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لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع"
"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/PS/20/283

١٩٠٨ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

مجلد واحد (٢٢ ورقة)

الملكية العامة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر




حول هذا السجل

دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع، يافع، الحواشب، والعلوي؛ الحدود
التركية؛ الأشخاص العابرين للحدود: بالإضافة إلى بعض الملاحظات على السياسة في الأراضي
الداخلية، كتبها النقيب هارولد فينتون جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي في الضالع سابقاً، في ٠٦ ديسمبر
١٩٠٧.


تركز الدراسة في الأساس على أمير الضالع (الأمير شايف) وعلاقاته مع قبائله ورعاياه، وكذلك بعض
القبائل المجاورة والحكومة البريطانية. ناقشت الدراسة أيضاً العلاقات المتبادلة بين قبائل
حالمين، و عفود [ردفان]، ومعفاري، ومحرابي، وحميدي، وجبل جحاف.

- علاقات أمير الضالع مع القبائل وكيف أثرت عليه؛
 - العلاقات البريطانية مع الأمير عبر الوكيل السياسي في الضالع. تتضمن هذه الدراسة نقاشاً حول العمل القيم الذي يقدمه المستوصف الموجود في الضالع وحول العمل الذي قام به العاملون بالمستوصف عند زيارتهم للقرى لتقديم المساعدة الطبية؛
 - يركز الهيكل القبلي للمنطقة على دور الطبقة الكهنوتية "السيد"؛ وضع النساء داخل المجتمع والدور المحتمل الذي يمكن أن يلعبه تعليم الحكام القبليين الذين سيتولون الحكم في المستقبل؛
 - نظام دفع ذوي الرواتب للزعماء والحكام المحليين لدخول منطقة في البلد المجاورة؛ وهل هناك قيمة لهذه العملية أم لا؛
 - الحدود التركية وتأثيرها على سياسات الضالع والأمير. كما تتضمن هذه الدراسة نقاشاً بخصوص القبائل الحدودية، وافتقارها للاهتمام بترسيم الحدود وعدم معرفتها لمعنى ذلك، وولائها للدول على طول جانبي الحدود؛
 - شؤون الحواشب والعلاقات البريطانية مع القبيلة؛
 - العلاقات مع قبيلة العلوي، بما في ذلك نظرة عامة على العلاقات العلوية-القتيبية؛
 - تجارة الأسلحة في المنطقة؛
 - شؤون المنطقة القريبة من يافع، بما في ذلك المناطق التي أشارت إليها البريطانيون باسم يافع العليا ويافع السفلى.
- طُبعت الدراسة في المطبعة المركزية الحكومية في بومباي، في ١٩٠٨ بناءً على توصية من اللواء إيرنست ديبراث، المقيم السياسي في عدن.

"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[أمامي] (٤٨/١)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أَعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[خلفي] (٤٨/٢)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أَعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[صلب] (٤٨/٣)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[حافة] (٤٨/٤)




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وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[رأس] (٤٨/٥)




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وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[ذيل] (٤٨/٦)




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وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[أمامي-داخلي] (٤٨/٧)




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[٢و] (٤٨/٨)




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وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[ظ٢] (٤٨/٩)




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[و٣] (٤٨/١٠)




"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[ظ٣] (٤٨/١١)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أعددتها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[و٤] (٤٨/١٢)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أَعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[ظ٤] (٤٨/١٣)



"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[و] (٤٨/١٤)

MONOGRAPH ON THE HINTERLAND OF ADEN AS TOUCHING
THE STATES OF DTHALA, YAFU', HAUSHABI AND ALAWI;
THE TURKISH FRONTIER; THE TRANSBORDER PEOPLE:
TOGETHER WITH A FEW REMARKS ON HINTERLAND
POLICY.

I intend in these pages to touch on our relations with the Hinterland since first the Boundary Commission went up in January 1902 and to carry my observations up to the time of our withdrawal in September 1907. The first Political Officer, the late Captain Warneford, was shot at Am Rija in Subehi territory on 3rd March 1904. Major J. W. B. Merewether left in December 1904 after seven months' stay and I succeeded him, remaining in charge till the evacuation last September, a period of about three years. The views I express are naturally my own and will not necessarily be endorsed by the Residency. *Quot homines tot sententiae.* A three years' experience of Hinterland affairs will justify my holding opinions.


2. Taking Amiri affairs in the first place I shall try to sketch the Amir's relations with his own tribes and subjects; then our relations with them, and our relations with the Amir himself. Next the Amir's commerce with the Turkish frontier and our relations also. I shall then pass on to the affairs of other tribes under my immediate supervision, and our dealings with trans-frontier peoples. Again I shall touch *inter alia* on the arms trade, the safe-guarding of the caravan routes, the working of the Dispensary a short time opened at Dthala, the feud existing between Turks and Imam, and include a few remarks on the people themselves and the Rulers.

3. By way of prelude it is noteworthy to remark the rôle prescribed for Political Officers after the breaking up of the Field Column in March 1904 when the country as a whole came under Political surveillance and troops were left in Dthala and on the Lines of communication in order to assist measures of political supervision. In a word, then, the Political Officer (styled Political Agent in January 1906) was left in Dthala mainly to give moral support to the Amir of Dthala and to be in a position the better to gauge the trend of affairs in Upper Yafa', which country had been tardily recognised by the Porte as forming one of the nine cantons in which British influence was predominant.

4. As regards the Amir and his peoples, I use the word "peoples" in its broadest acceptance, but a careful definition is necessary, for a differentiation is strongly marked. In the territories claimed by the Amir there exist two principal and distinct divisions of peoples, *viz.*, Tribesmen and Subjects. "Subjects" comprise in part peoples subdued by arms, and partly kinsmen and descendants, for the Amirs of Dthala have been represented for some three hundred years by one particular House. These subjects regard the Amir as their liege and master; pay him tribute and supply his revenues; fight their Chief's battles without remuneration, and if killed in his cause their next of kin are entitled to no gratuities. They are, however, far removed from the status of slavery. Slaves, or more properly those in domestic servitude, exist in places and are the recipients of perhaps the highest honours the State can afford. They fill the posts of confidants, command bodies of soldiers, and control the Customs, etc. The other main division is that of "Tribesmen". Here we see a body of men who have a status and importance co-ordinate with the Ruler himself, who is in their company only *primus inter pares*. In truth the country is one vast Democracy and comparable on the Indian frontier with the Pathan community rather than the more aristocratic and autocratic Baluchis. The tribesmen pay no taxes, nor tribute; cannot be fettered or imprisoned; are either totally exempted from paying the Customs dues, or

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"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
وغيرها، أعدها الرائد هـ. ف. جاكوب، الوكيل السياسي السابق، في الضالع."
[و٦] (٤٨/١٦)



return for his expulsion at their hands. To continue the story. The Amir collected the Yafa' mercenaries, but was worsted by the Shairis, and the recalcitrant Sheikh returned to his own people. Proverbs and aphorisms galore exist to shew the well-nigh implacable hatred that for 150 years and more has been rampant between Amir and Shairis. One doggerel runs: Cat and mouse, hyena and ass, fire and gunpowder, Saiyid and Daghar, so are Amir and Shairis. They cannot unite. "Every man is the Sheikh of his own country," "every man's spear is planted at his own door", "every town is built by the stones in its own vicinity". Such phrases are in every day use and testify to the independence of the tribesmen and belie what is a mere convenient theory, viz., that Arab *tribesmen* can submit to any one Arab Ruler. So independent indeed and unconcerned are the tribesmen that they have no voice in an Amir's selection. This is done by the subjects proper, aided, of course, by the ubiquitous Saiyids.

7. From my experience I can find no justification for the Commissioners' statement that "other tribes *subject* to the Amir are Shairi, Halmin, and Al Ajud tribes, ..." The Mifari, Azraki, Mihrabi, Ahmadi and Humedi have certainly been from time to time "dependents of the Amir," but the Commissioners go on to say "and have never at any time submitted to Turkish rule," by these words shewing the trend of their argument which was to prove Turkish encroachment rather than to adjudicate 'twixt tribe and tribe on our side of the border.

The Halmin and Al Ajud (or Radfan Hillsmen) are most certainly not dependents of the Amir nor subject to him. They are popularly termed "The Amir's two pockets" which by interpretation means that he can indent on them when pressed from without. In practice this just means that when called to repel Amiri invaders the Amir must put both his hands into his pockets to remunerate their services. Called to his standards these "two pockets" of his are expected to rally and are paid, whereas the Shairi tribesmen, as we have seen, come or not as they please and are paid not a sou. It is not uncommon to see these mercenaries split into two parties from one tribe, one part with the Amir's forces, and the other in opposition. Only the other day, when most of the Radfans rallied to the Amir's call against the Shairis, the Kotaibis, the strongest clan, refused point blank their suzerain's (?) advances, and I had to visit Saleik, summon the Sheikh, and finally dissuaded him from attacking the Amir in rear and capturing his southernmost villages.

8. Passing on to the so-called dependent chieftains, Mifari, Mihrabi, Humedi, etc., it is true that the Amir produced before the Commissioners many documents concluded between himself and these chieftains by which a part of their domains, and certain shares in their revenues, were for all time assigned to his predecessors, and in some cases, at a later date, re-affirmed as continued to himself, Amir Shaif. If, however, we keep in mind Arab predilection, the very nominal hold a chieftain exercises over his people, the perpetual ebb and flow of local politics and the ever-recurring making and breaking of intertribal agreements, it is not difficult to gauge how very slender a thread unites the Amir and these river-dwelling tribesmen who, concurrently with Amiri engagements for mutual attack and defence, have other external agreements to which the Amir is not only not a party, but which, further, he is unable either to sanction or oppose. The Amirs of Dthala hold ancient Imamic Sanads by which, in exaggerated terms of now long past Arabian generosity, wide tracts of country—over which so-called Imamic authority was largely tempered by actual and diverse tribal claims, with their prescriptive privileges and autonomous rights—were consigned to the Amirs for proved loyalty, while similar Imamic Sanads for the self same territories may be seen—and I have seen them—in the hands of many of these so-styled Amiri dependents. The Amir's domains by such a Sanad, dating back 300 years, extended the territory now confessedly Haushabi and owned by that Sultan, and so it is quite impossible arbitrarily to fix bounds and borders or to ignore these unmistakable rules of democracy; equality and liberty, exist but not fraternity. An apt illustration of Arab ideals will be found in the remark of the Socialist who hearing a moderate say that "every man was as good as another" added "and a—sight better."

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[ظ٦] (٤٨/١٧)

4

Mihrahi, Ahmedi and Humedi have concluded, in time past, conventions which assign certain tracts to the Amir in consideration of certain duties performable by the latter, but these conditions have seldom been observed. When the Commissioners first set foot in Dthala, Mifari was called upon to declare for the Amir as against Turk, and since that time Amir Shaif has done his best to improve the occasion and has attempted to exact more than his dues. This has led in every case to friction, which was increased by the action of the Amir who when certain Sheikhs in these tracts began to kick against the pricks of his forceful tactics, set up rivals in each tract to oppose the prescriptive rights of the other. In consequence there was inaugurated the reign of chaos in these parts, and Amir Shaif has a nut to crack for which his diplomacy is scarcely adequate.

Lately, when the Jabal Jihafis joined the Shairis and made a solemn compact against the Amir, the Humedi tribesmen, who at first were content to "sit on the fence", have now quite recently, and in part, gone over to Jabal Jihaf.

9. Take the Azraki tribe. With a fighting reputation, they have always been employed as Amiri mercenaries, but the Sheikh bitterly resents Amiri exactions and he is strong enough to compel Amir Shaif to listen to his own terms and has refused, after the late Amiri-Shairi embroglio, to allow the deaths of his own people to be reckoned a part and parcel of the general Amiri losses, as tribal custom in his case appears to sanction, but insists on carrying on the blood feud with the Shairis independently of Amiri concession and admissions. My meaning is that these alliances are for *mutual* attack and defence; are concluded practically on co-ordinate terms, and even if they provide for Amiri suzerainty do not militate against the very clearly defined rights and privileges of the tribesmen *inter se*.

10. Once again we see the collection of villages on the Dthala plateau comprised in the style "Bilad al Ashraf". These people are claimed by the Amir as his dependants, but it is clear that the Amir has not sole undisputed rights in the local revenues. These are shared proportionately by suzerain and the village Akils, but the pendulum for many years has swung alternately between tribal disaffection and Amiri action to avenge the same. During the late unrest on the Dthala plateau the six villages of this group remained neutral, and along with the other Amiri villages on the Shairi area, known as "the Bilad al Husein" (comprising al Husein, Marfad, Khobar, Munadi, Lakamt al Ashub, Atri and Al Kabba) refused to fight in the Amiri ranks.

11. In further proof of the very slender hold the Amir has over his tribesmen, he professed only recently his total inability to arrest one Thabet Hassan who deserted our service with two Government carbines and although this miscreant was living in the Amir's own quarters in Dthala, the Amir was unable to effect the restoration of the arms. Further, in the case where a man of Hazzat al Abid (Amiri) murdered a Turkish Arab subject in Amiri limits the Amir was unable to give satisfaction because he feared reprisals from Jabal Jihaf whose people had lately risen up against him. The authority, then, which the Amir exercises over his tribesmen is dependent on their willingness to admit his claims of suzerainty and has nothing to do with his desire to achieve that end. This is in a less degree true of his subjects in these times.

