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زنبار، مسقط، بلاد فارس وشبه الجزيرة العربية

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/PS/18/B2

٠١ يوليو ١٨٦٨-٢٤ يوليو ١٨٦٨ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف ١، ٦ مواد (٢٩ ورقة)

رخصة حكومية مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل

ست مذكرات تتعلق بطريقة معالجة البريطانيين للعلاقات بين مسقط وزنبار وبلاد فارس. جميع
الكتاب مرتبطون بمكتب الهند في لندن، وغالبيتهم أعضاء في مجلس الهند. يبدو أن بعض المذكرات
كُتبت بشكل مستقل، بينما جاءت الأخرى رداً على مذكرات سابقة. جميع الوثائق تغطي بعض أو جميع
القضايا التالية:

• المساعدة المالية السنوية بقيمة ٤٠,٠٠٠ دولار التي تتلقاها مسقط من زنبار؛

• مقتل ثويني بن سعيد آل سعيد، سلطان مسقط، على يد نجله، سالم بن ثويني آل سعيد، الذي نصب
نفسه بعد ذلك سلطاناً؛

- تجارة الرقيق في شرق أفريقيا؛
- طموحات بلاد فارس بالوجود البحري في الخليج العربي؛
- إجراءات لحفظ النظام في الخليج؛
- استئجار مسقط لميناء بندر عباس من بلاد فارس؛
- كيف يجب أن تكون إدارة المنطقة: إلى أي سلطة يجب أن تتبع مختلف المكاتب، إلى وزارة الخارجية أم إلى الحكومة في الهند.

"زنبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [١٨ و] (٦/١)

B2.

Zanzibar, Muscat, and Persia.

MEMORANDUM BY POLITICAL SECRETARY.

* India Foreign,
14th May, No. 81,
1868.

A letter,* though by no means an exhaustive one, having been received from the Government of India, on the subject of the relations between Muscat and Zanzibar, and of the connexion of the British Government with these Chiefships, it is desirable that the numerous pending questions bearing directly or indirectly upon those relations should be disposed of with as little delay as possible.

The complications, both political and official, are many. There is (to speak in unofficial language), a "triangular duel," in which Zanzibar, Muscat, and Persia are the actors.

It is expedient that the conflict between Zanzibar and Muscat should be first considered. The Sultan of Zanzibar (Syud Majid) stipulated, under an arbitrament of the Government of India, to pay to his brother, Syud Thoweynee, of Muscat, and to his successors, the sum of 40,000 dollars per annum. There was nothing personal about this agreement; it was a dynastical compact. And Sir William Coghlan, who negotiated this agreement, and the Reverend Mr. Badger, who assisted him, both distinctly state that it was understood in that light by the Zanzibar Chief, and so accepted by him without any reservation.

The plea, therefore, that it was a personal engagement, and lapsed on the death of Syud Thoweynee, the late ruler of Muscat, cannot be maintained.

But the Zanzibar man advances another plea. He says that the present ruler of Muscat was the murderer of his own father (Syud Majid's brother), and an usurper; and that, in these circumstances, it is a disgrace to him to pay money to his brother's murderer. The Government of India say that this is a mere suspicion, but I believe that the fact is not to be questioned for a moment; and, whatever may be the character or the career of Syud Salim, he has been recognized by the British Government, and, therefore, we are as much bound to uphold the award as if he had been a better man. Moreover, those who are versed in the history of Oman know well that such incidents as the murder of relatives, and personal or dynastical changes consequent thereon, have been of frequent occurrence. Sir William Coghlan states that the father of the Sultan of Zanzibar died with the blood of kindred upon him. I am disposed to think, therefore, that this objection is a mere subterfuge; and that if it

9638.

"زنزبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [١٨ ظ] (٦/٢)

2

had been his part to receive, instead of to pay, the subsidy, the "*non olet*" doctrine would have been his; he would have pocketed the 40,000 dollars without smelling a brother's blood.

As a mere question of justice and good faith between the two branches of the family, I do not see that anything can be said in favour of releasing the Sultan of Zanzibar from his engagement.

As a question of policy, in which the British Government is concerned, it is to be observed, that Sir William Coghlan says "In my estimation, it would have the worst possible effect throughout Oman and the Persian Gulf, if the British Government allowed the plain terms of its arbitrament to be set aside by such flimsy prettexts." The Government of India, in their last letter, state distinctly that the good faith of the British Government is involved in the maintenance of the award, and only a little time ago they were thinking of sending a ship of war to compel the Sultan of Zanzibar to act in accordance with his agreement.

On the other hand, it is to be observed that the Sultan of Zanzibar is greatly impoverished, that he is much in debt, that he can with difficulty pay the subsidy, and that his financial exigencies compel him to derive profit from the importation of slaves. It has often been stated, that if he were released from the necessity of paying the subsidy, he would fall readily into an arrangement for the entire suppression of the slave trade in the territories and waters subject to him.

It is at this point that the India Office and the Foreign Office come into conflict with each other. The former wish to maintain the present relations of Muscat and Zanzibar, as a point of good faith. The latter wish to annul the present compact, so as to obtain more readily the good offices of Zanzibar for the suppression of the slave trade.

Now, Zanzibar may be embarrassed by the payment of the subsidy; but Muscat must be equally, if not more, embarrassed by its non-payment, as it is an item of revenue, to the punctual payment of which it was fairly entitled to look. And, as long as it is unpaid, Muscat will allege its non-payment as an excuse for disorders of all kinds, including non-fulfilment of money engagements to others, and irregular means of levying revenue, by piracy, &c. These irregularities have commenced, and Persia is complaining of them. Of these Persian complications I will presently speak more in detail.

Apart from these considerations, it has been shown that we are bound, in good faith, to insist upon the payment of the subsidy to Muscat, or else, it may be said, to pay it ourselves. I do not, however, think that this would meet the difficulty. For, by relieving Zanzibar from the nominal payment, we should break down the whole compact between the Chiefs, and Muscat would be at liberty to make war on Zanzibar, and the States of Oman would thus revert to the unfortunate condition in which they were held before Coghlan's arbitration.

If, therefore, anything is to be done in a pecuniary way by the British Government, it would be far better, in my opinion, to leave the relations of Muscat and Zanzibar as they now are, and to make a specific payment to Zanzibar, in lieu of slave trade revenue.

But it is to be observed that this question was mooted several years ago. When Sir George Clerk was Governor of Bombay, he recommended that the efforts of the Sultan of Zanzibar for the suppression of the slave trade should be supported both by our ships and our money. "The Honourable the Governor in Council," it was said (March 24th, 1861), "cannot for a moment doubt that, if the horrors described by an Officer so cautious as Brigadier Coghlan were made known to the British nation, not a voice would be raised against so small an acknowledgment to Zanzibar as 8,500*l.* per annum for the attainment of so noble an object as the extinction of the East African slave trade." This was brought to the notice of the Foreign Office in the subsequent year. But the Foreign Office (then under Lord Russell) stated that they could "not agree to pay anything to the Sultan of Muscat, towards putting down the slave trade in his dominions," and so the subject fell to the ground. A different view may now be taken of the subject. But it is to be borne in mind that the object to be attained is one of Imperial interest, and that it is the Empire, not the dependencies (India) that ought to pay. The Foreign Office now see the importance of relieving the finances of Zanzibar, and if they are convinced that this cannot be done by our ceasing to enforce the payment of the subsidy, they may recognize the propriety of doing it in a less objectionable way.

