purchase, if necessary, the resultant products.

57. Special provision was made for the allotment of seed for sowing purposes under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, which issued an order to the effect that cotton seed might only leave a ginnery under the authority of the Ministry or of the Cotton Seed Control Board.

58. In practice, the purchase and loading of seed for account of the Board was entrusted to firms of standing in the cotton and cotton seed trade, on a commission basis, all expenses of reception, storing and shipping being borne by the board, which allotted among these firms the shipping space provided by His Majesty's Government.

59. The board allotted to the local crushing mills, in proportion to their capacity, licences for the purchase, at the standard prices, of the quantity of seed reserved to meet the local requirements of oil, reserving to itself the right to purchase the resultant cake.

60. The fixing of the quantity of seed to be reserved for the Egyptian mills gave rise to a long discussion. It was at first estimated that 100,000 tons of seed would amply provide for the oil requirements of the Egyptian market; but, early in the season, it was realised that, owing to falling off in the import of edible fats and also of mineral oil (resulting in the use of cotton oil as an illuminant), consumption had risen much above the normal, and, in the event, it was found necessary to exceed this limit.

61. Another early problem was the disposal of local produced cake. The British Government anticipated difficulty in providing tonnage for its transport, while there was no demand for it in Egypt. Happily, the growing scarcity of fuel in Egypt created a local demand for it, and eventually the Egyptian Government elected to retain the whole output of the local mills.

62. Other difficulties with which the board had to contend were alternate congestion of stocks at Alexandria owing to shortage of shipping, and dearth of supplies owing to congestion on the Egyptian State Railways, transport of seed

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having to give way to urgent military traffic and to transport of food supplies and cotton.

63. All these difficulties were rapidly overcome by the practical experience of the board, aided by the cordial co-operation of the military authorities, the Railways Administration, and the Shipping Board.

64. During the course of the 1917-18 season—	Tons.
the board shipped ... ..	312,000
and delivered to local crushers ... ..	112,000
	424,000

65. The same régime was applied to the 1918-19 crop. The smooth working of the scheme was greatly facilitated during this season by the experience acquired in the previous year, and also by close co-operation with the Cotton Control Commission (formed in June 1918), of which Mr. Hornsby was appointed Deputy-Chairman.

66. During the 1918-19 season—	Tons.
shipments amounted to ... ..	238,000
and deliveries to local mills, to ... ..	94,000
	332,000

67. The control of cotton seed was abolished on the 14th July, 1919. Its utility during the two seasons of its operation may be gauged by the fact that, within a fortnight of the release, local quotations had risen, under the impulse of speculation, by 150 per cent.

68. The Cotton Seed Control Board carried out with complete success, under very difficult conditions, a task of considerable magnitude and complexity. The board has recently completed its liquidation, which occasion affords me the opportunity of paying a tribute to the public spirit of its members in devoting their high technical ability and experience, and a large part of their time, to the carrying out of a long and arduous task which was of considerable service to His Majesty's Government.

18. *Zionist Immigration through Egypt.*

69. The disturbed situation at the end of April and early in May 1921 led the Palestine Administration, at the beginning of the latter month, to close the frontiers to immigration.

70. Considerable embarrassment was caused by this measure to the police and port control authorities of the Egyptian Government. When immigration was suspended, a large number of Zionist immigrants were actually at sea, and duly arrived shortly afterwards at Egyptian ports, on their way to Palestine via Kantara. The closing of the frontier prevented them completing their journey, and they could not be permitted to land in Egypt and remain there indefinitely. The immigrants were therefore not permitted to disembark, except in a few cases for the purpose of transshipment, and after some little difficulty with the shipping companies concerned, those who had arrived in Egypt were returned to their ports of departure at the expense of the Zionist organisation.

71. When immigration into Palestine was subsequently reopened, under certain specified conditions, the bulk of this traffic continued to pass through Egyptian, as opposed to Palestinian, ports. This fact gave rise to criticism in Egypt from the political point of view, while the Public Health Department more than once pointed out the potential danger to Egypt of the spread of epidemics, since a proportion of the Zionist immigrants originated from the typhus-infected areas of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. I laid these considerations before the Administration of Palestine, who reported in a despatch dated the 30th August that instructions were being given for the diversion of the stream of immigrants from Egyptian to Palestinian ports, with the possible exception of small parties of Jews travelling as passengers to Palestine, who it was hoped would be allowed to pass through Egyptian territory as before.

72. The Palestine Administration, however, failed to give effect to the instructions referred to above. The number of Jews who passed through Egypt during the period the 24th September to the 15th November was 418, while the figure from the 21st November to the 25th December reached 432, or nearly double the rate for the two preceding months.

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73. On receipt of this latter information, strong representations were again made to the Jerusalem Government on the point, on which no decision had been reached by the end of the year.

19. *Armenian Refugees from Cilicia.*

74. At the end of November and the beginning of December, as a result of the publication of the Angora Agreement, and the subsequent exodus of a part of the Christian population of Cilicia, several ships arrived at Egyptian ports carrying large numbers of refugees, the majority being Armenians. Some of them had come on from Syria and Palestine, where they had been refused permission to land, but a considerable number were in possession of visas for Egypt granted by a Spanish vice-consul at Mersina, who was in charge of British interests there. On receipt of this information a telegram was immediately despatched to His Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, requesting him to ensure that no more of these visas were to be granted, and instructions were issued at the same time to the local port control authorities to the effect that no refugees from Cilicia were to be permitted to land. A few exceptions were subsequently made to this ruling in the case of individuals having means of support here, and in cases of severe illness.

75. Eventually the ships carrying these refugees left Egyptian waters, two of them returning to Mersina. An unusual incident, however, occurred on the steamship "Pomone," a French vessel, carrying 350 Armenians, who all claimed to be in possession of a British visa for Egypt issued by the Spanish vice-consul at Mersina. The refugees, on hearing that they could not land in Egypt, took possession of the ship, confining the officers, and capturing as hostages two representatives of the ship's agents, who came on board. The refugees declined to allow the ship to sail for Marseilles, on the ground that they did not trust the French whose real intention was to return them to Mersina, where they would be massacred.

76. The master of the ship equally refused to sail, maintaining that the mutinous refugees, disarmed or not, would overpower his crew at sea.

77. This situation was prolonged for a considerable time, the steamship "Pomone" remaining in Alexandria harbour.

78. Eventually, at the request of the French consular authorities, the refugees were disarmed by a detachment of Egyptian police, a few revolvers and knives being seized. A picket from a French man-of-war was placed on board, and the "Pomone" sailed for Beirut. She had been in Alexandria harbour for a fortnight.

79. Although it was finally settled by the intervention of a French detachment, this episode raised the question of the duties of the British naval authorities, in cases of this nature arising in ports of countries in which the Capitulations are in force.

20. *Russian Refugees.*

80. At the beginning of 1921 the Russian refugees in Egypt were divided between two camps, situated at Sidi Bishr, on the coast a few miles east of Alexandria, and at Ismailia respectively. A further camp at Limassol, in Cyprus, is under the same military administration as the camps in Egypt, and is therefore dealt with below.

81. The total number of Russian refugees in Egypt and Cyprus in February 1921 was 2,980. During the year there were no important additions to this number, which, on the other hand, was slowly reduced. In June 1921 the detailed figures were as follows:—

Egypt—			
Sidi Bishr Camp	...	...	1,172
Sidi Bishr Hospital	...	...	307
Ismailia	...	...	467
Living at their own expense	...	...	339
Cyprus—			
Limassol Camp	...	...	486
Limassol Hospital	...	...	104
Living at their own expense	...	...	72

making a total for Egypt and Cyprus of 2,947, of whom 411 were self-supporting. In December 1921 the total numbers were 2,822, of whom 710 were self-supporting.

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82. In June 1921 the daily cost of maintenance of a refugee, including all administrative charges, was as follows:—

				<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Sidi Bishr Camp	...	...	...	3	6
Sidi Bishr Hospital	...	...	...	9	2
Ismailia Camp	...	...	...	2	9
Limassol Camp	...	...	...	2	8
Limassol Hospital	...	...	...	5	10

83. In July the Administration reported a reduction of the daily cost of living at Sidi Bishr to 2*s.* 4*d.* per refugee, while at the end of the year the figures were approximately:—

				Per Week.	
				£	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>
Sidi Bishr—					
Adult	...	...	...	15	11
Child	...	...	...	10	8½
Ismailia—					
Adult	...	...	...	1	1 7
Child	...	...	...	14	3½
Limassol—					
Adult	...	...	...	19	3
Child	...	...	...	12	0

84. From the foregoing it will be seen that both the total numbers and the individual cost of maintaining the refugees have been reduced during 1921.

85. In May His Majesty's Government authorised the payment of the cost of transport to destinations beyond Egypt of such Russian refugees as would become self-supporting on arrival. By the end of the year eighty-four Russians had been despatched under this arrangement to Serbia, Greece and other countries, at a total cost of some £800.

86. Apart from the desirability of enabling these refugees to make a fresh start, this expenditure represents an eventual economy to His Majesty's Government when placed against the cost of the individual's maintenance in a refugee camp.

87. During the year a number of refugees put forward claims to nationalities other than Russian, *e.g.*, Polish, Esthonian, Latvian, &c.

88. These claims were forwarded by the Foreign Office to the Governments concerned. After a considerable delay decisions were reached in the great majority of cases. Of those recognised by their Governments, thirty-four were repatriated before the end of the year. They consisted of Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians and Esthonians.

89. Early in 1921 a number of refugees in Egypt had expressed a desire to return to Soviet Russia.

90. The Foreign Office communicated with the Soviet Government accordingly, but no definite reply was returned by them on the subject.

91. In September, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Ainsworth, C.B.E., the inspector of Russian refugees in Egypt and Cyprus, reported the presence of Bolshevik activity at the Sidi Bishr Camp, the principal agents being among those who had petitioned for repatriation to Soviet Russia. Authority was therefore requested, and obtained from the Foreign Office, to despatch a party of refugees to Soviet Russia, and 102 Russians left Alexandria for Constantinople on the 29th September. It had been contemplated that this party should be put ashore on the south Russian coast, without the consent of the Soviet authorities, if the latter still refused to accept their own nationals and sympathisers.

92. However, on the arrival of the party at Constantinople, Sir H. Rumbold reported by telegram that he considered such a course to be impracticable, and since the Soviet maintained its refusal to admit them, there was no alternative to the return of the refugees to Egypt. The party therefore disembarked at Alexandria on the 27th October, and returned to the camp at Sidi Bishr. Excluding the charges for the return journey, which were not paid by the Residency, the cost of this abortive move amounted to some £520.

93. The expenditure of £500 was authorised in September on material for winter clothing for the women and children in the refugee camps in Egypt. This material was purchased locally, and made up by the refugees themselves.

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94. During 1921 negotiations were conducted by His Majesty's Government with Serbia, and subsequently with the League of Nations, with a view to the evacuation of all the Russian refugees from Egypt. By the end of the year, however, no definite agreement had been reached.

21. *Refugees passing through Egypt.*

95. A considerable number of refugees passed through Egypt during the year on their way to destinations beyond, which necessitated their landing and transshipment here. Arrangements for their accommodation, railway journeys and onward passages by sea were undertaken by the Public Security Department. Their maintenance was greatly facilitated by the action of the International Quarantine Board, who were good enough to allow the majority of the refugees to remain in the quarantine camp at Esh-Shatt, near Suez, till their onward voyages could be arranged, although this tended to occupy space required for ordinary quarantine purposes. In May 1921 a party of some 140 refugees, of whom sixty were Armenians and the remainder Poles, Hungarians and of other nationalities, arrived at Suez from Basra and Bombay. The European refugees were shortly afterwards repatriated via Trieste, while some twenty of the Armenians left for various destinations. The disposal of the remaining forty odd Armenians occasioned considerable difficulty. They originated from the district of Lake Urmi, near the Kurdish-Persian frontier and were technically Persian subjects.

96. The authorities in Mesopotamia had despatched them to Egypt with a view to their proceeding to the United States. On their arrival at Suez, however, it was found that they had not enough money to pay their passages and to remain in possession of the minimum sum insisted on by the United States authorities in the case of all arriving immigrants. Sanction was obtained from His Majesty's Government to make up the deficiency, which amounted to £1,000, if the disposal of these refugees could thereby be ensured. But enquiries from Washington showed that the quota for Persians was actually complete for 1921, and their admission before January 1922 was therefore very doubtful. It was, therefore, decided not to expend the £1,000 referred to above, but to await the arrival of certain vessels chartered by the Mesopotamian Administration for the conveyance of Armenian refugees from Basra to Batoum. The party in question was finally embarked on one of these ships, but not before they had been maintained in Egypt for eight months at public expense.

97. During the year some ninety Turks passed through Egypt; the great majority came from the Yemen via Aden. They were accommodated at the camp at Esh-Shatt, and were subsequently despatched to Constantinople.

98. The total cost incurred during 1921 by His Majesty's Government on the maintenance and disposal of refugees passing through Egypt was approximately £5,800. Of this amount some £3,200 was expended on Armenians, but the remainder is recoverable from the Governments concerned, *e.g.*, Turkish, Polish, Hungarian, &c.

99. With the departure of the Poles, Estonians, &c., mentioned in the section dealing with Russian refugees, and of the party of Armenians who left for Batoum, few, if any, refugees of nationality other than Russian are left in Egypt.

22. *War Graves.*

100. Early in 1917 a representative of the Directorate of Graves Registration, War Office, visited Egypt, and, in view of the fact that military graves were widely scattered—many of them in places which rendered proper surveillance costly and access for relatives difficult—recommended that they should all be concentrated in a few select cemeteries.

101. The Council of Ministers was approached in November 1918, and generously offered to make a free gift of such sites as might be chosen; but the completion of the necessary formalities was prevented by political developments; and a committee which had been formed at the instance of the Imperial War Graves Commission in the previous August—consisting of four British officials of the Egyptian Government and five military members representing the various branches of the Imperial forces concerned, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Langley, C.B.E., Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture—found itself confronted by considerable difficulties for want of official recognition. Exhumations and reburials in the chosen cemeteries were, however, proceeded with during 1919–20 by the Graves Registration Unit of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force; and many problems of a practical nature were resolved as the result of a visit to Egypt in September 1920 of Sir Fabian Ware,

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vice-chairman of the commission. Sir Herbert Cox arrived shortly afterwards to advise on the treatment of Indian graves according to the needs of religion and caste, cremation being necessary in the case of Hindoos.

102. The cemeteries which had been chosen for the concentration of British graves numbered nine: Alexandria (2), Cairo, Ismailia, Kantara, Suez, Port Said, Minia and Tel-el-Kebir; the Indian burying grounds already established numbered five: Alexandria, Cairo, Ismailia, Kantara and Suez. Reburial in the case of isolated Indian Moslem graves could not be undertaken, except where ground had in any event to be disturbed, exhumation being against Moslem religious practice; a considerable number therefore remain scattered.

103. The committee was formally recognised by the Council of Ministers as the agency of the commission on the 4th May, 1921, and a deed of gift making over the fourteen sites mentioned above to the commission in perpetuity was passed in the Mixed Courts on the 9th May, 1921. The committee, as recognised, was not limited in numbers, but it was thought better, for political reasons, that it should not contain more than two military members. Mr. Langley resigned the chairmanship in July on retirement from the Egyptian Government service and was succeeded by Dr. W. Hastings, O.B.E. The instrument of appointment providing that vacancies on the committee should be filled by the commission upon the joint recommendation of the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's representative in Egypt, a recommendation was approved to the effect that, on the completion of construction work—which, it was hoped, would be by the end of 1922—two Egyptian members should be invited to serve. The Egyptian Government, when they originally offered the sites of the cemeteries to His Majesty's Government, had expressed their readiness to pay for the maintenance of the cemeteries on completion. It was thought preferable, however, that all expenses should be met by the commission, on the analogy of His Majesty's Government's arrangements with Belgium and France. This decision was conveyed to the Council of Ministers in suitable terms.

104. By the end of February 1921 the Graves Registration Unit had completed their work of exhumation and reburial (except in the cases of nine isolated graves, four of them at Baharia Oasis) and had handed the cemeteries over to the committee for construction work, the latter assuming responsibility for the isolated graves, which it hopes to be able to exhume during 1922. The number of British soldiers concentrated in the nine British cemeteries is 8,852, while 423 Indians and 709 cremated Hindoos are interred in the five Indian burying grounds.

105. The construction of the British cemeteries in accordance with designs drawn up in Egypt by Sir F. Lorimer—comprising, in addition to separate headstones for each British grave (of uniform design for officers and men alike), imposing record-houses and general memorials—was put out to tender during the year. The erection of tombstones or other memorials by private individuals except by special leave of the commission had been forbidden early in 1918, but those then existing, provided that they were of durable material, were allowed to remain. The contract was finally given to a local Italian firm, the lowest British tender being 15 per cent. higher, and the Egyptian Government consented to waive import dues and afford railway transport facilities in respect of limited quantities of material. Horticultural schemes were decided upon for all cemeteries except Kantara, where water is deficient.

106. The Indian burying grounds were designed on simpler lines in accordance with Moslem and Hindoo religious custom. They are to consist of enclosed spaces, horticulturally treated where possible, with a general monument in each recording the names of all interred there. A similar monument will commemorate twenty-five Indians buried in the Moslem civil cemetery at Port Said.

107. Schemes were also initiated for the erection of a general memorial to all the Indian units which served with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Egypt and Palestine, on the bank of the Suez Canal at Port Tewfik, and another to the 15th Imperial Service (Indian) Cavalry Brigade at Ismailia, both on sites selected by Sir H. Cox during his visit.

108. As regards the Egyptian Labour Corps and Camel Transport Corps, of whose casualties accurate records were not kept, several proposals for suitable memorials were considered. One, that a small mosque should be erected at El Arish, was rejected on the ground that such a mosque would be too remote to commemorate these two corps adequately; while as regards another, that drinking fountains should be erected in various centres in Egypt, it was felt that they might be damaged in times of political unrest. It has since been decided to construct an ophthalmic laboratory at Giza, Cairo, and details are being worked out.

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109. The committee decided that it could not possibly undertake responsibility for graves of prisoners of war and interred civilians with its existing staff. A large number of Turkish prisoners died in various camps and hospitals in Egypt during the war, and the records available locally were found to be far from complete. The military authorities accordingly transferred all the above records to London during the course of the year, for the commission's decision, pending which the Egyptian Government undertook to arrange for the supervision of the graves in question by the various mudirieh's concerned.

23. *Visit to the Soudan.*

110. I left Cairo on the 27th January for a tour of inspection in the Soudan, reaching Wadi Halfa on the 30th January, where I was met by the Governor-General.

111. The quarantine station at Wadi Halfa was at that time in full use. The labourers recruited in Egypt for work on the Gebel Aulia and Sennar Dams were examined and disinfected at this station before entering the Soudan. These workmen were a good type of man who had been recruited in Southern Egypt by contractors for a period of six months; they were well paid and well fed and generally contented. The medical officer in charge of the station informed me that a large number of these men had served in the Egyptian Labour Corps during the war and that they invariably expressed great contentment with the conditions under which they had then worked.

112. From Halfa I proceeded to Khartoum, making short visits to Atbara, El Damer and Shendi on the way. From Khartoum I made visits of inspection to the White Nile dam works at Gebel Aulia and at the Blue Nile works at Sennar. I left Khartoum on the 5th February and returned direct to Wadi Halfa, which I reached on the 7th February, taking steamer there for Assouan and Assiout, whence I took train, reaching Cairo on the evening of the 14th February.

113. I found the Soudan materially prosperous. There had been good rains in all the provinces throughout the seasons and people had in many places more grain than they were even able to harvest. This should ensure sufficient food supply for two years to come, and consequent contentment. In spite of a fall in the price of cotton, I found that it could still be grown at a profit in the Soudan, and the Soudanese who grew cotton on the stations in the Gezira had profited from the foresight of the Government and the Soudan Plantation Syndicate, who disposed of the cotton before the fall in prices took place. The merchants were less prosperous than usual, owing to the general slackness of trade, but were still contented with recent profits. On the whole, the impression which I received during my visit to the Soudan was very satisfactory: there was a general atmosphere of prosperity and contentment, and satisfaction with Government methods was freely expressed.

ANNEXES TO CHAPTER I.

(Not printed.)

1. Draft treaty presented to the Egyptian delegation on the 10th November, 1921. Annex I=No. 43 of Minutes of Meetings and correspondence in connection with the Egyptian official delegation, 1921.

2. Lord Allenby's explanatory letter to the Sultan of the 3rd December, 1921. Annex II=No. 3 of Papers respecting negotiations with the Egyptian delegation. ["Egypt, No. 4" (1921)—Cmd.1555.]

3. The Egyptian delegation's reply of the 15th November, 1921, rejecting the treaty. Annex III=No. 45 of Minutes of Meetings and correspondence in connection with the Egyptian official delegation, 1921.

4. Adly Pasha Yeghen's report on his mission to London, dated the 8th December, 1921—see enclosure to No. 5 of "Egypt," Part LXXXIX.

CHAPTER II.—FINANCE.

24. *Financial and Economic Situation.\**

114. The general tendency of the economic movement in Egypt during the year 1921 has been towards stabilisation. The heavy fall of prices in the previous year,

\* For a more detailed treatment of this subject I may refer to the report of His Majesty's commercial agent for Egypt, published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922.

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following on a rise to abnormal heights, left a legacy of trouble and liabilities from which the country has been slowly extricating itself during the past year. The process of liquidation has been accompanied by a further draft on the resources accumulated during the period of war activity and inflated prices.

115. These additional resources have been employed partly in repayment of debt, but the bulk of them has been kept liquid in the form of paper currency (covered by securities), of bank deposits and of realisable investments. Their total was estimated two years ago at some 150 million pounds, and a year ago they had been diminished to upwards of a 100 millions. The further inroad which has been made in them during the past year may be estimated at some 15 millions. This is reflected, on the one hand, in the excess of imports over exports, and, on the other, in the fall in the note circulation and in bank deposits. It is noteworthy, however, that private investments in Egyptian securities have increased by purchases from holders abroad.

116. The value of the cotton crop of 1920-21 has been estimated at £E. 47,429,000. This compares, of course, very unfavourably with that of the preceding season, which was estimated at £E. 107,057,000. A season of inflated prices such as that of 1919-20 cannot, however, be used as a just standard of comparison. When compared with the estimated value of the three preceding crops, which averaged £E. 45,000,000, that of last season appears slightly superior, and it is largely in excess of those of pre-war crops. Were the 1921-22 season's crop to equal last season's in value, the country would be surmounting its difficulties with far more ease than is actually the case. Unfortunately, however, while prices are no higher on the average than those of last season, the yield is considerably lower, owing not merely to reduced acreage, but also largely to late sowing, careless cultivation, unseasonable weather, and the ravages of the pink boll-worm. The crop is estimated to attain only 3,300,000 kantars,\* as against 6,036,000 last season. The resulting depression is only partly attenuated by the fact that a considerable portion of last season's crop is being disposed of during the present season.

117. On the other hand, general commodity prices have been falling, as in other countries, and the index-number of wholesale prices of local articles of consumption in Cairo stood at the end of the year at 170, as against 238 at the beginning, pre-war prices being taken at 100. The fall in prices of goods of both local and foreign origin has brought sensible relief to all classes of consumers, and has favourably affected costs of production, agricultural and industrial.

118. The gradual approximation to normal and stable conditions which appears to be taking place is of good augury for the economic health of the country. Despite the natural disappointment among producers at the disappearance of inflated prices, the real interests of the country are better served by a régime which allows production and commerce to be carried on with assured, if moderate, profits than by one which exposes them to violent vicissitudes of fortune.

119. To view the situation in proper perspective, it is essential to compare it, on the one hand, with that which existed before the war, and, on the other hand, with world conditions generally. A country whose material prosperity has improved and whose debt has been diminished during a period of consumption of the world's resources and impoverishment of whole populations, is in a distinctly enviable position among the nations.

120. I referred in my last report to the various measures adopted by the Government to mitigate the difficulties caused by the fall in price of cotton and the glut on the market. It is now possible to review the effects of the more important of these measures. A table is appended showing the area and yield of the Egyptian cotton crop for the years 1910-21.

(a.) *Restriction of Cotton-Growing Area.*

121. During the war, and also in the years immediately following the war, the area figures were affected by special circumstances, and to arrive at an estimate of the effect of the Cotton Restriction Law in the past year, the comparison of the 1921 acreage should probably be made with the average acreage of the five years 1910-14, which is 1,710,806 feddans. This comparison shows a reduction of 24 per cent. in the 1921 acreage. The area figures of 1921 follow fairly closely those of 1918, when the cotton crop was under similar restriction. As in 1918, considerable areas, mainly in the north of Egypt, were exempted, comprising land which was not considered

\* There is, however, reason to suppose that this estimate will prove to have been considerably too low.

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capable of giving a normal yield under cereal crops. It is probable, however, that the actual area under cotton in 1921 was considerably in excess of the official figures. If that is true, the total estimated yield for 1921 would fall considerably below the true yield.

(b.) *Facilities for Ginning and Storage without Sale.*

(c.) *Attempt to Foster Agricultural Co-operative Societies.*

122. These measures were both noted last year as having met with little response.

(d.) *Advances on Cotton.*

(e.) *Advances to Owners of Small Properties.*

123. The facilities for guaranteed advances to cultivators were not taken advantage of to any great extent. The total amount advanced by the National Bank was about £ E. 62,000 and that by the Agricultural Bank about £ E. 40,000. These advances have been nearly all repaid.

(f.) *Suspension of Special Compulsory Storage of Unginned Cotton.*

124. The decision of the Egyptian Government to suspend the law by which owners of unginned cotton are obliged to keep it in moth-proof stores resulted, as was to be anticipated, in a much-increased prevalence of the pink boll-worm. The infestation by this pest during the early part of the season was worse in Lower Egypt than it had been since 1917 and worse in Upper Egypt than ever before. There were other reasons for the very poor average yield of 1921, but this must be considered as a contributing factor.

(g.) *Purchase of Cotton from Small Cultivators*

(h.) *Purchase of Ginned Cotton in Bulk.*

125. The purchase of cotton by the Government from small cultivators in the interior commenced in March 1921 and was followed by purchases in bulk in the Alexandria market in April and May. The total purchases aggregated 88,000 kantars in the interior and 86,000 kantars in Alexandria, the total expenditure being about £ E. 950,000.

126. The premium on Egyptian over American cotton, which had been about 65 per cent. at the beginning of the year, and had fallen to 50 per cent. in February, rose on the announcement of the Government's intentions and attained over 90 per cent. in April. It fell again to about 70 per cent. in the summer, but with the advent of the new crop a rise took place in both Egyptian and American cotton, and the premium on Egyptian cotton also recovered to nearly 100 per cent. in September, without any intervention by the Government, which, on the contrary, took the opportunity to dispose of a considerable portion of its stock. The rise was short-lived, and prices gradually subsided, the Egyptian premium also falling off. When the budgetary estimates were completed and passed (late March) it stood at about 63 per cent. At the end of June it stood at 46 per cent. The experience of the year goes to show that temporary speculative movements may take place with or without Government intervention, and that such intervention can have no permanent effect on prices.

(i.) *Limitation of Agricultural Rents.*

127. Under the law of the 1st May, 1921, commissions were appointed to enquire into and decide differences between landlords and tenants with regard to the rent of agricultural land. The number of cases with which they had to deal was very large, amounting in all to 111,141. Of these, a small proportion was settled out of court, but most landlords preferred to await the decision of the commissions before making any reduction of rent, however impossible it may have been for the tenants to pay. The reductions made were fairly drastic, varying from 30 per cent. to 60 per cent. of the original rental. The complaints against the commissioners were, nevertheless, very few, and their decisions appear on the whole to have proved acceptable to both parties. In fact, the working of the law appears to have been so beneficial in its effects as to render worthy of serious consideration the introduction of permanent legislation and machinery for the control of the relations between landlord and tenant.

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THE Egyptian Cotton Crop, 1910-21.

128. Areas under cotton in feddans and yield in kantars :—

Year.	Cultivated Area.			Area under Cotton.			Percentage under Cotton.			Total Yield.	Average Yield per Feddan.
	Lower Egypt.	Upper Egypt.	Total.	Lower Egypt.	Upper Egypt.	Total.	Lower Egypt.	Upper Egypt.	Total.		
	Feddans.	Feddans.	Feddans.	Feddans.	Feddans.	Feddans.				Kantars.	Kantars.
1910	8,100,233	2,245,119	5,345,352	1,325,834	316,776	1,642,610	42·8	14·1	30·7	7,495,600	4·56
1911	3,022,304	2,241,554	5,263,858	1,347,536	363,705	1,711,241	44·6	16·2	32·5	7,383,740	4·31
1912	3,038,932	2,246,522	5,285,454	1,346,254	375,561	1,721,815	44·3	16·7	32·5	7,497,859	4·36
1913	3,052,917	2,229,710	5,282,627	1,339,609	383,485	1,723,094	43·9	17·2	32·6	7,663,801	4·45
1914	3,019,510	2,008,720	5,028,230	1,373,243	382,027	1,755,270	45·5	19·1	34·9	6,450,573	3·67
1915	3,045,014	2,293,876	5,338,890	1,377,015	248,989	1,626,004	30·8	11·0	22·3	4,774,770	4·03
1916	3,013,983	2,219,288	5,233,271	1,289,869	365,643	1,655,512	42·8	16·5	31·9	5,060,389	3·06
1917	3,057,553	2,261,595	5,319,148	1,293,789	383,521	1,677,310	42·3	17·0	31·5	6,293,424	3·75
1918	3,038,968	2,243,348	5,282,316	1,023,888	291,684	1,315,572	33·7	13·0	24·9	4,820,650	3·66
1919	3,051,075	2,246,626	5,297,700	1,219,303	354,359	1,573,662	40·0	15·8	29·7	5,571,632	3·54
1920	3,048,270	2,256,966	5,305,236	1,378,503	449,365	1,827,868	45·2	19·9	34·5	6,035,000	3·50
1921	3,066,225	2,268,377	5,334,602	1,012,349	277,456	1,289,805	33·0	12·2	24·2	3,300,000*	2·56

\* Probably underestimated.

25. Currency.

129. The general economic tendencies already outlined have been reflected in the movements of the currency. The note-issue, which stood at £ E. 40,400,000 at the beginning of 1921, declined to £ E. 30,400,000 in the course of the spring and summer. In the autumn the seasonal demand for currency arose in connection with the marketing of the cotton crop, and the issue increased to £ E. 38,000,000. It afterwards declined to £ E. 37,000,000 at the end of December, showing a net decrease for the year of £ E. 3,400,000. This decrease represents the portion borne by the note-holders in the diminution of the capital resources of the country during the calendar year. At the end of June 1922 the issue stood at £ E. 29,000,000.

130. Silver coin has also been returned in considerable quantities from circulation. It had previously been hoarded to such an extent as to necessitate the issue of small currency notes. These have nearly all been withdrawn, and silver coin has again taken its proper place as the medium of subsidiary currency. The total amount in the hands of the public stood at £ E. 6,660,000 at the end of the year as against £ E. 6,800,000 at the beginning, the difference representing the amount returned to the Treasury. It is to be foreseen that the quantities of coin thus returned from hoards may eventually become so large as to exceed all possible requirements for years to come, in which case it will be necessary to dispose of a portion as metal and write off the consequent loss to the budget. At the end of May 1922 the sum in circulation was £ E. 6,432,000.

131. Nickel coin has also returned from circulation in large quantities, the amount in the hands of the public falling from £ E. 847,000 to £ E. 732,000 during the year. The large stocks in the hands of the Government consist partly of worn coin of the old unperforated issue, which is being sold as metal. At the end of May 1922 the nickel coinage in circulation stood at £ E. 705,000.

26. Government Finance.

132. When my report for the year 1920 was written it was anticipated that a final closing of the previous year's accounts would show a deficit of £ E. 12,900,000 on the working of that year. All the commitments in regard to the purchase of supplies were not at that time accurately known, and the deficit proved to be nearly £ E. 14,750,000. Therefore, instead of the reserve fund having stood at £ E. 3,042,866 on the 31st March, 1921, as was believed when the 1921-22 budget was passed, it actually stood at £ E. 1,513,000.

133. The budgetary estimates of the year were balanced by means of a projected draft of £ E. 1,981,000 on the reserve, which, on the figures then expected, would still have left £ E. 1,061,866 in the reserve fund at the end of 1921-22. When it was found that the reserve was reduced to £ E. 1,513,000 instead of £ E. 3,042,866 at the end of 1920-21, the Government were faced with the prospect of an overdraft on the reserve fund by £ E. 468,000 at the end of 1921-22. It had been imagined that the worst consequences of the economic depression, of the excess purchase of coal, and of the failure to unload excess stocks of cereals had been met in the preparation of the 1921-22 estimates, and this unexpected aggravation of the situation caused great anxiety during the first two-thirds of the recently-expired financial year.

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134. Judged by the standards to which Europe has become accustomed of recent years, a deficit involving an addition of approximately half a million to the national debt is no great matter. In Egypt the prospect was serious, since it seemed that for the first time for forty years the Egyptian Government might fail to pay its way, in spite of the great accession of wealth brought to the country during the war. As will appear, the actual financing of the daily requirements of the State threatened to present serious difficulty, and an issue of bonds for the purpose had to be contemplated. If this situation had materialised, it would have had a most damaging effect upon the credit of Egypt at a crucial time in her existence, when Europe generally is asking whether she can still be relied upon to meet her obligations and to avoid depreciation of her currency.

135. Since the instalments of the land tax are arranged so as to fall due principally after the cotton harvest, it is usual in Egypt for expenditure to outrun revenue in the earlier months of the financial year, the balance being readjusted in the late autumn. Since it is obviously undesirable, on the one hand, to keep funds idle or, on the other, to sell investments merely to tide over a temporary shortage, it has been customary to look to the National Bank of Egypt to finance such deficits during the year's working should they arise.

136. In the opening months of the expired financial year (1921-22) it was anticipated that an overdraft might be required in the summer of an amount that would overstrain the unaided resources of the National Bank and probably make recourse to an issue of Government bonds unavoidable. Happily this danger was averted. The overdraft on the National Bank averaged £ E. 5,000,000 during August and September, which, although a considerable sum, was well within the available resources of the bank. Then the tide began to turn, and what had been perhaps the most difficult period in the history of modern Egyptian Government finance was successfully passed.

137. By the end of the financial year the situation was clearly re-established, though the liabilities of the war period cannot yet be considered as finally discharged. This prompt financial recovery was only rendered possible by the natural recuperative power of the country, which is in the position of a world farm that has accumulated wealth, and continues in a position to acquire it, by the supply of a unique standard of a necessary article. A particularly strenuous effort, however, was required on the part of the Government to right its position, and great credit is due both to the Minister of Finance, Ismail Pasha Sidky, who has given proof of much ability and pertinacity, and to the Financial Adviser and the senior British staff of the Ministry. Three main lines of action were adopted by the Ministry of Finance with this objective. The gravity of the situation as it appeared in March 1921 was not disguised or minimised, and the full liabilities of past action, particularly of the excess purchases of cereals and coal, so far as then known, were faced and published. This was the essential foundation upon which to build recovery. The Government then set itself to the double task of cutting down expenditure and of adding to or expanding sources of revenue. The former was principally effected during the preparation of the estimates, a process of the greatest difficulty, since there were so many important unexpired liabilities from the previous period of affluence in addition to the two major ones mentioned above. It was valuably supplemented during the actual course of the financial year by a rigid insistence upon the ever-present necessity of saving, and by abandoning the insidious practice of readily granting supplementary credits, which had grown up during the war. The total saving thus effected in expenditure was £ E. 969,000.

138. The following additions to revenue were received during the year from new or expanded sources:—

	£E.
(i) Egyptian Labour Corps Pension Funds given by His Majesty's Government and representing half their share of the profits of the Cotton Control Commission	960,000
(ii) Additional taxation or fees—	
(a.) P.T. 20 per kilog. on tobacco	605,000
(b.) Increase in registration fees	162,000
(c.) Excise on alcohol	172,000
(d.) Corresponding addition to import duty	90,000
Totalling	1,989,000

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139. Although the grant to the Egyptian Labour Corps Fund is a legitimate addition to the reserve, since it is balanced by equivalent recurrent pension commitments, it was a windfall in respect of the particular year.

140. Besides these savings and receipts from sources not included in the estimates, the actual yield from the estimated sources of revenue exceeded expectations by £E. 2,525,000. This was principally due to increased receipt from customs and railways. The profit of £E 221,765 realised during the year on Government dealings in cotton should also be noted. The funds held by Government also appreciated during the year by £E. 587,000 which sum was also carried to the year's receipts.

141. These four sums of £E. 969,000, £E. 1,989,000, £E. 2,525,000 and £E. 587,000 made an aggregate improvement of £E. 6,070,000, which after covering the budgeted deficit of £E. 1,981,000 left a net surplus of £E. 4,089,000 to be added to the Reserve Fund.

142. The heavy deficit of the financial year 1920-21 was attributable to abnormally high expenditure upon salaries, food supplies and coal.\*

143. Part of the increase in salaries was granted as permanent addition from the first, while a further permanent addition will result from the application of the Cadre Commission's recommendations. Excluding the temporary high cost of living allowances, the Government's bill for salaries and wages amounts in the current budget to £E. 10,866,000, compared with £E. 5,360,000 in 1913-14. The sums granted on account of the temporary high cost of living allowance between 1917-18 and 1922-23 are as follows :—

	£E.
1917-18	327,000
1918-19	1,252,000
1919-20	2,564,000
1920-21	6,082,000
1921-22	3,823,000
1922-23	2,500,000 (provided).

There has been great delay in putting into effect the Cadre Commission's recommendations, partly owing to the intricate and detailed character of the work involved and inefficiency in carrying it out, but partly also to lack of co-operation by departments which were dissatisfied with the proposals. The regrading of the high posts (directors-general and upwards) has not yet been attempted. However, by far the greater bulk of the public service should be regraded before the 1st April, 1923, and if this is accompanied by a continued fall in prices, it may not be necessary to make any provision for temporary allowances next year: in any case the provision will be much reduced.

144. No full account has yet been given of the Government control of supplies and purchases of coal, in both of which there was considerable mismanagement. The Financial Adviser in his note on the 1922-23 budget expresses the intention of reviewing these operations when they have been finally wound up. Latterly the work of the Supplies Department has been efficiently conducted, with the result that in spite of conservative estimating, and the unexpected heavy fall in prices, the expected net deficiency on working from the 1st April, 1921, until the winding-up of the Department has been reduced from £E. 672,000 to £E. 373,000.

145. The full demand on the resources of the Government occasioned by the abnormal purchases of cereals and coal has now been felt: that occasioned by the former had also been absorbed and the Supplies Department will shortly be abolished. There still, however, remain sufficient stocks of this coal for use until the end of 1923-24, and to render any normal purchases of coal from that year's budget unnecessary. Similar relief of the budget from routine expenditure on this account has occurred also in the current financial year: it is equivalent to current expenditure having been anticipated and met off the reserve fund, and the specific savings thereby occasioned in 1922-23 and 1923-24 will be properly due to that fund.