From time immemorial the Amirs of Dthala have been powerless to govern the Radfan tribesmen or to check their depredations on the road. Long prior to our stepping into the Hinterland the Amir had, time and again, implored our aid to punish these tribesmen and on several occasions we have intervened to destroy the Kotaibi custom houses, which we ruled so far back as in 1884, to have been set up illegally. Had the Amir been able to check these tribesmen, over whom he claims suzerainty, no such affairs as the Kotaibi fight would have been necessary. A reference to page 107 of the Blue Book will prove that the submission to the Amir of the Radfan tribesmen was possible only with the aid of British arms.

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[٧] [٤٨/١٨]

5

Though in possession of Jabal Jihaf for 30 odd years the Turkish revenue-collectors, whose authority over the Hill was secured by force of arms and a permanent garrison were not able, or perhaps thought it impolitic, to press for an annual collection, and it is very patent, therefore, that the somewhat nebulous claims on the Hill preferred by the Amir on the strength of some ancient Imamic documents could not be pressed by him at a distance. An examination of Amiri pretensions on Jabal Jihaf merits a separate paragraph.

12. This Hill, as spasmodically of yore, *now strongly* opposes the Amir and is the chief obstacle to the pacification of the country. Recently in Turkish hands, where the assessment was grievous to be borne, it has resented the working of the Amiri menials who were sent, contrary to my advice, to tax the people. These had merely exchanged the Turks and their harsh measures for an equally hard and tactless task master, and finally the Hill elected its own Sheikh a Zindani and kinsman of the late Turkish nominee there. Sheikh Mukbil Nagi dances constant attendance on the Turkish officials across the border, and would gladly readmit his old masters could he regain the dole his predecessors received. The Hill I take to be the property of the tribesmen who are split up into quite a number of distinct clans all professing allegiance to their several Sheikhs, but just now almost to a man willing to confront the Amir. We gave this Hill to the Amir because it had doubtless been illegally held by the Turks whom we had ousted. It was not the province of the Commissioners to settle the country internally or to adjudicate between the various claims preferred by the Amir and his tribesmen. That such claims conflicted we did not care to know. Galleo was there our model and a convenient one in those days. Our main object achieved, "we cared for none of these things."

13. The Saiyid of Jabal Jihaf, one Mahummad Taha, who is a man of great influence in the country, and so far as I can gauge a friend to Amir Shaif, told me that the documents brought by the Amir for the examination of the Commissioners do not, *per se*, prove Amiri suzerainty on the Hill. They were just documents professing alliance, offensive and defensive, and the conditions of the agreements were more honoured in the breach than in the performance.

The A. H. 1276 paper (not mentioned in the Blue Book) was, he says, the result of fighting between the Amir and the Shairis and its aim was to strengthen the Amir's hands against the latter. It was soon set at naught, and we see Jabal Jihaf resuming its usual *role* of defiance; that the Radfan tribesmen were, if anything, more closely connected with the Amir, for they were supposed to flock to his standards as paid mercenaries, but not so Jabal Jihaf.

As to the document of 1278 A. H. (Blue Book, page 136) it touches, says the Saiyid, the Zindani clan only; that the sum of \$80 therein specified has scarcely ever been paid owing to the Amir's failure shortly afterwards to support Jihaf against the people of Ad Dakkam.

To revert to the agreement of 1276 A. H., it is, I find, one of mutual co-operation against outsiders. The Amir is styled Father and Ruler, and this to enable him to secure Jihafi assistance against his foes. A community of interests is distinctly stated, the key-note is fraternity, "Each should act in a brotherly manner for the benefit and assistance of the other." The Amir was indeed to adjudicate between *his own people* and Jihafis, but held no brief to exact tithes, and such like, which local usage interprets to mean that the Jihafi was not a subject. I fail to see that the Amir has on this Hill any superiority of rights. I note, rather, the distinct tribal standing each clan holding its peculiar portion with enjoyment of revenues. This is tribal law, the highest authority in the land, superior in Arab eyes to parchments, and superseding even Koranic sanction.

The Amir claims Jabal Jihaf as his taxable domain. That he might possibly have taxed the Hill in days to come had he started with the strictest moderation is a fairly correct estimate.

Again the document of 1278 A. H. allows the Amir to tax not the Hill at all, but only the Zindani clan, nor is it clear that Jihaf lands proper were

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[ظ] (٤٨/١٩)

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included in the assessed area. Here again in return for the Zindani acknowledgment of the Amir's fatherhood and rule, the people are termed his sons *to assist him at all times against his foes*. This to me seems tantamount to a co-ordination of interests. The key-note is mutual succour. The Blue Book at page 136 mentions Zindani predominance. To this I assent. These Zindani were originally Imam's soldiers, and they hail from the North. Where, however, the text goes on to record that the suzerainty of the Amir over Ahl Jihaf was acknowledged by the documents of A. H. 1278, 1285, and 1341 (read 1314) I with diffidence beg to differ. Jabal Jihaf is a general term and comprises a large diversity of interests. An acquaintance with tribal folk lore and customs would have prevented such a mistaken conclusion.

It may safely be affirmed that not till we arrived on the scene and took up the Amir's cudgels against Turk and so-called Amiri subjects did the Amir fairly start to tax the various parts. It is a pity we were so impetuous, for a door was at once opened for Amiri cupidity, and this has caused the disintegration of the Amir's authority in places where, even if the ties of sympathy were at times wanting, there would exist a certain transfusion of prejudices making for some semblance of order and rest.


Admitting the existence of some vague sort of suzerainty over Jihaf, it is the same as exercised (?) over the Radfan tribes near Suleik. This suzerainty gives the Amir no grasp on Radfan territory nor any right to its revenues (on Jihaf he expressly stipulated for *certain* revenues, but this right of his was tempered by a corresponding duty). Again, the suzerainty gives no authority over a tribesman's person *quod* imprisonment or fettering. What the Amir has, he has derived from the tribesman's willing assent which marks the period of its continuance to him.

14. I have tried to sketch the inter-tribal relations as they affect the Amir of Dthala. I will now discuss our relations with him through the medium of the Political Agent. It will be remembered, and it is a commonplace, that the duties of a Political Agent are narrowly and carefully proscribed and interference as clearly proscribed, but I cannot see how Dthala with its Amir can be put on an equal footing with other chiefs in India. Emerson has said that the "man is explicable by nothing less than all his history". This is indeed true of the Amirs of Dthala. A stipendiary of the British Government which corresponded from a distance, he was daily pin-pricked by the invading Turk. Like Issachar of old he was "an ass crouching between two burdens". It is not surprising that duplicity of character has been the outcome of the attempt to serve two masters and that Amir Shaif's name amongst his tribesmen is synonymous with treachery and deceit. "Put no confidence in the House of Kharafa even if it swear a solemn oath" is a common saying, which loses by the departure from the jingling rhyme into English. We came into this country under arms and though the Field Column was soon broken up, troops remained under Political control and this act of itself was very significant as spelling, and implying the possibility of, intervention of an unusual kind. Intervention, then, is no new thing, but resort to it even if fitful was warranted by past history and I hope to shew was justifiable.

15. I must first touch on certain remarks made by the Foreign Department, Simla, in a Confidential Memorandum of information for the month of September 1905 in *re* external affairs relating to Arabia. From it we learn that the Government of India had previously expressed "a hope that the personal influence of the Political Officer of Dthala might prove useful as a means of conciliating the tribes"—Again, it is believed that "if time be given to Captain Jacob to consolidate his position at Dthala, his influence may become a factor of great importance in keeping the tribes quiet and the trade routes open" and finally, they state the indispensability of a Political Officer's presence *inter alia* "as the pivot of a new system of dealing with the Hinterland tribes."

16. Take the case of the restless Sha'iri tribesmen who for 150 years have been on bad terms with the Amir. The Turks who for years had retired

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[و٨] (٤٨/٢٠)



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from the Yemen returned in 1872. After occupying Jihaf, and the River tracts of Mirahbi, Ahmedi, Humedi, &c., they turned their attention to the Sha'iris and taking up a strategic position at Al Jalila two and a half miles from Dhalala they inaugurated a system of forceful taxation. Appointing overseers from among the Shairis, they won over by threats a certain number of this tribe to their cause, paid them doles, more or less regularly, and used this vantage ground as a base for annoying the Amir and appropriating some of his revenue-paying tracts, notably the cluster of villages styled "Bilad al Asraf." It was clear, as soon as the Turks, by demarcation of our several spheres of influence, had been pushed back, that it was obligatory for us to reconcile these tribesmen to the Amir, not only because he possessed certain villages within their area, but because by Treaty with the Amir which was amplified in November 1901, this Ruler became responsible to us for certain roads and for the demarcated border line. Here he was told to keep in repair the boundary pillars and to give reparation for outrages perpetrated against Turkish subjects by his own tribesmen and subjects south of that line. This he could not possibly do were his inter-relations with the Shairi unsatisfactory, and there was a danger that these men, so recently schooled by the Turks to consider the Amir a mere puppet, would defy Dhalala and setting up their own customs at Al Jalila in imitation of the Turks, would interfere with road-farers. This then was a serious problem. The Amir was all for humiliating the tribe by arms, if only I would give the word. This I declined to do, and have all along advised him to adopt a policy of conciliation. The Amir's animus was chiefly directed against Al Jalila. Here while attempting to recover a fine laid on the village, a Shairi was shot by the order of the Amir's son, and the blood feud thereby re-started. Knowing we were not to stay permanently at Dhalala I tried to dissuade the Amir from pursuing tactics such as after our departure would impel the Shairis,—their passions necessarily curbed during our stay,—to adopt reprisals that would turn order into chaos and by overthrowing the Amir's authority would bring into being many and small chieftainships.

17. Some degree of intervention in tribal affairs was, therefore, imperative; the difficulty was to know how far to intervene. It is well to mention here a curious trait found with the Hinterland Arabs. Democrats to a man, and strongly averse to Arab interference and "one-man" rule the Arabs, as I have found them, are only too ready, nay, solicitous, to accept the overlordship of a Government like ours which while sympathising with native sentiment, studiously avoids interference with native customs and religion, and refraining from the collection of revenue has always been ready to perform the offices of their once-renowned Hatim Tai, a personage, by the way, who has long ceased to inhabit Arabia and whose mantle has not fallen on any Arab successor. I found the Arabs clamouring for my intervention. We were a *Daula*, i.e., Government, they said, and the Amir was but one of themselves. I have been particularly struck by the almost universal devotion ever expressed by all and sundry to our presence as a Government in their midst—a Government fortunately whose system contrasted so favourably with that of the Turks, than whom, it was universally admitted, we British were more sincerely Moslem. The importunity of the Arabs to hear our pronouncement in all matters affecting their difference with the Amir was most striking, but it constituted a real difficulty in so much as it tended to confuse the demarcating line between intervention and aloofness. The line is in theory quite distinct, but it was absolutely not correct to apply to the Hinterland cut and dried methods found suitable to India, or to stretch Arabia and India on one common Procrustean bed. Even the *village* is hardly the administrative unit. It is more correctly found in the head of the family, and he is more often a figurehead. "Each for himself and the Devil take the hindermost" is the Arab's motto. "*La ta'idi man arbabta walakin allaha vahdi man yasha*" is the Koranic message to those who busy themselves for the improvement of others. Jabal Jihaf with its covert and smouldering animosity to the Amir now lately changed to overt hostility; an upstart put up as Sheikh of the Hill: he coquetting with men across the border in virtue of his grand-father's rôle of a Turkish stipendiary. How is the problem to be solved? The very latest

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of 1907 the Amir was skirmishing with the Shairis. It was he who was the aggressor. I dissuaded him from taking really active measures till December 1906 when seeing our troops preparing to leave and scenting our early evacuation, Amir Shaif made a personal visit to the Radfan country to collect mercenaries. In January 1907 he came up with 2,000 men, but after an interview with me decided not to fight but to pay off and discharge his forces. Evil counsels, however, prevailed and five days afterwards he captured a Shairi position, only to be ousted therefrom the next day, when his hordes now panic-stricken began to melt away. From that time dates the Amir's downfall. From all directions came reports of fallings away and his tax-collectors were summarily told to quit. The Amir's avarice and want of tact are, of course, largely answerable for his disintegration, but the want of a well-defined policy on our part always stood out before him, and his last word to us is that he is now master of Dthala town only. An hyperbole no doubt but pregnant with truth.

20. The Amir's Radfan tribesmen are outwardly on good terms with him and the Halmin clansmen are also. Specially noticeable have been the Amir's recent attempts to conciliate the Kotaibi section. For many years Amir Shaif has vetoed Kotaibi pretensions on the Hardaba water-course. He furthermore looked askance at the Kotaibi claim to be masters of the lands about Suleik. Now he has of his own accord broken up the Blockhouse; asked that the Kotaibis might be at Suleik, and that they should be responsible for the road from Dar Hamra on the Habilen to as far north of Hardaba as Safa Iiliya. Strangest of all he has asked me to arrange a reversion to the Kotaibi Chief's claim to levy road dues. I will touch on this again.

The Azraki Sheikh remains on bad terms with the Amir who for some time, in pursuance of his favourite tactics, set up a rival one, Husein Saleh, the Sheikh's cousin. The Amir's authority over this tribe is nominal only. The tribesmen are considered good fighters. Sheikh Hasan, the head Sheikh, is one of our best friends. His country contains almost unlimited supplies of kirby and grain and was the chief source of supply during our stay in Dthala.