* Syud Thoweynee.

I now turn to the consideration of the complications in which the Imaum of Muscat (Syud Salim) is involved, apart from those which arise out of his connexion with Zanzibar. The late Imaum (or Sultan)* rented from Persia the port, &c. of Bunder Abbas, for 20 years from 1855, at the annual cost of 16,000 toman. The engagement provides that it shall not be binding on the Shah of Persia, should an usurper at any time obtain possession of Muscat. Now, Syud Salim is held to be an usurper and a parricide, and, what is worse than all, he is a defaulter. If Zanzibar does not pay him, he cannot pay Persia. So the Persian Government, not having received their rent, terminate the lease of Bunder Abbas.

Then Syud Salim of Muscat betakes himself to reprisals. He begins a retaliatory raid, or system of piracy, in the Persian Gulf, very hurtful to the commerce of Persia; and he has threatened to blockade the port. Persia having no means of her own of effectually suppressing these outrages, applies to the British Government for its good offices, alleging that Syud Salim is upheld by England, who has recognized and assisted him. And with a view to the suppression of these alleged outrages and the

"زنجبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [٩ ظ ٦/٤]

48

permanent protection of Persian commerce in the Gulf, the Government of the Shah express a strong desire to place some ships of war of her own in these waters. These vessels the Shah wishes to be commanded by English officers; and he requests that the British Government will build them at his own cost, the money to be repaid by instalments from the Persian treasury. It is suggested that a British Naval officer should be sent to Teheran to discuss the subject.

Now, it is doubtless our duty to use our good offices to restrain the offensive proceedings of Muscat, but in respect of the Bunder Abbas affair, we must be cautious not to commit ourselves to any measure which would be interpreted into a recognition of the Shah's right to close the agreement, on the ground that the present ruler of Muscat is an usurper, as we have ourselves recognized him as the legitimate sovereign of the country. And as to the employment of a Persian flotilla in the Gulf, I think the measure is to be deprecated, as it might give rise to very inconvenient complications. I would not, however, at once discourage it. A British Naval officer (an old officer of the Indian Navy, such as Captain Lynch or Captain Crutenden,) might be commissioned to proceed to Teheran to discuss the subject; but the sooner the Shah is convinced that we will do what he wants, and thus save his money, or, in other words, the sooner the whole project is stranded the better.

These are the several complications upon which Her Majesty's Government are now called upon to declare their opinions. The difficulty is very much increased by the fact that there are official (or departmental) as well as political embarrassments. Abroad there are five local authorities. The Agent at Zanzibar, who is partly under the Foreign, partly under the India Office. The Resident at Bushire, who is also under the India Office. The Political Agent and Consul General in Turkish Arabia, who is partly under the India Office, and partly under the Foreign Office. (The last named is only indirectly mixed up with the particular complications to which this memorandum relates.) And then there is Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, who is entirely under the Foreign Office. It would be difficult in the circumstances above recited, to prevent some conflicts of authority, and they have very inconveniently arisen. It is unnecessary to repeat here what has been said so often about the divided responsibility of the Zanzibar Agent and Consul. Turning in the other direction, we see that the limits of the authority of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and his relations with the British Minister at Teheran, have been the subject of a lengthened correspondence, which the Foreign Office has referred to the India Office for the opinion of Sir Stafford Northcote. Nothing, moreover, is more likely than that far more serious conflicts should arise in the course of the present quarrel between Muscat and Persia, Colonel Pelly being

"زنجبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [٢٠ و] (٦/٥)

inclined to support Muscat rather more than is agreeable to Mr. Alison.

It is obvious in the face of the foregoing facts, that there is a very embarrassing state of affairs, which is more likely to grow worse than to grow better as Zanzibar and Muscat sink more deeply into debt; and that it behoves the British Government very seriously to consider some definite and consistent policy to be pursued towards the Chiefs of Muscat and Zanzibar, and in respect of the relations of the former with Persia. I do not see that there is any very hopeful prospect of this, so long as the diplomatic action of the British Government is conducted by two different Departments, through agents recognizing different authorities. After an experience of twelve years in my present appointment, I can confidently assert, that there is no business done so badly as that which is done by two Departments of the State,—in this case, by the Foreign Office and the India Office. There is a tendency to shift responsibility from one to the other; to stave off the consideration of a troublesome question by referring it to another Department; asking the "opinion" or the "observations" of another Minister. Time is lost in these references and counter references, business is increased, delays are numerous, and sometimes, in the course of this shuttle-cocking, a grave matter drops out of sight altogether. Of course, if public servants were immaculate this would not happen. But I write not of what ought to be, but of what is, and, I believe, ever will be. The fewer, then, the occasions of these references between the Foreign Office and the India Office the better. They must happen sometimes, but is it wise to perpetuate a system which multiplies this sort of duplex action as much as if it had been cunningly invented for the express purpose? The answer being, of course, in the negative, it results that measures should be taken to bring all these several agencies, Zanzibar, Muscat, and Persia, under one undivided authority. The question, then, is, whether that one authority should be the Foreign Office or the India Office? We have invited the opinion of the Government of India as to the expediency of placing Zanzibar entirely under the Foreign Office, and the opinion is adverse to such an arrangement. It is obvious that Zanzibar and Muscat should be under one authority, and that we could not sever our connexion with Zanzibar without also letting go our hold of Muscat. Now, some high authorities are of opinion that all the affairs of the Persian Gulf should continue to be regulated from India. There does not appear to be so strong a reason for this as there was at the time when the Indian Navy existed; but still there are, doubtless, advantages in the system. And, having reference to the fact that the Indian Department of Her Majesty's Government is the one most versed in Oriental usages and best acquainted with the Oriental character,

"زنبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [٢٠ ظ ٦/٦]

6

Sir Stafford Northcote may, perhaps, consider it more advisable to place the entire group of agencies, thus connected with each other, under the superintendence of the India Office. It might be the best solution of the difficulty to let us again take the entire business (including that of Persia) into our hands. But it would be obviously absurd to do so if, on the occurrence of a change of Government, there should be any likelihood (as on the last occasion) of the reversal of the arrangement.

J. W. KAYE.

July 1st, 1868.

The following is a copy of a letter from Sir Stafford Northcote to the Secretary of State for India, dated July 1st, 1868. The letter discusses the proposed arrangement for the management of the Indian business, including Persia, and the possibility of a change of Government leading to a reversal of the arrangement.

