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المراسلات المتعلقة بشؤون زنبار من ١٨٥٦ إلى ١٨٧٢. "أعدّه النقيب ب. د. هندرسون، الملحق بالإدارة الخارجية"
"مُلخّص"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/PS/18/B150A

١٨٧٢ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد (٥٥ ورقة)

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل

الملف عبارة عن مُلخّص بمراسلات متعلّقة بالشؤون في زنبار بين السنوات ١٨٥٦ و ١٨٧٢، من إعداد النقيب فيليب دورهام هندرسون من الإدارة الخارجية في حكومة الهند. تتناول محتويات الملخص، الذي يشتمل على تقارير من كريستوفر بالمر ريجبي، القنصل البريطاني في زنبار والسير ويليام ماركوس كوجلان، ما يلي: وفاة سلطان مسقط، سيّد سعيد [سعيد بن سلطان آل سعيد] في سنة ١٨٥٦ بدون وريث مباشر؛ صراع الخلافة بين سيّد ثويني [ثويني بن سعيد آل سعيد] وسيّد ماجد [سعيد ماجد بن سعيد آل سعيد]؛ التحكيم البريطاني في النزاع؛ ترتيبات الخلافة في مسقط و زنبار؛ تجارة الرقيق بين زنبار ومسقط. الملخّص مُنظّم في ستة فصول (بعنوان I إلى VI)، كما يلي:

- الأحداث السابقة للتحكيم من قبل حكومة الهند؛ - I

• II – تحكيم حكومة الهند؛

• III – الإجراءات التابعة للتحكيم بخصوص مسألة الإعانة المالية؛


• IV – الأحداث في زنبار من التحكيم إلى وفاة سيّد ماجد؛

• V – الأحداث في زنبار من وفاة سيّد ماجد؛


• VI – تجارة الرقيق.

تشتمل صفحة المحتويات على أربعة ملاحق (بعنوان أ إلى د) وليست مشمولة في هذه النسخة من الملخص.

"مُلخّص المراسلات المتعلقة بشؤون زنجبار من ١٨٥٦ إلى ١٨٧٢". أعدّه
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"ملخص المراسلات المتعلقة بشؤون زنجبار من ١٨٥٦ إلى ١٨٧٢". أعدّه
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
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PRÉCIS

Of correspondence relating to Zanzibar Affairs,
from 1856 to 1872.

CHAPTER I.

Events preceding the arbitration by the Government of India.

1. DEATH OF SYED SAEED AND ACCESSION OF SYED MAJID TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ZANZIBAR.—In November 1856 Colonel Hamerton, Consul and Agent at Muscat, reported the death at sea, between Zanzibar and Muscat, of His Highness Syed Saeed, the Imam of Muscat, at the advanced age of 66 years and 7 months. In conveying this intelligence Colonel Hamerton wrote—

"All things here at present are quiet, and the government in the African possessions is administered by his son, the Prince Majid, who has administered the government by order of His Highness in his African possessions since the death of Prince Khalid, 7th November 1854.

The Prince Majid is now in the 22nd year of his age.

"I have been given to understand that His Highness has left a will, and a written statement of his wishes regarding the succession, and has nominated three persons,—Syed Mahomed bin Salem at Muscat, his nephew, and Syed Majid, his son, at Zanzibar, and Soliman bin Hamed, also at Zanzibar (a man of considerable influence), the same person who acted as regent during the minority of the Prince Khalid whenever the Imam was absent from Zanzibar,—as executors, and who are to carry out His Highness's instructions. I am perfectly well aware what His Highness's intentions regarding the succession were,—that Syed Thoweynee at Muscat should succeed to the government of his Arabian possessions, provision being made for certain of his sons as Governors of certain places in his Arabian possessions; and that the Prince Majid, whom His Highness considered in the place of his deceased son, Khalid, should succeed to the government of his African possessions, provision being made for others of his sons as governors of various places in his African possessions. This arrangement His Highness has frequently told me, with the blessing of God, he would see carried into effect if God spared his life on his return from Muscat to Zanzibar; but it is now difficult to perceive what turn affairs may take. The Prince Majid, who, since the death of Khalid, has administered the government in His Highness's African possessions, has given the fairest possible promises from the way in which he has acted on various occasions, and under some very trying circumstances of his perfect fitness and aptitude for the duties it was his father's intention should devolve on him. He has frequently shown a sense of justice and fair dealing in his decisions in difficult cases, which has elicited the admiration and astonishment of all. His administration has given particular satisfaction to the foreign residents."

A letter to the Governor General from Syed Majid was enclosed by Colonel Hamerton. It briefly intimated his father's death and concluded—

"My brothers, relations, and the great and old men of the city assembled together and recognized me as my late father's successor. I have thus become the ruler of the country, and by the grace of God, and the favor of your Government, everything is right, and tranquillity prevails throughout the kingdom, and the subjects are satisfied. I trust that Your Lordship will continue to show me the same kindness as Your Lordship hitherto showed to my late father.

"Pray gladden me always with any commission which Your Lordship may have to be executed here. I adhere to the treaties which existed between my father and the British Government."

Government replied to the Prince, in general terms, expressing regret at the melancholy intelligence of his father's death, and, in forwarding the reply for delivery to him, observed to the Bombay Government—

"From Lieutenant-Colonel Hamerton's report it appears that the late Imam intended to leave his Arabian possessions to the government of another Prince, and those in Africa only to the government of Prince Majid. It is not said whether Prince Majid is to inherit sovereignty over all; but, probably, this was intended by the late Imam, and it is assumed by Prince Majid. Until, however, further and fuller information respecting the succession is received, no final orders on the subject can be issued by the Government of India, and, therefore, the Governor General's reply to Prince Majid's letter is couched in very general terms."—Cons., 1st May 1857, Nos. 15-20.

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Events preceding the arbitration by the Government of India.

No further correspondence regarding the succession to the throne of the deceased Imam appears to have been received from Zanzibar, Syed Majid remained in undisturbed possession of Zanzibar and the African possessions; his brother, Syed Thoweynee, ruled at Muscat, and a third brother, Syed Toorkee, at Sohar.

2. EXPEDITION FITTED OUT BY SYED THOWEYNEE AGAINST ZANZIBAR. HIS CONSENT TO ABIDE BY ARBITRATION OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT.—In December 1858 the Native Agent at Muscat informed the Bombay Government that Syed Thoweynee, the ruler of Muscat, was fitting out an expedition against his brother, Syed Majid, at Zanzibar. The cause of hostilities was said to be the failure of the latter to remit the sum of 40,000 dollars, which, by an arrangement made in 1856-57, Syed Majid had agreed to pay annually to his brother. Captain Jones, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, was thereupon directed by the Bombay Government to proceed at once to Muscat and endeavor, by friendly counsel and remonstrance in the first instance, to prevent Syed Thoweynee from resorting to violence, and to persuade him, if he had any claim to prefer against his brother, to address the British Government on the subject.

On the 3rd February 1859 the Bombay Government wrote that the report communicated by the Native Agent had been confirmed by an Arab officer in the Muscat service then at Calcutta.

"The Arab Captain," they said, "stated that Syed Thoweynee had been instigated by the French to attack his brother, who has incurred their displeasure by his honest desire to act up to his engagements with the British Government for the suppression of the slave trade.

"It is not necessary to suppose that this is not the case. Judging, indeed, from the letters addressed to Syed Majid by the Governor of Bourbon, a copy of which accompanied my letter to the Foreign Department, it is by no means incredible; but it is evident that the general impression that Syed Thoweynee is countenanced in his aggressive projects by the French colonial authorities must strengthen his hands, especially in the absence of any indication of an opposite policy on the part of the British Government."

With regard to the remonstrances that Captain Jones had been desired to address to Syed Thoweynee, the Bombay Government said that, should the latter persevere in his intention,—


"the fact that our remonstrance has been unheeded, while we have done nothing at Zanzibar to afford a moral support to Syed Majid, will tell in favor of Syed Thoweynee rather than against him; for there can be little doubt that there is at Zanzibar a party hostile to Syed Majid and his policy of good faith, and favorable to Syed Thoweynee and to the slave trade."

In order to hold Syed Thoweynee in check and to afford protection to British subjects at Zanzibar, the *Assaye* was ordered to that port. The instructions issued by the Bombay Government were approved by the Government of India.—(*Cons.*, 25th February 1859, Nos. 46-50.)

Before the reply of the Supreme Government could reach Bombay, news arrived there from Muscat, dated 27th January, to the effect that Syed Thoweynee was then on the point of sailing for Zanzibar with a force of 2,500 men. The Bombay Government, fearing that their instructions to the Resident in the Persian Gulf would not reach him in time, despatched, on the 11th February, to Muscat the *Punjab* with Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, Military Secretary to the Governor, as bearer of a letter to Syed Thoweynee, containing remonstrances against the proposed expedition, and proposing that the matter should be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government. In a minute recorded by Lord Elphinstone on the subject, it was mentioned as a ground for the proposed intervention of the British Government,—

"it must always be the interest of our Government to preserve the peace and to prevent maritime war among the Arab Chiefs, which soon degenerates into piracy."

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Colonel Russell overtook Syed Thoweynee's squadron at Ras-el-Hud, and found His Highness with a force consisting of a frigate, a large corvette, a brig and a troop ship; half a dozen buglas having gone on to Zanzibar with troops. On reading the letter addressed to him by the Government of Bombay, Syed Thoweynee at once agreed to submit the differences with his brother to the arbitration of the British Government, and gave orders for the return of the expedition to Muscat, despatching a messenger ostensibly to recall the buglas which had sailed for Zanzibar. It was fortunate for Syed Thoweynee that he had so readily listened to the remonstrances addressed to him; for Syed Toorkee, ruler of Sohar, had resolved to take advantage of his absence to attack Muscat—a project which was defeated by his brother's unexpected return.

Syed Thoweynee delivered to Colonel Russell his reply to Lord Elphinstone's letter. In it he intimated that he had followed His Lordship's advice, and hoped the Government would see that his claims were fully complied with. The claims, as mentioned by himself, were as follows:

"Article first—that there shall be one consolidated State without any division, Zanzibar being subordinate to Muscat; and that the interests of the one shall be identified with those of the other, as during the time of our father and forefathers.

"Article second—has reference to a settlement effected by brother Mahomed bin Salem between us, with the common consent of all parties, that he (Majid) should pay me annually a sum of forty thousand French dollars. In the event of Oman being involved in any hostilities, Zanzibar shall afford assistance, as it has always been the practice for Zanzibar to assist Oman.

"Article third—that the property of the orphans shall be given up by him (Majid) and deposited with a trustworthy person, in whose custody all parties may feel satisfied that it will be safe.

"Article fourth—that brother Majid shall indemnify me for all the losses entailed upon me on account of the expense of despatching an army in consequence of his opposition and disobedience."

3. PREPARATIONS FOR RESISTANCE AT ZANZIBAR, AND STATE OF AFFAIRS THERE.—In the meantime great preparations were being made by Syed Majid at Zanzibar to resist the threatened aggression. He equipped five ships-of-war carrying a very respectable armament, and collected a force of about 20,000 men, composed of Arabs, Beloochees, Mekranees, and others, and was prepared to resist his brother to the utmost. The people of Zanzibar were unanimously in his favor, and it appeared probable that, had a collision actually taken place, the chances were in favor of a successful resistance. On learning that Syed Thoweynee had, through British intervention, been induced to return to Muscat, and that the Government of India had offered to arbitrate between himself and his brother, Syed Majid manifested the deepest gratitude to Government for having saved his country from anarchy and bloodshed.

Regarding the means of resistance possessed by Syed Majid, Captain Rigby, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar, wrote—

"His Highness Syed Majid had equipped five ships-of-war of the armament as per margin. In addition to these he has the frigate *Victoria*, *Shah Allum* ... 44 guns. *Piedmontese* ... 36 " 32 guns, which has her masts struck, and acts as a guard ship for the Port of Zanzibar; he is also expecting a new corvette *Arlemid* ... 22 " *City of Poona* ... 4 " of 22 guns from Bombay. *Africa* ... 4 "

"His Highness has about 1,400 irregular soldiers, composed of Beloochees, Mekranees, and Arabs from Hadramaut, and a few Turkish gunners; most of the soldiers are distributed, in ordinary times, at the towns and ports on the main land. Since the expectation of hostilities they have all been called to Zanzibar, with the exception of the garrisons of Keelwa and Mombass.

"In addition to the above His Highness has distributed about 20,000 American muskets and carbines to the African tribes and Sowahilis, the Comoro men and the Negro slaves. Most

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Events preceding the arbitration by the Government of India.

of these people detest the northern Arabs, and would certainly have opposed Syed Thoweynee. The Negroes and Africans, who have only lately learnt the use of fire-arms, have a great dread of the Arabs, and would probably be easily conquered; but the Comoro men are brave, and, next to the Beloochees and Mekraanees, would have been His Highness's best defenders. The armed slaves, of whom many thousands were assembled from the plantations in the interior of the island, were a source of great apprehension to the inhabitants, as the chief slaves-holders were strongly suspected, and, as will subsequently appear correctly so, of secretly corresponding with Syed Thoweynee and of promising to join him on his arrival."

In describing the feeling of the people of Zanzibar as being almost unanimously in favor of Syed Majid, Colonel Rigby expressed apprehensions regarding the part that would be taken by the armed slaves, of whom there was a very large number on the island. Syed Majid had incurred the resentment of all the slave-owners and dealers by his efforts in favor of the abolition of slavery, and their enmity might have led to their taking the part of Syed Thoweynee. The largest slave-owners were men of the El Harth tribe, and regarding these Captain Rigby wrote—

"The principal tribe of Arabs residing at Zanzibar is the El Harth. The members of this tribe possess large landed estates and numerous slaves; they are the oldest Arab settlers on the island, and appear to have always had an idea of some day obtaining the sovereignty of it. Their character is vile in the extreme; from long residence here and constant cohabitation with African slaves, they retain nothing of the Arab character, but its sensual vices. This tribe furnishes most of the slave-merchants and slave-brokers, who are cruel, sensual wretches, dead to every feeling of humanity. The chief man of this tribe is one Abdulla bin Salim, a man of great wealth in ships and land, and possessing about 1,500 slaves, all armed. He has shown a sullen discontented disposition for some time, and never attends His Highness's darbar, as is customary with all the principal inhabitants. Notwithstanding this behaviour, His Highness continues to treat him with consideration, and allows all his goods to pass the Custom House free of duty, and makes him an annual allowance from his treasury of 1,200 German Crowns. It has recently come to the knowledge of His Highness that this individual, and three or four others of the El Harth tribe, have been writing to Syed Thoweynee inviting him to dethrone his brother, and promising him the aid of their tribe and their slaves.

"I believe that the design of these persons has been to embroil the sons of the late Imam in a war with each other, and to have taken advantage of the occasion to get rid of all the Imam's family and secure the government of the island for themselves. In the conspiracy against Syed Majid they found a willing tool in His Highness's younger brother, Syed Burgash."

When Zanzibar was threatened by Syed Thoweynee, Captain Rigby had an interview with Syed bin Salim, one of the influential Chiefs of the El Harth tribe opposed to the intrigues of Abdulla bin Salim, and explained to him the utter ruin that would overtake the Arabs if a civil war ensued. He showed that trade would suffer, foreign merchants would leave the island, property would become insecure, the Arab proprietors would find no purchasers for their produce, foreign powers might take the opportunity of occupying the island, and that proprietors of houses and lands would certainly have to pay for all losses incurred by subjects of foreign powers. These arguments came home to the El Harth, who had evidently not looked at the matter in this light before, believing it to be immaterial to them personally which side won. From being, to say the least of it, doubtful supporters of Syed Majid, they became active allies, and placed their services and those of their armed slaves at his disposal.

4. PROCEEDINGS OF SYED BURGASH AT ZANZIBAR.—For some time previous to the threatened attack on Zanzibar, the conduct of Syed Burgash, brother of Syed Majid, who resided at Zanzibar, had been a cause of great uneasiness to the latter. Since the death of the late Imam he had, said Captain Rigby,—

"always shown a sullen dislike to his brother and to all Europeans, excepting the French. He never attends his brother's darbar, nor accompanies him on public occasions. He has never visited me, or sent me any message of welcome since my arrival. He has frequently attempted to assume power to interfere in public affairs, and some time ago, when in a boat in the harbour, he fired into a buggalow, because the Nakhoda neglected to lower his sail when he hailed him.

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"A few days before the arrival of the *Assaye* a circumstance occurred, which showed the base character of Syed Burgash. About half past 9 o'clock at night His Highness Syed Majid was returning by boat from his residence in the town on board the *Shah Allum*, and, on the boat passing in front of the house of Syed Burgash, a volley of musketry was discharged at it from the house; after the volley a running fire was kept up, and, as I was sitting at the window, I heard the shot flying past the British Consulate. His Highness the following day ordered the *Artemise* to occupy a position in face of Syed Burgash's house, and intimated to him that he would no longer continue to pay him the monthly allowance of 700 Crowns, which he had hitherto given him from his own treasury."

The news of the abandonment of the Muscat expedition, and the arrival of the *Assaye*, caused great consternation among the conspirators. Abdulla bin Salem and the chief men of the El Harth tribe tendered their submission to Syed Majid; but he refused to receive them, and intimated to Captain Rigby his intention of deporting to Muscat four Chiefs of that tribe, and also his brother, Syed Burgash.

5. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH AT ZANZIBAR.—Certain proceedings of the French at Zanzibar should here be noticed.

When the expedition was daily expected at Zanzibar, the French Consul asked Captain Rigby, Her Majesty's Consul, what he intended doing on the arrival of Syed Thoweynee.

"I told him," says Captain Rigby, "I should do my utmost to prevent his (Thoweynee's) landing, by threatening him with the severe displeasure of the British Government, and warning him of the heavy responsibility he would incur if any British subject suffered in life or property.* Upon this he (the French Consul) remarked—'Why, we shall be acting exactly contrary to each other.'"

On hearing of Syed Majid's determination to deport Syed Burgash, the French Consul, in "very violent language," threatened him with the interference of the French Government if he did not abandon his intention. The French Consul soon after took Syed Burgash with him to Syed Majid's house and made the brothers shake hands.

At a dinner given at the French Consulate, at which Captain Rigby and others were present, the French Consul spoke of Syed Majid in the most abusive and contemptuous terms, and said that Syed Burgash was "now under French protection" and could not be touched, and that—

"the question of the right of succession to the government of Zanzibar would have to be settled in Europe."

With reference to this last remark, Captain Rigby, on a subsequent occasion, pointed out that both parties (Syed Thoweynee and Syed Majid) had agreed to abide by the arbitration of His Lordship the Governor General of India, and that the matter would be peaceably arranged. Upon this the French Consul said—

"I have instructions from my Government, and the French Government will never consent to abide by the result of any arbitration to which it is not a consenting party. We have treaties with the late Imam, and we have a right to make our opinions respected."

At length Captain Rigby thought it best to come to a clear understanding with the French Consul regarding his proceedings; this he did in the presence of the Commodore of the French Squadron, who happened to be in Zanzibar at the time. Finding himself unsupported by the Commodore in the position he had assumed, the French Consul explained that there had been a misunderstanding, and promised that he would not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the State. This satisfactory understanding averted the danger of an outbreak, which Syed Burgash, relying on French protection, might otherwise have attempted.

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6. CLAIMS OF SYED THOWEYNEE AGAINST ZANZIBAR.—It is now time to examine at greater length the claim advanced by Syed Thoweynee of sovereignty over Zanzibar, and his demand on Syed Majid for an annual subsidy of dollars 40,000. The Bombay Government, when reporting the result of Colonel Russell's mission to Syed Thoweynee, remarked in a letter of the 28th February, with reference to the claim put forward by the latter,—

"It will just be necessary to ascertain what are His Highness's claims against his brother, and how far they are supported or invalidated by the will of their late father, the Imam, and by the traditions and customs of Arab Chiefs.

"Syed Thoweynee asserts his right of suzerainty over Zanzibar, and requires that his brother shall pay him a yearly tribute or subsidy. This Government has not on its records an authenticated copy of the late Imam's will, in the absence of which it is evident the Government of India will not be able to arrive at a decision in the case; for, if the Imam left Zanzibar to his younger son subject to the payment of tribute to Muscat, the only points which will have to be considered are the amount of this tribute, and the degree of subordination due by Zanzibar to Muscat.

"If, however, on the other hand, the Imam bequeathed Zanzibar and his African territories absolutely and in full sovereignty to Syed Majid, it may still be expedient to enquire whether, according to Arab custom, he had a right to do so. At first sight it appears that if Zanzibar belonged to Muscat *ab antiquo*, the Imam had probably no right to divide his dominions; but that if he acquired it by conquest, or purchase, or marriage, he was fully justified in disposing of it as might seem most expedient to him.

"But there is another question besides that of right which is involved in this enquiry, *viz.*, the power of Zanzibar to pay, and the power of Muscat to enforce payment. Zanzibar is a thriving and rising port destined apparently to become the commercial emporium of Eastern Africa, and to exert a very great influence over its future progress. Muscat, again, is a place of limited commercial capability; but its geographical position, the superiority of the race by which it is inhabited, and the occupation by its ruler of Bunder Abbass, Kishm, and other places in the Persian Gulf, give it a certain political importance and render it probably more than a match for Zanzibar. The British Government is interested in the prosperity of both these places, and it cannot be indifferent to the growth of a friendly and comparatively civilized Native power on the East Coast of Africa—a power which has shewn a most laudable desire to discourage the slave trade, and to promote the development of legitimate commerce. At the same time it cannot be forgotten that the influence of Muscat in the Persian Gulf has been uniformly exercised in furtherance of objects which the British Government has at heart, *viz.*, the suppression of piracy and of the slave trade, and the maintenance of maritime peace. It would have been a grievous mistake to allow Syed Thoweynee to exhaust his resources in an attempt to re-annex Zanzibar to his dominions—an attempt which would probably have resulted in a desperate struggle both at Zanzibar and Muscat; for, as stated in the 3rd paragraph of this letter, another brother, Syed Toorkee, of Sohar, was watching his opportunity, and was preparing to attack Muscat in the absence of Syed Thoweynee."

With a view of clearing up the doubtful points in the discussion, and putting the Supreme Government in possession of all the facts of the case, the Bombay Government called upon Captain Rigby to submit an authenticated copy of the late Imam's will, and a report showing the date and manner of the acquisition of Zanzibar and the other African possessions of the late Imam; also, information as to the custom of Arab Chiefs with regard to succession and testamentary disposal of territory. The Bombay Government proposed to adjust the quarrel on the basis that the ruler of Muscat should abandon his pretensions of sovereignty on receiving an annual subsidy from Syed Majid. The Government of India, on the 30th May 1859, expressed an opinion that a settlement on this basis was desirable, the claims of Syed Toorkee being included in the settlement; but they considered, from the information then before them, that the British Government could not put forward the subsidy from Syed Majid as a right on Syed Thoweynee's part.

7. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. CUSTOM OF ARAB CHIEF WITH REGARD TO SUCCESSION.—In April 1859 was received from Captain Rigby a full and clear

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It is now time to report on the points specified by the Bombay Government. The first subject alluded to by him was the custom of Arab Chiefs with regard to succession. On this subject he wrote—

report on the points specified by the Bombay Government. The first subject alluded to by him was the custom of Arab Chiefs with regard to succession. On this subject he wrote—

"There is no doubt that, according to many precedents in the Imam's family, he did possess the right of dividing his dominions as he pleased, or of assigning any part of them to either of his sons during his own life. The rights of primogeniture have never been recognized among the Imams of Oman. Syed Saeed himself was elected to be the ruler, to the exclusion of his elder brother, Syed Salem. The father of Syed Saeed, by name Sultan bin Salem, had two elder brothers living when, in 1803, he succeeded to the chief rule; and the father of Sultan, by name Ahmed bin Saeed, had divided his dominions during his own life, having appointed one son, by name Kees bin Ahmed, to be ruler of Sohar, and the youngest of his seven sons, by name Mahomed bin Ahmed, to be Sultan of Sink.

"The son of this Mahomed bin Ahmed, by name Syed Hillal, is at present at Zanzibar, having left Muscat in command of one of the ships composing Syed Thoweynee's expedition. He is, however, favorable to Syed Majid, and is married to a daughter of Syed Soliman, the Governor of Zanzibar. He inherited the territory of Sink quite independent of Muscat, and many tribes of Bedouins paid tribute to him; but about the year 1828 he was dispossessed by the Sultan of Sohar, and has since resided at Muscat, having married the sister of the late Imam, Syed Saeed."

Again—

"On my questioning Syed Hillal regarding the customs of the Chiefs of Oman regarding succession, he stated that no law of primogeniture is recognized; that might, coupled with the election by the tribe, is the only right; that, generally, on the death of a Chief, his sons disputed the succession, and that the one who had most influence with the tribe, or who gave the greatest hopes of being an efficient leader, was elected; that it was on this principle the late Imam was himself elected to the exclusion of his elder brother, and that anxious, therefore, to avert the disputes which he foresaw would otherwise occur amongst his numerous sons after his death, he had, during his own life, divided his dominions amongst his three sons,—the Princes Thoweynee, Toorkee, and Majid,—leaving all the details of administration in their hands with the full understanding that they were to succeed to the full sovereignty of each after his own death. That the late Imam considered this so plainly settled that he did not consider any written will on the subject necessary."

* Vide Appendix A.

"By the accompanying genealogical table* of the family of the Imams, it will be seen that if the law of primogeniture or hereditary right prevailed, neither of the present sons of the late Imam has any right to succeed; for two sons are living of the Prince Hillal, the eldest son of the late Imam; also, two sons of Salem bin Sultan, the elder brother of the late Imam Saeed bin Sultan; and if the succession devolved as in the family of the Pacha of Egypt and some other Mahomedan States, Syed Hillal, the son of the late Imam's uncle, would have a prior right as the eldest of the family. And the fact that neither of these five members of the family has ever attempted to dispute the succession, proves that they considered the late Imam did possess the right to appoint his own successors."

S. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. POSITION OF ZANZIBAR WITH REGARD TO MUSCAT.—With regard to the subordination of Zanzibar to Muscat, Captain Rigby wrote—

"From his having appointed his second son to inherit the African dominions, and his third son to succeed him in the Arabian possessions, it was evidently not the intention of His Highness that Zanzibar should be tributary to Muscat, but that the States should be entirely independent of each other. The Prince Khalid was installed as ruler of the African dominions during his father's absence at Muscat, and, on his death, which occurred on 7th November 1854, His Highness passed over two of his sons and appointed his fourth son, Prince Majid, to succeed his deceased brother in the government of the African dominions; and it was proclaimed to all the chief Arabs in open darbar that he was to be regarded exactly in the same position as Prince Khalid had held, and that he had succeeded to all his rights and the future sovereignty of Zanzibar and the African dominions."

Again—

"In answer to a question from me, whether the family of the Imam considered that Zanzibar was to remain in any way dependent on Muscat, Syed Hillal replied that, according to Arab custom, wherever the Chief took up his abode, that was considered as the seat of

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government; that, consequently, when the late Imam removed from Muscat to Zanzibar and made the latter place his permanent abode, Muscat became in a measure a dependency of Zanzibar, and, as such, was ruled by a governor subordinate to the supreme authority at Zanzibar; that the late Imam having appointed his elder and favorite son, Prince Khalid, to succeed him at Zanzibar, whilst a younger brother, the Prince Thoweynee, was to succeed him at Muscat, was sufficient proof that he did not intend Zanzibar to remain in any way subordinate to Muscat.

"Syed Hillal being the eldest member living of the Imam's family, being the brother-in-law of the late Imam, and a man who bears the highest character in Oman, I think that his opinions are entitled to great weight. He was for many years the intimate friend of the late Imam, and is cognizant with everything that has taken place at Muscat and Zanzibar for the last 40 years. The question whether Zanzibar and the African dominions are to remain in any way subordinate to Muscat, is most important, because I believe the French Government have had some secret negotiations with Syed Thoweynee, and will strongly endeavor to have Zanzibar declared a dependency of Muscat, and then obtain the cession of a port on the African coast within the dominions of Zanzibar from Syed Thoweynee."

9. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. WILL OF THE DECEASED IMAM.—Regarding the will of the late Imam, Captain Rigby said—

"I have been informed by His Highness Syed Majid, by Syed Soliman bin Ahmed, and by Syed Hillal, that the late Imam did not leave any will or instructions relating to the succession to his dominions; that the paper* appointing Prince Majid, Syed Soliman bin Ahmed, and Syed Mahomed bin Salem as his executors, refers solely to his domestic affairs, the payment of legacies, distribution of alms, &c. In conversing on this subject, Syed Soliman and Syed Hillal dwelt particularly on the fact that the late Imam, having nominated none of his numerous sons to be executors, with the exception of the Prince Majid, was a strong proof of the affection his father entertained for him, and of his confidence in his sense of justice and fair dealing towards his younger brothers and sisters."

10. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. HISTORY OF THE ACQUISITION OF ZANZIBAR BY THE ARAB TRIBES OF OMAN.—Captain Rigby in his report gave the following account of the acquisition of Zanzibar and the other African possessions of the late Imam by the Arab tribes of Oman:

"The earliest settlement of Arabs on the east coast of Africa, of which there is any authentic account, is that of the El Harth tribe from the neighborhood of Bahrein, who, about the year A. D. 924, founded the cities of Magadosho and Brava; about 60 years after the city of Keelwa was founded by a colony of Persians from Shiraz, and from these points the Arabs and Persians gradually extended their authority over the whole of the east coast as far as Sofala, and took possession of the islands of Moucha, Zanzibar, and Pemba. For several centuries the Arab settlements formed a number of flourishing republics governed by elders, elected by the citizens; they carried on a great trade with Arabia, Persia, and India; and, when Vasco de Gama first visited this coast in 1498, he found that Mozambique, Keelwa, Mombass, Melinda, Brava, and Magadosho, were flourishing, well-built cities, the Arab inhabitants living in luxury, and the women clothed in rich silks and satins.

"The conquest of these rich settlements by the Portuguese and the destruction of their commerce soon followed. In 1698 the inhabitants of Mombass, rendered desperate by the tyranny of their Portuguese rulers, sent a deputation to Saif bin Sultan, the Imam of Oman, requesting his aid to free them from their oppressors; the Imam, in consequence, sent a naval force and wrested Mombass from the Portuguese, Zanzibar and Keelwa soon afterwards submitted, and the Portuguese were massacred or expelled from all their settlements north of Cape Delgado. But about the year 1728 the disturbances in Oman caused the Imam to withdraw from the coast of Africa, and the Portuguese again obtained possession of their former territories, and established their authority along the whole coast from Patta to Keelwa.

"A few years after the Portuguese were again driven out, and the Imam sent three ships which took possession of Mombass, and he also placed a garrison in Zanzibar. From this time until the accession of the late Imam in 1806, most of the territories, which afterwards comprised the African dominions of Syed Said, were governed by their own Chiefs, sometimes with a nominal subjection to the Imam of Oman. In 1746 the inhabitants of the island and city of Mombass elected Ali bin Osman as their Sultan, and threw off all allegiance to the Imam. At the accession of the late Imam, Syed Said, Mombass was governed by an independent Chief,

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by name Sheikh Ahmed bin Mahomed; Patta was governed by the Sultan, Foom Amadi. This Chief died 28th January 1807, when the succession was disputed by his son, Foom Alote, and his son-in-law, Wuzeer, whose father had been assassinated by Foom Amadi. It ended in the triumph of Wuzeer, who was elected Sultan under the title of Sultan Ahmed. Wuzeer having obtained the assistance of the Chief of Mombass, it was agreed that Patta should, in future, be a dependency of Mombass, and that an agent of the Mombass Chief should reside there. The followers of Foom Alote retired to Lamoo, which city refused to acknowledge the authority of the new Sultan of Patta, in consequence of which the Chief of Mombass marched against this city with a large force, but was defeated.

"In order to guard against future attacks from Mombass the inhabitants of Lamoo claimed the protection of the Imam Syed Said, and sent an envoy to Muscat. Syed Said consented to send a Governor to Lamoo, and selected for this office one Khaleef bin Nassir, who, by order of the Imam, erected a fort there.

"On the death of Ahmed bin Mahomed, Chief of Mombass, in 1814, his son, Abdulla, refused to recognize the suzerainty of the Imam, and, instead of sending the customary annual present to Muscat, he sent a suit of armour, a little gun-powder, and a few bullets as a defiance; shortly after Abdulla went to Bombay, and was well received by the Governor. After his return the inhabitants of Brava, having requested his intervention, placed the town and district under his suzerainty. In the meantime the youngest son of Foom Amadi, the late Sultan of Patta, by name Buana Sheikh, had gone to Muscat to claim the assistance of the Imam, and returned with a force, which succeeded in obtaining the election of Buana Sheikh as Sultan of Patta under the sovereign authority of the Imam, Syed Said. In 1822, in consequence of the encroachments of Abdulla, the Sultan of Mombass, Syed Said, sent a naval force to compel the submission of the Chiefs on the coast to his authority; and the Chiefs of Brava, Patta, and other places, by a formal act, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Imam.

"About this time Mahomed bin Nassir, who had been appointed by the Imam Governor of Zanzibar, took possession of the Island of Pemba; and the Sultan of Mombass, Soliman bin Ali, fearing that Syed Said intended to attack his territory, placed the island and fort of Mombass under British protection, and the British flag was hoisted on the 3rd December 1823 with consent of the population. On the 7th February 1824 Captain Owen, in the British frigate *Leven*, concluded a convention, by which the port of Mombass and its dependencies, including the Island of Pemba and the coast comprised between Melinda and the River Pangam, were placed under the protectorate of Great Britain under the following conditions:

- "1st, that Great Britain should reinstate the Chief of Mombass in his former possession;
- "2nd, that the sovereignty of the State should continue to be exercised by the Chief of the Mazara tribe, and be hereditary in his family;
- "3rd, that an agent of the protecting Government should reside with the Chief;
- "4th, that the customs revenues should be equally divided between the two contracting parties;
- "5th, that trade with the interior be permitted to British subjects; and
- "6th, that the slave trade shall be abolished at Mombass.

"The English protectorate over Mombass not having been ratified by the British Government, in January 1828, the Imam, Syed Said, fitted out a considerable expedition and sailed for Mombass, which surrendered to him, and, on the 11th January 1828, having taken possession of the fort and left a garrison, he proceeded with his fleet to Zanzibar, which he then visited for the first time.

"From the above resumé it is evident that the greater part of the African dominions of the late Imam were his own acquisition, and, although prior to his accession to power, the Imams of Oman had at various times exercised a nominal suzerainty over some parts of it, yet he first consolidated the whole into one dominion extending for 1,100 miles along the East Coast of Africa, and including the rich Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea."

11. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. ANNUAL TRIBUTE CLAIMED BY MUSCAT FROM ZANZIBAR.—With respect to the annual tribute claimed by Muscat, Captain Rigby wrote—

"It does not appear that the late Imam ever alluded to such a payment, either in writing or verbally; and that, if from what I have above stated, it is considered that the late Imam

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did intend his son, Prince Majid, to inherit his African dominions, that it was absolutely and in full sovereignty without requiring him to pay any tribute to Muscat, or show any mark of dependency.

"The claim of Syed Thoweynee to this payment is probably founded on a promise made by Syed Majid to pay his brother forty thousand crowns annually. On this subject His Highness Syed Majid informs me, and he is confirmed by Syed Soliman, Syed Hillal, and all principal Arabs, that soon after the death of the late Imam, Syed Thoweynee sent his cousin, Syed Mahomed bin Salem, from Muscat to Zanzibar to represent to his brother that, as the revenues of Muscat are much less than those of Zanzibar, and as their father had been in the habit of assisting the Muscat Treasury with remittances from Zanzibar, he hoped his brother would continue to assist him; and, in consequence, Syed Majid agreed to remit to his brother forty thousand crowns annually, of which sum ten thousand crowns were to be for the payment of the tribute to the Wahabees, ten thousand crowns to their brother, Syed Toorkee, the Sultan of Sohar, and the remaining twenty thousand dollars for himself; but that it was stipulated that the payment of the entire amount should be conditional on Syed Thoweynee abstaining from hostilities with his brother, Syed Toorkee; and that as Syed Thoweynee has violated this agreement, and never paid his brother, Syed Toorkee, any portion of the money, and has besides squandered it in creating dissensions amongst the Arab tribes and in making war upon Syed Toorkee, he has not remitted the amount for the past year.

"It appears that no written agreement was made on this subject; it was all arranged verbally in open durbar. Arabs have a great aversion to writing: no records of any sort are kept at Zanzibar, the most important affairs are settled in public durbar without any written proceedings. On this account I have not been able to obtain any written documents bearing upon the various points of this despatch. I am informed that the paper left by the late Imam referring to the distribution of his private property is in the possession of his nephew, Syed Mahomed bin Salem, one of the executors, and who is now residing at Mecca. I understand that he is so annoyed with the proceedings of his cousin, Syed Thoweynee (he is the eldest son of the late Imam's elder brother), that he has expressed his determination of never returning to Muscat, and that he has purchased a house and property at Surat, where he intends taking up his abode on his return from Mecca.

"But even supposing that the claim of Syed Thoweynee to the payment of the above forty thousand crowns annually were just, the warlike preparations to oppose the unprovoked aggressions of Syed Thoweynee have caused such a large outlay for the purchase of arms and ammunition, equipment of ships, payment of soldiers, &c., that it would be quite impossible for the Zanzibar Treasury to make any payment to Muscat for some years to come. The Custom Master at Zanzibar has given me the following statement of the income and liabilities of His Highness Syed Majid, viz.,—

	German Crowns.
" Annual farm of customs	190,000
" Do. for the Island of Pemba	6,000
" Tax paid by the Mukhadim, original inhabitants of Zanzibar	10,000
Total revenue	206,000

There is no land or house-tax, or any other source of revenue. Besides the public revenue, His Highness has no resources, except a sum of 90,000 crowns left to him by his father. The cost of the recent warlike preparations is not yet exactly ascertained; but it is known to much exceed 100,000 crowns, or two-and-a-half lakhs of rupees. His Highness owes 200,000 crowns to Jairam Sewjee, the Custom Master at Zanzibar, for sums advanced to meet public charges, and also 50,000 crowns on account of money advanced at Bombay for the building of a new corvette."

12. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. INTRIGUES OF SYED THOWEYNEE.—After having consented to submit the question of his claims to the arbitration of the Governor General, Syed Thoweynee sent one Hamed bin Salem to Zanzibar charged with a letter to Syed Majid, to the effect that the bearer had been deputed to arrange all differences between the brothers. It was also discovered that Syed Thoweynee had secretly sent 40,000 dollars to Zanzibar to be expended in exciting the people to revolt against his brother.

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13. CAPTAIN RIGBY'S REPORT. POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF ZANZIBAR.—
The following observations of Captain Rigby, at the close of his interesting report, are worthy of being placed on record :

"With the exception of a few of the great slave-proprietors of the Arab tribe of El Harth, there is no party at Zanzibar favorable to Syed Thoweynee, and, even admitting that he might, after a bloody struggle, establish his rule over the Island of Zanzibar, the Sowahili inhabitants of the dominions on the main land would never submit to him; when nine of the buggalows of his expedition recently arrived on the coast, the whole population was in arms against them, and they could not land to procure water at any point. The Sowahilis always associate the Muscat Arabs with the foreign slave trade. Syed Majid has far more power and influence on the main land than his father ever possessed. Captain Burton told His Highness that even on the shores of the Lake Tanganika, 600 miles inland, the Natives composed songs in his praise as the great and just prince dwelling on the sea shore. Numbers of these people, the Munianise, visit Zanzibar every year to dispose of their ivory, and, finding justice and security with no fear, as formerly, of being seized and sold as slaves, they speak in praise of the prince far over the interior.