As to Mihrabi, Ahmedi, etc., the River countries, and Mifari, their allegiance to the Amir is very fitful. Reports were at one time current of interference in these tracts—the work of the notorious Turkish Arab Muhammad bin Nasir Mukbil who took advantage of the divisions set up by the Amir to play off Sheikh against Sheikh. The report was somewhat exaggerated, but vigilance is required in that quarter.

21. The Amir is not Lord and Master in his country. He has never been so. I repeat most emphatically that he is but one of the people *primus inter pares* and his rise and decline depend solely on the popular voice. I am as equally sure that looking to the dictates of expediency it was once possible to have consolidated his position and that too without offending Arab susceptibilities or even outraging local opinion and usage. "For a dead opportunity there is no resurrection". So long as the Shairis remain quiet, and this would be facilitated if his Jabal Jihaf relations were improved, the Amir's authority will reach to the Turkish frontier. Only let the Shairis become restless one unprincipled scoundrel can ignite the match and the Amir is impotent before his Treaty engagements. As a matter of fact Article VII of the Amir's Treaty is a well-nigh impossibility for him to execute. He was powerless in the recent Shairi troubles to prevent Muresi tribesmen from assisting the Shairis from across the border.

We have placed the Amir on too lofty a pinnacle, whereas "the height of the pinnacle is determined by the breadth of the base."

22. I will briefly discuss the Kotaibi question and revert to it later in paragraphs 40—42. The Kotaibis were for long considered under the Amirs of Dthala. This view has now at last been abandoned and the true position they are seen to occupy is one of virtual independence. The Amir has practically no voice in Kotaibi affairs. So far back as 1884 he was obliged to call in our aid. The Kotaibis were tax-collectors at the time. Their action was unpalatable to the Amir Ali Mukbil, and also to us, as interfering with trade. The Kotaibis are split up into many factious and the levying was practised by a small

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[ظ٩] (٤٨/٢٣)

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section and apparently the Kotaibi Chief was no party to it, though impotent to check it. The history of that period will conclusively prove the inability of the Amirs to control this tribe (which is called the "Pinnacle of Radfan"). Though their custom houses were demolished by us, a reversion was made to the old state of affairs, so that in the time of the Commissioners' labours in Dthala we find the Kotaibi levying dues on the Suleik Habilen while no exception was taken by the Residency for some time. Latterly for his non-compliance with our order to visit the Resident in Dthala, Muhammad Saleh was forbidden to take dues, and this attitude has been maintained by us ever since. In November 1903 we punished the Kotaibis for attacking our post at Suleik. We entered their country, pulled down some houses, destroyed crops, and uprooted trees. When I went up to Dthala in December 1904, our relations were bad. A few months before it had appeared they were mischievously inclined, but nothing happened. I arranged an interview with Muhammad Saleh when shooting in the Halmin country and gained in some measure his confidence. Later on, after much toil and labour—for my invitation to him to come to Suleik fort was considered a plot to effect his arrest—Muhammad Saleh met me there and gradually I assembled the whole community of Akils. With Suleik fort demolished last September, the Kotaibis have now in part returned to the places on the Habilen where we found them in 1902, and when the agreement is signed they will be responsible for the road from Safa Hiliya southwards to the site of Dar al Qabtan which I lately had demolished.

23. As already mentioned the Amir has asked that the Kotaibis might revert to their rôle as collectors of road dues. He knows, of course, that it is impolitic to oppose in theory what he is quite unable, at our departure, *practically* to oppose, and with his Estate in course of disintegration elsewhere it were folly not to seek rehabilitation along the lines of least resistance. For my own part I can see no justification in our having forbidden the Kotaibis their road dues. It is surely axiomatic that one should never pass an order or prohibition which cannot be enforced and especially was such interference prejudicial to our prestige with Bedouins. It would be better at this stage, and I cannot too strongly recommend it, to allow the Kotaibi Chief,—who is to fill the same part on the road as the Amir, 'Alawi, Haushabi, etc.,—to derive similar rights with them the while he with them performs similar duties. "Don't apply antimony to one eye only" is a proverb they have quoted against preference or partiality. It is not wise to kill the goose that lays the golden egg and the tax-collectors will themselves be chief sufferers from diminution of revenues if caravans are overtaxed. To deny this privilege—or shall I call it a right—will cause constant heart-burning and restlessness, and, worse still, the Sheikh will not long be able to prevent his people in immediate charge of the road from taking the same. A graceful concession on our part should precede their taking the law into their own hands in the face of our veto. It is easy to reconcile our change of front, seeing that the Kotaibis are now entering upon a new rôle, and have formally entered the circle of our friendship.

The Kotaibi Sheikh and people have all along thought the Amir the *fons et origo* of the punishment we meted out to them, and this, in conjunction with other unsettled claims between him and themselves, had frustrated an *entente*. Seeing our evacuation of his territory, the Amir has changed his policy, and so at this time the Amiri-Radfan relations are outwardly hopeful. Tribal inter-relations are, however, proverbially fitful and the following instance will serve as an illustration. Refusing to give Amir Shaif assistance against the Shairis, unless I was agreeable, the 'Alawi Chief, hitherto a friend, incurred the Amir's enmity and in the late embroglio between 'Alawi and Kotaibi the Amir took no pains to conceal his pro-Kotaibi sympathies. The occasion was of course a fitting one to prove to Kotaibis his desire to forget the past and to turn over a new leaf. This trimming of the sails to catch every changing breeze is a commonplace in Arab politics and, owing to the fickle Arab nature, is of almost daily occurrence. We must then remember Josh Billing's advice and not prophesy before we know!

24. Before leaving the subject of the Amir's relations with his people, it is well to remember that not many years ago the revenues of Dthala and its dependent villages were shared equally by the Amir and "the Sheikh of

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[١٠] (٤٨/٢٤)

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Dthala" as he was called. The Sheikh, by name Mahummad Musa'id, was eventually poisoned by the Amir's orders in Az Zubed (Amiri) where he had fled when the Amir was assisted by Labej arms. His kinsmen remain two in Dthala and one Abdallah in Ash-Sharaf (Ahmedi country). Some of the Dthala merchants, having reason to complain of the Amir's oppressive measures and restrictions on trade, have openly told me that they advocate a return to the dual régime whereby the Amir's power was curtailed. Personally I think the Sheikh's followers are influential and Amir Shaif will find his powers considerably docted unless he played his cards very carefully at this time.

25. My relations with Shairi and Kotaibi, as these affected the Amir, will be seen to have been oftentimes very direct, but with so powerful neighbours to his north and south, and both of these on the trade route for which Amir Shaif was by treaty responsible to us—one tribe commanding the southern approaches to Dthala, the other the Turkish border, with every prospect before one of the Amir's reduction to the status of merely one of many *chieftains*—a result so diametrically opposed to the policy we went up to Dthala to inaugurate—all these were prime considerations influencing my action. It is right in a new country to prescribe a general line for political conduct, but the working out must be left to those on the spot. On one hand, I had to avoid the Scylla of appearing to give undue support to the many actors in that drama of dangerous rivalries: on the other, to steer clear of the Charybdis of the Amir's disintegration. The data given me to work upon, were a weakened, irresolute and avaricious Amir who while he readily received my advice was thwarted by a score of palace Ahithophels; a people thoroughly imbued with the spirit and practice of democracy, but cowed, at our first arrival, by a policy which threatened to sacrifice popular predilections to that of preferential dealings with one middle man; a people, again, who disgusted with the infamies of the recent Turkish régime were desirous of experiencing the more humane and British principles of which the half had not been told them; and finally, the existence of blood feuds—a cherished inheritance—which might in one short hour upset all plans even where these had received the Amir's *imprimatur* and had popular assent behind them.

26. In my own dealings with the Amir, with whom I constantly associated, I was very careful strictly to observe the demands of *meum* and *tuum*. We had no proper Cantonment limits and no Cantonment Magistrate. Any one of his subjects who transgressed our Camp regulations was handed over by me to him for sifting the evidence and trial, while I contended myself with ensuring that the transgressor was punished by the Amir. He, on his part, was eager to interfere with those of his subjects in our employ who had incurred his displeasure, and where feasible I let him deal with all of such who lived in his jurisdiction taking care, however, that they did not return to our service if proved guilty of misdemeanour.

27. I would associate with me in my attempts to spread British influence in Dthala, the names of Captain Rickman of the Rifle Brigade, Major Koe of the K. O. S. B. and Captain Reid of the 51st Pioneers who by their tact and considerate treatment of natives did incalculable service to our cause. The conduct of all the British troops I would specially eulogise. All ranks were deservedly popular with the Arabs.

28. The excellent road constructed in 1906 and 1907 on the Khoraiha Pass by the 51st Pioneers is a link in our relations with the country. By it trade will be largely facilitated and it is admittedly a boon to the Arabs. Its upkeep, now we have gone, presents grave difficulty. The Arab throughout the Hinterland is to be compared with the horse leech's daughter. It is all "give, give". The former tract, though quite eclipsed by the new road, was good enough for his forefathers, and they are a conservative people. It is one thing to have a brand new road presented free of charge, quite another to be asked to keep it in repair, and in their eyes a preposterous notion to expect this repair to be met from Arab sources of revenue. Though doubtless beneficial to trade, the road was as much constructed to give us better communications with Dthala where a Sanatorium was once believed possible. Again, there were strategic points to commend the construction. A system by which

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[١٠ ظ] (٤٨/٢٥)

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those interested in its upkeep should contribute to the same, would be equitable, and might be arranged by calling at Labej a conference of those most intimately connected. This category would include even Aden merchants and importers of Hinterland produce, but in the meantime we are sufficiently interested in the road ourselves to decline to see it deteriorate by neglect. We have left it in September in good repair.

29. Perhaps the most useful asset in our dealings with the people, for it has been most subtle in its working, was the Dispensary for the free treatment of Arabs and Jews. Opened in November 1905 it was closed in March 1907. The statistics have appeared elsewhere, suffice it to say that by its means we have come into closest sympathy with all classes of people not only on the Dthala plateau, but from across the Turkish side. Treated and cured of their ailment, men and women have returned to their houses lauding the British Government, and to this cause I would assign, pre-eminently, the very great influence for good we have been able to exert across the border, affecting not Turkish subjects only, but even many independent Sheikhs who have come in for medicine from great distances. One such Chief begged me to visit his country with a Doctor, for he had many and various ailments there and it was instructive to note what confidence he had in our medical skill. We were especially fortunate, from a Political view-point, by reason of the lack of such an institution on the Turkish side. I believe there is a Military Hospital at Sana'a, but the times were unfavourable to medical assistance from that centre. At Kataba, too, the dispensing work was a pure farce. Our Dispensary was, then, a very valuable asset and "worth" in the words of Doctor Neve of Kashmere, "more than half a battalion of soldiers." There was at first a marked disinclination to enter the Dispensary as in-patients. "Hospital is a place for dead men," was once said to me. "He who goes in quest of his health is a fool," is another common saying, and in a country where every one's aim is to be "Matawakkil," or "reliant on God," it was not easy to induce the people to come in for treatment. Cases near to death's door, where the patient had exhausted his reliance on the Divine, were ready to receive nursing indoors, but with the majority, village treatment was most acceptable, and with so meagre an accommodation as our tents in Dthala could afford, it was a better plan, not only for the people, but more especially for the extension of a political influence, to treat at home. Our field of usefulness was thereby largely extended and we were working along the line of least resistance. My thanks are due to Captains Parry, R. A. M. C., McPherson, Ingram, Brown and Steel, all of the Indian Medical Service for their exertions in this direction, and last, but not least, I would mention the particularly useful work performed *gratis*, after the Dispensary was closed, by Doctor MacRae of the Keith-Falconer Mission at Sheikh Othman who visited Dthala for six weeks. He was constantly with me in the villages, and by his skill and tact rendered me inestimable service in the country where he was deservedly popular. Here, too, I would speak in the highest terms of the generosity of the following merchants of Aden who placed sums at my disposal for this Dispensary. Mr. Hormusji Cowasji of Messrs. Cawasji Dinshaw and Brothers, Mr. Menahim Messa, Messrs. Edulji Kooverji Patel, Mr. Dorabji of Messrs. Pallonji Dinshaw, and Messrs. Bhicaji Cowasji and Company.

As far as I have gauged the Arab mind—its likes and its prejudices—I see no barrier to future Medical Mission work in Dthala at the hands of two such men as Doctors Young and MacRae. The former has fifteen years' experience with Arabs of every class in his Sheikh Othman Dispensary and I will repeat what I said some nine years ago in Aden that it is to his Dispensary we owe a large measure of what political influence we have been able to spread in this corner of Arabia. I would not, however, limit his usefulness to any particular sphere, for Sheikhs and common people have journeyed from all parts of the Yemen, and from the Hedjaz to be treated by Doctor Young. I consider him a *quasi* Political Officer of the Residency in Aden.

It is not the first time that Arabs have been treated at Dthala, for in the eighties Doctor and Mrs. Harpur of the C.M.S. stayed in Dthala town for three or four months. He was recalled only because the presence of Turkish soldiers, and the anomalous position in which the Amir was placed, rendered

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his stay inadvisable on grounds of his personal safety. There was no political objection even in those early days, and the Amir on his part was only too glad to get medical treatment *gratis*. An outpost of medical missionaries, when we have left the country and our departure is ascribed to superior Turkish diplomacy, would be of no political significance, and for that very reason the more subtle in its potentialities. The Missionaries would be safe as regards their persons. Their very independence of Government would render them peculiarly fit agents for watching the trend of events on the frontier, while the whole time our influence would be gradually extending within, along and beyond the border.