MEMORANDUM BY CAPTAIN EASTWICK.

1. Several questions, some of great political importance, are opened up for consideration in these papers and correspondence.
2. Before proceeding to offer a few remarks upon them, I would premise that I see no occasion for sending out any special Officer to enter upon questions of general policy with the Persian Government and with the Government of India. I would leave all such questions to be dealt with by the authorities on the spot, after Her Majesty's Government had decided upon the policy to be pursued. If any special agency should be required for the settlement of a particular question, the Government of India could appoint a special Commissioner to make the arrangements.
3. The very fact of sending a Commissioner from England would be apt to excite suspicion in the mind of the Shah of Persia, and create difficulties, by leading him to suppose that something more was meant than met the eye. The Officer selected must be of rank to carry weight, he must be paid a high salary, and have an establishment, and be invested with large powers to enable him to bring all the various matters treated of in this correspondence to a satisfactory conclusion. A very long time would probably elapse before he could complete his task.
4. I concur, however, in the propriety of despatching a competent Naval Officer to Tehran to assist Her Majesty's Minister in advising the Persian Government as to the best mode of carrying into effect the wishes of the Shah to establish steamers in the Persian Gulf. A better man than Captain Lynch could not be selected, if he would consent to go.
5. We are informed by Mr. Alison that the Shah is very much engrossed by this project, and it would not be politic to thwart him, as, failing to obtain assistance from our Government, he might be driven to apply to France or to America.
6. It is our policy to preserve and strengthen Persia, without, however, encouraging her to encroach on her neighbours. There are no antagonistic interests between the two countries, and we ought to endeavour to impress this sentiment upon Persia, at the same time evincing every desire to cultivate friendly relations by attending to her reasonable requests, and using all legitimate means to cement the alliance.
7. It was unfortunate that the application of the Shah a few years ago for British Officers to drill

9638 a.

A

"مذكرة للنقيب إيستويك" [٢٢ و] (١٠/٣)

3

12. While considering the intimate connexion of the interests of British Indian subjects, of the subjects of allied Native States, and of India generally, with this portion of the dominions of Persia, and the necessity of dealing with questions that may arise, not merely with reference to local and temporary objects, but on the basis of a large and comprehensive policy applicable to our widely extended empire in India, the further question mooted in these papers, as to the proper Department which should conduct our relations with Persia, is naturally suggested.

13. It will, I think, be admitted, that if it were not for our Indian empire, British relations with Persia would be shorn of half their importance. The chief matters which form the subject of diplomatic discussion and correspondence between the two countries, have more or less reference to India. This is the only ground on which the annual payment of 12,000*l.* for the Persian mission from the Indian revenues can be justified.

14. There is one subject especially which is assuming larger proportions every day, and occupying the attention of all whose duty it is to watch over the safety and progress of our Indian territories, the question of Central Asia. I am not one of those who view the advance of Russia with any undue alarm, but I nevertheless recognize, in the gradual approach of a great European power towards our North-Western frontier, an element of disturbance which should not be overlooked.

15. I know well, from experience (having held a political appointment on the Indus), the spirit that animates the warlike Mahomedan tribes of those countries, and their traditional impressions of plunder gained in former invasions of Hindostan. These impressions, though dormant at present, may at any favourable moment be roused into activity, and when combined with religious fanaticism represent a formidable danger not to be despised by prudent statesmen.

16. Such questions are little understood, and, consequently, little appreciated by diplomatic agents educated in the purely English school; they are, on the other hand, very familiar to the thoughts, studies, and experience of Indian political officers, and are thoroughly grasped and mastered by them in all their various bearings.

17. One great advantage, therefore, which would result from the transfer of the conduct of our relations with Persia to the India Office would be, in my opinion, the power possessed by the Indian Secretary of consulting those who had held high office in India, and had been in the habit of considering large political questions, and who would bring local knowledge and practical experience to bear upon many of the matters that would come up for discussion.

"مذكرة للنقيب إيستويك" [٢٣ و] (١٠/٥)

23

5

contemninous with Persia, involving a wide extent of frontier, comes undoubtedly more within the range of European than Indian diplomacy.

23. There is another point that ought not to be omitted. The Shah of Persia is peculiarly sensitive on the score of prerogative. I have always understood that a strong feeling exists, both with the Shah and his ministers, that it would involve a loss of dignity to carry on diplomatic relations with any Department but the Foreign Office. It is an element, though perhaps not a conclusive one, in the question of a change, that it should not be distasteful at the Court where it is proposed to be introduced.

24. If, however, I have some hesitation in advocating a change with regard to Persia, I have none in respect to Muscat, the affairs of the Gulf, and Zanzibar. I concur with the Government of India that our relations with those countries should be placed entirely under the Indian authorities, primarily under the Government of Bombay, to be supervised by the Government of India, and then in the regular course by the Secretary of State for India.

25. Our relations with Muscat, and with the Arab maritime Chiefs, have been conducted from the earliest times by the Government of Bombay; all our treaties and engagements have been made by the Indian authorities, and, from the proximity and constant intercourse between India and Arabia, there must necessarily be more exact knowledge possessed in India, and better means of forming correct conclusions upon any points of difference that may arise between the inhabitants of these countries that can be available at the Foreign Office.

26. The same reasoning applies, though in a less degree, to Zanzibar, and it is very desirable that the anomalous state of things at present existing there, in respect to the division of authority, should cease. The Political Agent should no longer be permitted to correspond direct with the Foreign Office. He should correspond with, and receive his instructions only from, the Government of Bombay. His appointment should also rest with that Government.

27. The important point as to the unity of the controlling authority having been determined, the question next come what is the policy to be pursued in the actual condition of affairs between Muscat and Zanzibar.

28. During the long reign of the Imam Syud Saeed, who succeeded to Muscat in 1807, and died in 1856, and who was a firm ally of the British Government, Zanzibar was a dependency of Muscat. At the death of Syud Saeed, he left Muscat to his son, Syud Thoweynee, and Zanzibar to another son, Syud Majid, on condition of certain payments.

9638 a.

B

19

Disputes arose, and there is little doubt Syud Majid would have been compelled to succumb, but for the intervention of the British Government. It must be borne in mind that Muscat is, as it were, the mother country, from whence the conquerors of Zanzibar and the Arab settlements on the coast of Africa came, and that, if left to themselves, the warlike tribes of the Gulf would soon reassert their supremacy over their African conquests.

29. In 1861, a final and permanent arrangement was made by Sir William Coghlan, under the orders of Lord Canning, by which Zanzibar became independent, paying annually 40,000 dollars to Muscat in compensation of all claims. Since the accession of Syud Salim to Muscat, by the alleged murder of his father, Syud Thoweynee, in 1866, Syud Majid declines to pay the 40,000 dollars, on the ground that Syud Salim is a parricide and an usurper.

