مكتبة قطر الوطنية Qatar National Library

من المصادر الإلكترونية في مكتبة قطر الرقمية ٢٠٢٢/٠١/١٨ تم إنشاء هذا الملف بصيغة PDF بتاريخ النسخة الإلكترونية من هذا السجل متاحة للاطلاع على الإنترنت عبر الرابط التالي: <u>http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_1000000833.0x00175</u> تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبير ها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت"

المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
المرجع	IOR/L/PS/18/B133A

- التاريخ/ التواريخ ديسمبر ١٩٠٥ (ميلادي)
 - لغة الكتابة للاتينية في الاتينية
 - الحجم والشكل مجلد (٢ أوراق)
 - حق النشر <u>رخصة حكومة مفتوحة</u>



حول هذا السجل

هذا الملف عبارة عن مذكرة بخصوص الكويت كتبها مسؤول وزارة الخارجية ر. ف. هاركورت [روبرت فينابلز فيرنون هاركورت].

المذكرة مُقسمة كما يلى:

- سرد عام النشاط التركي تفاهمات مع تركيا وألمانيا؛
 - الحدود الكويتية؛
 - الوكيل السياسي؛

- علم الكويت؛
- مكتب بريد الكويت؛
 - السياسة العامة.

تتناول المذكرة وضع بريطانيا في الكويت وتطور علاقات بريطانيا مع حاكم الكويت الشيخ مبارك الصباح.


يحتوي الملحق المرفق بالمذكرة (الأوراق ١١و-١٢) على نسخة من الاتفاقية الموقعة بين الحكومة البريطانية والشيخ مبارك الصباح حاكم الكويت في يناير ١٨٩٩، وترجمة لرسالة مرسلة إلى مبارك من المقدّم ميد [مالكولم جون ميد] في يناير ١٨٩٩، ونسخة من مذكرة بخصوص الكويت كتبها لوزارة الخارجية مركيز لانسداون [هنري تشارلز كيث بيتي-فيتزموريس، المركيز الخامس للانسداون] في مارس ١٩٠٢.



١

"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٦] (١٤/١)





المرجع: IOR/L/PS/18/B133A حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc_100023958855.0x00002/العربية/http://www.qdl.qa



۲

"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٢ظ] (١٤/٢)

such importance that it is necessary to describe in some detail the course of the struggle.

The quarrel arose from a raid by Sheikh Mr. de Bunsen, Abdur Rahman-bin-Faisal upon Nejd territory No. 63, with the connivance and assistance of Mubarak, October 3, 1900. the movement being supported on the north by Sadun Pasha, a Turkish subject, Chief of the Montefik Bedouins.

At the first news of disturbances, it was at once proposed to send Colonel Kemball, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Koweit "to counsel Mubarak to avoid giving the Turks an excuse for interference," and as the Agree- November 14, ment of 1899 had promised the good offices of 1900. Her Majesty's Government the Resident was also to be instructed "to endeavour to warn the Amir of Nejd that no attack on Koweit would be permitted."

Preliminary measures were to be taken to protect the Sheikh, but no force was to be landed without reference to the home authorities.

Shortly afterwards, however, reports were received that the crisis was over, and at Colonel Kemball's own request his visit was postponed. It appeared that Mubarak was able to hold his India Office own, and the presence of a ship of war would ^{Decen}_{1900.} ber 10, give him undue encouragement.

A despatch from the Consul at Bussorah Mr Wratislaw, summed up the situation. A conflict had been No. 41, November 22, averted, though at the cost of a considerable 1900. increase of Turkish prestige. The Vali, Mohsin Pasha, having prevailed upon both sides to keep the peace, had induced Mubarak to accompany him to Bussorah, there to make solemn professions of allegiance to the Sultan, and to promise to cease "coquetting with foreign Powers." Mr. Lyle, in Mr. Mackenzie's The result seemed to an independent observer letter, December likely to "prove a considerable blow to any 28, 1900. pretensions of Mubarak to being an independent Sheikh."

A declaration of some importance was made about this time with regard to the status of Koweit. An Arab native of Koweit, concerned in a case of smuggling arms into Persia, had been claimed as a Turkish subject by the Turkish at Bushire. The Resident at Bushire

was informed by the Foreign Office, in answer to his inquiry whether he should contest the claim, that-

"although Her Majesty's Government had promised their good offices to the Sheikh of Koweit, the district has



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٧و] (١٤/٣)

3

never been formally placed under British protection. Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, claim natives of Koweit as British protected persons."