30. Unchecked intercourse with the people has not been thought indispensable, but one does not necessarily *administer* a country just because one knows its peoples. One cannot advise its rulers, without a perfect and detailed grasp of the habits of the people, their language and customs, and this most essential knowledge cannot be obtained without our living, moving and having our being with the people. Three years' residence have given me a certain knowledge (which will now be transferred with me to another sphere of usefulness), but gravitation towards general Indian political principles, and but little latitude allowed one to meet the diverse requirements of Arabia, have been obstacles to preclude that fuller knowledge of affairs which would have been so useful for all time. A Political Agent in India moves freely over the entire state and his advice is freely tendered. It is a pity, to say the least of it, that this political supervision was not continued on the Dthala plateau and all along the Border. The times were altogether against the withdrawal, which, too, was, with a very few exceptions, unpopular within our border.

31. This brings me to the discussion of means that might at this stage be adopted the better to graft our ideas, while retaining the best in the Arab system. As a preliminary I will mention the principal factors of social life that are at this time moulding Arab thought along time-honoured lines. I will take first the priestly class, the Saiyids. Their influence is enormous and the reverence paid to them by common people and by Rulers is very noteworthy. They are always present at the accession of a Ruler, they are peace-makers in the fight and arrange the terms of the settlement; to them are given the uppermost seats in the assembly and many of them are consulted in matters of divination and geomancy. The Arabs are superstitious to a degree, venerator of saints whose shrines may be seen everywhere, the way to them being marked by tumuli of stone studded throughout the country. These, too, serve as marks for the devotee's veneration, as stone is piled upon stone an invocation muttered the while. The Saiyids fan the flame of this religious sentiment and constitute themselves its living priests. Some of them practise incantations to expel the flights of locusts, and to bring down the rain, while others are believed to have Divine authority delegated them in the granting or withholding of human offspring. These Saiyids, then, to all intents and purposes rule the country, but their plan of campaign is not necessarily based on the Koran, though if divergence between Koranic sanction and priestly practice can be reconciled, the agreement is pressed here. Tribal custom, however, is another factor to be studied. It is superior to Koranic order and prohibition, except so far as these conform to the unwritten tribal law. Yet it is strange to note the eagerness with which the Koran is quoted in support of some *prima facie* indefensible proposition or action. Local and private interpretation is liberal so that practically it can be always shewn that the Koran's *imprimatur* has been received, whatever is said or done. The Koran is studied in well-nigh every village. It is almost the sole piece of literature. The boys are taught little else. Koranic charms are worn by man and beast. Occasionally the poets are read and quoted, but by a few only. The Koran is carried about in the fields and I have seen boys reading it together, and labourers also at mid-day in harvest or when scaring away birds from the crops. And yet strange to say the people are not fanatical. There was a religious maniac who came to Dthala during the latter part of our stay and preached a Jihad which he said would begin any time from the month of Rajab 1325 A. H. Doggerel verse composed by him was known all over the country, but I discussed the matter freely and openly with

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all and sundry, and most of them while they believed an Armageddon was prophesied in their own books and by Christians and Jews also, said the hour had not yet come. All trace of fanaticism was absent from the conversation. The *pros* and *cons* were discussed quite coolly. Constantly in their houses, and outside, with men and with women, I have discussed religion and I have never found fanaticism, but with most a strong religious sentiment underlies all they say, write and do.

I have not found women oppressed. They are accounted the inferior sex, but they are not veiled, nor do they allow themselves to be kept in the background even in councils of war, and in the fight will be seen everywhere carrying ammunition and water. As an almost invariable rule a woman's person is sacred. She will not be molested and has a safe conduct everywhere. Prostitution is almost unknown. The woman of easy virtue is perhaps a Yemeni from across the border, one whom famine and scarcity have compelled to leave her home. The dancing girls, even, have strict ideas of morality and compare favourably in this respect with the class we see in India.

32. On the other hand, the women are not specially cared for; they are not taught the Koran; they cannot read or write; they are discouraged from trying; they are hewers of wood and drawers of water and they work in the fields. The Arab has a large family. These women are most ready to converse, and had there been a lady doctor in Dthala I would have revolutionised the place long ago. The presence of white troops has accustomed the people to us, and with the material we have to work on, I would prophesy great things and inconceivable amount of good done for the British name were there present some philanthropists of both sexes on the Dthala plateau. If only as a prelude we started schools controlled by educated Arabs, where, concomitantly with the Koran, English modes of thought were imparted in the vernacular, the effect would be to pacify the country and to combat, as nothing else could, the prevalence of the blood feud which tends to neutralise efforts at progress and set it at an *impasse*. The effects would not be local, but would impress the countryside in all directions and be a means, second to none, tending to establish the *Pax-Britannica* in S. W. Arabia on a sure footing.

33. Another scheme to reach the chiefs and their families was that proposed by an Acting Resident, Colonel Scallon, and perhaps even before his day. It was the creation of a college for chiefs. The Abdali Sultan advocated Dthala as the place for starting such an institution and offered to send his young kinsfolk there. By this means we could have exerted an influence over future chiefs who trained in such a place would have learnt much of useful administrative work, and best of all would have been grounded in British methods, so as to become more closely bound to us, their aims coinciding with ours in the development of their countries. Primogeniture is not a rule in this country, but the office of chief is as far as possible a close preserve belonging to one family, at times, however, going temporarily to some collateral branch. The Amir of Dthala has three sons, all of whom are speedily running to seed, whose fancies incline the more to women and chewing of *Kat* without the desire to confer a beneficial rule on their peoples. Even now it is not too late to inaugurate such a college in Lahej, or, in its inception, preferably in Aden. Such a college, where Islam would have a fair field, would be a fitting nursery in which to sow the seeds of British thought and British principles, and its *sequelæ* would be far reaching.

34. Along with this mental pabulum it is a pity that the system of tribal levies was advocated only to be dropped. The best made road from Dthala to Aden will not *per se* facilitate trade unless it is adequately patrolled. We throw away annually vast sums *quæ* Darbar Presents—with what result? Were tribal levies in vogue we should be paying for actual service rendered, whereas now the chiefs and a few important Sheikhs are the sole gainers, and we have called into being a discontented democracy, with equally valid claims, which we cannot satisfy. Tribal levies would engage all the tribes *en route*; would please a majority instead of as now a minority; would obviate the huge disbursements of to-day which are practically blackmail extracted from us; and while ensuring an increase of trade and its *safe conduct* would not entail any interference in tribal affairs *off the road*.

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Kataba I succeeded in having the majority of these warriors recalled. It was impolitic to allow outsiders from the Turkish side to assist in the Amir's downfall, and yet here we are confronted by the question of reciprocity, for were Turkish territory to be invaded by mercenaries from our side it would be difficult—the Amir at loggerheads with his tribesmen—for us to ensure their recall. Turks have expressed surprise to me on seeing unrest prevailing in our borders so long unchecked and we apparently unconcerned, but then the Turks administer the Yemen, whereas we are compelled to look on as spectators of disorder.

37. On the Amiri-Turkish border there exist lands Amiri, that with the demarcation have drifted across the border and are now situate on Turkish soil. The same facts hold good *vice versa* with reference to some Turkish lands. On lands so drifted the revenue rights still pertain to the original overlords, but tithes on these lands are enjoyed by the party into whose jurisdiction the lands have passed. The Amir complained that on his transferred lands the Turkish Arab, to whom the lands are farmed by the Turks, were exacting enormous rates and far in excess of what Islam prescribes, and that his own revenue collections were correspondingly, curtailed. I have often addressed the Kaim Makam of Kataba who was willing to discuss the matter *in situ*, but his presence with the troops at Nadra has been almost constant and so no interview was practicable. I have urged the Amir not to retaliate. This matter has been already reported to Government and the only remedy would seem to be for the Amiri occupants of these lands to file their suits in Kataba Courts, as the fields now lie within Turkish jurisdiction. At the same time Turkish Courts are dilatory, and more so now when the country is disorganised; and a suit cannot be pressed home by the bare payment of court fees. Discriminate *bakshis* is an aid to further your cause. This means expenditure incommensurate with the losses actually incurred by shortage of revenue, so that the easier and more truly Arab resort would be retaliation. I am not so sure but that retaliation is the more efficacious remedy in this country and one more likely to dispel Turkish apathy and lethargy. It is impolitic seriously to suggest it to the Amir.

38. There are many claims and counter-claims preferred by both sides *quâ* camel lifting, detention of goods in transit and also civil cases for sums due in trade transactions. These are inevitable and must naturally be chronic looking to the habits of the tribesmen and the rule of the *lex talionis*. Murders also are not uncommon. In civil matters the plaintiff must seek redress in the jurisdiction where the grievance has originated. In criminal cases, I have always, where the Amir's peoples are concerned, addressed the Kaim Makam, Kataba, occasionally with success. There have been of late some notable instances of crime committed by Amiri peoples this side, the line for which the Kaim Makam has pressed for redress, but owing to the hard times in which he now finds himself the Amir has not been able fully to respond. That he will give restitution or make a compromise is possible later, and our departure may help to expedite matters. *Res nolunt diu male administrari.*

In the Habil as Salamah (Amiri) case in February 1907 a Jubani (Turkish) man, domiciled in the Amiri village, was killed in an affray where Muresis (Turkish) had come over for a marriage festival. Ancestry of this sort will always give rise to foment. The Amir sent some bullocks for slaughter to the Turkish people. This technically termed an *irwa*, is local custom and intended to propitiate the people thus approached. A temporary truce was made. The Amir has promised to take over the murderer (who hails from his village of Alkhobar). If the actual murderer is surrendered, it is not customary to slay him nor even to ask for the full amount of blood-money (*dia*).

(b) In the Hazzat al 'Abid (Amiri village) case, one Muhammad Husain of Yubi territory (Turkish) was murdered by one of the former village. The Kaim Makam of Kataba sent the murdered man's brother to me and asked me to enforce a settlement at the Amir's hands. At that time the Amir was in extreme difficulties with his tribesmen and when his messengers went to make investigations at Hazza they were expelled by Jihafis who came down from the hill to assist Hazza. I told the Kaim Makam to exercise patience,

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and that the Amir had engaged to give satisfaction as soon as practicable. A little political pressure brought to bear on Hazza would have effected immediate settlement, but this I was unable to give, it being inordinate interference. I reminded the Kaim Makam that there were counter cases preferred by the Amir and that a *modus vivendi* was impossible without reciprocity of action.

The Amir has asked me to refrain from pressing him for immediate action to ensure Turkish satisfaction, and this not only because he was in temporary straits, but also because, from time immemorial, he has been on friendly terms with the Yubi Sheikhs, and he believed that, a favourable opportunity offering, they could effect an amicable settlement of this and other similar complaints of long standing. Time is of small moment with the Arab and I can, at the present juncture, conceive of no other more feasible method than *laissez aller*.

39. If we are not to have a local representative at Dthala or Sanah (Amiri) we cannot do otherwise than leave these matters to the Arabs themselves, not interfering ourselves, and recommending the Turks also to be passive spectators and to avoid embittering or complicating affairs by hasty interference. A native agent might keep us *au fait* with all border affairs and report progress. In this newly discovered country to whose ways and customs we are practically strangers, extra centralisation appears a grave mistake. We want greater flexibility and less mechanical precision. There is, I think, too much reference to Government of trivial matters, which by being repeated through a number of channels acquire an importance they do not intrinsically possess after the manner of the rolling snowball, *vires acquirit eundo*. On the Haushabi-Turkish border I will touch below.

40. I now discuss our dealings with the 'Alawi tribe and the 'Alawi-Kotaibi relations. Sheikh Ali Nashir is a commonplace man, but friendly to Government. He is too much addicted to the chewing of kat, but is certainly master of a country whose peoples are few and peacefully inclined. He has some good counsellors, and till the other day, in the affair of the demolition of his Fort, where his *amour-propre* was closely affected, he has given us no trouble. After the punishment we meted out to the Kotaibi, we allowed the 'Alawi to erect a fort on the hill of Al Hamra and we asked him to keep the road clear of marauders and also to oppose Kotaibi unruliness. We paid him Rs. 500 for the construction of the fort which he called Dar al Qabtan. We did not give him the soil on which the Fort was raised; we did not determine its ownership; this was beyond our province at the time. We ourselves settled at Suleik, built a fort for our troops, and so long as we remained there the 'Alawi was our friend and co-adjutor. Basking in the sunshine of our favour, he improved the shining hour and encroached here and there. He had his Customs near Jimil and opposite to his village of Ma'baja, and by giving certain villages between Jimil and Suleik immunity at his Customs, he was able to secure a *quid pro quo* by the acquisition of certain agricultural rights in certain villages notably in Ath Thumair which lies between Suleik and Jimil. All this was being quietly effected while the Kotaibis had been pushed back and were smarting in solitude from the punishment we had meted out to them. Ownership appears to have been purchased or otherwise acquired by the 'Alawi of lands north of Jimil and so far as up to the walls of Suleik Fort, and also in the villages lying immediately to the south and south-east of the Fort. On all this piece of ground prior to our settlement at Suleik the Kotaibis had been absolute masters and it was they who were responsible to us for the preservation of the telegraph wire from Jimil and Northwards as far as Hardaba.