30. Syud Salim was, we are told, elected by the tribes to succeed his father, according to the usage of Oman. He was recognized by the Government of India, and the recognition was approved by the Secretary of State on the 28th of February 1867. On the 22d May 1867, the Viceroy addressed a letter to Syud Majid, announcing his intention to enforce the payment of the subsidy. Sir William Coghlan, a high authority on these matters, having been consulted by the Secretary of State, sent in an elaborate memorandum, dated 17th August 1867, in which he expresses his concurrence in the letter and policy of the Viceroy, and states that "in his estimation it would have the worst possible effect throughout Oman, and the Persian Gulf, if the British Government allowed the plain terms of its arbitrament to be set aside by such flimsy pretexts."

31. Syud Salim depends upon the Zanzibar subsidy to enable him to pay his tribute to the Wahabees, his assignment to Toorkee, and other demands. The Government of India distinctly state, that British "good faith" is involved in the maintenance of the subsidy, and they strongly deprecate any measures that may tend to weaken the Sultan of Muscat. There is no doubt that for a series of years it has been the policy of the British Government to support Muscat; the late Syud Saeed, on more than one occasion, owed the preservation of his power to British interference in his behalf.

32. I feel strongly that the character of Syud Salim does not entitle him to our sympathy or support, but he is not the first eastern ruler who has risen to a throne by the shedding of blood. Syud Saeed, himself, stabbed his uncle and stepped into his place, and the Arab tribes did not think the worse of him for the outrage. Syud Salim was elected by those who had the right to elect him, and he has been acknowledged both by the Indian and

Home Governments. We must deal with him as the *de facto* Ruler of Muscat, and if we do so deal with him, we shall have the right to exact from him a strict adherence to the engagements of the Muscat State with us, both as regards the slave trade, and the preservation of the peace of the Gulf. We must tell him plainly, that we will not permit him to commence any hostile movement against our ally the King of Persia, and that we shall hold him responsible for any piratical outrages committed by the Arabs under his jurisdiction.

33. We may thus conciliate Persia, and do away with her plea for the establishment of a navy, and we shall maintain the position of a quasi-protectorate, which we have always held in the Gulf, but from which, since the abolition of the Indian Navy, we have shown a disposition to recede. If we do recede, it is certain that, sooner or later, anarchy and confusion will follow, and that we shall be obliged to interfere at last, and do over again, probably at a heavy expenditure of money and life, the work that we did so effectually in former times.

34. It is quite clear to me that the British Government alone has the will and the power to keep peace in the Gulf, but we must employ more adequate means, and have a more efficient system than at present, or we shall lose the ascendancy we have so long maintained. While this ascendancy exists, and the prestige of our power has suffered no diminution, we are in a far better position than we otherwise could be for carrying out more effective measures for the suppression of the slave trade.

35. We are informed that at the present time, in reference to the question of the subsidy, Sultan Majid is willing to make certain concessions, by which the transport of slaves will be restricted within narrower limits along the coasts of his dominions. I attach very little importance to a further limitation of the line of coast, if the conveyance of slaves from one part of the coast to another, or to Zanzibar, be still permitted. The door will still be open for evasion of the engagement, and facilities will be afforded for converting the transport into traffic. We should strike at the root of the evil, and prohibit the slave trade entirely. It is everywhere prohibited, on both coasts of Africa, except in the Zanzibar dominions.

36. Our proposition to Syud Majid should be, an extension to all his territories of the third additional article of the Treaty of 1839, with Syud Saeed, in regard to the Soomalies, which provides that the sale of males or females, young or old, being contrary to Mahomedan law, shall be considered as piracy, and all people convicted of being concerned in such an act after a specified date shall be punished as pirates. We should need the cooperation of the French Government in this arrangement, but there is no reason to doubt that it would be freely given.

9688 a.

C

8

37. Syud Majid has long anticipated that more stringent measures for the suppression of the slave trade would be adopted by the British Government, and he has, I am told, commenced building a town and residence on the main land, with a view to such a contingency. Still, we cannot expect him to agree to the sweeping proposition above stated, which would be most unpopular with his Chiefs and people, would take away a great proportion of the cultivators of his own estates, and would deprive him of the chief source of his revenue, without an adequate equivalent.

38. The payment of this equivalent, compared with the results to the general interests of humanity, would be an insignificant sum for the Imperial and Indian revenues to share between them. We might put it at ten thousand pounds, more or less. The amount stated to be realized annually by the Sultan of Zanzibar from the tax on the importation of slaves is about 40,000 dollars. We might add 10,000 dollars, to make the bargain more palatable, and, what would doubtless offer a great inducement to Majid to look upon the arrangement with favour, we might further undertake to pay the subsidy to Salim, giving Majid the surplus, and thus relieving him of a continually recurring obligation, most obnoxious to his feelings, and sparing us the necessity of perhaps being compelled to resort to coercive measures on behalf of a ruler whose conduct we cannot but regard with abhorrence.


39. It would probably be desirable to fix a date after which the measure would come into full operation, and arrangements might also be made for the gradual reduction and final extinction of the payment, on certain conditions being realized. We know that there is a supply of free labour to a considerable extent in Zanzibar, from the original inhabitants of the island, from the slaves of British subjects set free, from immigrants from the African coast and islands in the vicinity, and from other countries. This supply would increase with the demand, and remove any pressure in respect to want of labour, but it is not requisite to enter into these details.

40. As a set off to the annual charge for compensation, there would be the prospective reduction of the African squadron, and the extension of legitimate trade. It is stated by General Rigby* that "a great increase in the trade of Zanzibar, and in the growth of agricultural produce, took place after the abolition by treaty of the slave trade to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea." When we put down piracy in the Persian Gulf, the Chiefs principally concerned took to the slave traffic; if we deprive them of this outlet to their maritime energies, they will probably turn their attention to lawful commerce.


* Report, 1860.

41. The policy I have recommended may perhaps be considered to involve an undue amount of

"مذكرة للنقيب إيستويك" [٢٥ و] (١٠/٩)



"مذكرة للنقيب إيستويك" [٢٥ ظ] (١٠/١٠)



"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٩٢٦ و] (٢٤/١)

MEMORANDUM ON THE DRAFTS OF DESPATCHES REGARDING THE AFFAIRS OF MUSCAT AND ZANZIBAR.

I think that there is more to be said for Syud Majid's view of his obligations than the memorandum of the Department seems to admit.

The two brothers, Majid and Thoweynee, were at variance as to the division of their father's kingdom. At the request of both parties, Lord Canning, the then Governor General of India, became arbitrator, and divided the inheritance; Zanzibar to Majid, and Muscat and 40,000 dollars to be paid yearly by Zanzibar to Thoweynee.

Thoweynee was murdered by his own son Salim. There is not a shadow of doubt as to the fact, which was not denied to me when in open Durbar I received Salim's own envoys, three Sheikhs and men of weight in Oman, and told them, in so many words, what I had heard. It is to be regretted that the Government of India should obscure the question by suggesting doubts which are wholly untenable, and which no living soul acquainted with the facts really entertains.