27. Budget of 1922-23.

146. The budget is balanced at £E. 33,630,000 and a surplus of £E. 2,190,000 is anticipated. No express provision is made for the current cost of putting the Cadre Commission's recommendations into practice, since the saving regularly

\* See my report for 1920, pp. 26 and 27.

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effected by the abandonment of the clumsy method hitherto in force of budgeting for salaries on the mean of classes is expected to provide at least the greater portion of the sum required. Should this margin prove insufficient, a supplementary credit will be provided.

147. The current budget is the last in which provision will be made for national food supplies (representing in this budget £E. 162,000 revenue and £E. 75,000 expenditure), while should the allowance in respect of the high cost of living (£E. 2,509,000) be continued into next year it will doubtless be a greatly diminished charge.

148. It may also be hoped that the provision for riot reparations (£E. 90,000) and for compensating public servants for the delay in regrading their salaries (£E. 500,000) will not have to be repeated. These are the principal items of expenditure obviously traceable to the war or its results in the current budget, which should disappear next year; they are balanced by receipts originating in or swollen by the same abnormal conditions.

149. The saving both in the current and next year's budgets on account of railway stores, principally coal, previously acquired and paid for in excess of normal provision, has already been mentioned. This saving is entered at £E. 2,686,000 in this year's estimates, a figure which is based on cost price (1920) and consequently gives a greatly exaggerated idea both of the effective relief to the present and the following budgets, and of the charge to be resumed in subsequent years. It was proposed to make a reduction in railway rates which would have lessened the receipts by at least £E. 2,000,000, but in view of the paramount necessity of rebuilding the reserve this proposal was postponed till the next financial year.

150. As previously mentioned, a charge which may assume importance in the near future is the demonetisation of token coinage (silver and nickel) which had to be minted largely in excess of circulation requirements during the war to keep pace with its disappearance into hoards, the contents of which are now tending to flow gradually back to the Treasury. The renovation and repair of national works unavoidably allowed to deteriorate during the war must also levy a considerable toll on a series of future budgets. On the revenue side also a further shrinkage in the profit on the note issue is to be anticipated. A continuation of the downward movement in the cost of goods will tend to reduce customs receipts, and coupled with a lowering in the cost of service to reduce expenditure in every Department of the State.

151. The expansion which occurred in the revenue and expenditure of the State during the war and the following years, as well as of the accompanying fluctuations in the amount of the reserve fund may be seen from the tabular statement which follows. This also illustrates the degree of success achieved and anticipated during the financial years 1921-22 and 1922-23 in re-balancing income and expenditure and re-establishing the reserve fund.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE: April 1, 1914, to March 31, 1923, expressed in £E.

	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Reserve Fund.*
	£E.	£E.	£E.
March 31, 1914	..	..	5,103,549
1914-15	15,389,124	16,857,783	3,634,890
1915-16	17,759,418	16,594,666	4,799,642
1916-17	19,927,274	17,240,606	7,486,310
1917-18	23,166,074	22,496,948	8,155,436
1918-19	27,661,289	23,384,326	11,432,399
1919-20	33,677,401	28,991,934	17,117,866
1920-21	46,446,921	62,051,182	1,513,605†
1921-22 (approximate)	41,802,000	37,713,000	5,602,000
1922-23 (estimated)	33,630,000	31,440,000	8,000,000
Totals	259,459,501	256,771,116	

\* On the last day (March 31) of each respective financial year.  
† Investments were sold out and depreciations of funds written off.

152. There are three chief principles to which in their financial policy the now independent Egyptian Government will do well to adhere; the steady re-establish-

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ment of national works, the provision of funds for development annually from national income, without incurring further debt, and the refusal of solicitations to undertake, co-operate in, or subsidise enterprises of a commercial nature on the plausible ground that they are national benefactions. They will find the last danger a peculiarly insidious one.

153. The reserve fund is an unusual feature in public finance, born of Egypt's lack of fiscal freedom and her financial dependence upon the world's demand for a single special article. The device has proved its utility continually since its establishment; upon no occasion more so than when it enabled the Government to meet and recover so promptly from the unprecedented deficit on the working of the financial year 1920-21, a deficit which was very little short of the total annual revenue of the State before the war. It should in the future be maintained at a figure which both amply ensures external obligations and safeguards the financial equilibrium of the State against those violent fluctuations to which it is peculiarly susceptible, since the national economy is based upon a single commodity.

28. *Egyptian Debt.*

154. The public debt was reduced in 1921 by £221,100 through the automatic amortisation of the guaranteed loan, and stood on the 31st December, 1921, at £92,866,540 distributed at follows:—

	£
Guaranteed loan ... ..	5,766,800
Privileged debt ... ..	31,127,780
Unified debt ... ..	55,971,960
	92,866,540

Of this total, £6,552,860 represents stock held by the Government and the Commissioners of Debt. The amount in the hands of the public on the 31st December, 1921, was therefore £86,313,680.

29. *Direct Taxes.*

155. *Land Tax.*—Owing to the lower price of cotton in 1921, the collection of the land tax was more difficult than in previous years: the arrears of the land tax on the 31st December, 1921, including payments in advance, amounted to £E. 131,625 as against £E. 16,593 in excess on the corresponding date of 1920; and the administrative seizures from the 1st April to the 31st December, 1921, amounted to approximately 33,000 as against 12,000 for the corresponding period of 1920.

156. *Cotton Tax.*—The tax on cotton collected from the 1st April to the 31st December, 1921, amounted to £E. 1,609,740, of which sum £E. 1,149,380 was collected between the 1st August and the 31st December, as against £E. 775,958 for the corresponding period in 1920. This increase is due to the fact that owing to the fall in the price of cotton a considerable amount of 1920 cotton was not ginned that year and consequently did not pay the tax until 1921.

157. *Ghaffir Cess.*—The increase in the ghaffir cess from £E. 1,179,000 for the financial year 1920-21 to £E. 1,393,000 for the year 1921-22 is due to the cess having been increased to cover the extra pay given to ghaffirs owing to the high cost of living.

158. *Agricultural Loans.*—Apart from interest on Agricultural Bank loans, amounting this year to £E. 608,744 and collected by the Direct Taxes Department, that Department also collected an agricultural loan of £E. 25,000 issued by the Government through the Agricultural Bank to assist small cultivators.

159. *Government Land Rents.*—The rents on Government lands, assessed and collected by the Direct Taxes Department, amounted in 1920-21 to £E. 273,000; of this amount, £E. 113,000 was derived from riparian lands rented by contract as against £E. 106,000 in the previous year. The rentals on practically the whole of these riparian lands, amounting to some 27,000 feddans odd, were reassessed during the year.

160. *Statistics, 1920-21.*—The following table shows the collection returns of the Direct Taxes Department for the financial year 1920-21:—

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	£E.
Land tax—	
Budget estimate ... ..	5,135,000
Actual revenue to be collected ... ..	5,153,084
Collected ... ..	5,136,521
Arrears ... ..	16,563
Excess over budget ... ..	1,521
House tax—	
Budget estimate ... ..	340,000
Actual revenue to be collected ... ..	394,334
Collected ... ..	387,571
Arrears ... ..	6,763
Excess over budget ... ..	47,571
Government land rents—	
Budget estimate ... ..	210,000
Collected ... ..	272,737
Price of cotton seed—	
Amount to be collected ... ..	445,472
Collected ... ..	445,317
Arrears ... ..	155
Ghaffir cess—	
Budget estimate ... ..	1,179,000
Actual revenue to be collected ... ..	1,248,477
Collected ... ..	1,238,365
Arrears ... ..	10,112
Excess over budget ... ..	59,365

*Statistics, 1921-22.*—The total revenue from all sources for the collection of which the Department is responsible in the financial year 1921-22 amounts to :—

	£E.
Land tax ... ..	5,143,000
House tax ... ..	355,000
Government land rents ... ..	188,000
Ghaffir cess ... ..	1,393,000
Price of cotton seed sold by Government ... ..	99,771
Cotton tax ... ..	2,000,000
Provincial council dues ... ..	625,987
Miscellaneous ... ..	1,250,000
Total ... ..	11,054,758

The cost of collection works out approximately at 3 per cent.

30. *Foreign Trade and Customs.*

*Import Trade.*

161. In 1921 the value of goods imported into Egypt decreased from £E. 98,696,000 to £E. 53,535,000 and the value of the tobacco imported decreased from £E. 3,185,000 to £E. 1,973,000. Signs of improvement, however, were shown in September, and it was maintained during the rest of the year.

*Cotton Goods.*

162. The year began with a decrease of about 50 per cent. in the tariff for cotton goods. The tariff in force at the end of 1920 had been in operation since the 1st July, and a large fall in prices had taken place before the end of the year, with the result that clearances in November and December 1920 were reduced to a minimum in anticipation of the reduction in the tariff. In spite of this there was no improvement in the quantity of Manchester goods cleared in January and February. By April a further reduction in the price of cotton goods had taken place and the tariff was reduced by another 15 per cent.; this was followed by a

substantial increase in the quantities withdrawn from the customs. This was succeeded in May by a reduction in clearances due to the disturbances which took place in Alexandria, and no great improvement took place until September. There was a further improvement in October, but this was lost in November and December. A slight rise in prices took place in Manchester during October, and the customs tariff was increased by 5 per cent. with effect from the 1st November, only to be reduced again by nearly 10 per cent. with effect from the beginning of the new year. Prices, however, were still about 140 per cent. higher than in 1913. The stock of bales of cotton textiles held by the Egyptian Bonded Warehouses Company stood at 14,800 on the 1st January; this figure fell month by month to 4,057 on the 31st October. Decreased clearances in November and December led to an increase in the number in bond, and the year ended with 7,499 bales in bond.

*Increased Imports.*

163. Very few articles show an increase, the most important being as follows :—

					Kilog.	£E.
<b>Cheese—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	752,000	193,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	1,566,000	284,000
<b>Maize—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	10,797,000	220,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	19,970,000	418,000
<b>Barley—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	13,346,000	321,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	33,654,000	610,000
<b>Rice—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	174,000	6,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	27,681,000	460,000
<b>Benzine—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	5,054,000	139,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	14,049,000	300,000
<b>Flour—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	144,792,000	7,029,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	233,377,000	7,173,000

*Decreased Imports.*

The chief decreases took place in the following articles :—

<b>Meats : fresh, salted, smoked or preserved—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	6,232,000	532,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	3,445,000	345,000
<b>Fish : fresh, salted, smoked or preserved—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	6,247,000	634,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	4,616,000	309,000
<b>Boots—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	733,000	721,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	398,000	249,000
<b>Wheat—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	98,359,000	2,415,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	42,642,000	1,323,000
<b>Dried fruits—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	20,346,000	840,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	13,546,000	562,000
<b>Sugar—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	37,380,000	2,787,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	8,217,000	264,000
<b>Coffee—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	10,367,000	1,125,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	9,498,000	561,000
<b>Oil fuel—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	133,000	1,287,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	85,000	554,000
<b>Wood for building—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	340,000	2,689,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	339,000	1,591,000
<b>Coal—</b>						
1920 ..	..	..	..	..	981,000	8,255,000
1921 ..	..	..	..	..	921,000	3,512,000

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Manures—	Metric tons.	£E.
1920 .. .. .	120,000	2,901,000
1921 .. .. .	44,000	666,000
Cotton textiles—		
1920 .. .. .	..	18,771,000
1921 .. .. .	..	7,942,000
Woollen textiles (by weight)—	Kilog.	
1920 .. .. .	139,000	251,000
1921 .. .. .	33,000	72,000
Woollen textiles (by length)—	Metres.	
1920 .. .. .	3,510,000	2,768,000
1921 .. .. .	2,037,000	859,000
Silk yarn—	Kilog.	
1920 .. .. .	249,000	526,000
1921 .. .. .	209,000	268,000
Silk textiles (by weight)—		
1920 .. .. .	72,000	414,000
1921 .. .. .	41,000	159,000
Silk textiles—	Metres.	
1920 .. .. .	5,134,000	1,500,000
1921 .. .. .	4,129,000	662,000
Jute sacks—	Kilog.	
1920 .. .. .	18,405,000	1,258,000
1921 .. .. .	8,635,000	303,000
Iron or steel manufactured (by weight)—	Metric tons.	
1920 .. .. .	107,000	3,695,000
1921 .. .. .	61,000	1,616,000
Iron or steel manufactured (by value)—		
1920 .. .. .	..	1,214,000
1921 .. .. .	..	716,000
Motor vehicles—	Number.	
1920 .. .. .	2,334	1,058,000
1921 .. .. .	926	472,000
Copper and brass (sheets)—	Kilog.	
1920 .. .. .	3,760,000	687,000
1921 .. .. .	2,622,000	320,000
Gold bullion—		
1920 .. .. .	4,292	731,000
1921 .. .. .	53	7,000

*Tobacco.*

164. The total quantity of tobacco imported has decreased from 9,092,000 kilog. to 8,256,000 kilog. This is 94,000 kilog. less than the amount imported in 1919. Greece is again the chief supplier of leaf tobacco with 2,938,000 kilog. to her credit; China comes next with 2,351,000 kilog.; Russia has increased her contribution to 976,000 kilog.; and Turkey has supplied 762,000 kilog. The contribution of British India has again decreased from 113,000 kilog. to 45,000 kilog., and that of Japan from 197,000 kilog. to 37,000 kilog. There has been a further decrease from 44,000 kilog. to 33,000 kilog. in the demand for cigars, but there has been a largely increased demand for cigarettes from England.

*Tariffs.*

165. During the course of the year the following tariffs, which had been in force before the war, were renewed :—

- Raw silk from China, Japan and Italy.
- Indigo.
- Cement and Lime.
- Gypsum from Cyprus.

It is proposed still further to extend the system of substituting conventional periodic tariffs for valuation.

*Changes in Import Duties.*

166. On the 30th March, 1921, the duty on timber was increased from 8 per cent. to 10 per cent., that on benzine and lubricating oils from 8 per cent. to 15 per cent., and that on liquid fuel from 4 per cent. to 8 per cent. At the same time, an excise

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duty of 11 per cent was imposed on native benzine and of 4 per cent, on local liquid fuel. On the 27th July, 1921, a *droit de consommation* was imposed on certain liquids, foodstuffs and building materials. This tax is 2 per cent, *ad valorem*: it is collected on all such articles manufactured in the country and in the case of imported articles it is payable in addition to the existing import duty.

167. The Egyptian Government had been considering for some time the advisability of increasing the taxation of alcohol, but was not able to do so owing to its commercial agreements with certain Powers. Great Britain and France signified their consent to the proposed measure without demur, but it was not until the summer of 1920 that the formal consent of Italy was obtained; in consequence, Egypt now enjoys complete freedom in the taxation of alcohol and alcoholic drinks, with the exception of wine and vermouth. On the 25th June, 1921, an import duty of 100 millièmes per litre of liquid was imposed on imported alcoholic liquors containing not more than 50 per cent. of alcohol, and a duty of 200 millièmes per litre of pure alcohol was imposed on liquors containing more than 50 per cent. of alcohol. Alcohol imported for burning is admitted, after denaturation, at a tax of 6 millièmes per kilogram. An excise duty of 195 millièmes per litre of alcohol corresponding to the increase in import duty was imposed on all locally distilled alcohol: this necessitated the creation of a new branch of the customs administration for the collection of this duty. The effect of the new duty has been to increase the tax on a case of whisky, valued at £E. 2,500, from 250 millièmes to 900 millièmes.

168. On the 3rd October, 1921, the duty on stemmed leaf tobacco from countries having no convention with Egypt was increased from 620 millièmes to 820 millièmes per kilogram, that on unstemmed leaf tobacco from 720 millièmes to 920 millièmes, and that on cigars, cigarettes and manufactured tobacco from 720 millièmes to £E. 1,020, and from the 3rd December the drawback on exported Egyptian cigarettes was increased from 400 millièmes to 600 millièmes.

*Petroleum Products.*

169. During 1921 207,000 metric tons of Egyptian crude oil were received at the Suez refinery, an increase of 46,000 metric tons on the quantity received last year. Foreign crude oil brought for the refinery has decreased from 107,000 metric tons to 63,000 metric tons. In addition to this the refinery has received 137,000 metric tons of foreign benzine, 74,000 metric tons of foreign kerosene, and 43,000 metric tons of foreign fuel oil.

*Countries of Origin.*

170. The value of the imports from nearly all countries has decreased. Germany and Roumania are the chief exceptions. Germany's imports have increased from £E. 1,186,000 to £E. 1,649,000. She has contributed a large variety of articles, of which the most important are machinery, manufactured iron and steel, synthetic indigo, motor cars, locks and door-fittings, toys, pianos, cotton hosiery and beer. Roumania's imports have increased from £E. 527,000 to £E. 1,094,000, and have consisted almost entirely of barley, kerosene and timber. Czechoslovakia has also slightly increased the value of her imports from £E. 262,000 to £E. 273,000.

171. The United States have proved a serious rival to the United Kingdom, and the value of the imports from that country has been £E. 8,356,000 as compared with £E. 10,751,000 in 1920. The chief items have been coal (£E. 1,697,000), wheat flour (£E. 2,157,000), maize flour (£E. 988,000), wheat (£E. 903,000), maize, kerosene and mineral oils. It is improbable that the figures for coal and cereals will be maintained in the future.

172. The share of the United Kingdom and British possessions has fallen from 48 per cent. to 40 per cent., and that of the United States has increased from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. France comes next with 8 per cent. as against 6 per cent. in 1920, followed by Italy with 6 per cent., Argentina and Germany with 3 per cent., and Greece and Belgium with 2 per cent.

173. Imports from Japan have shown a marked diminution. During the war Japan had built up a considerable trade with Egypt, her share increasing from 6 per mille in 1915 to 50 per mille in 1918, in which year her imports totalled £E. 2,534,000 out of £E. 51,155,000. Since then, Japanese imports have steadily decreased and only reached 13 per mille or £E. 747,000 out of £E. 55,508,000 in 1921. This decline is partly due to enhanced prices, and partly to the inferior quality of Japanese goods. The chief articles which show a decrease since 1918 are matches, from £E. 289,000 to £E. 27,000 (this trade having returned to Sweden and Italy);

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tobacco, from £E. 308,000 to £E. 7,000; cotton hosiery, from £E. 349,000 to £E. 169,000; silk cloths, from £E. 182,000 to £E. 127,000; silk yarns and silk waste, from £E. 137,000 to £E. 8,000; glassware, from £E. 175,000 to £E. 20,131; paper, from £E. 139,000 to £E. 3,000; Silk shawls, handkerchiefs and scarves, from £E. 139,000 to £E. 61,000; and ready-made underclothing, from £E. 76,000 to £E. 4,000.

*Decline in Prices.*

174. There has again been a general fall in prices during the year. The following table shows the price of certain articles in December as compared with a value of 100 in January:—

Cotton textiles	...	...	...	91
Cardiff coal	...	...	...	40
Newcastle coal	...	...	...	44
Copper and brass	...	...	...	60
Tin	...	...	...	69
Lead and zinc	...	...	...	62
Rice	...	...	...	88
Kerosene	...	...	...	45
Benzine	...	...	...	69
Liquid fuel	...	...	...	39
Persian carpets	...	...	...	53
Morocco goods	...	...	...	66
Manufactured iron and steel	...	...	...	66
Cotton yarns	...	...	...	65
Wheat	...	...	...	62
Wheat and maize flour	...	...	...	49
Fresh fruits	...	...	...	66
Dried fruits	...	...	...	75
Sugar	...	...	...	37
Fresh and preserved fish	...	...	...	94
Household soap	...	...	...	65
Olive oil	...	...	...	50

*Export Trade.*

175. The value of general merchandise exported has decreased from £E. 84,516,000 to £E. 35,653,000, and that of cigarettes from £E. 951,000 to £E. 704,000.

*Cotton.*

176. This large decrease in value is due to the lower price of cotton. The year opened with cotton tariffed at £E. 5-180 per kantar; the price fell to £E. 3-335 in March, and rose again to £E. 5-380 in April; this was followed by a gradual fall to £E. 4-090 in July, when the price again rose and attained its maximum £E. 9-870 in October, after which it fell to £E. 7-050 in December. The quantity of cotton exported during 1921 increased from 4,002,000 kantars, valued at £E. 75,096,000, to 4,792,000 kantars, valued at £E. 28,375,000. During the latter months of 1920 there was a considerable decrease in the quantity of cotton exported, owing to the large fall in the price; this resulted in an unusually large stock remaining in the country at the end of the season 1920-21. The higher price at the end of 1921 led to an increased export.

177. The United Kingdom has taken 2,184,000 kantars as against 1,744,000 kantars, but the purchases of the United States have declined from 1,269,000 kantars to 1,018,000 kantars. France has increased her demand from 408,000 kantars to 413,000 kantars, Germany from 77,000 kantars to 264,000 kantars, Switzerland from 140,000 kantars to 245,000 kantars, Japan from 56,000 kantars to 215,000 kantars, and Spain from 74,000 kantars to 132,000 kantars; Italy has only taken 166,000 kantars as against 168,000 kantars.

*Cotton Seed and Cake.*

178. There has been an increase in the quantity of cotton seed exported, from 1,866,000 ardebs to 2,138,000 ardebs, but the value has fallen from £E. 3,492,000 to

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£E. 2,423,000. The bulk of this, 2,094,000 ardebs, went to the United Kingdom. Cotton seed cake to the amount of 93,000 metric tons, valued at £E. 587,000, has been exported as compared with 82,000 metric tons valued at £E. 595,000 in 1920. The whole of this was taken by the United Kingdom.

*Other Exports.*

179. Owing to the relaxation of restrictions consequent on the arrival of rice from the East, the exports of that commodity have increased from 4,071,000 kilog., valued at £E. 174,000, to 19,160,000 kilog., valued at £E. 482,000, of which Syria has taken 6,505,000 kilog. and Palestine, 6,279,000 kilog. Exports of wheat have increased from £E. 233 to £E. 203,000; lentils from £E. 3,000 to £E. 191,000; and eggs from £E. 302,000 to £E. 340,000.

180. The controlled price of sugar in Egypt is now above the world price, and exports have decreased from £E. 1,145,000 to £E. 313,000.

181. Exports of phosphates have decreased from £E. 416,000 to £E. 186,000, untanned hides and skins from £E. 460,000 to £E. 164,000, leather from £E. 253,000 to £E. 157,000, and onions from £E. 544,000 to £E. 358,000; the quantities of the last named of these commodities exported have, however, increased.

182. The cigarette trade has diminished from 446,000 kilog., valued at £E. 951,000, to 398,000 kilog., valued at £E. 704,000. Palestine is the only country which has increased her demand for Egyptian cigarettes, having taken 164,000 kilog. as against 10,000 kilog. in 1920. Holland with 41,000 kilog. and the Dutch East Indies with 80,000 kilog. are the next largest consumers. The United Kingdom has bought 19,000 kilog. instead of 41,000 kilog.

*Distribution by Countries.*

183. The share of the United Kingdom and British possessions in the export trade of Egypt has increased from 44 per cent. to 48 per cent., and that of the United States has fallen from 31 per cent. to 18 per cent. France comes next with 8 per cent., followed by Germany, Japan and Switzerland with 4 per cent. Italy's share has again decreased from 4 per cent. to 3 per cent., but Palestine has increased from less than 1 per cent. to 3 per cent.

*Re-exports.*

184. These have increased in value from £E. 2,552,000 to £E. 6,128,000. A large factor in this increase is the re-export of cereals by the Department of Supplies. Cereals, flour and other agricultural produce show a value of £E. 3,576,000, as compared with only £E. 88,000 in 1920. Woollen and worsted cloths show an increase in value from £E. 33,000 to £E. 128,000.

*Change in the Valuation Basis for Cotton.*

185. Since 1912 "good fair" has been taken as the basis for fixing the price of cotton and 3 per cent. has been deducted for tare. The Customs administration has long thought that this gives a price which is lower than the average price at which the cotton crop is sold, but, owing to lack of satisfactory proofs of its contention, has been unable to alter its basis of estimation. It was only when the Cotton Control Commission published statistics for the sale of the 1918-19 crop that such evidence was obtained. After discussion with the Alexandria General Produce Association in the light of this new evidence, the tariff was fixed from the 1st September, 1921, as the mean between the prices of "fully good fair" and "good fair," less 3 per cent. for tare. The result of the measure has been an additional £E. 17,000 of revenue from export duty on cotton during the last four months of this year.

*Trade with the Soudan.*

186. Imports from the Soudan have decreased from £E. 2,287,000 to £E. 923,000 and exports to the Soudan from £E. 3,954,000 to £E. 2,455,000. There has been a large decrease in the import of animals and animal-food products from £E. 1,024,000 to £E. 373,000, and of cereals, flour and agricultural produce from £E. 804,000 to £E. 362,000. The export of wheat flour has fallen from £E. 114,000 to £E. 46,000, of refined cane sugar from £E. 1,099,000 to £E. 431,000, and of coffee from £E. 176,000 to £E. 7,000.

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*Customs Stores.*

187. Egypt is bound by her treaties with foreign Powers to provide eight days' free storage for all goods landed in her ports. The Egyptian Government is itself the owner of most of the stores in its ports, and up till 1910 the Customs administration provided its own staff of storekeepers for the reception and delivery of the goods and its own porters for the handling of them. At that time the argument was brought forward that the Customs administration ought only to perform the purely fiscal duty of collecting revenue, and that it should seek to free itself from the responsibility for the storage and handling of goods by the employment of an agent. The Egyptian Bonded Warehouses Company was therefore entrusted with the management of certain stores in 1911 in return for the demurrage dues and 60 per cent. of the portage dues on the goods handled therein. This system was gradually extended with some modifications until nearly all the customs stores at Alexandria, with the exception of the tobacco stores, were thus administered by the company. This arrangement has led to a certain amount of friction between the Customs administration and the company; clearing agencies have complained that the latter, being itself also a clearing agency, has been placed in a privileged position; and the employment of the company has not altogether freed the administration from effective responsibility in cases where the delivery of merchandise has been delayed, for example, by a strike of the staff of the Bonded Warehouses Company. Consequently on the 1st April, 1921, the Customs administration resumed control of certain stores in the Mahmoudieh customs, and has secured a profit of over £E. 1,000 by the transaction. It has been decided to take over half of the stores in Alexandria customs this year and the remainder next year.

*31. Contraband.*

188. So far as is known, no cargoes of contraband were run on the north coast of Egypt during the year. Two abortive attempts were made by small steamers, which, however, took alarm and made off.

189. There is no doubt, however, that firearms are frequently smuggled into Egypt in small quantities by seamen and passengers, and counter-measures have been devised during the year by co-operation between the Customs, the Coastguards and the Public Security Department. The actual seizures made at the ports were of little importance, amounting to 34 revolvers, 80 shot-guns and 7,000 rounds of ammunition.

190. The price of hashish continues to be fairly high, and the operations of hashish-smugglers appear to have been hampered by the Græco-Turkish war. A certain quantity of hashish is introduced into Egypt in contraband from India. The smuggling of opium has decreased, owing probably to the growing preference for cocaine, the consumption of which, in Egypt as elsewhere, has increased enormously. Cocaine is chiefly introduced by seamen from France and elsewhere, and in passengers' baggage; an average price in Egypt is 1s. a gramme.

*32. Fisheries.*

*Yield.*

191. The yields from the various fisheries have been very unequal. Lakes Edkou and Mariout show large increases both in the quantity of fish landed and the number of boats fishing. On the other hand, Lake Karoun has produced little more than one-third of the amount of fish landed in 1920, while on Lake Menzaleh the yield has dropped from 12,911 tons to 10,028 tons, and the number of boats, in consequence, has been reduced from 2,102 to 1,641. To improve the yield on Lake Menzaleh a new canal is being made at Ratma, north of Damietta, which should enable 50 million or 60 million cubic metres of flood water to enter the lake during high Nile. It is hoped the canal will be ready in time to take advantage of the next flood.

192. As regards the sea fisheries, there is a reduction of 450 tons in the sardine fishery; while amongst the trawlers, although the fleet has increased by fourteen boats, the catches of individual boats have decreased.

*Pisciculture.*

193. The work of introducing mullet fry from the sea into enclosed waters has continued to be successful. During the year 36,754,000 fry have been placed in Lake

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Mariout and 2,300,000 in the Mahmoudieh Canal. The total quantity of these fish already marketed is 163,000 kilog., with a value to the fishermen of £E. 8,000. Elvers were less abundant than in 1920, but a total of 1,797,000 were distributed in various inland waters, including the Nile at Cairo south of the barrage. Steps are now being taken to stock the Ismailia Canal with mullet fry.

194. The experimental farm at Mex for lake fish has been completed and stocked with a view to determining the possibilities of intensive fish culture in this country, and to observe the rates of growth under various conditions. It consists of sixteen ponds varying in area from  $\frac{3}{4}$  to 1/20th of a feddan (acre) and occupying about 4 feddans. The water in the ponds is, in most cases, some 40-50 centim. above normal lake level, the level being maintained partly by pumping, partly by springs. The springs are salt, and the ponds fed by them have approximately the same salinity (44-45 grammes per litre) as the Mediterranean coastal water. It will thus be possible to compare the effect of water of differing salinity upon the rate of growth and the condition of the fish.

195. Most of the ponds have been stocked with ascertained numbers of mullet fry of the year, 2 to 3 centim. in length and about two months old; into others elvers and half-grown eels have been introduced. The fish are artificially fed with different substances on definite and varying scales, according to the estimated stock. Land has been obtained and plans made for a similar establishment to be constructed at the barrage in order that research may be made into the habits and rate of growth of Nile fish.

#### *Sponge Fishing.*

196. A survey of the sponge beds on the Egyptian coast was conducted by twenty-seven boats, and resulted in a crop of 309,000 pieces. The whole extent of the coast was fully examined, and much valuable information regarding the distribution of the beds, and the relative efficiency of the different methods of fishing, was obtained. The catch sold for about £E. 13,430, the share of the Government being nearly £E. 2,686.

#### *Receipts.*

197. The total receipts of the Fisheries Department from all sources, including sale of sponges for the year 1921, are approximately £E. 87,821, as against £E. 95,951 for 1921, showing a decrease of £E. 8,130, principally owing to the diminution of fish in Lake Menzaleh and the lower price realised from the concessions.

### 33. *Analytical Laboratory.*

#### *Chemical and Physical Inspection of Materials.*

198. There has been a general increase in the chemical and physical inspection work required on behalf of the Government Departments. This was particularly noticeable in respect of the various materials required for building work. Portland cement was especially prominent, and a decided improvement was noticed in the quality of some brands which had suffered in consequence of the manufacturing difficulties prevailing during the war. Cement from the Government factory in the Soudan was also examined and found to be suitable for use in the construction of the new dam at Makwar on the Blue Nile.

199. The new law regarding customs and excise duty on alcoholic liquors gave rise to a considerable amount of work in connection with the strength of spirits, and the selection of the denaturants required to render plain alcohol undrinkable.

200. The chemico-legal work involved the examination of over 100 specimens, including firearms and other weapons, false coins and banknotes, handwriting and seal impressions on legal documents. Reports on these matters were used as expert evidence in various criminal trials and courts-martial.

#### *Technical Chemical Consultations.*

201. Many chemical questions affecting public security, notably that of the safe storage and handling of petroleum products, were studied, and visits of inspection were paid to the principal storage installations in the country. The authorities concerned were advised as to the measures which should be taken to minimise fire risks. The Department also collaborated with the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in investigating Egyptian industries which involve chemical processes. Several of

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these industries are handicapped by inadequate technical resources, and an endeavour was made to point out how they could put themselves on a footing which would enable them to face foreign competition successfully.

*Experimental Research.*

202. Research work on Egyptian (Hurghada) petroleum was continued throughout the year. Since the refinement of the oil on a large scale has hitherto been limited to the production of petroleum spirit, kerosene and fuel oil by straightforward distillation and chemical treatment, it was necessary to examine its suitability for the production of pitch, lubricating oil and paraffin-wax.

203. The principal technical difficulties in connection with the above work have been overcome, but the question as to whether the manufacture should actually be undertaken at the new Government refinery at Suez cannot be settled until market prices have become sufficiently stabilised to show which products are likely to prove most profitable.

204. The contamination of some of the Hurghada crude petroleum with salt water, resulting in the formation of a tenacious emulsion, still causes considerable inconvenience and difficulty in refining. After careful study of several processes for separating the salt and water from the oil, the conclusion has been reached that the electrical method (use of a high-tension alternating current) is the most satisfactory from the practical point of view.

*34. Assay Office.*

205. The amount of gold and silver wares submitted to the assay offices in Cairo, Alexandria, Beni Suef and Tanta for assay and hall-marking during the financial year ending the 31st March, 1921, remained at the same high level as in the previous twelve months. The total gross revenue from assay dues amounted to £E. 37,677, which is £E. 547 more than in the previous year. The approximate bullion value of the wares dealt with, taking gold at the standard rate, was £E. 2,660,000.

206. The price of gold in the bazaars, which had fallen rapidly during 1920, maintained a downward tendency during 1921. The English sovereign (P.T. 97½) fluctuated between P.T. 106 and P.T. 122½, with an average price for 1921 of P.T. 114 per sovereign, or P.T. 20 less than the average price for 1920. The price on the 31st December, 1921, was P.T. 110. The price of silver fell considerably during 1921, the average price being 17 millièmes per dirhem (1/10 oz. troy) of pure silver, as compared with 24½ millièmes during 1920. The price on the 31st December, 1921, was 16.75 millièmes per dirhem.

207. Legislation was introduced for a proper control of gold and silver wares imported into Egypt, and such wares were regularly inspected at the customs on arrival.

208. The general inspection of jewellery establishments in Egypt during the past financial year was greatly increased, a total of 1,701 being carried out, resulting in 81 prosecutions and fines amounting to £E. 25.

209. Many improvements in the accommodation and equipment of the Assay Office were effected and the standard of work brought up to a higher standard of technical efficiency.

210. Owing principally to the general fall in prices during 1921, and especially to the fall in cotton, the amount of wares submitted from the 31st March, 1921, to the end of December 1921 has shown a decline from the high levels of the two previous years, but hardly to the extent anticipated.

*35. State Domains.*

*Rents.*

211. In spite of the uncertainty and depression prevailing in agricultural matters throughout the year no marked difficulty was experienced in the collection of rents. This was partly due to reduction amounting to £E. 52,992, made in accordance with the Agricultural Rents Law of the 1st May, 1921. Immediately after the promulgation of this law the administration appointed a committee, which discussed the situation with the tenants and adjusted rentals by mutual agreement on lines laid down in the law, thus avoiding reference to the special courts of arbitration established.

212. Evidence of the confidence and good relationship existing between the administration and its tenants is afforded by the fact that out of many hundred

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tenants only five declined to come to an agreement with the administration, and insisted on referring the matter to arbitration, a course which one group subsequently regretted, as the decision of the court proved less favourable to them than the offer originally made by the administration. But while the collection of rents was by no means unsatisfactory, great difficulty has been experienced in getting in the annual instalments of purchase price, particularly in the Fayoum, where large areas were recently sold on the instalment system. The price at which this land was sold was low, and the facilities for payment were great, so that even in the present depressed state of the market purchasers should find no difficulty in paying their instalments. Rigorous measures are therefore being taken against defaulters.

*Farming.*

213. In 1921, 8,514 feddans were put under cotton, as against 9,343 feddans in 1920. The main varieties grown were Assili, 1,432 feddans, and Sakellarides, 6,732 feddans, while 550 feddans were devoted to other varieties. The average yield per feddan for the whole area under cotton was 3.43 kantars, as against 3.86 kantars in 1920. The average yield of the whole country was 2.56 kantars. The cotton was ginned as usual in the administration's factory at Sakha, and sold by auction at Alexandria. The mean price obtained was £E. 8.693 millièmes per kantar, as compared with £E. 12.231 millièmes in 1920 and £E. 15.756 millièmes in 1919. During 1921, 13,535 ardebs of Domains cotton-seed from the 1920 crop were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Agriculture for distribution.

214. Bulk selection of cotton was continued as in past years with a view to the improvement of stock seed. The selected seed (Sakel X) used for the nucleus of Domains sowings was hand-picked after ginning with a view to eradicating inferior seed. There is every reason to hope that this system, now adopted for the first time, will result in still further improvement in the quality of Domains Sakellarides. A considerable amount of experimental work was carried out by the staff of the administration on lines laid down by the Cotton Research Board.

215. In past years it has been the custom to make use of surplus Domains wheat for supplying the needs of Departments of the State which are consumers. So long as this wheat was not markedly superior to the commercial article this system had the merit of being cheap. But the attention which has been paid in recent years to the quality of wheat grown on the Domains has resulted in such marked improvement that the Department felt that its produce would be more economically employed for seed purposes than as food. Accordingly, in 1921, 2,441 ardebs of Domains wheat were distributed to growers through the Ministry of Agriculture, with such satisfactory results that the measure will be continued in coming years.

*Sales of Land.*

216. The market has been unfavourable for sales of fully developed land during the past year. No effort was spared, however, to complete the sale of small scattered plots of State property throughout the provinces, largely increased facilities being given as an inducement to purchasers. During the year under review 18,833 feddans were disposed of in 2,980 plots, of which 6,719 feddans, forming 1,439 plots, were bought by tenants and 12,114 feddans in 1,541 plots were sold by auction.

217. Out of the 44,374 saleable scattered plots of less than 100 feddans in area which stood on the books of the administration at the beginning of 1919, when this work of liquidation was undertaken, 30,883 plots, forming 74,512 feddans, have now been disposed of. The remaining 13,491 plots have attracted no purchasers, in spite of repeated offers. Special measures are being taken with a view to dispose of them. Subsequently it is hoped to extend this process of liquidation to scattered blocks of larger size which from their isolated situation cannot be economically exploited or effectively supervised.

*Land Improvement.*

218. In spite of financial difficulties, the improvement scheme in Belqas Estate undertaken in 1920 was energetically pushed on during the past year. The original programme provided for the levelling and canalisation of 1,742 feddans in 1921, and it is satisfactory to note that it was found possible to carry out the work on rather more than 2,300 feddans. Only about 500 feddans will, therefore, remain for treatment in 1922, instead of the 1,000 feddans anticipated in the original programme.

219. The 1,800 feddans which had been taken up in 1920 were planted in rice, but unfortunately shortage of irrigation supply told heavily on the crop. Two

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hundred and fifty-two feddans of this area have been rented for 1922 at £E. 7 per feddan. At this rate, which is by no means excessive, the 3,700 feddans forming Gazayer Farm alone should be bringing in over £E. 25,000 per annum by 1924 as against a rent roll of under £E. 3,000 per annum before improvement was undertaken.

36. *Survey Department.*

*General.*

220. During 1921 the Survey Department commenced work on the new scale which has been adopted for the standard maps of the country, and good progress has been made.