I have carefully investigated the rights of Kotaibi and 'Alawi in the village of Ath Thumair which is the chief bone of contention, but it is impossible accurately to gauge the genesis of these rights. Both Kotaibi and Alawi were originally mercenaries of the Saiyids of Dthubiyat. The Kotaibi for years prior to our arrival was master of the Habilen from Jimil upwards and if at that time the Alawi had rights in Ath Thumair they must have been merely such as overlordship and protection of Alawi subjects who had gone to reside there. Certain it is that before our arrival the rights now claimed by Alawi to

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the exclusion of Kotaibi could not possibly have existed. If indeed the Alawi was able at that time to purchase certain rights in that village, the Kotaibi who ruled the Habilen, including the village of Ath Thumair, and had his own Customs on the Habilen, must have exercised equal rights with the other, and probably his jurisdiction was superior, on the principle that might is right.

41. We have now left the Hinterland. The difficulty I had with the Alawi is already known to Government. The facts of the road at this time are as follows:—Hardaba Fort and Suleik Fort are destroyed and the Kotaibis are in possession of both places, and their jurisdiction extends north of Hardaba some $\frac{1}{2}$ mile up the river bed to a place called "Safa Hiliya" where the Amir's jurisdiction starts Northwards. Dar al Qabtan (*alias* Dar al Hamrah) is also demolished. It stood opposite to Ath Thumair village and during the chronic inter-tribal disputes has been for two years used by Alawi to fight his battles. I had strongly recommended its demolition, for on our departure it would in Alawi hands have given rise to daily fighting. Dar Ta'iz which the Kotaibi lately erected on the hill opposite to, and commanding, both Ath Thumair and Dar al Qabtan, was also demolished under my supervision. This the Kotaibis called 'Dar Al Megar' after me and in opposition to the Alawi Fort which bore the late Captain Warneford's name. The idea was to leave Kotaibi with Alawi as co-adjutors in the custody of the road in that vicinity, and the agreements lately sanctioned would have effected this. As explained elsewhere there was at Lahej a Darbar presided over by me, and attended by the Abdali Sultan, the Amir of Dthala, the Kotaibi and Alawi Chiefs and many chosen Saiyids. Here the Alawi Sheikh agreed to my demolishing his fort of Dar al Qabtan, but went back on his word when I arrived at the spot, and blankly refused his assent unless the Rs. 500 promised him in the treaty (for demolition of this fort and the construction of another at Ma'baja) had been first paid over to him. This unfriendly attitude and the overt hostility of his people and mercenaries has been explained elsewhere. Owing to Ramadthan, primarily, and to the *volte face* executed by the Alawi Sheikh, the agreements are still waiting signature. The Haushabi Sultan and Kotaibi Sheik will, I believe, come into Aden; the Alawi's attitude merits serious notice as my life was endangered and the safety of the party with me was at one time imperilled. At the same time it would never do to let the Kotaibi sign his agreement and remain in possession of a certain portion of the road with the Alawi Sheikh unwilling to fulfil his obligations alongside. It would mean the effacement of Sheikh Ali's authority and a predominance of Kotaibi influence along the whole Habilen. In other words we should, *mutatis mutandis*, have the unsatisfactory conditions formerly in vogue, where then, it was the Alawi in the ascendant and using his opponent's weakness for self-aggrandisement.

There will never be complete rest on that plateau, but chronic impediment to trade, until the inter-tribal disputes of these two people are settled, as promised by the Abdali Sultan. The pacification will even then be one-sided and unsatisfactory unless Alawi and Kotaibi clansmen are equally strong on the plateau, with their respective bounds settled, as indeed they were before me at the Lahej conference.

The actual wording of the new agreements contains no mention of bounds, but this is a *sine qua non*. We cannot arm the Kotaibi and give him a stipend without assigning him a terrain for the exercise of his responsibilities. Otherwise we shall at once open the door to strife. The Kotaibi we found on the entire plateau and we recognised his position there though we did not investigate his credentials. There was at that time no need for it and still less need later when he flouted us and was driven back into his hills. Now re-admitted into the circle of our friendship he is coming back to ground which for the time being we permitted the Alawi to hold. Ergo, we cannot let the two parties fight it out, but are duty bound, as we make them co-ordinate road custodians to assign to each his several bounds. I have already so assigned these limits and both parties were agreeable. Owing to the break in the overtures, and our departure, we cannot do better than ask the Abdali Sultan to resume the

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negotiations where the threads dropped. He was chiefly instrumental in bringing about the unanimity at the Lahej conference and is *facile princeps* the most influential friend we possess in the Hinterland.

42. As stated in paragraph 23 above, the sooner we permit the Kotaibi to collect his road dues, and ask the Abdali to arrange for the same by convening a meeting of all interested, the better will it be for trade and the security of caravans. In my opinion our interference in earlier times to prohibit forcibly these collections by the Kotaibi (due in the main to a former Amir's representations) was unjustifiable, and far exceeds in magnitude any tribal interference during our sojourn in the Hinterland, and in our dealings with any tribesmen whomsoever.

43. The Alawi has reduced the dowry payable at time of marriage, and has set an example by giving daughters of his own household in marriage to poorer Sheikhs, asking half the usual amount. As I said in paragraph 33 if only we could secure his two young sons (he once promised to send them) at college, we should be largely instrumental in bettering their country, and the results would be beneficial to us and lighten our white man's burden. At present the boys are growing up their own way and learning to use the pernicious 'Kat'. An Arab is the most indulgent of parents. We don't require active interference if we can work so powerfully and indirectly from Aden.

44. The Alawi Sheikh has always taken exception to what his predecessor agreed to before a former Resident, General Hogg, in 1888 when his, and others, road dues, were defined. When we were in Dtbala, contractors used to complain to me of excess dues claimed, and of goods detained at Customs. The preceding Sheikh was most unpopular in his country and the present day folk do not believe in his patriotism. I think the time has come to revise all these rates under the Abdali's presidentship and the time would be a fitting one to focus all customs at one central station, preferably at Lahej.

45. Sheikh Ali's relations with the Saiyids of Dthubiyat leave much to be desired. The Saiyids, says the Sheikh, have thrown in their lot with the Kotaibi. Saiyid Ali Ridhwan is very astute and has found it better policy to side with the stronger party. Once let a Saiyid shew bias and party feeling and he becomes a veritable fire-brand in the country. The Radfan Saiyid Fadhel *bin* Alawi whose head-quarters are at Shi'b Taim, is a case in point. He is at the bottom of the Alawi-Kotaibi unrest, the greatest 'trouble-fête' of the country. At times, however, I have been able to make use of his vast influence and direct it into useful channels.

46. Proceeding to Haushabi affairs. The country promises to settle down, thanks to the young Sultan Ali Mami who is excellently piloted by the Akil of the Haushabis, one Saleh ba Hashim, his father-in-law. Ali Mami was bequeathed a *damnosa hereditas*. His uncle Mohsin *bin* Ali had turned the country upside down by his administration while his lavish expenditure to unworthy favourites tended to impoverish the country. Mohsin *bin* Ali was generous, but cruel. He kept the restless Subehis in check, but was loathed by the people. He left a son of 15 years, who, if not taken in hand and trained, will, so far as I can read Arab character, out-Herod Herod, and when his turn comes to rule, the country will suffer. Sultan Ali Mami took up the reins of Government at a time when affairs were at the low-water level. By his obstinacy and coquetting with the Turks Mohsin *bin* Ali had lost a large slice of his territory which the late Abdali had seized as war indemnity after going into Haushabi territory to punish him. The Haushabi stipend and his dues were received through the medium of the Abdali Sultan: the dues were collected at Lahej at the instance of Ahl Fajjar and Ahl Yahya, the Haushabi's kinsmen who claimed a share in the same, but did not partake of it when the Haushabi taxed caravans direct. By an agreement of 1895 concluded between Abdali and Haushabi and ratified by General Cuninghame, the Resident, the above reservation was included; certain and specified villages and lands in Haushabi exchanged hands, and the Sultan became responsible to the Abdali for the safe conduct of travellers and merchandise passing along the road to Lahej. A later agreement of 1899 which received no Residency *imprimatur* as the other, modified the earlier engagement, but its provisions remained practically

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a dead letter. The two documents could not possibly stand together and so when deputed in June of 1905 to adjudicate between Abdali and Haushabi interests—for young Ali Mani had expressed a wish to revert to the old order of things prior to 1895—I was able to effect the cancellation of the later document while the older one of 1895, by mutual consent of both Sultans, was retained. For a term of trial, indeed, it was agreed that the Haushabi should draw his stipend direct and appoint one of his trustworthy men permanently to collect his dues, though the place of collection was continued at Lahej. Again, the lands of Amur (once Haushabi) were transferred to the Haushabi who, after the conference dissolved, retransferred the same to the Abdali's jurisdiction, and stated his willingness, nay, preference, to consider Sultan Ahmed Fadhl his father, and to await the latter's pleasure if indeed he might prove willing at some later date to make him (Ali Mani) still further concessions. The decision arrived at in Nobat Dakim was endorsed by the Government of Bombay.

47. I see no cause to revert to another order of things. The Haushabi has a Protectorate Treaty concluded with us on the same date as the agreement of 1895; at its close it is stated that the Haushabi entered into the treaty "under the auspices of the Abdali Sultan and with his full knowledge and consent" (*sic*). We, then, recognised 12 years ago the Abdali's tutelage. It has been thought that the agreement between the two Sultans was *personal* only and that the conditions imposed therein became *ipso facto* null and void with the death of the contracting parties. In support of this view it appears that in 1902 when Mohsin bin Ali died it was found necessary to reaffirm the 1895 document. If this spells a personal compact, a like reaffirmation was surely necessary before 1902 and at the time of Ahmad Fadhl's election to Lahej. It was only, however, when Mohsin bin Ali played truant and refused to act up to the provisions of 1895 that the Abdali sallied forth to punish him when Mohsin bin Ali came in and again set his seal to the first document concluded between himself and Ahmad Fadhl's predecessor.

I hardly think this "personal argument" to be correct. If so, then, logically, had Mohsin bin Ali died the day after this agreement was concluded, the same would have become forthwith null and void, and the Abdali would have reaped no advantages nor received any compensation for the losses sustained by him in coercing the Haushabi at the instance of the Residency. In that case, doubtless, the Haushabi's successor would have been called upon by the Abdali to consent to his predecessor's action and continue the same and the Residency *imprimatur*, originally given, could not but have been repeated to include the incoming Ruler: in other words it would have been to the Residency's interest to see a continuance of the terms afore proposed. I do not therefore attach any importance to the personal factor in this agreement and believe that the co-existence of this and the Protectorate Treaty argues perpetuity in both instances. The Abdali tutelage so clearly admitted by Government in the Government's Protectorate Treaty, which has no personal factor merely, but extends to Haushabi successors, is found in the other and ancillary agreement, and this of itself presupposes a like continuance or perpetuity.

It was not possible we could forget the many and various good offices performed by the Abdali at a time when it was impracticable for us to work to achieve what the Abdali had accomplished. Expediency, convenience and economy compelled this policy of action by proxy. We would see to it, then, that the Abdali secured the fruits of his labours, and that in some permanent form. I believe the Haushabi was schooled to ask that the agreement be revoked, and his action was in part explicable, and traceable perhaps to our forward policy which gave rise to our direct contact with the chiefs of the Hinterland and was antagonistic to the old idea of working with them through a medium. In other words the prestige of Sultan Ali Mani was waxing synchronously with our move up to Dthala, while the Abdali's *role* of sole mediator was becoming less and less requisite.

48. The real point at issue appears to be whether or no the 1895 agreement works at this time. If *not*, change is indicated and as Government, in the person of the Resident, acquiesced in the expediency of that agreement, it is

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equally open for them now to cancel it and substitute a better one. So long as it works we had better leave well alone. Ali Mani is young and untried. We have no guarantee that if detached completely from the Abdali's tutelage we should not witness a return to the nuisances of the past. We had better see first of all how Ali Mani comports himself with his kinsfolk of Ar Raha, with whom it cannot yet be said he is on the best of terms.

49. It is in part owing to his differences with Ar Raha that the Dthambaris are urged to commit their misdeeds on the road leading along the Sailat Billeh where of late they have been somewhat active. Ali Mani tries to impose responsibility for this route on the Ahl Yahya, his kinsmen of Ar Raha but he gives them no monetary *quid pro quo*; hence their indifference to Dthambari misdemeanours, if not indeed their active concurrence with these tribesmen's acts.

The Dthambaris have their own grievances against the Haushabi Sultan and complain bitterly of his niggardliness in the bestowal of gifts. Ali Mani is popular in most parts of his territories, but is too addicted to pleasures and so is not disposed to distribute largesse to tribesmen who expect it as a matter of right. These Dthambaris, though geographically termed Radfan tribesmen, owe political allegiance to no one Ruler. They hasten to support the one with the largest purse and so it is that they are more amenable to the Abdali Sultan who works solely with the dollar. It is his one panacea to checkmate crime, and if he fail to check it, the dollar is forthcoming once more to obtain restoration of the property looted. The Dthambari is not amenable to Amiri influence at all. He is certainly not subject to the Haushabi. He is a much sought mercenary of the Alawi Sheikh whose own people have no great fighting instincts.

50. This brings me to the responsibility we would bring home to the Haushabi for crimes committed by such tribes as Dthambaris and Subehis within the confines of his territory. Ali Mani is not averse to punishing his tribesmen proper. The other day when his people of Al Ligma detained camels of a ration convoy proceeding from Dthala camp to Dthubiyat, the Sultan intervened. Government sanctioned the proposal to mulct Ali Mani through his stipend, but the Sultan recouped himself at the hands of the people. He is, however, not agreeable to incurring responsibility where outside restless tribes are concerned.