Late in December Mubarak was reported to be making fresh preparations for an attack on Nejd, and the second phase of the quarrel begins.

No. 59. In February C., February 10, 1901. opinion on the general situation. In February Sir N. O'Conor expressed his

An outbreak of hostilities, his Excellency observed, would scarcely fail to bring the Turks again into the field.

"Her Majesty's Government may thus be placed in a difficult position, and be forced either to raise an unpleasant question with the Ottoman Government, or to assert effective control over Koweit, or else sacrifice the privileged position acquired by the Convention of January 1899. It is hardly to be expected that the Sheikh of Koweit will respect an Agreement from which he derives no security and little material advantage."

His Excellency was strongly averse to doing anything which would "encourage the Sultan's anxiety in regard to British policy in the Persian Gulf," and he suggested that the Amir of Nejd should be approached through his Bussorah Agent, while the Porte might be informed that Colonel Kemball would use every effort to restrain the Sheikh.

On the 28th February the Viceroy telegraphed that the advice of the British Resident at Bushire had been already tendered to Mubarak (though, as afterwards appeared, not personally but through the newsagent) and refused. The proposed visit, therefore, did not seem likely to have any result, while "a second failure might even be embarrassing."

As in November, hostilities were allowed to begin without any formal remonstrance on the part of the British authorities.

On the 29th March the complete defeat of the Koweit forces was reported, and it was rumoured that the Sheikh had been killed in action. If the report was true it was obvious that Mubarak's death would seriously endanger the Agreement of 1899, and a ship of war was placed under orders. Colonel Kemball visited Koweit (April 18). He found the Sheikh alive, but was satisfied that he had been severely defeated. Nothing was said to the Amir.

Mohsin Pasha had remained comparatively inactive since his diplomatic success of Novem-

Sir N. O'Conor, No. 11, Telegraphic, March 29, 1901.



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٧ظ] (١٤/٤)

ber, but the defeat of Mubarak now brought on Turkish interference in a more acute form. A Turkish Field-Marshal left Bagdad for Bussorah on the 19th April, followed on the next day by Turkish troops. It was generally believed that the Ottoman Government intended to make use of force with a view to the deposition of Mubarak.

4

A British gun-boat was ordered to Koweit, and Sir N. O'Conor was definitely authorized, in the event of hostilities being resumed, to warn the Porte "to refrain from any action against the Sheikh in view of our arrangement with him."

But the astute policy of Mohsin Pasha again prevented matters from coming to a head. The Turkish Field-Marshal stopped short of Koweit, and the Vali himself, with a small escort, paid a friendly visit to the Sheikh. He was unable to enforce proposals for the establishment of a Turkisk garrison, but Mubarak accompanied him Mr. Wratislaw, to Fao, renewed his protestations to the Sultan, June 1, 1901. and returned to Koweit after a second act of apparently spontaneous loyalty.

On the 28th May the Amir of Nejd appealed for British protection, but, after consultation with the Viceroy, the India Office expressed the opinion, in which the Foreign Office concurred, that it was not advisable to-

"incur the difficulties and embarrassments which must India Office, ensue from the declaration of a Protectorate over June 14, 1901. either the territories of the Chiefs of Koweit and Nejd."

The Viceroy, however, pointed out that some answer must be given to the Chiefs, and Colonel Kemball again visited Koweit with general instructions to find some modus vivendi between the Sheikh and the Amir, while maintaining our Telegram communicated by hold upon the Sheikh.

Early in August he saw Mubarak, who suggested August 14, 1901. the Sheikh of Mohammerah as intermediary, and Mr. Wratislaw was subsequently authorized to assist communication between the latter and the agent of the Amir.

But renewed rumours of Turkish concentration again raised the larger diplomatic question.

In July Sir F. Lascelles had had a conversation with Dr. Rosen, of the German Foreign Office, upon the prospects of the prolongation of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, and the general situation in Asiatic Turkey.

India Offic



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [^و] (١٤/٥)

An expression used by his Excellency describing the Sheikh as "technically a subject of the Sultan but enjoying a considerable amount of independence," which on a previous occasion had passed without comment (see Sir F. Lascelles' No. 156 of the 15th June, 1900), now drew from the German Representative an assertion that the Sheikh was "merely a subject of the Sultan."

To Sir F. Lascelles, No. 128, Telegraphic, August 10, 1901.

No. 103, Telegraphic, August 10, 1901.