"The question of the political relations of Zanzibar assumes an importance from the position this State seems destined to occupy as the chief power on the East Coast of Africa, and from the designs of the French to encroach upon it and obtain a footing on the main land, the knowledge recently acquired that the interior is a fine, healthy country producing abundantly cotton, sugar, coffee, gums, &c., with a quiet agricultural population, will probably make the French still more anxious to obtain a footing. Their settlements at Nass Beh and Magotta are very unhealthy, and have disappointed all the expectations formed of attracting commerce to their ports. From possessing a commodious secure harbour and a salubrious climate, Zanzibar is rapidly becoming the emporium of the trade of all the east coast. Even the produce of the Portuguese settlements is brought to Zanzibar for shipment, to avoid the payment of the heavy duties levied at the Portuguese ports. When the officers of Her Majesty's steamer *Lynx* were recently at Tete, 300 miles up the Zambesi, they found the shops supplied with British goods, which had been conveyed through the continent by Arab caravans from Zanzibar, and undersold the heavily-taxed goods imported through the Portuguese Custom House. The Portuguese settlements on the east coast are in the last stage of misery and decay, and it is not probable that they will be able to retain them many years. Even at Mozambique, the seat of the Governor General, no Portuguese dare go five miles from the settlement, and were they not restrained by the fear of foreign intervention, the Arabs would dispossess the Portuguese in a day. It is probable that, ere long, the whole coast, as far as Delagoa Bay, will form part of the Zanzibar dominions; the Arabs are forming settlements along the Mozambique Channel, and not long ago the Sultan of Angozha, an island to the south of Mozambique, wished the Sultan of Zanzibar to declare him a feudatory, but the offer was declined by Syed Majid."

14. GOVERNMENT CONSENT TO ARBITRATE WITH PREVIOUS CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES.—On receipt of Captain Rigby's report above summarized, and after a careful consideration of the correspondence that had passed, the Government of India replied in the following terms to the Bombay Government (*letter No. 4590, dated 27th July 1859*): After commenting on the insincerity of Syed Thoweynee's offer to accept arbitration, as evinced by his letter to Syed Majid, as well as by the proceedings of his emissary at Zanzibar, Government refused to arbitrate in a case where it was manifest that one of the parties would be unwilling to abide by the arbitrament. Syed Thoweynee was to be warned that Government would hold him responsible for injury inflicted on British subjects, and that it recognized no pretension on his part to be the superior or suzerain of Syed Majid. The Government letter concluded—

"The Government of Bombay will judge whether it will be best to despatch a vessel to Muscat, with an officer specially appointed to make this communication to Syed Thoweynee. If a vessel and a trustworthy officer are available, the Governor General in Council thinks it will be best:

"The vessel should then proceed to Zanzibar, with instructions to Captain Rigby, Her Majesty's Consul, to inform Syed Majid of what has passed.

"If Syed Majid is still disposed to make to his brother the annual remittance of 40,000 Crowns, and to continue it so long as no aggression or unreasonable pretension proceeds from

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Muscat, this may still offer the means of bringing about an amicable understanding, and Captain Rigby would do well to encourage it. But the arrangement should not bear the character of a subsidy from a subordinate government to a superior one. It should be a free gift on the part of Syed Majid, in accordance with the previous engagement, to which, although Syed Thoweynee has forfeited the right to claim execution of it, he is still willing to revert.

"If by the above course we should not succeed in averting hostilities, and if a more authoritative arbitration should be found to be necessary, then the first step must be to obtain the formal consent and signature of both parties to articles of arbitration, obliging each to abstain from aggression during the arbitration, and to abide by the decision of the Governor General.

"This would give the Government of India the right to enforce compliance with its award, and it seems likely that nothing short of it would secure compliance.

"The Governor General in Council has strong objections to entangling the Government of India in any negotiations and obligations of this kind, still, rather than that the dispute between the Chiefs of Muscat and Zanzibar should grow into open hostility, giving opportunity for the intervention of other powers, the Governor General in Council is willing that the responsibility above described should be undertaken."

15. PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN MUSCAT AND ZANZIBAR.—Things continued in an unsettled condition in Muscat during the months of May and June. Syed Thoweynee's emissary continued to urge upon Syed Majid to accede to his master's demands, especially with regard to the payment of 40,000 dollars annually, the cession of the Port of Mombass on the coast of Africa, and the renunciation of the custody, as his father's executor, of the property of the young children of the late Imam. Captain Rigby wrote—

"I have a strong impression that Syed Thoweynee's only object in wishing to obtain possession of the Port of Mombass is to make it over to the French in some form. Captain Owen in describing it says—'There is, perhaps, not a more magnificent harbour in the world than Mombass. The surrounding country is fertile and healthy, there being no swamps nor stagnant pools.'"

The Chiefs of the El Harth tribe and Syed Burgash were actively fomenting disturbances with the view of intimidating Syed Majid, and the latter only hesitated to seize his brother and the principal El Harth Chiefs from the fear of precipitating an outbreak, in which much innocent blood would necessarily be shed. On one occasion, when the Sultan proposed to seize Syed Bargash quietly, the latter was informed by the French Consul of the design against him.*

The attitude of the El Harth tribe became at length so threatening that Syed Majid was compelled to adopt decisive measures against them, and, accordingly, on the 7th July 1859, he arrested all their principal Chiefs. Several of them were released in giving security for their future good behaviour, but five, who were the most active in fomenting disturbances, were confined in irons. Among the latter number was Abdulla Bin Salem, who has already been alluded to (paragraph 3) as one of the most influential and dangerous Chiefs of the tribe. On learning of the capture of their Chiefs, the El Harth collected and, assembling their slaves, threatened to set fire to the town. Finding the Sultan firm, however, they dispersed quietly.

16. REBELLION OF SYED BURGASH.—On the 21st October Captain Rigby reported that Syed Burgash had broken out into open rebellion against his brother, and had, on the 8th idem, fled from the town of Zanzibar and taken up a strong position in the interior of the island. He was soon joined by the

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El Harth, by mercenaries from the Persian Gulf, and by African slaves from the plantations. It was not till the 12th that Syed Majid, with the habit of procrastination peculiar to Arabs, marched against his brother with a force of 5,000 men. On the following day alarming rumours from the interior were received in Zanzibar. The shops were closed, and all who could do so commenced to remove their families from the town. Towards evening the town was in a state of anarchy. Shots were flying in every direction, and a British subject, one of the principal banian merchants, was shot dead at his own door, and another was dangerously wounded. Fortunately at this juncture Her Majesty's steamer *Lynx* arrived off the town, and, on the following day, Captain Rigby, accompanied by as many naval officers as could be spared, called on the Sultan, who was still inactive, and informed him of the outrages that had been committed on British subjects, and told the Chiefs, by whose advice Syed Majid was induced to refrain from taking active measures, that he would hold them responsible for the outrage. The result of this visit was that Syed Majid advanced with his whole force to attack the rebels. Syed Burgash had taken up a position in a large upper-storied stone building with several smaller buildings detached, the whole surrounded by a thick stone wall, which had been loopholed and otherwise prepared for defence. The rebels had three brass guns, and were evidently determined to show a firm front. The British officers, who had accompanied Syed Mujid's force, got two guns and some rockets in position, which they served themselves and succeeded in blowing open the gates and inner-doors of the house. Syed Majid's troops could not be induced to storm the place, and the officers returned to their ships in the evening.

17. AID OF BRITISH TROOPS GIVEN TO SYED MAJID AGAINST SYED BURGASH. SURRENDER OF THE LATTER.—Next day the Sultan, finding all his efforts fail to induce his own troops to storm the enemy's position, applied for the aid of British troops. Captain Rigby complied with his request, and a detachment, some one hundred strong with a 12-pounder howitzer, was disembarked from the *Assaye* and marched to attack the rebels. On arriving at their position, it was found to have been evacuated, and the building was accordingly destroyed. During the day intelligence was received that Syed Burgash was lying concealed in his own house, which was immediately surrounded, and he was at length induced to surrender himself, and was taken to the Sultan's palace. Arms for 800 men and one gun were found in his house, and 400 muskets were also discovered in the house of Abdulla bin Salem, the El Harth Chief. Syed Majid returned to Zanzibar and was joyfully welcomed by the whole population. On the following day Syed Burgash, in a public durbar, wrote out a formal engagement to quit the Zanzibar dominions for ever, never to plot or wage war against his brother, to proceed to any port fixed on by Captain Rigby, and always to act according to the wishes of the British Government. This engagement was signed by the British officers and Arab Chiefs present, and Syed Burgash took an oath on the koran to abide by it, adding in a loud voice—

"I swear I will never again listen to the advice of the French, nor of the El Harth, nor of any one except the British Government."

Agreeably to the Sultan's request, Syed Burgash was received on board the *Assaye*, which was to convey him to Muscat. The El Harth tribe, who had been heavy losers by their unsuccessful attempt at rebellion, made their submission to Syed Majid, and all seem quiet on the island. In reporting the above events to Government, Captain Rigby observed—

"I am fully aware of the responsibility I have incurred by complying with the requisition of His Highness for the aid of Her Majesty's troops, and that I should not have been justified in doing so had it been a case of His Highness's subjects endeavoring to rid themselves of

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an unpopular or tyrannical ruler; but it was not so. Syed Burgash had been provided with a large sum of money by the ruler of Muscat, purposely to stir up a revolution; he had also been generously provided by His Highness with a sum of ten thousand dollars, only the day before he fled into the interior. With this money he was enabled to attract to him a great number of mercenary Arabs, who come here from the north, eager for any opportunity to rob and plunder; and it is at this season that they usually arrive here by thousands. Whilst the Sultan was at Beitel Ras he sent me a private note saying that he was certain the French Consul had instigated Syed Burgash to rebel. That day Her Majesty's steamer *Lynx* arrived here, and Lieutenant Berkeley informed me that the French corvette *Cordeliere* had sailed from Mozambique, it was supposed for Zanzibar direct, and it was, therefore, probable that on the arrival of the *Cordeliere* the French would openly protect Syed Burgash, as during the former visit of that vessel. The town was being rapidly deserted: no food of any description was procurable in the markets for several days; there are nearly five thousand peaceable British subjects residing here, who looked only to me for protection of their lives and property; one respectable Indian merchant had been murdered, and I foresaw entire ruin and anarchy, unless the rebellion were speedily suppressed, for the savage passions of these semi-barbarous races were being aroused. These considerations induced me to afford the aid requested, and I trust that my proceedings, during what has been a period of great anxiety and responsibility, may meet the approval of His Lordship in Council."

On being informed of Captain Rigby's proceedings, the Government of India praised him highly for the sound judgment exercised by him throughout the whole transaction.

18. COMMANDER CRUTTENDEN'S MISSION TO MUSCAT. CONSENT OF SYED THOWEYNEE TO ABIDE BY ARBITRATION OF GOVERNMENT.—On receipt of the orders of the Government of India (*vide* para. 14) the Bombay Government had despatched Commander Cruttenden, of the Indian Navy, in Her Majesty's steamer *Feroze* to Muscat in order to communicate the substance of the orders to Syed Thoweynee. That officer arrived at his destination on the 12th September, and found that Syed Thoweynee had just returned from an expedition against his brother, Syed Toorkee, which had terminated without bloodshed, owing, it was said, to the remonstrances of the Resident at Bushire and the mediation of the Aboothabee Chief.

On the day after his arrival at Muscat, Commander Cruttenden waited on the Sultan and informed him of the subject of his mission. The latter was greatly chagrined at the refusal of the Government of India to recognize him as his brother's suzerain, and seemed to think his case had been prejudged. He denied that he had acted in any way contrary to good faith, and said that all he wanted was a fair settlement of his claims against Zanzibar and his brother, whom he accused of exciting his brother, Syed Toorkee of Sohar, to rebel against by sending up to him about four months previously in a French vessel a quantity of treasure, powder, shot, and arms, all of which were landed. He complained that he had no one to represent his side of the question to Government, who heard such lengthened details from the British Consul at Zanzibar of his (Syed Thoweynee's) acts that they could not help believing them. He denied the justice of the division of his father's property, declaring that he had left no will; that, had he done so, his two sons, Burgash and Faisal, who were with him when he died, would have been cognizant of it, and that if Syed Majid held Zanzibar, it ought to be on payment of an annual sum to the elder brother. Commander Cruttenden's report continued—

"His Highness further accused his brother at Zanzibar of having 'devoured' the shares of the late Imam's property left to the younger branches of the family, and of having failed to fulfil his promise of an annual payment of 40,000 German Crowns as guaranteed in the agreement made between them by Syed Mahomed bin Salem, and which agreement, in original, was now at Muscat.

"I pressed to be allowed to see this document, but was told that it was in Syed Mahomed bin Salem's house, and that he was absent on the pilgrimage, but daily expected in the ship *Sagof*. The *Sagof* did arrive two days afterwards, but the Syed had remained behind.

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"On my asking His Highness if there was any clause in that paper stipulating that a certain portion of this sum should be paid to Syed Toorkee, who was to be left unmolested at Sohar, he at first denied it, and then, with some inconsistency, said 'he had not seen the agreement.' I told him that I had always understood that his brother, Syed Toorkee, was placed in possession of Sohar by his father's express wish, and he denied it, saying that he had first conquered the place, and who had so good a right to it, therefore, as himself.

* * * * * "Although I allowed His Highness to relate his various and manifold grievances at length, I declined entering into any discussion as to their merits, as I told His Highness it would be disrespectful to His Excellency the Governor General, who had consented to arbitrate, provided His Highness would give the required guarantee, and, strongly urging him to do this and to weigh carefully all I had told him, I took my leave."

After waiting four days for a reply to the communication of the Government of India, Commander Cruttenden was at length summoned to hear read over the reply which Syed Thoweynee proposed to make. This, however, he found to be anything but satisfactory, very indefinite, and in no way binding the Sultan to abide by the award of the Governor General. Commander Cruttenden bluntly refused to be the bearer of a letter having no specific meaning, and the Sultan, somewhat disconcerted at his refusal, agreed to give an engagement binding himself to abide by the arbitration. Accordingly, on the following morning, a letter was brought off, but it turned out to be couched in precisely the same terms as the one read on the previous day; it was, therefore, returned also. Next was brought a letter written and signed by the Wazir on behalf of the Sultan. This also Commander Cruttenden refused to take, and at length Syed Thoweynee, by the advice of his brother, Syed Mahomed bin Saeed, gave the required guarantee, which was forwarded to Government. Captain Cruttenden placed but little faith on the sincerity of the Sultan, who had shewn himself extremely reluctant to enter into any engagement. He observed—

"The award of His Excellency, he feels, will be final and conclusive, and he will have no further excuse for molesting his brother whilst his own position will probably not be bettered."

"As regards Syed Toorkee, His Highness would not for an instant admit that he was independent. He styled him his 'wali' or governor, and, as such, considered himself fully empowered to exercise authority over him."

"After the landing of the stores from the French vessel for Sohar, His Highness ordered Syed Toorkee to dismiss his present garrison, and replace them with some friends of his own, which Syed Toorkee refused to do; and, consequently, His Highness prepared an expedition against him, which terminated, as before stated, without any result. Syed Toorkee is yet on the receipt of a monthly stipend from the customs at Muscat."

19. SECOND OUTBREAK OF SYED BURGASH.—Her Majesty's steamer *Assaye*, which had in the meantime proceeded on a cruise, but without Syed Burgash, for whom other arrangements were made, returned to Zanzibar on the 5th September. The presence of the vessel gave great confidence to the people, and the Sultan expressed himself as highly grateful for the moral support against foreign intrigue afforded by its arrival. Captain Rigby deemed it advisable to keep the *Assaye* at Zanzibar until the French Commander-in-Chief, who was shortly expected in the *Cordeliere*, had taken his departure, as, even if that officer did not interfere in the internal affairs of the State, it would be generally supposed, after what occurred during the previous visit of the *Cordeliere*, that he had designs hostile to the Sultan. Later, in September, Captain Rigby wrote that all was quiet at Zanzibar, and the El Harth tribe had become quite submissive. Events which had occurred in Muscat had completely detached them from Syed Thoweynee's side. It had come to the ears of the latter that the El Harth had imposed upon him, and appropriated the money he had sent to Zanzibar for the purpose of exciting a revolution. Thereupon he seized a ship belonging to Abdullah bin Salem, Chief of the tribe, thus making

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the El Harth his enemies at once. They had subsequently been extremely anxious to be reconciled to Syed Majid. The Muscat ship *Caroline* with Syed Thoweynee's Agent, Ahmed bin Salem (a cousin of both Syed Thoweynee and Syed Majid), on board had at last left Zanzibar. This Ahmed Captain Rigby represented to be a dangerous and unscrupulous person. During the whole of his visit he had been intriguing with the French Consul with the view of gaining the support of the latter in his designs against Syed Majid. It was not until after the Sultan had remonstrated strongly against his intimacy that the French Consul, in open durbar, refused to shake hands with Ahmed bin Salem, or to take any further notice of him. Shortly after this, said Captain Rigby, Ahmed bribed an Alaman jemadar of Syed Majid's to assassinate his master; but the plot was discovered in time. There was good reason to believe that Syed Burgash was privy to the attempted assassination, and the Sultan, therefore, determined to send him away at once.


On the 9th October Captain Rigby reported that Syed Burgash had again been giving trouble in Zanzibar. One of Syed Majid's own ships had been prepared to take him to Oman, but, after delaying his departure on various pretences for several days, he at length obstinately refused to leave his house, where he collected some of Syed Majid's younger brothers and their mothers, and which he threatened to blow up with gun-powder if force was used. He was induced, however, to promise compliance with the order to embark, and, at his request, a buggalow was prepared to take him to Maculla on the Hadramaut coast, where he expressed a wish to go until he could ascertain what sort of a reception he would meet with from Syed Thoweynee. His baggage and provisions were embarked, but the night before his intended departure he escaped into the interior of the island, and took possession of a large country house belonging to his deceased brother, Khalid, which he commenced to fortify, and openly declared his intention of opposing Syed Majid. Captain Rigby did his best to induce the latter to take energetic measures at once before Syed Burgash could entrench himself in his position and collect men by promises of pay and plunder. The rebellion was not formidable, but, from the peculiar mode of warfare of the Arabs, it was probable that none of the Sultan's troops would dare to approach the stockade, and hence resistance could be prolonged for a considerable time.

It was commonly reported in the town that Syed Burgash had not kept his promise of embarking from Zanzibar, because he expected a French ship-of-war to arrive there.


There is here a gap in the records of the Foreign Office, but it appears from a letter dated 27th December 1859, from Captain Jones, the Resident, Persian Gulf, that Syed Burgash arrived during that month at Bunder Abbas, where Syed Thoweynee happened to be at the time. Under cover of the same communication, Captain Jones forwarded letters from the ruler of Muscat denying that his agent, Hamed bin Salem, had been concerned in any intrigues against Syed Majid when at Zanzibar, and repeating the accusation that Syed Majid had aided Syed Toorkee with money and munitions of war.—(Cons. 9th March 1860, Nos 21-22.) Writing on the 30th November 1859, Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby reported all quiet at Zanzibar. The French Commodore in the *Corde liere* had arrived, and had shown due courtesy and respect to the Sultan. After the Commodore's departure, the French Consul, who was supposed to be in correspondence with Syed Thoweynee, had continued his course of petty insult to the Sultan.

In December 1859 Captain Rigby submitted a refutation of the allegations made by Syed Thoweynee against Syed Majid, with regard to the latter having aided Syed Toorkee with arms and money. He explained that the


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CHAPTER II.

Arbitration of Government of India.

20. DEPUTATION OF BRIGADIER COGHLAN TO ENQUIRE INTO THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ZANZIBAR AND MUSCAT.—On the 14th June 1860 the Bombay Government intimated that Brigadier Coghlan, the Political Resident at Aden, had left on the 31st May for the purpose of investigating and reporting on the complications existing between Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Sohar on the other. Associated with Brigadier Coghlan were the Reverend P. Badger, a Medical Officer, and Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, the latter gentleman being appointed as British Agent at Muscat as a temporary measure. Brigadier Coghlan was directed to proceed, in the first instance, to Muscat, and was furnished with a letter to the Sultan of that place, intimating that he had been appointed to enquire into the matters in dispute between himself and his brother. The instructions issued to Brigadier Coghlan by the Bombay Government were contained in a resolution dated 16th April 1860, of which the following is an extract :

"Resolved that the Political Resident be informed that this Government unreservedly grants to him authority to investigate and report, for the information of the Supreme Government, on the relative positions of the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar. It will be the duty of the Political Resident to ascertain what are the exact rights of the one in relation to the other by religious law, family customs, specific instrument, or force of circumstances. Having arrived at a conclusion on this question, it will remain for the Political Resident to consider whether it is actually necessary that exact rights should be recognized, whether peace and tranquility may not more effectually be secured by inducing the antagonist parties to make mutual concessions, whether judicious compromise will not be of more real benefit to the interests of all concerned, both rulers and subjects, than any rigid adherence to pretensions based on exact rights. In other words, it will be for the Political Resident to ascertain what is right and what is expedient, and whether the parties can be induced partially to concede the one for the purpose of permanently securing the other.

"The Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council considers that the whole question is open to the investigation and discussion of the Political Resident; that it is the sole desire of the supreme Government to administer justice between the contending parties, and that that high authority will gladly avail itself of any facts or considerations which Brigadier Coghlan may be able to contribute towards the solution of existing complications.

"The question of guaranteeing to the Imam his Arabian possessions is one on which the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council would wish to be favored with the Political Resident's opinion. The Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council is not aware whether any necessity exists for the grant of such guarantee, but the Political Resident may be requested to examine and report on the general question."—(Proceedings, April 1860-61, Nos. 26-29.)

21. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. SUBORDINATION OF ZANZIBAR TO MUSCAT.—Brigadier Coghlan submitted two reports of his proceedings, the first, dated 4th July 1860, written after visiting Muscat and previous to his arrival at Zanzibar; and the second, dated 4th December 1860, on the conclusion of his labors. The first contained a statement of Syud Thoweynee's case, as represented by himself, and also the result of Brigadier Coghlan's enquiries in Muscat. A great portion of the matter contained in the earlier is embodied in the later report, which treats as a whole of the subject in dispute between the two brothers. Previous to commencing his enquiries at Muscat and Zanzibar, Brigadier Coghlan obtained from Syed Thoweynee and Syed Majid a bond consenting to submit their case to the arbitration of the Governor General, and expressing their entire willingness to abide by His Excellency's decision in the matter. A statement of their respective cases were also submitted by the two brothers. The first point touched upon by Brigadier Coghlan was the position of Zanzibar with regard to Muscat.

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On this subject he wrote :

"I now proceed, in the first place, to state, as succinctly as possible, the various arguments adduced in support of the claims of His Highness Syed Majid to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

"In the year 1807 His late Highness Syed Saeed, second son of Syed Sultan, was elected by the principal tribes of Oman to succeed his father as Sultan, his elder brother Salim acquiescing in his promotion to the supreme power. During his lifetime, Syed Sultan had taken from the Portuguese the islands of Zanzibar, Mombasa, and Pemba, as also Kilwa and other places on the east coast of Africa. These remote possessions fell to Syed Saeed, as forming part of the kingdom of Oman; and, although the authority of his predecessor over several of them had been but nominal, or at least precarious, and Syed Saeed may fairly be entitled to the merit of having extended and consolidated the empire in those parts, nevertheless it was undoubtedly in virtue of his election in succession to Syed Sultan that he acquired the right of sovereignty over the African dependencies of Oman.

"Syed Saeed during his lifetime ruled over the conjoined dominions of Oman and Zanzibar. The seat of his government for many years was Muscat; but about the year 1840 His Highness selected Zanzibar as his permanent residence, committing the subordinate rule of Muscat and other provinces to his sons or relatives.

"On the 24th of July 1844, Syed Saeed addressed a letter to the Right Hon'ble the Earl of Aberdeen, then Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wherein His Highness thus expresses his wishes regarding his two elder sons Khaled and Thoweynee (Hilal, the eldest, being entirely overlooked in the projected arrangement): 'And after us (on our death) we constitute and appoint our son Khaled to be ruler of all our African possessions, that is to say, all places on the continent of Africa between Magadosha, situated in about 2° 10' north latitude, and Cape Delgado, situated in about 10° 42' south latitude, with the adjacent islands now subject to our rule and under our dominion. And, in like manner, our son Syed Thoweynee to be ruler over all our possessions in Oman, in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, and on the coast of Persia.' Syed Saeed's object in writing this letter, as stated by Colonel Hamerton, was 'to ascertain whether he might look to Her Majesty's Government to guarantee the succession to his sons Khaled and Thoweynee.' According to Colonel Rigby, no reply exists in the records of the Zanzibar Consulate either to Syed Saeed's letter above quoted, or to that from Colonel Hamerton, which appears to have accompanied it.

"Syed Khaled died in 1854, and in a letter announcing the death of the late Syed Saeed to Lord Aberdeen, dated Zanzibar, November 10th, 1856, Colonel Hamerton writes: 'All things here at present are quiet, and the government in the African possessions administered by his son Prince Majid, who has administered the government by order of His Highness since the death of Prince Khaled on the 7th November 1854. I have been given to understand that His Highness left a will and a written statement of his wishes regarding the succession. I am perfectly well aware what His Highness's intentions regarding the succession were: that Syed Thoweynee, at Muscat, should succeed to the government of his Arabian possessions, provision being made for certain of his sons as governors of certain places in his Arabian possessions; and that the Prince Majid, whom His Highness considered in the place of his deceased son Khaled, should succeed to the government of his African possessions, provision being made for others of his sons as governors of various places in his African possessions.'

"No written statement of the late Syed Saeed's wishes regarding the succession, as mentioned by Colonel Hamerton, has ever been found; and the only will hitherto forthcoming, as executed by His Highness, makes no provision whatever of that nature, but is confined almost exclusively to the disposal of his personal property. Colonel Rigby, however, confirms Colonel Hamerton's statements regarding the promotion of Syed Majid to the post which had become vacant by the death of his elder brother Khaled, in these words: 'The Prince Khaled was installed as ruler of the African dominions during his father's absence at Muscat; and on his death, which occurred on the 7th November 1854, His Highness passed over two of his sons, and appointed his fourth son Prince Majid to succeed his deceased brother in the government of the African dominions; and it was proclaimed to all the chief Arabs in open durbar that he was to be regarded exactly in the same position as Prince Khaled had held, and that he had succeeded to all his rights, and the future sovereignty of Zanzibar and the African dominions. The Prince Majid thus continued to administer the government, acknowledged by all as the rightful heir to the sovereignty, by virtue of his father's act, as publicly proclaimed.'

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"It does not appear, however, that this substitution of Syed Majid in the place of Syed Khaled was ever officially notified by His Highness Syed Saeed, either to the British or to any other foreign governments in alliance with him; and Syed Majid was unable to produce any native records attesting the arrangement as the act of the late sovereign. But the death of the latter was communicated by His Highness to Great Britain, France, and the United States of America; and letters of condolence were received by him in return from Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French, and from the President of the United States. The two former contain no recognition of Syed Majid's sovereignty; but in the reply of the Emperor of the French, and in that of the President of the United States, His Highness is congratulated on his accession to 'the supreme power,' and to 'the throne of the sultanry.' As no special mention, however, is made either of Muscat or Zanzibar in these documents, and Syed Thoweynee's position and claims are entirely overlooked, it is highly probable that the two above-named governments were unacquainted with the actual state of the case, and wrote under the impression that Syed Majid was the sole, rightful, and acknowledged successor to the sovereignty of all the dominions of his deceased father, Syed Saeed.

"The foregoing is a fair statement of the facts adduced from extraneous sources in support of Syed Majid's right to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies. His Highness himself rests his pretensions on similar grounds, namely, on the fact that, when his elder brother Khaled died, Syed Saeed appointed him *Governor of Zanzibar* in his stead, and notified the same to all the chiefs of Africa, as well as to the foreign consuls residing at Zanzibar; that he was duly recognized as such by them, and that he had occupied that position two years prior to the death of his father, which event occurred while on a voyage from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1856. His Highness then proceeds to establish his claim to the sovereignty of Zanzibar, on the ground of his having been elected thereto by the people. He writes: 'When I heard the report of my father's death, I called together my brothers and family (only those, of course, who were present at Zanzibar at the time,) and all the people in these parts from Sink (Delgado) to Marbat in order that they might recognise me. To this they all agreed, and they accordingly elected me to be ruler over them, and entrusted me with the direction of their affairs. He moreover considers that his sovereignty over Zanzibar and its African dependencies has already been acknowledged by the representatives of the different foreign powers who were in alliance with the late Syed Saeed, and he alleges that a similar recognition was virtually made by his brother Syed Thoweynee through his agent Mahomed bin Salem, who, on the death of their father, was sent from Muscat by the former fully empowered to treat with Syed Majid on his behalf. The yearly grant which on that occasion he agreed to remit to his brother Thoweynee, Syed Majid maintains was a purely friendly subsidy, and by no means a tribute recognising in any way the suzerainty of his brother Syed Thoweynee of Muscat.

"Unfortunately no documentary proofs are forthcoming to decide the important question involved in the above transaction. Syed Thoweynee contends that the grant was given and received as tribute, and the two brothers (who nevertheless now join in representing Mahomed bin Salem as a villain) confidently appeal to his statements formerly made in support of their opposite assertions. My original impression therefore is confirmed, namely, that the agent, for his own private ends, deceived both parties, accepting the yearly grant at Zanzibar as a fraternal gift from Majid to Thoweynee, and representing to the latter at Muscat that he had stipulated for it as a tribute involving the recognition by his brother of his suzerainty over Zanzibar and its African dependencies. Two documents, however, indirectly bearing on this point, are attached in the Appendix. The first is a letter from Mahomed bin Salem at Muscat to Luddah, the Customs Master at Zanzibar, desiring him to pay to bearer the balance of the 'Musaadeh,' that is, the aid or subsidy granted by Syed Majid to his brother Thoweynee. The other contains the original order drawn up in Syed Majid's own writing, authorising the said Luddah to pay his brother Thoweynee every year 'a subsidy' of 40,000 crowns.

"All the arguments adduced or admissible in favor of Syed Majid's claims are, I believe, fully and fairly stated in the foregoing summary. They are based on the following grounds, viz.:-

1. The will, or rather wishes, of His late Highness Syed Saeed.
2. His recognition by foreign powers.
3. His virtual recognition by his rival brother Syed Thoweynee of Muscat.
4. His election as their Sovereign by the Chiefs of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

I shall now proceed to make a few remarks under these several heads.

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"Although the tenor of the late Syed Saeed's official communication to Lord Aberdeen, in 1844, is not absolutely conclusive that he contemplated dividing his empire by constituting Zanzibar and its African dependencies a separate kingdom under the sovereignty of his second son Khaled, and although there is still less certain ground for inferring that on the death of Khaled he purposed carrying out the same intention in behalf of his fourth son Majid, nevertheless, I am of opinion that the evidence on that side outweighs the argument on the other, that His late Highness, in his arrangements, actually made, or prospectively designed, had nothing more in view than to allot subordinate governorships to one or more of his sons under the paramount Sovereign of Oman.

"Thus much conceded, however, the question arises whether the late Syed Saeed, in conformity with pre-existing usage, possessed the right of dividing his dominions, or of disposing of them at will. Syed Majid, during one of the Rev. Mr. Badger's official interviews with him, attempted at first to maintain that he had; but on being requested to adduce one single corroborative instance in the past history of the rulers of Oman, or to explain how it fell out, if such was the recognised law on the subject, that the succession in the existing dynasty had so often been diverted from the direct line, and the supreme power successfully usurped, His Highness at once abandoned the argument as untenable, admitting that the sovereignty of Oman had hitherto depended on election, the principal tribes generally choosing the candidate who was either most beloved by them, or who possessed the greatest power to enforce his pretensions. His Highness's testimony in this respect is in exact accordance with the account given by Syed Hilal, as reported by Colonel Rigby, of the mode of succession to the sovereignty of Oman: 'Might, coupled with election by the tribes, is the only right.' And again, 'The one who had most influence with the tribes was elected.'

"Colonel Rigby seemingly admits the same; for in explaining his former use of the word 'election,' as applied to the succession of the late Syed Saeed, he says—'By the term 'election,' I mean that he was proclaimed and accepted as their ruler by the Arabs of Oman, to the exclusion of his elder brother.' And further on—'The late Imam evidently considered that he possessed the right to dispose of his dominions as he pleased, from having, during his lifetime, disinherited his eldest son Hilal. But if the successor thus nominated were not acceptable to the people, I think they would refuse to accept him.' And again—'I think if a ruler of Oman were to appoint as his successor a person who was not acceptable to the Arab tribes and chiefs, that they would refuse to acknowledge him, and elect as their ruler a person who was more popular with them.'

"These admissions, however, are somewhat qualified by two or three examples adduced by the way in support of the opposite view. First, the case of Syed Hilal, just mentioned; but that instance proves nothing, even supposing that his being disinherited implied his exclusion from the succession, since, if the succession was ultimately by election, his father at best could only have nominated him to the sovereignty, and his confirmation in that dignity would have depended on the temper of the tribes.

"The next case is that of Ahmed bin Saeed, grandfather of the late Syed Saeed, and the first of the reigning dynasty, who, according to Colonel Rigby, 'divided his dominions during his own life, having appointed his son Kees to be chief of Sohar, and his seventh and youngest son to be chief of Sink.' Although it is true that in after years, owing to the incessant struggles for the sovereignty, and the fierce strife of parties in Oman, the two small provinces above-named did eventually attain a nominal independence, nevertheless it is highly improbable, from the peculiar circumstances of his own accession to the supreme power, that Ahmed's original concession either contemplated or sanctioned their detachment from the paramount state. They were most probably granted as appanages, but held on feudal tenure, their 'syuds,' or lords, being bound to render military aid to the suzerain whenever called upon to do so.

"In another place, replying to a query whether the tribes of Oman, to whom the late Syed Saeed owed his election to the sovereignty, and who had co-operated with him in the extension and consolidation of the African dependencies of the kingdom, might not justly claim a voice in the disposal of those territories, Colonel Rigby writes—'The late Imam succeeded in establishing his power over the east coast of Africa chiefly through the mutual jealousies and dissensions of the petty chiefs, who frequently sent envoys to Muscat to solicit his interference. I do not think that it would ever occur to any Arabs in Oman that they had any voice in the succession to the government of the African possessions on the ground supposed; I think they were regarded as being at the absolute disposal of the Imam; and the fact that all the property of the State, such as ships of war, arms, &c., were considered as the private estate of the Imam, strengthens this opinion.'

"To this I reply that the mutual jealousies of the native petty chiefs were undoubtedly availed of by the late Syed Saeed to extend his conquests in Eastern Africa; but it is equally certain that he acquired the sovereignty over Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mombasa, as also over

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several other localities on the African Continent, in virtue of his having been elected to succeed his father Syed Sultan, who had conquered them from the Portuguese. Hence, as the suffrages of the tribes of Oman contributed to invest the late Syed Saeed with supreme authority over those dependencies, it is but reasonable to suppose that the tribes at the present day claim the same privilege still. And further, as Syed Sultan does not appear to have arrogated to himself the right to dispose of the foreign possessions of the kingdom, there is no valid ground for presuming that his son could legitimately exercise that prerogative. Moreover, the argument drawn from a comparison of the sovereign's right to dispose of the sovereignty, because the property of the State was considered to form part of his private estate, is fallacious. The sovereignty, as we have seen, depended on election, and, strictly speaking, the State property of Oman was confined almost exclusively to the fortresses of the kingdom, which a successor generally inherited, though not unfrequently obliged to coerce some of the garrisons to recognise his supremacy. All other movable and immovable property, including what he originally possessed, as well as what he had added thereto during his reign from the public revenue, were held as belonging to the private estate of his predecessor. Such undoubtedly is, and ever has been, the law of inheritance in the succession among the Imams and kings of Oman, and it serves to explain what otherwise seems most anomalous in the will of the late Sultan Syed Saeed. By that instrument the testator directs that, after the payment of certain legacies, all his property, including his ships of war (two only excepted, which are bequeathed to the "Treasury of the Muselmans," that is, to the State), his money, palaces, furniture, plantations, &c., shall be divided among his surviving children 'according as God has ordained in His law;' but no provision whatever is made for the succession, and no bequests devised from any property which, agreeably with pre-existing usage, was considered to be public, and, therefore, as belonging of right to his successor in the sovereignty. It was in accordance with this law that His Highness Syed Majid (who, nevertheless, claims the sovereignty of the Zanzibar territories and all the rights appertaining thereto) only shared equally with his brothers in the inheritance left by their father. Thus Colonel Rigby says—'The ships of war, guns, stores of every description, even the arms in the possession of the troops, were set down at a valuation, and charged against the new ruler as a debt due to his father's estate.'

"The only logical inference deducible from the foregoing considerations is in strict accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Reverend Mr. Badger after a careful inquiry into the laws which have regulated the succession among the Imams and kings of Oman for several centuries. He writes—'Among all the sovereigns * * * * not one occurs who is recorded to have assumed or exercised the right of nominating a successor, or of disposing of his territories by will or otherwise. On the death of a ruler, the member of his family who happened to exercise the greatest influence at the time, either put himself forward, or was put forward by the people, to succeed to the sovereignty. The claim was frequently disputed by other of the relations of the deceased, and intestine family wars followed, the strongest ultimately gaining the ascendancy; but even in such cases the right to the sovereignty does not appear to have been regarded as valid without the concurrence of the principal tribes.'

"Having thus, as I conceive, fairly answered all arguments adduced in support of the contrary view, and proved as well by the admission of His Highness Syed Majid and of Colonel Rigby as by historical evidence, that the sovereigns of Oman did not, in accordance with pre-established law or usage, possess the right of disposing of their dominions, it results that the claims of Syed Majid to the sovereignty of the Zanzibar territories, as in any degree founded on the will or wishes of the late Syed Saeed, are invalid and nugatory.

"I proceed, in the next place, to consider the argument adduced by Syed Majid in behalf of his claims to the sovereignty, on the ground of his having been recognised as the ruler of Zanzibar and its African dependencies by several of the foreign powers which had previously been in alliance with his predecessor and father, the late Syed Saeed. It is unnecessary, however, to enlarge on that point, which has already been sufficiently discussed in paragraph 9 of this report; for even admitting that the alleged recognition has actually been tendered by France and the United States of America, and subsequently by the Hanseatic Republic, after a full investigation into the merits of the dispute regarding the sovereignty still pending between Syed Majid and Syed Thoweynee (which, at best, is every doubtful), the fact that the two brothers have voluntarily referred the settlement of their differences in that respect to the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, is a plain avowal of the existence of their rival claims, and effectually invalidates any such recognition unless eventually found to be in accordance with the final decision of the elected arbitrator.