51. In the 1895 agreement between the Sultans, the Haushabi by Article VI "undertakes to protect and make restitution of any property looted on the road leading to Lahej and *vice versa*." He then is primarily responsible to the Abdali Sultan for the roads, and although this agreement was witnessed by the Resident, it seems to me that the Abdali Sultan should *prima facie* be the first to move to ensure property being restored. This indeed he has done. It was he who lately persuaded the Dthambaris to restore the Kotaibi camel which was lifted by Dthambaris at a time when it was employed by us in carrying rations from Nobat Dakim to our troops in Suleik, and in many other cases the Abdali has mediated to support the Haushabi.

Our own Protectorate Treaty concluded in 1895 with the Haushabi is silent as to this responsibility and in this respect is unlike that concluded in 1904 with the Amir of Dthala, who receives special assistance in arms, while a part of his stipend is ear-marked for the express purpose of safeguarding the roads.

52. With the 50 carbines and the increase in his stipend now proposed, Ali Mani should be unable to shirk responsibilities of this nature. In article II he is asked to engage "to keep open the roads in his territory and its dependencies" and "to protect all persons who may be going in the direction of Aden or returning therefrom for the purposes of trade" and in article III "The British Government agrees to pay him Rs. 50 per mensem *in consideration of these undertakings and engagements being faithfully and fully carried out*."

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"دراسة حول المناطق الداخلية لعدن المجاورة لدويلات الضالع ويافع والعلوي
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I would, however, in this connection note that the original draft of the agreement was more precise. We had originally inserted clauses in which we made demands for compensation for injuries; redress for injuries inflicted outside tribal limits, and had demanded redress to be secured even from other chiefs. The Secretary of State did not approve of this and the drafts were remodelled as they now stand. I do not say that the Haushabi should be unanswerable for raids committed by Dthambaris and Subehis whom his niggardly policy may be exciting to acts of aggression. On the contrary, unless the Resident's scheme of assisting the Haushabi with the Aden Troop within certain limits on the trade routes is approved and sanctioned, it is impossible to check crime that must necessarily affect trade, if the Haushabi is not called upon to make restitution and to give some *quid pro quo* for the extra assistance in cash and arms we are prepared to give him.

53. As one who was lately Political Agent, with immediate supervision over the Haushabi Sultan, I feel I hold a brief for him, and would record as my contention that we at any rate should make reasonable distinction in the matter of crimes committed in his territory whether by his own tribesmen or by outsiders such as Dthambari and Subehi over whom he has no control, and should abstain from making him equally responsible for both kinds of offences. Certain it is, however, that if he is *totally* irresponsible, a premium will be placed on the recurrence of crime, when these miscreants note our own inaction, which spells indifference, and the Haushabi's *non possumus*. Aggrieved by the Sultan they will exult in their policy of pin-pricks which will at any rate serve as a perpetual reminder to us of Haushabi incompetence and will eventually lead us to reconsider the wisdom of paying him so unremunerative a stipend.


54. The Subehis are equally troublesome. The Abdali himself cannot control them. Vexed with what they considered but petty presents at his hands, some of the Jabbera section when returning from Lahej in 1906 fired on some Abdali well-diggers in our Nobat Dakim camp, and when our post returned the fire, a brisk exchange of bullets was kept up when the Subehis decamped. The Haushabi, it is true, subsequently decoyed the Jabbera leaders to his capital on pretension of some discussion. On their arrival he made prisoners of them and till quite lately they were detained at his capital of Musemir. Later on he asked the Abdali to assist him in an expedition. Abdali soldiers were sent up to the Haushabi country, but the brunt of the fighting was borne by the Haushabi's and the Abdali contented themselves—this was the Haushabi's story—with entering into an agreement with the offenders and then returning to Lahej. The late Haushabi Sultan though extremely cruel and unpopular with the masses generally, used to raid Subehi country and after decapitating his prisoners would expose their heads on his house.

55. Sultan Ali Mani is young but is extremely loyal. He has often asked me to give him a British flag and he is constant in his recognition of British predominance and is proud of his position as a part and parcel of the British Empire. In this respect he is a marked contrast to his predecessor who delighted to dance attendance on the Turks at Mavia and was wont, as the Arabic has it, "to eat with both hands," *i. e.*, to serve two masters—ourselves and the Turks—as it suited him best.

56. On the Turkish border there have been no such incidents as took place near Kataba, where the Amir of Dthala is concerned. It is true that the notorious Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil had been inciting Sheikh Manassar Al Wajih and Sheikh Nagi of Daba to collect tithes on land claimed by Ali Mani. I have visited the border, and again quite recently with the Maps, and found that while Ali Mani was claiming revenues on lands which were not his, there were certain tracts where he had not been collecting his dues owing to the encroachments of these Turkish Sheikhs. This is now rectified and Ali Mani is in possession of a complete descriptive list of his village, and understands the respective properties of both parties.

Sheikh Nagi of Daba, who was oppressed by the over zeal of Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, to whom the revenues in that tract had been farmed, was tempted

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to fraternise with the Haushabi Sultan. I have warned the Sultan not to entangle himself in these matters and to steer an independent course. I have traversed the boundary with him and believe he will avoid implicating himself in Turkish affairs.

57. Muhammad Nasir Mukbil was the cause of the Ad Dareja affair in 1900 and was subsequently taken prisoner by the Turks and confined at Sana'a. He was thereafter released when the Turks were hard pressed by the Imam, and now again he is in high favour and has lucrative appointments and higher powers than even before. He lately met Ali Mani on the frontier and they were able to come to terms over certain blood-feuds of long standing which had embittered frontier relations between tribes on both sides. In all his deliberations Ali Mani is ably assisted by his father-in-law Saleh ba Hashim who is Akil of the Haushabi and second only to the Sultan. He is practically arbiter in all tribal quarrels and responsible to Ali Mani for peace in his dominions. He is a man of strong character and well able to assert his authority. So long as he stands high in the Sultan's favour, Haushabi affairs need cause no anxiety.

58. Ali Mani's relations with the Saiyid community are not uniformly good. The Saiyids are but little accounted of in his eyes. There is one noteworthy exception in the person of Haj Ali al Kamarani who lives on the frontier at Kharanin near Jabal Na'man and has a reputation in the whole Hinterland second to none. The Abdali Sultan has a high opinion of this Saiyid's powers and is building for him a house at Nobat Dakim for, he says, the Saiyid by occasional residence there will act as a deterrent to all mischievously inclined Subehis.

Another Saiyid of importance is Ali Humadi of Ar Raha, the former Head-quarters of the Haushabi Sultans who moved to Musemir in recent times in order to control the extra traffic that passes along the river Tiban coming from Turkish territory.

59. Ali Mani's territory is very extensive. Along the river Tiban, and Warezan and Amiri tracts generally the cultivation is excellent as it is along the Turkish border in the vicinity of Shabwa, and Al Kafuf. For the most part, however, the country is stony and barren. The principal trade routes are six in number and the paucity of villages here render it, in places, a charming rendezvous for marauding bands. The people who live away from the river are mainly goat-herds and tenders of camels. They are strikingly poor. The people have a great reputation as warriors, and at one time in Aden the word *Al Haushaba* was synonymous with personal prowess in the fight. One may travel over the entire country without let or hindrance, for the people are very friendly. You will find more shikaries amongst the Haushabis than anywhere else in the Hinterland.

60. The Dthambari and Subehi clans are by nature prone to raiding. These tracts will be tamed only by the exercise of what in India is known as the Sandemanian policy of personal intercourse. They are possessed of great herds of cattle, and if more amenable to civilisation the demands of Aden could in large measure be supplied from their resources, thus obviating the necessity of transporting animals from over the water.

Had the Nakhlen expedition been less abortive we might have seen* these people no less tractable than the Kotaibis who felt the weight of our hand and became, therefore, more ready to fraternise. The old Indian adage is true for these Bedowins "*Pahle lat pichhe bat.*" "*Fortiter in re*" followed by "*suaviter in modo.*" The combination is important: the order of application is more so.

We require to be more in touch with the trade-routes. Strict order maintained there will teach the value of order within, and away from the roads. What these people want is a living example in their midst and yet by controlling the roads we should not come one iota nearer interference with the people or their country than we now are. I trust that General DeBrath's scheme will soon be in working order.

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61. The Dthambaris receive no stipend from us. They cannot, therefore, be expected to reverence us, nor will they dread us so long as we hold aloof from them. The same remark applies to the Subehis, so far as estrangement goes, but here we actually pay stipends in lieu of loss of transit dues. The Subehis have no real leaders. Each man is a law to himself. It has been deemed inadvisable to dock their stipends for excesses committed, for otherwise they would openly re-inaugurate the system of levying road dues. It will not check crime, I believe, to curtail their Darbar Presents. They will recoup themselves from the road at once. The one panacea is to live, move and have one's being in their country. This does not mean interference with their customs any more than a Political Officer in India who moves in a Native State can be accused of interference. It is the District Officer of India who, more than any one else, has revolutionised the country, and in these times when his paternal supervision is diminished by multifarious office routine we note the genesis of unrest and unruliness.

62. Much has been said in the matter of restricting the Arms Trade. Given the desire for arms, and the fact that men earn their livelihood by usurping the rights of others, so long will the Arms trade thrive and continue. Vigilance from outside is expensive and its adoption affects other nations whose interests it is to dump down the arms. Tell a Subehi that he is too well equipped and arms will in future be restricted. He will scent some ulterior and sinister motive impelling our action. If we restricted his arms and gave him something else to think about, well and good. What we would do is to deprive him of his birthright and withal give him as wide a berth as before. He sees a possible subjugation of his country. The same remark applies to the scheme of replacing his Gras carbines by M. H. weapons, so as the better to check the supply of ammunition *which is more costly than that of the Gras*. I have no belief in the efficacy of this policy. With it we are only on the fringe of the subject. The tribesman is going to have his weapon at any cost. We may be well aware of the number of M. H. carbines in the country, but we can never gauge the numbers of the other arms which he will call to meet the deficiency. We shall not affect the arms traffic except from within. The desire for arms must be turned into a desire for self-improvement. The blood-feud is at the bottom of the arms trade. This you cannot efface by practising aloofness. No one who knows Arabic and has sympathy with the people need be afraid of entering Subehi country. Personal intercourse alone is the panacea. A suppurating boil is best treated from within. One must not treat the symptom, but the cause. We may bandage the boil and so confine the poison. It is the entire system that requires attention. So it is with the Arms trade. The Arms trade will be more quickly annihilated by the absence of all restrictions, which only irritate, and by ameliorating the political organisation from within. All this may sound Utopian, but does any other system promise better results? We have a Subehi-Turkish border, but it is absolutely without supervision. The Sandemanian policy would remedy this defect, without a Political being obliged to tour very far from Aden.

I have seen M. H. sporting carbines (Peabody) from U. S. A. in the hands of several Arabs in the Hinterland and these are said to come from Muscat across the Hadthramaut. They are highly appraised and ammunition is scarce; German Mausers are very common now-a-days in and about Dthala, and these come from the Turkish side. I have seen them in the Sha'ri country and on Jabal Jihaf. During the Amiri-Sha'ri trouble the Sha'ris made their own powder and refilled the cartridge cases. Bullets are moulded at Lahej.

I do not see in the Arms Trade any danger to ourselves *qua* a tribal rising. The arms are wanted for sole protection and for personal aggrandisement at the expense of wayfarers. There is no sympathy here with Pan-Islamism. "It is good for dogs" said David Hiram "to have fleas, it helps them to forget they are dogs". So with the arms. They compensate the Subehis for their otherwise monotonous existence. All I recommend is that arms be replaced by some worthier aids to self forgetfulness, whereby the dawn of a brighter era may break upon the land.

63. I now propose to return to the Yafa' and its people (*vide* paragraph 24) and then pass on to the affairs in that vicinity, *viz.*, Juban, Bani Dthabiani,

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Na'wa and Rubעות، and next to add a little on the Turkish Arabs and on Sheikhs that are till now independent of European control. This will call for a few remarks on the Imam of Sana'a.