It was therefore pointed out to Sir F. Lascelles that the German Government might take advantage of his language to argue that the Sultan could dispose of the territory of the Sheikh.

The view that the Sheikh was simply a subject of the Sultan was one that Her Majesty's Government were totally unable to accept, and his Excellency was instructed to use language To Sir N. O'Conor, on the lines of Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 130 of the 10th April, 1900, viz., that Her Majesty's Government had an Agreement with the Sheikh which, although not opposed to the status quo, yet prevented him from making any concession of territory to another Power without their consent. (See Memorandum No. 7596 of the 30th October, 1901.)

> Sir N. O'Conor was at the same time authorized to state, if occasion arose, that if Koweit were threatened, Her Majesty's Government would use force to prevent attack.

> Important communications now took place at London and Constantinople.

> Considerable pressure was being exercised on the Ottoman Government by the German and Russian Embassies, and though a proposal of the Vali of Bussorah to use force against the Sheikh had been rejected by the Council of Ministers, Tewfik Pasha informed Sir N. O'Conor that Koweit was regarded as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.

> A warning given by the Commander of the "Perseus" to the Captain of a Turkish corvette off Koweit that no troops would be permitted to land was largely magnified in transmission, and occasioned further protests from the Turkish Government.

Tewfik Pasha inquired on the 29th August whether Her Majesty's Government intended to establish a Protectorate, and on the same day the To Sir F. Lascelles, German Embassy in London received a pressing September 3, 1901. instruction to state that a British Protectorate would be contrary to the Treaty of Berlin, and that in view of her interest in Koweit as the future terminus of the Anatolian Railway, Ger-C

[1265-1]

Sir N. O'Conor, Nos. 92, 93, Telegraphic, August 21, 1901.

Sir N. O'Conor, No. 102, Telegraphic, August 29, 1901.



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٨ظ] (١٤/١)

many would be compelled to regard such a proceeding as an unfriendly act.

6

The reply in each case was that His Majesty's Government had no such intention, Sir N. O'Conor adding the reservation "provided that Turkey did not force our hands by interfering with the Sheikh."

On the 3rd September Count Metternich called to say "that if by threats of force His Majesty's Government prevented the Sultan from landing troops at Koweit, they were refusing to recognize the Sultan's authority with which they had stated (in a Memorandum communicated by the King to the German Emperor, see p. 7) that they did not desire to interfere in those parts, and that the German Government considered that Koweit formed unquestionably part of the territories belonging to the Sultan.'

Sir T. Sanderson promised to report his observations to Lord Lansdowne, and said he could at once state that His Majesty's Government had no desire to disturb the status quo.

Next day telegrams were communicated by Anthopoulo Anthopoulo Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in September 6, 1901. London, protesting against the reported intention to declare a British Protectorate and describing the Convention of 1899 as without validity, but the Sultan had meanwhile been advised by the German Government to be satisfied with the assurances given to Count Metternich, and to ask for their repetition.

On the 6th September Sir N. O'Conor was sent for by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The assurances given by his Excellency on To Sir N. O'Conor, this occasion were considered by the Ottoman No. 209, September 11, Government "of a nature to terminate the 1901. present controversy," and Anthopoulo Pasha was instructed to ask for their confirmation

The following note was accordingly addressed to him :--

" The Marquess of Lansdowne to Anthopoulo Pasha.

" Foreign Office.

"Your Excellency, September 11, 1901. "I have taken note with satisfaction of the telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated by you on the 9th instant, in which his Excellency states that the Turkish Government will not send troops to Koweit, and will maintain the status quo there, on condition that His Majesty's Government will abstain from occupying that place or establishing a British Protectorate there.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/18/B133A حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023958855.0x000007/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية/archive/81055/vdc



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٩و] (١٤/٧)



"I have pleasure in confirming the assurance which has been given to his Excellency by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that, provided the Turkish Government abstain from sending troops to Koweit and respect the status quo there, His Majesty's Government will not occupy that place or establish a British Protectorate over it.

"I am, &c. "LANSDOWNE." (Signed)

To Sir N. O'Conor, No. 130, Telegrar

In a Secret telegram dated the 7th September, Lord Lansdowne, while pointing out that "the Relegraphic, September 7, 1901. situation requires very careful handling as our arrangement with the Sheikh is not very precise, and it was entered into without the knowledge or concurrence of the Porte," instructed Sir N. O'Conor that "we cannot recede from our position, and if Porte should insist on raising question of their rights we may have to convert into something much more precise the present indefinite understanding with the Sheikh."