221. Besides being responsible for all the local maps of this country, the Survey has undertaken the compilation of four of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ -M. sheets of the map of Africa, namely, Cyrenaica, Egypt, Libya and Nubia, and it is hoped to publish one sheet in the coming year. Work on these maps will necessarily be slow, as there are still vast tracts of desert which are unexplored, so that constant revisions and additions will be necessary for many years before an approach to finality can be reached. Field trials of the application of portable wireless apparatus to the determination of longitude have been made in the Eastern Desert with very encouraging results.

222. A survey party has during the latter part of the year commenced work running a line of levels from Fajac, on the Victoria Nile, to Nimule.

223. During the summer the services of two members of the staff were loaned for short periods to the Royal Air Force in connection with the survey of the Cairo-Bagdad air route, maps of which have been prepared and reproduced for the use of pilots.

*Cadastral Survey.*

224. The ninth and last district survey office was opened at Luxor in November last, which has greatly facilitated the proper decentralisation of work. The energies of district survey offices will in future be directed toward the gradual production of an up-to-date map on the scale of 1 : 1,000, based on a permanent network of survey reference marks.

225. Preparations have been made for bringing up to date all records of public domains; the demarcation of public channels and roads and of cemetery sites has been proceeded with, and for the first time some progress has been made in placing on a legal basis the limits of antiquity sites. Preparatory to the institution of a system of registration of title to land, the demarcation of land areas and the placing of permanent survey reference marks has been continued; the work is now finished in Menufia Province, and Qaliubia will be completed in the course of this year.

*Geological Survey.*

226. The most important branch of the geological survey work continues to be connected with petroleum research, one field party having been engaged during the year in examining the western foreshore of Sinai, while another is examining the central portion of the Sinai Peninsula in the direction of the Gulf of Akaba. The former presence of petroleum has been indicated at several localities, and areas suggested tentatively for reserve.

227. A party also visited the Island of Saint-John in the Red Sea, which has been geologically mapped for the first time. The main aim of the study was to determine the possibilities of the occurrence of petroleum.

*Desert Survey.*

228. The survey of Central Sinai on the 1 : 100,000 scale, commenced last year, has been continued, and about 2,900 square kilom. of hitherto unexplored country have been triangulated and topographically mapped during the year. The field maps of the area completed up to the summer, covering about 2,500 square kilom., have been reproduced and issued for the use of the Frontier Districts Administration and the Petroleum Office. The triangulation of the Sinai side of the Gulf of Suez has been completed during the year, and an area of about 4,600 square kilom. has been topographically mapped. The Sinai triangulation net has been extended across the Gulf of Akabar by the intersection of a number of prominent peaks on the eastern side of the Gulf, which will afford an accurate basis for any future survey work in Northern Arabia.

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229. The motor road from near Qena to Qoseir has been remapped on the 1:100,000 scale, and triangulation and topographical mapping has been extended over about 1,000 square kilom. of an hitherto little-known region north of the road.

230. A triangulation net has been carried across the great limestone plateau north-eastwards from Assiout connecting the Nile Valley and the Red Sea nets, and a considerable amount of topographical mapping of this part of the Eastern Desert has been accomplished.

231. Thirty prospecting areas, totalling 71 square kilom., have been located and beacons, chiefly in South-Western Sinai and in the neighbourhood of Qoseir.

37. *Bureau of Commerce and Industry.*

232. This recently established bureau has considerably extended its activities during the past year, and among the measures taken towards the development of Egyptian trade I may note the following: an industrial survey of Egypt, of which about one-quarter, embracing some 20,000 returns, has been completed; the inspection of industries throughout the country; the formation of a reference library of foreign trade catalogues, and of an index of Egyptian importers and exporters; and proposals for legislation designed to put a stop to the false lapping, folding and marking of piece goods, which is so prevalent in this country. The bureau is about to inaugurate a new cereal market at Alexandria, the profits of which will for the first ten years be equally divided between the Government and the Alexandria municipality.

233. The permanent exhibition of local manufactures and industries attached to the bureau has proved itself a successful means of propaganda on behalf of Egyptian trade interests. Some 10,000 visitors have passed through the turnstiles during the year, and the numbers increase daily. Numberless applications from would-be exhibitors have to be refused owing to lack of space, whereas when the exhibition was first opened all exhibits had to be purchased. An order department exists for the benefit of visitors who otherwise would be unable to obtain the goods which they require; a large proportion of these purchases are despatched abroad, another valuable form of trade propaganda. The object of the exhibition is largely to nurse the small industries until they are in a position to stand on their own feet. The bureau has earned the gratitude of many small traders working in remote corners of Egypt who in some cases have been enabled to treble their output.

234. The bureau has completed to purchase of exhibits for the Egyptian Court at the Imperial Institute in London (which exhibits are the property of the Egyptian Government) and where a full range of articles of commercial value can now be seen.

235. The restriction of the import trade by the war led to an appreciable revival of local industries: some of these, such as the manufacture of starch and jam, have almost disappeared again, but others have continued to develop. It is estimated, for example, that in addition to the cotton mills of the "Filature nationale" at Alexandria, which produced in 1921 9,000,000 metres of cotton goods and 4,000,000 pounds of yarn, there are some 8,000 to 10,000 cotton looms in the country, with an output of 9,000,000 metres, 2,000 looms producing 3,000,000 metres of silk material, and an equal number producing 4,000,000 metres of woollen goods, and 300 flax looms producing 500,000 metres of linen.

236. In conjunction with the Department of Technical, Industrial and Commercial Education and with the co-operation of the mudirs and the provincial councils the bureau is endeavouring to assist the weavers to adopt a more up-to-date loom which could double and treble their present output.

237. The Egyptian cement trade shows steady and encouraging expansion. The Ma'asara Cement Company has now a yearly output of 25,000 tons, which it is prepared to increase considerably in the future. The brick and tile works of Messrs. Sornaga and Co. at Kafr Ammar, where some 700 Egyptian workmen are regularly employed, is another important industry, and has recently commenced the manufacture of ceramic art pottery, on which the owner has expended large sums during the experimental stages. Works in connection with the manufacture of paints from natural earth pigments are in process of erection at Helwan and should develop into an important industry.

238. Amongst other progressive industries are the following: rug-making, basket-making, matting, rubber manufacture, leather and leather ware, bedstead manufacture, pottery, tarbushes, boot and shoe making, ivory work, confectionery, soap, oils, wicker-work furniture, felt roofing, &c.

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239. The absence of Egyptian capital invested in Egyptian industries is as noticeable as ever, and until the Egyptians can show their confidence in their own industries by subscribing the necessary capital for the development of their own industrial concerns, they cannot be surprised that the principal industries of the country are still in the hands of the Europeans.

38. *Mines and Quarries Department.*

*Mines.*

240. The approximate value of raw materials mined during the year was £E. 1,296,862, being a decrease of £E. 58,538 on the value of the output of the preceding year.

241. With the exception of petroleum the mining industry suffered from the effect of the world-wide trade depression and the consequent difficulty in finding buyers of the produce. This has been particularly marked in the case of phosphate, most of the shipments of which, in 1921, consisted of forward contracts made the previous year: 122,024 tons of phosphate rock were, however, mined during the year.

242. The manganese mines started the year well with good prices, but the demand soon fell off and only revived towards the close of the year. The production of manganese iron ore in 1921 was 55,065 tons as compared with 77,562 tons in the preceding year.

243. In the case of petroleum, prospecting by actual drilling has been more active during 1921 than at any time since 1912. The areas thus being tested are chiefly situated in hitherto untried localities. The production of crude petroleum was 182,668 metric tons, an increase of 34,718 tons on the output of 1920.

244. The Government continued geological and drilling prospecting operations on both sides of the Gulf of Suez and has proceeded with the erection of a small refinery which is expected to be put into operation this year.

245. The mining industry in Egypt gave direct employment in 1921 to 7,368 Egyptians and 523 foreigners.

*Quarries.*

246. The quarrying industry continues to expand to meet the demand for stone created by irrigation works and the gradual resumption of building. During the year 1,252 quarry licences were issued compared with 900 in 1920. A considerable demand also exists for the raw materials required for the manufacture of plaster, cements, drainage pipes, and pottery, and has been met by increased production.

39. *Department of Supplies.*

247. The food situation in the early spring of 1921 was perplexing. In place of the heavy and continuous demand throughout the winter months for Government flour (75 per cent. wheaten and 25 per cent. corn flour), anticipated so confidently by the Department, the actual sales had shrunk to small dimensions. It was not easy to determine the cause of the decline. The production of the 1919-20 wheat crop was far below the standard of Egyptian consumption in pre-war years, but no whisper of shortage had been heard; indeed, the market, at periods, was overloaded with supplies of Egyptian wheat. It appears probable that abnormally large stocks had been carried over from the 1918-19 harvest, and had swelled the production of the following year. Such stocks now are known to have been held by cornfactors and cultivators, influenced by the belief that the price of wheat during the last half of the year 1920 would exceed that of the first six months. Speculators had some ground for their confidence, for alarming rumours in the early summer of 1920 were current in Europe that the wheat supply of the world was short; and when one great wheat exporting country hastily stopped further shipments abroad, the Egyptian wheat holder was encouraged to continue his policy of holding up stocks.

248. But the rapid, and severe, fall in cotton values at the close of the year compelled all local traders to realise stocks. Cornfactors and cultivators were not exempted from this universal necessity; the local market was flooded with cheap wheat; and the Department of Supplies was left without customers. The Department met the position by reducing its prices as wheat parities weakened, but the continued excess of supply of local wheat over demand frustrated its efforts.

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to maintain the level of sales. The sale of the surplus stocks was delayed by a belief in certain quarters that world's parity would improve. That expectation was disappointed: prices continued to decline, prospective buyers grew scarce, and the favourable moment for unloading had slipped by. In the end the Supplies Department had to accept offers which contrasted poorly with those made a few weeks earlier.

249. Early in the summer of 1921, it became necessary to consider whether Egypt would require all of the 160,000 tons wheat and flour, ordered from abroad in the preceding autumn, in anticipation of a diminished local wheat crop. The agricultural prospect had altered completely. Cultivators, unable to sell cotton, had increased voluntarily the areas under cereals and pulses. It was clear in these circumstances that 1921-22 production would be much in excess of that of previous years, and large quantities, therefore, of the new imports have been sold abroad. At the end of May, Government stocks will be exhausted, and future deficiencies in local production must be met through ordinary trade channels.

250. The cost of the Government's policy in importing cereals and pulses during the last three years, has been heavy; but the policy has succeeded, at least, in maintaining local prices at a figure, which at critical moments, has been below world's parities. It may be said without hesitation that throughout the period of distress and shortage common to so many countries, Egypt has enjoyed ample and relatively cheap food supplies.

251. The entry of the Supplies Department into the butchers' meat markets of Cairo and Alexandria, coincided with the fall of cotton values. Throughout 1920, these markets had been kept deliberately and systematically short of supplies by meat purveyors, who had thus been in a position to exercise complete control of prices. The Department had no desire to interfere with purveyors' profits, but was keenly interested that sufficient meat should be in the markets to satisfy the needs of every consumer. Efforts to persuade purveyors to increase supplies proved ineffectual, however, and the Department was forced itself to import stock from the Soudan. But, as in the case of cereals and pulses, the acute fall in cotton prices radically changed the meat situation. Egyptian cultivators, forced to realise on what they could, sold stock to the butchers' meat markets; the necessity of importing disappeared, and the Department withdrew from its operations as speedily as possible.

252. Under successive arrangements with the Société générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Égypte, the export of sugar from Egypt has been officially controlled for several years past, and latterly the import and the local price have also been controlled. The result has been not only to secure a sufficient supply of sugar for Egypt and the Soudan usually at a price considerably below the world price, but also very greatly to stimulate the Egyptian sugar industry.

253. The arrangement concluded in January 1921 for the ensuing year guaranteed to the Société générale des Sucreries a sale of 75,000 tons of sugar in Egypt and the Soudan at £E. 56 a ton on condition of their buying the local sugar crop at P.T. 9½ a kantar.

254. The crop was unexpectedly large, and encouraged by a belief in the continued firmness of the world's sugar market the cultivators laid down in the spring of 1921 an acreage largely in excess of the normal. During the summer the sugar market broke. This stopped the company's export trade and produced a sudden reversal of local conditions. The termination of the agreement-year found the Egyptian price, hitherto below world's parity, more than £E. 20 a ton above it: the company, with its export trade gone and enough sugar in hand or in sight, on its own lands, to supply Egypt for more than two years ahead, was averse to increasing its stocks, whereas the cultivator was saddled with an unusually large crop for this year and next, which the sugar company was only prepared to buy, if at all, at less than a fair market value based on world's parity.

255. In these circumstances, and in order to liquidate the situation gradually, a further agreement was concluded with the sugar company early in 1922, by which the company undertook to purchase the standing crop (maturing in the winter of 1922-23) at P.T. 6 a kantar, against a guaranteed sale of 60,000 tons of sugar at an average price of £E. 35 a ton.

256. With this exception, and a still continued prohibition of the export of gold, all the economic restrictions by the Government which were necessitated by the war have now been abolished. Considerable criticism was aroused by withdrawing restrictions on the export of certain commodities, notably eggs and rice. But the action of the Supplies Department was fully justified by the results.

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257. The general fall in food prices has affected the prosperity of various co-operative and benevolent societies. But as their aim was to combat the high cost of living, the withdrawal from business in consequence of the fall in food prices can cause no surprise. In every case, these institutions have been controlled by local committees, working with capital subscribed locally; and on the whole their finance has been managed admirably. Profits have been made, and devoted generously in many instances to some object of public utility.

40. *Frontier Districts Administration.*

258. The Frontier Districts Administration was established in May 1917 after the expulsion of the Turks and the Senoussi from the Eastern and Western deserts, where during the earlier part of the war the previously existing civil administration had been withdrawn. The new administration drew its authority from an order of the Commander-in-chief issued with the approval of the High Commissioner: it was, however, attached to the Ministry of Finance for budgetary purposes.

259. Justice is administered under a special law drawing its sanction from the military authority. This law, though it gives power to the military administrator, as head of the Frontier Districts Administration, to make orders the contravention of which is visited with certain strictly limited punishments, provides in the main for the administration of justice in accordance with Bedouin usage and custom.

260. The constitution of the courts of justice provides for the presence of assessors to assist the judicial officers of the administration. These assessors are chosen from among the sheikhs to whom the Bedouin have been accustomed to look for the settlement of legal questions. Their opinions on points of local usage are in practice binding upon the presiding officer and their opinions on matters of fact always show great acumen. The knowledge of the weight which their opinions carry is a great inducement to the Bedouin to bring their disputes before the tribunals of the administration. These tribunals have the advantage over the old tribal courts of sheikhs alone, that their judgments are enforceable, and many cases have been brought before them which had been heard by the tribal courts before the Frontier Districts Administration was created, but the judgments in which had never been enforced.

261. Among the settled populations of the Siwa, Kharga, and Dakhla Oases the Egyptian codes are applied; and their limited application in cases of serious crime, and in cases where Bedouin are not exclusively concerned, has begun to inculcate the idea of the existence of a central authority having an interest in maintaining peace and security. On the other hand the general dependence on local custom is of great value in dealing with a race to whom that idea is foreign, whose customary law is founded upon the family as a unit, whose highest recognised authority is the tribe, and among whom any wrong done is done to the family and not to the individual.

262. The administration maintains a considerable police-force and camel-corps for the protection of the frontiers and the preservation of public security; they are subject to a special disciplinary code which is in general modelled upon the Egyptian Military Code. Public security in the deserts is at present in a most satisfactory condition.

263. Except in the oases the inhabitants depend for their prosperity upon rainfall, which in the winter of 1921 was most deficient, resulting in the complete ruin of the important barley crop of the Mariut district and a grave lack of grazing for animals. The tithe receipt of the administration amounted only to £E. 5,480 as compared with £E. 24,000 in the previous year.

264. Communications were steadily improved, motor roads being opened between El Burg (a new town constructed by the administration as the headquarters of the Mariut District) and Baharia Oasis, and between Kena and Kosseir, Kosseir and Safaga, and Safaga and Hurghada.

265. The Bedouin are in general quite indifferent to education, but a school founded at El Arish in 1920 has grown considerably: at the end of 1921 it contained ninety-four pupils, some of whom come from as far away as Gaza. In the oases the schools have been well attended, and a new school has been opened in Kharga Oasis on the request of the inhabitants.

266. The administration has devoted much attention to the health of the inhabitants of the deserts and oases, and during 1921 hospitals were opened at El Arish, Sollum, Sidi Barrani and Kharga; 46,859 out-patients and 1,352 in-patients were treated during 1921, as against 17,445 and 1,013 respectively in

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1920. Cases of infectious disease, on the other hand, diminished from 698 to 390, 325 of which were cases of influenza. There were 2,460 births and 1,283 deaths, as compared with 2,430 births and 1,884 deaths in 1920. The results of anti-malaria work in the oases are remarkable, no cases having been recorded during 1921 at Siwa or Aghourmi, and 58 at Kharga as compared with 115 in 1920. In Sinai, however, malaria seems to be somewhat increasing.

267. The Frontier Districts Administration will be placed under the Egyptian Ministry of War in the course of the present year.

CHAPTER III.—AGRICULTURE.

41. *General.*

268. In my 1914-19 report I mentioned that the development of the Ministry of Agriculture had been retarded by the outbreak of war. It has now made a serious start, and, given land for its experimental stations and seed farms, its progress during the next few years will be accelerated.

269. The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. John Langley, C.B.E., retired in May, after thirty-six years' service in the Egyptian Government. He had done valuable work both in this post, to which he was appointed when the Ministry was instituted, and previously as Director-General of the State Domains Administration. He has been succeeded, in March 1922, by Mohammed Pasha Abul Fetouh, Mr. A. T. McKillop, Chief Inspector, having acted as Under-Secretary during the interval.

270. The figures for the area under cotton, usually not available until August, were in 1921, for the first time, issued in June.

271. The following table gives the areas of the principal crops for the year under review, with the approximate yields :—

Crop.	Area in Feddans.	Total Yield in Thousands.		Average Yield per Feddan.	
		Kantars.	Ardebs.	Kantars.	Ardebs.
Cotton ..	1,291,878	3,300*	..	2·56	..
Wheat ..	1,404,798	..	6,715	..	4·78
Barley ..	379,540	..	2,165	..	5·70
Rice ..	} Not yet ascertained.	..	..	..	..
Maize ..		..	..	..	..
Millet ..		..	..	..	..
Sugar cane ..	63,992	42,163	..	659	..

\* Estimated.

42. *Cotton.*

272. The Egyptian crop for 1921 has been estimated at 3,300,000 kantars (660,000 American bales). It is the smallest crop since 1889, and its average yield, 2·56 kantars per feddan, the lowest ever recorded. Prices during the period under review although not of such extreme variation as in 1920, were very uneven, rising from 24 dollars in the middle of August to 54 dollars at the beginning of October, and falling again to 26 dollars at the end of January 1922.

273. The past season was remarkable for the number of adverse conditions which prevailed throughout its course. Both for some time before and during the normal period of preparation and early sowing there was a continuous and heavy drop in cotton prices. The cultivator, only recently emerging from a pleasant experience of unexampled prosperity and lavish expenditure, found himself hampered by the burden of additional property purchased at reckless prices. The loans which it was customary to raise for cotton cultivation were unobtainable, and, moreover, the cost of labour had not declined in correspondence with the cotton market. As a result, a large proportion of the cultivators hesitated, when the ploughing season arrived, to cultivate a crop which, at that time, promised no adequate financial return. Prices touched bottom at about the end of February, and the rise which followed stimulated the efforts to get in the crop. Precious time, however, had been irrevocably lost. When prices flattened out to rather below the 30 dollars average for Sakel, the

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majority of cultivators, wisely or unwisely, cut down cultural operations to the minimum. Much of the land received a single ploughing only, and ridging and other operations were often of the most perfunctory character.

274. In addition, the crop suffered from unfavourable weather during the germination period, necessitating resowing on a large scale; and the weather was also unfavourable during the early growing period. In July the water supply was extremely short, and in an effort to compensate for this, much over-watering occurred in August. In September the weather was cool and damp, delaying the maturation of the crop, and the severe pink boll-worm attack, probably aggravated by the other adverse conditions, contributed largely to reducing the first picking, and almost completely destroying the second.

275. Although the weather and water supply conditions were not favourable, it is certain that bad cultivation was the principal cause of the poorness of the crop. There is ample evidence to show that, where the normal amount of attention was given and the crop sown at the normal season, the results were satisfactory. The State Domains and other well-managed estates obtained either as good or only slightly shorter crops than in the previous year.

276. It is a noticeable fact that, whereas the average yield throughout the country was only 2.56 kantars per feddan, the average yield from the Cotton Research Board's field experiments was 4.55 kantars. The land on which these experiments are carried out is selected for evenness and, consequently, is somewhat above the average for the delta. It should be remembered, however, firstly that no Upper Egyptian plots are included in the average of 4.55 kantars per feddan given above, and this would be raised very considerably by their inclusion; and, secondly, that in an experiment where two or more sets of conditions are compared, only one set of plots can conform to optimum conditions, and the crop from the others is, therefore, less than it might have been. The yields obtained by the Cotton Research Board compare very favourably with the average of the country.

277. In the variety tests, as regards monetary return, Sakel, grown from Domains seed, stands well ahead of all rivals except the variety known as No. 310, introduced by Dr. Balls when he was working in the Department of Agriculture. It is doubtful, at present, which is the more profitable of these two varieties, Sakel giving a slightly heavier crop and No. 310 being of slightly better quality.

278. Of Upper Egyptian varieties, the Botanical and Plant-Breeding Service's selected strains of Ashmuni and Zagora are undoubtedly at least as good as anything in the country and far superior to the average.

279. It would appear, therefore, that the best strains of seed in the country are in the Government's hands, and that, if adequate seed farms are provided and a satisfactory system of seed control instituted, there is a very fair prospect of a substantial improvement in the quality and value, if not in the quantity, of the Egyptian crop in the not far distant future.

280. The Cotton Research Board, which was created in 1919, has continued to make steady progress. The new buildings were finished early in the year, and the technical staff has been substantially increased. The first annual report was published in June, and was well received; the second is now in the press. An extensive programme of experiments was carried out in 1921, and a more complete programme laid down for 1922, full accounts of which will be found in the annual reports of the board.

281. Distribution of varieties of cotton:—

Varieties.	Area in Feddans.	Per Cent.
Mit Afifi .. .. .	6,771	0.5
Sakellaridis .. .. .	995,479	77.1
Ashmuni .. .. .	170,514	13.2
Yoanovich .. .. .	300	..
Nubari .. .. .	8,645	0.7
Assili .. .. .	5,839	0.4
Abbassi .. .. .	1,267	0.1
Zagora .. .. .	92,536	7.2
Other varieties* .. .. .	10,527	0.8
Total .. .. .	1,291,878	100.0

\* "Other varieties" includes all minor varieties for which no records are available.

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Sakellaridis now represents 96.7 per cent. of the cotton grown in Lower Egypt, no other variety accounting for as much as 1 per cent.

282. The distribution of Government seed to small cultivators on credit was continued by the Commercial Service in 1921, as in previous years. The amount so supplied was sufficient for 228,000 feddans, divided among 36,300 applicants. In addition, the Ministry distributed 6,200 ardebs of pure seed from the State Domains to large proprietors.

*Cotton-seed Control Scheme.*

283. An outstanding feature in the history of cotton in Egypt is the great number of varieties which, after a period of commercial popularity, have, from various causes, completely disappeared from cultivation. At the present time, Egypt possesses a variety, Sakel, which, although botanically not perfect, is yet, as regards lint characters, one of the highest in the scale of the world's cottons. It is, however, in the same danger of degeneration and disappearance as its many predecessors. Owing to the unlimited possibilities which exist for mixing, accidentally or with intent, of the seed stocks of the different varieties, it has for some time been considered necessary that Government should have control of the seed supply of the country and the introduction of new varieties. Draft regulations for such control were submitted to public bodies interested and published in the press last summer.

284. The majority of well-informed institutions and individuals welcomed these proposals, and a law has been drafted which gives the Ministry of Agriculture the necessary powers. It will not, however, be promulgated until the Ministry of Agriculture is in a position to exercise the necessary control. This will not be possible until the Ministry has its experimental stations and seed farms.

43. *Insect and other Pests.*

285. During the year under review, the law compelling ginning of cotton before the end of May was relaxed, in order to allow cultivators to carry-over their crops to the next season, or until prices should have improved. It was probably partly due to this that the 1921 cotton crop was, as mentioned before, the worst on record since the advent of the pink boll-worm.

286. Nine hundred and eighty gardens were fumigated against the black scale (*Aspidiotus aonidum*) including 262,643 individual trees.

287. The Hibiscus mealy bug (*Phenacoccus hirsutus Green*), which has caused much damage in recent years, spread somewhat during 1921, involving the Mudiria of Fayoum. This necessitated the issue of a further *arrêté*, declaring Cairo, the Mudirias of Giza, Beni-Suef, and Fayoum infected and likely to transmit infection from the above areas into those at present free. It also gave the power to carry out control measures within the areas infected. Work in the Cairo nurseries has been continued, and a great improvement is to be observed. The attack in the Cairo area has been less severe this year, owing to the measures taken; and the vigorous campaign now in general progress will reduce the infestation and relegate this insect to the status of a minor pest.

288. A severe attack of the sugar-cane mealy bug (*Pseudococcus sacchari Ckll*) occurred on the sugar-cane in Upper Egypt. The effect of this insect is to produce gumming on the canes, which renders the juices extracted from the canes difficult to crystallise, and reduces the sugar output.

289. One thousand gardens, containing a quarter of a million trees, were fumigated against black scale (*Aspidiotus aonidum*), a pest which has much increased of late.

290. The work of plant quarantine has proceeded as usual at the customs-house. The Ministry of Agriculture—

- (1.) Prohibits the importation of cotton plants, seeds of cotton, cotton (ginned or unginced), vine leaves, living insects, and bacteria and fungi harmful to plant life.
- (2.) Allows importation, only after authorisation, of date-palms, banana plants, sugar-canes, green olives, olive trees, silkworm eggs, and honey-bees.
- (3.) Inspects and disinfects all imported plants, except delicate ornamental plants.
- (4.) Inspects and, when dangerous insects are found, fumigates all imported fruit.

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291. Bananas imported from the Canary Islands were found infected with a scale insect (*Aspidiotus destructor?*) and a mealy bug not recorded in this country. Measures were taken to protect the Egyptian banana plantations from both these pests.

44. *Agronomic Service.*

292. In August 1921 a nucleus Agronomic Service, the need of which has long been felt, was constituted by the transfer of trained staff from other Departments of the Ministry. Its more important functions are to undertake the cultural programme, tests and experiments approved by the Cotton Research Board, to organise the propagation of pure strains of seed, to study mechanical developments in connection with agriculture, and the establishment of new crops, and to foster the livestock industry.

293. Since the formation of this service, an extensive programme of experiments on the more important crops has been drawn up. Part of this, in so far as the wheat and cotton crops are concerned, has already been put into execution. In addition to the Government farm at Gemmeiza, it is hoped to secure two seed farms, one in Upper Egypt and the other in the middle of the delta, for the propagation in bulk of strains of seed selected by the Botanical and Plant-Breeding Services. Meanwhile, this work is being carried on on a fairly large scale on farms belonging to well-known cultivators, under the control of the service. As regards the breeding section of the service, the Government farm at Gemmeiza is, in the meantime, being used as a station for the herd, while several observation stations on farms belonging to private individuals are under the supervision of the livestock officer.

45. *Veterinary Service.*

294. Owing to the difficulty of importing animals for food, and to the dearth and high cost of fodder, the number of domestic animals in Egypt seriously decreased during the war and the immediately following years. A recovery has now begun, and the 1921 census shows an increase of 34,000 cattle, 60,000 buffaloes, and 56,000 sheep, as compared with that of 1920, in spite of an increase in the number of Egyptian animals slaughtered, and the temporary prohibition of import from the Soudan, where there were severe outbreaks of disease.

295. The veterinary laboratories continued with success their diagnostic and research work upon the diseases of animals. The Serum Institute, where 150 serum-producing bulls from Cyprus are maintained, supplied the Egyptian requirements of anti-cattle-plague serum, and also provided considerable quantities for Palestine and the Soudan. 7,000 Egyptian cattle were inoculated. There was comparatively little cattle-plague in the country, only 131 deaths having been recorded.

296. Two thousand five hundred animals were treated by preventive serum against hæmorrhagic septicæmia, of which ninety-three cases were detected as compared with thirteen in 1920. There were only twenty-seven cases of glanders.

297. Rabies continues to spread, and is not likely to be satisfactorily combated unless the existing regulations can be enforced and dog-licences made obligatory throughout the country; 117 cases were reported during 1921. At the end of the year a serious outbreak occurred among jackals in the Fayoum, one of which attacked a group of people asleep on a threshing-floor and bit eleven of them before it was killed.

298. The important fowl-breeding industry suffered from severe outbreaks of fowl cholera and fowl plague, the latter a very fatal and highly contagious disease. Measures of control were taken in the infected areas and over the import and export of fowls into and from those areas, and the spread of the diseases has hitherto been successfully checked.

46. *Botanical Service.*

299. *Cotton.*—Progress has been made during the year in the direction of the establishment of pure lines of various types and races of cotton, by the method of breeding from single plants. Strains which appear to be satisfactory have, in this way, been isolated from the principal varieties now grown in Egypt, and, in addition, a number of new types with distinct characteristics are receiving attention. The work of bulk selection, which aims at the improvement of the existing races of cotton by a vigorous elimination of inferior plants, has been proceeded with at Giza, and at four different localities in the provinces. Comparative field-tests of the improved strains produced in this manner have been carried out at Giza in conjunction with this work. An experiment has been made at Giza on the degree of

natural cross-fertilisation which occurs in the field. This experiment was carried out in considerable detail, and the results, when available, should do much to settle a question which vitally affects the problem of degeneration in Egyptian cotton. A large number of exotic types of cotton have been grown in a special field set apart for this purpose at Giza. The botanical and commercial characteristics of these types, as well as their suitability to Egyptian conditions, have been studied.

300. *Flax*.—A small quantity of seed was imported of a pure line of tall flax, which had originally been raised by Mr. Bateson at the Jones Innes Horticultural Institution, England. This seed was grown in comparison with the "Beledi" and the "Continental" types of flax ordinarily found in the country, with extremely encouraging results.

301. *Cereals*.—Ninety different varieties of wheat were sown in plots, and full records kept; selections were made in each variety for trueness to type and resistance to disease. Variety tests were made in various parts of the country in order to compare wheats previously selected; and numerous experiments were made in hybridisation. Several varieties and strains of maize were sown with a view to special selection and bulk selection for purity of type, and a start was made with an American system of self-fertilisation, as a means to the eventual isolation and subsequent combination and multiplication of the best plants. Ten varieties of rice were sown on the Government farm at Gemmeiza, and the crops were subjected to field selection for purity of type.

302. *Mycology*.—A careful study was made of the sore shin disease in cotton, and after many experiments strong indications appeared that by a slight change in the methods of cultivation the disease could in a large degree be remedied. Researches were also made into a variety of diseases of wheat and citrus trees, and several fungous diseases of other crops, the cause of which was previously unknown in Egypt, have been successfully diagnosed.

#### 47. Horticultural Service.

303. Vegetable, flower and fruit-tree seeds are produced on a large scale at Giza Gardens on the outskirts of Cairo, and sent throughout the country, and some 600,000 young fruit and timber trees were distributed from the gardens during the past year. Travelling inspections are made by staff, who also advise the provincial councils on road-planting and the making of parks and nursery-gardens. Successful experiments have been made in the cultivation of the Persian lime, and in retarding the ripening of the Italian lemon, while navel oranges and various sorts of Japanese plums, first introduced into Egypt some years ago by the Horticultural Service, are now largely grown and have appeared in the Cairo and Alexandria markets. The gardens also provide a training centre for gardeners, of whom twenty-four left during 1921, after three years' training, to take up public and private horticultural posts in different parts of Egypt.

304. Among other activities of this Department, I may mention the Orman Botanical Garden, which is chiefly devoted to the cultivation and study of a great variety of eucalyptus trees; the encouragement given to fruit-growing in Upper Egypt by the experimental orchards at Esna; the Kerdasa date-palm nursery, where 5,000 shoots have been planted during the year and experiments made in cultivating grapes and other fruits on sand; and the planting of figs, olives and vines at El Burg in the Mariut district, west of Alexandria, famous of old for its vineyards.

#### 48. Agricultural and Veterinary Education

##### *Higher School of Agriculture, Giza.*

305. On the 1st April, 1921, the number of students attending the school was seventy-nine. Twenty-two were successful in the final diploma examination held in June. On the 31st December there were only sixty-seven students, the number seeking admission having again been disappointing. Until the 18th December, the anniversary of the declaration of the protectorate, the conduct of the students was satisfactory, and discipline was well maintained. In the subsequent trouble all the students absented themselves, with the exception of three; but there was no disturbance in the school itself.

306. The recently introduced system of excursions has proved an undoubted success, and the interest taken by the students has been very gratifying. A botanical and entomological museum and a debating society have been started.

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307. The School of Veterinary Medicine is still housed in the Higher School of Agriculture buildings, the new building intended for the former being still uncompleted at the end of 1921. The need for increased accommodation is pressing, but no improvement in the existing crowded conditions can be expected before the School of Veterinary Medicine removes to its new quarters.

*School of Veterinary Medicine.*

308. On the 1st January, 1921, there were nineteen students in the school, distributed as follows :—

First year ... ..	4
Second year ... ..	4
Third year ... ..	7
Fourth year ... ..	4
Total ... ..	19

309. The annual examinations were held in May and July 1921, with the result that three of the fourth year students graduated. Three of the first year passed and were transferred to the second year; four of the second year passed and were transferred to the third year, and all the seven of the third year passed and were transferred to the fourth year. On the opening of the school on the 8th October, 1921, the numbers of students were as follows :—

First year ... ..	15
Second year ... ..	4
Third year ... ..	4
Fourth year ... ..	8
Total ... ..	31

310. The new school building is progressing satisfactorily, and will probably be wholly occupied before the end of the present school year. The dissecting room, pharmacy and infirmary buildings have been occupied since January 1920.

*Intermediate Schools of Agriculture.*

311. The three intermediate agricultural schools at Mustohor, Damanhur and Shebin-el-Kom have made some progress, and the revised syllabus, which was restricted to the first and second year classes in 1920, has been extended to all classes from the beginning of the school year 1921-22 (October 1921). Sixty-one pupils graduated from these schools during the year.

312. The following table shows the number of applicants to the three Intermediate Schools, as well as the number actually admitted, as compared with the figures for 1920 :—

School.	Year.	Applicants.	Number actually admitted.
Mustohor .. ..	1920	95	28
	1921	69	29
Damanhur.. ..	1920	24	22
	1921	25	17
Shebin-el-Kom .. ..	1920	35	31
	1921	27	26

313. The number of pupils at each school was as follows :—

School.	1st Year.	2nd Year.	3rd Year.	Total.
Mustohor .. ..	29	39	29	97
Damanhur .. ..	23	32	22	77
Shebin-el-Kom .. ..	27	37	21	85

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*Farm Schools.*

314. The unsatisfactory condition of the Farm Schools in general has obliged the Ministry to appoint a Committee of Enquiry, which has recommended that the Farm Schools, having failed in their object, should be abolished and replaced by two gardening schools, under the direct control of the Ministry of Agriculture.

315. The following table shows the number of pupils at each of these Farm Schools on the 31st December, 1921 :—

School.	1st Year.	2nd Year.	3rd Year.	Total.
Samanūd .. ..	25	18	27	70
Mansura .. ..	15	7	14	33
Beni Suef .. ..	19	11	18	48
Nag Hamadi .. ..	11	9	13	33

CHAPTER IV.—PUBLIC WORKS.

49. *Personal.*

316. In the summer of 1921 Sir Murdoch MacDonald, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P., tendered his resignation, having been Under-Secretary of State, with no Adviser, from 1912 to 1916, Adviser and Under-Secretary of State from 1917 to 1920, and Adviser since that time. He had been associated with a number of the irrigation works which have distinguished the latter half of the period of the British occupation, and the acceptance of his proposals for the Blue and White Nile dams by the Nile Projects Commission was recorded in the last report. Among the works with which he was specially connected, the first was the Assouan dam in all stages of its construction; and, in particular, he was responsible for the very durable protective work carried out downstream of the structure in 1906 and 1907. Other works which will remain associated with his name are the Esna barrage and the new Menafia head regulator, which he built in an emergency. He launched the drainage and irrigation projects in the provinces of Gharbia and Beheira, and he introduced the remarkably accurate system of measuring the volume of the Nile by the sluice discharges at Assouan. Mr. P. M. Tottenham, C.B.E., remains Under-Secretary of State with no Adviser. He was appointed Under-Secretary in 1920 and has wide experience of the Irrigation Service, both in Egypt and the Soudan. Quite recently Abd-el-Hamid Bey Suliman has also been appointed Under-Secretary of State; he is a very capable irrigation officer and one of the strongest personalities in the younger generation of Egyptian engineers.

317. It is with great regret that I record the death in London of Sir A. L. Webb early in 1921, from a renewed attack of illness, which overtook him while actually engaged in an inspection of the Blue and White Nile dams, for which he was consulting engineer. Of his previous career in Egypt it is unnecessary to speak here. His services are well known and are described in the annual reports of his time.

50. *Irrigation.*

318. The discharges of the Nile, at the opening of the year, were sufficient to supply all wants and, in February and March, the supply was even in excess of demand, which was lessened by the cultivators' hesitation to plant cotton, because of the low prices which it was fetching at the time. The result was that, during these months, water that would have been very useful later was passing to the sea. Towards the end of March it became apparent that the water supply would not come up to the forecast. Better discharges than in 1920 had been anticipated; it had accordingly been decided to permit the cultivation of a larger area of rice, up to 230,000 feddans, and the programme for emptying Assouan reservoir was based on this decision. As it turned out, the Blue Nile remained abnormally low until the 12th May, and meanwhile, from the end of March onwards, owing to the very gradual emptying of the reservoir, the supply was below requirements. At one time, indeed, the rice crop was endangered, and it was only owing to great exertions by the Irrigation Department that eventually no appreciable part of it was lost. In saving the rice, however, and in maintaining the cotton crop, the contents of the reservoir

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were exhausted and practically no storage water was left to help in meeting the heavy demand for irrigation in July.

319. In Upper Egypt, severe summer rotations had to be enforced on the canals in the perennial area and the supply thus economised was passed on to Lower Egypt to help towards saving the rice crop.