64. Upper Yafa' is not so known to the Arabs. Yafa' is really one country and is made up of what we call Lower Yafa' and Yafa'-as-Sufal (our Upper Yafa') which means in reality Lower Yafa'. I will keep to our nomenclature as more comprehensible. Lower Yafa' is the parent stock and at this time the Bani Kasid (of whom 'Abdallah bin Mohsin is Sultan) have much to say in all Yafa' country politics. The principal clans are Yazidi, Kaladi and Yahari. Sultan Kahtan bin Umar who was deposed for coming to Aden to make a treaty, is now in the Yazidi country and Yafa'is admit that his restoration will be possible only with this clan's assistance. Sultan Kahtan's downfall has been much discussed elsewhere. He was not deposed simply because his inclinations were pro-British, but because his tribesmen resented his being singled out as sole stipendiary to the exclusion of many others, who became jealous of his favoured position. Yafa', the old land of the Himyarites, is an excellent example of the democratic spirit. There are numerous clans and the country is split up into chieftaincies whose name is legion. Sultan Kahtan is not, as represented the titular Sultan of Upper Yafa'. There is no one occupying so exalted and singular a position. He hails from the old House of Sheikh A.i. His forbears quarrelled and separated, and the whole House began to trek. Kahtan's ancestors moved to the Dthubi clansmen and Haidara'a sought an asylum with the Mausatta tribesmen. Deposed when he came at our invitation to Aden, it behoved us to do our best to reinstate him so far as money was an instrument. He has been given the \$ 3,000 promised, but still remains merely *de jure* Sultan, while his brother Saleh has usurped his place. Kahtan still receives his stipend from us, and so long as his tribesmen still hope for his rehabilitation it is politic to continue his dole. It is, however, somewhat prejudicial to our prestige to have for three years been waiting to see his restoration to power, and to have displayed to all Yafa' an expectation which they see we do nothing practical to bring about. We certainly have not tried to enter Yafa' for any purpose, and so our indifference *ought* not to be misunderstood, but I fear it is interpreted to mean want of influence in these quarters. The Turks have never entered the country, which prefers splendid isolation so long as it can reap pecuniary advantages from us. Before our arrival, Sultans Haidara and Saleh bin Umar (Kahtan's powerful brother) were recipients of Turkish stipends, but in the days of the Commissioners' advent, Haidara was on Turkish soil and somewhat shy of approaching us. We had done better to have made him our stipendiary, and, with the Mausatta and Mufahi Sheikhs added, we need not have made other arrangements. The others are mere men of straw no better nor worse than many others there. The cultivation of worthless stipendiaries is not merely a waste of money, but has served to stir up a lot of resentment, so that did we ever incline Yafa'wards, an entrance would be almost impracticable because of the multitude of existing rivalries. To enter this country would entail the propitiation of all the clans, the readiness of some few to receive us being counterbalanced by the many who receive nothing at our hands. The paltry sum given to the Madhrami, for instance, cannot further our influence in that quarter, not only because of the many there who receive nothing, but because the Rs. 20 per mensem merely goes into the pocket of this one Sheikh without increasing in any way his powers of persuasion. The two brothers and stipendiary Sheikhs of Dthubi do not receive enough for distribution to any outside their immediate family circle, and in consequence the payments each month are unremunerative.

65. The Yafa' treaties, as observed above, are precise as to the facilities prescribed for each contracting party to visit the territories of the other. This provision by its impracticability of execution serves only to accentuate our exclusion from Yafa'. The treaty is one-sided. It is a mistake with these people to contract for what cannot be effected. It imparts an air of unreality to these Bonds. Such a clause had better have been omitted. We derive nothing from the Yafa'i Bonds. The country is anti-Turkish and anti-Imam. The Yafa'i as a whole do not wish us there, and a survey party would be most

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unpopular, as was evidenced when the Mausatta clans opposed our surveyor at Awabil in the Shaibi country which they claim as their special preserve. Nothing can in any case be achieved in Upper Yafa' so long as our relations with the Bani Kāsīd Sultan remain unsatisfactory. The two countries are united by close bounds of sympathy. Many Sheikhs from Lower Yafa' have visited me in Dthala and have expressed a desire to oust Sultan Abdallah bin Mohsin of Bani Kāsīd, whose estrangement from us has caused a diminution in their income *qua* Darbar Presents.

66. The Mausatta tribe comprises the best fighting material, with such clans as Al Ku'aiti and Al Khulāki. The Nakibs of Mausatta style themselves "the Fathers of Yafa'" and are perhaps our most useful stipendiaries, *i.e.*, the two brothers Ali and Mohsin bin Askar. The latter's son Ali Mohsin Askar is the most active personality in all Upper Yafa', as he is also the best hated man. He was a constant adviser of the Commissioners and was chosen by my predecessor, Major Merewether, as a middleman to effect Kahtan's restoration to power. The split between Kahtan and his brother Salch was the cause of much blood-shed, satisfaction for which up to this time has not been effected in spite of our dollars.

67. In May 1906 Kahtan's party came to Dthala with a bond passed between Kahtan and his cousin Haidara (*ex-nominee* of the Turks) in which Haidara's co-operation was conditioned by his being included in the number of our stipendiaries, and by the receipt from us of arms and ammunition to effect Kahtan's restoration. The Resident explained that the restoration must be effected by tribal means solely, and that our assistance would be confined to the sum of \$ 3,000 which we had engaged to contribute.

Haidara's father was a great admirer of the British, and Haidara's goodwill is necessary to serve our purpose, if we are really solicitous to see Kahtan once more a *de facto* Sultan.

The style of Sultan is somewhat misleading as suggesting the idea of a powerful Ruler. There are some 360 Sultans in Yafa', and the status is in no way superior to that of Sheikh.

68. The Yafa'is are many of them great travellers journeying to Hyderabad (Deccan), Java and Sumatra where they fill the posts of mercenaries and are also tradres.

69. I think we should have confined our attentions nearer home, and studied to consolidate our influence in and around Dthala; to have brought about rest and order in the Sha'iri country, disillusioned the Jihafis as to the indifference we shewed on their Hill, and to have corrected their hostility towards the Amir, who for his part should have been compelled to treat these tribesmen in a more conciliatory manner. Jabal Harir with its villages, in part owned by the Amir, and in part by the Muffahi Sheikh (Upper Yafa') was the most convenient place for us to have begun to influence Yafa'. In short our *rôle* was to turn to the spots most accessible from Dthala, and to use these places as nurseries in which best to establish our influence, so that they in turn might be object lessons to those further afield, of the advantages British occupation had to offer. This indeed has been my aim, but our policy has not been sufficiently bold, nor indeed has the time of our sojourn been sufficiently prolonged to effect great things. It were almost preferable to have left the Hinterland synchronously with the completion of the Commissioners' labours than to have waited just long enough to have created a taste for a fuller knowledge of our methods which our departure has left unsatisfied.

70. Ali Mohsin Askar who fancied (though without foundation) that he had been treated with scant respect in Aden, returned to the Sha'ib country in April 1906 and stated his intention, by letter, of turning Upper Yafa' against us. He had been chiefly instrumental in selecting the list of our Yafa' stipendiaries and was always reckoned a man of some importance. He then dismantled one of the Sha'ib pillars, for the upkeep of which Mutahar Ali of Adh-Dthathina is responsible, and wrote to detail his action. His allowance was at once stopped, but after two months he visited the Resident in Dthala and craved pardon. Since his restoration to favour this Sheikh has

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been a different man and is now one of our best friends and well-wishers. His treatment for fever for several months in our Dthala Dispensary served to increase his respect for us, and was an excellent object lesson to the whole country side of our fairness and absence of malice. Many an Arab from Yafa' tried to dissuade Ali Mohsin from trusting to British good faith and hinted at the excellent opportunity he was giving us, under the guise of treatment, to put him quietly out of the way. He was deaf to all their representations and declared that if our intentions were bad, the process we employed was most palatable to him, and he meant to stick to us. He was eventually cured, and returned to his country. The demolition of the pillar, since repaired by the Sheikh in charge, has thus proved a valuable political asset to us, though at the time it was thought likely to prove a precedent that might be followed by others who fancied themselves aggrieved, and the incident might have given rise to awkward correspondence with the Turks, who would view with suspicion any *ex-parte* restoration of the boundary marks.

71. The transaction whereby Juban was proclaimed Turkish while Rubeaten, the Bani Dthabiani and Na'wa were allowed by the Turks to be under our influence is not in practice altogether satisfactory. Juban is admittedly Turkish, but it has had from time immemorial close commerce not only with Yafa', but also with Na'wa and the Bani Dthabiani over which tracts the Bani Nakib of Mausatta (Yafa') claim to exercise some sort of control. Only lately there were disturbances between Juban and Na'wa, when the Mausatta Sheikhs were asked to adjudicate. Not only Mausatta but Kahtan, the Muflahi and the Hadthrami were similarly petitioned by Juban. These stipendiaries were warned to steer clear off any action that would be resented by the Turkish official of Radaa' into which Katha Juban properly falls. The line of division between us and the Turks is not readily understood by the Arabs, but Mausatta promised to be cautious though they shewed the necessity of proceeding themselves to Juban. This they did and matters at dispute were settled though not without a slight skirmish.

72. One of the Juban Sheikhs Ali Ubad (*alias* Ali Abdul Karim) visited me in 1905 and on several occasions has made violent attacks on Turkish methods and declared his wish to come under our flag. I have told him as often that he is beyond our sphere and so, while glad to consider him our friend, we must remind him of our friendship with the Turks and that perfect reciprocity of action between the two Governments could not permit of our encouraging his overtures. He then adopted an opposite line and wrote virulently abusive of everything British, reminding me of his Turkish proclivities and asserting his antagonism to everything non-Moslem. I took no notice of this effusion which was shortly afterwards repented of and followed by letters eulogising methods British and again decrying the Turkish administration which aimed at the extinction of Juban's independence. Juban has in 1906 made overtures to Mausatta (Yafa') and wrote me that Juban was one with Yafa', *i.e.*, the Bani Wais of Juban with 'Ali Abdul Karim as chief.

Ahmad Bubakr Abdul Rab the co-Sheikh has also written to know our intentions towards himself. I have reminded him of his obligations to Turkish demands.

73. Na'wa and Bani Dthabiani are both "sitting on the fence", but were eager to know in whose sphere of influence they are situate. Na'wa wrote as Juban has done decrying the British, but I think it was merely an attempt to draw our sympathy. I have had much correspondence with them. They can be approached, if necessary, through the medium of Ali Mohsin Askar of the Mausatta.

74. Rubeaten is clearly under Kahtan's tutelage, though supervision is now exercised by his brother Saleh. A fixed portion of its revenues are recoverable by Kahtan's House. The Sheikhs are most friendly and have often pressed me to visit their country.

75. Regular correspondence with these countries would entail an outlay of Darbar presents and probably raise expectation of stipends to which claims would be raised.

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It is probable that altogether unvisited by us these people may quietly continue oblivious of our existence, and if watched by Mausatta, which has an interest there, we shall be kept fairly conversant with their doings. I hardly think the Turks will pay stipends to those who are acknowledged to be under our influence. Should, however, the Imam replace the Turk in the Yemen, and this is not altogether an extravagant idea, these places would be a source of worry and anxiety, for we have done nothing to know the people or to encourage intercourse with their Sheikhs. In fact these countries do not know under whose authority they are so arbitrarily placed, and inwardly chafe at the thought of dependence on any Power. All dread Turkish usurpation, for the Turk annexes and not supervises merely. Our aim in defining our own sphere of influence would appear to be directed towards limiting Turkish influence rather than impressing our image on those that have come within the circle of our protection.

76. The Arabs on the Turkish side hold in great respect the name of Sultan Abdul Hamid of Stamboul, but have an equally fixed contempt for the Turkish administration of Yemen which is known popularly as the dumping ground for Turkish undesirables. It is for many Turkish officials a house of exile. A recent Kaim Makam of Kataba had been for ten years ostracised from Constantinople for advanced views on education, and has often, but in vain, tried to return. He finally left Kataba hurriedly and passed to Aden from where he visited Cairo. Eventually, he was reinstated in a Kaim Makamship in Syria! He belongs to the Young Turkish Party, but conceals his aspirations. There are many officials like unto him. They improve the occasion by amassing fortunes. It is the acts of such men that have been chiefly instrumental in injuring Turkey's cause in the Yemen and opening the door to the spread of revolutionary ideas, thus furthering the cause of the Imam of Sana'a and his Zeidi bands.

The Turks farm the revenue collections annually to the highest bidder who is instant, in season and out of season, in feathering his nest. Disaffection is the natural outcome of their *regime*. Many a Sheikh both in the Turkish jurisdiction and on neutral soil has expressed his desire to cultivate our acquaintance. Sabah is one, Juban as above said, is another. Again there is the Nakib Muhammad bin Abdllah Mohsin Shaif of Du Husein who wants our friendship. He hails from Saba near Jof. So, too, the Sheikh of Ans who wrote me an invitation to visit him with troops. "Knowledge of us" he said "can only be achieved by the overflow of your Government into our parts". The Marib Sheikh has an inclination towards us. This place with Saba is famous in Arab chronicles as the old-time Head-quarters of the Queen of Sheba. A prominent Saiyid in Turkish territory who came down to Lahej was Ahmed Ubadi. I saw him in Haushabi territory where he journeyed to interview me. He was most bitter against the Turks, and asked for our protection. I told him he could live within our sphere if he chose, but that regarding his lands on the Turkish side, we could do nothing to assist him towards their recovery, since it was a purely personal concern between him and them.

Without doubt before the evacuation of Dthala, our prestige was in the ascendant across the border. The withdrawal of our political oversight has everywhere been ascribed to superior Turkish diplomacy.

77. If the Imam and Turk are reconciled, it is not unlikely that the former will be allowed to administer the Yemen in the name of Sultan Abdul Hamid who would still remain the overlord and derive tributary rights. In that case the Imam would replace the Turk all along our frontier and we should be in direct communication with him. We have no reason now to expect that the Imam would be specially drawn to us. We have not replied to his first letter asking our intervention. I had guaranteed to have a reply placed in his hands without the Turks becoming aware of it. At one time we considered him a rebel against Turkish authority. I think that his status and importance prospectively have perhaps tempered our earlier view. Again, at a later period he asked to come within the circle of our friendship. An impossible request for us to grant no doubt, but his letter

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demanded an answer. The Imams once held all Yemen and their rule reached as far as Aden. If, it is not a merely chimerical supposition, he set his borders to march with ours, it is conceivable he would dream of the sea border. The Turks would hardly be sorry to see us confronted with so difficult a problem. It is a thousand pities we could not see our way to humouring "Al Mutawakkil," "while we were in the way with him," and it was disastrous to have withdrawn political supervision while the Imamo-Turkish problem was in course of solution.