"The argument next adduced by Syed Majid, on the ground of his having been acknowledged as sovereign by his elder brother Syed Thoweynee of Muscat, being based on one-sided evidence, is inadmissible. His Highness alleges that Mahomed bin Salem, the

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envoy of Syed Thoweynee, who was fully authorised to come to an understanding with him on all public as well as private matters connected with the death of their late father, did fully recognise that Zanzibar and its African dependencies belonged of right to him; on the other hand, Syed Thoweynee disavows that any such concession was ever authorised or made by or for him, and unhappily no documentary evidence is forthcoming to verify the assertion of either party. For a similar reason, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from the contradictory statements regarding the yearly grant of forty thousand crowns which Syed Majid agreed to pay to Syed Thoweynee, the latter affirming that his agent accepted it in his behalf as *tribute*; whereas Syed Majid insists that it was given and accepted as a *friendly gift*, and on the express condition that he should be recognized by his brother Thoweynee as the supreme ruler of Zanzibar and its dependencies. The only two documents produced by Syed Majid in support of his assertions have already been described in paragraph 11. In the letter written by Mahomed bin Salem from Muscat to the Customs Master at Zanzibar, he does, indeed, speak of the grant made by Majid to Thoweynee as a "musaadeh," that is, an aid or subsidy; but, on the one hand, it is by no means apparent that Syed Thoweynee sanctioned such a definition of the money; and, on the other, it is just the style which Mahomed bin Salem might be expected to adopt in writing to Zanzibar, supposing, what I believe to be now generally believed, that the said agent, in his transactions between the two brothers, had managed to deceive both parties to his own advantage. The other document, namely, Syed Majid's order to the Customs Master at Zanzibar to pay to his brother a "subsidy" of forty thousand crowns per annum, may go a certain way to indicate what His Highness's own views were in bestowing the grant, but it fails to prove in any degree that Syed Thoweynee had accepted it in that light. His Highness, in his written statement, also alludes to a declaration which Mahomed bin Salem had drawn up, previous to quitting Zanzibar, for presentation to Syed Thoweynee on his return to Muscat. According to him it was to the following effect: 'I, Mahomed bin Salem, ask of Majid bin Saeed an annual subsidy of forty thousand crowns in behalf of his brother Thoweynee bin Saeed.* No such paper is forthcoming; and the circumstances under which it is stated to have been prepared are so improbable as to throw considerable doubt on His Highness's veracity.

"Summing up the foregoing considerations, I am led to conclude that Syed Majid's claims to the independent sovereignty of Zanzibar, as based on his alleged recognition by Syed Thoweynee of Muscat, through the medium of his agent and plenipotentiary, Mahomed bin Salem, must be pronounced untenable.

"I shall now proceed to discuss the last argument urged in behalf of Syed Majid's claims, namely, his election as their sovereign by the chiefs of Zanzibar and its African dependencies. His Highness's own statement to that effect, already quoted in paragraph 10, is fully confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Rigby, who believes that, if the suffrages of the principal chiefs were taken, the majority would undoubtedly elect Syed Majid in preference to Syed Thoweynee. And again, referring to the meditated attack from Muscat in 1859, the same officer writes—'When the invasion of the Zanzibar dominions by Syed Thoweynee was expected, the inhabitants of the Sowahili rose *en masse* to support Syed Majid. Many tribes under their own chiefs came over to Zanzibar; every accessible point on the coast was occupied; and when some of the dhowes which had Syed Thoweynee's troops on board endeavoured to procure wood and water, they were driven from every point at which they attempted to land, and at length were obliged, in consequence, to surrender to Syed Majid's ships of war. At Zanzibar the Sowahili population and the natives of the Comoro Isles were all in arms to support Syed Majid, and I heard many of them state, as a reason for doing so, that the Muscat Arabs come here to kidnap their children and carry them away as slaves. The Northern Arabs are feared and hated at Zanzibar.'

"Without attempting to analyse the causes which led to this general preference of Syed Majid to Syed Thoweynee, there is no good reason to doubt the fact of its existence. That being the case, the question naturally arises whether such recognition of his claims validly entitles Syed Majid to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

"I have already pointed out (paragraph 14) that the supreme power over Oman was conferred by election, and (paragraph 3) that, in virtue of that election, His late Highness Syed Saeed acquired the right of sovereignty over the African dependencies of the parent State. It does not appear, however (in fact it is highly improbable), that the people of those dependencies enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the election of the sovereign. Up

* The distinction between the import of the Arabic terms which I have throughout expressed by the English words "subsidy" and "tribute" is not explicit. The former denotes a gift accorded solely by the will of the giver; the latter implies obligation, and a proof of subjection to superior authority.

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to the period referred to, they were doubtless regarded as a conquered race, as subjects, not citizens. They were ruled by local authorities generally sent from the seat of government at Muscat, and, as a people, were not allowed any part in the public administration. For obvious reasons, such must necessarily have been the state of those countries on the accession of the late Syed Saeed. Their conquest by his predecessor was of recent date, and their subjection to Oman was, in many instances, merely nominal. Moreover, their importance, both in a political and commercial point of view, was then inconsiderable, the Arabs valuing them more as a nursery from whence they could readily procure an abundant supply of slaves than for any other cause. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the people of Zanzibar and its African dependencies should have had no voice in the election of their sovereign.

"But during the reign of His late Highness Syed Saeed, extending over a period of 50 years, the general condition of those countries underwent a surprising change: his sovereignty over them was firmly established; large numbers of Arabs from Oman settled on the African mainland and the adjacent islands; agriculture and commerce were extensively promoted; and Zanzibar, which, in 1834, was described by the Commander of Her Majesty's ship *Imogene* as having 'little or no trade,' possessed, in 1859, an aggregate trade estimated at £1,664,577 sterling. Moreover, the revenue derivable from those dependencies has increased in the same ratio. Colonel Rigby writes—'Twenty-five years ago the late Imam did not receive more than 50,000 Crowns of annual revenue from his African possessions. In 1847 it had increased to 185,000 Crowns, and at present the revenue amounts to 206,000 Crowns.' In 1840 Syed Saeed removed the seat of government from Muscat to Zanzibar, ruling Oman mostly through a deputy; and it was doubtless owing to the presence and energy of the sovereign that the African possessions of the kingdom made such remarkable and social commercial progress. Those possessions are actually more extensive, and far more fertile and valuable in every way, than the Arabian territories, and their annual revenue exceeds the revenue of the latter to the amount of 77,000 Crowns, or about £16,000 sterling.

"Such being the altered condition and circumstances of the African dependencies, it seems consonant with reason and justice (considering the form of government which prevailed in Oman) that the people of those countries should have a voice in the election of the sovereign. They accordingly availed themselves of the prerogative on the death of the late Syed Saeed, and chose his son Syed Majid to be their ruler in preference to Syed Thoweynee who had succeeded to the sovereignty of the parent State. Regarded from one point of view, the act may be characterised as a national revolution, and as such Syed Thoweynee, the sovereign of Oman, was justified in counteracting it, and in attempting to establish his own claims by an appeal to arms, if success was unattainable in any other way. Apart from all consideration of the alleged cause which eventually induced him to project an invasion of the Zanzibar territories for that purpose, namely, the non-payment by Syed Majid of the stipulated sum of 40,000 Crowns after the first year, the custom in similar cases which had invariably obtained, especially in the family of the reigning dynasty on the demise of the sovereign, fully warranted Syed Thoweynee in regarding the attitude assumed by Syed Majid as an usurpation of the hereditary rights of the sovereigns of Oman.

"Syed Thoweynee prepared accordingly to contest the sovereignty of the African dependencies with his brother Majid. With that object in view, he probably resorted to every available stratagem to secure ultimate success; and there can be little doubt that when his expedition sailed from Muscat, he had won over a party at Zanzibar, chiefly among the El Harth tribe, who were ready to co-operate with him. Syed Majid, on the other hand, made corresponding preparations to repel the invasion, and it may fairly be presumed that he was equally active in the use of all the intrigues sanctioned by Arab warfare to thwart the schemes of his antagonist. There is every reason, indeed, to believe that to this end he took advantage of the misunderstanding which existed at the time between Syed Thoweynee and Syed Toorkee of Sohar, and, by dint of persuasions and promises, succeeded in enlisting the latter on his side.

"Such was the attitude of the belligerent parties when the Government of Bombay interposed to prevent a collision between them. At the solicitation of the late Lord Elphinstone, Syed Thoweynee agreed to abandon the expedition to Zanzibar, and to refer his claims to the arbitration of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, Syed Majid at Zanzibar consenting, through Colonel Rigby, to abide in like manner by his Lordship's decision.

"The intrigues and counter-intrigues which followed this arrangement, and which in October of last year resulted in an insurrection of the El Harth tribe at Zanzibar, headed by Syed Burgash, call for notice, chiefly with a view to determine the culpability of the respective parties in fomenting them. Under the plea of recalling a part of the expedition

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
which had preceded him to Zanzibar, Syed Thoweynee is severely censured for having attempted through his agent Hamed bin Salem, to settle the differences subsisting between himself and his brother Syed Majid, after he had consented to submit his claims to the arbitration of the Governor General of India. His Highness's explanation of that transaction is to the following effect: 'After receiving the communication from Government through Colonel Russell, which induced me to abandon the expedition and to submit my case to the arbitration of the Governor General, I understood that an officer would be sent to Zanzibar to institute the necessary inquiries; and as I deemed it desirable to have an agent on the spot to represent me, I decided to send Hamed bin Salem in that capacity. My intention in this respect was communicated to Colonel Russell. I do not deny having written the letter to Syed Majid, but I declare that it was one of friendship merely, and that any overtures which might have been made by Hamed bin Salem, in consequence of that letter, were by no means designed to set aside the final arbitration of the Governor General. My intention was, by previously establishing a more friendly understanding with Syed Majid, to render the task of arbitration easier, and the result more satisfactory to both parties.' Allowing for a certain degree of Native disingenuousness in this apology, it is not devoid of plausibility; and, further, it is very questionable whether Syed Thoweynee fully appreciated the extent of restraint which he had voluntarily incurred by accepting the arbitration of a third party. On all such points of international law, Syed Majid had the advantage of Colonel Rigby's constant advice and guidance; whereas the British Agent at Muscat at the time was an illiterate Jew, who was as incapable of advising Syed Thoweynee as His Highness was naturally backward to consult him.

"For the remaining charges brought against Syed Thoweynee, of having, through his agents and others, created disaffection at Zanzibar, and excited the El Harth tribe to rebel against Syed Majid, I must refer the Hon'ble the Governor in Council to my Muscat report, where His Highness's vindication of himself is also recorded. On a careful review of the whole, it appears to me that, although Syed Thoweynee had not ceased to correspond directly with the disaffected at Zanzibar, and endeavoured to maintain a party there favorable to his ulterior views, nevertheless he is not justly chargeable with many of the actual charges against his agents, nor with having instigated the rebellion of the El Harth in October 1859. I am confirmed in this conclusion by the opinion of Colonel Rigby, who, in writing of that tribe, says—'Their rebellion last year was not intended to favor either Syed Thoweynee or Syed Burgash, but with the hope of getting rid of the whole family of the late Imam, and then obtaining possession of the government. Moreover, the charges made against Hamed bin Salem, as Syed Thoweynee's principal agent, in fomenting the insurrection at Zanzibar, are considerably qualified by the friendly tenor of the letters addressed to that individual on his final departure for Muscat by Syed Majid himself; and Sooliman bin Hamed, His Highness's Vizier, in whose integrity Colonel Rigby formerly placed great confidence, but whom he has since had cause to regard as a most unprincipled man, did not hesitate, in a letter to Syed Thoweynee, to imply that Colonel Rigby was in some degree responsible for the rebellion of 1859, and for the subsequent conduct of Syed Burgash.

"The numerous charges made against Syed Thoweynee, of having acted throughout under French influence, were rebutted by His Highness in the manner already reported. I am further able to confirm his account of the paper submitted to him by the French Commodore De Langle by the admission of Syed Majid, who, in his written statement, relates that, on being appealed to by the former to do so, he had directed his Vizier, Sooliman bin Hamed, to draw up a document of precisely the same import as that described by Syed Thoweynee as having been handed to him at Muscat by the French Commodore. Equally inconclusive in proof of this general imputation is the statement of Colonel Rigby that 'the French Consul was known to be carrying on a very active correspondence with Syed Thoweynee'. The letters from Muscat to the disaffected Arabs here (Zanzibar) were sent under cover to the French Consul. That no collusion existed in this matter between the parties referred to is evident from the tenor of the French Consul's official despatch to Syed Thoweynee, wherein he especially requests His Highness 'not to enclose any letters for the Arabs at Zanzibar in the letters which he may do him the honor to address to him.' Moreover, Syed Majid frankly acknowledged that he had no evidence to prove that his brother had been acting under the influence of the French; and Colonel Rigby himself, who had framed several of his inferential charges against Syed Thoweynee in that respect, on the assertions of the then French Consul at Zanzibar, now writes—'From subsequent experience I have very little faith in anything the French Consul said on any subject.'

"But if Syed Thoweynee is justly chargeable in any degree with having intrigued against Syed Majid after he had consented to refer the settlement of his claims to the arbitration of the Governor General of India, Syed Majid is equally open to the imputation of having kept up a secret correspondence with Syed Toorkee of Sohar, who was well known to be disaffected towards his suzerain at Muscat, and was actively plotting with the tribes and with the

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Wahabees to undermine his authority over Oman. The explanation given by Syed Majid of the guns, money, and munitions of war, despatched by him to Syed Toorkee in March 1859, is undoubtedly very plausible, but under the circumstances of the case it fails to carry conviction to the mind of any one well versed in the sophistry and equivocation of the Arabs. The letter also written by Syed Majid at the commencement of the current year to his brother at Sohar, advising him of a remittance of 2,000 dollars, which letter was intercepted by Syed Thoweynee, is another ground of suspicion against the former; and in a subsequent part of this report I shall have occasion to add some further considerations which will tend to confirm the opinion here expressed—that His Highness, Syed Majid, chiefly with a view to strengthen his own position, was not less actively engaged against Syed Thoweynee, through the medium of Syed Toorkee of Sohar, than was Syed Thoweynee, through his agent at Zanzibar, to weaken the authority of his brother, Syed Majid.

"I have deemed it pertinent to enter into the foregoing discussion of the mutual attitude and conduct of the two rival brothers as a precaution against any unfair bias towards either. That done, it is of some importance to enquire what would have been the probable result had the two parties come into actual collision on the occasion of Syed Thoweynee's projected invasion of Zanzibar.

"As regards the chances of Syed Thoweynee, I have already written as follows: 'Colonel Rigby, in his account of the preparation made by Syed Majid to resist the expected invasion, represents the means at the disposal of the latter as ample to destroy any force brought against him, dwelling especially on the enthusiasm of the people in his cause. Subsequently, however, and long after the expedition of Syed Thoweynee had returned to Muscat, his report of the state of affairs at Zanzibar led the Government to conclude that the position of Syed Majid at Zanzibar was not secure; and later still, on the occasion of the outbreak, when the El Harth Arabs rose in support of Syed Burgash, all the force which Syed Majid could bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising was not suppressed until assistance from three British men-of-war had been sent to co-operate with them, when, as it is averred, the Arabs yielded, because they would not fight against the British.' Subsequent inquiry confirms me rather than otherwise in the obvious drift of the foregoing quotation. The elaborate account given by His Highness Syed Majid of the insurrection at Zanzibar in October 1859, divested of its vain colouring, shows that he was hard pressed by the insurgents; and Colonel Rigby, in attempting to reconcile a former statement of his, that the faction opposed to Majid was 'utterly contemptible,' with the position which that faction had secured on the occasion referred to, renders it highly probable that, without the opportune assistance of the British, the struggle would have been prolonged, and the final result at least doubtful.

"On the other hand, however, it is by no means certain that the success of the insurgents would have placed Zanzibar in the hands of Syed Thoweynee. Colonel Rigby is of opinion that the El Harth were actuated by private aims, and availed themselves of Syed Thoweynee's antagonism to Syed Majid, not for his sake, but for their own, anxious, if possible, 'to get rid of the whole family of the late Imam.' Besides which (and the reflection is of considerable importance in this inquiry) there is strong reasons for believing that, had Syed Thoweynee persisted in the invasion of Zanzibar, the tribes in Oman would have thrown off their allegiance to him, and elected another sovereign in his stead. This contingency was foreseen by the late Lord Elphinstone, and recorded by him in an able minute, dated 10th August 1859. His Lordship writes—'When Colonel Russell was at Muscat, he heard it said openly that it was well for Syed Thoweynee that he had listened to the advice of this Government and returned to Muscat; for, if he had not done so, Syed Toorkee would undoubtedly have attacked Muscat in his absence, and would probably have succeeded in making himself master of it, and of all the Imam's possessions in Oman. In grasping at the shadow of sovereignty in Zanzibar, Syed Thoweynee would have lost the substance in Muscat.' Considering that Muscat would have been almost denuded of ships and troops; that the restless and mercenary tribes of Oman have never failed to seize any promising opportunity for bartering their influence and acquiring gain, and that Syed Toorkee was on the spot quite prepared to avail himself of so favorable an occasion for promoting his own ambitious views, there is good ground for believing that a civil war would have followed the continued absence of Syed Thoweynee, and that the sovereignty of Oman would have been lost to him perhaps for ever. Syed Majid was doubtless fully aware of these weak points in the position of his antagonist, and was not backward to take advantage of them. His strategy could best be carried out through his brother at Sohar, who was accordingly subsidised by him to that end. Under the circumstances of the case, 'it was quite natural,' so writes Lord Elphinstone, 'that Syed Majid should send arms and ammunition to Syed Toorkee with the view of Syed Toorkee's creating a diversion in his favor at Muscat.

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"To sum up: Considering the fact that the people of Zanzibar and its African dependencies did, on the death of the late Syed Saeed, elect his son, Syed Majid, to be their ruler in his stead; considering that the altered condition of those dependencies during the last half century fully entitled them to that privilege; considering that, if Syed Thoweynee, the elected sovereign of the parent State, was justified in coercing them into submission, the people of the African dependencies, on the other hand, were equally justified in resisting him; considering that it is very doubtful whether any such attempt on his part would have been successful, and considering the probability that, if persisted in by Syed Thoweynee, the projected invasion of Zanzibar would have led to the forfeiture of his supremacy over Oman, I arrive at the conclusion, on these grounds exclusively, that Syed Majid's claims to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies are superior to any which can be adduced in favor of Syed Thoweynee."

Brigadier Coghlan then proceeded to show how, on the ground of expediency, it was advisable that Zanzibar should be separate from, and independent of, Muscat. This he showed from Colonel Hamerton's correspondence, and the replies given by that officer to certain queries on the subject addressed to him by Brigadier Coghlan. The arguments brought forward in favor of the separation on the score of expediency were briefly—

That the connection which existed between Oman and a country so far remote as East Africa was always an unnatural one, and ever prejudicial to the interests of both countries;

That the severance of Muscat from Zanzibar would soon lead to the stoppage of the slave trade; and

That if Zanzibar were constituted an independent State, the dominions of its ruler would extend into the interior, his power would be consolidated, and, in time, it might form a considerable African kingdom.

The Brigadier concluded—

"It would be superfluous to add anything to these considerations in favor of the independent sovereignty of Zanzibar. Fortunately, the expediency on which they are based, and which alone would hardly suffice to justify the severance of that State from the parent State of Muscat, is adequately supported and confirmed by the arguments founded on right, which have already been discussed in the foregoing pages."

The Bombay Government, in a resolution passed on this subject, intimated their agreement in the conclusions arrived at by Brigadier Coghlan.

22. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. QUESTION OF SUBSIDY FROM ZANZIBAR.—Next as to the question of the Zanzibar subsidy, Brigadier Coghlan wrote in continuation of the paragraph last quoted :—

"But if, notwithstanding these combined considerations, Syed Thoweynee, as the sovereign of Oman, may still be deemed to have some claim on the African territories of the kingdom, either in virtue of the relationship which has hitherto existed between those dependencies and the parent State, or by way of indemnity for any chance which, though having consented to forego his projected invasion of Zanzibar, he may consider that he has forfeited for himself and his successors, or in consideration of his recognition of the future independence of the Zanzibar State, I judge that the compensation offered on that behalf by Syed Majid is a fair equivalent for such pretensions. The amount of that compensation is more than Syed Thoweynee is ever likely to gain from the revenues of Zanzibar were it to continue a dependency of Muscat, and would, moreover, by enabling him to establish his authority over Oman, be of far greater use to him than the sovereignty over a distant possession, the population of which are notoriously ill-affected towards him. I should be less disposed to insist on this point, were it not that the obligation was acknowledged by Syed Majid himself when he first volunteered to grant to Syed Thoweynee a yearly subsidy of 40,000 Crowns. Colonel Rigby states that, during the lifetime of the late Imam, 10,000 Crowns were annually sent from Zanzibar to Muscat on account of the tribute to the Wahabee Ameer: that this was a fixed payment. Other sums were sent as required,—some years 10,000 Crowns and some years, if hostilities were going on in Oman, considerably more.' On the death of His late Highness, Syed Majid, according to his own statement, wrote to Syed Thoweynee offering to remit him this sum of 10,000 Crowns to assist him in paying the Wahabees; and further, in case of emergency, to assist him with his money, his influence, and his troops. Subsequently, yielding to the arguments or solicitations of Mahomed bin Salem, Syed Majid engaged to raise the amount to an annual subsidy of 40,000 Crowns.

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"With regard to the conditions averred by Syed Majid to have been insisted on by him in voting this grant, namely, *first*, that he should be recognised by Syed Thoweynee as his father's successor over the Zanzibar territories, and *secondly*, that Syed Thoweynee should abstain in future from all hostilities with their common brother, Syed Toorkee, there is no evidence whatever to corroborate His Highness's allegation; and my firm conviction is, that no such terms were attached to the concession. It is, moreover, worthy of note that Syed Majid, in his written statement, entirely overlooks what he had before repeatedly declared, namely, that ten thousand of the stipulated sum of 40,000 Crowns were to be transferred to Syed Toorkee, and that it was on account of Syed Thoweynee's infringement of that condition that he discontinued the payment of the subsidy to the latter. Colonel Rigby, who had formerly hazarded these statements on the authority of His Highness, now writes—'I consider it very unlikely that any stipulation was made relative to one-fourth of the promised subsidy being paid to Syed Toorkee. I have always had great doubts on this point, because Thoweynee and Toorkee were on bad terms with each other at the time the agreement with Mahomed bin Salem was made, and also because I was informed that the allowance made from the Muscat treasury to Sohar during the life of the late Imam was only 1,200 Crowns per annum. If the whole of the tribute to the Wahabee Chief is, and always has been, paid from the Muscat treasury, it is, I consider, a strong confirmation of the doubts which I entertain, for Syed Toorkee could have no possible claim to such a payment from the Zanzibar treasury.' These suspicions are confirmed by the tenor of Syed Majid's note to the Customs Master at Zanzibar, wherein he states as follows: 'We have granted to our brother Thoweynee bin Saeed a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns every year, from the beginning of the year 1274, half (to be paid) during the south-west monsoon, and the other half during the north-east monsoon,'—without hinting that the payment of the said gratuity was to be dependent on the observance of any condition by His Highness Syed Thoweynee.

"Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that Syed Majid is bound to Syed Thoweynee in the sum of 40,000 Crowns per annum; and further, considering that the existing variance between the two brothers originated in the non-fulfilment of that obligation by the former, under the false plea that the latter had violated the attached condition, I judge that it would be only fair that Syed Majid should be called upon to make good his original promise by disbursing to Syed Thoweynee the arrears of the stipulated subsidy due since the date when its payment was suspended."

On the question of the subsidy it was observed by the Bombay Government—

"In seeking for a basis of compromise, attention is naturally directed to the terms on which it is admitted Syed Thoweynee was willing to resign his claims. Those terms were briefly an annual payment of 40,000 Crowns by Zanzibar to Muscat, but whether as tribute or a subsidy is disputed. The Hon'ble the Governor in Council is very willing to admit that the dispute involves a question of considerable importance, but he is of opinion that the negotiation indicates the nature of the compromise which the British Government should arrange. He thinks then as an indemnity for abandoning his claims on his father's African dominions as an adjustment of the balance between the two inheritances, the ruler of Zanzibar should make an annual payment to the ruler of Muscat of 40,000 Crowns, and that this payment should be regarded as a subsidy and not as a tribute. It would be unjust to the prosperous state of Zanzibar, exhibiting as it does so much evidence of vitality and such aptitude for self-development, to make it tributary to any foreign sovereign, and especially to one of so effete a state as Muscat. A subsidy, on the other hand, would secure to Syed Thoweynee as much material advantage as he could fairly have expected, under all these circumstances, had he succeeded in dethroning his brother; it being always remembered, as clearly shown by Brigadier Coghlan and Colonel Rigby, that the defeat of Syed Majid would not, as a matter of course, have secured the recognition of Syed Thoweynee as sovereign of all the African dominions of the late Imam."

23. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. DURATION OF SUBSIDY.—With regard to the duration of subsidy, Brigadier Coghlan thus expressed himself—

"A question of considerable importance, touching the duration of this subsidy, here suggests itself. The arrangement, as it stands, has respect to the two brothers only, no provision whatever being made that it should continue in force beyond their own lifetime. But, although the strict letter of all we know of the mutual agreement might be held to sanction that limitation, the grounds upon which the subsidy was first offered by Syed Majid, and the considerations which subsequently induced him to increase the amount to 40,000 Crowns

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per annum, clearly imply that he was negotiating on the part of the Zanzibar State, and that the subsidy was to be a permanent charge on its revenues in behalf of the sovereign of Muscat. The transaction, indeed, as far as I can judge from the evidence adduced, was a family compact, entered into by Syed Thoweynee and Syed Majid as the representatives of their brothers and of the subjects of the two States, whereby it was agreed to divide the sovereignty exercised by their late father into two nearly equal shares,—the Zanzibar State engaging, through Syed Majid, to compensate the Muscat State for the loss which it would sustain by the partition to the extent of 40,000 Crowns per annum."

With regard to this point the Bombay Government observed—

"There are two points to be noticed before the Hon'ble the Governor in Council commits this important question to the final decision of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General:

"1st, is the subsidy to be permanent?

"2nd, is it to be paid with arrears?"

"The Hon'ble the Governor in Council regards the first of these questions as one of peculiar difficulty. The British Government must naturally be reluctant to impose a perpetual burden on Zanzibar, for the purpose of buying off, as it were, a claimant to the sovereignty; but, on a balance of all the considerations which surround the question, this seems the only expedient which can be adopted. Syed Thoweynee can hardly with honor resign the claims of his country—not merely his own claims—for a payment which is to determine with his own life. A temporary assignment from the revenues of Zanzibar would only film over the wound which Muscat sustains by the loss of the African dependencies, and irritation would again break out on Syed Thoweynee's death. By the permanent subsidy, a motive is given to Muscat to abstain from all ambitious movements against its wealthier brother; if that motive was removed, designs on Zanzibar would, from generation to generation, be the great point of honor,—the great centre of intrigue,—to which would converge all the daring and adventurous spirits in Oman. The subsidy will be well spent money, if it preserves Zanzibar from those attacks to which it must otherwise be liable from the needy ambition of Muscat.

"Next as to the arrears. Brigadier Coghlan is of opinion that they should be demanded from Syed Majid. The Hon'ble the Governor in Council will not dispute the conclusion that, in strict justice, Syed Majid is liable to his brother for the arrears, though it is certainly open to question. But as the arrangement under discussion is essentially one of compromise, it should be considered whether the demand is expedient. The Hon'ble the Governor in Council cannot think that it is. It must be remembered that Zanzibar has its financial difficulties as well as Muscat, and it is of obvious policy not to impose any burthens on Syed Majid from which he cannot be reasonably expected to free himself by careful and judicious administration. It is probable that, if not overwhelmed at the outset by extraordinary charges and embarrassments, Zanzibar, by the ordinary progress of a State possessing great materials and facilities for commerce will, at no very distant period, be able to pay the subsidy without any severe strain on its resources, to regard it as a mere premium of insurance; but it cannot be doubted that the payment must for some time be regarded as a heavy burthen, and great care must be taken that the vessel is not swamped at once by overloading. To impose a large liability for arrears on Syed Majid would imperil the stability of the whole arrangement; it would put the heaviest weight on the weakest part; for, as before stated, it is only now and for the next few years that the subsidy will prove an embarrassing burthen to Zanzibar. No pretext should be afforded to either party for breaking the agreement; and, under this view, the Hon'ble the Governor in Council would not recommend that Syed Majid be held liable for more than two years' arrears of subsidy, or 80,000 Crowns. Such a sum will be of material benefit to Syed Thoweynee, and its payment will not be an insuperable difficulty to Syed Majid."

24. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. HIS OPINION AS TO TERMS OF ARBITRATION AND GUARANTEE FOR FULFILMENT THEREOF.—Recapitulating the conclusions arrived at through the foregoing discussions, Brigadier Coghlan wrote—

"I submit the following results as the most equitable terms for settling the existing dispute between the rival parties:

"1st, that Syed Majid should be confirmed in the independent sovereignty over Zanzibar and its African territories:

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"2nd, that, as regards the succession to that sovereignty, neither the ruler of Muscat, nor the tribes of Oman, shall have any right whatever to interfere; but the sovereign of Zanzibar, or the sovereign in conjunction with the people, shall be left absolutely free to make whatever arrangements they may deem expedient for appointing future successors to Syed Majid :

"3rd, that, in consideration of these concessions, Syed Majid shall be bound to remit to Syed Thoweynee the stipulated yearly subsidy of 40,000 Crowns; and, farther, to liquidate all the arrears due on that account since the payment was suspended :

"4th, that this subsidy of 40,000 Crowns per annum shall be a primary and permanent charge on the revenues of the Zanzibar State, payable by the sovereign of that State to the ruling sovereign of Muscat and Oman.

"The liberty accorded me by the Hon'ble the Governor in Council of recommending a fair adjustment of the differences existing between their Highnesses Syed Thoweynee and Syed Majid, has warranted me in submitting these terms as, in my opinion, the best which can be proposed to that end. I do not feel authorised to exceed the limits of my commission by advising any precautionary measures for the due observance of those terms by the rival parties; nevertheless, as it does not appear that the Right Hon'ble the Governor General has undertaken to guarantee that his final arbitration shall be carried out, and as it is more than probable that pretexs will be constantly devised on both sides to evade the obligations imposed by His Lordship's decision,—pretexs which, by re-opening the existing dispute, will entail the most disastrous consequences to the welfare of the two States,—I venture with much diffidence to suggest whether the following subsidiary terms might not be insisted on as a safeguard against such evasions :

"5th, that no cause whatever, other than an open attempt on the part of Syed Thoweynee or his successors to infringe upon the independence of the Zanzibar sovereignty, shall be held to justify Syed Majid or his successors in withholding the stipulated subsidy :

"6th, that in the event of any such attempt being made by the ruler of Muscat, or, on the other hand, in the event of the sovereignty of the Zanzibar State failing, under any plea whatever, to pay the aforesaid subsidy, the aggrieved party shall submit the case to the Viceroy and Governor General of India before proceeding to settle the dispute by an appeal to arms."

25. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. ABILITY OF ZANZIBAR TO PAY THE SUBSIDY.—Syed Majid had, on the 11th September 1860, written to Colonel Rigby representing the inability of his State to pay a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns annually. In forwarding the above to the Bombay Government, Colonel Rigby had entered into a full statement of Syed Majid's pecuniary resources of liabilities. On this subject Brigadier Coghlan wrote—

"I have deemed it desirable to insist on the payment of the subsidy agreed on between the two parties, because various excuses are urged by Syed Majid to evade that obligation. The most reasonable of these is the actual condition of His Highness's finances. On this subject Colonel Rigby writes—'The difficulty arises from the embarrassed state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syed Majid is entirely dependent on the will of his Customs Master for supplies of money, and were he now to bind himself to the payment of an annual sum, and the Customs Master subsequently refuse to advance the amount, Syed Majid might be compelled to break his engagement without any fault of his own.' As an offset, however, against the difficulty, Colonel Rigby subjoins—'But if His Highness could be persuaded to establish a small force of disciplined troops, with a few light guns, in place of the useless rabble now in his pay, and would also get rid of most of the large ships which he now has, and which are of no use whatever, and in place of them keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, it would be a great direct saving to him; and, knowing that he had troops he could rely on, he would feel more independent of the Arabs from the north, and of the Chiefs of tribes amongst whom he squanders so much money.' Syed Majid himself estimates the amount which he pays yearly in gratuities to the northern Arabs at 15,000 Crowns; and Colonel Rigby gives a list of several of the principal Chiefs of Zanzibar, who are subsidised by Syed Majid, and whose aggregate incomes from his treasury exceed 10,000 Crowns per annum. The saving of these sums alone (and there would certainly be no reason for their being continued when once the sovereignty of Zanzibar was secured to

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Syed Majid) would suffice to cover more than one-half of the Muscat subsidy; and if, in addition thereto, His Highness would abstain from other useless expenditure, there can be no doubt that he would be able to meet the obligation with comparative ease. As regards his debts to the Customs Master, amounting to 327,000 Crowns, and those to his orphan brothers, whose share of their father's inheritance he has borrowed to the extent of seven lakhs of crowns, Colonel Rigby, after reviewing Syed Majid's financial position, comes to the conclusion that, with prudence and care, his existing liabilities might soon be paid off.

"But the finances of Syed Thoweynee are comparatively as much embarrassed as those of Syed Majid, and the payment annually of 40,000 Crowns by the latter, considering the capabilities of the Zanzibar territories, will still leave him in better circumstances than the ruler of Muscat.* In fact, without that aid I do not perceive how Syed Thoweynee can continue long to administer the government of Oman. Hence, as so many grave considerations are involved in the prompt and regular payment of the stipulated subsidy, I trust that the Right Hon'ble the Governor General (should His Lordship coincide in the view here taken of the subject) will attach such sanction as he may deem expedient to ensure the faithful discharge of that obligation by His Highness Syed Majid."

26. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. HIS OPINION ON CERTAIN COLLATERAL POINTS.—In the next succeeding paragraphs of his report, Brigadier Coghlan proceeded to consider some collateral points connected with the main subject under discussion :

- (a.)—The propriety or otherwise of providing for the succession to the sovereignty of Zanzibar on the death of Syed Majid, who had no male issue. His remarks on this subject need not be noticed, as the Governor General in his award declined to offer an opinion in the matter.
- (b.)—The claims of the younger children of Syed Saeed at Zanzibar. Syed Thoweynee alleged that Syed Majid had wrongfully assumed the guardianship of these orphans and appropriated their shares in their father's inheritance. Syed Majid acknowledged his liability to them to the extent of seven lakhs of crowns, and justified his use of their property on the ground that he had been appointed a joint executor to his father's will, which will was in the possession of one of the other executors who resided at Mecca. Should this document be forthcoming, said Brigadier Coghlan, there would be an end of the dispute, otherwise Government might afterwards move in the matter to prevent disputes between the brothers.
- (c.)—The course to be pursued with regard to Syed Burgash. Should the independent sovereignty be awarded to Syed Majid, Brigadier Coghlan suggested that Burgash should be permitted to reside at Zanzibar under surveillance of the British Consul.

27. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT. INDEPENDENCE OF SOHAR AND CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS.—Brigadier Coghlan had been directed by Government to make enquiries, both at Muscat and Zanzibar, with regard to the justice of the claim advanced by Syed Toorkee to the independent sovereignty of Sohar. The discussions pertaining to this question belong more properly to the history

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of Muscat, and it need only be briefly noted in the present précis that Brigadier Coghlan decided against the claim, and recommended that Syed Thoweynee should be officially informed of his recognition by the Government of India as the paramount sovereign of Sohar, and an intimation to the same effect being formally made to Syed Toorkee.

Other suggestions made by Brigadier Coghlan were—

- (a) that should Zanzibar be declared a separate State, treaties of commerce and agreements for the suppression of slavery should be concluded separately with both States, inasmuch as the existing treaties had been concluded with Syed Saeed as sovereign of the combined States ;
- (b) that a duly qualified British Agent, well acquainted with Arabic, should be appointed at Muscat, and that he should be independent of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. On this subject the Bombay Government observed that they had already recommended to the Secretary of State the establishment of a Professional Chair of Arabic at one of the English seats of learning.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOMBAY GOVERNMENT.—The Bombay Government suggested, for consideration, the following propositions as offering the best solution of the many difficulties that surrounded the case :

- " I.—That His Highness Syed Majid be declared ruler of Zanzibar and the African dominions of His late Highness Syed Saeed.
- " II.—That the ruler of Zanzibar pay annually to the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns.
- " III.—That His Highness Syed Majid pay to His Highness Syed Thoweynee the arrears of the subsidy for two years, or 80,000 Crowns."

29. AWARD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—The important document (No. 1532, dated 2nd April 1861) conveying to the Bombay Government the decision of the Government of India in the matter referred to them for arbitration, is quoted below *in extenso* :

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 6, dated 15th February, submitting a report by Brigadier Coghlan on the differences existing between His Highness Syed Thoweynee, of Muscat, and His Highness Syed Majid, of Zanzibar, together with a copy of the resolution recorded thereon by the Bombay Government.

* The conditions here referred to are those mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this précis. " In reply, I am directed to state that His Excellency the Governor General in Council agrees to the three conditions of settlement recommended in the resolution of the Bombay Government, paragraph 16.*

" The limitation to 80,000 Crowns of the arrears of subsidy to be paid by Zanzibar to Muscat is expedient, because it names a distinct sum. In the opinion of His Excellency in Council the demand should be made rather in the form of a compromise than as the assertion of a strict right. It is understood, also, that the aggregate amount of the arrears claimable would not much exceed this sum.

" The three conditions will constitute the decision of the Governor General as arbitrator, and it should be impressed upon both parties, at the time of delivering to them the Governor General's letters, that as they have solemnly accepted the arbitration, the Government of India looks to their abiding faithfully by His Excellency's award.

" The annual payment of 40,000 Crowns is not to be understood as a recognition of any dependence of Zanzibar upon Muscat, neither is it to be considered as merely personal between

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desiring to prevent war between kinsmen, I accepted the charge of arbitrator between you, and, in order to obtain the fullest knowledge of all the points in dispute, I directed the Government of Bombay to send an officer to Muscat and Zanzibar to make the necessary inquiries.

"Brigadier Coghlan was selected for this purpose, an officer in whose judgment, intelligence, and impartiality the Government of India reposes the utmost confidence.

"Brigadier Coghlan has submitted a full and clear report of all the questions at issue between Your Highness and your brother.

"I have given my most careful attention to each of these questions.

"The terms of my decision are as follows :

"1st, that His Highness Syed Majid be declared ruler of Zanzibar and the African dominions of His late Highness Syed Saeed ;

"2nd, that the ruler of Zanzibar pay annually to the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns ;

"3rd, that His Highness Syed Majid pay to His Highness Syed Thoweynee the arrears of subsidy for two years, or 80,000 Crowns.

"I am satisfied that these terms are just and honorable to both of you ; and, as you have deliberately and solemnly accepted my arbitration, I shall expect that you will cheerfully and faithfully abide by them, and that they will be carried out without unnecessary delay.

"The annual payment of 40,000 Crowns is not to be understood as a recognition of the dependence of Zanzibar upon Muscat, neither is it to be considered as merely personal between Your Highness and your brother Syed Thoweynee (Majid), it is to extend to your respective successors, and is to be held to be a final and permanent arrangement, compensating the ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances derived from your father, His late Highness Syed Saeed, the venerated friend of the British Government, which two inheritances are to be henceforward distinct and separate."

Due arrangements were made by the Bombay Government for conveying to the parties concerned the decision of the Government of India with regard to the points at issue.

30. RECEPTION OF THE AWARD OF GOVERNMENT AT MUSCAT.—The Revd. C. P. Badger was deputed to Muscat with letter to Syed Thoweynee, who heartily accepted the award of the Government of India. Describing an interview with His Highness, Mr. Badger wrote—

"His Highness then asked whether the British Agent at Zanzibar was empowered to insist upon the terms of the arbitration being fulfilled by Syed Majid. To this I replied that the supreme Government of India had directed the officers who should be charged with communicating the decision of the Right Honorable the Governor General to His Highness and to His Highness's brother, to impress upon them both that they were expected to abide faithfully by His Excellency's award ; and that, although the Government was not bound to enforce the conditions of the arbitration by either party, I nevertheless entertained no doubt that the influence of the British Agent at Zanzibar would be used in a friendly manner to see that the award was duly carried out. Subject to this qualification, I saw no objection to His Highness's proposition that the person whom he might authorize to receive the money from Syed Majid should be recommended to Colonel Rigby's good offices through the British Agent at Muscat, and I accordingly requested Lieutenant Pengeley to communicate with Colonel Rigby in that sense as soon as His Highness should inform him that he had appointed a deputy to treat with Syed Majid on the subject at Zanzibar."