320. The flood, whose maximum level at Assouan was R.L. 92.29 on the 2nd September, and at Roda R.L. 18.88 on the 13th October, was sufficient to meet all the requirements of Lower Egypt without being dangerously high. In Upper Egypt an important step taken was the fixing of new dates for the admission of flood water into the basin canals. By a previous order, dating back to 1897, a common date, namely, the 10th August, had been fixed for the whole of Upper Egypt. This arrangement was changed in 1921 by an order issued by the Ministries of Public Works and Interior, after consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture. New dates were appointed, varying with different localities, and were successfully enforced. There were protests, as there are every year, from cultivators who had been late in sowing summer millet and whose fear was to see the flood water admitted to the basins before this crop had been harvested, but, as a matter of fact, none of the crop was lost. Levels at Assouan fell rapidly after the beginning of September, but the second rise, towards the end of the month, enabled the basins to be filled, and the area that could not be inundated, including land on foreshores and islands of the river, amounted to not more than 10,500 feddans.

321. Progress in the Irrigation Department's Egyptian works in Egypt was restricted by lack of funds. In the Central Delta, the year's work was mainly confined to the collection of data and the preparation of designs and estimates. Among these were the estimates and drawings for a new drainage pumping scheme at Batra. In the Western Delta, work proceeded upon the project for the improved drainage and irrigation of an area of valuable land in the neighbourhood of Aboukir. The project comprises the remodelling of the present system of canals and drains and the installation of pumps by which the drainage will be lifted direct into the sea instead of into Lake Mariut. The installation of the pumping machinery is progressing, but the field work has been delayed by shortage of money. A second and very important piece of work, which was continued in this section of the delta, was the preliminary excavation for the enlargement of the Rayah Beheira, which is one of those developments of the main canals which have become necessary in order to meet the increasing demands of irrigation. The instalment of work which it had been intended to carry out amounted to 1,890,000 cubic metres of earthwork, but this had to be reduced to 700,000 cubic metres. Preliminary work included the study of a drainage and irrigation scheme known as the Nubaria project. In the Eastern Delta, various schemes for the prevention of deterioration in cultivated land and for land reclamation have been worked up to a point at which they stand almost ready for adjudication. They are grouped under the Mansuriya, Sharkawiya and Bahr-el-Saghir systems, affecting 44,700, 17,500 and 14,300 feddans respectively. Outside the delta, preliminary studies were directed to the improvement of drainage in Middle Egypt, the conversion of the Assouan basins to perennial irrigation and the granting of various pumping concessions both in Middle and Upper Egypt. The Irrigation Department also put into effect a long-standing agreement, dating from soon after the Assouan dam was heightened, to give Upper Egypt, on the strength of the increased storage thereby provided, the right to pump water for the summer irrigation of a considerable area. The scheme was in abeyance during the war, but pumping rights have now been given over a gross area of 94,000 feddans in the neighbourhoods of Esna and Dishna.

322. The project for the Nag Hamadi barrage, which, like other capital works, has been postponed, as will be explained later, continued nevertheless to be a subject of careful study, which included examination of the question of giving free-flow irrigation to the area lying between the site of the barrage and the point at which the barrage canals will begin to command the land.

323. Another occupation of the Irrigation Projects Department in Egypt remains to be noticed, namely, the attempt to determine, by actual measurement, the water required in various classes of soil and under normal working conditions in different parts of the country. Four areas were selected in which the actual run-on or run-off could be accurately measured, and whose total area was 530,000 feddans, including two pump-irrigated areas and two served by free-flow channels. Here the crops were surveyed and the daily water consumption measured. Independently of this particular investigation, an attempt was also made to calculate canal transmission losses.

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324. In addition to these experiments, the Director of the Delta Barrage continued the successful series of refinements in the measurement of the Nile's discharge that have been in progress for several years. The remarkable experiments at Assouan, which still continue, are referred to later in the section dealing with the Physical Department.

325. The report on the Assouan power scheme, which was referred to in last year's report, was duly prepared and presented to the Council of Ministers, but this most useful project is still in suspense. It may involve the concession of important rights to a commercial concern able to manufacture and market artificial fertilisers, and it was felt that, until the administration of the country was in a more settled state, the final consideration of this question might be temporarily postponed.

326. Of the total sum of £E. 1,030,000 granted in the budget for new irrigation works, £E. 400,000 were allotted to the operations upon the White Nile (or Gebel Aulia) dam. This important work, which is now suspended, has suffered since the beginning of the war from repeated interruption and delay. In 1919 the project was like other undertakings affected by the slowness that was everywhere experienced in the resumption of civil works upon a large scale, and in addition, the disturbed state of Egypt at that time was prejudicial to an undertaking of the kind. In 1920 it was thought advisable to cease constructional work upon the dam for several months in order to satisfy public opinion, which had been led to believe that it was an undertaking which might be disadvantageous, and even dangerous, to Egypt. To examine the grounds of this belief and, if possible, dispel it was one of the objects of the Nile Projects Commission which was appointed that year. It was while they were deliberating that work was stopped, and it was not until midsummer that, upon the issue by the commission of a favourable interim report, the order could be given for work to proceed. In 1921, the rise of prices, both of material and labour, had reached such a point that a new estimate of costs was made: this amounted to £E. 6,512,750 as against the previous estimate of £E. 2,500,000. Expenditure since 1917, when the work effectively began, already amounted to £E. 597,500, but, notwithstanding this, it was felt that there was no option but to postpone operations, and this was ordered by a Decision of the Council of Ministers on the 25th May. It may be remarked that, even at these greatly enhanced prices, the cost rate of the water supplied from the White Nile reservoir would have been less than that from the reservoir at Assouan, the former being designed to supply 4,000 million cubic metres of water and estimated to cost £E. 6,500,000; the latter supplying 2,340 million cubic metres and having cost over £E. 4,750,000.

327. Two other considerations, however, besides the bare fact of the increase in cost, influenced the decision to stop the work. The first was that, coupled with the estimate already quoted, was an estimate for other undertakings, forming one group with the dam, and which, added to the cost of that work, brought the total proposed expenditure up to £E. 12,000,000. This provided in particular for the construction of a barrage at Nag Hamadi. The scheme for such a barrage has always been associated with the project for the Gebel Aulia dam, as it will be required in order to enable the storage water provided by the dam to be used for the purpose of converting an area of Upper Egypt from basin to perennial irrigation. Greater insistence was now, however, laid upon the fact that it would not be possible to regard such a barrage as a luxury which might wait until the Gebel Aulia dam had been completed, the new storage water being used meanwhile to relieve sundry urgent demands for larger supplies. On the contrary, it was urged that the barrage and the dam must be built at the same time, because, by the withdrawal of water from the river in flood annually required to fill the reservoir, the levels of the river at that time would be lowered, and this lowering would, if the flood were not a good one, adversely affect the flood crops in the Upper Egypt basins. This question might have been further examined at the time, had there not been a second consideration, which made continuance of the work inadvisable: this was that it seemed inadvisable to proceed further with the damming of the Nile within Soudan territory at a moment when the local political situation was so indeterminate. The attacks upon this and other schemes, to which reference was made in the last report, were finally disposed of early in 1921 by the verdict of a jury at the Cairo Consular Court, but apart from this it was realised that the fact that the Gebel Aulia dam would be outside the boundaries of Egypt placed it in a peculiar position, and the Nile Projects Commission in 1920 actually recommended that, in the future, questions relating to the distribution of the supply of the Nile should be referred to a joint board representing the various national interests concerned.

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328. It can hardly be doubted that, sooner or later, the storage water which the Gebel Aulia reservoir has been intended to provide will have to be obtained. The population of Egypt continues to grow rapidly, and even now a low flood entails serious hardship. It is almost certain, for instance, that the 1922 summer water supply, even with the help of the Assouan reservoir, will be insufficient to allow of any rice at all being grown in the country. Meanwhile, the vital problem of what should be done, under the present financial conditions, in regard to the plans for increasing storage as well as for developing and extending the irrigation and drainage systems is not being neglected, and in the autumn the Government was very fortunate in securing the services of Mr. C. E. Depuis for the purpose of investigating this question. Mr. Depuis, who was formerly Adviser to the Ministry and who retired in 1912, has long experience of irrigation in India, in Egypt and in the Soudan, and it is confidently expected that his advice will indicate the best means of satisfying the irrigation requirements of the country under the present circumstances. He is at the same time investigating what administrative means can be devised that will most conveniently enable the Ministries of Finance, Public Works and Agriculture to combine in prosecuting the further development of Egyptian cultivation.

329. The work which the Ministry of Public Works has been carrying out on the Blue Nile on behalf of the Soudan Government, and which consists in the construction of a dam at Makwar and the canalisation of the Gezira, suffered from the same heavy increase in prices as affected the works at Gebel Aulia. The estimate on which the works were being carried out was £E. 2,350,000 for the dam and £E. 1,150,000 for the canalisation, or a total of £E. 3,500,000. This had to be increased to E. 5,692,400 for the dam and £E. 2,560,400 for the canalisation, or a total of £E. 8,252,800. On the 25th May the Council of Ministers, in taking the decision to interrupt the works on the Gebel Aulia dam, expressed themselves in favour also of the suspension of work upon the Sennar dam, and added that, should the Soudan Government, nevertheless, wish to go on with that undertaking, it would remain understood that it should not, without further consideration, serve to irrigate a greater area than 300,000 feddans. The Soudan Government decided to continue the work, which, however, after expert inspection was temporarily suspended in March 1922.

51. *State Buildings.*

330. The most important piece of business in which the State Buildings Department was interested during the year was connected with the new hospital and medical school to be built in Cairo in replacement of Kasr-el-Aini Hospital and School. It had been decided to hold a public international competition for this undertaking, and architects were accordingly invited to submit designs for a preliminary selection. Sixty-six competitors responded, of whom forty-one were British, seven French, six Swiss, three Egyptian, three American, two Italian, one German, one Finnish, one a Spaniard and one a Swede. Mr. J. W. Simpson, past president of the Royal Institute of British Architects, was good enough to visit Egypt and act as assessor in the competition. The six successful competitors, of whom five are British and one is French, have been invited to compete in the final stage of the competition with six selected architects of repute, three British, two French and one American. The designs in the final competition will be submitted next October.

331. Financial restrictions prevented as much building by the department as would otherwise have been undertaken; the staff was, however, able to make up arrears of designing which had accumulated during the war, and the following work of importance was actually done: extensions to Khanka Asylum, costing £E. 79,800; additions to the Cairo School of Medicine, costing £E. 37,850; central laboratories for the Department of Public Health at a cost of £E. 32,900; and a new Veterinary School at Giza, costing £E. 24,300.

52. *Cairo City Service.*

332. The approximate total expenditure of the Cairo Tanzim Department during the year was £E. 354,000 as against £E. 576,000 in 1920. The reduction is largely explained by there having been included in last year's account a special sum of £E. 162,000 for the purchase of the site of the new Cairo Hospital, to which reference has been made above. A total sum of approximately £E. 170,000, inclusive of transport, was expended on maintenance of roads and gardens as against £E. 162,000 in 1920.

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333. An extensive programme of paving in the narrow streets in the older quarters of the city and of extending macadam in developing areas suffered heavily owing to financial restrictions. Meanwhile experiments in substituting bitumen for tar for road surfacing gave promise of success, and are especially interesting because bitumen can be obtained locally from the distillation of crude Egyptian oil. During the year the department acquired a laboratory equipped with means of keeping a constant check on the pressure, heating powers and purity of the city gas supply, as also with photometric apparatus of great value in the regular testing of new and improved types of lamps, both gas and electric. The department's control over various companies of public utility necessitated its intervention in labour problems, which at one time became very prominent owing principally to economic conditions, although partially caused by political unrest. The establishment of boards of enquiry, on which a delegate of the department takes an active part, has proved beneficial in helping to avert strikes.

334. With regard to town planning, a considerable advance has been made in the preliminary investigations essential to a well-established scheme of development. The results have been carefully incorporated in civic survey diagrams and plans. Not only has the trend of the modern development of the city of Cairo been considered, but also its history and growth in the past.

53. *Antiquities.*

335. The question of enabling the Department of Egyptian Antiquities not only to return to pre-war activity, but considerably to enlarge the scope of its operations, has been the subject of careful consideration by the Ministry of Public Works. It is hoped that it will be possible to give effect to the department's plans in 1923. Meanwhile the Director-General of Antiquities is engaged upon the preparation of a programme which will accompany his request for larger grants. These are intended to provide for an increase in the staff which is employed in protecting antiquities in Egypt and in supervising excavation on ancient sites, particularly the digging and removal by the fellahen of rubbish for manure (a long established practice which it would be impossible to prohibit and which, under careful observation, is even of advantage in disengaging sites without expense to the State), and for the excavation, on a tolerably large scale, of those sites which the Government reserves the right to open up itself.

336. During the year excavation was resumed upon the two important sites of Karnak and Saqqara, which had been closed down during the war. At the former site, in addition to ordinary work of consolidation, the plans are being reconstituted and the great avenue of pylons, which leads from the temple of Amon to the temple of Mout, is being cleared. At Saqqara the dependencies of the pyramid of Teti are being cleared, and the plan of the site stands out plainly. The exterior part of the great Mastabas of the VIth dynasty, hitherto unknown, has also been disclosed; the pits of these tombs, which possess a certain novelty in their arrangement, have been emptied and were found to contain various objects of interest. At Dendera the great "Birth Temple," dating from the time of Augustus, has been completely cleared. The anterior half of the temple had been demolished by Christian hands and the materials used again in the construction of a basilica, of a remarkable type, which is well preserved. Private excavation has everywhere been nearly as active as ever and has been prolific of results. It is sufficient here to mention the discovery by Mr. Winlock, working for the Metropolitan Museum, New York, at Deir-el-Bahari, of a sarcophagus of the XIth dynasty, covered with paintings and sculptures in an excellent state of preservation.

337. The Antiquities Department is preparing to publish the results of its own recent excavations. This publication, however, as well as the continuation of the General Catalogue, of which sixty-five volumes have been published up to the present, is retarded by the high cost of printing. The rearrangement and redecoration of the Egyptian Museum have been in progress for some time, and promise to result in a notable and much-desired improvement.

54. *Mechanical Department.*

338. The Mechanical Department are able to record a large increase in the number of inspections of engines, which means an advance in the degree of public safety that is maintained in Egypt; the number of inspections in 1920 was 5,463; in

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1921 it was 8,886. The Government pumping stations for irrigation or drainage worked uneventfully, except for temporary interruption by two breakdowns, one at Mex and one at Atf. This latter station is in process of being equipped with new machinery, replacing some very interesting old steam plant driving large scoop-wheels, which has, however, gradually become inefficient; nine new internal combustion units were in use this year for the first time. A similar replacement of machinery is under consideration at Kassassine. The installation of the machinery at the new pumping station at Aboukir is well in hand; reference has already been made to the project of which this station forms a part. The Shubra research works, which the Government had opened during the war to assist economy in fuel consumption, were closed down and the plant disposed of.

55. *Main Drainage Department.*

339. The Main Drainage Department found their work of extending the system of sewers in Cairo hampered, like the work of other services, by lack of money, but succeeded in laying 15 kilom., while private enterprise, profiting by lower prices of materials, was active in connecting houses to the new drains. Trouble has been caused by the action of sulphuretted hydrogen upon the large concrete sewers, and the matter is being investigated by a committee of engineers and chemists. Important provincial works include progress on the drainage of Mansura and Suez, and in either town part of the system has now been brought into operation. The scheme for Tanta has been retarded for financial reasons. A scheme for the drainage of the new quarter of Port Said on the east of the Canal is under consideration, and the department has been consulted regarding the drainage of Jerusalem. The carrying out of sundry schemes for Government Departments and for the Anti-Malaria Commission and the inception of a survey for the improved sanitation of all State buildings complete the record of the year's work.

340. It is to be hoped that the large centres of population throughout Egypt will take further advantage of the presence in the country of the chief engineer of the Main Drainage Department and his staff of experts, and that the great improvement they have introduced and are still introducing in the capital may be widely imitated.

56. *Physical Department.*

341. The work of the Physical Department expanded in all sections and its premises require extending.

342. Nile gauge readings were received from eighty-one stations on the river between the equatorial lakes and the sea. Normal values for all the years during which the gauges have been read were computed and plotted on a diagram with the current year's readings so that, at every station, the current year's gauge reading and rates of rise and fall can be compared at a glance with the normal values. The readings of the most important gauges were published in the "Daily Weather Report" and in a Nile gauge diagram, which was published fortnightly during the flood season and monthly during the remainder of the year. Returns were registered from 216 rainfall stations in Egypt, the Soudan, Abyssinia, Uganda and Kenia Colony, and monthly mean and normal values computed. This was done for certain obvious geographical groups of stations as well as for the individual stations. The readings from twelve stations were published in the "Monthly Weather Report." A general supervision was exercised over river discharges; a number of existing or proposed discharge sites were inspected as far south as Mongalla and a regular series of discharges was measured on the Upper Blue Nile. The discharge computations from all the river discharge sites were checked and 226 current-meter ratings were carried out. An improved apparatus for the automatic rating of current meters, designed and manufactured by the department, was installed in a large tank at Abbasia and a considerable amount of experimental work was done.

343. The numbers of the meteorological stations controlled were 22 in Egypt, 30 in the Soudan and 17 elsewhere. All the Egyptian stations were inspected and some in the Soudan and in Palestine.

344. The "Daily Weather Report" was issued regularly containing the forecast for the following twenty-four hours. In addition, a special forecast of early morning flying conditions, based on later information, was issued to the Royal Air Force every evening during the winter and the same force were given a special daily

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weather message, to be transmitted by wireless for use in connection with the Cairo-Bagdad air route.

345. At Helwan Observatory the large telescope was used on eighty nights and 103 photographs were taken with it, most of them of nebulae. Observations for time were made on sixty-two nights. General failures of the time signal occurred twice during the year, but were not the fault of the Astronomical Service. From the 15th June, the noon gun at the citadel ceased to be fired electrically from the observatory and automatic firing has not yet been resumed. Observations of wireless time signals from Lyons were made on nineteen nights in April and May to redetermine the fundamental longitude of Egypt. The usual meteorological, magnetic and seismological observations were made, as also those of solar radiation. A new and highly sensitive Milne-Shaw seismograph was installed in November.

346. Important research work has been carried out in connection with the study of the flow of water, principally with the object of improving the accuracy of measurements of the discharge of the Nile and its tributaries. Accounts of some of this work have been published in departmental papers. The department collaborated with the resident engineer of the Assouan dam in some important work on the use of models as a means of predicting the discharge of the full scale dam, and found that, with some limitations, the discharge of the prototype could be predicted from that of its model. In continuation of previous work they were able to extend the measurement of the discharge of the Nile by means of the sluices of the dam to flood conditions. This marks an advance in the study of the hydrology of the Nile, but final results are not yet available.

57. Zoological Department.

347. Visitors to the gardens numbered 370,034 compared with 423,590 in 1920 and 396,992 in 1918, the two years with the highest numbers. The decrease in 1921, as compared with the previous year, was no doubt largely due to suspension of the tramway service by strikes, especially as these happened to coincide with holiday times. The present extent of the collection is indicated by the figures for the annual stocktaking, when 368 mammals, 855 birds, 223 reptiles, 27 batrachians and (in the aquarium) 190 fishes were registered, making a total of 1,663 individuals. The total number of forms represented is 354. An expedition to the Soudan, the first since the war, brought back a number of valuable additions to the gardens. It is reported that the Dorcas gazelle continues to hold its own both east and west of the Nile, but it should be protected from the 15th February to the 1st August, and, in certain districts, at all seasons of the year. On the other hand, the ibex and the few wild sheep that linger in Upper Egypt are in danger of extermination, and it is difficult to see how they can be preserved. The egrets (cattle egrets (*Ardea ibis*) and little egrets (*Ardea garzetta*)) are firmly re-established. The resident Egyptian hoopoe continues to increase, thanks to the protection given it by law and public opinion. Nowadays the appearance of a crocodile in Egypt is an event. In 1920 it was reported that three had been seen to pass the Assouan dam, two of which got through alive. In the same year a living specimen was caught in Upper Egypt. It is possible that this was one of the two creatures that were seen to have passed through the Assouan sluices in safety, and in 1921 the adventures of its companion may also have come to an end. For another, nearly seven feet in length, was captured by two fishermen "by means of hooks." They took it to market at Esna where it was purchased by the authorities and put on a train for Cairo in charge of a policeman.

CHAPTER V.—EDUCATION.

58. General.

348. The following tables show the attendance in January 1922 at the educational establishments of all grades, (a) under the direct management of, and (b) under inspection by, the Ministry of Education. The School of Law and the School for Cadis (which are under the Ministry of Justice), the Schools of Agriculture and the Veterinary School (which are under the Ministry of Agriculture), the Military School (under the Ministry of War) and the Police School (under the Ministry of the Interior) are not included in these statistics.

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(a.) Under the management of the Ministry of Education :—

Category of School.	Number of Schools.	Attendance.		
		Boys.	Girls.	Total.
<b>I. Vernacular schools—</b>				
Elementary schools ("maktabs") .. ..	142	10,829	10,441	21,270
Higher elementary schools .. ..	6	250	682	932
Training colleges for elementary teachers .. ..	11	582	547	1,129
Domestic schools .. ..	1	..	70	70
Trades schools and evening classes .. ..	7	1,558	..	1,558
<b>II. Europeanised schools—</b>				
Infant schools .. ..	2	272	..	272
Primary schools .. ..	39	11,382	901	12,283
Secondary schools .. ..	10	3,786	44	3,830
Technical schools .. ..	4	797	..	797
Professional colleges .. ..	5	1,268	106	1,374
Egyptian educational mission in Europe .. ..	..	49	8	57
<b>Total .. ..</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>30,773</b>	<b>12,799</b>	<b>43,572</b>

(b.) Under the inspection of the Ministry of Education :—

Category of School.	Number of Schools.	Attendance.		
		Boys.	Girls.	Total.
<b>I. Vernacular schools—</b>				
Elementary schools ("maktabs")—				
Under other Government Departments .. ..	80	2,925	617	3,542
Provincial councils .. ..	577	41,810	11,139	52,949
Private (grants-in-aid scheme) .. ..	2,962	182,623	28,372	210,995
Companies (salt and soda) .. ..	1	47	8	55
Provincial council training colleges for elementary teachers .. ..	15	719	250	969
Private domestic schools .. ..	2	..	48	48
Provincial council trades schools and evening classes .. ..	18	1,943	..	1,943
Private trades schools .. ..	6	647	215	862
<b>II. Europeanised schools—</b>				
Provincial council primary schools .. ..	70	7,642	1,479	9,121
Private primary schools .. ..	98	13,231	3,934	17,165
Private secondary schools .. ..	35	5,018	..	5,018
Training school for nurses and midwives .. ..	1	..	49	49
Egyptians studying in Europe at the expense of other Departments .. ..	..	40	..	40
Egyptians studying in Europe at the expense of the Sultania Wakfs .. ..	..	2	..	2
Egyptians studying in Europe at the expense of the Fahmia Wakf .. ..	..	2	..	2
Egyptians studying in Europe at their own expense .. ..	..	617	..	617
<b>Total .. ..</b>	<b>3,865</b>	<b>257,266</b>	<b>46,111</b>	<b>303,377</b>

349. The increase in the budget for 1920-21 had led to the hope that the Ministry of Education would be able to carry out some of the more important parts of its programme of educational development which had been delayed by the war, notably the extension of the system of elementary education and the establishment of a university. But owing to the state of the Government finances in 1921 the projects of development have had to be postponed or reduced to the smallest dimensions.

350. The Ministry is thus not only precluded from providing accommodation for the ever increasing number of candidates who desire admission to Government schools and who are consequently obliged to obtain their education at schools which are often a distinctly inferior type, but has also been obliged to postpone the execution of its building programme. This matter is now of the utmost urgency. During the war building operations ceased and the needs of the moment were met by the purchase or hiring of buildings often unsuitable for their purpose, or by confining schools to premises which they had long outgrown.

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351. Moreover the existing school buildings are gravely defective. During the last few years the fabric of no less than three important boys' primary schools has collapsed, and many others have been condemned as dangerous, unhygienic, or insanitary.

352. The progress in physical education which has been a marked feature of recent years has been well maintained especially with regard to organised games; the King's Cup, which is competed for by all football teams, both military and civil, in Egypt was won in 1921 for the first time by an Egyptian team, most of the members of which had learnt their football in the schools. A swimming bath for the use of pupils and students was opened in Cairo during the year and is very much appreciated.

353. The Boy Scout movement continues to make progress among Egyptian boys, and was much stimulated by the visit of Sir Robert Baden Powell to Egypt in April 1921. In accordance with his recommendations it has been arranged to send one of the Egyptian scoutmasters to attend a course at the special training centre in England in 1922 in order that the recognised methods of training may be understood and followed in Egypt.

354. The year 1921 was remarkable for the number of school strikes. Discipline in the schools (particularly the secondary schools) has been seriously undermined; and great firmness will be required for a considerable period to restore a spirit of orderliness.

355. The higher schools, however, with few exceptions have been less affected by strikes than in the preceding year, while the primary schools for boys, except those which have been attacked by street mobs, have worked regularly without interruption.

356. By far the most persistent strikers have been the pupils of the secondary schools. There is no doubt that the strikes in secondary schools have been to a very great extent due to agitators from outside, who have represented the school strike as a patriotic duty. To a certain extent, however, the strike has become a means by which the boys show their disapproval of any school regulation which interferes with their complete freedom.

357. In order to avoid the closing of schools or dismissal of pupils on a large scale, the Ministry of Education is proposing to obtain powers to levy "caution money" from boys who have taken part in a strike as a condition of being allowed to resume their studies. Such boys would be required to deposit a certain sum of money as a guarantee of good behaviour. Should they complete their school career without further misdemeanour their money would be returned to them. But any bad behaviour on their part would result in the forfeiture of the whole or part of the deposit.

59. *Elementary Education.*

358. Pending legislation to extend elementary education on the lines of the recommendations made by the commission alluded to in my last two reports, that the Ministry of Education is doing its best with the limited funds at its disposal to lay solid foundations in each branch of the elementary work: elementary training colleges for teachers of both sexes; higher elementary schools for pupils of the elementary schools who have completed the elementary course; and the elementary schools themselves. The following tables show the number of these institutions and the number of pupils under instruction:—

I.—ELEMENTARY TRAINING COLLEGES.

Authority.	Number of Colleges.		Number of Students.		
	Men's.	Women's.	Men.	Women.	Total.
1. Ministry of Education ..	5	6	582	547	1,129
2. Provincial councils ..	10	5	719	250	969
Total ..	15	11	1,301	797	2,098

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II.—HIGHER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS.

Authority.	Number of Schools.		Number of Students.		
	Boys'.	Girls'.	Boys.	Girls.	Total.
Ministry of Education ..	1	5	250	682	932

III.—ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS.

Authority.	Number of Schools.				Number of Pupils.		
	Boys'.	Girls'.	Mixed	Total.	Boys.	Girls.	Total.

(a.) *Fully organised* (following the syllabus of the Ministry of Education or one corresponding thereto).

1. Ministry of Education—							
(a.) For itself .. .. .	5	6	..	11	757	724	1,481
(b.) For Wakfs Ministry ..	57	45	5	107	7,417	7,858	15,275
(c.) For Alexandria municipality	14	9	1	24	2,655	1,859	4,514
Total .. .. .	76	60	6	142	10,829	10,441	21,270
2. Other Government administrations	13	2	65	80	2,925	617	3,542
3. Provincial councils .. .. .	245	86	246	577	41,810	11,139	52,949
4. Societies .. .. .	5	3	2	10	577	341	918
Grand Total .. .. .	339	151	319	809	65,141	22,538	78,679

(b.) *Grant-in-aid* (mostly "kuttabs," few of which follow the syllabus of the fully-organised schools).

1. Ministry of Education .. .. .	91	18	316	425	27,337	10,421	37,758
2. Provincial councils .. .. .	683	5	1,840	2,528	154,756	17,618	172,374
Total .. .. .	774	23	2,156	2,953	182,093	28,039	210,132
Grand Total .. .. .	1,113	174	2,475	3,762	238,234	50,577	288,811

359. It will be seen that the Ministry of Education maintains 11, and the provincial councils 15, of the 26 training colleges; that the Ministry of Education maintains alone 6 higher elementary schools; that of the 809 fully-organised elementary schools 142 are managed entirely, and maintained wholly or in part, by the Ministry of Education, 80 are managed and maintained by other Government administrations, 10 by societies and 577 by the provincial councils; and that, of the 2,953 grant-in-aid elementary schools, 425 are subventioned by the Ministry of Education, and 2,528 by the provincial councils. The provincial councils, finding the maintenance of the elementary training colleges increasingly burdensome from the financial point of view, are in many cases seeking to have them transferred to the Ministry of Education.

360. The general progress of all elementary training colleges is linked up with, and dependent upon, the progress of elementary schools. The total number of fully-organised schools of this class is only 809, and the lack of the funds which can alone permit of the creation of much needed elementary schools, especially in the large towns where the demand is constantly increasing, is one of the most regrettable facts in the present financial situation of the Ministry of Education. Though the Ministry is morally responsible for the provision of elementary education in governorates, it has been compelled to renounce the creation of six elementary schools; two girls' schools at Port Said and Ismailia; and four boys' schools at Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and Damietta.

361. In addition to the various branches of elementary education dealt with above, the Ministry of Education includes under the same denomination, for purposes of administration, two boys' infant schools, one in Cairo and the other in

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Alexandria. These are, in reality, preparatory schools for pupils who will ultimately enter the boys' primary schools. They possess 272 pupils, and their popularity is so great that the demands for admission cannot be met.

362. Perhaps the most significant feature of elementary education is the overwhelming number of the grant-in-aid schools. Out of a total of 3,762 elementary schools that are either under the management or the inspection of the Ministry of Education, 2,953 are grant-in-aid establishments, *i.e.*, 78 per cent. of the whole. The vast majority of these schools still hardly deserve the name; they are more accurately described as "kuttabs," in which the three R's are badly taught, the Koran more or less committed to memory, and other subjects neglected. The premises are mostly unhygienic, the equipment bad, books and materials lacking, and the staff both inadequate and incompetent.

60. Primary Education.

363. There have been no striking developments in primary education during the past school year. It was hoped that it might be possible to create in September 1921 two new primary schools, one at Shubra (Cairo) and the other at Ismailia, but funds were not available. It is probable that a new school at Shubra may be provided from other sources, and the project for the school at Ismailia is renewed for the coming session (1922-23).

364. Primary education suffers severely from the inadequacy and unsatisfactory character of the accommodation provided. Lack of funds has also prevented the development of the boarding sections anticipated in last year's report. The shortage of trained teachers continues to be a serious hindrance to the effective staffing of primary schools, whether Government or private.

365. The following table shows the number of primary schools maintained or inspected by the Ministry of Education :—

	1919-20.			1920-21.			1921-22.		
	Schools.	Classes.	Pupils.	Schools.	Classes.	Pupils.	Schools.	Classes.	Pupils.
I. Maintained—									
Ministry of Education ..	31	244	8,609	34	292	10,749	34	307	11,382
II. Inspected—									
Ministry of Wakfs ..	2	10	333	2	11	371	3	15	558
Sultania Wakfs ..	3	20	686	3	23	832	3	23	961
Provincial councils ..	34	158	3,943	53	239	6,404	58	256	7,642
Private ..	55	311	9,160	56	326	10,567	59	354	11,712
Total ..	125	743	22,731	148	891	28,923	157	955	32,255

(Of the private inspected schools, twenty-eight are Coptic foundations and two Greek.)

366. For the entrance examination to secondary schools there were 3,246 candidates, or 316 more than in any previous year. The following table gives details of the result :—

	Number of Candidates.	Passed.	Percentage Successful.
From Government schools—			Per cent.
Ministry of Education ..	1,760	929	53
Others ..	45	38	85
From provincial council schools ..	379	204	54
„ private schools under inspection ..	307	249	49
„ „ not under inspection ..	473	254	54
Private study ..	82	33	40
Total ..	3,246	1,707	53

The percentage of successes was the highest obtained since 1916. Of the successful candidates 95 per cent. actually proceeded to a secondary course.

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61. *Secondary Education.*

367. Two new Government schools were opened in 1920, one at Zagazig, and another at Mansura, resulting in the admission of about 400 new pupils. There are now eight Government secondary schools, and the number of pupils in attendance rose from 3,261 in October 1920 to 3,679 in October 1921. During the last two years there has been a total increase in numbers of 45 per cent. Another secondary school is urgently required in Cairo to remedy the overcrowding of classes, and it is also proposed to establish a school at Minia, as there is at present only one Government secondary school in Upper Egypt. When these two new schools are provided, the Ministry of Education will for the time have completed its programme for the establishment of Government secondary schools in Egypt. One third of the general total of pupils in these schools are now full boarders, and all new schools contain ample boarding accommodation.

368. The number of private secondary schools under the inspection of the Ministry increased from thirty-two to thirty-five; of these nine (with a total attendance of 3,052 pupils) provided a complete four-years' secondary course, while the remaining twenty-six (with an attendance of 1,966) provided only a partial course, in most cases one or two years leading up to the examination for the Secondary Education Certificate (Part I).

369. The schools under inspection are of varying degrees of efficiency. In a few of them the standard of efficiency is practically equal to that of the Government schools. In others the teaching and discipline still leave much to be desired, chiefly owing to the low salaries paid and to the insufficient output of teachers from the Government Training College. Very little improvement, however, can be expected in their present state unless advice is accompanied by money grants to enable governing bodies to carry out the recommendations of the Ministry's inspectors. The Ministry has requested that a credit of £E. 6,000 should be provided in the 1922 budget for this purpose. As a first step it is intended to publish a list of schools recognised as efficient, and no school will be eligible for a grant unless it has been so recognised.

370. In the following statistical table the results of the examinations held in June and September are shown:—

SECONDARY Education Certificate Examination, Parts I and II, 1921.

	Number of Candidates.	Passed.	Percentage Successful.
			Per cent.
<b>Part II—</b>			
From Government schools . . . . .	578	{ Ordinary . . . . . 400 Supplementary . . . . . 24 }	424 73
„ private schools under inspection . . . . .	353	{ Ordinary . . . . . 171 Supplementary . . . . . 11 }	182 51
„ „ not under inspection . . . . .	162	{ Ordinary . . . . . 52 Supplementary . . . . . 7 }	59 36
„ private study . . . . .	175	{ Ordinary . . . . . 44 Supplementary . . . . . 8 }	52 22
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>1,263</b>	<b>{ Ordinary . . . . . 667 Supplementary . . . . . 50 }</b>	<b>717 56</b>
<b>Part I—</b>			
From Government schools . . . . .	853	{ Ordinary . . . . . 384 Supplementary . . . . . 36 }	420 50
„ private schools under inspection . . . . .	2,034	{ Ordinary . . . . . 440 Supplementary . . . . . 71 }	511 25
„ „ not under inspection . . . . .	1,273	{ Ordinary . . . . . 380 Supplementary . . . . . 49 }	429 34
„ private study . . . . .	640	{ Ordinary . . . . . 121 Supplementary . . . . . 18 }	139 21
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>4,800</b>	<b>{ Ordinary . . . . . 1,325 Supplementary . . . . . 174 }</b>	<b>1,499 31</b>

62. *Female Education.*

371. The remarkable increase in the number of applications for admission to all types of girls' schools has been maintained.

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*Elementary Schools.*

372. The number of girls in attendance in elementary schools belonging to the Ministry or under inspection increased from 46,409 in 1920 to 50,362 in 1921. It is evident from the steady growth in the number of pupils that the parents of the poorer classes are becoming alive to the advantages which their daughters gain from school life, and that the former prejudice against education is disappearing. This is particularly noticeable in the larger towns. In Upper Egypt the prejudice still lingers.

373. The following figures show the increase of pupils in the elementary schools which are managed by the Ministry of Education :—

	Girls' Schools.		Mixed Schools.	
	Number of Schools.	Number of Pupils.	Number of Schools.	Number of Girls.
Wakfs elementary schools—				
1920 .. .. .	51	7,690	6	214
1921 .. .. .	51	8,378	5	204
Alexandria municipality schools—				
1920 .. .. .	9	1,729	1	43
1921 .. .. .	9	1,792	1	67

374. Owing to financial stringency no new schools have been opened, but whenever opportunity has occurred larger premises have been rented and the number of classes increased. The schools are now full to overflowing and number of pupils are refused admission every month owing to lack of space. Much has been done to improve the equipment and staff of these schools. There are now 221 qualified women teachers employed in them compared with 185 in 1920.

375. The provincial councils have been active in increasing the educational facilities for girls. Five new girls' schools have been opened, making a total of eighty-six schools, attended by 7,592 pupils in 1920. In addition, 2,451 girls attend mixed schools compared with 2,100 in the previous year. The increase in the number of students who have completed the course of study in the women's elementary training colleges has enabled the provincial councils to improve the staff of these schools, though difficulty is still experienced in finding women teachers who are willing to go to the smaller towns and villages.

376. There are 408 girls in attendance in schools maintained by the Ministry of Communications, Frontier Districts Administration and other Government Departments, as compared with 333 in 1920.

377. The number of girls in the elementary schools which receive a grant either from the Ministry of Education or from the provincial councils increased from 26,708 in 1920 to 28,374 in 1921. Very few of these schools can be considered efficient.

*Higher Elementary Schools.*

378. The number of girls in the higher elementary schools maintained by the Ministry increased from 656 in 1920 to 682 in 1921. Additional schools of this type are urgently needed, but the proposal to open one in Alexandria and another in Cairo has been abandoned owing to lack of funds.

*Elementary Training Colleges.*

379. The successful development of the girls' higher elementary schools, in which a three-years' course of study, with domestic science as one of the principal subjects, is followed, has produced a more advanced type of recruit for the women's elementary training colleges. Until three years ago all candidates for these colleges were drawn from the elementary schools, and their state of preparation for a training course was very inadequate. Now practically all the students of the two women's training colleges originally belonging to the Ministry are recruited from the higher elementary schools. The standard of education and of technical training is naturally being considerably raised, and it will soon become possible to abolish the old three-years' course and substitute for it a two-years' technical training course open to candidates who have completed courses of four years in the elementary schools and

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three years in the higher elementary schools. The change, however, can immediately affect only the two women's training colleges in Cairo and Alexandria; the training colleges in the provinces must continue on a lower scale of attainment until the provincial councils are able to take up the question of girls' higher elementary schools.

380. There are 547 students in the six elementary training colleges belonging to the Ministry compared with 587 in 1920. The number of students taking a two-years' supplementary course at Bulak Training College after passing the elementary teachers' certificate examination has increased from fifty-eight in 1920 to eighty-nine in 1921. The number of students in the five elementary training colleges belonging to the provincial councils shows a slight increase, 250 girls being in attendance in 1921 compared with 235 in 1920.

*Primary Schools.*

381. It was found impossible to carry out the plan for the establishment of two new schools in 1921, but a certain amount of extra accommodation was obtained, and the attendance increased from 842 in 1920 to 901 in 1921.

382. There are twelve girls' primary schools managed by the provincial councils, of which the total attendance increased from 1,347 in 1920 to 1,479 in 1921.