78. One styled "Al Majnun" (or the "mad one") has been residing lately on Jabal Harir in a village belonging to the Amir of Dthala. No one knows his real name nor his origin. He is popularly supposed to be an emissary of Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad ibn Hamid-ud-din. Jabal Harir headed by the Derwish party there turned him out, but Nasr, the Amir's son, had him re-instated and he has been permitted to build a house on the Hill. He is said to exercise miraculous powers.

The Amir of Dthala once sent me a letter from the Imam. That was in 1905. The letter told the Amir of the infamies practised by the Turk and urged him to declare for the Imam. No direct mention was made of the English, but the desirability of a permanent Islam was the key-note. The Amir asked what reply I should give. I advised a bare mention of the British good faith to which Amir Shaif should state his indebtedness and his position as one of the protected States under British influence. After a while I enquired of Amir Shaif what he actually had written and asked that a copy of his reply might be shewn me. He pretended to be grieved by my want of confidence in him, for which there was no justification; that had he been treacherous (*sic*) I should never have seen the letter in question. I can of course prove nothing, but am inclined to believe that the Amir was at that time, and since too, the recipient of several such missives.

79. Granted their Sanads originally by the Imam of Sana'a our Chiefs and Sheikhs would not be barred, by reason of their holding distinct religious tenets, from again fraternising with the Imam if necessity demanded it and he came down towards our confines. We have not here, as in India, the absolute incompatibility of union twixt Sunni and Shiah. There is less fanaticism here. The perverts of India are naturally more intense. Rid, with our advent in Dthala, of Turkish tyranny and habituated to a four years' *regime* which did not diminish their coffers, but the reverse, I do not believe our Arab friends will willingly accede to Imamic politic domination and to revenue assessments. I decline, however, to admit a religious irreconcilability. Religion has no strong grip on the Hinterland Arab's heart. Jabal Jihaf was originally largely Zeidi (Shiah) in doctrine but, cut off from their origin and surrounded by other influences, an adaptation to the tenets of Shafa'i (Sunni) doctrines was no insurmountable difficulty. Reversion to the former beliefs would be no harder.

80. The personal magnetism of the Imam is great. I see great possibilities for the Imam when at leisure from Turkish troubles to turn his thoughts further south—great possibilities that is for intrigue. His estate broken up during our *regime* and that when he was supposed to be in our leading strings, Amir Shaif might be tempted to seek relief from the representative of his old masters to whom he is entirely indebted for all he now holds. The Amir in conversation with me has deprecated the Imam's approach Dthala wards, as signifying his extinction as a distinct entity, but knowing Amir Shaif I do not give his assertion its face value.

On the other hand there are many who have felt the iron hand of the Turks and have also dreaded the possibility of the Imam's restoration to full power. Nizam Abdallah as Saiyadi, the Sheikh of Al Ud, Haj Qasim al Kabsh, the Sheikh of Ash Sha'ar, and Abdur Rab as Saiyadi, all of whom are under the Turks, wrote lately to Turkish Head-quarters and expressed a wish to communicate with the British Government to help them against the Imam. They said that both Turk and Imam had oppressed them. It is said that under instructions from Ta'iz these influential Sheikhs were given liberal grants in compensation for losses inflicted by Zaidi raids.

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81. Next to the Imam come such Lieutenants as the following, and probably in this order of merit and importance—Abu Naib (a nickname which means "one with prominent teeth"), Saif al Khilafa *alias* Ahmad bin Yahya, Saiyid Muhammad bin Yusuf, Ali al Mikdad, Ghalib al Mikdad, Tahir Hasan al Fareh and Kadthi al Akam. The country is full of rumours of their prowess in the fight.

82. I have elsewhere stated that a Jibad in the Hinterland was not a probability and certainly not as things now stand, but in the words of a prominent Derwish of Jabal Harir and a great friend of mine: "If the Imam comes to the front and enters these parts, it is possible." "Al Majnun" of paragraph 78, though not everywhere credited, is studiously trying to incite the people. He arranged a meeting at Al Wabh (Sha'iri) with the notorious Saiyid Ahmed Mohsin Abd-ud-Daim (formerly of Lakamat as Saleh and supposed to have set up the religious fanatic to stab one of the British Commissioners). This Saiyid was at enmity with Amir Shaif, but is now reconciled. "Al Majnun" preaches from Jabal Harir a coming Armageddon, and if the times were propitious, the doggerel verses now found in every man's mouth might appear to call for active expression—

Min Häf ila Jihäf,
Min Ar Rakka ila'd Dakka,
Min Akraka ila Hardaba,
Min läb Aden ila Akraka,

i. e., the fight will rage from Häf (Shairi) to Jihäf, from Ar Rakka (Shairi) to Ad Dakka (Jabal Jihäf), from Akraka (Kataba) to Hardaba (Amiri), and from the Gate of Aden to Kataba. So says this mysterious personage who has fixed upon his new abode, and might almost be preparing a special area for a coming event, as Napoleon who by promulgating his plans well in advance found the world fascinated and prepared to receive these when the full time came.

There is a story current from Al Kara (Lower Yafa) of a certain brass bowl belonging to Sultan Abdallah bin Mohsin. This bowl for long time has been heard to give out a sound once every year or two, whereas lately it strikes constantly of itself and has occasioned an expectancy of something about to happen.

83. There have been prophecies abroad for 300 or 400 years that some European Power will take the Yemen. A book called *Shams ul Maarif* contains such a prediction. Arabs have told me the British Government are bound to return to Dthala and then step still further north. "A comet of exceptional lustre is expected in the East. It will herald the dawn of European supremacy on hills and plain". The name European or "Al Afrang" is held to be synonymous with the British.

84. While on this subject it is idle to deny importance to the novel movement detailed in the book entitled:—

Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque, by Negib Azoury, *ex-Adjoint du Gouverneur de Jerusalem* (Paris, Librairie Plon) and again in the later book

Les Puissances devant La Revolte Arabe, by Eugene Jung (Paris, Librairie Hachette).


The books print a manifesto addressed to the Powers by the National Arab Party of Turkey, 'La ligue de la Patrie Arabe.' I attach the preface of one book in which the programme is given.

PREFACE.

Un manifeste adressé récemment aux puissances par le parti national arabe de la Turquie s'exprimait ainsi:

"Un grand changement pacifique est à la veille de se produire en Turquie. Les Arabes, que les Turcs ne tyrannisent qu'en les maintenant divisés par des questions insignifiantes

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de rite et de religion, ont pris conscience de leur homogénéité nationale historique et ethnographique, et veulent se détacher de l'arbre vermoulu d'Othman pour se constituer en Etat indépendant.

" Ce nouvel empire arabe s'étendra dans les limites de ses frontières naturelles, depuis la vallée du Tigre, et de l'Euphrate jusqu'à l'isthme de Suez, et depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à la mer d'Oman. Il sera gouverné par la monarchie constitutionnelle et libérale d'un Sultan arabe.

" Le vilayet actuel du Hedjaz formera, avec le territoire de Médine, un empire indépendant et dont le souverain sera en même temps le Calife religieux de tous les Musulmans. Ainsi, une grande difficulté, la séparation du pouvoir civil du pouvoir religieux dans l'Islam, aura été résolue pour le plus grand bien de tous.

" Nous respecterons tous les intérêts des étrangers actuellement engagés dans notre pays et toutes les concessions qui leur ont été accordées jusqu'à ce jour par les Turcs. Nous respecterons également l'autonomie du Liban, le *statu quo* dans les sanctuaires chrétiens de la Palestine et dans les principautés indépendantes du Yémen et du golfe Persique.

" Nul homme honnête et loyal ne peut être hostile à ce mouvement bienfaisant qui ouvrira un immense débouché au commerce international et assurera d'innombrables placements avantageux et sûrs aux capitaux européens.

" Par le fait même que nous nous détacherons de la Turquie, toutes les autres nations opprimées, les Kurdes, les Arméniens, les Albanais, etc., etc., recouvreront leur liberté; car c'est par les Arabes que les Turcs contiennent les Albanais et c'est par les Albanais qu'ils écrasent les Bulgares; de même, c'est encore par les Arabes qu'ils compriment les Kurdes et c'est par les Kurdes qu'ils massacrent les Arméniens. Lors donc, que nous aurons abandonné le Sultan, chaque nation proclamera son indépendance et le monde sera délivré de ce brandon de discorde qu'on appelle la question d'Orient.

" Nous ne demandons aux puissances de faire aucun sacrifice pour nous, ni d'entreprendre aucune démarche armée en notre faveur; nous prions seulement, les Etats éclairés et humanitaires de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord de favoriser par leur simple neutralité notre mouvement, de nous encourager de leurs sympathies et nous saurons mener à bonne fin notre sainte et glorieuse entreprise. Nous sommes 12 millions d'Arabes opprimés par quelques centaines de fonctionnaires turco-circassiens, tous prêts à trahir leur Padschah dès qu'ils nous verront les plus forts."

There is a strong Young Turkish Party spirit dormant in this country among Turkish officials, and the invitation extended by Abdul Hamid to the Yemen Saiyids and Sheikhs is in large measure due to the machinations of this Party, aided by discontented Arabs of the country. Its existence is well known at Yildiz.

85. The Aden-Nobat Dakim Railway scheme seems to have died a natural death. Aden merchants had studied their best interests and had an eye to the main chance. Nothing much was to be expected from a railway whose terminus stopped short at Nobat Dakim, but with us in the country and British supervision being exercised so far north as at Dthala, it was believed possible, once a foot-hold was obtained, that the line might be extended Mawia-wards so as to tap the rich country whose produce is now being taken to Hodeida along a very insecure route, where caravans require always a military escort. The Yafa country coffee and skins are carried by camels through the Hijaili country (Radfan), thence by a road to the east of Suleik along Kotaibi territory and by the Suhaib (Alawi) and Ramla (Haushabi) routes to Lahej. The ordinary military route from Suleik to Nobat Dakim is utilised by Turkish caravans to and from Aden. I do not think any of this trade is of vast importance, but it might all have been focussed at Nobat Dakim whence the railway would have conveyed it to the sea. A railway creates a carrying trade. With our return to Aden I fancy Aden merchants are not so keen as before. Upper Yafa's have often asked me when the railway would be opened. They all favoured the idea although its existence would have placed us considerably nearer to their country.

I think many a Yafa'i thinker sees a future of European intervention in his country's affairs, but believes it will not be in his time. "The camels of

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Government are outplac'd by the gazelles of the tribesmen," "Government are prepared to move onwards. Stretch yourself out, oh sleepers!". These are phrases in use to signify the slow advance of Government.

No railway that stopped short at Nobat Dakim would of itself create a trade till such time as the roads above were secure, and I do not believe in security except through the tribal levy. All else is blackmail.

First prove by a system of patrols up to Nobat Dakim that the security of a road is conducive to trade and tribal prosperity. That of itself would tend to show the way to those living above Nobat Dakim even although we never went farther north but, without concern, left everything to unsupervised Arab discretion.


86. I cannot close this report without a few words on the Abdali Sultan who although he did not actually fall within my sphere of supervision, was closely bound up with Haushabi affairs over which I had the oversight.

Sir Ahmed Fadhli is an astute Chief, popular with all his people, of strictly temperate habits, and certainly the most influential and friendly Chief in the country. That he has reason to be so I do not deny. I merely cite facts as we find them. His house has long been friendly to us, and has always been foremost in assisting us. Whether it was we had to deal with the Amir, or the recalcitrant Kotaibis, or with Haushabi Sultans, with Lower Yafa, Upper Yafa' or Fadhli, it is the Abdali Sultan that has consistently come forward to help us. It was of course to his interest to do so. It enlarged his responsibilities and enhanced his reputation. He lives at the door of Aden and all and sundry come to us through Lahej with the Sultan's introduction. Our advent into the Hinterland did not really please him. This could hardly be expected, for we came into direct touch with the tribes and had first hand commerce with them. Thus Sir Ahmed's star began to wane. His influence even in those days was still not inconsiderable. "Our Father" is his style right up to Yafa'. He has contracted a marriage alliance with Haidara's sister and his finger was visible in the Kahtan-Haidara rapprochement. He gives large presents to Yaf'is and others, and is visited by Saiyids and Sheikhs on both sides of the border.


It is to our interest, therefore, to humour this Chief whose Treaty relations with us more specially so than in any other treaty, are those of comity and mutual good-will. His treaty contains the most favoured clauses and is distinct from others in this Hinterland. He deserves special treatment and we should see that nothing embitters our relations with him. The seemingly petty matters bulk the largest. It is so easy by small concessions to do much towards winning a Chief's confidence, and the Abdali is particularly sensitive and, Arab like, ready to read an affront where none was intended. Hence I say we should go half way, and even out of our way, to conciliate him. We can do this without loss of dignity in the act. Let the Subehis and Arab Rulers and people see that we are one with the Abdali, that our interests are identical, that order and rest in the country are possible only by our keeping him well to the fore, a central figure looming large in the foreground of Hinterland politics. His prosperity will be seen to be a result of close union with us, and others whom the suspicion born of ignorance still keeps at a distance will be induced to approach us. It is by our relations with a loyal friend so near at hand that we can best advance our interests in the entire Hinterland. It is an opportunity not lightly to be thrown away. By it our influence will permeate through the country with a minimum of propelling power behind, and, to boot, most economically.

A lustrum of sojourn in the Hinterland has afforded us a good opportunity to disclose and further British ideals. I say we have so furthered them, but time alone will declare it. It is certainly not anything visible to the eye nor tangible to the touch to which, at this stage, we can point with the finger of pride and say "Lo! this I have done," but there has none the less been planted a seed which will germinate and grow "we know not how," and one day we

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