Majid, Sultan of Zanzibar, and a younger brother, Toorkee, who was in Oman, both became, by Arab custom, bound to avenge Thoweynee's death, by killing Salim, and either could have done it, for either would have had the support of the whole of the Oman population, which was not tainted with Wahabecism. But we actively interfered to prevent either of them from ridding their country and their family of the parricide. We took Toorkee and carried him off as a prisoner, and only released him on his parole not to attack Muscat by sea.

(N.B.—The Arabs of Oman, a very different race from either Bedowees or Nejdees, though possibly, like many other polygamous races, less scrupulous than monogamous races in shedding the blood of more distant relatives, have quite as great a horror as we have of parricide. Salim's crime is always spoken of in Oman, when men dare speak at all of it, as an unheard of and unparalleled atrocity, and we have greatly lost in character by our apparent indifference to his crime.)

Majid now says, "I am bound, by every consideration binding on an Arab ruler, to go to war with Salim, and avenge my brother's blood. If you prevent me by force, as you have already prevented Toorkee, from ridding our family and our country of this monster, I, like Toorkee, must bow to superior force, but I will not willingly go on paying to my brother's murderer what I agreed to pay to my brother as the price of peace, and of an equitable division of our inheritance."

I think he has both natural and diplomatic right on his side.

9638 b.

A

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٢٦ ظ] (٢٤/٢)

2

When kings differ the natural solution of their difference is war. If for our own convenience, and for the better prosecution of our buying and selling, we interfere between two rulers, as we have done twice in these last ten years, and stop war, we are clearly bound to settle all quarrels which, but for our interference, would be settled by appeal to the sword.

To my mind, it would be perfectly monstrous to use force to compel Zanzibar to pay the 40,000 dollars, unless we either adjudicated this new cause of quarrel arising out of Thoweynee's murder, and punished the murderer, if found guilty, or left the uncle and nephew at liberty to settle the question, as to the guilt of Salim, by appeal to arms. No Arab will ever be deceived by the arguments now used by the Government of India; and we shall only confirm the suspicion the Arabs have begun to entertain, that, for some selfish object of our own, we secretly approve of Salim's crime, and desire to profit by it.

The only way in which we can, without further loss of honour, satisfy Salim without further outraging Thoweynee, would be by paying Salim ourselves. This seems to me to be the logical consequence of the course we have adopted in interfering to keep Salim on the throne, and the only course by which we can avoid further wrong-doing and disgrace.

Probably, if we agreed to do this, Zanzibar would consent to some fresh and more effectual arrangements for abolishing the slave trade, and there can be no doubt that, as a mere question of money, it would be well worth our while to pay much more than 40,000 dollars per annum for any agreement which would enable us to reduce our squadron now employed to suppress slavery on the east coast of Africa.

I would not scruple even to pay much more, as a life grant to Syud Majid. To him the abolition of the slave trade implies, not only execration in every household of note within 100 miles of the coasts of the Red, Arabian, and Persian Seas, but a complete destitution of the labour which now cultivates his clove and sugar gardens in Zanzibar, and yields nine-tenths of his income.

If we really wish to stop the slave trade, to keep faith with all concerned, and to avoid adding to the mistakes we have made during the past three years, we should empower the Government of India to send out an envoy like Sir William Coghlan, with an assistant like Mr. Badger,* as secretary, and instructions to this effect.

1. To arrange between Muscat and Zanzibar for a revision of the existing agreement on the following basis:—

- (a.) Complete separation of interests and obligations as regards both Muscat and Zanzibar.
- (b.) The Government of India to pay yearly to Muscat the sum now due from Zanzibar.

* I mention these officers because they are intimately acquainted with the whole subject, and are personally known to every one of the parties affected by the treaty, and enjoy their confidence.

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٢٧ و] (٢٤/٣)

3

(c.) Muscat and Zanzibar to agree to effective arrangements to stop the slave trade, and to prevent a revival of piracy.

(d.) Zanzibar to receive such further payment from the Government of India as our Envoy may find to be reasonable, as a set off for the loss of slave labour. This payment to continue for one or two generations, as may be found equitable.

(e.) The charge of such arrangements to be divided between India and England, as a reasonable payment for lessening to India* the cost of resuscitating a local navy for the Persian Gulf, and for enabling England to reduce the East African squadron.

*N.B. This necessity can only be postponed, and its cost lessened, it cannot be entirely obviated.

I believe, by some such plan, we might stop the slave trade as effectually on the east, as has been done on the west, coast of Africa, and content both Zanzibar and Muscat, without paying heavily for the attainment of both those great objects.

As to the Persian Gulf and Persia's share in these disputes, I would defer action till such an officer as Captain Lynch has visited Teheran, as proposed in the departmental Memorandum, and can tell us distinctly what Persia wants to do in the Gulf, and how, and why.

We must remember that Persia, thwarted and overridden on every possible occasion, to the north and north-east by Russia, and on the Turkish frontier, is glad of any opportunity to fancy herself independent towards Khorassan and the seaboard. In this she is encouraged by Russia, whose interests are equally served whether Persia makes way or gets snubbed by the English in those directions. This plan of a navy in the Gulf may be either a plaything of the Shah's, or a serious effort, such as from time to time is suggested by some of the more intelligent Persian ministers to strengthen their position, but it can in no way diminish our necessities or obligations as a naval power in these seas.

If two men like Sir William Coghlan and Captain Lynch were to report, the one from the Persian, the other from the Muscat, point of view, we should know more exactly what it may be best to do in the way of advising or aiding Persia as to getting up a navy for herself in the Indian seas.

On the general question, I cannot add much to what I have often said, in one form or another, to the Governor General and Secretary of State, *e.g.*, in a letter to Sir J. Lawrence, of the 23d March 1866, of which and of other correspondence on the subject extracts are annexed.

It is difficult, if not impossible, now to retrace the false steps we then took, and since have taken, in recognizing Salim, and thrice interfering when we prevented Toorkee and Majid from opposing Salim, and actively aided Salim to suppress the tribes of Oman who had revolted against him. All we can now do is to prevent making more mistakes of the same kind.

23

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٢٧ ظ] (٢٤/٤)

4

Time presses ; and what is now to be done cannot be well deferred. But the only plan which seems to me likely to enable us permanently to maintain the position we have held in the Arabian seas for so many years past, is that which was proposed by Sir G. Clerk to Lord Canning, to have a Governor of Aden, as we have of Malta and Gibraltar, appointed by the Indian Government, but corresponding direct with the Secretary of State, as the Governors of Madras and Bombay do, and having Assistants with political and consular powers, much as at present, but reporting to Aden from Zanzibar, Jeddah, and Muscat.

The Agencies at Bushire and Bagdad should, in like manner, report to the Minister at Tehran, who should be an Indian Officer selected by Her Majesty's advisers from among the men qualified for the posts of Lieutenant Governors, Chief Commissioners, and the higher grades of political officers.