On the 9th September a further communication was made to Count Metternich.

To Sir F. Lascelles, Nos. 304 and 312, September 11 and 12, 1901.

A Memorandum upon various subjects, including Koweit, drawn up by Lord Lansdowne for the King's personal use, and handed by His Majesty to the German Emperor at their recent meeting, had elicited a formal reply from the German Government which Count Metternich had left at the Foreign Office on the 3rd.

It was now explained to him that the Memorandum, which had been hastily prepared, was a purely informal and unofficial document. The statement referred to by Count Metternich on the 3rd was a repetition of Sir N. O'Conor's language in 1900, which might be more correctly described as having stated that His Majesty's Government have no desire to interfere with the Sultan's authority as it exists in those parts.

There could be no doubt that this authority was of a very limited description. The Sheikh belonged to a class of native Chiefs enjoying a large measure of practical independence with whom His Majesty's Government found it necessary to have direct relations for the sake of the maintenance of tranquillity and the protection of British trade.

Therefore, although ready to maintain the status quo, His Majesty's Government had been unable to acquiesce in attempts recently made by Turkey to impose on the Sheikh conditions from which he had hitherto been free. They had considered it



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [٩ظ] (١٤/٨)



a matter for direct and friendly discussion with the Porte, who now regarded the incident as closed, and Count Metternich was informed of the assurances exchanged.

Lord Lansdowne subsequently informed Count To Sir F. Lascelles, To Sn. No. 325, Santember 28, Metternich that it was necessary to bear in mind s that where minor Eastern States were concerned 1901. it was not unusual to find that they owed a divided allegiance to more than one Power.

The German Memorandum above referred to states that Koweit has an importance for Germany merely as the proposed terminus of the Bagdad Railway, and gives an undertaking that the Manager of the Railway Company will be instructed to come to an understanding with the British Government when the time for purchasing land for a railway terminus and a landingplace at Koweit shall have come. Shortly afterwards Count Metternich confirmed this assurance in conversation with Lord Lansdowne, To Sir F. Lascelles, adding that the railway might be made five years No. 337, October 16, 1901. or fifty years hence, or not at all, but that when it was made it was important for Germany to find a peaceful condition of things in that part of the Gulf.

In spite of the Agreement for preserving the status quo in Koweit, the Turks began soon to display considerable activity. A Turkish official, the "Nakib" of Bussorah, visited Koweit in a Turkish ship with a message from the Porte to the Sheikh threatening forcible ejection. Strong representations were addressed by His Majesty's Government to the Porte, and British ships were placed under orders for the purpose of defending Koweit in the event of an attack by the Turks or the Amir of Nejd. The result of this action was that the Turkish Government disowned the Nakib, who was not, the Ambassador declared, an agent of the Porte, but merely a "kind of Bishop."

Indirectly the Turks were concerned in a more serious affair. Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit had originally obtained his position by murdering his elder brothers and their sons. The nephews, assisted by one Yusuf Ibrahim, retaliated in 1902, by making a piratical raid on Koweit, the success of which was only prevented by prompt action on the part of His Majesty's ship Lapwing." In an encounter with the raiders a British seaman was killed. Turkish complicity in the affair was proved, dilatory and evasive tactics were adopted by the Turkish authorities



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١٠] (١٤/٩)



Sir N. O'Conor, in a subsequent inquiry into the facts, and it was No. 529, December 2, 1902. considered necessary to make a strong protest at the Porte on the subject.

Koweit Boundary.

9

In 1902 questions began to arise as to the extent, geographically speaking, of the Sheikh of Koweit's authority. At the time of the Agreement the limits of Koweit territory had never been discussed, and considerable uncertainty prevailed on the subject. We had obtained a hold over Koweit, and in this manner could claim to be consulted as to the terminus of the Bagdad Railway, but it now began to seem quite possible that the Company would be able to make arrangements with the Turks for a débouché on the Persian Gulf in territory to which the Sheikh could make no claim.