383. There has also been a marked increase in the provision of facilities for girls' primary education by private initiative, chiefly due to the establishment by the Ministry of a system of grants-in-aid for the encouragement and assistance of these schools, which have increased from twenty-five in 1920 with 2,863 pupils to thirty-two in 1921 with 3,913 pupils. Many of these schools are markedly inefficient. As regards equipment and, to some extent, buildings, it is hoped that the grants-in-aid given by the Ministry to approved schools will effect considerable improvement, but a greater difficulty will be to find a sufficient supply of well-qualified women teachers.

384. The number of trained teachers provided by the Sania Training College is hardly sufficient to staff the Government schools. The attendance is at present 107, and the classes are being doubled, while efforts are being made to increase the number of applicants for admission by the establishment of a certain number of free places in the Government girls' primary schools. But it will be necessary to extend considerably the facilities for training women teachers before anything like a sufficient supply for the needs of the whole country is forthcoming.

*Secondary Schools.*

385. The secondary school for girls, opened in October 1920, is developing, and now comprises two years of secondary study attended by forty-three pupils as against twenty-eight during the previous year. The supply of pupils is necessarily rather limited, and the progress of the school is seriously hindered by the lack of boarding accommodation, which would greatly extend the influence of the school and at the same time provide a much needed addition to the school buildings. With a view to providing Egyptian women teachers for specialised work in the secondary school and in training colleges, eight girl students are now undergoing further courses of study in England. Of these, three are preparing for the qualification of the National Froebel Union, three for a teaching diploma in general subjects, one for a domestic science qualification, and one is following a special course in physical training.

386. The medical inspection of girls' schools has been very much extended during the year and nearly 20,000 girls in the various categories of schools have now been brought under the regular supervision of the medical inspectorate of the Ministry. This denotes a great advance in a most important department of female education. At the same time a complete individual physical record has been established for the pupils of all classes of schools except higher elementary schools and elementary schools, and this record is kept up to date throughout the pupil's school career.

*63. Technical, Industrial and Commercial Education.*

387. The development of the School of Engineering which took place in 1920 in order to meet the anticipated demands of other departments for engineers of all types has inevitably resulted in the overcrowding of the existing premises, and extended laboratory and workshop accommodation is urgently required, though an increase in the staff has made it possible to deal with the situation more or less satisfactorily while the additional students are still in the preliminary stage of their training.

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388. One of the most important features in the development of the department during recent years has been the growth of evening commercial classes. This form of education had received little attention in the past, but it has now been extended beyond the large towns to many provincial centres. The possibility of concluding the classes in centres distant from Cairo or Alexandria depends on the presence of suitable instructors, and they have hitherto only been started in provincial towns, where the services of graduates of the higher or intermediate school of commerce were available. The provincial councils are anxious to promote these classes, and five new centres have been established during the past year.

389. During the past fifteen years trades schools, most of them comprising sections for four or five trades, have sprung up all over the country, chiefly in the Mudiria towns; they are conducted with reference to the special needs of the district in which each school is situated.

390. The year 1921 saw the retirement of Mr. Sidney H. Wells, C.B.E., to whose direction the department was entrusted on its foundation in 1907. Mr. Wells's health had been failing for some time past. The remarkable development of technical education during the last fifteen years is almost entirely due to his initiative and ability and to his untiring devotion to his work.

64. *School of Medicine.*

391. During the year the following diplomas were granted:—

Medical : 54, as compared with 15 last year.

Pharmacy : 5.

Nurses : 12.

392. The normal output of graduates has thus been resumed, though the loss of time to students caused by the strikes of 1919 remains irreparable. Owing to the increased accommodation and staff, it has been possible to admit 100 new students of medicine and 24 of pharmacy, as compared with 50 and 10 which have hitherto been the maxima. At the end of December 1921 there were present:—

Medical students : 328, as compared with 268 in 1920.

Pharmacy students : 49, as compared with 39 in 1920.

Four students were sent to England for post-graduate study in nervous diseases, urology, pathology and botany respectively. There are now seven medical students maintained in England by the Ministry for post-graduate study. The staff of the school was strengthened by the appointment of lecturers in anatomy and pharmacology, an assistant physician for skin diseases and a prosector in the Department of Anatomy, besides extra demonstrators and *préparateurs*.

393. The chief change which took place in the school during the year was the erection of the new laboratories and students' club. The old students' club and adjoining rooms have been converted into a block of physics laboratories, and a large new chemical laboratory has been erected, together with a lecture theatre and research rooms. As a result of these changes it is now possible to teach physics and chemistry to nearly 200 students. This, with the extension of the biological laboratories, has made it possible to double the entry of the medical school, more than to double that of the school of pharmacy, and at the same time to take over the science teaching of the Sultania Training College. This constitutes a remarkable advance in the teaching of science in Egypt. The Anatomy Department has also been rebuilt on an extended scale, so as to accommodate twice the number of students, and a beginning has been made with the museum. The students' club is an entirely new building of two storeys, containing dining, recreation, lecture and reading rooms, together with kitchens, lavatories and other offices. The dining room seats 100, and the internal arrangement is controlled by sub-committees of students under a general committee which includes some members of the Egyptian staff.

394. Under the new scheme for clinical work all the members of the clinical staff have now definite teaching duties, and the first students under the new curriculum will reach the wards in January 1922. A very satisfactory development is that twenty-nine qualified medical men are attending the practice of the hospital unpaid, with great benefit both to themselves and the teaching. This is the first time that post-graduate work has been carried out on any considerable scale, and it only needs the formation of a university to enable it to be converted into a course for higher degrees.

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395. Mr. J. W. Simpson, late president of the Royal Institute of British Architects, came to Egypt in December to act as assessor in the first stage of the architectural competition for the preparation of plans and designs for the proposed new hospital and medical school. Over sixty plans were submitted by competitors from most of the civilised countries of the world.

396. The completion of the laboratory for experimental physiology has enabled a complete course to be carried out for the first time in this subject, and a considerable amount of research work was carried on by the school staff during the year.

65. *Higher Training Colleges.*

397. In view of the recent decline in the number of students of the Sultania Training College, and of the growing demand for teachers, it was decided in 1921 to abolish fees in the hope of attracting larger numbers of students. The immediate result was that the number of students admitted in October 1921 was 59, as compared with 28 in 1920 and 18 in 1919. The first set of students to complete the new four years' course established in 1918 will pass out of the college in May 1922, and should in many ways be much better equipped technically than their predecessors. More attention is now being given to physical training and most students are qualified to teach Swedish drill and games. Scoutmasters' classes have also been started in the college; these are voluntary, but a large number of students have taken advantage of them.

398. As explained in the report for 1920, the Nasria Training College (for sheikhs who teach the Arabic language and cognate subjects) was reorganised in the autumn of that year and its former name, Dar-el-Uloom, was restored to it. The new conditions comprised (1) the creation of a preparatory school, in which foreign languages are replaced by an extended course in Arabic and other subjects; (2) a higher college course of four years corresponding in level of attainment to that of the other higher colleges. As a result of the new system, pupils of the preparatory school will in 1922 for the first time sit for the Secondary Education Certificate Examination (Part I); they will undergo the same examination as the secondary school candidates, with the exception that English and translation will be replaced by Mahomedan religion and jurisprudence. The number of classes in the college has increased during the past year from twelve to fourteen, whilst the total number of students shows a slight decrease, having fallen from 357 to 350. The comparison of the two types of students stands as follows:—

Category.	1921.	1920.
Preparatory school ... ..	101	60
Higher college ... ..	249	297
Total ... ..	350	357

399. The Sania Training College for women teachers is referred to under the heading "Female Education."

66. *State University.*

400. The University Commission completed its work and prepared its final report in June 1921. A summary of the main proposals of the commission for the establishment of a State University appeared in my report for the year 1920. The commission contemplated the starting of the intermediate courses in October 1921, and submitted a scheme with this object to the Minister of Education in March 1921 for consideration by the Superior Council of Education. Owing to the political situation, however, the Government found it impossible to devote the time necessary for the consideration of the scheme, and the inauguration of the courses had to be abandoned. The publication of the completed report of the commission has also been postponed.

67. *Egyptian Students in Europe.*

401. During 1921 the number of Egyptian students in Europe showed a slight increase on the numbers for 1920, and was fully up to the average of the years preceding the war. In addition to the fifty-seven Government students (fifty-six in England and one in Germany) maintained by the Ministry of Education, the

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Ministries of Public Works, Justice, Agriculture and Finance have sent students to Europe for specialised training to meet the needs of their services and to provide that as far as possible technical posts may be filled by Egyptians rather than Europeans. There are at present nineteen Public Works engineers in England specialising in various branches of engineering; eleven students of the Ministry of Justice are following a course of law (five in England and six in France), six students of the Ministry of Agriculture are specialising in England, and three students of the Ministry of Finance are working for a Degree in Economics in England. In addition the Ministry of Agriculture maintains three students in America for special courses. The King is also maintaining in England at his own expense two students to be trained for teaching posts in the Royal Wakfs Schools. The "Fahmia Educational Mission," endowed from a Wakf established by Ali Bey Fahmi, has also sent two students to England for post-graduate study.

402. By the end of the year arrangements had been made for the appointment of a Sub-Director of the Egyptian Educational Office in England, with a special knowledge of engineering, in order to facilitate the placing of the engineers sent to England by the Ministry of Public Works with suitable firms, and in general to maintain more effective control over their studies. It is anticipated that the number of these students will be largely increased in 1922.

403. The number of Egyptian students in Europe at the end of 1921, as compared with 1920, was as follows:—

	United Kingdom.	France	Switzerland.	Belgium.	Italy.	Germany.	Total.
1920—							
Government students ..	66	1	..	..	..	..	67
Private students—							
Supervised ..	236	196	31	2	126	..	591
Unsupervised ..	39	24	11	..	..	..	74
Total ..	341	221	42	2	126	..	732
1921—							
Government students ..	89	6	..	..	..	1	96
Private students—							
Supervised ..	229	248	44	1	95	..	617
Unsupervised ..	37	38	11	1	..	..	87
Total ..	355	292	55	2	95	1	800

The number of Egyptian private students in Germany and Austria is not given as it is impossible to form a reliable estimate. The greater increase of private students in France as compared with England is due to the fact that admission to the universities was more easily obtained in the former country, the number of vacancies at the universities and medical schools in England allotted to foreign students since the war having been greatly restricted owing to the crowded state of these institutions.

68. Royal Library.

404. The contents of the Royal Library have been increased during the year from 94,000 to 100,850 volumes, 5,207 volumes having been added to the Oriental section and 1,643 to the European. These additions include benefactions in the shape of the private libraries of the late Said Ahmed-el-Husseini Bey, Dr. Mohammed Elwi Pasha and Ali Rida Bey, which have been presented to the library. They also include twelve photographed MSS., ten from the Bibliothèque nationale of Paris and two from the British Museum, obtained by the director during his visit to Europe in 1920. The use made of the library by the public continues to extend, the number of books lent for reading in the library having risen from 34,385 to 35,188, and the number borrowed for home reading from 11,510 to 12,283, while the number of visits paid to the reading rooms increased to 35,986 in 1921, as compared with 32,076 in 1920 and 18,089 in 1919. The Royal press has been transferred from the Government press to the library, and has begun the task of printing an abridged Arabic catalogue of the library up to date. In accordance with the proposals made by his Excellency Gaafar Wali Pasha, arrangements are being made to value the

scattered estates, which form the endowment of the library, with a view to exchanging them for a single Government estate, which would admit of being more economically administered.

CHAPTER VI.—INTERIOR.

69. *Public Security.*

405. The disturbed state of the political atmosphere has been reflected in the criminal statistics. Murder and robbery increased to an alarming extent after the riots of 1919, and the succession of incidents during the last three years has prevented a return to normal conditions. During the last six months, however, the population has been more orderly and officials have shown more interest in their work. If the comparative political peace now reigning (April 1922) continues, there is little doubt that the criminal statistics for the current year will be more satisfactory. Tables of crime will be found in the chapter on "Justice."

406. For some time it has been realised that in the provinces many crimes which remained unproved might have been cleared up had sufficient attention been paid to them, or a special officer, unencumbered by the routine work of a markaz, or an outpost delegated to work at such cases and nothing else. As an experiment a small office has been formed in the Public Security Department, which has devoted itself especially to following up important crimes by delegating an officer to work with the provincial authorities, to breaking up gangs of well-known criminals and to the capture of persons wanted. The office has already proved its value in all these matters. Several important crimes have been proved and sentences obtained by its assistance, while criminal gangs in Behera and Beni Suef have been broken up and their leaders captured, and a very large number of persons wanted, many of them for life sentences, have been brought to book.

407. It is intended to enlarge this office so that a special detective officer may be available for each mudiria, keeping in Cairo at the same time a "mobile brigade" ready to deal with organised crime in the provinces wherever it may assume serious proportions. To be a real success however, this system requires the loyal and interested co-operation of mudirs, the majority of whom fail at present to realise how important a part of their duties consists in public security work.

408. The ghaffir force, which is the real provincial police force, is now composed of nearly 50,000 men. At present their pay on the whole is reasonably good and a fair average of recruiting has been obtained, but in some mudirias the pay is still too low considering the amount of work which the ghaffirs have to do and its dangerous nature. The ghaffir force is paid locally, and the "ghaffir cess" is one of the most unjust taxes in the country. It is levied on each village, and falls with greater weight upon the poor than upon the rich. Moreover, the mudiria councils fix what the total amount of salaries of ghaffirs in each mudiria is to be, and there is consequently no uniformity of tax as between mudirias.

409. Laws and regulations prepared in the Permit Office of the Public Security Department have included amendments to the legislation on dangerous and unhealthy establishments, amendments to the public establishments law and a draft law on betting. The most important law dealt with by the Permits Department is that of unhealthy and dangerous establishments. The present amendments to the law are designed to remove the chief drawback to the present system, that when once a dangerous establishment is issued with a permit, the place is subjected to little or no inspection, there being no staff of technical inspectors at the disposal of the Ministry.

410. A close watch has been kept for some years back on licences for selling alcoholic liquors. During the year only one licence has been granted.

411. A committee under the Director-General of Public Security was appointed early in the winter to study questions relating to the flash point, storage, transport and importation of petroleum and petroleum products.

70. *Police.*

412. The police have been severely taxed during the year, especially in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, and also to a considerable extent in several of the provinces, by the frequent occurrence of political unrest leading to demonstrations, often of a dangerous nature.

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413. Cairo has been in an almost continuous state of political effervescence, and the same may be said of Alexandria. In both cities the police have been severely tried and have suffered considerable casualties at various times at the hands of the mob. In Port Said and in the provinces the visit of the British Labour Members of Parliament and Saad Pasha Zaghlul's trip to Upper Egypt threw much arduous work upon the police, and demonstrations of a more or less serious nature have occurred at other times, more particularly at Port Said and at Tanta, which is usually a centre of disaffection.

414. On the whole, the police force throughout the country, and more particularly in the cities, has done extremely well and have shown a spirit of discipline and *esprit de corps* singularly uncontaminated by the powerful political influences which have been so evident throughout the country. The Cairo police in particular, and especially the guard company, which constitutes the only striking force in the hands of the commandant in case of serious trouble, have come through the ordeal with great credit.

415. The provincial police, under the Egyptian commandants, have done well on the whole. It must be remembered that a considerable proportion of the population is hostile to the police, and the vast bulk of the remainder is apathetic and at no time ready to render the slightest assistance to the guardians of law and order.

416. The strength of the city police in Cairo and Alexandria in 1921 was as follows:—

Cairo—			
European officers	...	...	31
Egyptian officers	...	...	102
European head constables and constables	...	...	131
Egyptian n.c.o.'s., constables and men	...	...	2,926
Alexandria—			
European officers	...	...	29
Egyptian officers	...	...	60
European head constables and constables	...	...	199
Egyptian n.c.o.'s., constables and men	...	...	1,337
Artisans	...	...	26

71. *Police School.*

417. In January 1921 there were forty-nine second-year cadets and forty-eight first-year cadets in the school. Work has progressed much more satisfactorily since only candidates in possession of secondary certificates were admitted as cadets.

418. At the end of the school year in June all the second-year cadets passed out satisfactorily and all except two of the first-year cadets qualified for admission to the second year course. The new school year began in October with forty-six second-year and fifty-nine first-year cadets. The conduct of the cadets, both in class and on parade, has been excellent throughout the year.

419. In addition to the cadets, 245 conscripts were trained at the school during the year, of whom 100 were posted as foot police, 70 as mounted police and 75 as prison warders.

72. *Prisons.*

420. The daily average number of prisoners for the year 1921 was 17,117 (of whom 535 were women) compared with 17,055 for 1920.

421. The number of persons confined in the adult reformatory at the end of the year was 639, while the number of inmates of the juvenile reformatory amounted to 745, of whom 637 were boys and 108 girls. Enquiries made about habitual and juvenile offenders released from the respective reformatories during one year from July 1920 to June 1921 showed that 73 habitual offenders out of 87, 121 boys out of 140 and 40 girls out of 42 were leading honest lives.

422. The number of deaths amounted to 412, a rate of 23.1 per thousand on the average daily population against 44.6 per thousand in 1920.

423. The mortality rate is lower than it has been since 1915, but still higher than before the war. The prisons continue to be seriously overcrowded, and the results of the low diet of the poorer classes during the latter years of the war are still seen in the bad state of health of new prisoners.

424. The annual cost per prisoner on the daily average population was £E. 12.993 millièmes (£E. 19.611 millièmes in 1920 and £E. 12.922 millièmes in 1919).

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73. *Municipalities and Local Commissions.*

425. The number of mixed municipalities (13) has remained unchanged. Local commissions have increased from 49 to 52 and village councils from 12 to 14. Municipal taxes are now being paid in all places where local commissions have been established, except at Helwan and Akhmim.

426. The budgets of the seventy-nine mixed and local commissions and village councils (excluding ten village councils recently created which have not yet prepared their budgets) for the financial year 1921-22 show the following totals:—

Ordinary Budget—		£E.
Government subvention	... ..	162,681
Other resources	... ..	567,639
<b>Total</b>	<b>... ..</b>	<b>730,320</b>
Extraordinary Budget	... ..	317,916

The corresponding figures for the preceding year were:—

Ordinary Budget—		£E.
Government subvention	... ..	161,056
Other resources	... ..	479,163
<b>Total</b>	<b>... ..</b>	<b>640,219</b>
Extraordinary Budget	... ..	275,766

427. Loans, amounting in the aggregate to £E. 228,800, were granted by the Government and devoted to the following objects:—

	£E.
Lighting, Damanhur	20,000
Lighting, Bilbeis	4,400
Lighting, Zagazig	15,000
Water, Mansura	5,000
Water, Rosetta	11,000
Water, Mataria-Manzala	92,000
Water, small installations	400
Water, experimental filter	2,000
Drainage, Mansura	78,000
Tanzim works in various towns	1,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>228,800</b>

To this sum of £E. 228,800 should be added the amount lent by the Government to municipalities to enable them to pay the high cost of living allowances to municipal staff, viz., £E. 79,372.

428. In the various branches of engineering work great progress has again been made during the past year. The important filtered water supply for Mataria-Menzala, so long delayed by the war, is on the point of completion and will be put into operation almost immediately at a total cost of about £E. 148,000. The new water supplies for Akhmim and Rosetta have been completed and are now working. Small water installations have also been constructed at Abu Tig, Baliana, Kous and Maghagha, while improvements and extensions to existing plants have been carried out at Mansura, Benha, Bilbeis, Damietta and Menouf. Similar work is at present in progress at Shebin-el-Kom, Damietta, Dessouk, Kafr-el-Zayat and Sherbin. Schemes have been prepared for new and improved water supplies for Girga, Minia and Kafr-el-Zayat. The electric lighting installation at Damanhur, which was interrupted by the war, has been almost completed, and those at Zagazig and Bilbeis enlarged, while an additional plant has been ordered for Mansura. During 1921 the electric lighting installation at Helwan, which was previously the property of a company, was purchased by the local commission.

429. The drainage schemes for the towns of Mansura and Suez, which are being executed by the Main Drainage Department of the Ministry of Public Works, have made considerable progress and will very shortly be put into partial operation.

430. The architectural work done by the Municipalities Department for the provincial councils has still further increased, covering the design of new schools and other buildings and the inspection of repairs and modifications to existing ones.

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74. Alexandria Municipality.

431. The City of Alexandria Town Planning Scheme has been approved by the Municipal Commission and the Government, and has now been published. This important scheme provides a programme for the future improvement and development of the city on approved lines.

432. Tenders have been invited for the supply and erection of the pumping station at Kaid Bey for the main drainage outfall works and it is hoped that this essential work will be completed in the course of 1922. The low level main sewer has been completed and work is in course of execution for the completion of some of the main arteries of the main drainage scheme. A project has been lately carried out at Ramleh to avoid the serious inundations to which this district has been subjected for many years during heavy rains.

433. With regard to road making the efforts of the municipality have been principally directed to making good the deteriorations caused during the years of war by heavy military traffic. Notwithstanding the repairs already carried out, there still remains much to be done to bring the roads to their pre-war state. Material is still expensive and unobtainable in sufficient quantities to carry out the full programme of repairs.

434. The births in Alexandria in 1921 numbered 19,904, or 44.2 per 1,000; the deaths 13,149 or 29.2 per 1,000.

435. There were 147 deaths from typhus and 443 from typhoid and paratyphoid.

436. The budgetary estimates for 1921-22 were £E. 489,000 receipts and £E. 459,150 expenditure. From the 1st April, 1921, to the 31st December, 1921, the actual receipts amounted to £E. 382,506 and the expenditure to £E. 326,114.

437. The most important archaeological discoveries of the year are: The remnants of public baths of the Roman era at Kom Negila Awlad-el-Sheikh; very interesting prehistoric remains at Kom-el-Karainein; and a beautiful and important mosaic, certainly one of the most ancient among known mosaics, at Chatby.

438. A group of inscriptions sent by the Antiquities Service, and a number of sculpture fragments, terracottas, &c., have been classified and exhibited. The Archaeological Library has increased its collections by several hundreds of volumes. In its annual report for 1919-20, the Museum Service published a detailed review of the excavations at the Serapeum of the Anfouchy Necropolis, and of various incidental discoveries. A complete catalogue of the museum library is attached to the above report.

439. The Municipal Library which was founded in 1892 possessed on the 31st December, 1921, 29,790 volumes of which 18,042 were in the European Section, and 11,748 in the Arabic Section.

75. Provincial Councils.

440. The provincial councils called during the year 126 meetings, of which forty-nine were adjourned for want of the legal quorum, largely the result of the fact that no elections to vacancies have taken place since the outbreak of war.

441. The receipts and expenditure of the provincial councils for the year are as follow:—

	Revenue.	Economies carried forward.	Administration of Council.	Health.	Agriculture Works.	Various.	Elementary Education.	Other Education.
	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.	£ E.
Kaliubia ..	37,288	6,156	2,729	720	1,522	30	20,902	10,958
Sharkia ..	82,131	24,982	3,619	2,600	2,131	..	59,768	24,928
Dakahlia ..	64,314	2,593	5,654	2,984	1,132	..	31,258	17,369
Gharbia ..	135,969	31,046	12,733	10,852	176	2,400	69,956	18,474
Menufia ..	141,377	29,061	4,525	5,814	1,023	1,279	31,707	25,961
Behera ..	71,806	18,600	4,187	4,186	1,697	767	34,663	21,892
Giza ..	30,744	..	3,521	1,121	36	..	15,222	8,050
Fayoum ..	28,212	2,030	2,010	1,966	1,153	..	17,270	5,460
Beni Suef ..	31,768	17,379	2,294	4,927	2,042	1,000	24,097	9,395
Minia ..	43,055	37,668	4,073	2,173	2,303	393	33,584	19,215
Assiout ..	62,068	4,297	3,877	1,227	976	537	32,179	15,359
Girga ..	32,329	1,145	1,440	970	..	..	18,259	7,737
Kena ..	34,318	9,553	2,126	..	145	..	25,418	8,975
Assouan ..	7,462	1,498	579	..	..	..	6,061	1,700
Total ..	802,841	186,008	53,367	39,540	14,336	6,406	420,344	195,483

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442. Loans have been advanced by the Government to certain councils up to a total of £E. 54,178 of which £E. 49,076 have been repaid up to date, the balance being payable during the current financial year. It is proposed to discontinue the issue of loans in future, the reserve fund at the disposal of the various councils being now sufficient to enable them to discharge their current expenses.

443. The councils have during the year allotted subventions amounting to £E. 18,747 to elementary private schools, which number 2,616 and contain 132,458 pupils of both sexes. The number of elementary schools of both sexes under the direction of the councils has reached a total of 582, attended by 51,369 pupils.

444. A commission formed by the Ministry of Agriculture has recommended that the direction of schools of practical agriculture should be transferred from the provincial councils to the Ministry, grants towards maintenance being afforded by the councils. It is probable that the majority of the provincial councils will acquiesce in these recommendations, provided they are given representation on the controlling body.

445. Industrial schools maintained by the provincial councils number eleven, attended by 1,644 pupils. Commercial schools take the form of evening classes and total seven, attended by 256 pupils. Training schools now number ten for male teachers, with an attendance of 711, and five for female teachers, with an attendance of 213. The provincial councils maintain fifty-two primary schools for boys with 5,576 pupils, and twelve primary schools for girls with 1,473 pupils.

446. Children's dispensaries number ten, but the Provincial Council of Giza has been obliged from motives of economy to decide on the suppression of its dispensary. Four orphanages, 8 maternity schools, 7 ophthalmic hospitals (as against 5 last year) and 5 isolation hospitals, are maintained by the provincial councils.

447. The cotton markets which are directed by the provincial councils have been more largely patronised than in any previous year.

76. Lunacy.

448. The number of admissions to the asylums during the year was 1,126, almost the same as in the year 1920. The number of patients actually in residence at the end of the year 1921 rose from 2,195 to 2,280. The total number of cases treated in the year was 3,321. The cost of maintenance per patient per annum rose to £E. 74. The death rate rose slightly to 10.66 per cent. It was again necessary to discharge many uncured patients to make room for incoming cases.

449. During the year sixty beds were added to Abbassia Asylum by the construction of a new section for women. Buildings to hold 200 beds have also been completed at the other asylum at Khanka and will be opened in February 1922. Separate residences for seven of the medical officers have also been completed. There are now 1,841 beds in the asylum, *i.e.*, about fourteen beds per 100,000 of the population (in England 250 and in India three beds are provided per 100,000).

450. In the twenty-seven years during which lunacy administration has been under British direction, 21,000 lunatics have been admitted; the relative statistics have been compiled and will be published in the Annual Lunacy Report for 1921. In that period the cost of maintenance has amounted to £E. 1,105,000 and the cost of buildings to £E. 360,000.

451. The admission rate of Europeans resident in Egypt is approximately 3 per 10,000; that of Egyptians less than .5 per 10,000. Syrians and Armenians have an even higher rate than Europeans. The rate of admission of all races from the town of Cairo was over 4 per 10,000. If all the cases occurring (many, of course, never being certified and sent to the asylum) were included, the insanity rate in Cairo would probably differ little from that of England (6.2 per 10,000). The census of 1917 gave the total number of insane in Egypt as 14,387. No doubt there are many more.

77. Quarantine.

452. The work of the Quarantine Board of Egypt, which had been much reduced during the years of the war, has again increased during 1921. For instance, 2,078 ships have been disinfected against 1,038 in 1920; fifty-one ships deratised in 1921 against twenty-two in 1920. The sea-borne cattle trade has recommenced, and in 1921 twenty-one cattle ships were disinfected against none in 1920.

453. The receipts of the Quarantine Board are still not sufficient to cover the expenditure, and the Egyptian Government has been advancing funds to meet the

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deficit. It has therefore become necessary to revise the quarantine dues, which have not been increased for many years. The actual scale of fees was established over sixty years ago, when the maximum tonnage of ships for taxation was fixed at 875 tons.

454. The Quarantine Board has given shelter to some 300 Russian, Armenian and Turkish refugees at its subsidiary quarantine station at El Shatt (Suez). At the Gabbari Lazaret over 600 emigrants coming from Central Europe have been disinfected. These emigrants were mostly Jews on their way to Palestine.

455. The quarantine stations which had been occupied by the British military authorities, except at Kantara, have all been handed back to the board, and a grant has been made by the military authorities towards the expenses of restoring them.

456. Large new lazarets are needed at Port Said and Suez and at Alexandria, where, although the existing lazaret at Gabbari has been much improved, a more modern establishment will eventually have to be built and equipped.

457. The pilgrimage from Egypt is still small, and in 1921 consisted, apart from the escort of the Holy Carpet, of only 1,000 pilgrims. The pilgrimage from the Soudan, however, has become normal again, and 4,000 Soudanese pilgrims passed through the station at Suakim last year.

78. *Health.*

458. The reorganisation of the health services of the country, alluded to in my report for 1920, has been somewhat delayed by the political excitements of the last year. But the general recommendations of the recent Cadre Commission have foreseen a reorganisation of the Health Administration, and have been based upon a modified form of the scheme proposed by the commission which sat in 1918 to advise on the future organisation and work of the Public Health Department.

459. In Egypt, as in many other countries, there has been during the past few years a progressive and serious increase in the habitual use of narcotic and stupefacient drugs, particularly cocaine.

460. A law has been drafted, but is not yet promulgated, prohibiting the import and export of these drugs except by special licence for each consignment. It is hoped that this, combined with closer control over the local trade, will help to check the spread of the drug habit. It is difficult, however, as long as the Capitulations exist, to impose a sufficiently deterrent penalty applicable equally to Egyptians and foreigners.

461. The budgetary provision for the health services of this country for 1921-22 was £E. 742,839 as compared with £E. 720,425 in 1920-21. This does not include grants for repairs and new buildings, which are shown in the budget of the Ministry of Public Works.

*Hospitals.*

462. Government hospitals now exist in the chief towns of the various provinces, but these do not afford adequate relief for the sick in the more remote districts, and should be supplemented by the provision of a smaller type of hospital in each district or markaz. A general provision of such by the State, however, would impose too great a financial burden upon the Government, and this local need must fall to be met by local effort. As mentioned in last year's report, evidence of an increasing public interest in the provision of hospital treatment for the poor is shown by the readiness of the prominent residents in many localities to give land and money to provide hospitals and to help in collecting funds for their maintenance. The existing economic and political conditions have stood in the way of full advantage being taken of the interest thus shown, but it is in this direction that a solution of the problem of the provision of adequate sick relief to the poor throughout the country is most likely to be found.

463. Cairo is still without a lying-in hospital, but a maternity section has been added to Kasr-el-Aini Hospital, where the poorer women of the city can be attended to, and where suitable provision can be made for the practical instruction of Egyptian women who wish to take up the profession of midwifery.

464. As compared with the high standard of medical treatment in the Government hospitals, the provision made for nursing leaves much to be desired. The attendants are, generally speaking, drawn from a low class, and are ignorant and incapable of being properly trained. An attempt has been made to improve matters by the appointment of English nursing sisters to supervise the nursing, but this is

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not altogether satisfactory, and the real solution of the difficulty must be found in the provision of a higher grade of Egyptian attendant. In order that recruits may be drawn from a more intelligent and educated source, it will be necessary to offer a scale of pay considerably above that at present given. Experiments in this direction are being made at the Government hospital at Abbassia, where a certain number of high-class male and female attendants are engaged as probationers at an improved rate of pay, which is further increased when they have passed examinations in nursing.

465. The number of in-patients treated in Government hospitals in 1921 was less than in the previous year, there having been only 57,901 admissions in 1921 as compared with 62,493 in the previous year. The number of out-patients was, however, greater, for 285,983 out-patients were treated in Government hospitals in 1921 as compared with 274,557 in 1920. The hospital returns show a progressively increasing number of operations, there having been 17,370 in 1921 as against 12,797 in 1920 and 9,051 in 1919.

466. The cost of maintenance in 1921 was £E. 242,482 as compared with £E. 230,612 in 1920. The average cost of upkeep for each bed during 1921 was £E. 59.041 millièmes as against £E. 56.370 millièmes in 1920. Hospital receipts were £E. 15,299 in 1921 as compared with £E. 15,983 in 1920 and £E. 18,097 in 1919.

467. A special anthelmintic annex to the Tanta General Hospital was opened during the year, in addition to those previously established in connection with Kasr-el-Aini, Kaliub, Benha and Mansura general hospitals, for the free treatment of out-patients suffering from ankylostoma, bilharzia and other worm infections. In these annexes, 142,492 cases received treatment during the year, 31,314 being cases of ankylostoma infection and 111,030 of bilharzia. In addition, 3,581 ankylostoma and 9,890 bilharzia cases were treated in the Government general hospitals during the year. A travelling anthelmintic hospital has just been established at Shebin-el-Kom by the Provincial Council of Menufia Province, and it is to be hoped that the good example of this council will be followed by the institution of similar establishments in other provincial centres.

*Children's Dispensaries.*

468. Twelve provincial dispensaries worked steadily throughout the year, *i.e.*, at Damanhour, Tanta, Mansura, Zagazig, Shebin-el-Kom, Port Said, Giza, Fayoum, Beni Suef, Beba, Wasta and Minia. Their work as infant welfare centres is bearing fruit, but progress is necessarily slow. In spite of adverse conditions, the lack of proper water supply, the absence of any system of sanitation, and the mud-brick homes of the fellaheen, there is a noticeable improvement in the cleanliness of both mothers and children attending the older dispensaries where daily teaching has been given over a long period of years, and the dispensaries are of great value from this point of view. It is also a matter for satisfaction that the local medical practitioners are taking an increasing interest in this work; at some dispensaries they attend daily and give valuable help in the more difficult cases. The total number of attendances at the children's dispensaries in 1921 was 379,955, and the number of children receiving treatment 78,819.

469. In Cairo, useful work is carried out by charitable committees in the Mohammed Ali Dispensary at Manshia and Madbuli. The latter is a large new building finished this year and situated on the borders of the Bulac district.

*Maternity Schools.*

470. The maternity school for the training of the local midwives, established at Damanhour, Mansura, Zagazig, Shebin-el-Kom, Fayoum, Minia, Sohag and Tanta, continued working during the year and steadily gained in popularity. At Zagazig, an intern department (the first to be instituted in connection with these schools) was established during the year in an adjoining building. It comprises a large airy ward of six beds, operation room and lecture room with the usual annexes. The difficulty formerly experienced in obtaining pupils for training has greatly diminished, and some schools have now even a waiting list. The total number of midwives trained in the provincial maternity schools during the year was 160.

471. The higher efficiency taught in these schools is maintained by frequent inspection of the work of the midwives in their villages. These inspections are made by English inspecting sisters, who visited, during the year, 789 midwives in all parts of the country.

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*Ophthalmic Hospitals.*

472. One hundred and thirteen thousand new patients were treated in these ophthalmic hospitals during the year, and over a million attendances of out-patients were recorded. The number of eye-operations performed was 65,000. In a country such as Egypt, where eye diseases are extremely prevalent, and where over 95 per cent. of the population are affected with chronic trachoma, the benefits conferred by these institutions are incalculable. During the year, 15,000 patients applied for treatment who had already become blind in one or both eyes. That the work is highly appreciated is shown by the fact that there are fifteen specially built ophthalmic hospitals in the fourteen provinces, which, though maintained by the Government, have been erected and equipped by local effort. Two hospitals also are in course of construction at Qena and Giza. In addition to the ophthalmic benefits to the general population provided in these hospitals, a high standard of training is provided for the medical officers employed; and it is satisfactory to record that the ophthalmic hospitals throughout the country are now entirely staffed by highly efficient Egyptian ophthalmic surgeons working under the British director. Ophthalmic inspection and treatment of the pupils in Government school forms an important feature of the work of the ophthalmic section of the Public Health Administration.

*Communicable Diseases.*

473. The diminished incidence in the principal infectious diseases in 1920, to which allusion was made in last year's report, has been repeated to an even greater extent during the year under review. The reduction has been most marked in the case of smallpox, typhus fever and relapsing fever, of which diseases only 92, 4,476 and 1,217 cases respectively were recorded for the whole country in 1921, as compared with 3,004, 13,279 and 2,876 cases of each of these diseases in the previous year. The smallpox figures are the lowest on record for this disease, and the greatly diminished incidence is largely to be ascribed to the vaccination campaign which, begun in 1919, was completed only in 1921, and during the course of which a total of 6,000,000 persons were revaccinated. The progressive diminution of infectious disease generally in the country is in a large measure the result of improved methods of control.

474. In last year's report reference was made to the dangers attending the use of shaving brushes imported from Japan, which investigations had shown were largely infected with anthrax. The measures then in force were found to be insufficient to give reasonable security, and during the year the Public Health Administration found it necessary to have an *arrêté* issued definitely prohibiting all importation of shaving brushes manufactured in Japan. Since the imposition of this embargo, a serious effort has been made by the Japanese Government to deal with the source of danger, and in the near future it may be possible to moderate the stringency of the measures now in force.

475. During the year the occurrence in the country of several cases of *Encephalitis lethargica* rendered it necessary to include this disease in the schedule of notifiable infectious diseases.

476. No abnormal occurrence of malaria was noted during 1921, and in spite of the introduction of a considerable measure of infection through the movements of troops during the war, there has been, so far, no serious spread of the disease in the country. The incidence of malaria, however, requires careful watching, more especially since the employment of large numbers of Egyptian labourers on works in the Soudan has undoubtedly increased the possibilities of its dissemination. For the purpose of minimising the risks from this source, measures of precaution have been adopted in agreement with the Soudan Government.

*Anti-Malarial Commission.*

477. The valuable work carried out by this commission has been continued during the year, though with restricted funds. New works were confined to those districts in which they were most urgently required, namely, Derr—which was severely infected in 1919—Shellal, Kharga Oasis, Siwa and the Fayoum. For the destruction of mosquito larvæ, 160 ponds and over 700 wells were stocked with fish.

*Passenger and Immigrant Control.*

478. During the year, 114,553 passengers and immigrants from countries infected or suspected to be infected with cholera landed in Egypt. Measures of

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control and observation at their destinations were taken in the case of 106,323 of these or 92.8 per cent. The number of persons, therefore, who were lost sight of before completing their periods of observation was 8,230, a notable increase upon the proportion of such hitherto obtaining. This is to be attributed to the large number of Palestinian immigrants who, disembarking at an Egyptian port, proceed almost directly to Palestine without any notification of their departure. Arrangements have been made with the Government of Palestine to discourage the use of Egypt as a route of immigration into that country.

*Pilgrimage.*

479. The number of pilgrims from Egypt in 1921 was 2,834. As usual all were vaccinated against cholera before their departure from Suez. The size of the pilgrimage, which during the war had become greatly reduced until in 1919 only 438 pilgrims left the country, is therefore increasing, though it still falls far below the pre-war average of 13,000 persons.

480. No undue prevalence of epidemic disease during the pilgrimage was reported from the Hedjaz, though one case of cholera, in the person of a returning Egyptian pilgrim, occurred at the quarantine station at Tor.