I think this would be a better field for selection than is afforded by the less favoured attachés of the Turkish and Persian missions.

I would pay the whole cost of these arrangements from India, but there is no reason why all the Persian correspondence which relates to European foreign affairs should not come before Her Majesty's Government through the Foreign Office, as at present, while, as regards purely Indian affairs, the Minister corresponded direct with the Viceroy, the Governor of Bombay, or the Secretary of State for India, as the case might require.

Just as, for the last century and more, the Admiral in the Mediterranean has had as much diplomatic as naval correspondence, without leading to any misunderstanding between the Admiralty and Foreign Office.

In dealing with all these questions, we must not forget—


(1.) That all our interests with Persia, Arabia, and East Africa are primarily Indian interests.

(2.) That the Indian interests in those countries are not modern, but reach back to the ages of the ancient Persian, Assyrian, and Egyptian dynasties.

(3.) That the most modern feature in our relations is the very serious interruption to trade in those seas for more than a century, caused by the increase of piracy, which was consequent on the decay of the modern Ottoman, Persian, and Mogul empires, and in which our own countrymen, with the Dutch and Portuguese, 150 to 200 years ago, unhappily set the example.

(4.) That the Indian trading communities now found in almost every port on those coasts had been there from time immemorial, when Vasco de Gama first rounded the Cape, and that we cannot now, either safely or honourably, repudiate our obligations as the rulers of the country of which they are natives and to which they owe allegiance.

(N.B.—These traders very rarely take their



5
families with them, and still more rarely settle. Their legal *domicilium* is always at ports of Western India, Tatta or Kurrachee in Sind, in various towns of Cutch and Kattywar, Bombay, or Calicut.)

(5.) That we have, by treaty and long usage, an almost exclusive right of interference with nearly half the Arabian seaboard, and that we have, up to the present time, actively enforced those rights. The Indian Government in former days, under Lords Wellesley, Hastings, William Bentinck, and Auckland, sent embassies and expeditions, fought at Ras-el-Khyma, bombarded Moeha, occupied Karack, and took Aden, to maintain our position; and no Government of India, up to three years ago, ever dreamed of repudiating our powers and responsibilities in those seas.

(6.) That France, America, and Russia are all most anxious for a footing on these coasts. France sent Mr. Gifford Palgrave "to look for an island," and the French Commodore now in those seas has, I have every reason to believe, an eye to the development of that idea. The operations of Prussia and America, with a similar object in view, are in abeyance while their hands are so full at home, but they are never concealed or denied by Americans or Germans interested in the east, nor is there anything for Americans or Germans to be ashamed of, or to be regretted by us, in their prosecution.

But it is quite certain that wherever we recede from the position we have so long held, one of these powers will step in. We shall not annihilate our interest and responsibilities in Persian Gulf and Arabian affairs. We shall simply transfer them from the Indian authorities, to whom they traditionally belong, and who do understand, or ought to understand, them, and who can manage them economically, and we shall make them over to the Foreign Office, who will not, and cannot, know much about them, or give them much real attention, until some question arises which assumes the aspect of a European complication, the solution of which will cost millions.

(7.) That Russia is passive in Southern Persia and Arabia, because whatever happens must work to her advantage. Russia well knows that nothing will induce us to attempt extending our Empire at the expense of Persia, Afghanistan, or Turkey, and that all three Empires must gravitate towards the aggressive powers, which are at present Russia and France. If we prop up Turkey and Persia, and help them, as we do now, to develop trade, and to become richer, so much more valuable will be the prize when it comes to be shared. Meantime, we keep out French and Americans, and other less peacefully disposed powers. In promoting our own peaceful views we are doing the work of Russia, and if we were, instead of a telegraphic line, to make a railway from Tiflis to Bushire, Russia would hardly object. It would aid her to sit astride of

9638 b.

B

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٢٨ ظ] (٢٤/٦)

6

Persia, with one foot in the Caspian sea and the other in the Persian Gulf, and she knows that, till she puts her foot in the stirrup, we shall not wish ourselves to mount into that saddle.

Russia is equally well assured that we do not wish to weaken, or to keep weak, either Turkey or Persia. But if our action, or inaction, has that effect, the ultimate result is the same to the interests of Russia, which cannot help being an aggressive power as long as its neighbours are weaker and less civilized than itself.

(8.) That we cannot devolve on either Persia, Turkey, or Muscat, or on any two, or all of them combined, our obligations and responsibilities to suppress piracy, and to do what is essential to prevent its revival by arbitrating between hostile tribes.

The piratical tribes of the Persian Gulf coasts have never owned, and probably never will own, allegiance to any other power, whether Arab, Turk, or Persian. We have treaty engagements with them, into which they entered partly because we brought an overwhelming force against them, but more because they found that we really did not wish, as all Arab, Turk, and Persian potentates do, for territorial aggrandisement. We simply desired that they should keep the peace at sea, and render the seas safe for trade.


These treaties are solemn engagements, made many years ago, and acted on ever since, until quite lately, when we have been slack in doing our part, partly because the Government of India enunciated a perfectly new view of its own intentions and responsibilities, and partly because the ships of the Royal Navy cannot be left in the Gulf during the hot season, as the ships of the old Indian Navy used to be, at the call of the Resident.

If Muscat had a really good navy (as she had a few years ago, in the lifetime of Syud Saeed, the father of Thoweynee and Majid), it would, of course, help in many ways to discourage piracy, but it could not suppress it, and Muscat, without the revenues of Zanzibar, could hardly now maintain such a navy.

No naval force which Persia or Turkey could organize would be of any use in putting down piracy, because Turks and Persians would always attempt territorial conquest, and thus rouse the hostility of the pirate tribes to an extent which would aggravate the evil.

Piracy in these seas is no modern evil. It has been, off and on, the main occupation of warlike tribes, on a barren and unhealthy coast, for many centuries. The strength of the tribes consists, not only in their fierce, fanatical, courage, but in the terrible heat, unhealthy climate, and dangerous navigation of their coast, which makes it almost impossible for any civilized foreign Power continuously to hold territorial possession of the whole coast.

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط ووزنبار" [٢٩ و] (٢٤/٧)



7

Hence, the suppression of piracy depends on the constant use of a naval force of small armed vessels, sufficiently strong to coerce any one tribe, or even all of them combined, but used only to enforce treaty engagements, or just arbitration under treaty. Our Indian navy did all that was required, with from four to eight small sailing vessels,—the largest, a small 20-gun sloop of war,—and a steamer or two, always present in the Gulf. This small force sufficed, because the tribes knew we had no ulterior objects, and had no designs on their territorial independence, and were generally, in a rough way, just and reasonable. Had they been suspicious of our motives, a much larger force would have been needed.