31. RECEPTION OF THE AWARD OF GOVERNMENT AT ZANZIBAR.—The letter to Syed Majid, conveying the decision of Government, was delivered to him by Colonel Rigby. Syed Majid expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the

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terms of the arbitration, but only feared that he would have great difficulty in raising an amount sufficient to pay off the 80,000 Crowns, arrears of subsidy.

As a question was subsequently raised by Syed Majid as to the terms used by him in accepting the award of the Government of India, his letter intimating that acceptance is entered *in extenso* :

"AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—I desire to inform you that I have been very much gratified by the receipt of the letters from His Lordship the Governor General of India and His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, conveying to me the intelligence of the settlement of the disputes which existed between myself and my brother, Thoweynee bin Saeed, and regarding the decision that I shall pay to my brother, Thoweynee, the sum of 40,000 Crowns annually, and also the sum of 80,000 Crowns on account of arrears for two years. I agree to pay these sums, and I accept and am satisfied with the terms of the decision, and they are binding on me. And it is the desire of the British Government (*Jamab-el-Sirkar*) that each of us, that is myself and my brother, Thoweynee, shall be independent of each other in his own dominions, and Sultan over his own subjects; that is to say, that Zanzibar and the islands (Pemba and Monfa) and the dominions on the continent of Africa dependent upon it shall be subject to me, and that Muscat and its dependencies, with the land of Oman, shall be subject to my brother, Thoweynee bin Saeed; and that we shall dwell in peace and friendly alliance the one with the other, as is customary between brothers. I pray that it may be so, if it please God. I feel very much obliged to the British Government for all its kindness and favor, and for having averted from my dominions disorders and hostilities. During my lifetime I shall never forget the kindness which it has shown to me.

"And now what I desire from you is this, that you will mention to His Lordship the Governor General of India that he should kindly determine that the payment of the 40,000 Crowns per annum to my brother, Thoweynee, shall be settled as follows, *viz.*, that 20,000 Crowns shall be due and payable each year at the 'Mousim' (about April, when the south-west monsoon sets in), and that the other 20,000 Crowns shall be due and payable each year at the 'Damaui' (about September-October, when the annual accounts are made up and the revenue from the customs is paid), in like manner as I before agreed to do when I made the arrangement through my cousin, Mahomed bin Salem, to pay 40,000 Crowns annually to Muscat.

"And respecting the 80,000 Crowns arrears for two years, that it shall be paid as soon as I can possibly do so.

"This I desire in order that there may be no grounds of dispute hereafter.

"This is what I wish for from the friendship of the Government.

"And for whatsoever you may desire from me the sign is with you.

"From the confiding slave in God's mercy,

"(Signed) MAJID BIN SAEED.

"Written on the 19th day of the month of Zilhuz, in the year 1277 of the Hegira—corresponding to the 29th June A. D. 1861."

32. APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH AGENT AT MUSCAT.—Acting on the sanction of the supreme Government, the Government of Bombay appointed Lieutenant Pengelley, of the Indian Navy, British Agent at Muscat, on a salary of Rs. 600 per month, with Rs. 100 as an allowance for a writer and boat hire. The following extract from the instructions which were communicated to the agent by the Bombay Government relates to his duties as regards the relations of Muscat with Zanzibar :

"His Excellency in Council feels sure that you will always bear in mind the bond of friendship which has for so long a period existed between the Chiefs of Muscat and the British Government; that you will employ your utmost influence in cultivating between Muscat, Zanzibar, and Sohar those amicable feelings towards the establishment of which so much pains are being taken by the Government of Bombay and the Government of India."

(Proceedings, A., April 1861, Nos. 34-45.)

(" " August 1861, " 226-232.)

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The Proceedings above-noted were reported to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 165, dated 8th October 1861.

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character of the arrangement, were futile and utterly untenable. It was further shown that his second argument was equally weak, Syed Salem being, as a matter of fact, in possession of the government of Muscat and having been recognized by the British Government. The letter concluded—

"Every such successor, being of the dynasty of Syed Thoweynee, is entitled, under the provision above-quoted, to claim the established subsidy from Zanzibar, and I cannot admit the validity of Your Highness's objection.

"My Friend,—It is incumbent upon Your Highness to meet this obligation; and I expect Your Highness, without further demur and at once, to discharge the claims of Muscat."

In submitting the representations of Syed Majid, Dr. Seward, while admitting the equity of the Muscat claim on Zanzibar, adduced arguments, which were not without a certain force, based on the grounds of expediency, for countenancing the lapse of the subsidy. He observed—

"Should the Government determine otherwise it must remain a living germ of quarrel, destined inevitably to reproduce those very troubles of the past to which the arbiters essayed to put an end. Add to this the hopelessness of any long obedience to an award, which gives upon a rising State a perpetual debt without providing a single safeguard for its discharge, and we have already two strong reasons for following this course."

Again—

"May not the Government aptly use Syed Salem's crime as the edge and opportunity wherewith to sever the last remaining link between the two Sultanats?"

"Now the subsidy is an ever-threatening source of discord. It is the direct interest of the ruler of Zanzibar to impel Muscat to some act of aggression, which may be her justification for withholding the subsidy.

"This can only be effected by veiled intrigue, for the aim must ever be to cause Muscat to sin, whilst Zanzibar rests tranquil in seeming sinlessness."

* * * * *

"Muscat must always be unsettled whilst her adversary (because her subsidizer) has such cause for exciting disorder, and she would positively gain by the removal of this last pretext for the aggression of Zanzibar intrigues.

"It tends, moreover, to fix the attention of Zanzibar on Muscat, gives it an unwholesome itching to meddle with its politics, keeps alive an ambition that were better dead, that for the reunion of Oman to Zanzibar, sustains an injurious correspondence between disaffected partisans, and maintains that cohesion and close relation between either capital, which, amongst other resultant evils, facilitates and vitalizes the international slave traffic."

Dr. Seward's proposal was that Zanzibar should withhold, and Muscat waive all claim to, the subsidy as the "blood money" of Syed Thoweynee; all old scores being thus cleared, there was to be peace between the two States. These arguments were not noticed by the Government of India in their reply.—(*Political, A., May 1867, Nos. 137-140*). The above correspondence was forwarded to the Secretary of State by despatch No. 107, dated 22nd June 1867.

36. SYED MAJID EXPRESSES WILLINGNESS TO PAY SUBSIDY THROUGH THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT.—On receipt of the letter from the Government of India, insisting on the continuance of the subsidy, Syed Majid, though still protesting at being compelled to pay anything to a paricide, expressed himself willing to pay the amount to the Bombay Government, and arrangements were accordingly made by him for liquidating the arrears due. The Government of India, in a letter addressed to the Sultan, intimated their consent to the proposal of the Sultan that the subsidy should be paid through the Bombay Government.—(*Political, A., December 1867, Nos. 130-134*). The above correspondence was reported to the Secretary of State by despatch No. 8, dated 14th January 1868.

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37. MR. CHURCHILL PROMISES TO SUPPORT THE SULTAN IN HIS APPEAL AGAINST PAYMENT OF SUBSIDY.—Mr. Churchill, who had taken up the appointment of Political Agent and Consul at Zanzibar about the middle of 1867, in reporting the negotiations conducted by him with a view of obtaining certain concessions regarding the slave trade, informed Government that the Sultan was willing to make the concessions required, provided he might be allowed to revenge himself on Syed Salem, or to discontinue payment of the subsidy. Mr. Churchill addressed a very proper remonstrance to the Sultan against permitting himself to be carried away by a spirit of revenge, and then proceeded to make a further communication to him, which will be related in Mr. Churchill's own words:

"If, I added, it so happened that the throne of Muscat became vacant by the death of Salem, then it might become a matter for consideration whether it would not be politic to allow him, Syed Majid, to rule over Muscat as well as Zanzibar; but that would necessarily depend very much on the manner in which he governed his own State. In the meantime, with regard to his final demand, namely, that the State of Zanzibar should henceforth be totally separated from that of Muscat, and that all claims between them should be disallowed, I begged to assure him of my hearty support."

The Bombay Government, on receiving this unlooked for announcement of Mr. Churchill's proceedings, passed the following resolution on the subject, which met with the entire concurrence of the Government of India:

"Mr. Churchill should be informed that, however desirous the Government may be to enter into arrangements with the Sultan which shall have the effect of discouraging and limiting the traffic in slaves, it is no part of his duty to hold out, as inducements to the Sultan, the probability of concessions being made to him, which the Government has given the agent not the slightest authority to discuss. In the present instance the concessions he has entertained the consideration of are impossible; they are contrary to the policy which the Government has adhered to as regards a union of the two States, and to the express decision of the Government of India as regards the subsidy. And, moreover, the subsidy itself has been made the subject of special arrangement with the Sultan of Muscat in the late convention as regards Syed Toorkee. Mr. Churchill should take an opportunity of informing the Sultan clearly on these points, and state that a negotiation on the basis suggested was wholly unauthorized." (Political, A., February 1868, Nos. 174-176.)

38. PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT OF AWARD BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—An advance of Dollars 40,000 to Syed Salem, repayable from the Zanzibar subsidy, had been sanctioned by Government in 1867. On being informed of this, Syed Majid addressed Mr. Churchill to the effect that he had not yet acknowledged the payment of the subsidy to Syed Salem.

His letter continued—

"What we said in our former letter in reply to yours, was that if Government insisted on our paying this subsidy, our agent in Bombay should pay it to the Honorable Government, and the latter might do as it liked with it, but if it so please the Honorable Government to make our money over to Salem we shall consider ourselves to have been ill used, and our claim in this matter shall not rest there."

Mr. Churchill attempted to undo as well as he could the mischief he had caused by his previous indiscreet assurances, by representing the matter of the subsidy in its proper light as a matter between State and State, and not between Syed Majid and his brother.—(Political, A., May 1868, Nos. 55-56.) The correspondence was reported to the Secretary of State by despatch No. 69, dated 27th April 1868, and it was said—

"To whatever source it is due, we are clearly of opinion that this refusal to execute an agreement guaranteed by the Government of India should be permitted to continue no longer.

"So great are the necessities of the Sultan of Muscat, due partly to the Zanzibar subsidy having been so long withheld, that the Resident in the Persian Gulf has been compelled to advance no less than Rs. 1,08,884 in anticipation of the payment of that subsidy.

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"We propose, therefore, with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, to address the Sultan of Zanzibar once more on the subject of the subsidy, telling him in plain terms that the payment will be insisted on. And in case he still refuses, we would propose the despatch of a man-of-war to blockade his port."

39. VIEWS OF HOME GOVERNMENT ON THE SUBSIDY QUESTION. WITHDRAWAL OF POLITICAL AGENCY FROM THE CONTROL OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT SUGGESTED.—In the meantime a despatch (No. 20, dated 15th February 1868) had been received from the Secretary of State on the general question of the subsidy. The English Foreign Office had expressed a wish to be informed whether, apart from the consideration that the treaty, which stipulates for the payment of a subsidy by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Sultan of Muscat, was negotiated under the auspices of the Indian Government.

"There are many Indian interests involved in the political relations between Zanzibar and Muscat, which render it advisable for the British Government to require the Sultan of Zanzibar to continue the payment of the subsidy to Muscat."

Should Indian interests not require the enforcement of the payment, the Foreign Office observed—

"There are considerations enonected with imperial interests which would seem to Lord Stanley to warrant our leaving the Sultan free to act as he may think fit in this matter."

These considerations were connected with the suppression of the slave trade, in order to effect which it was necessary to put a stop to the carriage of slaves coastwise from one part of the Sultan's dominions to another, and also to limit the number of slaves imported into Zanzibar, with the view, if possible, eventually to put a stop to the importation entirely.

"But, continued the Foreign Office, it cannot be expected that Sultan Majid will make the requisite concessions in this matter, unless some means are found to compensate him for the diminished income, which must necessarily be the consequence of his losing the capitation tax on slaves introduced into Zanzibar.

"This loss would, however, be in a great measure made up to him, if he were not compelled to pay the subsidy of 40,000 Dollars annually to the Sultan of Muscat; and, considering the conduct and character of that Chief, Lord Stanley is of opinion that Her Majesty's Government would be perfectly justified in declining to use their influence to compel Sultan Majid to continue the payment of this subsidy, and more especially as the Sultan of Muscat has not kept his treaty engagements with us for the suppression of the slave trade, his own vessels having been captured by British cruisers engaged in the traffic of slaves."

In forwarding a copy of the Foreign Office communication, the Secretary of State wrote—

"I avail myself of this opportunity to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have had for some time under their consideration the question of the control of British relations with the Chiefs of Oman and the Sultan of Zanzibar. Much correspondence has at different periods taken place between the Foreign Office and the India Office on the subject. The discussion has recently been renewed, and it appears to me now to be more than ever desirable that the matter should be placed permanently on such a footing as may conduce most advantageously to the public interests, whilst removing departmental uncertainties and inconsistencies, which may, in practice, lead to considerable embarrassments. In furtherance of this object, I am anxious to obtain from you an expression of Your Excellency's opinion.

"You are aware that the agent at Zanzibar, who is an officer of the Bombay Government, is also Her Majesty's Consul at that place, and in that capacity he corresponds with, and receives instructions from, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"The Agent at Muscat, who is an officer of the Bombay Government, also holds a consular commission from Her Majesty. His correspondence is conducted wholly with the Bombay Government, from whom he receives his instructions. He has no direct communication with the Foreign Office.

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"The salaries of both these officers are, as Your Excellency is aware, paid entirely from the Indian revenues.

"I need not inform Your Excellency that the Agent and Consul at Zanzibar receives instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, mainly because an important part of the business which comes before him is connected with the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa. It is obvious that the regulation of the measures to be taken for the prevention of this traffic must rest undividedly with Her Majesty's Government, as represented by the Foreign Department. Questions also have arisen in connexion with the action of other European powers in that part of the world, which must be submitted for the decision of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"But, although there are substantial grounds for this partial control by the Foreign Office of an officer holding a situation under the Indian Government, it is not the less apparent that this state of things is attended with considerable inconvenience. It engenders inconsistency of action, and conflicts of authority. It has happened, on some occasions, that the Agent at Zanzibar has received contradictory instructions from the Bombay Government and from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which have placed him in an embarrassing position. The commanders of Her Majesty's vessels in these waters are also subject to the receipt of inconsistent orders from the authorities in India and in England.

"I am anxious, therefore, to be informed whether, in Your Excellency's opinion, there are any political and commercial questions, arising out of the relations between India and Zanzibar, of sufficient importance to render it necessary that any controlling authority should be exercised by the Indian Government. I am well aware of the large body of British Indian subjects continually trading with, or settled in, the Zanzibar country; but I do not see that this suggests anything more than a reason why a contribution from the Indian treasury should be made towards the cost of the consular establishment.

"I am not forgetful of the intimate relations between the Chiefs of Zanzibar and Muscat, or of the references made from time to time to the British Government upon points connected with mutual obligations contracted by them under our arbitrations, references of which the papers now forwarded to us furnish a suitable illustration. It is essential that, in dealing with these questions, the officers of the British Government should display no want of harmony among themselves; but it is to be apprehended that, if the Zanzibar and Muscat agencies were under different controlling authorities, it might be difficult to maintain that entire unity of sentiment and consistency of action which should be apparent in all our dealings with the Chiefs of Oman. I wish, therefore, to be favored with Your Excellency's opinion as to whether the disadvantages likely to arise from separation are such as to outweigh any benefits that may arise from placing the Zanzibar agency entirely under the control of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."

40. REPLY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. WITHDRAWAL OF AGENCY FROM CONTROL OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT OPPOSED.—The reply of the Government of India (despatch No. 81, dated 14th May 1868) to the above despatch is quoted *in extenso* :

"We have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your political despatch No. 20, dated 15th February 1868, submitting, for our consideration, a copy of a letter addressed to you by direction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which questions of much importance are raised regarding the future relations between Zanzibar and Muscat, and the position of the Political Agent and British Consul at Zanzibar.

"In our despatch No. 8 of 14th January, Her Majesty's Government have already been informed of our decision that the payment of the annual subsidy of dollars 40,000 to Muscat is a delegation which the Chief of Zanzibar is bound to discharge; and we are of opinion that no evasion of this obligation could be countenanced by the British Government without prejudice to our good faith and the risk of serious political complications in the Persian Gulf.

"The award given by Lord Canning in 1861 was expressly declared not to be a temporary arrangement, but to be binding on the successors of the then ruling Chiefs of Zanzibar and Muscat, and to be a final and permanent arrangement, compensating the ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances 'derived from' His late Highness Syed Saeed, which two inheritances were thenceforth to be distinct and separate. The negotiations which resulted in this award were undertaken at a time when Syed Thoweynee, of Muscat, had actually started on an expedition against Zanzibar, in which there was every prospect of his being successful, but which he was

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induced to abandon solely on the promise of the British Government to effect a just settlement of his claims. If it is to be left to the option of the Sultan of Zanzibar to evade fulfilment of an award so unequivocal in its terms and concluded under such circumstances, it appears to us that the moral influence of our political officers in the Persian Gulf will be weakened, the Chiefs of the Oman coast will prefer seeking the adjustment of their quarrels by the sword to relying on the mediation of the British Government, and there will be danger of a relapse to the state of anarchy in the Persian Gulf, which it has cost many years of negotiation and not a little bloodshed to put down.

"The annual subsidy, moreover, was intended as compensation to Muscat for the loss of valuable claims in Zanzibar, from which its revenues could be recruited. The State of Muscat is poor, and if the Zanzibar subsidy be withheld, it will be difficult and probably impossible for the Sultan to maintain a settled government, or preserve his position against Wahabee influence, which even now it is difficult to resist. The efforts of the British Government to preserve the peace of the Persian Gulf and suppress piratical aggressions, which are liable to occur at all times, and more especially where Wahabee influence is felt, are intimately bound up with the establishment of a firm government at Muscat, and we strongly deprecate the adoption of any measures tending to weaken the authority of the Sultan.

"With respect to the character and conduct of the Sultan of Muscat, it has never been satisfactorily proved that he murdered his father, Syed Thoweynee; and, however grave may be the suspicion that he did so, that suspicion can furnish no ground on which we can countenance the withholding of any of the right appertaining to him as Chief of Muscat after we have formally recognized him as ruler of that principality. If we once admit the propriety of the refusal of the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay the subsidy, on the ground of the misconduct of the Chief of Muscat, to be consistent, it would be incumbent on us to retrace our steps and deny the right of Syed Salem to the throne of Muscat. In point of fact, however, we did not allow, as we ought not to allow the personal merits or demerits of Syed Salem to weigh in our consideration of the question of his recognition. Our duty is to support that ruler whom the subordinate Chiefs and people have chosen for their head, and, so long as he can maintain his position, we are bound on broad grounds of policy to give Syed Salem at any rate our moral support.


"Having regard to the position of Zanzibar and its general relations to India, and to the tribes on the shores of the Indian Sea, it appears to us that the Political Agent there ought to be under the Government of Bombay, subject to the control of the Government of India, rather than under the Foreign Office; and that the agent should be chosen by the Government of Bombay, who have the best opportunities for making a good selection. Indeed, it would, in our opinion, be better that the present anomalous state of things, and the inconveniences alluded to in paragraph 7 of your despatch, should continue than that the control of political affairs at Zanzibar should be entirely transferred to the Foreign Office, which could not take cognizance of cases affecting the interests of Indian subjects, and subjects of neighbouring allied States, with the rapidity and convenience that are desirable.

"At the same time we are of opinion that the inconveniences arising from double references, and the risk of conflicting orders, would be best obviated by causing the Agent at Zanzibar to discontinue his direct communication with the Foreign Office. No real loss of time would ensue from the transmission of communications affecting European subjects through the Bombay Government; and there can, in our opinion, be no more reason for direct communication with the Foreign Office from Zanzibar, than from Muscat, where the Agent enjoys no such privilege. On the other hand, if Muscat be under the Government of India, and Zanzibar be under the Foreign Office, there will not only be a conflict of directions, but sooner or later also a probable conflict of policy."

To the above despatch the Duke of Argyll replied (No. 28, dated 18th February 1869) to the effect, that the whole question of the superintendence of the affairs of the Persian Gulf and of the East Coast of Africa was under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to the rectification of the existing system which was admitted on all sides "to be fraught with much public inconvenience and embarrassment." In the meanwhile the Secretary of State observed that, if the Political Agent at Zanzibar failed in reporting to the Bombay Government all matters connected with the agency as distinct from the consulate, he should be severely censured.

"He is an officer for the time being of the Bombay Government, whatever may be his antecedents, and the Governor of Bombay can at any time remove him and appoint another person in his place."

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The Secretary of State observed that, since the date of his despatch No. 20, dated 15th February 1868, he had learnt that the Agent at Muscat, in virtue of his consular office, communicated directly with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

41. ARREARS OF SUBSIDY PAID BY ZANZIBAR.—On the 18th May 1868 the Bombay Government reported that the arrears of subsidy due by Zanzibar to Muscat, amounting to Rs. 1,68,000, being the equivalent of Dollars 80,000, had been paid into the Bombay General Treasury by Jairam Sewjee, the Zanzibar Sultan's agent. The Bombay Government was thereupon directed to remit the amount, through Colonel Pelly, to the Sultan of Muscat, after deducting the advances already made to His Highness. As, however, there was a British Treasury at Muscat, the Bombay Government wrote that it had been arranged to remit the amount direct to the Political Agent at that place. The Secretary of State was duly informed of the payment.—(*Political, A., June 1868, Nos. 32-35 ; Political, A., July 1868, Nos. 46-48.*)

On receiving the arrears of subsidy, the Political Agent, Muscat, pointed out that the Zanzibar Agent had paid in the amount at a rate of exchange which had caused a loss to Syed Salem of Rs. 6,000. Certain arrangements sanctioned by Government about that time for carrying on the operations of the Muscat Treasury were adopted partly with the view of obviating the evil complained of.—(*Political, A., September 1868, Nos. 296-295.*)

42. MISSION SENT BY SULTAN TO ENGLAND TO REMONSTRATE AGAINST PAYMENT OF SUBSIDY.—Towards the end of 1868 intimation was received from Mr. Churchill of the intended deputation of a mission from Zanzibar to England, in order to make certain representation to Her Majesty's Government against the payment of the subsidy. The Sultan informed Mr. Churchill that he would make the next half-yearly payment, which was due in September, only under protest.—(*Political, A., November 1868, Nos. 172-173.*)

43. SECOND DESPATCH EMBODYING VIEWS OF HOME GOVERNMENT. SUGGESTED PAYMENT FROM INDIAN REVENUES OF SUBSIDY TO MUSCAT.—A second despatch from the Secretary of State (No. 1, dated 6th January), on the subject of the subsidy, was received in the beginning of 1869. It was written after the Sultan of Zanzibar had sent the above-mentioned mission to England; after Mr. Churchill, the Political Agent and Consul, had personally represented to Her Majesty's Government that, by ceasing to enforce payment, the British Government could purchase from the Sultan concessions which would enable our cruisers to deal effectively with the slave trade, and, lastly, after the second revolution at Muscat, which had resulted in the expulsion of Syed Salem by Azan bin Ghes, brother-in-law of the ex-Sultan.

It was as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government have long had under their consideration the complicated state of affairs in the Persian Gulf and on the East Coast of Africa, arising in no small measure from the political relations between the Chiefs of Oman (the Sultan of Muscat and the Sultan of Zanzibar). Recent events have raised the question as to how far the honor of the British Government is committed, in the altered circumstances of the case, to the maintenance of those arrangements between the two rulers, which hitherto we appear to have enforced.

"Your Excellency's Government is aware that, in the year 1860-61, the Governor General and Viceroy consented to arbitrate between Syed Thowaynee, the ruler of Muscat, and Syed

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Majid, the ruler of Zanzibar, who were brothers, and that, after a searching enquiry and elaborate report by Brigadier Coghlan, Lord Canning, in communication with the Governor of Bombay (Sir George Clerk), determined that it would be just that Syed Majid should be maintained as ruler of Zanzibar, and that 'the ruler of Zanzibar should pay annually to the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns.' Announcing this reward to the two Chiefs, Lord Canning wrote to each of them saying—'I am satisfied that these terms are just and honorable to both of you; and as you have deliberately and solemnly accepted my arbitration, I expect that you will faithfully and cheerfully abide by them, and that they will be carried out without unnecessary delay. The annual payment of 40,000 Crowns is not to be understood as merely personal between Your Highness and your brother, Syed {Thoweynee} {Majid}. It is to extend to your respective successors, and is to be held to be a final and permanent arrangement, compensating the ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances.'

"It is clear, from these words, that the subsidy was not intended to be merely personal, but was to be paid at least to the successors of the Sultan of Muscat. But it is not equally clear, since the contemplated succession was spoken of as an 'inheritance,' whether the subsidy is still to be considered as due from Zanzibar, whatever changes or revolutions may occur in the ruling power in Muscat.

"Two such changes have already taken place. In 1866 the Sultan of Muscat, Syed Thoweynee, died, under circumstances which left little doubt of the fact that he had been put to death by his son, Syed Salem, who was then declared Sultan in the place of his father. Your Excellency's Government recognized him as the *de facto* ruler of Muscat; and, although some question was naturally raised as to whether the Sultan could justly be called upon to recognize the legitimacy of this succession, your Government enforced the continued payment of the subsidy by that ruler. I now learn that another and more complete revolution has taken place at Muscat, and that Syed Salem has been deposed. His successor is Syed Azan bin Ghes, brother-in-law of the ex-Sultan. But the power by which he is represented to have succeeded in possessing himself of Muscat, is said to be of the nature of a foreign power; and the result seems to have been, in fact, the conquest of Muscat by the Wahabee Arabs of the interior. I assume, however, that in the event of Syed Azan finally establishing his authority at Muscat, he will be recognized as the *de facto* ruler of that country; but I do not know whether, in your view, it would follow from such recognition as a necessary consequence that he would be entitled to the rights guaranteed under British arbitration to Syed Thoweynee and his successors.

"Her Majesty's Government, at all events, cannot be surprised that the Sultan of Zanzibar should be encouraged by violent changes of this kind, which, he declares to be illegal usurpations, to assert his right to be relieved from the payment of the subsidy to Muscat. This charge presses severely upon his limited revenues, and he frequently alleges it as a reason why he is unable, to the full extent desired by us, to suppress the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa. He has recently had, as Your Excellency is aware, a mission in this country charged with the duty of representing his case to Her Majesty's Government, and soliciting, on the part of His Highness, relief from the payment of the subsidy, in return for which he professes his willingness to abandon the revenues derived from the slave trade, and to enter into a new treaty with the British Government respecting the prohibition of the traffic—an object which Her Majesty's Government have long been anxious to attain.

"Two questions, however, arise with respect to this proposal,—the first is, 'How far is the faith of the British Government in India pledged to enforce payment of the subsidy by the Sultan of Zanzibar?' and the second is, 'Supposing us to be free in this matter, so far as our honor is concerned, how far have we any political interest in desiring that it should continue to be paid?'

"As regards the first of these questions, I have to observe that an arbiter, as such, does not necessarily bind himself to enforce his awards; but under the circumstances which have hitherto existed, we appear to have undertaken this duty; nevertheless, it may well be open to serious doubt whether we should continue to do so. It appears to me that there is much to be said in favor of the claim advanced on behalf of the Sultan of Zanzibar, to the effect that the recent revolutions in Muscat have so entirely changed his relations to its ruler that he ought no longer to be compelled to pay the subsidy. Were it not for our interference, this question would probably be decided by war; but we forbid war between the two States, because of the danger it involves to the peace and safety of the seas. If we do this, it appears to me that we ought to construe very strictly the original contract, which was imposed by us under very different circumstances, and that we are not justified in enforcing by our superior power the continued payment of this contribution by Zanzibar, if there is any reasonable

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doubt of the construction to be put on Lord Canning's award, and if the Government of Muscat has now ceased to be, in any sense, a part of the inheritance of the Sultan, to whom it was originally due. It might even be argued, with some force, that if we consider our honor pledged to this payment and refuse to allow the Sultan of Zanzibar to get rid of it by war, we ought to take the payment on ourselves, and to make it a charge on the revenues of India.

"Secondly, as regards any object of policy that we may have in connexion with this question, I apprehend that we can have no other interest in maintaining existing relations between Muscat and Zanzibar than this,—that it has been considered desirable that the ruler of Muscat should be sufficiently strong to exercise some substantive power and authority in the Persian Gulf for the protection of commerce and the support generally of the police of those waters. The withdrawal of the subsidy, moreover, may possibly induce, or even compel, the Sultan of Muscat to resort to, or connive at, illegitimate methods of increasing his revenues, and, perhaps, to prosecute hostilities against Zanzibar for the recovery of what he has lost. On the other hand, if Muscat is now conquered and governed by the Wahabee Arabs, they may make the State stronger than it has ever been before, and wholly independent of the subsidy which has hitherto been paid by Zanzibar.

"If, then, on a careful review of all the circumstances of the case as above indicated, it should be thought that the honor of the British Government, notwithstanding all changes in the government of Muscat, is committed to the continued enforcement of the payment of the subsidy by Zanzibar, it may be considered whether, by taking the payment upon ourselves, we might secure adequate advantages on the side both of Muscat and of Zanzibar to compensate us for the sacrifice. On the side of Muscat we might obtain important conditions, as regards the peace and security of the Persian Gulf, which would amount to an equivalent to the money expended; and, on the side of Zanzibar, by relieving the Sultan from the payment of the subsidy, we might obtain concessions in respect of the slave trade, to which Her Majesty's Government attach a high value. But I should be disposed to take the payment of the subsidy on ourselves only in the case of our honor being very clearly committed to its continuance, and in the case also of the payment being substantially useful to our interests in the Persian Gulf. On a former occasion Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated unreservedly his inability to recommend the Lords of the Treasury to make an annual payment to Zanzibar, with a view to the suppression of the slave trade, equal to the amount of the subsidy. If, therefore, such a payment is to be undertaken by the British Government, it must be made a charge upon the revenues of India, and this could only be done with propriety, so long as the payment is advantageous to India, by preventing serious complications in the Persian Gulf, and thus relieving our Government from expenditure which otherwise might be incurred.

"With reference to these considerations I have to request that, at your earliest possible convenience, you will furnish me with the views of Your Excellency's Government with respect to the effect of the recent changes in the government of Muscat upon the relations between that State and Zanzibar, and the more general question of the construction which it behoves our Government to place upon the word 'successors' in the letter addressed by the Viceroy of India to the Chiefs of Muscat and Zanzibar, as quoted in a former paragraph of this despatch. It is obvious that this question, if not now set at rest, is likely to be one of very frequent recurrence, and that, until it is placed on such a footing as will prevent continual references to Her Majesty's Government on the subject, much inconvenience and embarrassment must arise both in this country and in India. I am anxious, therefore, that it should be finally disposed of with the least possible delay; but before passing any final orders on the subject, I wish to receive from Your Excellency's Government a full exposition of your views as bearing on the several points indicated in this despatch."

44. OPINION OF THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT ON POINTS NOTICED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Government of India requested the Bombay Government to express their views thereon.—(*Political, A, February 1869, Nos. 50-51.*)

On the 6th March the Duke of Argyll telegraphed asking the Viceroy to telegraph the substance of his "views as to maintenance of Zanzibar subsidy in present state of Muscat affairs."

The reply (No. 86, dated 10th March 1869) from the Bombay Government was as follows:

"The first question is, how far the faith of the British Government in India is pledged to enforce payment of the subsidy by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the present ruler of Muscat.

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"It is suggested that, although it was expressly stated in Lord Canning's award that the annual payment of 40,000 Crowns was not to be understood as merely personal between the two Sultans, Majid and Thoweynee, but was to extend to their respective successors, yet the fact of the term 'inheritances' being applied to the possessions of the two Sultans, the inequality in which was to be adjusted by the annual payment, makes it doubtful whether the subsidy should still be considered as due from Zanzibar after the changes which have occurred in the ruling power at Muscat.

"If this question is to be settled by a reference to the intention of Lord Canning, so far as this can be ascertained, it will be difficult to support the view that the term 'successors' should be interpreted with the limitation suggested. It was shown by General Coghlan that constitutionally there could not be such a thing as a succession by inheritance to the Sultanat of either Muscat or Zanzibar, the validity of each succession being dependent on the will of the Arab tribes. Moreover, the question of the succession to Syed Majid was discussed and was disposed of by the Government of India saying that to offer any opinion about the rule of succession in Zanzibar would be travelling beyond the bounds of the question submitted for arbitration.—(Vide paragraph 6 of Government of India's letter No. 1532 of 2nd April 1861.)

"As further showing that the term 'successors' was used without any limitation as to the mode of succession, it may be noted that the permanency of the subsidy was made an article of the award rather out of policy than as settling any point in the dispute between the two Sultans. The dispute which led to the arbitration arose out of an arrangement for the payment of the subsidy of which General Coghlan wrote in his paragraph . . . 'The arrangement, as it stands, has respect to the two brothers only, no provision whatever being made that it should continue in force beyond their own life-time.' And he added that 'the strict letter of all we know of the mutual agreement might be held to sanction that limitation;' but he then goes on to argue that the arrangement ought to have been made as between the two States, and not merely as between the two brothers, Majid and Thoweynee. And this view was adopted by the Bombay Government, who wrote in paragraph 14 of their resolution—'Syed Thoweynee can hardly with honor resign the claims of his country, not merely his own claims for a payment which is to determine with his own life.' It is clear, therefore, that the British Government, holding that it was for the true interests of both States that a permanent motive should be given to Muscat to abstain from ambitious movements against Zanzibar, and holding, also, that it was for their own interests that the power of Muscat in the Persian Gulf should be permanently increased by the subsidy from Zanzibar, supplemented the arrangement made between the two brothers by declaring that it should hold good between their successors as well as between themselves.

"It must be observed, further, that in stating the terms which he submitted for adoption in order to settle the dispute between the two Sultans, General Coghlan did not use the word 'inheritances,' or any expression tending to limit his recommendation to an arrangement between families of the two Sultans; and the Government of Bombay, in submitting their opinion to the Government of India in accordance with General Coghlan's recommendations, in the same manner evidently contemplated a permanent arrangement in no way dependant on any question of succession by inheritance as regards either Oman or Zanzibar. General Coghlan, indeed, suggested, in order to prevent any re-opening of the dispute between the two States, that the Government of India should insist upon a subsidiary term being adopted, to the effect that no cause whatever, other than an open attempt on the part of Syed Thoweynee or his successors, to infringe the independence of Zanzibar sovereignty, should be held to justify Syed Majid, or his successors, in withholding the stipulated subsidy.

"In dealing with the third paragraph of the Secretary of State's letter, it appears to His Excellency in Council that His Grace is under some misapprehension as to what has lately occurred at Muscat. His Excellency in Council thinks that he is premature in considering that Syed Azan bin Ghes can be considered as the successor of Syed Salem, although, for the present, he appears to have partially established himself at Muscat, and at any rate the revolution which has taken place cannot be considered as a conquest of Muscat by the Wahabee Arab of the interior. Although holding some religious tenets in common with them, he is, on the contrary, hostile to the Wahabee power, and it is probable that, if the deposed Sultan regains power, it will be owing to Wahabee aid.

"Without therefore going so far as to say that it is impossible that any such changes or revolutions should occur in the ruling power of Muscat as to render the decision of Lord

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Canning inapplicable, His Excellency in Council is clearly of opinion that, under the circumstances which now exist, the subsidy has not ceased to be legally payable according to the terms of the arbitration.

"The question how far the faith of the British Government in India is pledged to enforce the payment of the subsidy by the Sultan of Zanzibar, as stated in paragraph 6 of the Secretary of State's despatch, does not present itself to His Excellency in Council exactly in the form stated in paragraph 7. The Secretary of State intimates that the question will arise as to whether the Government would be justified in refusing to allow the Sultan of Zanzibar to get rid of his liability to pay the subsidy by war. It is probable, however, that, if British compulsion were removed, the Sultan of Zanzibar would simply cease paying the subsidy, and the question which the Government would have to decide would be whether they would be justified in refusing to the Sultan of Muscat the opportunity of enforcing his rights by war. His Excellency in Council is of opinion that in such a refusal the Government would not be justified. In connection with this subject, I am directed to draw attention to a letter No. 523 of 20th November last, from the Acting Political Agent at Muscat, herewith enclosed.

"As regards the second of the two questions stated by the Secretary of State in his 6th paragraph, namely, how far we have any political interest in desiring that the subsidy should continue to be paid, it appears to His Excellency in Council that the same reasons which existed when the arrangement was made exist now, and, therefore, as a matter of policy, the payment of the subsidy to Muscat ought to be continued.

"The question then arises whether we ought to take this payment on ourselves. In his 9th paragraph the Secretary of State suggests that by doing so we might secure adequate advantage on the side both of Zanzibar and Muscat to compensate us for the sacrifice. He adds that the payment, if assumed by us, would be a charge on the Indian revenues.

"The advantage to be gained as regards Zanzibar is certain concessions in respect to the trade to which Her Majesty's Government attach a high value. But it appears to His Excellency in Council that this is so clearly an object of imperial interest that the revenues of India could not be justly charged with any payment in order to secure it, and His Excellency in Council would add that he believes this is the first time that a proposition has been made to burden the Indian revenues for such an object.

"On the side of Muscat the Secretary of State intimates that we might obtain important conditions as regards the peace and security of the Persian Gulf, which would amount to an equivalent of the money expended. His Excellency in Council would, however, observe that we obtain these conditions already by treaty, and he does not see what further concessions could be obtained from Muscat in this direction which we do not possess already. It is argued that beyond the conditions referred to the payment of the subsidy to Muscat would be advantageous to India by preventing serious complications in the Persian Gulf, His Excellency in Council believes that the same amount might be expended much more advantageously by placing at the disposal of the Government a force sufficient to ensure that the existing treaty should be observed, and to prevent any complications arising that may disturb the peace in the Persian Gulf.

"Reviewing the whole circumstances, His Excellency in Council does not hesitate to express the opinion that it is undesirable that the existing relations between Zanzibar and Muscat should be disturbed."

In the letter referred to in paragraph 9 of this despatch, the Political Agent, Muscat, had dwelt on the extreme and immediate probability of an expedition being directed by the people of Muscat against Zanzibar; it would, he was told, be so popular that 50,000 men could readily be collected to take part in it.

45. REPLY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DISSENTING FROM VIEWS OF HOME GOVERNMENT.—The Government of India then wrote to the Secretary of State, No. 100, dated 20th March 1869, saying—

"We adopt, in their entirety, the arguments set forth by the Bombay Government, and only desire to add a few remarks of our own.

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"We can have no doubt whatever, from an attentive consideration of the minute of Lord Canning of the 26th of March 1861, and from the letter which, on the 2nd of April following, he caused to be addressed to the Government of Bombay, an extract of which is quoted in the margin, that it was that statesman's intention to create a real right in the State of Muscat to the subsidy, as well as a real obligation on the part of the State of Zanzibar to pay it. In using the word 'inheritances' Lord Canning, that the then disputant parties claimed to succeed by inheritance; and it is expressly stated, too, that he offered no opinion whatever on the questions of succession.

Enclosure No. 5 of Political despatch No. 165 of 1861.
PARA. 5. The annual payment of 40,000 Crowns is not to be understood as a recognition of any dependence of Zanzibar upon Muscat, neither is it to be considered as merely personal between Syed Thoweyne and Syed Majid; but, as a permanent arrangement, compensating the Ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances, which are to be henceforward separate.
6. The Governor General in Council offers no opinion about the rule of succession in Zanzibar. To do so, would, he considers, be travelling beyond the bounds of the question submitted for arbitration.

it seems probable to us, merely meant to indicate that the then disputant parties claimed to succeed by inheritance; and it is expressly stated, too, that he offered no opinion whatever on the questions of succession.