481. In connection with the regulation prohibiting the landing in Egypt of non-Egyptian pilgrims returning from the Hedjaz to countries north of Suez, certain difficulties were experienced during the year. These arose mainly from the fact that the Governments concerned with such pilgrims had taken no steps to arrange shipping facilities for those returning from the pilgrimage. The lack of such arrangements resulted in the receipt by the public health authorities of numerous requests from various sources to agree to a suspension of the regulation. Obviously, however, if Egypt is to obtain a full measure of protection from her own arrangements, she can scarcely consent to the landing of parties of non-Egyptian pilgrims who, usually without means, would make their way slowly through the country and expose the inhabitants to the danger which the Egyptian Government make such elaborate arrangements to avoid.

482. It is highly desirable, in order that the return of non-Egyptian pilgrims should not be hindered, that the Governments concerned should make either the necessary arrangements for their direct sea transport or such financial provision as will permit of their proper supervision while on Egyptian territory and of their repatriation at the earliest possible opportunity.

483. The medical officer in charge of the Mahmal escort in 1921 has reported that facilities for the hospitalisation and treatment of sick pilgrims are practically non-existent in the Hedjaz, and that in consequence the stock of drugs which he had taken with him for the treatment of Egyptian pilgrims was exhausted on the return journey before he reached Jeddah. The Egyptian Public Health Administration has under consideration at the present moment the whole question of the provision of a properly organised service for the treatment and hospitalisation during the pilgrimage of the sick from amongst its own pilgrims, but the full benefit of a medical control furnished by a provision of this nature could only be possible if similar arrangements were made by other countries from which pilgrims proceed to the Hedjaz. A pilgrimage controlled from each country of origin on the lines of the existing Egyptian arrangements and accompanied by a medical service provided by each Government for its own nationals would do much to reduce the constant menace to the world's health resulting from the present unsatisfactory position.

484. The usual measures for the prevention of the return of Egyptian and other pilgrims by unauthorised land routes with the object of avoiding quarantine were again put in force in 1921, and desert patrols were maintained for this purpose in the Sinai Peninsula and on the Red Sea coast. Twenty-one pilgrims were intercepted by the Sinai patrols. None were found by the patrols operating on the Red Sea littoral.

*Authorisations to Practise Medicine, &c.*

485. During the year 327 authorisations were given to practise the medical or allied professions, as compared with 376 during 1920. Of the persons licensed, 197 were doctors, 32 were pharmacists, 10 assistant pharmacists, 9 veterinary surgeons, 33 certificated midwives, 6 dentists with registrable qualifications and 40 persons, specially authorised to practise dentistry under the transitory section of the dental law mentioned in my last report, whose authorisation had been delayed from last

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year pending certain enquiries which it was considered desirable to make. The number of midwives given above only includes those midwives who are registered on a regular certificate or diploma issued by a recognised institution. The provincial midwives are not included in this figure, but are registered separately. Of the 327 persons authorised as above under the law regulating the practise of medicine and its allied branches, 207 were Egyptians and 39 were Ottoman subjects, whilst 81 were foreigners of various nationalities.

*Public Health Laboratories.*

486. The total number of examinations carried out in the laboratories during the year was 20,075, as compared with 18,411 in 1920, showing, as usual, a steady increase. A considerable extension of the laboratories was completed during the year, and the new rooms taken over in the autumn.

487. The Public Health Department has entered into negotiations with the London School of Tropical Medicine with a view to obtaining the services of a professor during the coming year for investigation work into the ætiology of ankylostoma and bilharzia. Professor Lieper visited Egypt at the end of the year to make preliminary arrangements, and it is hoped that the work will begin soon. Arrangements have also been made with the governing body of the Lister Institute for two members of their staff to conduct typhus fever researches in the public health laboratories for five months in 1922, and this work will begin early in February.

488. Three Egyptian bacteriologists were given special leave for study in Europe; they attended courses in the London School of Tropical Medicine and two obtained the diploma in tropical medicine of the University of London. One of these bacteriologists also attended courses in public health and carried out bacteriological research at the Lister Institute.

*Rabies.*

489. In 1921 a total of 1,323 persons were treated in the Antirabic Institute. Dog-bites accounted for 1,015 of the cases.

CHAPTER VII.—JUSTICE.

79. *Personal.*

490. The following changes took place during the year 1921 in the higher personnel of the Ministry of Justice: The office of Minister was vacated by Ahmed Pasha Zulficar on the fall of Tewfik Pasha Nessim's Ministry in March, and was assumed, on the formation of the Ministry of Adly Pasha Yeken, by Abdel Fattah Pasha Yehia, the Under-Secretary of State. The post of Under-Secretary was accepted somewhat unwillingly by Mohammed Pasha Ibrahim, the Procureur général, and the place of the latter was taken by Mustapha Pasha Fathy.\* These arrangements remained in effect at the end of the year, save that on the fall of Adly Pasha's Ministry in December Abdel Fattah Pasha of course relinquished the post of Minister, and was not replaced till after the end of the period under review.

491. In the course of the year an additional post was created for a foreign judge in the Mixed Court of Appeal and was filled by the promotion of Judge Pereira e Cunha (Portuguese). The number of foreign judges in the above-mentioned court is now restored to its pre-war figure of ten; and the distribution of seats according to nationalities is as follows: British three, French, Italian, American, Greek, Belgian, Norwegian, Portuguese one each. The vacancy created in the Mixed Court of Appeal at the end of the last judicial year by the retirement of Mr. S. P. Tuck (American) and the seat vacated this year by M. Bernardi (Italian) have been filled respectively by the appointment of Mr. Jaspar Yeates Brinton, and M. G. Baviera, formerly judge of the Mixed Court of Cairo. The retirement, in November, of Adly Mazloum Pasha, the Senior Egyptian Judge of the Mixed Court of Appeal, left vacant a seat which was filled by the appointment of Shker Ahmad Bey, formerly a judge of the Cairo Mixed Tribunal.

492. At the end of the year Judge Nyholm (Dane), President of the Mixed Court of Cairo, retired on appointment to a seat on the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

\* This gentleman has since (in 1922) become Minister of Justice in Sarwat Pasha's Ministry.

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493. In the Mixed Courts of First Instance the eight European vacancies alluded to in my last report and the further vacancy occasioned this year by M. Nyholm's departure have all been filled with the exception of two.

494. In view of the great increase of business which has taken place in the last year or two in the Native Court of Appeal, both on the civil and on the criminal side, it was decided, during the year under review, to create three additional posts in that court, all of which were filled by the appointment of Egyptians. The total strength of the Native Appeal Court is now thirty-two judges, of whom ten are non-Egyptian.

80. *Legislation.*

495. In reviewing the legislation promulgated under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice during the past year, certain enactments, considering their general importance to the community, call for somewhat detailed observations.

496. In the first place, Law No. 4 (Limitation of Rents) may be noted. This measure, which was promulgated on the 21st February, in addition to renewing the provision of the previous Rent Law (No. 11 of 1920) also introduced certain amendments to the original measure which had the effect of extending the principle of limitation of rents to premises let for any purpose other than that of habitation. As stated in last year's report, this law is based on the findings and recommendations of the Rent Commission set up by a decision of the Council of Ministers on the 28th September, 1920. However, as a result of detailed consideration by the Consultative Committee of Legislation of the preliminary draft prepared by this commission, the law as promulgated modifies in certain respects the recommendations put forward. While the principles of the statutory prolongation of leases and the limitation of the maximum permissible increase of rent to 50 per cent. of the rent payable on the 1st August, 1914, are maintained, certain modifications are effected in the interest of landlords.

497. Besides the ordinary cases of ejection provided for in the original law (non-payment of rent, improper use of the premises, &c.), the present law lays down three new sets of conditions in which the landlord can give his tenant notice to quit: (1) When the landlord himself wishes to occupy the dwelling-house or has need of it for occupation by his near relations (father, mother, son or daughter); (2) when the landlord finds it necessary to sell the premises and the purchaser himself intends to occupy the dwelling-house; (3) when the landlord wishes to carry out extensive alterations in the premises, or to demolish them with a view to reconstruction.

498. If the landlord or the purchaser does not enter into occupation of the dwelling-house within one month of the tenant's departure, and does not continue in occupation for at least a year, or if the building operations are not completed within the period laid down in the judgment, the tenant has the right to resume possession of the dwelling-house without prejudice to any claim for damages to which he is entitled.

499. The original law provided for two exceptional cases, in which the lessor might be authorised to collect a rent higher than the legal minimum. Law No. 4 introduces a third exception where, owing to the existence of a lease of not less than six years duration, the rent payable on the 1st August, 1914, was less than the average rent of similar dwelling-houses.

500. Similar restrictive provisions, with certain exceptions, apply to furnished dwellings, of which the rent must not, in any case, exceed more than 100 per cent., the legal maximum of rent payable for the same premises if unfurnished. In regard to premises let for purposes other than habitation the same rules are applicable, provided the rent of such premises on the 1st August, 1914, did not exceed £E. 72 per annum.

501. The practice of assignment and total sub-letting of premises by the tenant having in many cases given rise to abuse, the legislator has sought to protect the interests of the landlord by a provision that the tenant who wishes to assign or sublet, must duly notify his landlord, who may appeal to the court for relief. The law does not apply to the relations between the proprietors of hotels and pensions and their clients, nor as long as the principal tenant continues to occupy himself a part of the dwelling, nor to the partial sub-letting of an unfurnished dwelling. Further, partial sub-lettings of premises let for purposes other than habitation do not come within the terms of the law. The exemption in favour of partial sub-lettings has for its object their encouragement, with a view to relieving the dearth of dwellings and business premises.

502. Originally it was not anticipated that the law would remain in force after

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the 30th June, 1922, but in view of its very beneficial effects, and the generally expressed opinion as to the necessity for its continuance, it is probable that the measure will be renewed for a further period of a year. It is to be observed that this law was put into effect as regards capitulatory foreigners by a proclamation under martial law.

503. Law No. 14 had for its object to set up commissions to fix the rents of agricultural lands for the year 1920-21.

504. The extraordinary rise in the price of cotton in 1919 naturally had its effect on the rents of agricultural lands, which in the year 1920 reached an exceptionally high figure. The sudden fall in prices in 1920-21 caught the fellah unawares, as he had, at the time of the cotton boom, signed leases on the basis of the high prices then prevailing. In these circumstances considerations of equity and public policy called for legislative intervention. Without such intervention the tenant fellaheen who make up an important portion of the population, would have been in many cases completely ruined, and the discontent thereby engendered would certainly have resulted in serious disturbances.

505. The law provides for the setting up in each mudiria of one or more Agricultural Rent Commissions. These commissions, composed of a judge of the Native Courts acting as president, and two notables representing the landlords and the tenants respectively, are entrusted with the task of examining complaints put forward by tenants, with a view to fixing the total rent payable for the agricultural year 1920-21.

506. The conditions on which complaints are receivable are :—

- (1.) That the lease had been drawn up in the year 1920 for a term including the agricultural year 1920-21.
- (2.) That the agreement provides for the payment of rent in money either in whole or in part.
- (3.) That the lands have been let in contemplation of a normal cotton cultivation.

The law also lays down certain rules of procedure. It is probable that the law will be renewed for the year 1921-22.

507. It was not possible to make this law applicable to foreigners save under martial law, and in spite of the lively unofficial protests of certain Ministers, I refused to exercise my powers in this case. My reasons for refusal, apart from my general reluctance to resort to martial law legislation, save in cases of necessity, were (a) that in dealing with agricultural rents we were not, as in the case of house rents, following a nearly world-wide precedent, and (b) that such regulation, once embarked upon, is not unlikely to lead to far-reaching modifications in the system of land tenure, in which it is not desirable that my exceptional powers should be involved.

508. Another law of which mention may be made is No. 30, which introduces into the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the Native Courts a new article (No. 371 *bis*), couched in the following terms :—

“Whenever, in the investigation of a case, any chamber of the Court of Appeal shall be of opinion that on the point of law to be decided there is a conflict of previous decisions, or shall be inclined to depart from earlier decisions, it shall have power to adjourn the case for re-hearing by a general assembly of the court composed of at least fifteen judges, making up an unequal number. Owing to the non-existence of a Supreme Court, it was necessary to find a means of obviating the inconvenience resulting from the numerous contradictory decisions recorded by different chambers of the Court of Appeal on the same point of law.”

509. The system introduced by Law No. 30 having already been successfully put to the test since the year 1906 in the Mixed Court of Appeal, there is reason to believe that the same beneficial results will follow on its introduction to the Native Courts, and that these tribunals will increasingly tend to follow the jurisprudence emanating from the general assembly of the Court of Appeal.

510. Law No. 2 was an emergency measure designed to cope with a very remarkable situation. There is no specific legislation in Egypt regulating the formation of trades unions, a fact which has not prevented the creation in recent years of a considerable number of these bodies. Early last year the Union of Tramway Employees

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came under the influence of a very active demagogue, one Kemal Bey Hussein, an advocate of the native Bar. Partly in order to consolidate his power, and partly in order to enable him more effectively to conduct operations against the company, he induced the association to adopt a rule under which all the members irrevocably assigned to him the whole of their wages both present and future without limitation of amount or time, and without any declaration of trust on his part.

511. In order to render the assignments made under this rule effective *vis-à-vis* the debtor, Kamel Hussein proceeded to notify them in due form of law to the company. Although it might very well have been argued that such unlimited and irrevocable assignments of future wages were void as contrary to public policy, it was considered to be more prudent to introduce immediate legislation. Under the provisions of Law No. 2 (which was made applicable to foreigners by a proclamation) it was laid down that all assignments of wages by employees to any trade union or other similar body are void. The same prohibition was extended to powers of attorney given to a trade union to recover wages.

512. Law No. 28, which was promulgated on the 31st October, 1921, prolongs the powers of the Mixed Courts for an indefinite period.

513. The powers of these tribunals, which were set up in 1876 experimentally for five years, had been successively prolonged, generally for quinquennial period, up to the 1st February, 1915. After that date it was judged more desirable, in view of the comprehensive judicial reforms which it was then hoped to introduce at an early date, to prolong the powers of these courts only for very short periods. Owing to political events which took place after the armistice, the introduction of the reforms in the organisation of these tribunals, which the contemplated abolition of the Capitulations rendered necessary, was postponed, and the system of short prolongations continued to be followed. Eventually, however, it was found more convenient to terminate this system and prolong the powers of the Mixed Courts *sine die*. After somewhat protracted negotiations, all the interested Powers, with the exception of France, Greece and Holland, signified their assent to this prolongation for an indefinite period, with a stipulation giving a reciprocal right to the Governments of the interested Powers and the Egyptian Government to withdraw from the arrangement on giving a year's previous notice.

514. The first article of the law provides that the date of expiration of the powers of the Mixed Courts shall be fixed by decree published in the "Official Journal" at least a year before the said date. Holland signified assent to the prolongation for a period of one year from the 1st November, 1921, and in the case of France and Greece the assent was provisional for a period of only three months.

515. Subsequently to the promulgation of the law, the Hellenic Government signified its assent to indefinite prolongation on the same conditions as the other Powers, and France accepted the prolongation for a further period of three months pending further diplomatic explanations. This change in the situation should in the normal course of events have been ratified by the publication of a decree, but, as no Council of Ministers was in existence at the time, the forms of the organic law could not be complied with, and the matter was temporarily adjusted by a proclamation under martial law.

516. Law No. 31 introduces an innovation in regard to the challenging of Judges of Mahkamas; the challenger who fails in his challenge being made liable to a fine of P.T. 400 to P.T. 4,000. The previous rules did not provide any such salutary preventive sanction, with the result that the right of challenge had become a much abused pretext for delaying proceedings.

517. Finally Laws Nos. 17, 18, 19 may be noted. Their effect is to increase the *ad valorem* fees chargeable on certain transactions in the mixed and native courts and the Mahkamas.

81. Peace Treaties.

518. The Advisory Committee on the Peace Treaties set up in 1919 under the chairmanship of the Judicial Adviser has been responsible during the year for the preparation of two proclamations, namely that issued on the 18th May, 1921, which put into force the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, and that issued on the 5th October, 1921, bringing into force the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. Both proclamations follow very closely the lines of the German and Austrian peace treaties prepared by this committee and issued last year. The most important section of both documents deal with the vesting in the Public Custodian, for purposes of liquidation, of all property in Egypt belonging to Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals at the dates

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of which the respective treaties came into force. As in the previous proclamations the High Commissioner is given a general power to dispense property from the operation of the proclamations, and the exemption, at the discretion of Licensing Officer (Financial Adviser), of diplomatic and consular archives, property of diplomatic and consular agents, mixed court judges, &c., is also provided for. Meetings of the Advisory Committee have been held, whenever deemed necessary to deal with concrete cases. In this way the property of enemy nationals in Egypt as yet unliquidated has been reduced to small dimensions.

519. The problem of the manner in which claims for compensation under the peace treaties are to be proved and admitted to rank against the proceeds of liquidation is giving rise to considerable difficulties. The main questions under examination are (a) as to the extent of the obligation of claimants to submit disputed claims to a mixed arbitral tribunal; and (b) as to the extent of the obligation of such claimants to exhaust their legal remedies in Germany before being entitled to rank against the Egyptian fund. Another very important question which has been raised is as to the validity of the Egypt Amending Order in Council (and the corresponding provisions in the proclamation relating to the property of Germans) under which Egyptian nationals who have been the object of exceptional war measures in Germany are admitted to claim against the liquidation fund

82. *Royal School of Law.*

520. The work of the school during the year 1920-21 was carried on with less difficulty and interruption than during the previous year. It was decided to allow the students who had failed at the examination in May 1920 an opportunity to be re-examined in October, and the session of 1920-21 began with this examination.

521. The results were not encouraging, the percentage of failures among first-year students being as high as ninety-one, and the general percentage of failures seventy-three. It was clear that the students, at whose urgent instance the examination had been held, had made little effort during the summer months to regain the time they had wasted in political agitation.

522. The number of students has rapidly increased from 734 (286 internal and 448 external) in the year 1917-18 to 1,147 (478 internal and 669 external) in the year 1920-21.

83. *School of Cadis.*

523. The work of the year 1920-21 has shown very satisfactory results, and the conduct of the students, has been, or the whole, good. The following short table shows the number of students in both sections of the school, compared with the preceding two years:—

School Year.	Number of Students.		
	Primary Section.*	Higher Section.†	Total
1918-19 .. .. .	148	113	261
1919-20 .. .. .	166	107	273
1920-21 .. .. .	165	107	272

\* Four years' course.

† Five years' course.

524. At the final examinations for both sections held in June, all the students (thirty-seven) of the fourth year primary section who presented themselves passed successfully. Of this number, twenty-one were admitted to the first year of the higher section and the remaining sixteen were sent to the Dar-el-Ulüm Higher College. In the examination for diploma and Alims' certificates (fifth year higher section) twenty out of twenty-one candidates were successful. Of the successful list of Alim the first two were appointed teachers in the college, twelve were employed as judicial clerks in the Mahomedan courts, and five are working at the Bar.

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84. Statistics for 1920-21.

(November 1, 1920-October 31, 1921.)

NATIVE COURTS.

525. Civil jurisdiction :—

	Cases entered for Trial.		Cases Disposed of.		Cases awaiting Trial at end of Year.	
	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.
Court of Appeal .. .. .	1,132	1,203	902	827	1,238	1,609
Central Courts—						
Appeal .. .. .	5,750	5,696	4,876	5,159	4,192	4,657
First Instance .. .. .	6,513	7,049	4,675	5,969	5,709	6,824
Summary Courts .. .. .	110,596	144,440	104,388	140,039	26,623	31,467
Cantonal Courts .. .. .	141,385	264,356	140,255	247,684	16,216	31,931
Total .. .. .	265,376	422,744	255,096	399,678	53,978	76,488

526. It will be seen from the above figures that the civil work of the native courts has considerably increased during the last year, as compared with the previous year : 157,368 more new cases were entered for trial in 1920-21 than in 1919-20, representing an increase of 59.3 per cent. Although general in all the courts, the increase was more marked in the cantonal courts, where it amounted to 87 per cent., and in the summary courts, where it was 30.6 per cent.

527. This increase of civil cases is a natural result of the fall in the price of cotton, and of the consequent financial stringency. It would certainly have attained greater proportions, owing to the difficulty experienced by farmers in paying the rents due to landlords, had it not been for the promulgation of Law, No. 14 of 1921, which provided for the institution of commissions for the purpose of fixing rents of agricultural lands for the agricultural year 1920-21.

528. Criminal cases :—

	New Cases.		Cases Disposed of.		Cases awaiting Trial at end of Year.	
	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.
Assize cases .. .. .	3,539	3,591	3,583	3,610	82	63
Misdemeanours—						
Appeal .. .. .	27,628	27,603	26,078	27,364	5,035	5,274
First Instance* .. .. .	87,151	83,887	84,285	85,128	19,033	17,792
Contraventions—						
Appeal† .. .. .	3,293	3,824	3,089	3,780	405	449
First Instance† .. .. .	73,197	86,289	71,477	83,637	8,255	10,907
Total .. .. .	194,808	205,194	188,512	203,519	32,810	34,485

\* Summary and Markaz misdemeanours.

† Court of Appeal and Central Courts.

‡ Summary, Markaz and cantonal conventions.

529. The total of "real" offences (*i.e.*, offences finally classified by the Parquet as such) for the judicial year under review amounted to 263,036, against 253,098 in 1919-20, *viz.*, an increase of 9,938 offences or 3.9 per cent. This total is divided into 8,676 crimes, 128,739 misdemeanours and 125,621 contraventions (besides 1,396 cantonal contraventions). As regards "real" crimes, there is a further increase this year, the total being 8,676 as compared with 7,772 in 1919-20, *viz.*, an increase of 904 crimes or 11.6 per cent. The most important increase comes under the heading of arson (which shows an increase of 679 over the figures of the previous year), of attempted homicide (131), of homicide (110), and of falsification (65). On the other hand, cases of recidive of theft show a decrease of 133. Other crimes show only slight variations, although the proportional increase or decrease in some cases is rather high, as may be seen from the following table :—

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Offences.	1919-20.	1920-21.	Increase.	Percentage.	Decrease.	Percentage.
Wilful homicide .. ..	1,173	1,283	110	9.3		
Attempted homicide .. ..	1,132	1,263	131	11.6		
Total .. ..	2,305	2,546	241	10.5		
Serious assault .. ..	316	354	38	12.0		
Theft and attempted theft .. ..	1,896	1,829	..	..	67	3.5
Recidive theft .. ..	550	417	..	..	133	24.2
Arson .. ..	1,654	2,333	679	41.1		
Destruction of crops .. ..	268	332	64	23.9		
Cattle poisoning .. ..	84	104	20	23.8		
Bribery .. ..	22	13	..	..	9	40.9
Falsification .. ..	133	198	65	48.8		
Rape and indecent assault .. ..	233	233	..	..		
Extortion .. ..	116	158	42	36.2		
Misappropriation .. ..	15	22	7	46.6		
Railway crimes .. ..	46	48	2	4.3		
Other crimes .. ..	134	89	..	..	45	33.5
Total .. ..	7,772	8,676	1,158	..	254	
Increase net .. ..	..	..	904	11.6		

530. As regards the distribution of crimes according to localities, the statistics show that there was a big increase in the following mudirias, viz., Dakahlia (an increase of 251 crimes over the figures for the previous year), Behera (192), Kaliubia (183), Menufia (165), Gharbia (113), Beni Suef (99) and Assiout (95). On the other hand, there was a decrease in Girga (113), Kena (110) and Fayoum (61). Other localities show only slight variations. The following table gives the figures for each mudiria and governorate :—

III.

Provinces.	1919-20.	1920-21.	Increase.	Percentage.	Decrease.	Percentage.
Cairo .. ..	483	519	36	7.5		
Alexandria .. ..	266	273	7	2.6		
Canal .. ..	89	93	4	4.5		
Damietta .. ..	22	20	..	..	2	9.1
Behera .. ..	560	752	192	34.3		
Sharkia .. ..	596	659	63	10.6		
Dakahalia .. ..	432	683	251	58.1		
Gharbia .. ..	832	945	113	13.6		
Kaliubia .. ..	455	638	183	40.2		
Menufia .. ..	617	782	165	26.7		
Giza .. ..	342	327	..	..	15	4.4
Beni Suef .. ..	324	423	99	30.6		
Fayoum .. ..	353	292	..	..	61	17.3
Minia .. ..	612	611	..	..	1	0.2
Assiout .. ..	706	801	95	13.5		
Girga .. ..	71	458	..	..	113	18.8
Kena .. ..	456	346	..	..	110	14.1
Assouan .. ..	56	54	..	..	2	3.6
Total .. ..	7,772	8,676	1,208	..	304	
Increase net .. ..	..	..	904	11.6		

531. The proportion of crimes to the population of the country amounted this year to 6.8 for every 10,000 inhabitants, as against 6.1 in 1919-20. For Lower Egypt (including Cairo) this proportion was 7.2, as compared with 5.8 for 1919-20; while for Upper Egypt it amounted to 6.4, as against 6.6 in the previous year.

532. It was in the Mudirias of Kaliubia, Beni Suef and Behera that this proportion stood at its highest, viz., 12.1, 9.4 and 8.4 respectively; while it was at its lowest in the Mudirias of Kena and Assouan, viz., 4.1 and 2.1 respectively.

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MIXED COURTS.

533. Civil and Commercial Cases :—

	New Cases.		Cases Disposed of.		Cases awaiting Trial at end of Year.	
	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.	1919-20.	1920-21.
Court of Appeal . . . . .	1,293	1,280	1,183	1,123	992	1,149
Courts of First Instance—						
(a.) Appeals from Summary Courts	591	784	557	648	270	406
(b.) First Instance . . . . .	6,987	10,573	6,271	9,587	4,169	5,155
Summary Courts . . . . .	6,877	12,749	6,298	12,041	1,506	2,214
Référé cases . . . . .	2,856	2,743	2,827	2,769	80	54

PENAL JURISDICTION.

	1919-20.	1920-21.
Court of Appeal—		
New cases . . . . .	53	53
Decided . . . . .	53	56
Courts of First Instance—		
Misdemeanours—		
New cases . . . . .	68	116
Decided . . . . .	108	62
Contraventions—		
New cases . . . . .	1,722	2,635
Decided . . . . .	1,704	2,611
Total—		
New cases . . . . .	1,843	2,804
Decided . . . . .	1,865	2,729

MAHKAMAS SHARAIYA.

	1919-20.	1920-21.
New cases—		
Appeal cases presented to the Supreme Mahkama . . . . .	247	319
Appeal cases presented to the Central Mahkama . . . . .	3,080	3,188
First instance cases presented to the Central Mahkama . . . . .	843	841
Cases presented to the Summary Mahkama . . . . .	126,907	116,852
Total . . . . .	131,077	121,200
Cases disposed of—		
Appeal cases disposed of by the Supreme Mahkamas . . . . .	159	222
Appeal cases disposed of by the Central Mahkama . . . . .	2,544	2,571
First instance cases disposed of by the Central Mahkama . . . . .	419	475
Cases disposed of by the Summary Mahkama . . . . .	117,449	107,931
Total . . . . .	120,571	111,199
Cases awaiting trial at end of year—		
Appeal cases awaiting trial by the Supreme Mahkama . . . . .	88	97
Appeal cases awaiting trial by the Central Mahkama . . . . .	536	617
First instance cases awaiting trial by the Central Mahkama . . . . .	424	366
Cases awaiting trial by the Summary Mahkama . . . . .	9,458	8,921
Total . . . . .	10,506	10,001

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CHAPTER VIII.—COMMUNICATIONS.

85. *Railways, Telegraphs and Telephones.*

534. The following table shows the general results of the year's working as compared with those of 1920-21 :—

	1920-21, actual.	1921-22, estimated.
Railway receipts—	£E.	£E.
Coaching .. .. .	3,899,592	3,467,000
Goods .. .. .	3,970,740	4,275,000
Sundries .. .. .	178,730	173,000
Total receipts .. .. .	8,049,062	7,915,000
Total expenditure .. .. .	7,891,318	6,500,000
Net receipts .. .. .	157,744	1,415,000
Upper Egypt auxiliary railways—		
Receipts .. .. .	101,349	90,000
Expenditure .. .. .	115,034	95,000
Expenditure in excess of receipts ..	13,685	5,000
Western oases railways—		
Receipts .. .. .	5,373	5,000
Expenditure .. .. .	8,538	8,000
Expenditure in excess of receipts ..	3,165	3,000
Passengers carried—	Number.	Number.
1st class .. .. .	993,423	942,569
2nd „ .. .. .	3,197,380	2,955,461
3rd „ .. .. .	26,357,666	23,380,398
Tonnage of goods .. .. .	3,768,921	3,908,332
Train kilometres run .. .. .	12,865,848	13,714,490
Kilometres of line open .. .. .	2,531	2,531
Telegraphs—	£E.	£E.
Receipts .. .. .	346,396	336,000
Expenditure .. .. .	323,445	296,000
Net receipts .. .. .	22,951	40,000
Telephones—		
Receipts .. .. .	310,231	338,000
Expenditure .. .. .	247,713	225,000
Net receipts .. .. .	62,518	113,000

535. Good progress has been made, in respect of maintenance and renewals, towards recovering the ground lost during the war; and in particular a considerable length of permanent way has been renewed, chiefly on the main Cairo to Alexandria line. Except for telephone extensions, no important capital works have been undertaken. Available credits have for the most part been utilised for the completion of works begun in previous years. £E. 15,000 have been spent on the new railway station at Alexandria and £E. 10,000 on improving the facilities for handling oil traffic at Suez and Arsein junctions. I may note that before the war all new railway stock and far the greater proportion of finished spare parts for replacement were purchased abroad; but now a large amount of new stock is built, and many spare parts made, in the railway workshops.

536. Very large purchases of coal, at high prices, were made in 1920, and the stock still remaining at the end of 1921 was 700,000 tons, a quantity sufficient to meet railway requirements for more than two years. Owing particularly to the large expenditure on this coal, and also to the high cost of labour, the price of stores and sea freights, both passenger fares and goods rates remain unduly high. A reduction may, however, be expected if the general recovery in the Government finances which has occurred in the past year is maintained.

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537. The passenger services on the main and suburban lines have been further extended during the year, and the Sunday train service between Cairo and Alexandria has been improved. The services are now regarded as adequate to the needs of the travelling public.

538. A new system of police control over goods in transit has recently been instituted, with the result that claims for loss and damage have diminished by more than 50 per cent.

539. Both the Upper Egypt Auxiliary Railways and the Western Oasis Railway are worked at a loss. The former are unable to compete successfully with other modes of transport; the latter might be profitable if it were extended 150 kilom. to Dakhla Oasis, which is more fertile than Kharga and has a population of 20,000.

540. Progress has been made in providing improved telephone facilities, and the difficulties experienced in obtaining material have now been largely overcome. New exchanges have been opened at Ezbekieh (Cairo), Ibrahimieh (Alexandria), Mit Ghamr, Bilbeis, Mellawi and Maghagha. Fifteen new trunk circuits have been erected and twelve new call offices opened in provincial towns during the past year. New plant is now being put down in the Cairo Central Exchange to accommodate 3,000 subscribers and a new trunk position has been provided. A building has been erected at Kubba (Cairo) with the view to installing an exchange there in 1922-23 for 720 subscribers, with an ultimate capacity for 2,000. A switch-board extension for 900 subscribers is being installed at the Alexandria Central. The Tanta switch-board has been extended to provide for more subscribers and a new trunk position. It is proposed to erect a central exchange and headquarters in Cairo on a suitable site already acquired for the purpose.

541. Communication with ships at sea has been established through the opening of a wireless station at Ras-el-Tin, Alexandria.

86. *Post Office.*

542. The foreign postal rates, though they were increased during the year, remain below the maximum authorised by the Madrid Congress; inland rates were not changed.

543. The receipts for the year were £E. 691,881 and the expenditure £E. 690,314. The Post Office has therefore just paid its way, without making a profit, which is probably the most desirable state of affairs.

544. The correspondence passing through the Post Office during the year was approximately 114,222,800 letters, postcards, &c., or an increase of 1 per cent. on the previous year. The number of parcels decreased by 7 per cent. to 1,709,175. Cash-on-delivery parcels from Great Britain regrettably diminished by 47 per cent., from 68,438 to 36,081.

545. Egyptian postal orders issued increased by 9 per cent., foreign money orders issued by 20 per cent. and British postal orders by 17 per cent., the value of the last named being £E. 56,539.

546. Inland money orders diminished by 2½ million pounds, foreign money orders paid by 22 per cent. and British postal orders by 37 per cent., to a value of £E. 25,495.

547. 242,152 accounts were open at the savings bank on the 31st December, 1921, 93,357 of which were habitually active. There were 4,576 new depositors during the year, and the total amount on deposit was £E. 1,268,134, being an increase of £E. 115,838 over the previous year.

87. *Ports and Lighthouses.*

548. The revenues of this administration during the last two years have been as follows:—

	1920.	1921.
	£E.	£E.
Port of Alexandria .. .. .	142,818	162,240
.. Port Said .. .. .	40,442	42,577
.. Suez .. .. .	58,792	62,402
.. Damietta .. .. .	210	286
.. Rosetta .. .. .	36	36
Total .. .. .	242,298	267,572

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549. Expenditure was £E. 846,000 in 1920 and £E. 900,526 in 1921, £E. 501,000 and £E. 551,000 respectively of these sums being devoted to new works.

550. The most important of the new works now proceeding is the extension of Suez harbour, while at Alexandria the walls and filling of quay K have been finished and mole E has been completed except for paving, and the cranes and machinery on this mole are expected to be in working order before the end of 1922.

88. *Aviation.*

551. There is outwardly no change in the situation as regards the development of civil aviation in Egypt since my last report, but much useful preparatory work has been done in the interval, such as the drafting of an air law and the framing of technical regulations.

552. Although there is now no actual prohibition of civil aviation in Egypt, yet there has existed a virtual prohibition by reason of the fact that all existing aerodromes are still under the control of the Royal Air Force, who have not as yet signified their willingness to throw open their aerodromes for use by civil aircraft. Negotiations are in progress, however, with a view to permitting such aircraft to use certain specified Royal Air Force aerodromes subject to compliance with regulations and conditions which will be settled between the Ministry of Communications and the Royal Air Force, and subject to the payment of such dues and fees as may be determined—an arrangement similar to that introduced in England during the inaugural stage of civil aviation immediately after the war. Apart from this, however, all aerodromes in Egypt have, by Sultanic decree, been declared a monopoly of the State, so that no person may use any area of land for the purposes of an aerodrome without obtaining the sanction of the Egyptian Government.

553. As far as can be foreseen the policy of the Government towards civil aviation in Egypt will be to afford such material assistance as may be possible, such as the provision of land for aerodromes, but it is not at present proposed to grant subventions. Measures are being taken to reserve sites for a civil aerodrome at Alexandria.

554. Although several tentative enquiries have been made regarding the possibilities of commencing aviation in Egypt no definite schemes have yet matured. It is difficult to forecast the measure of success which may attend such enterprises within Egypt, but there is probably not much scope for local air services.

555. Egypt is likely, however, to become an important air junction for international air routes, and with this probability in view the Ministry of Communications keeps in constant touch with aerial developments in all the more important countries of the world. The Royal Air Force have been working a fortnightly air-mail between Cairo and Bagdad since September 1921.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN  
EGYPT.

Part I.—Résumé of Events up to the Declaration of February 28,  
1922.

*Introductory.*

IT is now four years since the unexpected and violent outbreak of nationalism, which in varying degrees of intensity has remained a chronic symptom of the Egyptian political situation. The declaration of the protectorate and its apparent acceptance by Egyptians during the war were supposed to have sanctioned definitely the juridical and political position of Great Britain in Egypt and provided an agreed basis for the development of the latter country in relation with Great Britain. No one could have foreseen at the end of 1918 that the continued activity of Nationalist agitation would three years later have obliged His Majesty's Government to withdraw the protectorate in an attempt to pave the way to some more lasting settlement. The cause of this seems to have been that Nationalist demands before the war were for self-government, and were not so much directed against the *de jure* Turkish or *de facto* British suzerainty. After the war, however, the demand was for "complete independence, internal and external," a development which was almost inevitable once the principle of the League of Nations and the free association of independent nations had been adopted.

2. Looking back on the way in which the very dangerous situation during the early part of 1919 was handled, and on the measures adopted to meet the many more or less acute crises which have subsequently arisen, events stand out in truer perspective than was the case at the time of their occurrence. A brief recapitulation of the episodes which can now be seen to have had the most important consequences may therefore be of assistance in forming a correct appreciation of the position to-day, and of the policy which should be followed in the future.

3. In the following retrospect no attempt has been made to examine the causes which inspired the Nationalist movement, as this task was undertaken by Lord Milner's Mission, and is fully dealt with in their report, and, in order to condense the narrative as much as possible, mention is only made of those events which gave rise to ulterior consequences of some importance.

4. One fundamental difficulty of the situation must always be borne in mind. However great the influence of the British representative was, the Government of Egypt could only be carried on through Egyptian Ministers appointed by the ruler of the country. The object of the Nationalists during the period under review has been to create a condition of things in which no capable man could be found to undertake the responsibility of government. When, therefore, it was impossible for the time being to form a Ministry in 1919, and again in 1921, the only way out of the difficulty lay in recourse to the powers under martial law of the British Commander-in-chief, who by military proclamation empowered Under-Secretaries to fulfil Ministerial functions. Such an arrangement was, however, essentially a makeshift, which could only hope to bridge the period intervening between the fall of one normally constituted Government and the early assumption of office by another.

5. In the course of the narrative it has been necessary to refer to the succession of Egyptian statesmen—Rushdi, Mohamed Said, Wahba, Nessim, Adly and Sarwat Pashas—who have held the office of Prime Minister, but it is important to remember that, with the possible exception of Adly, none of these is a leader of a party in the sense understood in Europe. They are all members of the limited class of Egyptians, mostly of Turkish extraction, who have in the past provided men with sufficient education and administrative experience to enable them to conduct the business of government when unhampered by parliamentary control. In these circumstances a

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change of Government in Egypt does not necessarily reflect a revulsion of public opinion, which in a population containing over 90 per cent. of illiterates represents at most the views of the *intelligentsia* of the towns.

*Resignation of Rushdi Ministry and Deportation of Zaghlul.*

6. On the 2nd March, 1919, the Rushdi Cabinet had resigned, and the Sultan had been unable to induce another Government to take office in the face of the refusal of His Majesty's Government to receive Zaghlul, who wished to state the case for Egyptian independence in London. On the 9th March Zaghlul and three of his chief associates, who in their endeavours to prevent the formation of a new Ministry had resorted to methods of intimidation, were deported and interned in Malta. Egyptian nationalism had definitely challenged British authority, and the challenge had been accepted.

7. A week later, on the 16th March, General Bulfin, the Commander-in-chief in Palestine in the absence of General Allenby, who had been summoned to the Peace Conference in Paris, arrived in Cairo and proceeded to take active steps to deal with the insurrection which had broken out throughout Egypt.