Three (3) small, well-armed steamers, of which two could be always in the Gulf, would be ample to do the same work now, and to prevent a revival of piracy; but they must be small, to work on a shore masked by a network of coral reefs, with deep channels between. They must be well manned and armed, for an Arab boat, with 50 to 100 men on board, would never hesitate to board a vessel double her own tonnage, and, once on the decks, the Arab pirates, with sword and dagger, and thorough contempt for life, are formidable customers, even to well-armed English sailors.


This work cannot be done by Her Majesty's ships under existing Admiralty regulations, nor will the Admiralty ever allow any permanent exceptional relaxation of their rules in any one sea.

The best course open to us in these seas seems to me to be:—

1. To have an Indian Commodore,—a young, active, Post Captain,—to command the war vessels of the Indian Government, under the orders of the Viceroy, and paid by the Indian Government.
2. He should have at least three small, well-manned and well-armed steamers, for service in the Persian Gulf, and he should command all the other marine of the Indian Government.
3. His Officers and European seamen should be volunteers from Her Majesty's Navy, lent to the Indian Government for five (5) years at a time, without prejudice to their prospects or promotion in the Royal Navy, and subject to recall when wanted by the Admiralty.
4. Legislation will be requisite to give the Commodore proper authority under Her Majesty's Commission. All hands should be subject to his orders, as they are, in Her Majesty's ships, to the orders of the Admiral, but he should be subject to the authority of the Viceroy and Indian Government only, the Indian Treasury paying all expenses.

H. B. FREER,
July 15th, 1868.

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٣٠ و] (٢٤/٩)



"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [ظ ٣٠]

(٢٤/١٠)

10

them, in the course of their aggressions against Muscat, had cruelly put to death, in cold blood, several Hindoo traders, non-combatant British subjects, living and trading in Muscat territory.

Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, consequently not only urged the Government of Muscat to repel and punish the aggressors, but asked the Officer commanding Her Majesty's ship "Highflyer" to aid with the ships under his command.

In attacking the small fort of Demaun, near Khatiff, the boats of the "Highflyer" were repulsed, with the loss of four men killed, and several wounded.

The Sultan of Muscat was, about the same time, treacherously assassinated by his son Salim, who had become imbued with Wahabee doctrines, and who, in the absence of the army and its Commandant, his uncle Toorkee, and of the British Resident, succeeded in seizing the palace, the capital, and such treasure and military stores as they contained.

On these circumstances being reported, the Government of India expressed a general disapproval of all that had been done by the Resident.

I have not at hand the demi-official letter which the Viceroy wrote at the same time, but it was very much to the same effect as his later letter of April 21st, extracts from which will be found below.

The following letter, dated Bombay, March 23d, 1866, contains the views which I submitted to the Viceroy in reply:—

"I have been very carefully thinking over what you say about Muscat affairs in your letter to me of the 12th, as well as in the official Despatch, and there are one or two points on which I am afraid I can hardly agree with you.


"The repulse at Demaun was certainly very annoying, and the loss of the four brave fellows killed a very lamentable and, it may be said, a very useless expenditure of valuable life. But, in apportioning the blame, I think you should consider that the season for naval operations was drawing to a close; that the Admiralty peremptorily forbade the retention of ships in the Gulf after the hot weather set in; and that, if the navy was to do anything, it was necessary to do it quickly.

"Of course, if Colonel Pelly had been on board [the "Highflyer,"] the information would have been better, the reconnoitring more complete, and the attack would probably have succeeded, with, possibly, no loss; but is Colonel Pelly to blame for not going with the "Highflyer"?

"I certainly think not. He could not be in two places at once, and he was much more wanted at Muscat and with the Sultan than up the Gulf. The naval operations were merely auxiliary; the main object was to rouse the Sultan to use his own very

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٣١٥]

(١١/٢٤)



11
ample forces by land to repel the Wahabee aggression. This Colonel Pelly could not do unless he kept close to the Sultan. He did stay close to him, and did rouse him, and would have made him do for himself all that was needed had not his parricide soon cut him off, by a crime which no one could foresee, and which was so improbable in itself that the poor Sultan, when warned by a faithful slave, refused to believe it possible.

"Colonel Pelly is, I believe, the first Resident who ever stirred from Bushire except on a holiday trip. He has done his best by personal activity and exertion to make up for the want of a more numerous Agency, and has almost literally carried his life in his hand, in visiting, not only all the shores of the Gulf, but in his most perilous journey to Riadh, and this year in his trip through Oman."

"His predecessors had always at their beck and call a squadron, never less than two, and usually three or four, well armed ships of war of the Indian Navy, generally one of them a steamer, with their head quarters at Bassadore, in the Gulf. If anything was to be done, and hardly a year passed without a brush or demonstration of some kind, one or two of these vessels were sent, and the show of force was usually sufficient to overawe opposition."

"Colonel Pelly has nothing of the kind. He has one small worn out steamer, which he dare not arm lest he should give her an unequivocal character as a pirate, and on which, owing to legal difficulties long since laid before the Government of India with our prayer for relief by legislation, he can neither hoist a pennant as man-of-war, nor enforce discipline under the Merchant Seaman's Act. He has no authority over any man-of-war which may chance to come up; he must catch one, as he can, and can only advise, request, and suggest."

"The position is a most difficult one, and I am quite certain the present system cannot last. If any man could have worked it, I believe Pelly would, for he is on the best of terms with the navy, and his personal character and manner prevent the Chiefs, as far as it is possible to prevent them, from noticing the absence of the force in ships and men of the Indian Navy, which were always ready to back his predecessors, and of which former Residents generally made a rather ostentatious display."

"In sending his Native Agent with the "High-flyer," Colonel Pelly did the utmost he could, and that at great personal inconvenience and considerable risk to himself. He advised Captain Pasley to go *vid* Bahrein, where he would have got any pilots and information he could require, and had he done this, and reconnoitered with ordinary caution, he would either not have attacked the port at all, or ensured its capture and destruction with little risk of loss."

"Do I then blame Captain Pasley and his officers for their rashness? I should be very sorry to do anything of the kind. No doubt the thing might have been better and more prudently managed, so

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [ظ ٣١]

(٢٤/١٢)

12

as to ensure success and avoid loss, and with older men we should not have had to regret the mortifying repulse, and the sad loss of four such fine fellows; but they attempted an impossibility in a most gallant and dashing fashion, and were repulsed without disgrace. The next time the survivors have anything of the kind to do, every man who was in those boats will know how to set about it, and will succeed, unless the spirit be preached out of them by our official lectures on their rashness.

"Of course, what they did was very rash, but so are all stormings and boardings and cuttings out. It is owing to such rashness, joined to other great qualities, that our navy is what it is. We should have thought them very fine fellows if they had succeeded, and I trust the Admiralty will not think the worse of them for having honourably failed in an enterprise so desperate that few but British sailors would have attempted it, and in which none could have been defeated with so little disgrace.

"As to the tone of Colonel Pelly's letters to the Wahabee Ameer, and the shortness of the time allowed for compliance with the demand for compensation, I was at first inclined to agree with you that the letters were too peremptory and the time allowed too short. I wrote in this sense to Colonel Pelly.