"We are further of opinion that the recent events which have occurred in Muscat ought not to be considered as having altered the relations between the two States as far as this subsidy is concerned. We also think that the honor and good faith of the British Government are pledged to the continued payment of the subsidy, and that the political reasons which induced Lord Canning to effect the arrangement still exist in all their force and intensity.

"We also concur with the Bombay Government in opinion that the revenues of India cannot be burdened with any portion of this payment, and all things considered we do not see any reason for recommending that the present arrangement be modified or annulled."

46. SYED MAJID ENCOURAGED IN WITHHOLDING PAYMENT.—On the 26th February 1869, Mr. Churchill sent to the Bombay Government copies of letters from Her Majesty the Queen and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and said that the Sultan's uncle, who had brought these letters, had been—

"Told by the Duke of Argyll, with reference to the subsidy, that, viewing the turn affairs had latterly taken in Oman, it was not likely that Her Majesty's Government would press Syed Majid to continue its payment, and that His Grace had written in that sense to the Government of India."—(Political A, March 1869, Nos. 247-52).

47. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DESIRED TO INFORM THE SULTAN THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ARBITRAL AWARD HAD LAPSED.—In a despatch No. 7, dated 30th July 1869, regarding the aspect of affairs in Oman, the Duke of Argyll conveyed the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that whatever might have been the obligation on the part of the Government of India to exert its influence to maintain the continued and regular payment of the Zanzibar subsidy to the legitimate successors of Syed Saeed, if they had maintained their supremacy, it was not incumbent upon them to interfere any longer when the succession had been interrupted by a revolution which has placed the authority in the hands of a member of another family—

"Your Excellency may, therefore," His Grace said, "inform the Sultan of Zanzibar that the British Government are willing to consider the arrangement which was made in 1861, and communicated to His Highness in Lord Canning's letter of the 2nd April of that year, to have lapsed on the expulsion of Syed Salim from Muscat, and that it will rest with him (Syed Majid) to enter into such engagements with the new ruler of Muscat as in the present altered circumstances he may consider to be advisable.

"But it will be your Excellency's duty at the same time to impress upon the Sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that peace should prevail between the rulers of the two divisions of the old principality of Syed Saeed, and that, moreover, it will be incumbent upon you to interfere in the event of any naval operations being undertaken, which will cause disturbances in the Persian Gulf.

"I am sensible of the difficulty of drafting definite instructions for the guidance of your Excellency's Government, as whilst I am writing some new and unexpected turn

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may render them obsolete and useless. Indeed, I have received advices direct from Muscat since the preceding paragraphs were written, which point to the probability of some member of Syed Saeed's family regaining the ascendancy at that place. But if the authority of the old family were to be re-established, it might be again subverted; and I do not perceive that it is our duty to provide with reference to the arbitration of 1861 for all the varying circumstances of a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions arising out of events which we cannot control. It is obvious the successor of Syed Thoweynee has not been able to maintain his authority at Muscat; and I do not conceive that it is incumbent on your Excellency's Government on the occasion of every political necessity which may place him or any member of his family at the head of affairs, perhaps only for a time, to restore to him the privileges guaranteed to Syed Thoweynee and forfeited by the misconduct or incapacity of his son."

48. RENEWED REPRESENTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—To the above despatch the Government of India replied on the 22nd February 1870 (No. 17)—Premising that the position of Azan bin Ghes was still far from secure, an opinion was expressed that, should he retain his power, it would be necessary formally to recognize him. Before doing so, however, the Government of India was desirous of learning the final decision of the Home Government with regard to the subsidy. On this subject the despatch continued—

"In our telegram of the 10th December we again drew attention to this subject, and we think it necessary that your Grace's final decision should be conveyed to us before we take positive steps for the formal recognition of Azan. In our former despatches marginally noted we have so fully discussed the considerations of justice, policy, and good faith which, in our opinion, render it incumbent on us to insist on the continued payment of the subsidy by Zanzibar to the Muscat State irrespectively of dynastic changes, that we can do little more than refer to them.

"It is quite true, as observed in the 7th paragraph of your Grace's despatch No. 1, dated 6th January 1869, that an arbitrator does not necessarily bind himself to enforce his awards. But the case of the Zanzibar subsidy is different from an ordinary arbitration. The negotiations which resulted in Lord Canning's decision were, as we have pointed out in former despatches, undertaken at a time when Syed Thoweynee of Muscat had actually started on an expedition against Zanzibar, in which there was every prospect of his being successful. Our interference was supported by vessels-of-war, and we have already on two occasions actually enforced the award and required the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay up the subsidy with arrears. In one particular case the arrears due amounted to \$80,000, which sum was, after a protected discussion with the British Agent, paid by the Sultan of Zanzibar and forwarded to Muscat in one of Syed Thoweynee's men-of-war.

"The argument moreover, however in accordance with the ideas of European diplomacy, is one which no Oriental nation can appreciate. In the eyes of the ruler of Muscat and of all the Chiefs and tribes of the Persian Gulf we are bound to see our just decision carried out; and it will be impossible to persuade these people that an arbitrament so made and actually enforced by us differs in any way from a solemn treaty. We apprehend, therefore, that little respect will be paid to our awards either in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere if the idea gain ground that they may be evaded by either party. It has been our consistent policy for the last fifty years in the Persian Gulf and the sea of Oman to induce the predatory tribes to abandon their internecine wars and rely for the settlement of their disputes on the arbitration of the British Government. This policy has saved much bloodshed, has averted many political difficulties, has suppressed piracy, and rendered commerce in those regions secure. But we fear that, for the future, these Chiefs will prefer the adjustment of their quarrels by the sword, if we give them ground to believe that we are indifferent to the execution of our awards.

"We have already stated that we consider the subsidy to be due to the Muscat State, and not merely to the ruler of it for the time being; that the honor and good faith of the British Government are pledged to the continued payment of it; and that the political reasons which induced Lord Canning to effect the arrangement still exist in all their force and intensity. To that opinion, after the most mature consideration, we still adhere, and having been placed

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by the visit of Colonel Pelly to Calcutta in possession of more complete information, we feel it to be our duty to state to your Grace that our former views have been much strengthened thereby.

"The subsidy was intended as compensation to Muscat for the abandonment of valuable claims in Zanzibar from which its revenues could be recruited. It is expressly so described in the deed of arbitrament. The Muscat State is poor, and its resources have been so exhausted by internal revolutions that, as already noted in paragraph 5 of this despatch, Azan bin ghes has difficulty in raising money to defend himself from Wahabee invasion, and he naturally looks to the subsidy to recruit his resources. The loss of this annual payment will be felt not only by the ruler of Muscat, but by the numerous subordinate Chiefs whose interests are affected, and who look to it as the source from which their honorary presents from the Sultan are defrayed, and from which they are enabled to meet the cost of the tribal forces necessary for the defence of the State.

"The Resident in the Persian Gulf informs us that every man amongst these Chiefs is impressed with the idea that British faith and British honor are pledged to the punctual payment of a subsidy, a portion of which they have long been in the habit of receiving, and which has formed in many cases the only bond of union between them and the ruler of the Muscat State.

"Though it is not within our province to offer any opinion upon the amount of success or failure in the suppression of the traffic in slaves on the eastern coast of Africa which has attended the proceedings of Her Majesty's squadron in those waters, we feel it our duty to state that, having heard the views of those best qualified to give an opinion on the subject, we are convinced that the release of the Zanzibar State from the payment of the Muscat subsidy is not likely to have any perceptible influence in the extinction of the slave trade.

"We cannot, therefore, fail to look upon the cessation of this subsidy as a matter fraught with danger to the permanence of the Muscat State. Our recognition of the *de facto* Government in Muscat will be of small value, and will be little appreciated if we are not prepared to accompany it with the assurance that we intend to maintain the same position with regard to Azan bin ghes as with former rulers, and that the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy, so essential to the maintenance of a settled Government, will be continued. We can conceive nothing more detrimental to our good name, more damaging to our legitimate influence in Oman, or more likely to encourage a resort to force and violence in the settlement of the quarrels that are constantly arising in the Persian Gulf, than a declaration that we are prepared to countenance the Sultan of Zanzibar in the evasion of the just demands of the Muscat State."

49. OPINION OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SLAVE TRADE COMMITTEE.—In February 1870 the Report of the Slave Trade Commission (dated 24th January 1870) that had been recently sitting in England was forwarded to the Government of India, whose opinion on the subject was called for. The Commission had suggested that any loss of revenue resulting from measures which the Sultan may be moved to adopt for the suppression of the slave trade should be made good to him from the subsidy payable to the Muscat State. On this point the Government of India observed.—(Despatch No. 29, dated 20th May 1870)—

"The question of the Zanzibar subsidy has no connection with that of the slave trade, and in our opinion the discussion of the two questions ought to be kept quite separate and distinct. The subsidy is a matter of international agreement, in which the name and good faith of the British Government are intimately concerned, and in which important interests to Oman and the Persian Gulf are involved. The question, whether the Sultan of Zanzibar can be relieved from the payment of it, ought to be discussed solely with vide paragraph 48 reference to the considerations set forth in our Secret despatch No. 17, dated 22nd February. Little loss of revenue will probably be caused to Zanzibar if, as suggested by the Commission in paragraph 17, the cessation of the export of slaves be effected gradually. If, however, any compensation to the Sultan be deemed necessary, we are of opinion that it cannot with justice or propriety be provided by cancelling the obligation of the Zanzibar State to pay the subsidy to Muscat."

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Again, in a despatch No. 31, dated 27th May 1870, regarding the recogni-
tion of Azanbinghes, the Government of India wrote—

"If in recognizing Azanbinghes as the ruler of Muscat we were authorized to intimate
to him that the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy, so essential to the prosperity of his Govern-
ment, will be continued, and that we intend to maintain the same relations with him as with
former rulers, we anticipate little or no difficulty, by the exercise of our legitimate influence, in
preserving the peace in the sea of Oman, on which the prosperity of the neighbouring countries
so intimately depends. Without such an intimation our recognition would be of little or no
value; and unless we are prepared to secure to him the subsidy, to which not only he but every
Chief in Oman and on the shores of the Persian Gulf considers our guarantee and good name
are pledged, we consider that we should not be justified in preventing him from endeavouring, by
force of arms, to recover those rights of which he considers himself to have been unjustly de-
prived. We need hardly remind your Grace that it was with the express purpose of preventing
such hostilities that Lord Canning intervened to mediate between Muscat and Zanzibar; that our
mediation was offered when an armed expedition had actually started against Zanzibar; and
that the promise of the payment of the subsidy by that State formed one of the principal
conditions of peace."

In the same despatch the decision of the Secretary of State was solicited
on various points relating to Zanzibar and Muscat, and among others
as to—

"Whether the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy is to be enforced, and, if, not enforced,
whether we are to inform the ruler of Muscat that we should interfere to prevent a recurrence
to that state of things which existed when Lord Canning intervened to mediate between
Muscat and Zanzibar; and in the event of hostilities being threatened, as they then were, whether
we should send an armed force to prevent the ruler of Muscat from enforcing that to which he
doubtless considers he has an indefeasible right.

50. MR. CHURCHILL DIRECTED BY HOME GOVERNMENT TO HOLD OUT HOPES
TO THE SULTAN OF RELIEF FROM PAYMENT.—In the instructions given to
Mr. Churchill on his return to Zanzibar in May 1870 by the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, it was said, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State for India—

"You are aware that in view of the altered state of things which has arisen from the recent
revolutions at Muscat, Her Majesty's Government have had for sometime under their consi-
deration the justice and expediency of releasing the Sultan from the obligation to continue
this payment, and you may, on your return to Zanzibar, intimate to His Highness that you have
a well-grounded expectation that at no distant period you will receive formal instructions from
the Government of India to announce to the Sultan that the arrangements existing under the
arbitration of 1861 are at an end."

The Government of India expressed their regret that the arguments
brought forward in its numerous despatches on the subject had failed to con-
vince Her Majesty's Government of the existence of an obligation to require
the continued payment of the subsidy on grounds alike of justice, national
faith, and good policy.

51. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA URGE NECESSITY FOR CONTINUANCE OF SUBSIDY
ON SYED TOORKEE'S ACCESSION.—On the 23rd May 1871 (despatch No. 27),
after the accession of Syed Toorkee to the throne of Muscat, the Government
of India addressed the Secretary of State as follows with regard to the pay-
ment of the Zanzibar subsidy:

"As regards the claim to the Zanzibar subsidy, it appears to us clear that many of the
reasons conveyed in your Grace's Secret despatch No. 7,
dated 30th July 1869,* as having induced Her Majesty's
Government to consider the British authorities under no obligation to maintain the payment,
do not apply in the case of Syed Toorkee. 'Whatever,' your Grace then wrote; might have
been the obligations on the part of the Indian Government to exert their influence to maintain

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the continued and regular payment of the subsidy to the legitimate successors of Syed Saeed, if they had maintained their supremacy, it is not incumbent upon them to interfere any longer, now that the succession has been interrupted by a revolution which has placed the authority in the hands of a member of another family. Now that the Government of Muscat is re-established in the hands of a member of the old dynasty, we consider that the

* *Vide* paragraph 48. arguments by which, in a series of despatches, and more especially in that of February 22nd, 1870, No. 17,* we urged the obligation of the British Government, on the grounds of good faith and the requirements of good policy, to maintain the arrangement negotiated by Lord Canning in 1861 as an agreement of a permanent character between State and State, have acquired additional force.

† *Vide* paragraph 53. We have asked the Bombay Government to inform us in what precise terms † Mr. Churchill may have intimated to the late Sultan of Zanzibar the cessation of the obligations to pay the subsidy to Muscat. But with reference to the views which we have from time to time laid before your Grace on this subject, we earnestly hope that it may not be too late to secure the continuance of a payment to which we believe that our good faith is pledged, and which we consider to be of vital importance to the establishment of a strong government in Oman."

In a despatch No. 35, dated 23rd June 1871, and again by telegram dated 11th August, the Government of India pressed for an early reply as regards the subsidy question.

52. RELATIONS BETWEEN ZANZIBAR AND MUSCAT ENDANGERED.—In his letter No. 54, dated 1st June 1871, Dr. Kirk, the Political Agent, Zanzibar, describing the reception given by Syed Burgash to Admiral Cockburn, wrote—

"His Highness is, however, himself aware of his situation, and I know that the question of his probable relations with his brother at Muscat has been lately the subject of many serious discussions, in consequence of what has been reported by the Native Agent of Messrs. Jairam Sewjee as to what he says was told him respecting the policy of the Government by the Bombay Secretariat. In this Native Agent's report, addressed to Ludha Damjee, it was stated that Syed Toorkee would be allowed to claim the subsidy with arrears for two years back. Whether such a report is correct or not, it has been treated by Syed Burgash as if it were well founded, and I am told he will pay at first with a seeming good will the subsidy, if demanded, so as to remove the ostensible ground on which Muscat might with show of right be allowed to attack Zanzibar."

In transmitting this letter to the Secretary of State, it was observed by the Government of India (despatch No. 56, dated 7th September 1871)—


"We would add this consideration to the many others to which we have from time to time adverted in favor of the continuance of the arrangements concluded between Muscat and Zanzibar through the mediation of Lord Canning in 1861."

53. REPRESENTATIONS ADDRESSED TO SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING DUAL CONTROL OF ZANZIBAR AGENCY.—The Government of India, in a letter dated 23rd May 1871 (No. 985P), had requested the Bombay Government to ascertain, if possible, the exact terms in which Mr. Churchill had communicated to Syed Majid the intimation which he was directed to make to His Highness by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Indian Government would probably announce the termination of the arrangements existing under the arbitration of 1861. In reply, Mr. Churchill wrote—

"The exact terms in which the above message was conveyed will be found in the letter addressed by me to His Highness soon after my arrival at my post, of which a copy was transmitted to the Government of Bombay. In that letter I took particular trouble to quote the very words of Lord Clarendon's instructions to me of the 16th of June 1870, in which I was told to intimate to His Highness that I had a well-grounded expectation that at no distant period I should receive formal instructions from the Government of India to announce to the Sultan that the arrangements existing under the arbitration of 1861 were at an end.*

* *Vide* paragraph 50. "I am glad to say that I never for a moment lost sight of the fact that it was from India that I was to receive this intimation, but I did invite the Sultan, with a view to save time, to

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CHAPTER IV.

Events at Zanzibar from the arbitration to the death of Syed Majid.

54. PROPOSED CESSION OF THE COMORO ISLANDS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.—In December 1860 the Government of India learned that the Sultan of Johanna was desirous of ceding the Comoro Islands to the British Government, and Colonel Pelly was accordingly directed to proceed thither on his way to Zanzibar to take up the officiating appointment of Agent there.*—(*Political, A, September 1861, Nos. 111-112.*)

5. UNWILLING ACCEPTANCE OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD BY THE SULTAN. HIS CHANGED CONDUCT.—In a letter dated 5th October 1861, Colonel Rigby wrote that, since he had communicated to Syed Majid the terms of the arbitration, he had observed a marked change in the Sultan's manner: the arbitral award had been accepted unwillingly and in a bad spirit by Syed Majid, who had not expected that he would be called on to make any payment to his brother. When communicating the terms of the arbitration, Colonel Rigby had recommended the Sultan to conciliate the El Harth tribe, and release this Chief, Abdulla bin Salem, then in confinement at Lamoo; but, instead of following this advice, the Sultan caused Abdulla to be put to death in prison, and seized all his property.* Syed Majid was fast alienating all the Arabs from him by his apathy and neglect of all business, and was rapidly ruining his own health by debauchery and excess

* Colonel Rigby subsequently reported (30th October 1861) that he was led to believe that the Chief died a natural death, but was not quite satisfied on the point.—(*Political, A, January 1862, No. 234.*) In a letter of 21st November 1862, Colonel Pelly expressed an opinion that no proof was forthcoming, and that further enquiry into the matter was inadvisable.

of every kind. Another circumstance showing the *animus* of the Sultan was the re-appointment to the governorship of Lamoo of his nephew, Syed Saood bin Hillal. This Syed Saood was the individual who seized and ordered to be put to death an Arab, named Salim Jubran, who had given information to Colonel Rigby regarding the slave trade.† Colonel Rigby had hauled down his flag, and insisted on the man's dismissal from the governorship of Lamoo; but on the very day following Colonel Rigby's temporary departure from Zanzibar, he was reinstated by the Sultan.

56. COLONEL PELLY'S APPOINTMENT TO ZANZIBAR AGENCY.—On the 16th October 1861 Colonel Pelly assumed the appointment of Agent and Consul at Zanzibar. He took Syed Burgash, who appears to have accompanied him to Zanzibar, to an interview with the Sultan, who plainly showed that his brother's presence was distasteful to him. Towards Colonel Pelly the Sultan was agreeable, and, in discussing business matters, showed a frank and conciliatory spirit.

57. PORTUGUESE MISSION TO ZANZIBAR DEPUTED TO SETTLE BOUNDARY QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDE A COMMERCIAL TREATY.—On the 30th October Colonel Pelly announced the arrival at Zanzibar of the Governor General of the East African Portuguese Settlements, whose object was to con-

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clude a commercial treaty with the Sultan and to arrange certain boundary questions. The boundary of Zanzibar on the south, it may be here observed, is conterminous with that of the Portuguese Settlements: a line drawn from Cape Delgado inland would, Colonel Pelly said, define the two territories. It was apparently the object of Portugal to secure a line northward of that point, with the view of embracing the valley of the Roovoma River, and thus command the trade which might be expected to develop along that line. Colonel Pelly appears to have succeeded in gaining the confidence of Syed Majid very soon after his arrival at Zanzibar, for in November he wrote that the latter had consulted him regarding the treaty with Portugal. Colonel Pelly suggested many modifications in the draft treaty more favorable to the Sultan and to British interests.

On his way to Zanzibar Colonel Pelly had visited the Comoro Islands, and thence touched at the Portuguese Settlement at Iboo, of which he gave an unfavorable description. The place was notorious for its export of slaves. None of these settlements, Colonel Pelly said, paid their expenses.—(*Political, A, January 1862, Nos. 211-223.*)

58. OUTBREAK ON MAINLAND OF ZANZIBAR.—An outbreak on the mainland opposite to Zanzibar was reported by Colonel Pelly in November 1861. This was caused by one or more tribes from the interior, as usual, annoying the more direct subjects of the Sultan on the coast line:

"The plain fact is," said Colonel Pelly, "that the Sultan's power is very slight and undefined along his African possessions. He has stepped into the shoes of the Portuguese; he holds the islands as fiefs; he exercises over the softer and agricultural tribes, and mixed breeds of the low shore, a certain degree of authority, but dare not tax them, nor advance any governmental claim on the soil. As to the more inland tribes along his ill-recognised frontier, their relation with him seems to have originated in commerce, and to be limited by the requirements of their commerce to the present day."

Colonel Pelly concluded—

"I sometimes anticipate, now that the supply of the northern blood is cut off by the separation of Muscat from Zanzibar, that the Arabs of the latter place will soften and effeminate to the tone of society usually found in rich, low enervating situations, where little exertion is essential to a dreamy existence, and where climate offers many incitements to sensuality and idleness."

59. CASE OF THE GOVERNOR OF LAMOO. CONFLICT OF OPINION BETWEEN HOME AND INDIAN GOVERNMENTS.—Colonel Pelly, on the 10th January 1862, brought up again the case of Syed Saood, the Governor of Lamoo, and his treatment of Salim Jubran, the informer, which has been alluded to above (paragraph 55.) The correspondence on the subject furnishes a notable example of a conflict of opinion between the Home and the Indian Governments on the same question. The Government of India had called in question Colonel Rigby's right to haul down his flag, adding that the occasion was not one of "undoubted national offence," and that in circumstances,

"such as those described by the Agent, it is to the personal exertions and influence of the British representative, rather than to his solemn withdrawal from his official position,"

that the Government trusts. Colonel Pelly wrote—

"The Earl Russell, acknowledging Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby's report of the same transactions, instructs me to acquaint His Highness the Sultan Syed Majid, of Zanzibar, that Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby's conduct in demanding the instant dismissal of Syed Saood bin Hillal

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from the governorship of Lamoo for his conduct to Salim Jubran has been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who will hold the local authorities responsible for any injuries that may be committed either from Salim Jubran or any other persons who may be employed in furnishing the English Consul or Her Majesty's naval officers with information respecting the slave trade. I have communicated these instructions to the Sultan by letter, and His Highness's reply is to the effect that Salim Jubran was imprisoned not for giving information to the English Consul but for ill-conduct in the town."

Meantime, as Syed Saood had been reinstated as Governor of Lamoo, Colonel Pelly asked for instructions as to what steps he should take in the matter, adding that Syed Saood was the only man fit for the post. The Bombay Government desired Colonel Pelly to express neither approval nor disapproval of the measure, and these instructions were approved by the Government of India. Later in the year Colonel Pelly received instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to demand the instant dismissal of Syed Saood. Colonel Pelly explained to Earl Russell his reasons for thinking the measure highly inexpedient, reported that the Sultan entertained strong objections to the step, and that he had, therefore, refrained from pressing the matter until receipt of further instructions. All the foreign consuls had protested against the demand being insisted on.*

* The result of Colonel Pelly's remonstrance was not reported for the information of the Government of India.

60. UNSUCCESSFUL EXPEDITION AGAINST TRIBES ON THE MAINLAND.—On the 1st January 1862 Colonel Pelly reported the return to Zanzibar of an unsuccessful expedition against the Chief of the Wazaramo tribe on the mainland, who was in rebellion against the Sultan.—(*Political, A, April 1862, Nos. 178-185, & May 1862, Nos. 172-173.*)

61. CONCLUSION OF A COMMERCIAL TREATY BETWEEN ZANZIBAR AND PORTUGAL.—In a letter dated 10th January 1862, Colonel Pelly submitted information regarding the negotiations carried on by the Governor General of the Portuguese Settlements for the conclusion of a commercial treaty—(*vide supra* paragraph 57.) The Governor General had attempted to introduce a clause providing for an alteration of the existing frontier between Mozambique and the Zanzibar territory. The River Mimmene had hitherto formed the actual boundary, but it was sought to extend the Portuguese territory slightly to the northwards by giving as the boundary an imaginary line drawn inland from Cape Delgado. At Colonel Pelly's advice, given in his private capacity, the Sultan demurred to the proposal, on which the Portuguese Governor General threatened to break off the commercial treaty and take his departure. Colonel Pelly then, as British Agent, officially informed the Sultan that only a few months had elapsed since he accepted the definition of his kingdom under the arbitration of the Viceroy of India, and that it would not be seemly to alter that definition without first consulting the Viceroy. Colonel Pelly had, as Her Majesty's Consul, been ordered to protest against granting the Portuguese any further concessions of territory which might give them any pretence for interfering with the mouth of the Roovoma River, and he announced his intention of carrying out these instructions, if the Sultan showed any disposition to cede territory to the Portuguese. Thus encouraged, the Sultan showed a bold front, and the Portuguese Governor General was obliged to content himself with obtaining a commercial treaty *minus* the boundary clause. During the progress of negotiations a question arose regarding an article in it providing for the mutual deputation of Consuls. The Portuguese Governor General objected that, if the functions of a Portuguese Consul at Zanzibar were limited to questions of trade, while some of

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the other Consuls exercised political functions, the dignity of his Government would be compromised.

"But," said Colonel Pelly, "the Sultan's advisers reminded His Excellency that upon this point the position of his Government was not analogous with that of other Governments; that the law generally obtaining is, that where there is no Ambassador or Minister residing in a State, a Consul exercises the functions of a Minister; but that in the case of Portugal, in her relations to Zanzibar, His Excellency himself, as Governor General of Portuguese territories contiguous with those of Zanzibar, stood *virtually* in the position towards Zanzibar of Ambassador from the King of Portugal; and hence that in political questions there could be no necessity for interpolating a third and inferior agent between His Excellency and His Highness. What the advisers of the Sultan feared, in truth, was this, that, if a Consul, having daily access to His Highness, possessed political powers, he might elicit, on some unforeseen occasion from His Highness, a verbal promise, having reference to boundaries, inconvenient in itself, and less likely to be elicited, if writing should remain the sole means of political communication."


Colonel Pelly's proceedings were approved by the Government of India.—
(*Political, A, April 1862, Nos. 241-243*).

62. DETENTION OF DR. KRAPFF AT PANGANI.—In March 1862 Colonel Pelly reported that, although under Articles I. and II. of the Treaty with Zanzibar, British subjects were to enjoy full "liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass through," all parts of the Zanzibar dominions, there had, nevertheless, been a strong tendency always shown by the Sultan to evade these obligations and to hinder strangers from residing in, or even travelling through, his possessions on the Arabian Coast. Only recently Dr. Krapff, who had been strongly recommended to Colonel Pelly's good offices by the Foreign Office, and had received a passport from the Sultan, was reported to have been detained with his party by the Governor of Pangani—a place only 40 miles from Zanzibar. Colonel Pelly immediately remonstrated with the Sultan against this infraction of the treaty, and, not receiving in due time a satisfactory reply, threatened, if the captives were not released, to proceed himself to Pangani and release them by force. This threat produced an effect, the captives were released, the Governor of Pangani was ordered to Zanzibar in disgrace, and a proper apology for the occurrence was made by the Sultan. All the European Consuls waited in a body on the Sultan and insisted on his issuing a circular to all his Governors, enjoining on them the observance of the treaty provisions. Colonel Pelly's action was approved by the Bombay Government and the Government of India, and he was desired to express to the Sultan the regret of Government at this illegal detention of British subjects and the tardy reparation afforded. It may here be mentioned that during the progress of the negotiations Colonel Pelly was much embarrassed by the action of the senior naval officer at Zanzibar, who, when required by Colonel Pelly to convey him to Pangani, if such a step were necessary to obtain the release of the prisoners, raised numerous objections in regard to coal, sailing, coastal difficulties, and other causes, so much so, that Colonel Pelly had made up his mind to proceed in a Native dhow. To obviate such difficulties for the future, Colonel Pelly proposed that a war steamer of light draught should always be placed at the disposal of the Agent. No such vessel was, however, available at the time.—(*Political, A, May 1862, Nos. 190-92.*)

63. EXPEDITION HEADED BY THE SULTAN AGAINST REBELS ON THE MAINLAND.—Syed Majid was compelled in the end of 1863 to head in person an

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expedition against the town of Sewee on the mainland, which had thrown off its allegiance to him some time previously. The expedition was successful in re-establishing the authority of His Highness, who was now strong enough to impose taxation at Lamoo, the commercial capital of the District which had hitherto been exempt from the payment of any duties.—(*Political, A, April 1864, Nos. 29-30.*)

64. CONCESSIONS MADE TO THE FRENCH IN THE COMORO ISLANDS.—In January 1865 Colonel Playfair, the Political Agent, reported that on the death of the King Consort of Mohilla (one of the Comoro group of islands), who was a connection of Syed Majid, the Queen had made important concessions to a Frenchman, named M. Lambert, of Madagascar notoriety. It was subsequently ascertained that M. Lambert had been offered any amount of land for the purpose of sugar cultivation on almost nominal terms.

"If," said Colonel Playfair, "this be all, M. Lambert's settlement at Mohilla must be considered as an important step towards the civilization of that island, and, as such, a sincere matter of congratulation to all who have the interest of that beautiful group of islands at heart; but it is too well known that it has long been a favorite scheme of the French Government to unite them all into a French colony, and there is reason to believe that it is rather as a step towards the attainment of this object than to develop the resources of the island, or to benefit himself that M. Lambert has been induced to settle there.

"His Highness Syed Majid lately informed me that the Chiefs of Angazilla (Great Comoro) had invited him to assume the sovereignty of their island, and he asked my advice as to whether he should accept it. I strongly dissuaded him from doing so, as the island is barren, without water, and its possession would only be a source of weakness to him; besides which it would probably bring him into unpleasant relations with the French—a contingency by all means to be avoided."

In a subsequent letter of February 1865, Colonel Playfair wrote—

"While the French steamer *Loiret* was at Mohilla, Sultan Ahmed, one of the Chiefs of the Great Comoro (Anga Tibei) residing at Maroni, a port on the south end of the island, wrote to the commander of the *Loiret* to represent that his sons had rebelled against him, and solicited the aid of the French. The *Loiret* proceeded thither, landed a party of 27 men to lead the King's followers, and with these the insurgents were completely routed. The French lost one man killed and several slightly wounded. The numbers actually engaged were about 1,700 on each side."—(*Political, A, April 1865, Nos. 9-10, & May 1865, Nos. 76-77.*)

65. FRENCH PROTEST AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF A NEW TAX AT ZANZIBAR.—The French Consul at Zanzibar protested in 1863 against a tax* recently introduced by the Sultan, on the ground that it was a contravention of Articles X. and XI. of the French treaty.† The former of these articles merely provided that the duty on imported French merchandize should not exceed five per cent., and the latter prescribed that, subject to the above duty, all import and export trade should be perfectly free. The Advocate General at Bombay gave it as his opinion that there was no article in the treaty which deprived the Sultan of the right to impose a tax on lands. No further information regarding the protest made by the French was reported.—(*Political, A, May 1865, Nos. 255-256.*)

66. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYED MAJID AND ABDOOL AZEEZ.—A serious disagreement took place in March 1865 between Syed Majid and his younger brother, Abdool Azeez, then a youth of eighteen. On the latter demanding in an

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unbecoming manner, and in open Durbar, the share due to him of his deceased father's estate, Syed Majid told him he was a silly boy, and slapped him on the face. Abdool Azeez half drew his sword, but was removed by the guards in attendance, and shortly after this he was imprisoned in irons in the fort, on the grounds that he had entered into a conspiracy against his brother's life and contemplated rebellion. The Sultan determined on banishing him, and he was accordingly made over to the care of Syed Burgash, who was just then about to proceed to Bombay to obtain medical advice for himself. It may here be mentioned that, according to Colonel Playfair, Syed Burgash's conduct since his return to Zanzibar had been most exemplary. He had lived in strict seclusion, and had never attempted, by word or deed, to weaken his brother's influence, or regain his own. Syed Majid, however, refused distinctly to be reconciled to him, or to make him any allowance.—(*Political, A, June 1865, Nos. 149-150.*)

67. VISIT OF SYED MAJID TO BOMBAY.—On the 6th June 1865 Syed Majid landed in Bombay, whither he had been invited on a visit to His Excellency the Governor. Colonel Taylor, c. B., of the Retired List, was deputed to attend His Highness. The Sultan brought some presents valued at twenty-six thousand odd rupees, in return for which the Bombay Government proposed presenting him with the steam yacht *Thule*, which was to be had for Rupees 45,000. The Government of India were at first unwilling to make a return present so far exceeding in value those received; but the Bombay Government received the instruction too late to retrace the steps that had been taken in respect to the *Thule*, which was eventually presented to the Sultan by Dr. Livingstone at Zanzibar.—(*Political, A, November 1865, Nos. 210-211, & July 1866, Nos. 27-28.*)

68. PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A COAL DEPÔT AT ABD EL KOORI.—In March 1867 Dr. Seward proposed that the Island of Abd el Koori should be occupied as a coaling and provision depôt for the squadron employed in the suppression of slavery in the Zanzibar waters, and also as a temporary depôt for freed slaves. This island lies between Socotra and Gardafui, and is owned by the Sultan of Socotra. It was represented by the Resident at Aden to be uninhabited. No supplies were procurable, and it would have been necessary to transport all the requirements of the station from Aden. The Commodore on the east coast station gave an opinion adverse to the proposal, which was, therefore, abandoned.—(*Political, A, March 1867, Nos. 219-21.*)

69. KEELWA OVERRUN BY THE MAFITI.—In March 1868 the Political Agent reported that the Mafiti, a warlike tribe of Central Africa, had overrun the country in the neighbourhood of Keelwa, and had defeated the garrison of that place. A force of 600 men had been despatched from Zanzibar to their assistance. One effect of this raid, he said, would be to prevent the slave caravans from reaching the coast from the Nyassa.

70. QUESTION OF VESSELS PROVIDED WITH CONSULAR PASSES BEING ALLOWED TO FLY BRITISH FLAG.—In November 1868 was submitted for the decision of the Government of India a correspondence that had been carried on for nearly a year between the Political Agent, Zanzibar, and the Bombay Government, connected with a question raised by the former as to whether

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vessels under British protection, *i. e.*, vessels belonging to British subjects, residents at Zanzibar, or subjects of Native States in alliance with the Government of India, when carrying passes from the British Consulate at Zanzibar, might be allowed to fly the British ensign, or the colors of their own country.

The Political Agent, in November 1867, represented to the Bombay Government the necessity for his having issued passes to vessels in the coasting trade belonging to British subjects, residents at Zanzibar, and suggested that such vessels should be allowed to fly either the British ensign or the colors of their own country.

On this the Bombay Government referred the question to the Advocate General for his opinion.

The Advocate General stated that, under Section 24 of Act X. of 1841, the Governor of Fort William, or the Governor in Council of any Presidency, alone had the power to grant passes to any ship or vessel belonging to subjects of Native Princes or States, and that the issue of such passes by Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar was not warranted by that Act; consequently he had not the power to allow such vessels to hoist the British colors.

The above opinion was combated by Mr. Churchill; but the Advocate General, on a further reference being made to him by the Bombay Government, considered his former opinion not at all weakened by the reasoning of the Political Agent.

Mr. Churchill, however, resumed the issue of passes to vessels, the property of British Indian subjects, and subjects of Native protected States, on a suggestion made to him by Commodore Heath, who was of opinion that such vessels, without a consular pass, would be liable to be treated as suspicious craft to the detriment of legitimate trade.

The Bombay Government, in forwarding the papers for consideration with special reference to the omissions* in the law (Act X. of 1841), expressed an opinion that Mr. Churchill has clearly exceeded his powers in resuming the grant of passes.

* Namely, that it did not provide for the granting of temporary registers by British Consuls to ships purchased by British protected subjects in foreign ports.

The reply of the Government of India, based on an opinion given by Mr. Maine, was as follows:

"His Excellency in Council agrees in the views expressed by the Government of Bombay and by the learned Advocate General on the subject, and he is of opinion that Zanzibar is not within the ordinary legislative powers of the Government of India, and, therefore, that the provisions of Act X. of 1841 cannot be applied to that place. From this it follows that it is beyond the competency of the Supreme Government to delegate to the Consul of Zanzibar the power of admitting the ships of British protected subjects to the privileges of British ships under Statutes 3 and 4 Victoria, Chapter 56, Section 54."—(*Proceedings, Political, A, December 1868, Nos. 403-12.*)

71. INTRIGUES OF SYED TOORKEE.—In June 1868 Syed Toorkee, who was deported from Muscat in the autumn of 1867 owing to his machinations against Syed Salem, the reigning Chief, and had since been under the surveillance of the Bombay Government, wrote a letter to his brother, Syed Majid, the Sultan of Zanzibar, calling upon him to foment discord in Muscat. This letter Syed Majid showed to Mr. Churchill, the Political Agent at Zanzibar, and eventually the matter was brought to the notice of the Supreme Government, which caused Syed Toorkee to be warned against a repetition of such conduct. The Government of Bombay also intimated the displeasure of the Viceroy to Syed Majid, who, in return, observed that he was quite aware of the impropriety committed by his brother in sending him such a letter, and that it was on this account he made its contents known to Mr. Churchill.—(*Political Progs., August 1868, Nos. 23-25, October 1868, Nos. 312-13, & February 1869, Nos. 29-30.*)

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72. ALLEGED DESIGNS AGAINST ZANZIBAR BY AZAN BIN GHES. VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AS TO PROTECTORATE OF ZANZIBAR AND MUSCAT.—In December 1869 the Agent at Muscat reported that there were indications then of an intention, if not on the part of Azan bin Ghes himself, at least on that of some of the principal members of his Government, to invade Zanzibar. Dr. Kirk appears to have assured the Sultan that on his own responsibility he would suppress by force any attempt to disturb the peace of the place. The Government of India, therefore, desired that the Political Agent should be informed—

"that the Government of India is not bound, under all circumstances, to undertake the protectorate of Zanzibar, and that he should abstain from all proceedings likely to give rise to the idea that Government is inclined to place itself in such a position. The Government of India has already refused to allow the State of Muscat to attack Zanzibar by sending a naval force against it, and the envoys recently sent from Zanzibar to Bombay have been informed that the orders of the Supreme Government for the preservation of peace in the waters of the Persian Gulf admit of no exception, and preclude the possibility of sanctioning any expedition against Muscat by sea. While acting in this way for the common good of Zanzibar and Muscat, the British Government can give no pledge that it will protect either Zanzibar or Muscat from invasion, but will, under all circumstances, reserve to itself perfect freedom of action."—(Enc. despatch to Secretary of State, No. 615 P, dated 4th April 1870.)


Colonel Pelly, on being referred to, expressed an opinion to the effect that Syed Azan had not really contemplated any attack on Zanzibar. Syed Majid, however, was apprehensive of an invasion, and issued a proclamation that any vessel coming from Oman and bringing to his dominions the people of that State after the monsoon, would be burnt, and the owner punished. This was explained by Dr. Kirk as not being intended to interfere with trade, but to give to the Sultan the power to arrest and detain suspicious persons, and to prevent them from landing without being liable to subsequent claims for compensation. Since the rumour, current in the fall of the previous year, about the ambitious designs of Azan bin Ghes, all passengers from Oman had been watched, and some arrested. To these measures Dr. Kirk attributed the peace of the country.