8. By the 24th March General Bulfin had control of the situation, and the leaders of the movement in Cairo were already frightened and seeking for a means of retreat from the position which they had taken up. It is possible that, if the large number of troops which were then available had been employed to enforce a vigorous and sustained policy of coercion, the Nationalist movement would have collapsed for a time, just as that which started in 1906 collapsed shortly after Lord Kitchener became agent and consul-general in 1911. The effectiveness of a general strike of civil officials as weapon in the Nationalist armoury had not then been demonstrated, as was the case a month later. In any event, it is certain that at no subsequent period did coercion offer the same chances of success, nor were the means to enforce it so readily to be had.

*Lord Allenby takes over Control.*

9. On the 26th March Lord Allenby took over control as Special High Commissioner and Commander-in-chief. The more violent phases of the insurrection were on the wane, and on the 31st March he asked for authority to remove the restrictions on travel which had been imposed on Egyptians. In effect, he was prepared to allow any Egyptians who were so minded to go to Paris, where they had vague ideas of laying their case before the Peace Conference. Lord Allenby was satisfied that the moment was opportune for making such a concession, which, he was advised, would render possible the formation of a Ministry.

10. Meanwhile, the active revolt having failed, its promoters in Cairo determined to try methods of passive resistance, and on the 2nd April practically all Egyptian officials in the Ministries and Government Departments in the capital went on strike. Even though this movement was almost entirely confined to Cairo and did not appreciably affect the provincial administration, it produced a situation with which it was practically impossible to cope for any length of time, and showed clearly that the machine of Government could not be made to work without some measure of co-operation on the part of the Egyptian officials of all ranks. On the 4th April Lord Allenby renewed his request for leave to make the concession referred to above, and on the following day he was authorised by the Prime Minister to do so. Mr. Lloyd George at the same time suggested that the opportunity might be taken of announcing that a special mission of enquiry under Lord Milner would be sent to Egypt.

*Release of Zaghlul and Strike of Government Officials.*

11. Accordingly on the 7th April the restrictions which had been imposed on Egyptians wishing to visit Europe were removed, and Lord Allenby extended this concession so as to cover the case of Zaghlul and his three associates in Malta. At the same time he informed the Foreign Office that the visit of the Milner Mission would be desirable later, but at the moment would be useless. The immediate result of the concession which Lord Allenby had urged and had eventually been authorised to make, was to encourage Rushdi to form a rather feeble Ministry which took office on the 9th April, and addressed themselves to the task of persuading the Government officials to return to work. In this they were unsuccessful, as the departure for

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Paris of Zaghul and his colleagues who were joined by other members of the Zaghulist Committee from Egypt was regarded as a signal triumph for the Nationalists, who paid scant attention to the admonitions of what was obviously a weak Government. Discouraged by his failure to control the situation, Rushdi resigned on the 22nd April, and simultaneously Lord Allenby determined to put a stop to the strike by methods more radical than those hitherto attempted. A proclamation under martial law was published to the effect that all officials who did not immediately return to work would be dismissed; this proved entirely successful, for the strike ended on the 23rd April.

12. It had lasted for three weeks and had completely paralysed all but the most necessary services which were kept going as far as possible by British military personnel, then fortunately available in large numbers with the essential technical qualifications.

*Announcement of forthcoming Milner Mission and their Terms of Reference.*

13. On the 15th May the Secretary of State after further consultation with Lord Allenby announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to despatch to Egypt the Milner Mission "to enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country, and the form of the Constitution which, under the protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests." At the time this announcement was made it was intended that the mission should go to Egypt in June, and no one could then foresee that over a year would elapse before even an interim report could be received from them. During that period the knowledge that the mission ~~was~~ coming had the double effect of calling a halt to any constructive policy which Lord Allenby or the British element in the Egyptian service might otherwise have initiated, whilst, at the same time, it kept Egyptian opinion constantly alive to the possibility of some drastic change in the régime of the country as a result of the enquiry and recommendations of the mission. were/

*Formation of Mohamed Said's Ministry.*

14. On the 21st May a Ministry was formed by Mohamed Pasha Said, a former Prime Minister and an old hand in the art of Government as practised in Egypt during the reign of the ex-Khedive, and with this development which was rendered possible by the effective military measures taken to restore order throughout the country, there seemed to be a fair chance of Egypt settling down to something like normal tranquillity. Thus, when on the 22nd May Lord Allenby was informed that Lord Milner did not wish to visit Egypt till the early autumn, he replied that the conditions had altered and that he would like the new Ministry to have time to establish its position. He therefore thought that the mission should come out in September.

15. The summer passed without serious incidents, and as public opinion began to realise the failure of Zaghul and his "delegation" to achieve anything substantial at Paris, attention was increasingly turned towards the forthcoming mission of enquiry. Towards the end of August it became evident that for some reason or other neither the Sultan nor his Prime Minister wanted the mission; the excuse they urged was that until peace had been made with Turkey and Italy had recognised the protectorate the position of Egypt would not have been sufficiently regularised to warrant the investigations which the mission were to undertake.

16. Mohamed Said's attitude was not wholly prompted by dislike of the idea of the mission. He was being increasingly attacked by the Zaghulists for not preventing ~~the~~ despatch, and consequently in opposing it he felt that he was disarming his critics whilst indulging his own feelings. Meanwhile, the Nationalists, on Zaghul's inspiration, were advocating the boycott of the mission, to whose coming the Prime Minister and his colleagues became increasingly opposed, until towards the end of September he informed Sir M. Cheetham, who was acting for Lord Allenby, that if his wishes were disregarded he would resign. The mission/

*Resignation of Mohamed Said, who is Replaced by Wahba Pasha.*

17. After consultation with Lord Allenby, who was then in England, it was decided on the 6th October to postpone the departure of the mission until he had

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returned to Egypt and could himself report on the situation. This he did on the 11th November, and recommended that the mission should start without delay. This action was followed within a week by the resignation of Mohamed Said, who was succeeded by Yussuf Pasha Wahba, an honest and agreeable man if a less forceful personality than his unscrupulous predecessor in office.

*Arrival of the Milner Mission.*

18. On the 7th December the mission arrived, and in spite of a very complete boycott were able to conclude their enquiry by the beginning of March 1920, when they returned to England.

*Submission of their Interim Report.*

19. Shortly after their return Lord Milner communicated to the Secretary of State by way of an interim report a document embodying certain general conclusions which the mission had unanimously reached before leaving Egypt. These conclusions advocated a wide extension of self-government and a large reduction in the number of Englishmen in the service of the Egyptian Government. The view was in fact expressed that a satisfactory situation could only be restored when Egyptians could be brought to appreciate that their British colleagues were their true friends and not merely the occupants of highly paid posts at the expense of native talent. But Lord Milner and his colleagues felt that until they had had an opportunity of hearing the views of Zaghul, to whom they had constantly been referred in Egypt as the true mouthpiece of Egyptian opinion, they would not be in a position to formulate their final recommendations. Moreover, they realised that if Zaghul's co-operation could be won his personal influence on the mass of Egyptian opinion would greatly facilitate the settlement which it was their object to achieve.

20. In April, Adly Pasha, with whom Lord Milner had been in close relations in Egypt, proceeded to Paris and saw Zaghul, whom he eventually persuaded to accept Lord Milner's invitation to visit London to discuss the Egyptian question with the members of the mission.

*Resignation of Wahba, who is replaced by Nessim Pasha.*

r/ 21. In Egypt the Nationalists, on the departure of Lord Milner, had turned their attention to making things difficult for the Ministry, and on the 19th May the Prime Minister, Wahba Pasha, whose health had broken down, resigned and was succeeded by Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who took office on the clear understanding that his Cabinet was purely a Ministry of Affairs which would attend to current business, but avoid taking any political decision pending a solution of the problem of the future régime of Egypt.

*The Milner-Zaghul Conversations.*

22. Zaghul and his colleagues came to London early in June and commenced their conversations with Lord Milner and the members of his mission, whilst Adly Pasha played the part of honest broker in attempting to promote agreement between the two parties.

23. The effect in Egypt of Zaghul's visit to England was immediate. The centre of gravity of Egyptian politics was at once transferred to this country. The Zaghulists felt that they had scored a great moral victory, and that their policy of boycotting the mission when in Egypt had been amply justified, as, in their eyes, it had compelled Lord Milner to recognise the paramount position occupied by Zaghul and to sue for peace with him.

24. The negotiations continued during the summer, whilst in Egypt excitement died down and was replaced by a feeling of expectancy. Finally, in the latter half of August, the mission and Zaghul's "delegation" were not far from agreement on the general terms of a settlement which was to take the form of a treaty of alliance between England and Egypt.

*Publication of the Milner Memorandum.*

25. Zaghul himself, when it came to the point, feared to commit himself to this agreement until it had been submitted to the "nation." Consequently on the

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21st August, Lord Milner informed the Secretary of State of the terms of the proposed settlement, and asked that the full text should be telegraphed to Lord Allenby. As Zaghlul and his colleagues had been provided with copies and intended to make the terms public in order to sound public opinion in Egypt there could be no question of withholding them from Lord Allenby. They were in fact published by Zaghlul at the end of August.

26. So far as their interim report was concerned, the Milner Mission were well within the limits imposed by their terms of reference, for although it recommended the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt whereby Great Britain would guarantee the independence of Egypt, the chief attributes of a protecting Power, viz., the control of foreign affairs and complete freedom to determine the strength and distribution of British forces in Egypt, were reserved to His Majesty's Government. The August proposals, on the other hand, in giving Egypt the right of diplomatic representation abroad and in confining the British army of occupation to a definite locality were barely compatible with the terms of reference; they came, therefore, as a great surprise to the British Government who determined to maintain an attitude of complete reserve towards the Milner scheme until the full report of the mission had been received and carefully considered.

27. Some observations must be made upon the substance of this scheme, which represented a bold attempt to solve the insoluble. It was designed to persuade the Egyptian that it represented practically complete independence, but under the guise of a scheme of judicial reform, which would get rid of the Capitulations, it made the British High Commissioner a permanent and very important part of the executive machinery of government and retained in his hands much of the power which the British agents and consuls-general had been accustomed to enjoy in Egypt before the war. The coming into force of the treaty implementing this settlement was made contingent on the prior acceptance by the capitulatory Powers of the scheme of judicial reform. Negotiations had been opened with these Powers in the early summer of 1920, but by the autumn it became apparent that their hostility to the abolition of the Capitulations could not be overcome within a reasonable lapse of time. But if the capitulatory Powers were hostile to the scheme of judicial reform, the Zaghlulists were even more opposed to it, as they speedily realised that the draft judicature laws, which were an essential part of the scheme, conferred on the British High Commissioner powers which in practice would greatly curtail the apparent independence offered by Lord Milner.

28. None the less, and in spite of a very half-hearted endorsement by Zaghlul himself, the suggested terms of settlement were favourably received by the majority of Egyptians, who were astonished at the liberality of the proposals. It was, however, only in consonance with Oriental character that their acceptance was qualified with reservations which, in the first instance, were no more than pious aspirations, but with the passage of time became fundamental conditions, which had even undergone a process of expansion by the time official negotiations came to be undertaken in the following year.

*End of Milner-Zaghlul Conversations.*

29. In November 1920 Zaghlul and his colleagues returned to London and Lord Milner tried in vain to persuade Zaghlul to initial the heads of agreement as Egyptian opinion had shown itself favourable. But Zaghlul displayed typically Egyptian lack of courage at the critical point and refused to commit himself. The negotiations were therefore discontinued on the understanding that the mission would submit a report advocating a settlement on the lines of the published agreement, whilst Lord Milner expressed the hope that Zaghlul's delegation, the majority of whom regretted their leader's refusal to seize the opportunity of concluding such a favourable bargain, were to do their best to promote the acceptance of the proposed settlement by their countrymen.

30. It has not always been sufficiently realised that, whatever His Majesty's Government and British opinion might think, Egyptians of all classes regarded the Milner Mission and His Majesty's Government as synonymous, and consequently believed that the latter could not honourably abate or go back upon an offer made by the former.

31. The Milner Mission and, in Egyptian eyes, His Majesty's Government were committed to the heads of agreement published in August 1920, whereas Zaghlul, by refusing to initial that document, had secured a tactical advantage and had retained complete liberty of action in regard to those proposals.

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32. The consequence was that when official negotiations came to be initiated in 1921 the Egyptians considered that they should start upon the basis of the Milner heads of agreement minus the judicial reform scheme, whose rejection by the capitulatory Powers was by then a foregone conclusion. There is unfortunately no escaping from the fact that the hands of His Majesty's Government had been forced and their position greatly weakened for undertaking the negotiation with the Egyptian Government of a settlement which should retain for Great Britain any vestige of the position which she had occupied in Egypt *de facto* before the war and *de jure* since the protectorate.

*i/* *Publication of Milner Report and Invitation to Egypt to open Official Negotiations.*

33. The report of the Milner Mission was received in December 1920 and laid before Parliament in February, 1921, and His Majesty's Government, who had in the meantime carefully considered the policy to be adopted, published an invitation to the Sultan to send a duly accredited delegation to negotiate a settlement, the ground having been cleared by the work of the mission. His Majesty's Government were at pains to make it clear that they did not regard themselves as bound by the terms of the mission's recommendations, but, as already explained, Egyptian opinion held a contrary view.

*Adly becomes Prime Minister.*

34. The first consequence of the invitation of His Majesty's Government was to let loose an orgy of intrigue in Egypt in connection with the formation of an official delegation. The Ministry of Tewfik Nessim Pasha, whose main achievement during his tenure of office had been to consolidate the position of his master the Sultan and to invest him with some slight degree of popularity, yielded place to one formed by Adly Pasha, who assumed the premiership on a wave of popular enthusiasm. This immediately aroused the jealousy of Zaghlul, who could brook no rival as popular hero. He hastened home to Egypt, which he had last left in the spring of 1919 as a prisoner bound for Malta. His reception was a delirious triumph, and completely turned his head; nothing short of the presidency of a delegation, recruited for the most part amongst his most trusted adherents, would satisfy him. For weeks Adly Pasha, whose own popularity was completely eclipsed, reasoned with his overbearing rival and offered concession after concession without avail. Eventually he abandoned the attempt to secure the collaboration of Zaghlul, who promptly denounced him as a traitor to his country and the agent of Great Britain, the secular oppressor.

*fomenting/* 35. Zaghlul and his followers having failed to reduce the Adly Government to a state of subserviency, did their utmost to bring about its fall by ~~instigating~~ the disorders which began at Tanta and culminated in May in the massacre of Greeks and Italians at Alexandria. But Adly held on, though his position was greatly weakened, and the Zaghlulists realised that their manoeuvres had alienated foreign sympathy without gaining any compensating advantage.

*The Imperial Conference and the Egyptian Negotiations.*

36. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government had invited the Imperial Conference which was then sitting to consider the terms of a treaty which could be concluded with Egypt of a nature to safeguard Imperial interests. The resulting document was less generous than the ill-fated Milner heads of agreement, which, owing to the impossibility of obtaining the consent of the capitulatory Powers to the proposed scheme of judicial reform, no longer provided a complete framework on which a settlement could be elaborated. Even if Adly's Government had enjoyed the whole-hearted support of Egyptian opinion, their acceptance of such a treaty after the expectations which the Milner report had aroused in Egypt would have meant their downfall and the repudiation of their action by their countrymen.

*Start of the Negotiations.*

37. It was in these circumstances that the official negotiations with Egypt opened in July 1921. Their prospects, never of the brightest, were not improved by the ceaseless attempts of the Zaghlulists to undermine the Adly Government, which, though it remained in office, became increasingly unwilling to accept any agreement that might be open to the criticism of political opponents in Egypt.

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*Breakdown of Negotiations and Resignation of Adly Pasha.*

38. Negotiations were protracted over a couple of months, when it became evident that no agreement could possibly be reached on the basis of the terms approved by the Dominion Premiers, whose ~~was~~ preoccupation ~~was~~ to perpetuate and strengthen the British hold on the Suez Canal. In the Government itself certain elements which had never grasped the true position in Egypt were resolutely opposed to anything in the nature of compromise. The result was the breakdown of the negotiations. It had been found impossible to reach agreement on any section of the proposed treaty save that relating to the protection of minorities, for which purpose the phraseology and provisions of the Roumanian and Polish treaties had been adopted. In these circumstances Adly Pasha returned to Egypt at the end of November and his resignation was announced immediately after his arrival.

chief/

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*Deportation of Zaghlul.*

39. The publication of the terms which Adly had rejected spurred the Zaghlulists to fresh exertions. They roused popular opinion to an extent that made the formation of a new Ministry impossible, and by the end of 1921 their activities had become so threatening that Lord Allenby, with the consent of His Majesty's Government, deported Zaghlul and his principal associates to the Seychelles. But Lord Allenby fully realised that this drastic measure was merely a palliative for a situation which could only be met by coercion or concession. The former policy was far less practicable than had been the case in March 1919; the latter involved the abandonment of the protectorate.

*The Declaration of February 28, 1922.*

40. Lord Allenby, with the unanimous support of his local advisers, had no hesitation in pronouncing for the second alternative, and after personal consultation with the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, the policy embodied in the declaration to Egypt of the 28th February, 1922, was finally adopted. The text of this declaration is given in Appendix (A).

**Part II.—The Situation during 1922.**

*Sarwat Pasha becomes Prime Minister.*

41. The declaration of the 28th February, 1922, was regarded in Egypt as indicative that His Majesty's Government had abandoned the attitude which they had taken up in the autumn of 1921 when the negotiations with Adly Pasha had broken down. Another crisis had been conjured by concession, and Sarwat Pasha, who had been Adly's second-in-command and *locum tenens* during the latter's absence in England in 1921, became Prime Minister. The chief points of the programme which the new Government published on taking office were the elaboration of a democratic constitution establishing the principle of Ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control, and the withdrawal of martial law.

*Proclamation of Egyptian Monarchy.*

42. On the 14th March the House of Commons devoted seven hours to the discussion of the declaration to Egypt, and on a division it was approved by 202 votes to 77. The next day the Sultan assumed the title of His Majesty King Fouad and proclaimed Egypt a monarchy.

*Declaration of a British "Monroe Doctrine."*

43. Simultaneously His Majesty's Government informed all Powers with whom they were in diplomatic relations that the British protectorate over Egypt was terminated. At the same time a virtual "Monroe Doctrine" in regard to Egypt was declared by the formal communication to these Powers of the following notification:—

"When the peace and prosperity of Egypt were menaced in December 1914 by the intervention of Turkey in the great war in alliance with the Central

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Powers, His Majesty's Government terminated the suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt, took the country under their protection and declared it to be a British protectorate.

"The situation is now changed. Egypt has emerged from the war prosperous and unscathed, and His Majesty's Government, after grave consideration and in accordance with their traditional policy, have decided to terminate the protectorate by a declaration in which they recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State, while preserving for future agreements between Egypt and themselves certain matters in which the interests and obligations of the British Empire are specially involved. Pending such agreements, the *status quo* as regards these matters will remain unchanged.

"The Egyptian Government will be at liberty to re-establish a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and thus to prepare the way for the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt abroad.

"Great Britain will not in future accord protection to Egyptians in foreign countries, except in so far as may be desired by the Egyptian Government and pending the representation of Egypt in the country concerned.

"The termination of the British protectorate over Egypt involves, however, no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt itself.

"The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt, long recognised by other Governments. These special relations are defined in the declaration recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State. His Majesty's Government have laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power. In pursuance of this principle they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempts at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command."

*General Recognition of Egyptian Independence.*

44. During the ensuing weeks almost all Powers who had hitherto maintained in Egypt only agents and consuls-general raised their representatives to the rank of Minister and accorded a varying degree of recognition to the new Egyptian monarchy.

45. The achievements and failures of the Sarwat Ministry are fully described in Lord Allenby's despatches of the 30th September and the 15th October, which are reproduced *in extenso* in Appendix (B).

*The Egyptianisation of the Services.*

46. One of the first acts of the new Ministry was the "Egyptianisation" of the public services by the appointment of native Under-Secretaries, whose executive authority overshadowed that of their English colleagues of the same rank. The process was carried out so rapidly as in many cases to impair efficiency, but the Ministry of Finance formed a notable exception. Here the Minister, Ismail Sidky Pasha, himself directed the policy with great ability and success and relied for its execution on the higher British officials whose functions in consequence underwent but little change.

*Retirement of British Officials.*

47. Lord Allenby tried hard, but unsuccessfully, to induce Sarwat to conclude a definite agreement in regard to the retirement and compensation of those British officials who found their position and prospects so impaired under the new régime that they felt unable to continue in the Egyptian service. Eventually an unofficial understanding was reached whereby Sarwat would allow to retire with special compensation any officials whom Lord Allenby might recommend to him. This arrangement is actually in operation, though up to the present not more than a few dozen officials have left the service on these conditions, owing to the dilatoriness of the Egyptian Government in dealing with the cases submitted to them by Lord Allenby.

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48. In the domain of purely internal administration the Ministry gave way to the vice of nepotism and in their attempts to find Government posts for their friends and relatives they earned great unpopularity and provoked discontent amongst the important administrative officials in the provinces on whose exertions the maintenance of public security depends.

*The Indemnity Law.*

49. The text of an indemnity law, <sup>the</sup> ~~an~~ enactment <sup>of which</sup> should prelude the abolition of martial law, was prepared in consultation with Lord Allenby. In order to ensure that this measure should not be regarded as of a transitory nature and liable to repeal at the discretion of the future Egyptian Parliament, its enactment was to be accompanied by the conclusion between the British and Egyptian Governments of a special agreement the text of which was also agreed upon after reference to the Foreign Office.

*The Draft Constitution.*

50. In the political sphere an important and fairly representative commission was appointed to draft a constitution and prosecuted their labours throughout the summer. By October they had completed their task and a draft Constitution, the text of which the commission had allowed to become public, was submitted to the Government for final revision and eventual presentation to the King, who, it was intended, should promulgate the new charter.

51. Meanwhile King Fouad viewed with increasing misgivings the elaboration by this commission of a constitution on liberal lines modelled upon continental practice. The King is not a believer in democratic institutions for Oriental countries and regards a benevolent despotism as the only form of Government which is suited to the present state of Egyptian society. The Ministers in common with all Egyptians of the upper classes are no more enamoured of democratic ideals than King Fouad, nor would they evince any enthusiasm for the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control if it were not for their fear of the caprice and licence with which the King would probably administer the country were he to wield absolute power.

*Friction between King Fouad and his Ministers.*

52. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the relations between Sarwat and his sovereign showed signs of increasing friction throughout the summer. King Fouad realising that his personal ambitions would find no support from Lord Allenby, attempted to strengthen his own position by weakening that of the Government. This he did by paying court to the Zaghlist opposition who met his overtures more than half way.

53. The Ministry who were constantly libelled in the press as the mere puppets of the British Government were in turn attempting to strengthen themselves by the creation of a Liberal Constitutional Party under the leadership of Adly Pasha, whose honesty and integrity had gained for him a well-deserved reputation amongst his fellow countrymen.

*Genesis of the Liberal Constitutional Party.*

54. The new party though enjoying the tacit and unofficial support of the Government fell rather flat, and their sole newspaper was quite unable to make itself heard effectively above the clamour of the Nationalist press. Such backing as the Government may have hoped to derive from the Adly Party was further weakened when its leaders adopted an attitude frankly critical of the Sarwat Ministry, whom they accused of subserviency to British interests in the matter of Egyptian claims to the Soudan and of Egyptian representation at the Lausanne Conference. This change of tone was the result of the fear engendered by the murder in the streets of Cairo of two prominent members of the party by a gang of gunmen who were probably students of ultra Nationalist views.

55. On the whole, however, the Sarwat Ministry had grappled courageously and not altogether unsuccessfully with the very difficult situation which confronted them when they took office, and despite their undoubted unpopularity they regarded the future with optimism and felt confident of achieving their programme. A constitution had been drafted, providing for a democratic system of government on European

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lines, in a form unobjectionable to His Majesty's Government, apart from references to King Fouad as "King of Egypt and the Soudan" and to the Soudan as "belonging to the Egyptian Kingdom." Sarwat, however, informed Lord Allenby that he was quite prepared to modify or even to omit these particular clauses.

*Egypt and the Lausanne Conference.*

56. Shortly after the 15th October Sarwat expressed the wish to send an Egyptian delegation to the Lausanne Conference, which was then about to assemble, to take part in the discussions when the clauses relating to Egypt in the Turkish Treaty were under consideration.

57. There ensued a complicated series of negotiations between Lord Allenby and Sarwat Pasha, as a result of which a general measure of agreement was reached regarding the articles of the new treaty which should replace articles 101 to 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

58. His Majesty's Government felt justified in going far to meet the wishes of the Egyptian Government in regard to the form of the new articles, as they had every reason to hope that Egypt would then formally accede to the treaty on its signature. The effect of this accession would have been to invest the unilateral declaration of the 28th February, 1922, with the force of a bilateral agreement between Great Britain and Egypt. With such an agreement His Majesty's Government could have afforded to regard the future relationship of the two countries with equanimity, as treaty sanction would have been secured to the reservation for future settlement of the four questions described in the declaration as being vital British interests.

viz. :—

- (1.) The protection of Imperial communications.
- (2.) The defence of Egypt against external aggression.
- (3.) The protection of foreign interests and of minorities.
- (4.) The Soudan.

As satisfactory arrangements for Egyptian participation in the conference had been reached with Sarwat, the French and Italian Governments were asked to join with His Majesty's Government in inviting a duly accredited Egyptian delegation to proceed to Lausanne.

*Fall of the Sarwat Ministry.*

59. This was the position when at the end of November the following telegram was received from Lord Allenby :—

"Sarwat has informed me that he proposes to place his resignation in the hands of the King on 30th November.

"He stated his relations with His Majesty, which had long been strained, had recently become impossible; that King not only obstructed conduct of Government, but lost no opportunity to weaken Cabinet's position, and openly sided with elements hostile to it.

"I asked him whether he was not willing to stay in office until Constitution was passed by King, since he knew he could count on my full support.

"He replied that this was impossible because the King, even if forced to sign Constitution, would make it known through his press that whole responsibility rested on Sarwat, whom, *à propos* of Soudan articles, His Majesty had gone so far as to describe as a traitor, who was trying to force His Majesty to assent to a document that deprived latter of half of his dominions.

"Sarwat went on to say that in these circumstances it was impossible to remain in office, and he made it clear that his decision to resign was definite.

"I fear there is much justification for Sarwat's statements about King, whose attitude has lately swung towards Zaghlul. Although Sarwat was insistent that his relations with the King were his only reasons for wishing to resign, I think it possible that he has been moved by—

"(1.) Decision taken two days ago by Adly Party to withhold their support if he met my wishes in regard to Soudan clauses of Constitution;

"(2.) Growing apprehension of criticism of line he has taken in accord with His Majesty's Government with regard to revision of Treaty of Sèvres; and perhaps also

"(3.) The recent political murders (of members of the new Liberal Constitutional Party).

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"If Sarwat does not feel strong enough to alter or remove Soudan articles of Constitution, it is not easy to see how to help him, and it seems to me that nothing is to be gained by trying to induce him to remain in office.

"It seems probable that King may nominate Tewfik Pasha Nessim in Sarwat's place, and as things stand at present I am not disposed to endeavour to influence His Majesty's choice.

"I propose, however, to speak sharply to King, pointing out to him—

"(1.) That he has allowed to become widespread belief that he regards with favour a group who are our declared enemies;

"(2.) That fact that he has used every means in his power to bring about fall of a Government that enjoyed my support implies hostility to policy that commanded sympathy of His Majesty's Government;

"(3.) That I consider particularly unfortunate that his attitude should have forced Government out of office at a moment immediately after assassination of two members of a political party friendly to Sarwat; and

"(4.) That in these circumstances it will be with considerable misgiving that I shall watch development of policy for which His Majesty is responsible.

"In a subsequent telegram I shall endeavour to explore believed implications of Sarwat's resignation."

60. The Sarwat Government, though supported by Lord Allenby, did not feel able to stand up against the combined forces of the Palace and the Opposition, and resigned office on the 29th November.

*Nessim Pasha becomes Prime Minister.*

61. King Fouad had undoubtedly scored a signal success, which was made more complete when Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who early in 1922 had become the King's "chef du cabinet," formed a Government whose chief characteristic was that individual Ministers were acceptable to their Sovereign if not otherwise specially qualified for their position.

62. Lord Allenby, whose support had not availed to prevent the fall of the late Government, had no part in the formation of that which is now in office, though he has a high opinion of the present Prime Minister personally and is on good terms with his colleagues.

63. In the meantime His Majesty's Government were able to prevent the despatch to the Egyptian Government of the invitation to the Lausanne Conference until it was ascertained whether the Ministry of Nessim Pasha would be prepared to accept the Egyptian articles in the form agreed upon with Sarwat. Lord Allenby immediately opened negotiations with the new Government, but up to the present their fear of exposing themselves to hostile criticism by accepting anything less than formulæ likely to find favour with extreme Nationalist opinion has rendered any agreement on this subject impossible of attainment. In consequence, the issue of the invitation to Egypt remains suspended.

**Part III.—The Soudan.**

*Reconquest and Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899.*

64. When in 1898 the Soudan was rescued by an Anglo-Egyptian military expedition from the barbarism into which the conquest of the Mahdi had plunged the entire country, its status was determined by the convention concluded between Great Britain and Egypt in 1899, establishing an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The terms of that instrument, which is reproduced as Appendix (C), show that the British title was based on the right of conquest, and they are so drawn as to make Great Britain the predominant partner in the Administration of the Soudan. The Egyptian title is based partly upon the fact that the Soudan was an Egyptian province which had successfully rebelled, and partly upon the military and financial share taken by Egypt in its reconquest.

*Why Egypt wants the Soudan.*

65. There is no ethnical affinity between Egypt and the Soudan, and, though the northern half of the latter country is populated by Mahommedan Arabs their aversion

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for Egyptians is quite as great as that of the negroid pagans who inhabit the southern provinces. The Soudanese, whether black or Arabs, despise the Egyptians as cowards, whilst the latter look down upon the Soudanese as barbarians and regard service in the Soudan as tantamount to exile. But in spite of this complete lack of sympathy between the two peoples, the Nationalist agitators in Egypt have succeeded during the last four years in making the essential unity of the Soudan with Egypt almost the chief plank in their political platform. Their success is attributable to the two motives which are most powerful with Egyptians, love of money and anxiety for their water supply. Since 1899 the Egyptian taxpayer has balanced the Soudan budget, whilst British officials have controlled the policy and administration of the country. Apart from a loan for railway development of over 5,000,000*l.*, on which no interest has yet been paid, the Egyptian Treasury has contributed directly and indirectly very large sums to the Soudan. Thus it is the Egyptian army which plays the part of a police force and is entirely paid for by Egypt, who similarly defrays the cost of any military operations which the vast size and necessarily loose administration of the territory may necessitate.

66. It is true that in return for all this expenditure Egypt has enjoyed complete immunity from any threat to her water supply or to the peace of her southern frontier, but of the value of the services thus rendered by the Soudan Government will never be appreciated in Egypt by a generation which has forgotten the fate of the Egyptian military expedition led by Hicks Pasha. This force was almost entirely annihilated by the Dervish hordes in 1883.

67. Anxiety about the water supply is only justifiable on the hypothesis that Anglo-Egyptian relations will not always be friendly. Egyptian Nationalists, however, are unceasing in their efforts to convert this hypothesis into a fact. Consequently their knowledge that an increased water supply for Egypt is dependent on the goodwill of the Soudan Government, who at any time can imperil the prosperity of Egypt by inconsiderate schemes of development in the Soudan, cannot fail to occasion them misgivings.

68. There is, therefore, a perfectly genuine desire on the part of Egyptians to eliminate British influence in the Soudan in order that they may have a free hand to make use of the whole volume of the Nile discharge for their own country, and to recover, at the expense of the Soudanese, the money advanced by Egypt since the reconquest.

*Egyptian Propaganda in the Soudan.*

69. Egyptian Nationalist propaganda has made some impression in the Soudan during the last four years, particularly in the towns where Egyptian clerks and subordinate officials are fairly numerous. Even in the country districts the Soudanese, whose loyalty to the British connection is inspired more by dislike of Egyptians than by any other consideration, are uneasy lest His Majesty's Government should attempt to placate Nationalist opinion in Egypt by allowing Egyptians to take a growing share in the control and administration of the Soudan. This uneasiness is bound to increase, and thus the ground will be prepared for Nationalist propaganda to take firm root. The generation which can remember the miseries of the Mahdi régime is fast disappearing, and with them will go all gratitude for the peace and prosperity which British administration has produced.

70. Lord Milner and his colleagues were impressed by the danger of the Nationalist demand that the Soudan should be regarded as an essential part of Egypt, and it was therefore made unmistakably clear during their negotiations with Zaghul that the recommendation of the mission did not apply to the Soudan. But this, in itself, was sufficient to make the Egyptian demand more insistent and *passu* with British concessions, in regard to the status of Egypt, the Nationalist clamour for the complete control of the Soudan has grown in extravagance.

*The Soudan is not at present a Burden on the British Treasury.*

71. Beyond a share in the cost of the military operations, which culminated in the battle of Omdurman, and the expense of keeping a single British battalion in Khartoum, the British taxpayer has not had to contribute anything towards the administration and development of the country, though it is true that Soudan loans under the guarantee of His Majesty's Treasury have been raised in London for about 10,000,000*l.* Hitherto it has in fact been possible through the tacit acquiescence

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will of /  
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of Egypt to run the Soudan on the cheap. It is scarcely likely that such a policy ~~will~~ prove feasible when an Egyptian Parliament meets and demands the repayment or at least the interest, on Egyptian advances.

*Financial Pressure which Egypt could Exercise on the Soudan.*

72. It is, therefore, quite possible that in order to maintain their control over the Soudan, His Majesty's Government will have to adopt a definitely irreconcilable attitude towards Egyptian pretensions. The Egyptian Government might conceivably retort by cutting off supplies of money. This could be effected, firstly, by a refusal to remit to the Soudan Government customs dues collected at Egyptian ports on goods in transit to the Soudan, and, secondly, by the withdrawal from the Soudan of the native Egyptian battalions and the Egyptian officers of Soudanese battalions, and by a refusal to make any contribution towards the defence of the Soudan.

73. The first method would involve a loss to the Soudan of about 400,000*l.* per annum; it could be adopted without a definite breach with His Majesty's Government over the Soudan question, as under the terms of article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement it is not certain whether Egypt is under any obligation to make such payments.

74. The second step, however, would mean the withdrawal by Egypt of the only striking symbol of her sovereignty in the Soudan. The cost of defence thus thrown upon the Soudan Government would amount to about 1,250,000*l.* per annum, and as under present conditions Soudan revenues barely balance expenditure, the country, which is not yet self-supporting, would become bankrupt unless the British Treasury could see their way to helping with a grant-in-aid of about 1,500,000*l.* to 2,000,000*l.* per annum.

*Strategic Importance of the Soudan.*

75. The Soudan, however, will in time be self-supporting, and apart from its financial prosperity it is strategically the key position for the whole north-eastern corner of Africa. The Power which holds the Soudan has Egypt at its mercy, and through Egypt can dominate the Suez Canal. The Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 was, as its author, Lord Cromer, was the first to admit, a diplomatic expedient designed to establish a temporary *modus vivendi*, which would safeguard British interests without calling for a large expenditure of British revenue. This purpose it has fulfilled, but with Egypt "an independent sovereign State" in the words of the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, the attitude of an Egyptian Government responsible to a popularly elected Parliament may, at any moment, render difficult, if not impossible, the administration of the Soudan on present lines in accordance with the terms of the 1899 convention. In Lord Cromer's own words, that instrument "was of necessity, to some extent, the child of opportunism. Should it eventually die and make place for some more robust, because more real, political creation, its authors need not bewail its fate."


*Eventual Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention.*

76. When this prophecy is fulfilled it is essential that His Majesty's Government should not be exposed to the charge of having been the first to tear up a convention to which a British Government was a party. On the other hand, if Egypt should denounce or repudiate that convention it must be remembered that annexation of the Soudan by Great Britain would to-day be welcomed by a majority of the population. Ten years hence this majority may have shrunk or even disappeared, twenty years hence it will almost certainly have done so, as by then a Soudanese nationalism will have come into being.

J. MURRAY.

January 4, 1923.

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14-A

APPENDIX (A).

*Declaration to Egypt.*

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared :—

1. The British protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt :—

- (a.) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
- (b.) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
- (c.) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
- (d.) The Soudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.

February 28, 1922.

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14-B

APPENDIX (B).

[E 10769/1/16]

(1.)

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)*

(No. 799. Confidential.)

*Ramleh, September 30, 1922.*

My Lord,

THE Sarwat Ministry has now spent seven months in office, and the most important line of its constructive policy, the preparation of Constitutional Government, is approaching a critical climax. I propose, therefore, to make some attempt to estimate the achievement of this Ministry, their present position and their prospects. I shall confine myself in this despatch to matters of administration, and devote a subsequent despatch to matters of politics.

The Ministry has been dominated throughout by the personalities of Sarwat and Sidki Pashas; of the rest, Ibrahim Fathy Pasha is no longer the man he was in Lord Kitchener's time, Gaafar Wali Pasha, an able, cultivated and honourable man, has, through timidity and softness, become rather a disappointment to his friends, and the remaining five, including Mustapha Maher Pasha, of whom something was hoped, have certainly failed to pull their weight.

The result has been that Sarwat Pasha, already sufficiently burdened with the duties of Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has found himself over-occupied with the work of a variety of Departments, and has, I think, been unable to give sufficient attention to his own other Ministry, the Interior, which is the keystone of the Egyptian Administration. The Ministry of Finance has been ably guided by Sidki Pasha, whose remarkable quickness of intelligence has made him Sarwat's constant and very influential adviser.

It was intended that the declaration of Egyptian independence should give a definite impetus to the Egyptianisation of Government Departments—an intention which was taken up in the Ministerial programme—and it was foreseen

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that the Administration might deteriorate in the process. When one remembers the perturbations of the preceding years, the absorption of officials in politics, the financial strain to which many of them were subjected, the intermittent strikes and the constant impatience of discipline, I do not think that there is cause for much dissatisfaction. There have been no strikes, and officials have been to a great extent freed from the intrusion of politics—at least opposition politics—into their work, and have almost settled down into the mild routine which they prefer. In so far as they are discontented, since the passing of the regrading proposals largely removed a long-standing grievance, it is because of acts of nepotism and favouritism on the part of Ministers or high Egyptian officials, which have been more frequent and flagrant than I anticipated.

In point of efficiency there has been much variation between different Departments. In the Ministry of Finance, I understand, little change is perceptible. The Minister is most anxious to prove his capacity to the world, his Egyptian Under-Secretary, Abdul Hamid Pasha Mustafa, is exceptionally competent, and full use is made of the British staff. A scheme for the gradual replacement of Englishmen by Egyptians in the Survey Department of this Ministry has been agreed upon between Sidki Pasha and Mr. Dowson. An economic council has been set up, consisting of well-selected members, of various nationalities. The financial results of the current year's working are expected to be very satisfactory.