A gun-boat was sent in February to report on several outlying portions of so-called Koweit territory. Small Turkish posts were found at Um Kasr on the Khor Abdulla, and on Bubian Island, to the north of Koweit. Sir N. O'Conor (telegram No. 30 of the 11th March, 1902) thought that the Sheikh's claims to these places were shadowy and unreliable, though we might protest against Turkish occupation of them as a breach of the status quo. This was accordingly done, and a desultory discussion has continued up to the present time regarding Bubian Island. A small Turkish post still remains there, and Sir N. O'Conor continues to press for its withdrawal. It is believed that the Turks would withdraw the post if the British Government consented to abolish the post of Political Agent to Koweit, which they have recently established (see that section of the present Memorandum), but there is no question of agreeing to such a "bargain"; the two matters are to be kept distinct. If the Turks refuse to remove their post, it has been proposed by the India Office, after a reasonable delay, to make a counter-move by establishing and maintaining a post on behalf of the Sheikh. Mubarak has agreed to this course, subject to assurances of our support, financial and otherwise. Lord Lansdowne was not of opinion that any immediate action was necessary, and recommended that the question should be referred to the Defence Committee before further steps were taken. [1265-1] D

India Office, July 20, 1905.

To India Office, August 9, 1905.

المرجع: IOR/L/PS/18/B133A حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023958855.0x00000a/العربية/archive/81055/vdc



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١٤/١٠] (١٤/١٠)

10

As regards Um Kasr (on the mainland of Eastern Arabia, some 50 miles to the north of Koweit), the position is unsatisfactory. Its importance as a possible débouché for the Bagdad Railway is considerable (see Bagdad Railway Memorandum), but the Sheikh's claims to it are so weak as to be hardly worth putting forward. If the Germans try to deal direct with the Turks on the subject, our *locus standi* for putting forward the authority of Koweit would be a doubtful one.

Political Agent.

We still maintain the position that there is no British protectorate over Koweit, and that the status quo of 1901 continues to exist. But the Government of India (who have always favoured an active policy in regard to Koweit affairs. generally) urged that, as we were without a India Office Representative there, our information was spas- August 1, 1903. modic and unreliable, and our hold on the Sheikh uncertain. They wished accordingly to appoint a Resident Political Agent at Koweit, as at Bahrein. This was thought here to be incompatible with the assurances given to the Porte that the status quo would be scrupulously regarded, and Lord Lansdowne refused to agree to such an appointment. He suggested, however, in a letter to the India Office that a via media might be found; an officer might be deputed by the Resident in the Gulf to visit Koweit, from time to time repeating To India Office, his visits as occasion required until his stay Angust 13, 1908. became practically permanent. The position obviously was a difficult one, and a somewhat awkward misunderstanding arose on the subject. Captain Knox was selected for a temporary mission to Koweit-he was to visit the place and come away again-but the Government of India argued that by agreeing to his being sent to Koweit the home Government had accepted their original view, and that a permanent appointment of a "Political Agent to reside at Koweit" had been made. This had not been the intention, and a discussion ensued which ended by the temporary withdrawal of Captain Knox, with the understanding that he should return at intervals. He is now under orders to return to Koweit. The position we take up, as regards the Turkish Government, is that His Majesty's Government, while they have appointed no permanent Agent to Koweit and consider that the status quo of 1901



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١١] (١٤/١١)

11

continues to exist, reserve absolutely the right to dispatch an officer to that place as occasion requires at their uncontrolled discretion as to time and length of stay.

There is a voluminous correspondence on the subject in the autumn of 1904 (see especially India Office, 19th November, and our reply of 25th November).

We have discouraged the idea of a "mission of inquiry" into the interior which the Government of India put forward, and have expressed strongly the opinion that British influence should be rigidly confined to the coast.

Koweit Flag.

India Office, March 10, 1905. The Sheikh at present flies the Turkish flag. He has been recommended to adopt a distinctive ensign for shipping purposes while retaining the present flag for use in Koweit itself.

Koweit Post Office.

1904-5.

It has been proposed to establish a British Post Office at Koweit. After some discussion it was decided that the proposal might raise inconvenient questions with the Porte, and the British Agency surgeon, who has proceeded to Koweit in his professional capacity, is not as yet to perform the duties of postmaster.

General Policy.

A Memorandum, written in 1902 by Lord Lansdowne with regard to Koweit and Persian Gulf affairs generally, is given in Appendix No. 2.

Under the heading El Katr will be found a later expression of opinion on the same subject.

(Signed) R. V. HARCOURT.

E


Foreign Office, December 11, 1905.

[1265--1]



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١٤/١٢] (١٤/١٢)







"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١٢] (١٤/١٣)

13

<page-header><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text>

Vide draft telegram herewith for your concurrence.

Foreign Office, March 21, 1902.

LANSDOWNE. (Signed)



"مذكرة بخصوص الكويت" [١٤/١٤] (١٤/١٤)