73. COST OF POLITICAL AGENCY, ZANZIBAR, HOW TO BE BORNE.—In acknowledging receipt of the report of the Commission on the slave trade that sat in 1870, the Government of India observed in their despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 29, dated 20th May 1870—

"In providing for future administrative arrangements, such as those which form the subject of paragraphs 75 to 80, it is expedient that the political duties of the Agent should be kept entirely distinct from those relating to the slave trade. The correspondence of the Agent regarding political affairs should be addressed to the Government of India, and regarding the slave trade, to Her Majesty's Government in England. It is, of course, not contemplated that, in providing such additional agency establishments as may be required in connection with the recommendations of the Commission, any fresh charge should be thrown on the revenues of India. No additional agency is needed for the discharge of the political duties at Zanzibar. We consider, therefore, that the political charges, as they stand at present, may properly continue to be borne by the Indian Government, which should retain its present control over the political duties of the Agency."

In the correspondence forwarded under cover of despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 8th July 1870, which contained an intimation to the effect that the arrangements made under Lord Canning's arbitral award would probably be discontinued, the Government of India were made aware of the fact that Lord Clarendon had addressed the Lords of the Treasury, in support of a proposal made by the Parliamentary Commission, that a portion

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
of the charges of the Zanzibar Agency should be borne by the Imperial Government. On the receipt of this despatch the Government of India wrote—(Despatch No. 45, dated 12th August 1870.)

"In the event of our being instructed to convey to the Sultan this decision (*i. e.*, regarding the subsidy) on the part of Her Majesty's Government, we would represent that, with the release of the Sultan from his obligation to Muscat, the interest of the Government of India in the affairs of Zanzibar will be at end. Under such circumstances there would no longer exist any reason why this Government should retain the control of the Political Agency in that State, or why any portion of the cost of the Agency should be debited to the revenues of India. We, therefore, request that we may be freed from all official connection with the Agency, and that the Agent may henceforward be appointed and controlled by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"With reference to the letter addressed by Lord Clarendon to the Lords of the Treasury, we would repeat our opinion that the suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa is not an object for which the Indian revenues should be forced to contribute. It is a matter exclusively connected with Imperial policy, and in which the Government of India have no concern, and the expenditure which it necessitates should, therefore, be defrayed solely from imperial sources. We cannot consent to debit any portion of such outlay to the Indian Budget, and we trust that Your Grace may think fit to urge Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to re-consider this proposal. As already observed in paragraph 3 of this despatch, we consider it right that, under the altered relations of Zanzibar to the State of Muscat, the Government of India should be relieved of all connection with Zanzibar and all expenditure in that quarter. But should Her Majesty's Government think otherwise, the only alternative arrangement which would command our assent is that proposed in paragraph 10 of our despatch No. 29, dated the 20th of May 1870, *viz.*, that we should continue, as heretofore, to pay the political charges and have control of the Political Agency at Zanzibar, the entire cost of the arrangements for the suppression of the slave trade being borne by the imperial revenues. We cannot believe it to be just, under any circumstances, to impose a portion of the latter charges on the revenues of India."

73a. DEATH OF SYED MAJID.—In a letter of the 7th October 1870 Mr. Churchill reported the death of Sultan Syed Majid after a brief illness of only a few days' duration.

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CHAPTER V.

Events in Zanzibar from the death of Syed Majid.

74. ACCESSION OF SYED BURGASH.—PROCEEDINGS OF MR. CHURCHILL ON THE DEATH OF SYED MAJID.—When reporting the death of Syed Majid, Mr. Churchill submitted to Government, in a letter dated 7th October 1870, the following report of his proceedings with regard to the choice of a successor; and it must be here noted that these proceedings were taken a few hours before Syed Majid's death:

"I sent Dr. Kirk to Syed Burgash, inviting him to come to the Agency with a view to seeing what his intentions were, and before I shaped my course, for there were several pretenders to the throne,—one, Syed Kulfan, a young prince of about thirty years of age, a younger brother of Syed Burgash; another, Syed Hamed bin Salem, of Muscat; and a third, Ali bin Soond—this latter was very objectionable on account of his declared fanaticism and vicious propensities. Syed Burgash came immediately, and the result of the interview was that he pledged himself not to do anything without first consulting this Agency. He repudiated all fanatical ideas, and promised to satisfy Her Majesty's Government with regard to the ultimate suppression of the slave trade; he pledged himself to take my advice with reference to Syed Majid's standing debt to Messrs. Jairam Sewjee, of Bombay, and to honor and respect Sheik Sooliman, whom I was determined to protect on account of the services he had rendered to Her Majesty's Government during the lifetime of Syed Majid.

"I spoke very plainly to the prince, and told him that I required to be assured, before I pledged myself to back his candidature, that he would be friendly towards England, and would not revert to bigotry or to mutawa principles with which Her Majesty's Government could have no sympathy."

In the afternoon of the same day, after the Sultan's death, Mr. Churchill waited upon His Highness Syed Burgash, in company with the officers of the Agency and those of Her Majesty's ship *Teazer*, and congratulated him as his brother's successor. He advised Sheik Sooliman, who was in command of the troops, to proclaim to the soldiers the change that had taken place in the head of this government, and he undertook himself to see some of the most influential Chiefs of the place in order to prevent disturbances. Next day Mr. Churchill wrote to Government—

"I am happy to say that everything is quiet in Zanzibar. The decided attitude of this Agency, with regard to the succession of Syed Burgash, has closed the mouths of many who were inclined to reject his candidature. In reality there was not a single man in Zanzibar who could have opposed him with success, while the prince was made to understand that he himself had no chance if Her Majesty's Government were against him."

On the 10th, however, Mr. Churchill wrote to the Bombay Government—

"Since I last had the honor of addressing you on the subject of Zanzibar politics, matters have developed themselves unfavorably: Burgash has thrown off the mask he had put on just before and after his accession, and makes no secret of his inclinations to the fanatical party of which the head quarters are at Muscat.

"A council of priests is to direct the affairs of the State, the law of the koran is to be revived, and there is now a talk of making the Zanzibar dominions an appenage of the Imam of Muscat, as it was in Syed Saeed's time. It is to be regretted that there should not be at the present moment any one in Zanzibar to dispute the succession. Syed Burgash's promises regarding the slave trade are all repudiated.

"I shall lose no time in bringing His Highness to book for this glaring instance of want of faith, and it is urgent that in these troubled times a man-of-war be sent to Zanzibar to protect British interests."

The Political Agent transmitted copy of a letter he had written to Syed Burgash, asking for an explanation of his proceedings, to which the latter replied that he did not recollect making any pledges, and added—

"If, even, the question referred to at the time were in my hands, I could not have promised you its fulfilment before calling together the great men of the State from all parts of

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the country and taken their advice; and was it possible when my brother Majid was still alive?"

Mr. Churchill observed, in forwarding the correspondence to the Bombay Government—

"His Excellency the Governor will judge from this how little the new Sultan can be relied upon, and how desirable it would be to unseat him on the first pretext. Syed Toorkee, who is older than Burgash, is the only member of the Bu Saidi family who could dispute the right of succession: but he should come here, if at all, with English influence to back him."

The Bombay Government replied to Mr. Churchill—

"From a perusal of the proceedings of the Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, and its recommendations on the question of the future succession to the sovereignty of Zanzibar in the event of that State being permanently severed from Muscat, it would appear that His Highness Syed Toorkee, as the elder brother of Syed Burgash, could establish no absolutely preferential claim to the throne on the ground of his seniority. On the other hand, it would appear that he was equally eligible with Syed Burgash. His Excellency the Governor in Council considers that your action, therefore, in lending your support so actively to the latter, and so far committing your Government, has been precipitate and injudicious.

"The only excuse could be the necessity, if it existed, of having some ruling authority established without delay; but this, I am to state, your despatches do not sufficiently show to have existed."

It appears from a letter written by the commander of Her Majesty's ship *Teazer*, who was present at Zanzibar when Syed Majid died, that the Arabs intended to have had no Sultan in succession to Syed Majid, but "a kind of republic," and were quite taken by surprise at Syed Burgash ascending the throne.

75. OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON MR. CHURCHILL'S PROCEEDINGS.—On receiving an account of Mr. Churchill's proceedings, the Government of India wrote—

"The Viceroy and Governor General in Council, after a most careful consideration of Mr. Churchill's reports, can arrive at no other conclusion than that the Political Agent has, in the present instance, entirely misunderstood his position and his duties. Not only has he erred by interfering in the succession, but, by making the religious opinions of Syed Burgash a condition on which the countenance of the British Government should be given or withheld, he has violated one of the cardinal principles which actuate the Government of India in its dealings with its own subjects and foreign States alike. His Excellency in Council, therefore, entirely disapproves of Mr. Churchill's proceedings. The Government of India, I am to observe, has no wish to interfere in any way in the succession to the throne of Zanzibar, but prefers to leave the question to be settled by the people themselves. Whatever form of government may be adopted in that country, or whoever may succeed to Supreme power, the treaties and engagements concluded between the British Government and Zanzibar will still be binding on that State. Their validity is not affected by any change in the succession or in the constitution of the government."—(Enclosure to despatch to Secretary of State, No. 60, dated 21st December 1870.)

An explanation was subsequently, in January 1871, submitted by Mr. Churchill of his proceedings, which, however, did not induce the Government of India to alter the views already expressed by them on the subject. (S. I. 1871, Nos. 6-9.)

Writing subsequently with regard to the succession of Syed, Dr. Kirk, Mr. Churchill's successor, observed (letter dated 1st May 1871)—

"I may, however, state that, in my opinion, looking at what has happened with the advantage of subsequent experience, Syed Burgash would have assumed the throne as quietly and surely had Mr. Churchill taken no steps in the matter as he did under his auspices; nor would any rival, put forward by Mr. Churchill, have had the least chance of success, unless backed with the active interference of the English agent and the commander of the ship-of-war then present; and I doubt not that even then Syed Burgash would have been supported by all the other Consulates.

"Indeed, I see now that Burgash, with an insignificant but organized party of fanatics, and aided by his old friends, the Harthi tribe, could not have been kept down unless arrested or

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punished; nor do I find among the members of the family of Syed Saeed, with whom I am acquainted, any one who would have suited our purpose a whit better, or granted the concessions we asked for after his accession.

"In every other respect Syed Burgash has shown himself master of the situation by having been able quietly to throw off the fanatics and take the direction of affairs into his own hands."

Copies of several intemperate letters, written by Mr. Churchill to the Sultan, were forwarded by the Government of Bombay about a year after date. These served to confirm the opinion previously expressed by the Government of India regarding Mr. Churchill's proceedings.—(*Political, A, November 1871, Nos. 25 to 36.*)

76. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SUGGEST SEVERANCE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH MUSCAT. CORRESPONDENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT.—In reporting the matter to the Secretary of State (*despatch No. 60, dated 21st December 1871*) the Government of India intimated disapproval of Mr. Churchill's conduct, and the despatch concluded—

"We would take this opportunity of representing to Your Grace our earnest desire that our official connection with the Zanzibar State should cease. The existence of a Political Agent there in no way serves the interests of India, whilst, as has been shown by Mr. Churchill's recent proceedings, there is the risk that such an officer may commit himself to a policy which we cannot regard as safe or wise. Under these circumstances we deem it necessary to repeat the request which we proffered in our despatch No. 45 of 12th August, that there should be a complete and early severance of existing relations between the Indian Government and the Political Agency at Zanzibar."

On receipt of the above despatch, the Secretary of State for India addressed the London Foreign Office in the following terms:

"It will be seen that His Excellency is of opinion that the interests of India require that the present connexion between the Government of India and the Zanzibar State should be entirely severed. The Duke of Argyll, as at present informed, cannot see how this severance, however expedient it may be in the abstract, can be accomplished without great embarrassment, so long as the superintendence and control of the Muscat Agency, and generally of the affairs of the Persian Gulf, are in the hands of the Indian Government.

"Upon this subject the Duke of Argyll desires to be favored with the views of Lord Granville. His Lordship is aware that the inconvenience of the present divided authority, in the countries to which reference has been made, has frequently been a subject of consideration and discussion by successive Governments, whilst the evils of the existing system have been found difficult to substitute for it any other, which would not equally be open to objection."

So far, then, as the instructions to Mr. Churchill relating to the slave traffic were concerned, the Duke of Argyll—

"would leave it to the discretion of Lord Granville to shape them in such a manner as may be consonant with the views of His Lordship, Mr. Churchill on all questions of general policy receiving his instructions from the Government of India."—(*Proceedings S. H., 1871, Nos. 28 & 29.*)

The correspondence was forwarded for the information of the Government of India, who replied (*despatch No. 16, dated 4th April 1871*),—

"Your Grace has intimated to Lord Granville that you cannot see how this course, however expedient it may be on general grounds, can be accomplished without great embarrassment, so long as the superintendence and control of the Muscat Agency, and generally of the affairs of the Persian Gulf, are in the hands of the Indian Government. In answer to this we would express our opinion that the only interests which the Government of India has, or ever has had, in Zanzibar, has arisen out of the intimate relations which formerly existed between that State and Muscat. When Syed Saeed was Sultan, the two States formed one kingdom, and, therefore, only one Political Agent was needed. In 1840 the Sultan removed the head quarters of his government from Muscat to Zanzibar, whither the Political Agent followed him; and from that time until the year 1861, when the kingdom was split in two, there was no Agent at

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Muscat. On the division of the State, two Political Agents were appointed. When the tributary dependence of the one State on the other was severed by the resolution of Her Majesty's Government, that the obligation of the Sultan of Zanzibar to continue to pay the subsidy to Muscat was at an end, our interest in Zanzibar ceased. So far, then, from the fact of our maintaining an Agent at Muscat being a reason why we should keep one at Zanzibar, it is rather, we consider, a reason why our connection with that State should be discontinued."

77. SYED BURGASH ANNOUNCES HIS ACCESSION.—On the 17th October 1870 Mr. Churchill forwarded a letter from Syed Burgash announcing his accession to the throne of Zanzibar and its dependencies. The letter concluded—

"I shall, please God, continue to maintain friendship in perpetuity according to the agreement entered into between my father, the late Saeed bin Salem, and your Government."

A similar communication had been addressed to the Bombay Government. The Sultan's khureeta was not sent forward by the Bombay Government until the 9th February, and the Government of India, before replying to it, desired the Bombay Government to ascertain and report the events that had occurred at Zanzibar during the interval.—(S. M. 1871, Nos. 10-16.)

78. PROPOSITIONS OF BOMBAY GOVERNMENT IN FAVOR OF THE ANNEXATION OF ZANZIBAR.—Very soon after his succession Syed Burgash, as reported by Mr. Churchill, issued a proclamation to his subjects—

"to eject all natives of India from their plantations, and to prevent them from carrying on their trade beyond the precincts of the town."

No copy of the proclamation, however, was forwarded, and, from a letter addressed by Mr. Churchill to Syed Burgash, it appears that the proclamation, if there was one, merely enjoined His Highness's subjects—

"not to allow British subjects to establish themselves on Native estates, but that they should not be interfered with when established on their own estates."

The Sultan himself explained that the only orders issued were to the effect that those natives of India who were in the habit of inciting the slaves to steal cloves, should be prevented from frequenting the plantations of Arabs. Mr. Churchill, in several most peremptory letters, remonstrated with the Sultan against these orders restricting the liberty of British subjects as contrary to treaty. Incidentally it appears from the correspondence that Mr. Churchill had about the same time addressed a letter to the Sultan, enquiring whether he recognized the treaty engagements, proclamations, and declarations of his predecessors as binding on himself or not. The Bombay Government requested the Political Agent to inform the Sultan that such an infraction of the treaty as was contemplated by the Sultan's proclamation would not be tolerated, and, in forwarding the correspondence (some two months and-a-half after receipt of the same) to the Government of India, made the following startling propositions. They observed—

"Syed Burgash has no claim to succeed to the throne as next heir to Syed Majid, nor, as His Excellency in Council gathers from Mr. Churchill, whom he has seen within the past week, has he any hold whatever on the support of the people.

"Had it not been for Mr. Churchill's precipitate action in supporting his claims, Syed Burgash would probably never have been on the throne. Further, he has manifested an open hostility to us, and a desire to evade the engagements entered into by his predecessors. He has no claim on our good will or support. Sir L. Heath has more than once urged that Zanzibar should become a British possession, both with a view to the suppression of the slave trade and the development of the trade with the East African Coast. As long as the territory was under the sovereignty of a well-disposed ruler, such an annexation would not, in His Excellency in Council's opinion, have been desirable. But the case is much altered when the sovereignty has been seized by an individual who has no right, either by lawful succession or election, and manifests an open hostility to our power.

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"It is difficult to foresee what the result of the present contest at Muscat may be. The Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council doubts much whether, if Syed Toorkee succeeds in his attempts to establish himself there, it would be desirable that Muscat and Zanzibar should be united under one authority. But if he fail, the Governor in Council has no doubt that his establishment in power at Zanzibar would be in every way preferable to the rule of Syed Burgash.

"It is for the consideration of the Government of India whether an active and immediate intervention by force at Zanzibar is not advisable, leaving it for future decision whether some other ruler should not be placed there, or whether it should be brought under the direct authority of the British Crown. It would seem not unlikely, if we do not intervene, that, in a few years, some other power may be established in the island."

Mr. Churchill left Zanzibar on a visit to Bombay about the end of 1870, and Dr. Kirk, who temporarily assumed charge of the Agency, wrote on the 24th December—

"Since taking over charge, subsequent to Mr. Churchill's departure, His Highness Syed Burgash has shown a marked change in his attitude and bearing towards the Agency. Not only have the arbitrary and unjust acts of himself and fanatic councillors to British subjects been set aside, but these very cases have been placed in my hands for settlement, and His Highness has shown himself peculiarly anxious to do nothing that could be taken as a slight by me.

"The despatch of business is thus greatly facilitated, and our protected Indians saved from much annoyance to which they had been subjected, while, I think, that we stand in a better position to bring His Highness to reason on the more weighty matter that will be pressed upon him,—the suppression of the slave trade,—on which I have as yet no reason to think that His Highness has altered his views."

The improvement in the Sultan's conduct noticed by Dr. Kirk did not, said the Bombay Government, induce them to recede from their former proposal.

79. VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON PROPOSITIONS OF BOMBAY GOVERNMENT. SUSPENSION OF MR. CHURCHILL.—With regard to Mr. Churchill's enquiry from the Sultan as to whether he considered his predecessor's engagements binding on himself, the Government of India wrote in reply to the Bombay Government—

"Mr. Churchill displayed great want of judgment in putting such a question to His Highness. As I have had the honor to observe in my former letter No. 2194 of the 16th December 1870,* the treaties and engagements concluded between the British Government and Syed Saeed, when ruler of Muscat and Zanzibar, are binding on the latter State, whoever its ruler and whatever its form of government may be."

The letter continued—

"To judge by recent events, His Excellency in Council cannot but fear that the hostile attitude assumed by Syed Burgash may be accounted by the discourteous tone in which Mr. Churchill has lately addressed His Highness. This view is strengthened by the fact that, since Mr. Churchill's departure, the Sultan has set aside his unjust and arbitrary order, and has placed the cases of the British subjects, against whom he had cause to complain, in Dr. Kirk's hands for settlement. Under the circumstances of the case, His Excellency in Council feels it incumbent on him not to permit Mr. Churchill to resume the duties of Political Agent at Zanzibar, until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government shall be known."

The Government of India next proceeded to comment on the propositions put forward by the Bombay Government for the annexation of Zanzibar. It was remarked—

"His Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, although admitting that there has been a favorable change of demeanor on the part of Syed Burgash, has not been induced thereby to recede from the proposal made in the earlier of the two letters under acknowledgment, viz., that recourse should be had to an active and immediate intervention by force at Zanzibar, and, that it should be left for future decision whether some other ruler should not be placed on the throne, or whether that State should be brought under the direct authority

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of the British Crown. To this proposal for the annexation of Zanzibar, His Excellency in Council is most decidedly opposed. He considers that it is contrary to the principles of justice and sound policy. It is possible that the annexation of Zanzibar would tend towards the suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, but this is a question which is not in the hands of the Government of India; but even if such a result were certain, it would not justify, in His Excellency's opinion, a deliberate act of spoliation. The remark that the territory of Zanzibar is not under the sovereignty of a well-disposed ruler, is one which, if accepted as a justification of the course proposed, would be equally applicable to many other States in Asia. For similar reasons His Excellency in Council is unable to attach any force to the argument which would justify the interference of the British Government by the anticipation that, unless such a course is taken, some European power might hereafter establish itself in these regions. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council cannot approve of a proposal which would be a deliberate and unjustifiable breach of treaty and a declaration of war with Syed Burgash. As pointed out by Dr. Kirk, the commercial treaty, and the tariff which it prescribes, give the British Government complete power to make the ruler of Zanzibar fulfil his engagements."

These proceedings were reported to the Secretary of State in a despatch No. 10, dated 22nd March 1871, with the remark—

"We cannot admit the force of the arguments by which the Bombay Government undertakes to justify such a measure. On the contrary, we hold that the annexation of Zanzibar would be a deliberate and unwarrantable breach of treaty, and opposed to every principle of justice and sound policy."—(S. I. 1871, Nos. 10-22).

The Bombay Government, on the 24th July 1871, submitted an explanation with regard to the propositions advanced by them, and which had been so unhesitatingly condemned by the Government of India. It was as follows:

"His Excellency the Governor in Council would observe that he never contemplated an annexation of Zanzibar, if it were found possible to place it under the government of a member of the reigning family who was well disposed to the British Government, and desirous of continuing on amicable terms with the British Government. There are other descendants of Syed Saeed, who would have a superior claim to the throne of Zanzibar; and, with reference to Syed Burgash himself, His Excellency in Council would remark that a reference to my letter will show that his removal from the throne was suggested for considerations not on the ground merely of his not being a well-disposed ruler, as might be inferred from your letter, but of his possessing no claim, either hereditary or elective, to the throne which he had seized. Syed Burgash is simply a usurper, who had infringed a fundamental treaty, and had manifested an open hostility to the English alliance.

"With reference to the remarks as regards the conduct of Mr. Churchill, of whose proceedings His Excellency in Council had already expressed his disapprobation, I am directed to point out that the Sultan's proclamation was the cause, and not the result, of the angry correspondence between the British Agent and His Highness.

"Finally, the complications which have from time to time arisen between the British and other European powers on the east coast of Africa may have caused His Excellency in Council to regard the possible presence of another European government at Zanzibar with greater apprehension than is entertained by His Excellency the Viceroy in Council. But a recollection of events of no distant date, both at Mayotte and Mozambique, impresses His Excellency the Governor in Council with the conviction that such an event as the assumption of a protectorate over Zanzibar by a European power, whose policy as regards the slave trade would be different from ours, would be a source of continued danger and anxiety."

This explanation of the Bombay Government did not induce the Government of India to modify the views previously expressed. As it was not known what recent events at Mayotte and Mozambique were alluded to, information on this subject was called for.—(Secret, 1871, Nos. 305-324.)

The Bombay Government replied on the 4th October 1871 that the allusion to Mayotte and Mozambique—

"refers to the difficulties which have from time to time arisen in respect to the suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa with the French and Portuguese Governments, and which have, His Excellency in Council thinks, more than once been the subject of discussion in Parliament. The observation was general, and had no reference to any difficulties experienced by the Indian Government."—(Political, A, November 1871, Nos. 25 & 26.)

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80. COMPENSATION PAID BY SULTAN TO A MAN UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION ILLEGALLY PUNISHED.—The Bombay Government in March 1871 forwarded a letter from Dr. Kirk reporting that an African, in the service of Captain Fraser, had been flogged by the Arab authorities on a charge of simple drunkenness without reference to the Consulate, such a proceeding being in violation of Articles IV. and V. of the Commercial Treaty of 1839. On Dr. Kirk's representation of the matter, the Sultan disowned all personal knowledge that the man was entitled to British protection, and at once paid the sum of 50 Dollars demanded by the Political Agent as a compensation to the injured party. Dr. Kirk's action was approved by the Government of India.—(*Political, A, April 1871, Nos. 22-24.*)

81. VIEWS OF HOME GOVERNMENT AS TO RELATIONS WITH ZANZIBAR.—Quoted below, *in extenso*, is an important despatch from the Secretary of State for India (No. 3, dated 21st April 1871), regarding the relations of the Government of India with Zanzibar, and the general policy to be pursued with respect to that State.

"I have had for some time under my most serious consideration the affairs of Zanzibar, and the relations of the Sultan of that territory with the British Government. But the course of events continually presenting fresh complications in respect not only of the Zanzibar State itself, but also of its connection with Muscat and the affairs of the Persian Gulf, has rendered it difficult, if not impossible, for Her Majesty's Government to dictate any general policy with respect to those States which might not, and as events have proved, actually would have been rendered, by some new revolution, inapplicable to the existing state of affairs at the time of the arrival of my instructions.

"But there appears, after this succession of vicissitudes, to be a prospect of a settlement of the affairs of Zanzibar and Muscat on a more permanent basis. The Sultan Syed Majid is dead, and has been succeeded by his brother, Syed Burgash. The usurpation of Syed Azan bin Ghos is at an end, and Syed Toorkee, another member of the family of Syed Saeed, is now reported to be supreme at Muscat. The present time, therefore, seems to be opportune for a re-consideration of the several important questions involved in the correspondence before me.

"But before I enter upon the family or dynastic questions arising out of the events which have occurred since the death of Syed Thoweynee, it is expedient that I should refer to

* *Vide* paragraph 73.

Your Excellency's letter of the 12th August 1870, No. 45 (Secret),* in which you indicate a course of policy which would render all further consideration of the affairs of Zanzibar, on the part of the Indian department of Her Majesty's Government, altogether unnecessary. You are of opinion that, except in so far as there may be certain engagements or guarantees to be maintained by the British Government, there is no reason why Your Excellency's Government should retain the control of the Political Agency in that State, or why any portion of cost of the Agency should be debited to the revenues of India; and you add—'We therefore request that we may be freed from all official connection with the Agency, and that the Agent may be appointed and controlled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;' and again, on the 21st December 1870, No. 60 (Secret),† Your Excellency's Government wrote—'We would take this opportunity of representing to Your Grace our earnest desire that our official connection with the Zanzibar State should cease. The existence of a Political Agent there in no way serves the interests of India.'

† *Vide* paragraph 76.

"With reference to these observations, I have to invite Your Excellency's attention to the views* expressed by the Government of your predecessor. In reply to an enquiry put by the Secretary of State for India, as to whether, in the opinion of the Viceroy, there were 'any political and commercial questions arising out of the relations between India and Zanzibar of sufficient importance to render it necessary that any controlling authority should be exercised by the Government of India,' the Viceroy in Council stated, 'having regard to the position of Zanzibar and its general relations to India, and to the tribes on the shores of the Indian sea, it appears to us that the Political Agent there ought to be under the Bombay Government, subject to the control of the Government of India, rather than under the Foreign Office; and that the Agent should be chosen by the Government of Bombay, who have the best opportunities for making a good selection. Indeed it would, in our opinion, be better that the present anomalous state of things should continue, than that the control of political affairs at Zanzibar

* *Vide* paragraph 40.

Political despatch to India, dated 15th February 1868 (No. 20).

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"ملخص المراسلات المتعلقة بشؤون زنجبار من ١٨٥٦ إلى ١٨٧٢". أعدّه
النقيب ب. د. هندرسون، الملحق بالإدارة الخارجية" [١٢٠ظ] (١١٤/٨٠)

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should be transferred to the Foreign Office, which could not take cognizance of cases affecting the interests of Indian subjects, and subjects of neighbouring allied States, with the rapidity and convenience that are desirable.

"Your Excellency is aware that the anomalous state of things here adverted to was brought by Her Majesty's Government under the consideration of a special committee on the East African slave trade, in which the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, and the Admiralty were represented, and of which Mr. Churchill, your Agent at Zanzibar (then on sick leave), was a member. The committee were of opinion that as the duties of the Agency and Consulate at Zanzibar were of a two-fold character,—one part concerning the Indian, and the other the Imperial, Government,—it was expedient that the controlling authority should be divided between the Foreign Office and the India Office, and first that the cost of maintaining this two-fold establishment should be equally divided between the Imperial and the Indian Governments. This recommendation was supported by the Foreign Office and the India Office; but it is with much regret that I have to inform you that the proposal has been negatived by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury,* who refuse to burden the Imperial Exchequer with any part of the expenditure necessary for the support of the Zanzibar establishment.

"Against this decision I have protested. I concur in opinion with Your Excellency's Government that the revenues of India should on no account be charged with any part of the expenditure entailed by the efforts made for the suppression of the East African slave trade. But I do not agree with you in considering that the interests of India are in no wise promoted by the residence at Zanzibar of an officer appointed and controlled by the Indian Governments. There is a large and increasing trade between India and Zanzibar, and many subjects of Her Majesty and of neighbouring Indian States are located in that territory. Apart from all political considerations, it appears to me, indeed, open to serious question whether an entire severance of the existing connection between your Government and the Sultan of Zanzibar would not be highly injurious to large numbers of the people under your rule.

"If, therefore, it should be finally determined by the Lords of the Treasury that no contribution shall be made by the Imperial Exchequer towards the maintenance of the British establishment at Zanzibar, I should consider it my duty, in communication with Your Excellency, to place the Agency on an entirely new footing, so that no payment should thereafter be made from the Indian revenues on account of any proceedings connected with the suppression of the slave trade, or any other measures not having for their object the benefit of the people of India. But it will be obvious to Your Excellency that at a time when the Financial Department of Her Majesty's Government refuse to entertain a proposal strongly recommended by other departments for an equitable division of the expenses of the Zanzibar establishment, I could not, if I thought it desirable, recommend that the Imperial Government should relieve India altogether of the charge of the Zanzibar Agency and Consulate.

"Another proposal of a very opposite character has been brought to my notice since this despatch was commenced. I learnt, in the first instance, through the Foreign Office, that Mr. Churchill, having gone to Bombay, had put himself in communication with Sir Seymour Fitzgerald with respect to the expediency of annexing the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar to our Indian Empire,* and that the proposal would be recommended by Your Excellency. On learning this, I lost

no time in telegraphing to the Governor of Bombay that no such proposal would be entertained by Her Majesty's Government, and that I hoped it would never be submitted. I have since learnt with regret that it has taken a more substantive official shape than I had expected. With respect to the proposal, it only requires that I should communicate to you the absolute disapproval of Her Majesty's Government of any project for the annexation of Zanzibar, or the assertion of any right to interfere with the succession in that country, and I do so with greater satisfaction, from the knowledge that Your Excellency's views are in accordance with my own.

"With regard, however, to the recent proceedings of Mr. Churchill, both at the time of the death of the late Sultan Syed Majid and subsequently on the occasion of his visit to Bombay, I cannot refrain from expressing my opinion—an opinion in entire accord with that expressed by Your Excellency—that he has altogether misunderstood his position and manifested an amount of indiscretion which proves him to be wholly unfitted for so important a post. Mr. Churchill, as you are aware, is not like his predecessors, an officer of the Indian establishment, but a member of the Consular Service of Great Britain. By an interchange of appointments, which I have never been thoroughly able to understand, and such as I hope will not be sanctioned again, Her Majesty's Consul-General in Algeria became Agent and Consul at Zanzibar under the Government of Bombay. I am anxious now, as soon as possible, to see

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the Zanzibar Agency again placed under the charge of an Indian officer, in whose knowledge and experience Your Excellency's Government can repose entire confidence, and to whom you can safely entrust any difficult and delicate duties of an exceptional character, which recent events may impose upon the representative of the British Government in that part of the world.

"Indeed, the circumstantial changes to which I have adverted at the commencement of this despatch seem to render it advisable that something of a special character should be given to the new mission at Zanzibar. It would be highly expedient that the British Government should avail itself of the coincidence of two new rulers, both of the old family of Syed Saeed, being established in Zanzibar and in Muscat, to ascertain the wishes of both Chiefs, to reconcile any differences that may exist between them, and to place their relations with each other on such a footing as to call for the least possible amount of interference from the British Government. Should an officer be available competent to perform these special duties with advantage to a State, and at the same time willing to accept the permanent office of Agent at Zanzibar, it will be so much gain to Your Government. But if not, Your Excellency's Government might consider it desirable to send an officer of rank and experience to Zanzibar, who, after arbitrating on all special questions that might arise, and placing affairs on a substantial footing not likely to be disturbed, might leave the direction of the Agency with its diminished responsibilities, in the hands of an officer of inferior rank.

"It is my wish, as I am sure it is Your Excellency's, that the British Government should endeavour to establish on an enduring basis amicable relations between the rulers of Zanzibar and Muscat, and at the same time so to contribute to their security, in their several possessions, as to render future appeals to British arbitration, and future necessities for our interference, as few as possible. I have been strongly impressed by the public inconvenience resulting from the vast amount of correspondence thrown upon the Indian Government, abroad and at home, by the engagements which we have contracted, and the arbitrations we have undertaken with respect to these distant alliances. Our great object is the preservation of the peace of the Persian Gulf and the adjacent waters, and, so long as this is secured, the less we have to do with the internal relations of the several States the better. It is naturally the wish of Her Majesty's Government that the descendants of our old and faithful ally, Syed Saeed, Imam of Muscat, should continue to rule over the possessions which he bequeathed to them. But we must not be unmindful of the fact that revolutions have been, and again may be, frequent in Omam, and that, therefore, our best policy is that which least connects us with personal engagements of any kind. We should be at all times free to recognize any ruler accepted by the people, without thereby renewing or discarding any previously contracted obligations, or being entangled in any difficult questions of public faith arising out of previous pledges and promises actual or constructive."

82. REPLY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA REGARDING RELATIONS WITH ZANZIBAR.—To the above despatch the Government of India replied (*despatch No. 35, dated 23rd June 1871*)—

"With reference to paragraphs 1 to 7, we would observe that the opinion given by the Government of India in their despatch No. 81 of 14th May 1868, to the effect that the political affairs of Zanzibar should be solely controlled by an officer appointed by the Bombay Government and not by the Foreign Office at home, was given at a time when the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy to Muscat had not been discontinued, and on the supposition that the intimate relations between the two States which the subsidy involved were to be permanent. On the supposition that the annual payment of the subsidy to Muscat by the Zanzibar State is to continue, we entirely concur in the views then expressed that, if Muscat be under the Government of India, and Zanzibar be under the Foreign Office, there will not only be a conflict of direction, but sooner or later also a conflict of policy.

"But if the obligation of Zanzibar to pay the subsidy to Muscat be declared to have ceased, matters have entirely changed, the intimate relations between the two States are severed, and there is no longer reason to apprehend that evil will result from the control of the political affairs at Muscat being under one authority, and those of Zanzibar under another. The recommendation made in our despatches marginally noted, that we should be released from all official connection with the Zanzibar Agency, rested chiefly, if not entirely, on the supposition that the subsidy is to be no longer paid.

To Secretary of State (Secret), No. 17, dated 22nd February 1870.	political affairs at Muscat being under
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" " " " 60, " 21st December "	under another. The recommendation
" " " " 13, " 23rd April 1871.	made in our despatches marginally
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Zanzibar Agency, rested chiefly, if not entirely, on the supposition that the subsidy is to be no longer paid.

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"In our despatch No. 16 of 4th April, of which an extract is given in the margin, we stated our opinion on this subject at some length, and we see no reason to modify the views therein expressed. The fact of Indian subjects having a large trade with Zanzibar does not appear to us to be a sufficient reason for having a Political Agent there. An equally large and remunerative trade is carried on by our Indian subjects with many other ports where a consular establishment is found sufficient for all the duties which arise."

Until a decision on the subject of the subsidy was received, the Government of India expressed their inability to carry out the suggestions of the Secretary of State with regard to the constitution of the mission at Zanzibar on its new footing.

88. CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING EXPENSES OF ZANZIBAR CONSULATE.—
In June 1871 copies of correspondence that had taken place between the London Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, with regard to the expenses of the Consulate at Zanzibar, was forwarded for the information of the Government of India. Of that correspondence the following is a summary: The Foreign Office appear, in submitting the report of the committee on the East African slave trade, to have recommended an increase of expenditure on account of the slave squadron, and on account of the establishment of new Consulates, and also the assumption by the Imperial Government of a half share of the cost of the Political Agency at Zanzibar. The Lords of the Treasury would not consent to any increased expenditure for the objects mentioned, and their reply concluded—

"My Lords, without stating what their view might be if the absolute extinction of the East African slave trade were in question, are not disposed to expend a greater amount than at present of public money upon measures which have the appearance of lending at least a partial countenance to it. My Lords think that the continuance of the present expenditure upon such terms requires serious consideration."

Thereupon the Foreign Office, believing that the objection was founded on a misconception of the question and of the policy advocated by the committee, represented that the complete, though gradual, cessation of all conveyance of slaves by sea was contemplated, and that a system by which less than five per cent. of the slaves exported were rescued was obviously inadequate. The Lords of the Treasury were asked to re-consider their decision, and, with regard to the expenses of the Zanzibar Agency, it was said—


"a great portion of this officer's duty is in connection with the slave trade, which is a subject of imperial interest; that the system of divided superintendence in slave-trade matters, which has hitherto prevailed, has led to the issue of conflicting orders at considerable detriment to the public service abroad, while at Home the two-fold action of the two departments multiplies correspondence and retards the despatch of business.

"It is, therefore, most advisable that the superintendency of slave-trade matters at Zanzibar should rest entirely with this department; and I am to state that the Government of India have lately expressed a very strong opinion that under the altered relations of Zanzibar to the State of Muscat, the Indian funds should be relieved of all expenditure on account of the Agency, and that the only alternative arrangement which they would consent to would be that the entire cost of the arrangement for the suppression of the slave trade should be borne by the imperial revenues."

The arrangements had, however, no effect on the Lords of the Treasury, who were "unable to arrive at any conclusion" than that previously announced. On being informed of this decision, the Secretary of State for India expressed his regret thereat and observed, with regard to the refusal of the Treasury to bear half the cost of the Agency,—

"as the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury have refused to accede to this proposed arrangement, the Secretary of State for India in Council is compelled to regard the question of the

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cost of the Zanzibar establishment from a new point of view, and to state distinctly his opinion on the subject.

"The proceedings of the special committee sitting at the Foreign Office, the report of which was laid before the Parliament on the 24th January 1870, clearly show the importance which the Imperial Government attached to the suppression of the East African slave trade. This, as observed by the Slave Committee Trade, is not an Indian, but an Imperial, question. The Government of India have, indeed, on more than one occasion protested against the justice of any part of the expenses attending the suppression of the East African slave trade being charged against the revenues of India. In the opinion thus expressed, the Duke of Argyll concurs. It is only in consideration of the fact that there is an extensive trade between some parts of India and Zanzibar that the Secretary of State for India in Council can sanction any expenditure at all on the maintenance of an establishment in this outlying territory. He desires, therefore, that you will state, for the information of Earl Granville, with a view to its communication to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that His Grace will take immediate steps, through the Government of India, to place the Zanzibar Agency on an entirely new footing with reference to the requirements of Indian interests and commerce."

The Foreign Office then transmitted a copy of the Duke of Argyll's letter to the Lords of the Treasury and remarked—

"As this change will involve the loss of all control over, and probably the entire neglect of, all slave trade questions at Zanzibar, Lord Granville must again express his great regret at the decision which has provoked this resolution on the part of the Government of India, and his strong hope that it may yet be rescinded.

The Lords of the Treasury replied that—

"they cannot agree with His Lordship in thinking that the policy suggested in their correspondence warrants any addition to the imperial expenditure already incurred on account of it."

Upon which the Foreign Office asked the India Office—

"whether, in saying that the Agency is to be placed on an entirely new footing with reference to the requirements of Indian interests and commerce, the Secretary of State for India means that the Agent is no longer to interfere in matters of imperial interest, such as the slave trade and traffic in slaves, and that he is to cease, as hitherto, to be under the control of this department in regard to such questions."