It is otherwise in the Ministry of the Interior. The organisation of this Ministry has been much criticised in the past, and several abortive attempts have been made to reform it; its present state is, by all accounts, one of great disorder; the Under-Secretary, Ahmed Ali Pasha, is on bad terms with the Minister, and barely on speaking terms with the Egyptian Director-General of Public Security, Mohammed Badr-ed-Din Bey, who, though keen, courageous and in many ways able, has no capacity for organisation. An additional Under-Secretary of State has recently been appointed in the person of Ali Gamal-ed-Din Pasha, late Mudir of Gharbia; he is agreeable and sufficiently intelligent, and has a good record as a mudir, but it remains to be seen if he will take a proper interest in that part of his work which deals with public security.

The disorderliness of the Ministry of the Interior is reflected in provincial administration, where mudirs (in some cases through disappointment at receiving no promotion when the present Ministry took office) have been inclined to go easy and to loosen their authority. Crime is very prevalent, but the statistics show some improvement as against last year. The position has recently been changed by a series of promotions and transfers among mudirs and sub-mudirs, affecting nearly every province; two notoriously incompetent mudirs have disappeared, but others of very doubtful administrative value have been promoted for political reasons. The most interesting appointment is that of Hilmi Issa Pasha, who has become Mudir of Gharbia. He was a judge in the Native Court of Appeal, and has had a rapid career. He is reputed to be a very able man; though without administrative experience, and is likely to be heard of in the future. Reports which have reached me indicate the turbulent town of Tanta is at present well in hand.

The position of the inspectors of the interior has been much canvassed in the past, and various opinions have been held as to whether they should reside in their provinces or in Cairo, and whether their local powers should be great or small. The main dilemma has been that if their powers are widened they interfere with the authority and prestige of the mudirs, while if they are narrowed they cannot check abuses. Sarwat Pasha has decided to make them entirely non-executive. They will make at intervals complete tours of their provinces, and, while taking no action locally, furnish elaborate reports to the Ministry. To what extent the Ministry will act upon these reports remains to be seen, but I have little doubt that the present scheme, though it is one of many which have already been tried and abandoned, is most suitable for the present time.

The Department of Public Health seems to be one of those in which a rapid deterioration has set in. The Under-Secretary of State has been somewhat inconsiderate in his treatment of English officials, and his attitude has been imitated, I learn, by his subordinates; this, combined with a considerable loss of the efficiency in which they had taken a keen pride, has naturally disheartened the English officials in this administration. Among the many stories which I have heard illustrating irregularities in the Department of Public Health I may perhaps recount to your Lordship how one of two doctors at the Anti-Rabic Institute refused to take his turn of duty on Fridays, and, after alleging successively pretexts of health and of

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religion, admitted that he had been ordered to spend all his Fridays looking after the Under-Secretary's farm in the country; and how the Under-Secretary himself, in continuing his private medical practice, found it necessary, owing to the stress of his public duty, to sign a blank death certificate for a moribund patient with instructions to the relatives to fill it in; they forgot to do so, and the Egyptian sanitary inspector who refused to allow the corpse to be buried and referred the matter to the Under-Secretary repented of his zeal.

In the Ministry of Communications, English control was previously altogether preponderant, and the administration has been much upset by the methods of Mahmud Sami Pasha, the Egyptian Under-Secretary of State. Sami Pasha possesses in a high degree the Egyptian administrative vice of overcentralisation; he is very hardworking, rather arrogant and has the reputation of being anti-English. Senior Englishmen in this Ministry differ greatly in their estimates of him, some of them finding that, with a little trouble, he is reasonable and open to conviction, while others find that he interferes intolerably and ignorantly in the details of their departmental work. His relations with the general management of the State railways in particular have been, and will be again, extremely strained. Sarwat and Sidki Pashas exercised a moderating influence in the dispute, but I foresee the possibility of having to intervene in order to preserve the efficiency of the railways—a matter in which we are directly interested. I have, indeed, already spoken to Sarwat Pasha on the subject. The Coptic Minister of Communications, Wassif Simaika Pasha, seems to be a polite nullity, with a pronounced tendency to nepotism.

I possess less evidence with regard to the working of the Ministries of Justice, Education, Public Works and Agriculture.

The Minister of Justice, Mustapha Fathy Pasha, is a man of little account, and the same may be said of his Under-Secretary. It is commonly asserted that justice has become more venal than it was, but I have no actual evidence of this. Ibrahim Fathy Pasha recently inveighed to me against the corruption of the courts, but his own record as Acting Minister of Finance last year was not above reproach, and he has a violent prejudice against lawyers.

The Minister of Education, Mustapha Maher Pasha, is a man of intelligence and provincial influence, but hardly of Ministerial capacity. As an ex-mudir, he is disposed, I understand, to excessive centralisation, so that business is much retarded, and he spends much of his time in contradicting his own orders. This Ministry, as was to be expected, is being rapidly Egyptianised in its higher posts, but I am told that the Minister is courteous and considerate in his dealings with his English officials. The students in the Government schools have shown an improvement in their behaviour since the present Ministry took office, but they are still unamenable to discipline, and likely to give trouble in the future.

The Minister of Public Works, Hussein Pasha Wassif, is a very agreeable and fairly competent man, and his Under-Secretary, Abdul Hamid Bey Suleiman, has been marked out as one of the most promising of the younger Egyptian officials. He is scarcely up to the level of his post, but works hard and creditably; though I fear there is discontent among the British officials of this Ministry, who are mostly men with considerable technical pride, and who have become accustomed to almost entire administrative predominance in the past.

In the Ministry of Agriculture, the Under-Secretary of State, Mohammed Abul Futouh Pasha, is well spoken of.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it was previously under Egyptian control, was of little importance and highly incompetent. It now appears to be reasonably efficient, and rapidly becoming more so, and it maintains very cordial relations with the Residency. Seifullah Yousry Pasha has hitherto merited his selection as Under-Secretary, and I have not observed that he is justifying in Egypt the reputation for intrigue which he acquired in Turkey.

On the whole I do not think we need be discouraged. It must be remembered that during the forty years of British occupation the semi-Turkish governing classes in this country have softened and lost much of the governing sense, or turned to other pursuits; the younger generations of officials, more Egyptian or Egyptianised, have become less corrupt and more instructed, but we have had no great success in the difficult task of investing them with moral courage and a sense of responsibility. We have vastly increased their responsibilities, at a moment when it was required to guide through strong cross-currents of politics an Administration overstrained and dilapidated by four years of war and three years of civil tumult. Not only have they been deprived of much experienced British advice, but the new conditions have made it difficult for British officials to render a full measure of assistance.

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If the machinery of government has worked slowly, it must not be forgotten that this is a constant phenomenon during the Egyptian summer, and that for six weeks all the business of the Council of Ministers was held up by the King.

The faults of ignorance, vanity, moral cowardice and favouritism have been apparent, but I hope that a nucleus has been found of hardworking, honest and capable officials, who will not be above learning by experience, and that the forecasts of a rapidly developing chaos in Egyptian administration, which were made in some quarters when we abolished the protectorate, will be falsified.

The despatch in which I shall endeavour to survey the political situation will reach your Lordship by the next bag.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,  
High Commissioner.

[E 11477/1/16]

(2.)

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 836. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, October 15, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 799 of the 30th September. In the present despatch I shall endeavour to give some account of the political progress of the Sarwat Ministry and of the political situation in this country.

When the Ministry took office the breakdown of the negotiations with the Egyptian delegation and the resignation of Adly Pasha had been followed by a period of political tension with no Ministry, and His Majesty's Government had decided that the only feasible way of proceeding with their policy of establishing normal and orderly government in an independent Egypt, with security for Imperial necessities, was to make a unilateral declaration terminating the protectorate and reserving British rights in respect of four essential requirements.

This declaration enabled a Ministry to be formed of those elements of Egyptian Nationalism which repudiated methods of violence or pure obstruction, and the Ministry undertook, while respecting the reservations, to establish an Administration genuinely under Egyptian control, to prepare for the abolition of martial law, and in particular to elaborate a Constitution providing for Ministerial responsibility to a Parliament whose creation was a necessary antecedent to any fruitful renewal of negotiations with His Majesty's Government. They had sufficient sense of reality to know that the half was more than the whole, and sufficient patriotism and courage to act upon their knowledge.

Some of their difficulties were already obvious. They commanded no great personal popularity, they were deprived of the active assistance of Adly Pasha, and the respect and prestige attaching to him, and of a group of able and rising men who were his partisans, and they were certain to encounter the bitter hostility of the Zaghlulist and Watanist parties. Of the Zaghlulists some held political views not greatly differing from those of the Ministry, but were passionately attached to their own leader; while others, as well as the Watanists, falsely held that Great Britain was the enemy, and imagined that the profitable policy was to refuse any sort of compromise, and to repudiate the suggestion that we had any sort of rights in Egypt or the Soudan.

The general line of attack which the opponents of the Ministry would take were also evident. They would pretend that Sarwat Pasha had treacherously accepted a fallacious shadow of independence, that he was the creature of Great Britain, that he intended not to secure the abolition of martial law, but to exist by its support; and, ignoring the fact that the main object of his programme was to prepare a Constitution, to summon a Parliament and to make Ministers responsible to it, they would accuse him of being irresponsible and unrepresentative. The extremists among them would provoke or commit acts of violence either out of blind political passion or with the more subtle object of provoking the use of martial law, and thus discrediting the Ministry's intention of procuring its removal.

The Ministry has, on the whole, faced such attacks, and even considerable personal danger, with courage. They have pursued their policy obstinately, and if they have pursued it more slowly than might have been hoped, it is to be remembered that they have had to proceed warily in the face of watchful and unscrupulous opponents.

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Allowing the press almost every licence of political abuse, they have been obliged to spend much of their time in forestalling, diverting or countering attack.

The Ministry have converted—too quickly for purposes of efficiency—an administration in which, speaking generally, there was a preponderantly foreign guidance into one which is genuinely under Egyptian control.

They have not yet fully prepared the ground for the withdrawal of martial law. It may be believed by critics in England of the Egyptian Government, and it is pretended by critics here, that martial law is little else than an instrument by which we still impose our will upon a country we have professed to make independent. If Sarwat Pasha, they say, had truly desired independence, he would have performed the easy act of passing an Indemnity Law, and we should immediately have been obliged to withdraw martial law. It is not such a simple matter as that. British martial law in Egypt is in the nature of an Egyptian Defence of the Realm Act, and only by its help could the Egyptian Government, during an abnormal period, overcome, as it was obliged to overcome, its legislative weakness in the face of capitulatory privileges. Martial law was thus used extensively for economic purposes, and economic conditions are not yet normal; it is through martial law that the import of sugar is controlled, and that landlords are prevented from exacting exorbitant house-rents. No other means have yet been found of making foreign subjects contribute towards the provision of night-watchmen, or of regulating through passport control the admission of persons into Egypt. In other respects, martial law has supplemented the native Penal Code of which a revision was compiled two years ago, but is now not entirely suitable for promulgation. Nor is the preparation of an Act of Indemnity without its technical difficulties, for, as your Lordship is aware, the most eminent legal opinions in this country are divided upon the question whether it is necessary, in order that the validity of such an Act should be recognised by the Mixed Courts, that it should have received the approval of the Capitulatory Powers.

It is true, none the less, that the existence of martial law has been of political value to the present Ministry. The Zaghulist "Wafd" issued a manifesto which constituted an offence against the Native Penal Code; the Government might have prosecuted the authors, but would probably have avoided a prosecution of such political importance. The manifesto was directed not only against the Ministry, but also against His Majesty's Government and the British military authority in Egypt, and constituted equally an offence against a military proclamation. The authors were therefore quite properly prosecuted under martial law, but the incidental advantage to the Ministry was such as to give rise, not unnaturally, to allegations that the Ministry could not stand without the support of martial law and that I was interfering in party politics.

The Ministry will reap further political advantage from martial law should it be shown that their opponents have been concerned in outrages upon Englishmen, for the investigation of which the use of martial law has proved indispensable.

It is hoped, however, that the withdrawal of martial law need not now be long delayed; for us it is, politically, rather an impediment than otherwise, for it makes it most difficult for us to disentangle ourselves from internal politics and from invitations to support, in the interest of order, whatever Ministry may be in office. I shall revert to this point later.

The third and principal plank in Sarwat Pasha's programme was the preparation of a democratic Constitution, to be followed by a general election. One of the first acts of the Ministry was to appoint a Constitution Committee under the presidency of Rushdy Pasha; opponents of the Ministry were invited to sit on the commission, but refused, and the members, though representative men otherwise, are not representative in variety of political opinion. This commission has sat persistently through the greater part of the summer, when official business in Egypt usually becomes almost stagnant, and is now on the verge of finishing its work. The Constitution will be criticised by the Opposition, less on its merits than as being made by the Government and not by Parliament. On the other hand, before Sarwat Pasha will be able to complete this part of the programme, which he submitted to King Fuad upon accepting office, it is probable that he will have to overcome strong opposition from the King himself, who is expected to be unwilling to accept the Constitution in the form in which it is likely to be presented by Sarwat Pasha.

Meanwhile, Sarwat Pasha seems to have sufficiently redeemed this third undertaking also.

There is, however, another ground for discontent with the Sarwat Ministry which seems to me to have ample justification. Partly with a view to increasing their personal popularity and obtaining political support, and partly, I suppose, owing to a

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prevalent reluctance to deny the demands of relatives and protégés, they have made a great number of highly arbitrary appointments and promotions. Though some of these may bring them political advantage and provide convenient channels for the exercise of power, there can be no doubt that in earning the thanks of one man they have incurred the resentment of fifty, and that, while they have become unpopular among their officials, they have not established at large the respect which accompanies a reputation for justice.

The relations of the Egyptian Government with foreign representatives here appear to be friendly and correct. I am not aware that any difficulties of importance have arisen, but I shall observe with interest the negotiations with the German Minister regarding the Egyptian articles of the Treaty of Versailles and the western frontier negotiations with Italy.

Their relations with myself have been most cordial, and, in spite of their refusal to accept my scheme for the retirement and compensation of British officials, they have, in general, shown a friendly willingness to meet our views and to accept suggestions, and where matters of principle were at stake they have been ready to seek some provisional and practical way out of a difficulty. Some patience, however, is often required to pass the time between Sarwat Pasha's very prompt verbal acquiescences and their practical application.

The Egyptian Government have, I think, been unwise in appointing no diplomatic or consular representatives abroad; such appointments would have emphasised the reality of Egyptian independence, and would have afforded a means of countering anti-Ministerial propaganda in England and elsewhere. They are, perhaps, more interested in diplomatic than in consular representation, and they have been precluded from making any appointment to London by the King's desire to appoint Adly Pasha, who, for his part, is determined to remain in Egypt. Seifullah Yousri Pasha, Mahmud Fakhry Pasha (ex-Minister of Finance and the King's son-in-law) and Ismail Sidky Pasha have been proposed, and successively refused by His Majesty; Mahmud Fakhry Pasha has recently been proposed again, but has himself refused the appointment.

The course of the relations between King Fuad and his Prime Minister has been interesting. Until eighteen months ago the King was known to entertain an acute personal dislike for Sarwat Pasha, and he did not easily acquiesce in Sarwat's inclusion in the Adly Ministry of last year. During that summer and autumn, however, while Sarwat was acting as Prime Minister, their relations appeared to improve—helped, one may presume, by the King's acquisition at that time of certain valuable properties of the ex-Khedive—and that your Lordship will remember that by December His Majesty had become most anxious that Sarwat should succeed Adly as Prime Minister. It may be supposed that Sarwat regulated his behaviour towards the King with an eye to this eventuality.

The advent of Sarwat Pasha to power, with a constitutional programme, introduced the elements of certain discord, and during the summer the King and his Prime Minister have been drifting apart, the former towards the consolidation of royal prerogatives, the latter towards the constitutional limitation of the monarchy. The crisis of July and August, reported to you in my despatches No. 671 of the 21st August and No. 799 of the 30th September, were a phase of this constitutional struggle, and the more recent disagreement over the King's *lèse-majesté* law had the same origin.

I now pass from summarising the progress of the Ministry since it took office to considering the political conditions prevalent in Egypt to-day.

The commonest general charge against the Sarwat Ministry is that it is unrepresentative. It is, of course, like all preceding Egyptian Ministries, unrepresentative in the sense that it does not represent any electoral or otherwise ascertained expression of majority opinion, but the charge is also true in the sense that the Ministry is not really representative of that large section of opinion which in the main shares its views. It is a group in a loosely arranged party of practical Constitutional Nationalists, which had the courage to come forward when, upon the rupture of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, the most prominent representative of these views was driven into retirement, and another group, largely composed of ex-Zaghlulists, from motives of prudence and of personal attachment to Adly Pasha, preferred to remain in the background. The party, if it can be called by that name, draws its strength from its constitutional principles, and the belief that it is the party of order. It finds its support among the more level-headed of the professional classes, and, especially on the second of these two grounds, among the land-owners large and small, who are not, however, a politically-minded class. I have seen it alleged in certain English papers, with reference to our difficulties in Turkey, that this is a party of Turkish pashas; such a nomenclature is many years out of date.

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The Sarwat group look upon themselves, and are regarded by the party, as a detachment holding and consolidating a position until the proper moment arrives for the main body of their friends to come to their support and to absorb them. They have met with a fair measure of success. They inspire the respect which is associated with fear, but not the veneration in which Zaghlu Pasha is held by his supporters, or the respect which Adly Pasha enjoys for his probity and dignity. They have not the qualities which command popular favour, and their equivocal and petty methods of administration have alienated the personal sympathies of many of the party, and aroused discontent among the Government officials.

The moment when they will merge into the main body of the party has been intended, if I rightly understand their plans, to be after the elections, though there is a recent tendency to believe that a more opportune time might be upon the King's signature of the Constitution. What I have hitherto loosely termed a "party" is intended to become more organic under the leadership of Adly Pasha, who is already maturing his plans, in association with such men as Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, Hassan Abdul Razik Pasha, Lutfi Bey-el-Sayed, Dr. Hafiz Afifi and Mohammed Ali Bey, four of them members of the original Zaghluist Wafii. They have founded a newspaper, which, it is stated, already has 15,000 shareholders, and which is expected to start publication on the 23rd October. The details of the party programme will then become known. I observe that in some quarters in England the assumption is made that because Adly Pasha is founding a party he is withdrawing his support from the Sarwat Ministry. I believe there is no ground for this assumption. The scheme, I am given to understand, is for the party to make its electoral campaign in collaboration with the Government, and, if their anticipations are fulfilled, for Sarwat Pasha to resign after the elections, with a view to Adly Pasha, as the leader of the victorious party, becoming Prime Minister and presumably finding an important place in his Ministry for Sarwat. They count, through the backing of the landed classes, upon the election and support of the strong country candidate in all or nearly all the rural constituencies, and upon a sweeping victory over the Zaghluists.

They are, I suspect, over-confident; and indeed Adly Pasha himself, who is always more prone to see his difficulties than the way out of them, seemed in a recent conversation with me to be less happy than, for instance, the Ministers or Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, and was seeking for some possible means of conciliating the more moderate Zaghluists. But, on the whole, unless any important new factor is introduced, the omens seem favourable. I should here observe that Mohammed Mahmud Pasha's future attitude is open to some doubt. He is on the wing of the Adly Party and noticeably critical, in conversation, of the Sarwat Administration.

The Zaghluist Party is no longer what it was. Its men of mark are in exile and their feeble successors are in prison. The existence of a "Wafd" is now hardly felt, and, though money is found for engaging counsel in England to contest the legality of Zaghlu Pasha's detention, it is supposed that the party funds are much depleted. All the hopes of the party are centred in the return of Zaghlu Pasha to Egypt. He is still the idol of the populace, the beloved leader of a great part of the professional classes, and to the wilder students a martyr. To most landowners, on the other hand, he is still a bogey, and to the fellahen either a vague hero of their race or an ominous destroyer of the foundations of their existence. And yet he is a little faded. To some of his followers, such as Amin Bey Yusuf and M. Louis Fanous, it now seems desirable to paint him in new colours as the true partisan of an understanding with Great Britain; but they have been disowned by the managers of the party in Egypt for painting a picture which contrasts too violently with the hostility to Great Britain unremittently expressed by the party organs in Egypt.

There is evidence, however, of a tendency in the Zaghluist Party to divide into two wings—united by their veneration of Zaghlu and their animosity to the present Ministry, but divided in their view of the relations of Egypt to Great Britain. A large proportion of prominent Copts appear to remain faithful to Zaghlu, presumably on the strength of the guarantees which he is believed to have personally given to them, and many of these are to be found on the more moderate wing.

Not only has the party lost much of its active force through the absence of its leaders, but the public mind seems to have become gradually less responsive to its activities; even among the students the high political tension of the last four years has appreciably relaxed. Annual occasions which the Zaghluists are accustomed to celebrate have this year been more tamely recognised; the majority of the telegrams which poured out of Egypt when Zaghlu arrived at Gibraltar were signed, though nominally sometimes on behalf of large bodies of people, by individuals of little

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significance or repute; and I am told by competent observers that the departure of Mme. Zaghlul from Cairo last week, when the Government did nothing to forestall any display of spontaneous or mercenary zeal, though it was very largely attended, was generally viewed as a public show rather than as a political event. Propaganda in favour of Zaghlulism has, except on special occasions, largely given place to abuse of the present Government, and, indeed, Sarwat Pasha's chief danger now lies rather in dislike for his administration (and in another cause, to which I shall presently allude) than in enthusiasm for another party.

This is not to say that if Zaghlul Pasha returned to Egypt to-morrow he could not do what he liked with the country. I do not know what his inclinations as an exile may be, but I have no doubt that, once restored, he would be a disruptive and not a constructive force.

The old Nationalist, or Watanist, Party has been swamped by Zaghlulism. Whereas Zaghlulism is a genuine Egyptian nationalist movement which has overreached itself and lost many of its saner representatives, through the reciprocal incitations of its more arrogant or malicious leaders and its more turbulent supporters, the Watanist Party maintains its Turkish affinities, its more Islamic than Egyptian outlook and its contact with the ex-Khedive. It finds, however, many points of common ground with the extremist Zaghlulists; they share its uncompromising rejection of any British connection whatever, and are indistinguishable from the Watanists in their enthusiasm for the achievements of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, whose name received a full share of ovation from the crowds which watched the departure of Mme. Zaghlul. The Watanists may applaud Zaghlul for their own purposes, but their leaders are naturally glad to be rid of a predominant rival. This party is probably relatively stronger among Egyptians abroad than in Egypt itself, but it draws strength naturally from Al Azhar University and from the Alexandria district, where there is much Turkish blood, and where the prestige of Prince Omar Toussoun and Mohammed Pasha Said is particularly felt. It is largely under Watanist influence (and in accordance with the traditional policy of the party) that preparations are being made for a demonstration in honour of the Minister of France, whom it is convenient at the present juncture to take at her own valuation as the friend and protector of Islam.

Above these parties, as His Majesty is fond of reiterating, stands King Fuad; his attitude is interesting and, I am bound to add, somewhat equivocal.

Until the time of the Tewfik Nessim Ministry, Sultan Fuad had remained almost a cypher, scarcely exerting himself publicly except to repress a bid for political influence on moderate lines by Prince Omar Toussoun, but the retirement which a lack of personal courage enforced upon him must have been distasteful to a man possessing the love of power which has characterised his family. Tewfik Nessim Pasha, with loyalty and prudence, brought his Sovereign into public notice; and this policy was continued by Adly and Sarwat Pashas, who have made persistent and successful efforts to bring the Palace into contact with the Egyptian people and to ensure large and representative attendances at receptions.

Already in the spring of 1921 the Sultan felt himself strong enough to attempt to oppose the formation of the Adly Ministry, but it was not until the summer of 1922 that he settled into the practice of endeavouring to dictate to his Council of Ministers in matters other than those affecting his own finances. I have mentioned already in this despatch, and recounted more fully elsewhere, the salient instances of this practice, and I may add that a new issue has just arisen, reminiscent of the reign of Abbas Hilmi, concerning decorations. The King desires to alter the statutes regulating the award of the "Étoile militaire" in such a way as to place this decoration wholly in his own gift, and to institute a new order, which he has elected to call the Order of Ismail, to take precedence over the Order of the Nile, and also to be wholly in his own gift. Sarwat Pasha, mindful, perhaps, of the declaration of King Fuad's autocratic father, "Dorénavant je veux gouverner avec et par mon Conseil des Ministres," is intending to stand out against this proposal, and in so doing he has my approval.

The King has not thus declared himself without bringing about relations of persistent and acute tension with a Ministry pledged, with his own sanction, to constitutionalism. He tells me frankly that all his Ministers hate him, and what Sarwat Pasha now feels about the King is indicated by some remarks, a copy of which I transmit herewith for your Lordship's information, which he made last month to a member of my staff. These feelings are at present shared by the leading adherents of Adly Pasha.

This open display of autocracy dates from the appointment of Tewfik Nessim Pasha  
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to be chief of the King's Cabinet. The King had desired to appoint him last year, but I understand that Adly Pasha prevented it, foreseeing that the result might be to shift the political centre from the Ministry to the Palace. When, after Sarwat Pasha took office, the King renewed his offer to Nessim Pasha, the latter was most unwilling to accept, and proposed conditions which he imagined would not be entertained; they were, however, agreed to (though I am told that they have not in fact been fulfilled), and Nessim Pasha entered the King's service. His Majesty has made full use of the loyalty of this strict and conservative statesman. I have reason to know that Nessim Pasha feels the embarrassment of his position, but he is supported by his devotion to the throne and his genuine dislike for the favouritism which characterises the Sarwat Administration, and from which, when Prime Minister, he was himself sternly averse.

About the time when the Sarwat Ministry took office there were indications that the Zaghulists, deprived of any weighty leadership, were attempting to establish contact with Adly Pasha; they met with no success and then made overtures to Nessim Pasha, but there is no reason to suppose that he gave them any encouragement. When, however, he was appointed to the Palace, it was part of his duty of establishing the position of the throne to place the King in contact with all sections of opinion, and during the latter part of the summer deputations and petitions to the Palace by members of the Zaghulist Party became noticeably frequent. I was assured that, though the King, being above parties, could not turn away any Egyptians from his door, no encouragement was being given to the Zaghulists.

I regret that, in the face of cumulative evidence to the contrary, I am no longer able to accept these assurances. At the King's accession-day reception on the 9th October, His Majesty took occasion openly to rebuke mudirs for having, as he alleged, used their influence in favour of the Adly Party, and I understand that he received the present so-called leader of the Wafd, a certain Saadi-el-Masri Bey, with marked cordiality. I hear on all hands that emissaries of the Palace proclaim pro-Zaghulist sentiments and are in close touch with Zaghulist newspapers; in a recent issue of the Zaghulist "Liberté," whose suspension by the Ministry was the chief immediate cause of a recent crisis, the photographs of the King and Mme. Zaghul appeared in conspicuous juxtaposition, and an evidently inspired article congratulated His Majesty on the courage which he must have required in order, for political reasons, to have concealed so long from the people his real opinions.

His Majesty, of course, has no Zaghulist sympathies; Zaghul Pasha, he is confident, is well out of the way, and the moment he has chosen for encouraging Zaghul's Party is significantly the moment when the party's fortunes are clearly waning and those of the Adly Party are in the ascendant.

The logic of events forces me to the conclusion that the dominant motive of the King's actions has been jealousy of any rival power, whether in an organ of Government, an individual statesman, or a member of his own family, and that, for him, to be above parties is to ride upon their nicely-balanced dissensions.

It is in these circumstances that Sarwat Pasha is about to ask the King to sign a Constitution. I understand that the King's present intention is to reply that he is unable to sign a Constitution drawn up by an unrepresentative body of men, and that he proposes to refer the matter to another body, representative of all shades of political opinion and of every liberal profession, having only this in common, that they will all be nominated by His Majesty, or, more correctly speaking, by the Ministry which he intends to bring into office. This refusal would have the double result of Sarwat's resigning and the promulgation of the Constitution being delayed. I am informed by Mohammed Sherei'i Pasha, who was recently charged by the King to form a Court or Conservative Party, but failed to discover its elements, that the view which he was to expound was that Egypt is not yet ripe for parliamentary institutions, and that a year or two of firm autocracy is still required. There is indeed much to be said for this view, but I see little prospect of a firm autocracy maintaining itself in the Egypt of to-day without external support, and our experience of the exercise of personal power by other rulers of the dynasty of Mohammed Aly suggests that it would not be used for the benefit of the people of Egypt.

The resignation of Sarwat Pasha would be followed, I understand, according to the King's intentions, by a Tewfik Nessim Ministry, formed of very much the same group which composed his previous Ministry. Administratively they might well be better than the present Government, but I distrust the political implications.

A vicious element in the present situation in Egypt, so far as we are directly concerned, appears to me to lie in the maintenance of martial law, which in itself seems most

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anomalous to outside observers, and which involves us in using it in an independent country to support a Government which rests on no representative sanction, and, in effect, to help the Ministerial party against the Opposition.

The condition of escaping from this situation, and also the condition of establishing on a treaty basis those relations with an independent Egypt which it is the aim of the policy of His Majesty's Government to achieve, is, it seems to me, the setting up of constitutional government. The accession to power of a Court party means delay of unknown duration. The necessity of obtaining pledges in regard to matters of detail implied by the reservations, and our ultimate responsibility for maintaining order, are calculated to entangle us with the new Ministry, which, so far as can be foreseen, would either find very little support in the country, or would be forced to look for support to Zaghulist elements, whose desires they would hardly wish or be able to satisfy. In most hostile opposition to the King and to such a Ministry, and, by implication, it is to be feared, also to us, would be found the very strong party of reasonable and progressive views which centres about Adly Pasha, Sarwat Pasha and their associates.

In my opinion, therefore, it would be advantageous for us, for Egypt, and, I may add, for the King himself that the promulgation of the Constitution should not be delayed.

I have just received from the Prime Minister an advance copy of the draft Constitution, which has been handed to him, not yet officially, by the Constitution Commission. I will send copies to your Lordship by the next bag.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in (2).

*Remarks by Sarwat Pasha.*

SARWAT *loquitur* :—

"I am going to tell you plainly what my plans are as far as I have formulated them. The Constitution will be finished and ready by the end of September. I shall take a fortnight or so to consider it; I shall then discuss it with the King, and, presuming that we arrive at a satisfactory decision, the Constitution will be promulgated at the end of October; November and December will be taken up with the preliminaries of the elections; the elections will be held in January, and Parliament will meet, say, in February.

"The one difficulty lies in the discussions with the King. I have always been respectful to him. I have done what he wanted whenever I could without harm to the principles for which I am working. I have given way on all matters not of vital importance. His Majesty has at times made it very difficult for me to keep my temper, but I have only failed once: that was when he sent for me and presented me with the law about the Khedive. I was a little hurt, naturally, at having a ready-made law thrust at me over the table; but when it was accompanied by the words 'There, take that; see that it passes quickly, and no changes,' it was too much for me, and I said: 'I presume your Majesty will at least allow me to read it.' I also said to Said Zulfikar: 'Please tell His Majesty that I am a Prime Minister, not a functionary, and that I come here to give advice, not to receive orders.' Otherwise I have always been as pleasant as it lies in me to be.

"Don't make any mistake about the King. He is nice enough and intelligent enough, but he has much too high an opinion of his own mental powers and he has no idea of the rôle of a constitutional monarch. He is an intriguer—I could forgive him much if he intrigued well, but everything that he does shows clearly the end he has in view—and he talks too much. It must be as clear to you as it is to me that all these petty incidents that arise every few days are only of importance in so far as they are connected with his main idea, which is to avoid by any possible means the inclusion in the Constitution of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. This is a point on which I shall never give way. It is the one thing for which we have fought, the one thing about which there is unanimity in Egypt; and further, not only in the agreement of the 28th February, but in all the preliminary negotiations, it is a clear condition of the grant by the British Government of independence. Personally, I would rather go back to direct British rule than be subject to an autocratic despotism of the type which the King wishes to create for himself. In the old days we used to play off the Khedive against the British and the British against the Khedive. The King is trying that same

old Oriental game of playing off each party against the other and coming out on the top himself. He has used us to down the Zaghlulists, he now wants to use another party to down us; but times have changed, and it won't do.

"I will give you an instance. You know all about the new party that Adly is forming with Mohamed Mahmoud, Afifi, &c. They are in fact working hand-in-hand with us. When I took office I did so with the full knowledge of Adly and under a complete understanding with him. You asked me if, in the event of the Constitution being made operative and Parliament meeting, Adly would take over the presidency. All I can tell you is that Sarwat is Adly, and Adly is Sarwat, and together we shall do what we think is for the best. Once the Parliament is working, no politician can hope to do any good unless he is backed by a party. We are forming one party now, and Adly's prestige is essential to that party. As you know, the idea some months ago was to send Adly to London as Egyptian Minister there. He would not go. He was perfectly right; he is wanted here, and I am glad he refused. The King clings always to the idea of getting Adly to London. Why? Because he wants to get him out of Egypt and break up his following. I am not speaking without proof. I have told you several times that I am most anxious to get Ministers appointed to London, Paris and Rome. Again and again I have spoken to the King about it. I have suggested Mahmud Fakhry, Gaafar Wali, Yousry Semaika, Tewfik Nessim and several others. I have left the choice to him, and he will do nothing. Take the case of London. I suggested long ago sending Mahmud Fakhry, his own son-in-law, to London. He is a good fellow, pleasant, polished and all that, but he is not quite the type of man we want in London. He hasn't the real political sense. What reason do you think the King gave me for not sending him? He was afraid Fakhry's wife—his daughter—might go wrong in London. Then I proposed Yousry. Yousry would have been admissible. He has the real political sense—more so than any other Egyptian. He would have gone far in London, as he speaks English like an Englishman, has all your manners and customs, and can talk to you on your own level. The King would have had none of it, because, he said, the suggestion had undoubtedly been made to me by the Residency. Then I proposed Sidky. His Majesty asked for three days to consider the proposition. I saw him yesterday, and he said he would consider the matter further, as Sidky was too valuable as Finance Minister for us to lose him. Nonsense! How can he say this to me when we all know that he hates Sidky and when he tried not so long ago to turn us both out of office? I will give you another proof of the trend of the King's ideas and of his desire to break up the Adly Party. The other day Sherei Pasha—you have heard of his new party, the "Conservatives"—came to me and told me that the King had sent for Demerdache and himself and had charged them with the formation of a new party as a counterblast to the Adly Party. They were to draw up a manifesto directed against Ministerial responsibility and get it signed by as many solid notables as they could. How, asked Sherei, was he to get people to sign against popular opinion, and what the devil was he to do? I suggested he draw up some inoffensive formulæ and getting as many people as he could to sign. He did so, and no one has heard any more of him. Apart from this, the King tells anyone who visits him that the Adly Party is dangerous, that it is working against the Sarwat Government, that it is split into factions—in fact anything he can think of to discredit it.

"I have told you all this so that you can understand the sort of difficulties with which I am faced daily. The work of government is delayed, and the administration of the country is hampered because the King will interest himself in the smallest matters—appointments of minor officials, questions connected with the law, the Wakfs, the press. I need not remind you of the 'Liberté' incident. I have been disgusted with the whole thing, and I would ask nothing better than to retire from this weary contest with honour. You will remember that I told you at the beginning of August that I was weary of it all and wished to resign, but I thought it my duty to see the thing through if I could, so now I shall carry out the programme if I can, believing it to be for the good of Egypt. I have, I think, been very patient over my difficulties with the Palace, and I am very sorry that Lord Allenby, to whom we owe so much, should have been so greatly troubled with them. I shall continue to be patient, and I shall endeavour to please the King so far as I can. In order to try and smooth things over I shall, if he consents to Sidky going to London, offer to take Tewfik Nessim into the Cabinet in his place and make him vice-president of the Council of Ministers. I shall also offer to take into the Ministry one other of the King's men. As to the presence of Tewfik Nessim in the Cabinet as a political asset, I do not set much value on that. Personally, he is a friend of mine—a clever, sound, loyal man, and I shall work with him with pleasure;

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but the appointment may ease matters with the King and facilitate the discussion of the Constitution. If the King would only tell me the points on which he is dissatisfied with the Constitution I think I could meet him on most of them except the question of Ministerial responsibility. Adly, by the way, is very confident that we shall succeed on that point, as popular feeling is so strong and the wishes of the British Government are clear. I am not quite so hopeful, but I do feel that I have one very strong weapon, in that it would be extremely awkward for His Majesty if the Ministry resigned, because he would not agree to a Liberal Constitution. I do not at all want to take that step, but I shall take it if necessary.

"As to the immediate situation, I don't think there is much to be done in the next few days. It is for the King to move. I have left entirely in his hands the question of the appointments abroad. Let us await events."

September 8, 1922.

APPENDIX (C).

*Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt relative to the Future Administration of the Soudan.*

WHEREAS certain provinces in the Soudan which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive;

And whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration of, and for the making of, laws for the said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition of large portions thereof, and the varying requirements of different localities;

And whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation;

And whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Suakin may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent;

Now, is is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned, duly authorised for that purpose, as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The word "Soudan" in this agreement means all the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which—

1. Have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or
2. Which, having before the late rebellion in the Soudan been administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, acting in concert; or
3. Which may hereafter be reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert.

ARTICLE 2.

The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, throughout the Soudan [except in the town of Suakin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used].\*

ARTICLE 3.

The supreme military and civil command in the Soudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the "Governor-General of the Soudan." He shall be appointed by Khedivial decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and shall be removed only by Khedivial decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

\* The passages in square brackets were cancelled by a subsequent convention concluded on the 10th July, 1899.

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ARTICLE 4.

Laws, as also orders and regulations, with the full force of law, for the good government of the Soudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by proclamation of the Governor-General. Such laws, orders and regulations may apply to the whole or any named part of the Soudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing law or regulation.

All such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's agent and consul-general in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive.

ARTICLE 5.

No Egyptian law, decree, Ministerial arrêté, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated, shall apply to the Soudan or any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by proclamation of the Governor-General in manner hereinbefore provided.

ARTICLE 6.

In the definition by proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Soudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Power.

ARTICLE 7.

Import duties on entering the Soudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory; but in the case of goods entering the Soudan at Suakin, or any other port on the Red Sea littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Soudan at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by proclamation.

ARTICLE 8.

The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognised for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Soudan [except in the town of Suakin].\*

ARTICLE 9.

Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined by proclamation, the Soudan [with the exception of the town of Suakin]\* shall be and remain under martial law.

ARTICLE 10.

No consuls, vice-consuls or consular agents shall be accredited in respect of, nor allowed to reside in, the Soudan without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE 11.

The importation of slaves into the Soudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by proclamation for the enforcement of this regulation.

ARTICLE 12.

It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd July, 1890, in respect of the import, sale and manufacture of firearms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors.

Done in Cairo, the 19th January, 1899.

(Signed)

CROMER.  
BOUTROS GHALI.

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\* The passages in square brackets were cancelled by a subsequent convention concluded on the 10th July, 1899.