The India Office replied—

"The Governor General of India in Council has, on more than one occasion, in the interests of the great dependency under his charge, protested against any appropriation of the revenues of India to such imperial objects as the suppression of the slave trade, and has even suggested the withdrawal of the Agent altogether, as an officer whose services are but little, if at all, required for purposes of a purely Indian character. Lord Granville is aware that in this opinion the Duke of Argyll has not concurred; but he considers it to be his duty to limit the employment of the Agent, and the expenditure of the Agency, to such objects as may tend directly to the promotion of the interests of India; and in this view it would be requisite that all instructions furnished to the officer selected by the Government of Bombay, or the Government of India, should emanate from these authorities, and that the ultimate controlling authority must be vested solely in the Secretary of State for India."

The last mentioned letter was dated the 22nd June, and on the 28th of the following month the Secretary of State addressed the Indian Government as follows:

"The whole question of the relations of the British Government with Zanzibar is at the present time under the consideration of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and that it is desirable, therefore, that only such action may be taken, pending the receipt of further instructions, as may be necessary to prevent inconvenience and embarrassment in the conduct of the current business of the mission. It is not desired that the views which I have expressed respecting the relations of the Foreign and Indian departments of Her Majesty's Government with the Zanzibar slave trade should be acted upon precipitately, or that anything should be done, pending the enquiry to which I have referred, to obstruct the efforts now being made for the suppression of the illegal traffic."

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To this the Government of India replied—

"We have not taken, and will not take, any steps to alter our existing relations with Zanzibar, until we shall have received the views of Her Majesty's Government in reply to the various despatches on the subject which we have addressed to Your Grace from time to time. Our opinion on the following points remains unchanged, *viz.*, (1) that the suppression of the African slave traffic is not an object to which any portion of the Indian revenues can with propriety be devoted; (2) that the payment of the subsidy by Zanzibar to Muscat should be continued; and (3), that if it be discontinued, then the political connection of the Indian Government with Zanzibar should altogether cease."—(Despatch No. 56, dated 7th September 1871.)

84. RECOGNITION OF SYED BURGASH BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.—

On the 17th July 1871 Dr. Kirk forwarded for information a copy of a letter from Earl Granville, recognising Syed Burgash as Sultan of Muscat. The letter congratulated him on his accession, expressed satisfaction at learning that he would observe the engagements concluded with his predecessors, told him that the Political Agent would make certain proposals with the view of furthering the suppression of the slave trade, and earnestly recommended these proposals to His Highness's attentive consideration. The Bombay Government observed—

"Any further acknowledgment of His Highness Syed Burgash's succession to the Sultanate of Zanzibar seems now unnecessary, in consequence of the formal recognition of His Highness by the Foreign Office."

And in this opinion the Government of India concurred, and did not deem it requisite to reply to Syed Burgash's letter announcing his accession to the throne of Zanzibar, an answer to which had been deferred pending the receipt of information from Bombay as to the position of affairs in Zanzibar.

85. INCONVENIENCES OF DUAL REPRESENTATION AT ZANZIBAR EXEMPLIFIED BY THE RECOGNITION OF SYED BURGASH.—In forwarding the correspondence regarding Syed Burgash's recognition, the Bombay Government observed—"The inconveniences of a dual representation at that place (*i. e.*, Zanzibar) is instanced by the present correspondence," and the Government of India in forwarding the papers to the Secretary of State observed—

"We solicit Your Grace's attention to the forcible illustration therein afforded, of the evils resulting from the present dual system of conducting the relations of the British Government with Zanzibar. From considerations of the doubtful aspect of affairs there, we had refrained from according to Syed Burgash any further recognition than what was due to the *de facto* possessor of authority at Zanzibar for the time being. It is readily conceivable that, had the affairs of Zanzibar taken a different turn (of which there appeared at one time some probability), we might have felt it our duty to have withheld formal recognition. In such an event serious difficulties would have arisen, if, after this had become known to the Sultan, he had received a letter of recognition from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. So long as the present system continues, there is at all times a liability to complications of a similar character; and if the political relations of the Government of India with Zanzibar are to continue, we would urgently press upon Her Majesty's Government the absolute necessity of placing them on such a footing as will effectually prevent the possibility of any difference taking place in action authorized by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Government of India."

86. QUESTION AS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF DR. KIRK AT ZANZIBAR.—

A question was simultaneously raised by the Bombay Government regarding the appointment of Dr. Kirk at Zanzibar. They observed—

"Dr. Kirk has been appointed only to act as Political Agent at Zanzibar, and he cannot, in the opinion of this Government, complain of the appointment of Political Agent and Consul being filled from India, where, I am to observe, the permanent appointment is justly

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other power to question any act seeming to be at variance with its provisions." The Secretary of State was asked by the Government of India to send a copy of the correspondence which led to the interchange of this declaration, and His Excellency the Viceroy remarked with regard to it—"This must be recollected in any question relating to Muscat." The declaration was as follows :

"Declaration between Great Britain and France, engaging reciprocally to respect the independence of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar.*—Signed at Paris, 10th March 1862.

"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, taking into consideration the importance of maintaining the independence of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, and of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, have thought it right to engage reciprocally to respect the independence of these Sovereigns.

"The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and the Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being furnished with the necessary powers, hereby declare, in consequence, that their said Majesties take reciprocally that engagement.

"In witness whereof, the undersigned have signed the present Declaration, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

"Done at Paris, the 10th March 1862.

(L. S.) COWLEY.

(L. S.) E. THOUVENEL."

90. FINANCIAL POSITION OF ZANZIBAR.—A valuable memorandum was transmitted by Dr. Kirk in August 1871, showing the financial position of Zanzibar at the time of Syed Majid's death, and the situation of Syed Burgash, and also of some of the members of his family on whom, in case of his death, the throne would probably devolve.

"By the peculiar constitution of the Zanzibar Government, confirmed by the practice followed on the death of Syed Saeed, and again on the accession of Syed Burgash, there exists no public or state treasury: the ships of war, merchant vessels, guns, arms, as well as houses, plantations, &c., are all valued or sold, and the net proceeds divided amongst creditors and heirs.

"On the death of Syed Saeed, a vast fortune was then left and divided amongst the sons, daughters, &c., the elder members of the family receiving in full their shares, while Syed Majid held in trust that of the younger brother's, to whom, from time to time, he made advances, which he charged against the trust funds.

"Syed Burgash was one of those who received in full his share of the late Syed Saeed's estate, but most of his patrimony was exhausted in consequence of the attempt made by him to wrest the throne from his brother.

"At Syed Majid's death there was a debit to Jairam Sewajee of \$ 423,000, and the unpaid-up shares still due to younger brothers amounted to \$ 420,000, making the total liabilities on his estate \$ 843,000.

"This estate included the ships, arms, guns, plantations, &c., &c., for which Syed Majid had paid or taken over on his father's death, and of which Syed Burgash has already received his share.

"The sale and valuation (for such things as ships, arms, &c., were not sold by auction, but valued) produced \$ 610,000, of which Ludda, as agent for Jairam, received \$ 308,700, and Syed Burgash took up to the value of \$ 391,004½, being in part a re-purchase from Ludda of certain things.

* Signed also in the French language.

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Events in Zanzibar from the death of Syed Majid.

"The outstanding debt to the house of Jairam, on the 22nd August 1871, or before the new arrangement, was as follows :

	\$	Cents.
1. Balance of Syed Majid's debt undischarged	114,300	18½
2. Liabilities incurred to enable Syed Burgash to take over the ships of war, palace, plantation, &c.	391,004	50
3. Old private debt of Syed Burgash before his accession	13,164	75
4. New debt incurred by Syed Burgash since his accession	120,533	73½
Total Liabilities	540,002	81½

"By the settlement effected on the renewal of the right to farm the customs revenues dating for five years from the 22nd August 1871, \$ 340,002-80 of the above liability was cancelled by Ludda, and the balance of \$ 200,000 consolidated under a written acknowledgment of obligation, which, however, bears no interest, while the customs remain in Jairam's hands, or for the term of five years.

"Syed Burgash has also discharged \$ 280,000 of the trust debts owing by Syed Majid to the younger brothers ; and this is probably the last they will ever receive.

"Even with the aid obtained from Ludda, His Highness has been obliged to part with many of the landed estates formerly in Syed Majid's hands ; the average yearly produce of those left with him not exceeding now \$ 10,000 with which \$ 300,000, yearly rent of customs, makes a total sum of \$ 310,000 (£ 65,263-3-2), or an income of \$ 15,000 less than that of his predecessor, for the tax levied on the Hadima of the island has been remitted. Syed Burgash has, however, effected a saving by stopping political pensions formerly paid to such as Syed Suliman bin Hamed, who received \$ 5,000 yearly, and others of lesser sums, and he has yet refused assistance to the insolent beggars from Oman who obtained from Syed Majid in later years. This retrenchment, however, with the present Sultan, amounts in many cases to meanness, and he is most impolitic in dealing with those independent of him but whose interest it is to conciliate."

"The Sultan's present monthly expenditure on ships, soldiers, &c., &c., amounts to \$ 22,000, or \$ 264,000 yearly, leaving a margin far too small for contingencies, and no provision for gratuities to his brother Toorkee at Muscat, still less for the payment of any regular subsidy which it would be for many other reasons most impolitic to re-establish.

"The information I have gained regarding the means of other members of the royal family shows that their incomes are, in many cases, not sufficient for their support. Of the male children of Syud Saeed there are now ten alive ;—of these, two are in Muscat and eight in Zanzibar.

"Abdool Azeez, now with Syed Toorkee in Muscat, has an estate here, but his property is so deeply mortgaged to Ludda as to be worthless.

"Next to Syed Burgash in age, comes Syed Khuleefa, the favorite brother of Syed Majid, a lad of no energy, but personally popular ; his property is worth about \$19,000, but, with a mortgage of \$7,000 on it, his income cannot exceed £ 200 per annum.

"Syed Ali has an estate worth \$35,000 mortgaged to Ludda for \$3,300.

"Syed Abbas, an active lad, who speaks English very well, but cannot read or write any language, has an estate worth very little.

"Among the youngest, Syed Abderab is, perhaps, the most independent, his estate being worth \$88,000, with mortgage on it of only \$9,000.

"No care whatever has been taken with the education of these young lads, who are purposely left in ignorance, and kept, as much as possible, from mixing with people ; and any attempts I have made to alter this system have proved fruitless.

"The above information, as also that connected with the new arrangement regarding the custom house, being given to me in confidence, it would obviously be injudicious to allow it to become public first through official channels. In town, the terms on which the customs have been rented are still unknown, and commonly said to be at five lakhs. Concerning the more detailed statistics of the Zanzibar liabilities, nothing certain whatever is known."

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Events in Zanzibar from the death of Syed Majid.

91. REPRESENTATION TO LORDS OF THE TREASURY REGARDING COST OF ZANZIBAR AGENCY.—The following communication was addressed by the London Foreign Office to the Lords of the Treasury in October 1871, respecting the question of dividing the cost of the Agency at Zanzibar between the Imperial and Indian Governments (*vide* paragraph 83):

"On receipt of your letter of the 2nd June, intimating the renewed refusal of the Lords of the Treasury to sanction any further expenditure from imperial funds for the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa, and for contributing to the maintenance of the Agency at Zanzibar, Lord Granville thought it necessary to ascertain from the Secretary of State for India what would be the position of this department with respect to the control of slave-trade questions at Zanzibar, and how far the Agent of the Government of India would be allowed to interfere in them.

"I am now to transmit to you, for the serious consideration of the Lords of the Treasury, a copy of the reply from the India Office, stating that their Lordships' decision has compelled them to determine that the duties and employment of their Political Agent shall, in future, be limited to such objects as to tend directly to promote Indian interests, that all instructions sent to him must emanate from the Indian Government, and that the ultimate controlling authority must be vested solely in the Government of India.

"As the Indian Government have always held the suppression of the slave trade to be a question of imperial and not of Indian interest, this decision will probably involve the neglect of slave-trade questions, and certainly the loss of control over the Agent at Zanzibar, hitherto exercised by the Foreign Secretary.


"The Lords of the Treasury must be aware of the heavy and important duties that devolve upon the Agent at Zanzibar as Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court in the trial of slave-trade cases, and they can appreciate, as well as Lord Granville, the serious mischief likely to ensue from a neglect of these duties, as well as from the absence of instructions from the only department competent to direct the Agent in slave-trade matters; but, unless this decision is reversed, it is evident either that the department must entirely surrender the direction of slave-trade affairs on the East Coast, or that Her Majesty's Government must appoint and pay special Agents of their own.

"Matters are now at a complete dead-lock. No instructions can be sent to the Agent from this department; and the question is reduced to the single and simple issue, whether the Imperial Government shall persevere in or abandon its endeavours to suppress the slave trade on the Coast.

A Select Committee of the House of Commons, recently appointed, has, after hearing the best evidence that could be produced, reported strongly* in favor of perseverance and increased expenditure on a system, and, without endorsing all their proposals, which have not yet been sufficiently considered, Lord Granville cannot doubt that, looking to the strong feeling which pervades the country on the subject of the slave trade, the spirit of their report will find a response in Parliament, and in the public generally, who will insist upon more being done.

"Lord Granville is decidedly of opinion that such a general feeling cannot be disregarded by Her Majesty's Government, and at all events, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he will not assume the responsibility of disregarding it. It must rest, therefore, with the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to decide whether they will as the first step grant or withhold the sums necessary to meet the expenditure for such an establishment as may be required at Zanzibar for carrying out a more vigorous and better organized policy for the suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa under the direction of Her Majesty's Government."

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CHAPTER VI.

Slave Trade.

92. BRIGADIER COGHLAN'S REPORT OF 1860 ON SLAVE TRADE.—After the completion of his labors on the Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, Brigadier Coghlan submitted, as he had been requested to do, a report dated 1st November 1860, on the actual state of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa, and suggested more effectual means for its extirpation than those then in force. The following is a brief resumé of that report: Brigadier Coghlan stated that within the few previous years the slave trade on the East Coast had largely increased, more especially in the Portuguese settlements, where it was carried on without risk and with the connivance of the local authorities. With a view to check it, he suggested that the Cape Squadron should be strengthened with a sufficient number of steam vessels to watch the Portuguese Coast from Delagoa Bay to Cape Dilgado, having a haven at the island of Johanna on the north and at Iniaek Island, at the extreme point of Cape Dilgado, on the south.

As regards the slave trade from Zanzibar, Brigadier Coghlan reported that, by the treaty of 1845 with the Imam of Muscat, the import of slaves from Africa to any portion of His Highness's possessions in Asia or Arabia, was prohibited, and British cruisers had power to seize any vessels, whether belonging to His Highness or not, conveying slaves, except in transit from one port in His Highness's African dominions to another. This treaty was, however, constantly evaded, and it was calculated that about 4,000 slaves annually were carried from Africa to Arabia and the Persian Gulf. There was also an extensive trade in slaves carried on under foreign colors, the chief agent in which was one Buonoventura Mass, whose proceedings at Zanzibar had so often been reported to Government by Colonel Rigby. The system of domestic slavery in Zanzibar was said to have become the principal source of the extensive supply of slaves for foreign exportation. About 30,000 slaves were annually brought from the African territories.

Syed Majid was not unwilling to check the trade to the extent of the treaty of 1845, but his orders were evaded, and he was unable to resist the influence of those around him. Brigadier Coghlan thought that the trade to the northwards might easily be stopped by the squadron in the Persian Gulf. A small steamer, or two schooners, stationed between Rasil-Hadd and Muzlvia Island, and a similar guard at the Persian Gulf during the season when Arab craft returned from Africa, would, he considered, be effectual. He proposed to separate these vessels from the Persian Gulf Squadron and make them a separate command from March to June each year, and he suggested that there should be on board of each vessel an officer conversant with the Native languages. He also suggested some more speedy method of adjudicating on slave prizes, and proposed to station a steam gun-boat of light draught at Zanzibar, from January to March, to prevent the shipment of slaves and arrest the foreign trade.

Brigadier Coghlan was in favor of endeavouring to effect a revision of the treaty of 1845, so as to prohibit all export or import whatever by sea in His Highness's dominions, giving three years notice of the prohibition. In paragraphs 34 to 39 of his report, Brigadier Coghlan treated of the objections which might be brought against this proposal, the chief of which was the loss which would ensue to the revenue of Syed Majid. His Highness levied a duty of two

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dollars a head on slaves, which yielded him between £5,000 and £8,000 a year. But Brigadier Coghlan suggested that Her Majesty's Government might, perhaps, be induced to give His Highness compensation for this for a space of, say, 10 or 12 years. "Nothing is needed," he said, "beyond an insistent urgency, coupled with an offer of reasonable indemnification and our support to ensure them against any overt acts of their subjects in consequence of the concession, to obtain the consent of either Syed Thoweynee or Syed Majid to the measure here suggested" for the more effectual abolition of the slave trade.

Brigadier Coghlan further proposed that the co-operation of France, and the United States of America might be secured, and a joint convention concluded for the total suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa. No orders were passed by Government on this report at the time, pending the decision of the Home Government with regard to the reduction of the Indian Navy.—(*Proceedings, May 1861, Nos. 9-11.*)

93. LIEUT.-COLONEL RIGBY'S REPORT OF 1861 ON SLAVE TRADE.—A further report on the slave trade was received in May 1861 from Colonel Rigby, who stated that the treaties with Muscat for the suppression of the slave trade had been considered a dead letter from the day they were concluded. About 10,000 slaves a year were exported northwards. The trade in slaves was recognized as a distinct traffic, and gave employment to about 150 vessels. Colonel Rigby was of opinion that the slave trade could only be effectually checked by operations on the African coast. During the previous year Her Majesty's ships *Lyra* and *Sidon* had captured 25 slaves. If this were followed up by active measures on the following year, Colonel Rigby thought that it would prevent the piratical tribes of the Persian Gulf from coming to the Zanzibar coast in future, and thus put a stop to at least half the traffic in slaves on the East Coast of Africa.

Her Majesty's ships *Lyra* and *Sidon* had returned to England, but Colonel Rigby stated that if two steam gun-boats were stationed at Zanzibar during the months of March and April, and also during the months of September and October, scarcely a vessel would escape. During the other months Native vessels cannot go north owing to the winds.

The Bombay Government considered the expediency of adopting Colonel Rigby's proposal to be urgent. On receipt of this report the Government of India announced its intention of addressing the Secretary of State with a view to adequate measures being taken for the presence of Her Majesty's cruisers at the station of Zanzibar during the proper months. As a temporary measure, the Government of Bombay were authorised to station two gun-boats at Zanzibar, if such were available, authority for the destruction of dhows *having slaves on board* being given to the commanders of such vessels. With regard to the revision of the treaty, a measure proposed by Colonel Rigby, it was said that any overtures for a revision would be premature in the absence of a naval force adequate to the suppression of the Zanzibar slave trade.—(*Proceedings, Political, A, October 1861, Nos. 92 & 93.*)

In October 1861 Colonel Rigby, in a report to the Bombay Government, gave several instances of the Sultan's apathy regarding the northern slave trade, and his neglect to carry out his treaty engagements. He had also refused to enter into negotiations for the modification of the existing treaties. The presence of Her Majesty's ship *Gorgon* had been most successful in checking the northern slave traffic.

Government still declined to interfere with the Sultan until there was a sufficient naval force in the Gulf.

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94. CONFLICTING INSTRUCTIONS OF HOME AND INDIAN GOVERNMENTS. COLONEL PELLY'S VIEWS ON THE SLAVE TRADE.—A report dated 1st February 1862 received from Colonel Pelly on the East African slave trade, serves admirably to illustrate the difficulties attending the position of the officer at Zanzibar, who at that time received conflicting instructions from the Home and Indian Governments with regard to the slave trade. It possesses also peculiar value as throwing a light on the effect of the action taken by the British Government to repress that nefarious traffic. When Colonel Pelly was appointed to Zanzibar, he was directed by the Bombay Government to give his earliest efforts towards procuring the acceptance by Syed Majid of—

"all treaties and agreements entered into by the British Government and the Imam of Muscat, as binding on the now recognised Sultanet of Zanzibar."

He was further desired to take no further active measures for the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa than such as might be warranted by existing engagements and treaties with the family of the late Syed bin Saeed. "Accordingly," wrote Colonel Pelly—

"my first intention was given to an examination of the treaty upon which our anti-slavery relations with the Imam were founded, and on arrival at Zanzibar, I took the earliest opportunity of proposing to the Sultan an acceptance of all subsisting treaty engagements.

"I found the slave treaty to be a document bearing date 2nd October 1845, for 'the suppression of the exportation of slaves from his Highness' African dominions,' but acknowledging the right of the Imam to transport slaves along the coast of his African dominions within specified limits; and I found also that a letter from the Imam to Lord Aberdeen, dated 8th April 1844, and the reply of Lord Aberdeen to the Imam, dated 21st December 1844, gave greater clearness and precision to the terms of the treaty, and tended to show that the treaty was mooted on account of the desire of the 'British people that no slaves should be taken from Africa to Arabia, Persia, and the Red Sea;' and went, moreover, to declare 'that Her Majesty's Government claim no right to interfere with the passage of slaves in your (His Highness') ships between the above-mentioned ports (Lamoo and Keelwa, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfa) and islands on the coast of your African dominions. And accordingly, in the draft of agreement to be proposed to Your Highness, the right to continue such transport of slaves has been treated as a reservation made by Your Highness rather than as a concession made to you by Her Majesty.'

"This, then, was the treaty that, in obedience to instructions, I proposed to His Highness to confirm in the month of October last. His Highness readily agreed and suggested only the introduction of a clause providing that his coasting craft within the specified limits should not be injured by our cruizers without being in the first instance brought to Zanzibar for adjudication by the Consul. The Sultan was evidently anxious on the question of the slave treaty, assured me that already his coasting trade was in a large measure destroyed by our cruizers, and begged to be informed whether, if he should now ratify the old treaty, he would be left at peace on the subject. I submitted it to be the wish of Government to accept the treaty at present obtaining, and that it was not the desire of Government to urge any active measures unsanctioned by the terms of that treaty. * * * * *

"After the lapse of some time, however, I learned that, prior to his departure from Zanzibar, Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby had received instructions from the Foreign Office 'to demand from His Highness such a modification of his treaties with Her Majesty for the suppression of the slave trade, as should authorise Her Majesty's ships to seize all vessels belonging to his subjects who might be found transporting slaves coastwise within his dominions,' that, acting under these instructions, Colonel Rigby had entered upon a series of discussions with the Sultan; that eventually the Sultan had declined to accede to the demand, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby had animadverted on this refusal to Government."

Colonel Pelly, therefore, felt it his duty to tell the Sultan that the demand of Her Majesty's Government remained uncomplied with, and that he must expect it to be repeated probably with increased emphasis. The Sultan showed that a compliance with the demand meant expulsion or death to himself and ruin to his country.

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According to the view taken by Colonel Pelly, the question of slavery involved two leading considerations—

- (a) the exportation of slaves northwards to the coasts of Asia; and
- (b) the status of slavery within the territories of Zanzibar itself.

Taking up the second point Colonel Pelly, after entering into an elaborate examination of the position of the Sultan, the organisation of society, and the condition of the slaves themselves, came to the conclusion that the proposed abolition of the slave trade within the limits of the Zanzibar would be in the highest degree inexpedient. The Sultan had but very little political power, and no naval or military force. If he issued a proclamation abolishing slavery, it would not be obeyed, and he would be deposed; and if the British Government issued it, they must carry it out by force of arms and take the Sultan under their protection. Colonel Pelly summed up by saying that, to root out slavery in Zanzibar itself, it would destroy the trade, ruin the Sultan, convulse society, leave slavery itself as rife as ever, and only succeed in exciting hatred of the Europeans along the East Coast of Africa.

Regarding the exportation of slaves northwards, however, Colonel Pelly urged that it should be put down. The northern slavers, he said, were pirates, who committed every kind of atrocity; and both the Sultan and his people would gladly put a stop to their visits. But the Government of Zanzibar deprecated the proceedings of the British cruisers, who had seized many vessels and liberated many slaves belonging to the home trade, contrary to existing treaty.

Colonel Pelly represented that the conduct of the British has so exasperated the northern slavers, and even the people of Zanzibar, that he considered his life is in danger.

The Government of India concurred with the Bombay Government in their opinion, that the object which it was desired to attain would be more effectually secured if the British Agents at Zanzibar and Muscat conducted their relations with the Sultan and Imam in the spirit of the instructions given to Colonel Pelly by the Bombay Government when he took up his appointment at Zanzibar. In the absence of a sufficient naval force in the Gulf, and of a clear indication of the policy of the Home Government with regard to the slave trade, the Government of India did not consider it desirable that those instructions should be exceeded. In forwarding these papers to the Secretary of State the Government of India drew attention to the dilemma in which Colonel Pelly was placed in consequence of conflicting orders, and solicited early instructions with respect to the policy to be pursued with Zanzibar, Muscat, and Persia as regards the suppression of the slave trade.—(*Political, A, May 1862, Nos. 119-29.*)

95. EFFORTS OF SYED MAJID IN THE SUPPRESSION OF SLAVERY.—Colonel Pelly reported to Government in March 1862 that the Sultan had seized and imprisoned three sets of Northern Arabs engaged in shipping slaves from Zanzibar in defiance of a proclamation which had been issued by him some months previously. After issue of the proclamation Colonel Pelly had told the Sultan that he confided on him to carry it out. No further communication passed on the subject, and the Sultan justified the confidence placed on him by the seizures reported.

"Certainly," wrote Colonel Pelly, "I am of opinion that so long as there is a Sultan of Zanzibar, it is on all accounts more fit and politic that the treaty should be fulfilled by the

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voluntary act of the Sultan himself, rather than that I or Her Majesty's cruisers should appear on the scenes as judge and jury."

The Sultan had, said Colonel Pelly, shown a real desire to expel the Northern Arabs, who on their part attributed the proceedings taken against them to Colonel Pelly. In forwarding the above report the Bombay Government observed—

"The state of affairs therein disclosed exhibits the great difficulties which the Sultan must encounter in repressing the exportation of slaves from Zanzibar and the coast of Africa, and the impossibility of expecting that, while he is thus endeavouring to effect its gradual suppression, he should also take active measures for suppressing the internal traffic in slaves among his own subjects; measures which would at once excite against him their anger and disgust as well as that of the Arab slave dealers from the Asian coasts, against whom his operations are now directed."

No action was taken by the Government of India on this report, the proceedings connected with the slave trade having already been reported to the Secretary of State.—(*Political, A, May 1862, Nos. 86 to 89.*)

96. BOATS OF HER MAJESTY'S CRUISERS PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING PORTS ON AFRICAN COAST.—In April 1862 Colonel Pelly reported an encounter between some Arabs and the boats of Her Majesty's Ship *Ariel*. In consequence of this affair Captain Oldfield, the commander of the vessel, interdicted the boats of Her Majesty's cruisers from entering any of the ports on the African coast, except as ports of refuge; and, in intimating this order, observed to Colonel Pelly, that the anti-slavery policy of the Sultan rendered the services of the boats unnecessary "and more injurious to legal traffic than beneficial in the stoppage of the slave trade."

This intimation Colonel Pelly adduced as a testimony to the good faith of the Sultan, and "to the results of our undue interference upon legitimate trade."—(*Political, A, July 1862, Nos. 15 & 16.*)

97. DHOW ENGAGED IN COASTING SLAVE TRADE SEIZED BY THE SULTAN.—On the 30th August 1862 Colonel Pelly reported that it having come to his knowledge that a large *dhow* with 300 slaves on board was about to leave Zanzibar harbour for Lamoo, he had addressed a friendly representation to the Sultan on the subject, admitting at the same time that under treaty engagements he possessed no right to remonstrate on the subject. The Sultan immediately ordered the slaves to be landed. This being the first instance in which any measure had been taken by the Sultan to prevent *coasting* traffic in slaves, the Bombay Government deemed it worthy of attention.—(*Political, A, November 1862, Nos. 121 & 122.*)

98. TREATIES CONCLUDED WITH SHUHUR AND MACULLA.—Treaties were concluded in 1863 between the British Government and the Nukeeb of Shuhur and Maculla, by which the latter agreed to prevent the export and import of slaves to those ports. This closed two of the principal slave depôts to the slave dealers from Zanzibar and the East Coast.—(*Political, A, July 1863, Nos. 58 to 60.*)

99. SLAVE TRADE CARRIED ON UNDER THE FRENCH FLAG.—In September 1863 Lieutenant-Colonel Playfair, Acting Political Agent at Zanzibar, submitted to the Government of India copy of a despatch addressed by him to

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Earl Russell regarding a new phase in the slave trade. Compelled by the vigilance of Her Majesty's cruisers to try every possible expedient for evading search, the slavers found the protection they needed under the French flag. The right of search being in such cases denied to cruisers, it became the object of all slavers to procure French registers, and these were obtained with great facility at Nossi Bé and Magotta.* When Colonel Playfair wrote there were ten country vessels under the French flag in Zanzibar harbour, whose character was more than doubtful.—(*Proceedings, Political, A, December 1863, Nos. 309 & 310.*)

100. SLAVERS TRANSFER THEIR OPERATIONS TO KEELWA.—Lieutenant-Colonel Playfair, in October 1863, wrote that the slave dealers, failing to obtain cargoes of slaves at Zanzibar with the same facility as formerly, had transferred their operations to Keelwa, upon which the Sultan immediately issued orders for controlling the traffic at that port with the view of confining the slave trade to the limits enjoined by the treaty.—(*Political, A, January 1864, Nos. 7 & 8.*)

101. REPRESSIVE MEASURES RECOMMENDED BY COLONEL PLAYFAIR.—Being called upon for his opinion as to the best method of stopping the exportation of slaves from the East Coast of Africa, Colonel Playfair, on the 20th September 1863, suggested that a powerful steamer, aided if possible by a gun-boat, should be stationed between the island of Socotra and the mainland of Africa. He recommended also that a Native agent should be stationed at Keelwa, and a Consul appointed at Mozambique. In the opening paragraphs of his memorandum, Colonel Playfair observed—

"There is no treaty prohibition regarding the transport of slaves from port to port in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, namely, from Cape Delgado, the southern limit, to Magdushoua, the northern boundary, but His Highness had made two concessions which materially interfere to prevent any but his actual subjects thus transporting slaves.

"First, he has given authority to our cruisers to seize any vessel carrying slaves unprovided with a custom-house manifest, stating the exact number it is permitted to carry, or those in which a single slave may be found in excess of the number stated in the manifest; and second, he has engaged to prevent the transport of slaves entirely, even from port to port in his own dominions, during the season when Arabs from the north frequent this coast for the purposes of the slave trade, say from the 1st of January to the 30th of April.

"If we are not to interfere with the actual *status* of slavery on the East Coast of Africa, these concessions appear to me as much as can reasonably be demanded of His Highness, and as much as he can make without imminent danger of losing his kingdom, and, probably, his life.

"That he has every disposition to fulfil his engagements I firmly believe, but unfortunately his power is not commensurate with his good intentions.

"Although his nominal suzerainty extends along so great a stretch of coast, his real authority is limited almost to the island of Zanzibar, and even there it is so weak, and police regulations are so defective, that he can do little more than prevent the open exportation of slaves from the port of Zanzibar."

102. COLONEL PELLY'S OPINION ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE SLAVE SQUADRON.—In December 1863 Colonel Pelly, then Resident in the Persian Gulf, submitted to the Bombay Government some remarks regarding the slave trade, and suggested that the naval division could operate with more effect if it was stationed on the coast line of Arabia.

"At present," he observed, "its operations are mainly carried on between Cape Delgado and the line along the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, with whom our slave treaty is

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of a character to hamper seizures of slave crafts and to throw on us the suspicion of using the authority which we possess under that treaty towards an illegal interference with the slaves status which that same treaty sanctions, thus exciting against us the doubts, opposition, and hatred of those whom the action of the treaty should rather convince and conciliate."

With regard especially to the limits of his own charge, the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly remarked that obviously the best position for a cruiser would be the Straits of Mussendom, at the opening of the Persian Gulf:

"Still," he continued, "even when so stationed, a cruiser would not make a very great number of seizures for more than one or two seasons, since the slave runners would doubtless land their slaves before entering the Straits, and contrive to pass them overland to market; and the margin for profits as between the price of a slave bought in East Africa at from 6 to 12 dollars and the price of a slave sold in the markets of Asia at from 60 to 100 or 200 dollars is so great that it is worth the while of a dealer to run almost any risks and sustain almost any losses, provided he eventually succeed in selling a moderate percentage of his drove. On the whole, however, my personal observation of slave trade, as well along the East Coast of Africa as along the coasts of Arabia and Southern Persia, induces me to think that, if one cruiser were stationed in the Straits of Mussendom, a second at the turning point of Rasel Had, with boats near Soor, and a third in the neighbourhood of Socotra, with boats towards Maculla, these vessels would find themselves in the best position practicable for suppressing the slave trade between East Africa, the Berbera Coast, and Southern Central Asia, because a craft taking her departure from Africa would be compelled to sight one of these points, whether for the sake of water or of verifying her position. Again, these cruisers would prove of great, and since the abolition of Her Majesty's Indian Navy, of almost essential importance for our continually increasing interests along these shores."—(*Political, A, May 1864, Nos. 169 & 70.*)

103. PRESENT OF ORDNANCE MADE TO SULTAN OF ZANZIBAR.—In recognition of the services rendered by Sultan Syed Majid in the suppression of the slave trade, and with more special reference to his recent prohibition against the transport of slaves even from port to port in his dominions during the monsoon, the Government of India sanctioned the presentation to His Highness of six mountain train guns with carriages and limbers complete, and a moderate supply of ammunition.—(*Political, A, May 1864, Nos. 173 & 174.*)

104. RENEWED EFFORTS OF THE SULTAN TO SUPPRESS SLAVERY.—Writing in March 1864 Colonel Playfair reported that contrary to the practice of all previous years the most perfect tranquility prevailed at Muscat, and that, comparatively, few Northern Arabs,—less than half the usual average,—had made their appearance during the season. As their object in coming was merely to procure a supply of slaves, their absence had no effect on the commercial prosperity of Zanzibar.—(*Political, A, May 1864, Nos. 171 & 172.*)

Colonel Playfair reported, in November 1864, that the Sultan had abolished a tax that he had recently imposed on cocoanut trees, and had substituted in its place an increased tax on slaves.—(*Political, A, February 1865, Nos. 25 & 26.*)

105. COLONEL PLAYFAIR'S COMMENTS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE SLAVE SQUADRON.—A correspondence that had passed between Colonel Playfair and Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was forwarded for the information of Government by the former in June 1864. It appears that Colonel Playfair, writing in May 1863, had represented to Earl Russell that, to use his own words—

"a series of arbitrary acts on the part of Her Majesty's vessels, and the capture and destruction of numerous dhows, whose complicity in the slave trade was at best extremely

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doubtful, had engendered throughout the entire African and Arabian coast a feeling of the most bitter animosity against the English; that in few places was a Christian's life safe beyond the immediate precincts of the Sultan's forts; and that such a feeling of insecurity was engendered, that legitimate commerce languished and threatened to collapse."

The Lords of the Admiralty, while admitting an unauthorized destruction of certain dhows by the boatswain of the *Gorgon*, took exception to the statements of Colonel Playfair, who, when called upon for an explanation, defended his remarks on the authority of Colonel Pelly, Captain Oldfield, himself a naval officer, and all the European residents of Zanzibar. He further instanced the case of a Turkish dhow improperly destroyed by the *Lidon* for which Her Majesty's Government had to pay damages to the amount of £5,771, and the proceedings in Mombasa harbour of the boats of Her Majesty's ship *Ariel*. Of this latter case, Colonel Playfair wrote—

"Dr. Krapff, the celebrated African traveller, who was an eye-witness of the affair, says in regard to it: 'It is the indiscriminate destruction of property which enrages the Natives against the English, not the suppression of the slave trade itself.' I could enumerate other acts of a similar nature were it necessary, but the above are sufficient, and I have no desire to make specific accusations against any officer."

With regard to the dhow captured by the *Gorgon*, Colonel Playfair observed—

"People who are only too ready to take exception to our acts, will not be content to abide by the decision of a warrant officer, and they will naturally ask whether it is right that he should be judge, who is also captor and pecuniarily interested in the capture, and whose social standing does not offer a sufficient guarantee for his impartiality."

Colonel Playfair defended himself from the imputation of adopting the statements of interested persons which had been made against him by the Admiralty, and asserted that he had always lent his cordial support in the suppression of the slave trade, which duty he, nevertheless, wished to see carried out with care and circumspection. He concluded—

"I believe that no naval officer now on the station will deny that 'arbitrary acts' have been committed, and it is mainly owing to these having been fearlessly reported that they have ceased to exist, and, as I have before now pointed out, that the recollection of them has in a great measure been effaced."

Earl Russell entirely concurred in the views set forth in Colonel Playfair's reply.—(*Political, A, March 1865, Nos. 206 & 207.*)

106.—COLONEL PLAYFAIR'S VIEWS ON THE SLAVE TRADE.—The following observations are extracted from a despatch addressed by Colonel Playfair to Earl Russell in May 1865, reporting on the measures adopted for the suppression of the slave trade during the season then closed, and their results. He wrote—

"From what I have stated, it is evident that our operations during all the years over which they have extended, have had no appreciable effect in stopping the slave trade, and from the experience I have gained at Zanzibar, I have no hesitation in saying that nothing we can do will ever stop it. Many slavers may be taken, and, if we put sufficient pressure, the export may even be entirely suspended for a time; but the moment that pressure is removed, and our efforts relaxed, it will be resumed with as great activity as ever."

"The whole fabric of Arab society is so interwoven with slavery, and the manners and customs of that race are so unchangeable, that it is hopeless to expect that they will ever permanently abandon their pursuit of slaves. Their fathers have possessed them ever since Arabia was peopled, and they have no idea of a state of things in which slaves do not occupy a prominent place. The institution is one sanctioned by their religion; such a thing as civil law or any other not contained in the Koran is unknown to them; and I fear that no efforts of ours can induce them to regard slavery with the horror which its name excites in a Christian mind."

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"There is one thing to be said in favor of slavery amongst Arabs, and that is that no class of the community is so happy, so free from care, and so well treated, as the Mahomedan slave; nine out of ten would hardly regard freedom as a boon; and, but for our intervention, which compels slavers to resort to all kinds of expedients to procure cargoes, the suffering of the slaves after their arrival on the coast would be hardly appreciable.

"But it is that word after which says so much; we shall never know the amount of suffering, the severance of family ties, and the misery resulting from the depopulation of large tracts of country, which is caused by the pursuit of slaves in the interior of Africa."—(*Political, A, July 1865, Nos. 125 & 126.*)

107. PROTEST OF SULTAN AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH VESSELS IN ZANZIBAR WATERS.—Consequent on the destruction of a dhow in Zanzibar waters, and the detention of another in the vicinity of Pemba Island, Syed Majid, in September 1866, protested against the interference in any way with vessels in the Zanzibar waters by Her Majesty's cruisers employed in the slave trade. In addition to this the Sultan preferred a claim—

"to the whole area of water included within lines drawn parallel to the African coast, north and south from the outside, or eastern shores of Pemba and Zanzibar islands, to Cape Delgado and Lamoo."

Dr. Seward informed His Highness that, pending a reference to Government—

"the extent of his territorial waters must be regulated by an appeal to international usage that to demand the discontinuance of the right of search within the wide limits of his claim, was in effect to demand our abandonment of the treaty."

Lord Stanley replied—

"The three engagements which, taken together, contain the positive international obligations of the Sultan of Zanzibar to Her Majesty, are the treaty of 1845,* the formal concession of 1850,† and the engagement of 1863.‡ By these instruments Her Majesty's ships may seize and confiscate Zanzibar slavers generally on the high seas, and also vessels transporting slaves from port to port in the Zanzibar dominions during January, February, March, and April, and Her Majesty's ships may enter creeks, rivers, and harbours in Zanzibar territories 'from Songhe Manara to Tonghe' for the purpose of destroying slavers.

"Now, if this last engagement be binding, which Her Majesty's Government consider it to be, the question of the inviolability of the territorial waters within this limits does not arise. With respect to other territorial waters, upon general principles of international law, the Sultan is not entitled to claim jurisdiction beyond three miles from the shore; and Her Majesty's Government do not consider that His Highness's claim to the larger area of waters mentioned in your despatch can be supported either by usage, or by reasons arising from the natural configuration of the coast."

The Political Agent was, therefore, directed to inform the Sultan that—

"in no event can Her Majesty's Government recognize his right to a wider claim over territorial waters than the usual limit of three miles from the shore; and that, when His Highness fulfils that part of his engagement which binds him to suppress in every way the slave trade, Her Majesty's Government will consider whether, consistently with their sole object, the suppression of the slave trade, they can abandon the practice sanctioned by such long usage, and never before complained of, of capturing slavers in the waters of Zanzibar."

Before Lord Stanley's reply could reach the Political Agent, a further protest against the proceedings of Her Majesty's cruisers was made by the Sultan.—(*Political, A, June 1867, Nos. 39 & 40.*)

108. POLITICAL AGENT URGES WITHDRAWAL OF SLAVE SQUADRON FROM ZANZIBAR WATERS.—In the meantime, Dr. Seward had addressed a letter to

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the Bombay Government strongly urging the absolute withdrawal of the slave squadron from Zanzibar waters. His arguments were as follows:

"Its presence and its operations are in complete antagonism to the settled policy of Indian administrators, who desire, if I understand that policy aright, to leave the slave status untouched in Zanzibar, to strengthen the hands of the Zanzibar ruler, to add to his power to govern a coast as yet but under a weak control or none, and to await the upgrowth amongst a well-ordered and thriving population of good influences, which may by-and-by overshadow slavery with liberty.

"Under existing adverse conditions, the operations of the fleet have been, by common consent, absolutely futile, and these conditions unaltered and the powers of cruisers further restricted, its labors must continue to be thankless and barren of good result, nay harmful.

"It destroys the prestige of the ruler, who, in his own waters, should, in the eyes of his people, be absolute; and worse than this, as some injustice is inseparable from its working, its acts are a chronic source of irritation, begetting hate amongst a people otherwise disposed to trust and attach themselves to the English beyond all other nations."

Next he drew attention to the inconsistency of allowing the importation of slaves to the Island of Zanzibar while it was prohibited in another direction. He observed—

"At this moment English capital, distributed by an English agent, is busy in Zanzibar in setting on foot enterprises wholly dependent on slave labor; and to obtain this fresh, hundreds of Africans must be enslaved, new villages depopulated, new crimes committed.

"And thus it is that the presence of our anti-slave fleet is an anomaly. They leave untouched the crowded dhow, and whose slave freight is destined, perchance, for the estates of a British sugar planter in Zanzibar; we confiscate that dhow without remorse, if found in another latitude. They blow hot, and we blow cold; we employ our fleet to limit enslavement; we employ our capital to encourage it."

He concluded—

"On the ground, then, of its inutility on the one hand, its antagonism to the policy of the Indian administration on the other, to say nothing of the anomaly of its presence, I advocate the entire removal of our slave squadron from Zanzibar waters to a cruising ground, where it may act with real efficiency, and without provoking comment on the misapplication of British capital to the encouragement of slavery in Zanzibar."

Colonel Pelly, whose opinion was asked on the matter, observed—

"Judging the question as it stood when I left Zanzibar, I consider that we have no treaty right to interfere with the Sultan's slave trade, carried on within Zanzibar waters, within certain specified latitudes, and which latitudes are, I believe, that of Cape Delgado, on the south, and that of Lamoo, on the north; and that the only ground that we have for visiting a craft carrying slaves in those waters is our suspicion of her intending to carry her slaves to some point exterior to the specified limits."

* * * * *

"It is obvious that the Sultan of Zanzibar not having conceded to us any right to interfere with his slave craft within certain limits, and having conceded to us the right to seize his craft exporting slaves beyond those limits, the rightful stations for our ships would be at points exterior to the limits where there could be no question that any Zanzibar craft found with slaves on board was lawful prize."

Colonel Pelly concluded—

"The subject alluded to by Dr. Seward, of English capital creating slavery for its own profit, requires, in my deferential opinion, very careful handling. My own experience leads me to conclude that the employment of African labor on an Englishman's estate at Zanzibar, or elsewhere, is susceptible of arrangements under which the employer shall receive fair labor, and the laborer fair remuneration, without any injustice to either party."

The Bombay Government, in acknowledging Dr. Seward's letter, wrote—

"I am at the same time desired to draw your attention to the memorandum by Colonel Playfair, dated the 20th September 1863,* and the concessions by the Sultan of Zanzibar, which you appear to have overlooked in both your letters above quoted.

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"If the Sultan has engaged to prevent the port-to-port trade in slaves in his own dominions from January to April in each year, and if His Highness has also expressly authorized our cruisers to seize Zanzibar vessels carrying slaves without regular manifest, or in excess of the number manifested, the Governor in Council is unable to see how your present proposal could be acted upon without abandoning concessions already freely made, and so entering upon a retrograde course.

"You will be so good as to afford some explanation on this point, and also to state whether
* The reply to this call was not reported to the Government of India. the concessions made in 1863, above referred to, were reduced to writing."³²—(*Political, A., February 1867, Nos. 208 & 210; Political, A., March 1867, Nos. 219-221; and Political, A., March 1867, Nos. 229 & 30.*)

109. LABOUR CONTRACTS OF MESSRS. FRASER AND COMPANY.—In July 1866

We, the undersigned, agree and undertake to supply to Messrs. H. A. Fraser and Company (400) four hundred male and female able-bodied laborers, and we engage that the said laborers shall be at the sole disposal of Messrs. A. H. Fraser and Company for the period of five years, after which term we bind ourselves to guarantee the freedom of all the said laborers, who shall be slaves, on condition that Messrs. H. A. Fraser and Company pay to us for every laborer one year's pay, at the rate of two dollars per month per laborer on delivery, and half a dollar per month for each laborer for the succeeding four years: the balance of wages, one dollar and a-half per month, to be payable to the laborers, from whom we bind ourselves not to exact or receive any portion of their pay on any pretext whatever. For the first year Messrs. H. A. Fraser and Company shall clothe and maintain the laborers at their own expense, and for the four succeeding years of this contract they shall not be called on to make any disbursement on this account.

Dr. Seward, the Political Agent, solicited an expression of opinion concerning the legality of certain contracts entered into by Messrs. Fraser and Company, British merchants of Zanzibar, with Arab slave-owners for the supply of slaves to work on their estates. Divested of the personal matters raised in the subsequent discussions on the subject, the case was as follows: Messrs. Fraser and Company entered into a contract, the text of which is marginally appended, with certain Arab slave-owners for his labor supply. Dr. Seward was of opinion that the contract effected a virtual transfer of all property in the slave to the firm. He said—

"The twelve months' wages, at two dollars per laborer per month, handed over to the contractor in one lump sum on delivery, puts him in possession of the average cost of an adult slave, who thereafter stands at the complete disposal of the firm, who immediately become responsible for the slave's food and clothing. It is true that freedom—ultimate freedom—is a stipulation on the promise of the contractor; but I would submit that we should not be blinded by the illusory veil of philanthropy thrown over the transaction."

The Advocate General, Bombay, expressed an opinion, 1st, that the validity of a contract being, as a rule, decided by the law of the place where it is to be performed, and slavery being allowed at Zanzibar, he could see no ground for holding the contracts in question to be invalid; 2^{ndly}, that assuming they were invalid, Dr. Seward had no right to interfere until, on the occurrence of a dispute between the parties, the matter should come before him for adjudication under the provisions of the treaty. The Advocate General concluded—

"The Assistant Political Agent, though residing in a slave country like Zanzibar, cannot legally constitute himself a *censor morum* or *contractum* in regard to British subjects. By the treaty of the 31st May 1839, articles 1 and 2, British subjects have a right to reside, and to purchase or hire lands or houses, &c., at Zanzibar; and Captain Fraser's legal status seems somewhat analogous to that of Englishmen holding estates in our West India Islands, and to that of planters in the slave states of North America, whilst slavery was allowed in those countries. Bearing in mind, therefore, that slavery is not contrary to the law of nations, I think that Dr. Seward has no right at present to concern himself with the validity or invalidity of Captain Fraser's contracts with the Arab slave-owners, and that, if Dr. Seward of his own accord should take any action in the matter, Captain Fraser will have just ground for complaining of a clear violation of his (Captain Fraser) liberty and right as a British subject."

In forwarding the Advocate General's opinion for Dr. Seward's guidance, the Bombay Government remarked that, in addition to the legal aspect of the question, it had also another aspect; for it was observed—

"This is not merely a case of connection with slave-holding by a British mercantile firm, but of slave-trading; it is a case of large contracts made by such a firm with those who

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supply the slave labor market, and can supply it only by kidnapping their victims in the interior, and conveying them across from the mainland in a state of slavery."

The Political Agent was, therefore, directed to enquire from Messrs. Fraser what precautions had been taken by them to prevent these large demands from operating as a direct and dangerous stimulus to increased activity in the slave traffic with the interior, and also what guarantee they had that the laborers at the expiration of their five years' term of service would be declared free.

The Government of India on the 14th November 1866 observed to the Bombay Government that, whatever the legal aspect of the case might be—
"it is evidently incumbent on the Government to do what lies in its power to discourage and repudiate a line of conduct in any of its subjects so inconsistent with the attitude which it holds towards the State of Zanzibar and other countries in respect of slave dealing."

The Messrs. Fraser were to be informed distinctly that the Government and its representative will in no case support such contracts, or aid in respect of any difficulties which might arise from them.

In the meantime the matter had been reported by Dr. Seward to the London Foreign Office, and on the 5th November 1866 Lord Stanley replied—

"Having consulted the proper law officers of the Crown, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that in entering into this contract, Messrs. Fraser have violated the provisions of Act 6 and 7 Victoria, Chapter 98, which renders applicable the provisions of the Act 5, George IV., Chapter 113, to all British subjects wherever they may reside.

"The contract stipulates that for five years certain the laborers are to be at the sole disposal of Messrs. Fraser and Company, after which term they are to be set free. During the interval they are clearly slaves, and the case falls within the following words of the Act of George IV., viz. (section 2), 'deal or trade in persons intended to be dealt with as slaves'; 'contract for the transfer of persons intended to be dealt with as slaves'

"I have, therefore, to instruct you to apprise Messrs. Fraser and Company that by entering into these contracts they have incurred the penalties of the Acts in question, and you will enquire and communicate to Her Majesty's Government whether anything, and what, has been done under the contracts, and also whether Messrs. Fraser and Company have any representation or submission to make upon the subject before proceedings are taken."

On being made aware of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, Captain Fraser, who until then apparently had no opportunity of stating his case, represented that the contract had been framed on a contract previously drawn out by Colonel Playfair when Political Agent at Zanzibar, and which had been approved by the Bombay Government. Dr. Seward urged that there was no similarity in the terms of the two contracts, but, as a copy of the agreement framed by Colonel Playfair was not submitted to the Government of India, there are no grounds for forming an opinion in the matter. Mr. Maine, the Legal Member of Council, observed on the case—

"With the main question the Government of India does not seem to me to have anything further to do. But it is a somewhat awkward element in the case that Messrs. Fraser's contracts should have been so fully concurred in by the former Consul, Colonel Playfair. (What Dr. Seward's part has been in the matter I fail to collect from this most unintelligible letter.) The offence against the statutes is not holding slaves (which cannot generally be helped in a slave-holding country) or employing, but contracting for their labor."

In March 1867 Dr. Seward informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Sultan had, at his instigation, liberated 711 slaves who had been working under contract with Messrs. Fraser and Company. Lord Stanley expressed satisfaction at the intelligence, and intimated that no proceedings would be taken against Messrs. Fraser, provided they could undertake to abstain in future from similar offences.—(*Political, A, November 1866, Nos. 45-47; May 1867, Nos. 141-43; May 1867, Nos. 181-83; June 1867, Nos. 24 & 25; and April 1868, Nos. 145 & 146.*)

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110. EXPORTATION OF SLAVES AS CREW OF VESSELS TRADING TO BOMBAY.—In December 1866 it was stated by the commander of Her Majesty's steamer *Wasp* that the crews of the Zanzibar *dhows* trading to Bombay were all slaves belonging to people at Zanzibar; that they were paid nominally two or three dollars for the voyage to Bombay and back, but many were taken on to the Persian Gulf. The Commissioner of police at Bombay stated that every precaution was taken by the water police to guard against the importation or exportation of slaves, the crews and passengers of all *dhows* being mustered both on arrival at and departure from the harbour.—(*Political, A, March 1867, Nos. 242 & 243.*)

111. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REDUCTION OF LIMITS OF SLAVE TRAFFIC.—Mr. Churchill assumed charge of the Zanzibar Agency about the middle of 1867, and shortly after entered into negotiations with the Sultan, having for their object the reduction of the limits within which the transport of slaves for domestic purposes would be permitted. After considerable pressure the Sultan agreed to fix Ras-ya-dege, in S. latitude 7° as the southern, and Mombas, in latitude 4°, as the northern limits for this traffic. The extent of the concession comprised about three-fifths of the Sultan's seaboard. In obtaining this concession, however, Mr. Churchill had held out hopes to Syed Majid of being relieved from payment of the subsidy to Muscat. A negotiation on this basis was declared by the Bombay Government, with the concurrence of the Government of India, to be wholly unauthorized.—(*Political, A, February 1868, Nos. 174-76.*)

112. ESTABLISHMENT OF A VICE-ADMIRALTY COURT.—From a letter dated 30th November 1867, addressed to Lord Stanley by Mr. Churchill, it appears that with the consent the Sultan, a Vice-Admiralty Court had been established a short time previously in Zanzibar.

113. RIGHTS OF KUTCHEES TO HOLD SLAVES.—In 1867 a question was raised by the Political Agent as to whether the British Government had a right to interfere with the subjects of the Rao of Kutch who held slaves, but who had not registered their names as entitled to British protection. From Mr. Churchill's letter of the 22nd December 1867, it appears that, previous to Colonel Rigby's departure from Zanzibar, all natives of India, whether subjects of the British Government, or of independent Native States, were under British protection; but in 1863 those of the latter class who had not formally applied for such protection and registered their names at the British Consulate, were deprived of consular protection, and were allowed to place themselves under the protection of the Sultan.

The course then followed by the Political Agent was supported by the Bombay Government; but in 1866 it had been ruled (Foreign Department letter No. 104, dated 3rd February 1866) by the Government of India with regard to Kutchees resident in Muscat that—

"the subjects of any Native State bound, as Kutch is, to have no relations with foreign powers, are morally entitled to be admitted in foreign territory to all the privileges which natives of British India enjoy in the same locality; and the Sultan of Muscat and the subjects of Kutch, residents in his dominions, seem, from the passages marginally quoted, neither of them to entertain any doubt on this point. His Excellency in Council conceives that there can be no obstacle to the Political Agent at Muscat exercising the same authority in respect of Kutchees as in respect to the British subjects. The Political Agent should be authorized to act in accordance with this opinion."

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It is obvious, said the Political Agent, that—

"the above-quoted resolution of His Excellency the Governor General in Council is meant for Zanzibar as well as for Muscat; and His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, like the ruler of Muscat, has never doubted the right of the British Government to exercise jurisdiction over the natives of Kutch or any other protected State in India; but since the abandonment by my predecessors of the right of protecting such of these natives of India who did not seek our protection, His Highness assumes that we have no further right to jurisdiction over them."

On arrival at Zanzibar Mr. Churchill had ascertained that, although Colonel Rigby had succeeded in emancipating all the slaves in the possession of the natives of India established in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, upwards of one thousand two hundred slaves were still held in bondage by natives of that country, and that they enjoyed this privilege because they were under the protection of His Highness Syed Majid. Mr. Churchill, therefore, represented to the Sultan that he was under a necessity of putting a stop to the holding of slaves by all natives of India in Zanzibar, and he further claimed jurisdiction over all natives of independent states in India, even though they had forfeited British protection and placed themselves under that of the Sultan. The Sultan pleaded that Colonel Playfair had formally intimated that those natives of independent States in India who had not entered their names in the Consular Register should be considered as Arabs. They were thus, he said, under Arab law, and had, therefore, a right to hold slaves. At the Sultan's request the matter was referred to Government. The Bombay Government observed—

"The British Government have practically said to certain Kutchees—'you are not our subjects, and are not entitled to our protection, because you have not been registered by our Consul.' It is proposed now to say to them 'though you have not our protection either by right or birth, or by force of registration, you are yet subject to our jurisdiction, and are amenable to us for doing that which is no crime, either in the country in which you reside or that from which you came.'

"It appears to the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council that the British Government have no right to interfere.

"If it is expedient to interfere, the Governor in Council thinks that we can only do it by coming to an understanding with the Rao, in virtue of which his subjects will be legally, as well as morally, entitled to our protection, and, in return, liable to our jurisdiction; and in that case, if the slaves now held by Kutchees are to be liberated, His Excellency in Council concludes, under the circumstances, they will be entitled to compensation, which the British tax-payer, and not the Indian, will have to pay, as it may be almost certainly taken for granted that the Rao will not."

The Government of India, to whom the case was referred for decision, remarked—

"It appears to the Governor General in Council that the decision of the question raised turns on the following issues:

I.—Do the Kutch subjects in question merely own and hold slaves?

II.—Or do they deal in, or make contracts regarding, slaves involving transactions tantamount to slave-dealing?

III.—Does their case resemble that of Messrs. H. A. Fraser and Company at Zanzibar,* which case was held to involve such an approach to slave-dealing as to come under the prohibitions of English statute law?

* Vide Paragraph 109.

"It may be assumed that the Kutchees are not British subjects in the ordinary acceptance of the term, and that they are in much the same position towards the British Government as the people of Kattiawar.

"But if the transactions of the Kutchees are found to amount to slave-dealing, then a question will arise as to whether these transactions can be stopped in the same manner as the transactions of Messrs. Fraser and Company in Zanzibar were stopped, Messrs. Fraser being

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British subjects. And this question turns on another, viz., can the people of Kutch be in this particular respect put on the footing of quasi-British subjects, that is to say, in matters in which the British Government is concerned, as it is in the suppression of slave-dealing? Can that Government, as the lord paramount of the State, to which their immediate allegiance is due, exercise a check over them in transactions beyond the boundaries of India?

"The last point will obviously demand legal consideration. But this might well be deferred till the questions of fact have been taken up, and it has been decided whether the Kutchees are engaged in slave-dealing or not. If they are merely slave-holders, then there would seem to be no sufficient legal warrant for interfering with them."

Information on the issues of fact above mentioned was called for by the Government of India.—(*Political, A, April 1868, Nos. 144-46.*) For the continuation of the correspondence on this subject *vide* paragraph 120.

114. SLAVE TRADE STATISTICS, 1868.—The following statistics of the slave trade were given by Mr. Churchill in a letter dated 4th March 1868:

"In former times slaves were brought down to various parts of the coast. At present Kilwa appears to have monopolized this nefarious trade, which has, to some extent, increased of late. Thus, in counting from September to September in each year, the number of slaves exported in the five last years has been—

For 1862-63	18,500
" 1863-64	17,500
" 1864-65	16,821
" 1865-66	22,344
" 1866-67	22,038

making an average of 19,440 per annum. They were embarked at Kilwa and sent to various places, namely, Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamoo, Arabian Coast, Mohilla, and Madagascar, in the following proportion:

In 1862-63	...	{ 13,000 came to Zanzibar. 5,000 went elsewhere.
" 1863-64	...	{ 1,400 came to Zanzibar. 3,500 went elsewhere.
" 1864-65	...	{ 13,821 came to Zanzibar. 3,000 went elsewhere.
" 1865-66	...	{ 18,344 came to Zanzibar. 4,000 went elsewhere.
" 1866-67	...	{ 17,538 came to Zanzibar. 4,500 went elsewhere.

"From these figures it will be observed that in the course of the last five years nearly one hundred thousand registered slaves have been exported from Kilwa, beyond those who have been smuggled out of the country unknown to the authorities; of the former, 76,703 were brought to Zanzibar.

Now, when I say that a tax of 2½ dollars per head is levied at Kolwa on every slave exported, and a second tax of 2 dollars per head is levied at Zanzibar on every slave imported, it may be wondered why so large a proportion of the slaves exported from Kilwa should come to Zanzibar without having the effect of over-stocking the market. The simple reason is this, that it is not safe for a slave-dealer to keep his slaves on the mainland, because they would be apt to run away. They must necessarily be brought to some island, whence escape would be out of the question, and Zanzibar is preferred, because it is a central place and the residence of the Arabs who usually act as agents to the people of Arabia, with whom slaves are in great demand.

The value of a slave, when brought to the coast was, Mr. Churchill says, a little more than five dollars.

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115. DOUBTS REGARDING JURISDICTION OF VICE-ADMIRALTY COURT.—A doubt had been raised by Dr. Seward in May 1866 as to the competency of the Vice-Admiralty Court to adjudicate, under existing treaty arrangements, within the Zanzibar territories in the matter of confiscating vessels, the property of subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar, which might be seized by the ships of Her Majesty's Navy on suspicion of being engaged in the slave trade within the Sultan's dominions. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs decided that—

"Dr. Seward's doubts on this subject were not well founded, and that any decisions he might have given as Judge of Her Majesty's Vice-Admiralty Court in the territories of Zanzibar would have been perfectly valid."

116. RULES ISSUED BY SULTAN TO CHECK SLAVE TRAFFIC.—The Political Agent, Zanzibar, in a letter of the 9th April 1868, forwarded, for information, a copy of a stringent set of rules issued by the Sultan, in order to check the trade in slaves. Of late the Sultan had, he said, been making endeavours to put down the traffic.—(*Political, A, July 1868, Nos. 83-84.*)

117. SULTAN THREATENS CONFISCATION OF ALL DHOWS BELONGING TO NORTHERN ARABS.—Shortly after this, the Sultan addressed letters to the several Sheikhs along the Arabian Coast, giving them notice that, as the Northern Arabs were in the habit of repairing to the East Coast of Arabia with no other motive than that of running slaves to the Persian Gulf, all dhows coming to Zanzibar, or any part of the Sultan's dominions, would be forthwith seized and burnt. The Government of India expressed satisfaction at the evidence of the Sultan's desire to co-operate with the British Government.—(*Political, A, July 1868, Nos. 85-87.*)

Subsequently, Mr. Churchill pointed out to the Sultan that Her Majesty's Government would be bound, by its treaty engagements, to take notice of any hostile proceeding against the Arab tribes in treaty with it, so long as they did not engage in the slave traffic. The Sultan accordingly modified his original notice to the Arab chiefs, and declared that he would confine himself to destroying the vessels of such chiefs as had failed to fulfil their treaty engagements with Her Majesty's Government.—(*Political, A, August 1868, Nos. 262-64.*)

118. MR. CHURCHILL'S UNFAVORABLE OPINION OF EXISTING MEASURES FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.—In a despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (dated 22nd August 1868), a copy of which was forwarded for the information of Government, Mr. Churchill discussed the condition of the East African slave trade, and proposed more effectual steps for its suppression. He also suggested precautionary measures by which British cruisers would be better able than they had done to distinguish slave vessels from regular traders. With regard to the mistakes frequently committed by the cruisers, Mr. Churchill observed—

"In order to stimulate the officers and men of Her Majesty's Navy in the fulfilment of the onerous duties devolving on them, it is thought necessary to offer a premium for every slaver or slave captured; and as the investigations made to ascertain whether a dhow is really engaged in the illicit trade are not always very minute, it not unfrequently occurs that a legal trader engaged in legitimate trade is captured and destroyed. This mode of proceeding, against which, I am sorry to say, many complaints have been forwarded to Her Majesty's Government without any result, has had the unhappy end of estranging from us those who were friendly disposed towards us in former days, and of crippling the legitimate trade, which is the most powerful instrument we have in hand calculated to supplant the slave trade."

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In this letter was given the first intimation of an intention on the part of the Sultan to send a mission to England to discuss the slave trade question, and to appeal against the payment of subsidy.—(*Political, A, September 1868, Nos. 302-4; and Political, A, October 1868, Nos. 357-59.*)

119. PROPOSITIONS REGARDING SUPPRESSION OF SLAVE TRAFFIC MADE BY COMMODORE HEATH.—In August 1868 certain propositions regarding the slave trade were made to the Sultan by Commodore Heath, the Naval Commander-in-Chief. These were, 1st, that the slave trade should be made a Government monopoly; 2ndly, that vessels employed in the trade should either be of European build, or, if dhows, should have a distinctive mark; 3rdly, that the traffic should be confined to one port on the coast of Africa, and one port in the Island of Zanzibar; 4thly, that all intermediate traffic should be stopped; 5thly, that the traffic should be legal only between 1st May and 1st January. The Political Agent in the following month reported the substance of a conversation which took place in his presence between Commodore Heath and the Sultan on the subject, and sent also a copy of a letter in which His Highness formally recorded his approbation of the second proposition only. The conversation was directed to this point, and also to the question of the trade being made a Government monopoly, and of restricting the traffic to certain limits. To the two last of these suggestions, the Sultan would give no countenance; but he took the opportunity of recurring to his grievance concerning the payment of the subsidy to Muscat, which really was wholly unconnected with the matters under discussion. The Government of India, in forwarding the correspondence to the Secretary of State, stated their disapproval of the measures proposed by Commodore Heath.—(*Political, A, October 1868, Nos. 541-44; and Political, A, December 1868, Nos. 114-17.*)

120. DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITH REGARD TO KUTCHEE SLAVE-HOLDERS.—Mr. Churchill, in August 1868, supplied the information required by the Government of India with regard to the Kutchee slave proprietors of Zanzibar (*vide* paragraph 113). His reply was to the effect that Kutchees who had elected to place themselves under Syed Majid's protection—

"do not merely own and hold slaves by inheritance or otherwise, but they trade in slaves, purchasing them, bartering, transferring, and removing them from place to place. In point of fact, they are regular slave-dealers. The Sultan's pretensions are that Her Majesty's Consulate having declined to protect the individuals (British subjects as well as Kutchees), whose names were not registered in the books of the Consulate, they are at liberty to act in his dominion as they may please, so long as they do not do anything against the laws of his country, and so far his claims cannot be contested; but he goes a step further, and says, 'having declined to protect these subjects of yours, and these natives of India, whose country is under your protection, you have thereby lost all jurisdiction over them; they may do as the Arabs do.'

The position of the Kutchees being as above stated, Mr. Churchill considered that the question as whether their case resembled that of Messrs. Fraser and Company, required no special answer. The Government of India replied to the Bombay Government as follows:

"His Excellency in Council has given his most attentive and earnest consideration to this whole subject; but whatever may be the difficulties of putting down the slave-trade, when carried on by the Sultan of Zanzibar or his natural born subjects, His Excellency in Council can have no doubt that it is our bounden duty to interfere with a high hand, and authoritatively to put down slave-dealing when carried on by the subjects of a Native State with which we have a treaty, where we have an accredited representative, and which is bound to be guided by the advice and influence of the paramount power in matters so intimately connected with the very first principles of public morality and justice.

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"In this view, His Excellency in Council desires that you will at once address the Political Agent in Kutch on the subject. The Agent should point out to the Rao the inequity and cruelty of this traffic, and he should inform him that the British Government, which, by the proclamation* issued by the Rao in 1863, had evidently used its authority to prevent the importation of slaves into that principality, will by no means permit any of his subjects, when residents or domiciled in foreign parts, to engage in the slave-trade, on the pretence that they have acquired a right to do so either by residing at Zanzibar or by neglecting or refusing to register themselves before the British Consul at that place. All traders or others, subjects of the Rao, who are proceeding to Zanzibar, or who are actually residing there, should be warned that, though mere domestic slavery by Kutchees may be tolerated for the present, the British Government will take steps to interfere with any prosecution of the traffic in human beings, and that no claims for loss or compensation, in the event of the release of any number of captives, sold or being hurried into slavery, will be listened to for a moment.

"The Bombay Government is further requested similarly to address Mr. Churchill, the Consul and Agent at Zanzibar, to the same effect, and to authorize him to interfere actively and authoritatively, and by all the means at his disposal, to put down slave-dealing when carried on or attempted by Kutchees. His Excellency in Council observes that the results of the offer to the subjects of Kutch to register themselves before the British Consul, though undoubtedly well meant, appears to have been unfortunate, as it would seem that the Kutchees, not registered, have conceived the notion that they are emancipated from all control or interference, and that the Sultan himself favors these pretensions. Mr. Churchill should be instructed to inform the Sultan that the Government of India by no means recognizes any such claims, and the traders from Kutch should be plainly told that, though the retention by them of domestic slaves in their households may, for a time, be tolerated, all attempts at purchasing, selling, or trafficking in slaves, will be summarily put down, and that this Government will not entertain any claims for redress or compensation.

"His Excellency in Council is also constrained to say that he can by no means endorse the opinion given by the Bombay Government in the 3rd paragraph of your letter, dated 31st March last, viz., that slavery is no crime, either in the country, in which these Kutchees reside, or in that from which they come. It may unhappily be no crime against the laws of Zanzibar, but it would certainly be a crime if committed in the territories of the Rao of Kutch, and it would be one which, if it occurred on the coast of India, or in any part of the dominions of any of its Chiefs or Princes, would assuredly be dealt with effectively and summarily by the paramount power."

These proceedings were reported to the Secretary of State by despatch No. 207, dated 5th December 1868, and opportunity was taken to ask for an early reply to a previous despatch, No. 81, dated 14th May 1868 (*vide* paragraph 40), in which the desirability of placing the Agent at Zanzibar under the Indian Government had been urged.—(*Political, A, December 1863, Nos. 45-51; and Political, A, January 1869, Nos. 294-95.*)

121. VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AS TO DOMESTIC SLAVERY.—Mr. Churchill, on receiving the above instructions, called on all British Indian subjects to state the number of slaves in their possession, and said that, as it was most difficult to distinguish between domestic slaves and those possessed by them for the purpose of engaging in the slave traffic, he intended to limit the number which they might have in their possession to two or three according to the circumstances of the owner.

Thereupon the Bombay Government told Mr. Churchill that—

"it was unnecessary to interfere with any existing arrangements by which domestic slaves were then actually possessed by British Indian subjects at Zanzibar for household purposes."

Their letter reached him just as (1) he had sentenced a Kutchee under the Sultan's protection to a fine of \$ 500 and to imprisonment in the Sultan's Fort till he could be deported, and as (2) the Sultan had written strongly to remonstrate against such action towards an Indian who was under his protection, and as (3) he had rejoined denying that—

"the natives of India who, in order to carry on the slave trade had placed themselves under the Sultan's protection, were his subjects."

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Perceiving, on receipt of the Bombay Government's letter, that he had exceeded his instructions, Mr. Churchill again wrote to the Sultan, saying—

"I will not object to allow the Kutchees under your protection the possession of the slaves they now hold, provided they do not buy any more, or sell those they have. This concession will have the effect of covering your Highness's *amour propre*, for so long as the Kutchees under your protection do not traffic in slaves, I shall not interfere with them; but, in order to keep a check over them, I should wish your Highness to order them to give you the names and description of their slaves. Any Kutchee under your protection purchasing a slave, or selling one, shall be deemed to have committed a heinous crime, and shall be amenable to British jurisdiction; but if your Highness will pledge yourself to punish such individual condignly, I will gladly suggest to the Bombay Government our non-interference.

"All future arrivals from India shall be deemed amenable to British law in every way, and there shall be no excuse for their purchasing or holding slaves in your Highness's dominions."

To this the Sultan rejoined (1) as to the past—

"The correspondence that passed between our Government and Colonels Pelly and Playfair some time back acknowledges our right to protect all natives of Kutch whose names are not inscribed in the Consular register books kept in Zanzibar, and to consider them as our own subjects in every way."

(2) As to the future,

"we can easily understand the natives of Bombay and Surat and other parts of India subjugated by Great Britain should be subject to your jurisdiction, but that those who came from States that have not been conquered, should be amenable to British law, is at variance with the explanations previously given by Colonels Pelly and Playfair, *viz.*, that if they have not elected the protection of the British Consulate by writing their names in the Consular register, their status shall be that of the Arabs, our subjects. Now, however, with a view to the maintenance of the friendly relation between us, we are willing to accept the position assumed by you, as explained in your letter under present acknowledgment, until such time as our envoy may return from India, when we trust that the most perfect understanding will be arrived at on this subject between us."

On receiving this correspondence, the Government of India said—

"The Bombay Government might take an opportunity of intimating to the Political Agent that, while using all legitimate influence in the discouragement of the slave-trade, he should avoid, as much as possible, the expression of opinion as to purely domestic or household slavery when practised in Zanzibar by Kutchees or others."—(*Political, A, July 1869, Nos. 229-40.*)

122. SLAVE-TRADE UNDER FRENCH FLAG.—When reporting in his No. 131-30, dated 10th April 1869, the destruction of 16 slaving dhows by the *Nymphe*, the Officiating Political Agent, Dr. Kirk, wrote—

"Captain Meara tells me that to the south almost every dhow is now under the French flag; that when last year only five dhows with French flags were seen by the *Nymphe* during her cruise in the same ports, this year there are fifty; and that so well do the natives know the jealousy with which France protects her rights, that dhow owners told him plainly that he had no right to touch them if even they had a cargo of slaves, politely showing their papers at the same time. These papers he found in all cases drawn up regularly. There is no doubt that very soon the French flag will be the only one in use on this coast, giving, as it does, perfect protection alike to the honest trader and the regular slaver."

In sending on the paper to the Secretary of State, No. 183, dated 10th June 1869, the Government of India drew attention to this remark.—(*Political, A, June 1869, Nos. 76-78.*)

123. DESTRUCTION OF ZANZIBAR CRAFT BY BRITISH CRUISERS.—The reports of the Political Agent at Zanzibar, and the Political Resident at Aden throughout the summer of 1869, abounded in repeated instances of illegal seizures and

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destruction of innocent dhows, which acts caused considerable hardship and great irritation among the chiefs and all classes of the population on the coast, seriously checked honest trade, and tended still more to drive the native vessels to sail under the French flag.

124. PROCLAMATION OF RAO OF KUTCH REGARDING HIS SUBJECTS AT ZANZIBAR ENGAGED IN THE SLAVE-TRADE.—In No. 213, dated 1st June 1869, the Bombay Government reported that the Rao of Kutch had issued a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Kutch generally, but more particularly to those trading with Zanzibar, and the Arabian and African coasts, warning them against the penalties incurred by such of them as may be engaged in the slave-trade, and saying that their claims and suits should be settled by the British Government in the same way as if they were the subjects of the British Government.

When this proclamation was communicated to the Sultan, he at first refused to allow the proclamation to be enforced, or to recognize as Kutchees under British jurisdiction any but those who registered their names at the British agency.

Dr. Kirk insisted on the acceptance of the terms of the proclamation, and the Sultan yielded the point and wrote simply acknowledging the receipt of the proclamation without questioning its force, and asking that the minor questions* regarding our jurisdiction over the limited number of Kutchees, who formerly enrolled their names as under Arab protection, might be considered.

Dr. Kirk thought a great success had thereby been achieved, remarking—
"While the natives of Kutch established in Zanzibar were under our sole protection and jurisdiction, we held the most wealthy and enterprising among the mercantile community, and our influence was in all matters paramount.

"Afterwards, as a settlement of certain vexed questions connected with the slave-trade, each Kutchee was allowed to elect his protecting State, and His Highness, by holding forward the Arab privilege of buying and selling slaves to all who did not register their names at the English agency, secured every new arrival from Kutch to himself, and confidently looked forward to the time when British influence would be reduced to an equality with that of France and other foreign powers having no material stake in the country. During the past four years, registrations at the British Agency have become almost unknown."

125. LIBERATED SLAVES. THEIR DISPOSAL AND EXPENSES.—The officer in command of Her Majesty's Naval Forces on the east coast of Africa having applied to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs through the Admiralty, for information as to the condition and distribution of the slaves that had been liberated at the Mauritius, the Seychelles, Aden, and Bombay, the Foreign Office asked the India Office for the information. The call was passed on to the Bombay Government and the Resident at Aden, and the reply of the latter showed that the slaves liberated at Aden were a cause of very great embarrassment to the authorities there, and were necessarily kept in circumstances which involved considerable hardship to themselves.—(*Political, A, January 1870, Nos. 185-187.*)

The Bombay Government also sent a return showing the following facts. During the previous five years, about three thousand slaves had been landed and liberated at Aden. Of this number, 524 had been sent to Bombay, 143

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measures which the Parliamentary Committee of 1870 had proposed for the suppression of the slave trade, and to report whether the Sultan would consent to enter into a new treaty for that object.—(*Political, A, November 1870, Nos. 65-66.*)

Before, however, the negotiations could be completed, Syed Majid died.

128. DESTRUCTION OF DHOWS BELONGING TO SULTAN.—The Political Agent, Zanzibar, in April 1871, reported to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that two dhows belonging to the Sultan, having been used for conveying slaves, had been condemned and destroyed. The Sultan declined to prefer any appeal in the case, and contented himself with declaring that his vessels had been unjustly dealt with on the ground, Dr. Kirk presumed, that they were captured in territorial waters, and that the owner ought not to suffer for the acts of his agent, the Captain. Dr. Kirk solicited the expression of an opinion on the subject by the Secretary of State.

129. SLAVE TRADE UNDER FRENCH FLAG.—Dr. Kirk, when reporting in March 1871, his having adjudicated in two cases of slave vessels seized by Her Majesty's ship *Columbine*, observed with regard to one of them.—

"The evidence given in the first case established clearly that the French flag is used to cover slaving transactions."—(*Political, A, August 1871, Nos. 112-13.*)

130. INTENTIONS OF SYED BURGASH REGARDING SLAVE-TRADE.—After the recognition of Syed Burgash by the Home Government in July 1871, the Political Agent wrote—


"Some time ago I had reason to think that His Highness might be willing to abolish all slave trade by dhows between Quiloa and Zanzibar, and to put on one of his steamers for that service. If he could be induced to make Dar Salam, and not Quiloa, the port on that side, more than has been asked would be granted in all except the numerical limitation, which can only become practicable after we have concentrated the traffic in one or two channels; the difficulty will be in getting him to apply some such regulation to the Lamo trade, for it is obvious, once this traffic enters into the hands of the Arab Government alone, that we have a much simpler means of control and a clearer line of distinction between slavers and legal traders than is now possible, when every Zanzibar dhow may at any moment become a legal slaver.

"I am not prepared to say that His Highness will grant such terms, but I think that some time ago he was favorably inclined to entertain them, and I shall endeavour to sound him again, feeling my way well before approaching him with any proposition in person." (*Pro., Secret, October 1871, Nos. 325-45.*)

131. REPORT OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE.—The report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the East African Slave Trade, dated 4th August 1871, was received by the Government of India in the following month. Among the recommendations of the Committee were the following:

- (1).—That all legitimate means should be used for putting an end altogether to the East African slave trade.
- (2).—That the Sultan of Zanzibar be told that the existing treaty provisions having been systematically evaded, and found inefficient to protect the Negro tribes in the interior of Africa from destruction, the British Government will, unless further securities can be obtained for the entire prohibition of the foreign slave trade, abrogate the treaty, and take measures to stop all slave trade, foreign or coasting.

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