"But, on reconsideration, I felt inclined to trust much to his personal knowledge of the people he was dealing with, and I think the event proves he was right. The Ameer, or whoever writes in his name, clearly thought it best to knuckle down. He immediately accepted Colonel Pelly's offer to mediate, and has sent envoys to Khatiff to discuss the terms. These offers of mediation are the same which the Ameer, in September, treated with contemptuous silence, and I think it very questionable whether they would now have received such respectful attention had Pelly's letter been milder in tone or his demand more moderate.

"But the main question is, whether we have any business there at all? and here I am not sure that I quite concur in the view you take of our duties and responsibilities on that coast.


"Of course, if by taking the consequences of living 'in such a country' is meant taking all the consequences to which the native subjects of the ruler are liable, I agree, as far as the treatment of our subjects by that ruler is concerned, the cases are exceptional in which we could reasonably expect him to treat our people better than he does his own; and our people, if they go there, must take their chance of such uncertainty of life, liberty, and property as is the natural and usual characteristic of such Governments, and the hereditary misfortune of all their subjects.

"But in the present case the Ruler of Muscat was not in fault, further than that in not defending his own people he had exposed our subjects, along with his own, to the outrages of a third power.

"What is our duty in such a case? Here we had

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٣/٢٠]

(٢٤/١٣)



"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٢٣ ظ]

(٢٤/١٤)

114

for the increase of direct trade with Kurrachee, Kutch, Kattywar, Surat, and other ports down the coast has been even greater than with Bombay. "Yet with this one port you will see the trade has risen from a value of less than 800,000L. in 1844-45 to more than 2,640,000L. last year, the great increase being in the last three years, during which the trade has just doubled."

"Then look at the items of which the trade is composed. Last year we imported 680,000L. worth of cotton wool, an import unknown in 1844-45. Last year was one of local scarcity and high prices in India, and we got grain, dates, and other articles of food to the value of 270,000L., against a value of 40,000L. in 1844-45."

"STATEMENT showing the Value of Trade between the Port of Bombay and Persian Gulf (including Muscat), during the last five years, viz., from 1860-61 to 1864-65, as compared with the Trade twenty years ago, in 1844-45."

	1860-61.	1861-62.	1862-63.	1863-64.	1864-65.	1844-45.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
IMPORTS.						
Cotton wool	19,300	87,210	16,10,515	16,10,000	67,93,945	-
Fruits						
Dates	3,23,309	10,83,730	10,18,836	9,07,513	14,30,759	3,28,423
Other sorts	2,82,630	2,91,556	2,74,989	2,74,087	2,87,207	69,981
Grain	4,000	4,000	1,25,656	3,72,086	3,43,652	3,028
Silk	1,56,617	3,38,967	2,60,916	2,79,281	10,43,652	1,30,134
Wool	4,05,489	3,38,577	4,00,259	8,81,687	2,70,871	88,290
Other goods	59,28,943	41,73,310	97,29,617	93,13,570	83,90,249	27,21,262
Total	64,78,147	62,85,746	76,98,968	1,18,91,829	1,42,64,573	33,22,327
EXPORTS.						
Cotton goods	32,85,684	37,21,870	33,84,638	46,97,234	41,26,204	30,20,665
Dyes	4,05,388	75,290	61,733	2,02,985	4,35,177	46,133
Grain	3,90,447	3,55,197	3,41,215	6,72,274	9,25,949	1,23,971
Metals	2,56,310	2,09,323	6,26,277	4,21,983	13,06,231	1,12,172
Sugar and Sugar						
Candy	5,00,354	9,29,637	8,63,890	4,54,080	6,01,653	7,46,291
Treasure	4,21,160	2,87,450	6,28,470	19,48,338	82,70,284	3,83,726
Other goods	12,77,612	13,12,091	15,82,662	11,23,968	14,12,294	11,46,137
Total	69,64,453	62,80,407	62,60,945	94,25,487	1,22,13,092	65,72,282
Grand Total	1,34,42,602	1,25,66,153	1,39,59,913	2,13,20,316	2,64,77,665	79,94,609

(Signed) A. F. BELLASIS,
Commissioner of Customs.


Bombay Reporter General's Office,
27th March 1866.

"At the same time, our exports of cotton goods to Muscat and the Gulf doubled, rising from 200,000L. to 410,000L. The export of metals rose from 11,000L. in value to 130,000L., and every one I ask tells me that the trade is only just beginning to develop itself."

"The estimated value of the specie and jewels brought on board the "Berenice" at Muscat, when Colonel Pelly took off such of the British subjects as wished to leave, was 300,000L.; set it down at one half, it is still a large sum for merchants to have about them in portable valuables. Surely, this is not a commerce which we can leave to the depredations of Wahabee pirates, and to the merchants engaged in which you can say 'You went there for gain, and must take the consequences; we shall not protect you.'"

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٩٣٣و]

(٢٤/١٥)



15

"But what are the risks of a revival of Wahabee piracy? Is it not dead, and will it not remain so if we leave it alone?"

"I would answer, first, by referring to the past. Piracy, especially on the ships of idolatrous and usurious Hindoos, or of Christians and other Kaffirs, has been the sanctified amusement of these tribes for ages. Sindbad found them at it in the good days of Haroun-al-Raschid, and there are many men now alive who I have had relating that, in their own days, no unarmed vessel was safe from the attacks of pirates, Soorees, Joasmis, and Ras el Khymerrees, when trading between Bombay and Surat.

"Since 1824, the effect of Ibrahim Pacha's campaigns in Nedj, the Muscat operations on the coast, our own expeditions to punish some of the pirate nests, and the constant patrol of the sea by the vessels of the late Indian Navy, have made piracy impossible.

"So the old pirates took to slavery on the East Coast of Africa, and our Consuls at Zanzibar, Colonels Playfair and Rigby, as well as Pelly and Dr. Livingstone, or Captain Oldfield, or any intelligent officer of the East Coast squadron, will tell you that the Soorees, Joasmis, and Ras el Khymerrees are just as well known as the most active and desperate slavers now on the African coast, as they were famous as pirates 50 years ago on the coasts of Persia and Western India.

"Moreover, our anti-slavery operations in Eastern Africa have excited the most bitter animosity against us, but especially against our naval officers, throughout the old pirate coast, and popular feelings everywhere would be in favour of a revival of piracy.

"For the last three years, since the abolition of the late Indian Navy, Colonel Pelly has managed to get on without any naval force in the Gulf, but no one knows better than your Excellency that this cannot go on for any length of time, and that when it is clearly seen that there is no material force at hand to punish the wrong-doer, there is no permanent security for the efficacy of moral force.

"You remember how Trevelyan objected to letting the Resident have even a steam yacht in place of the Indian Navy squadron of former days.

"Such a yacht might have done well enough as long as all went smoothly; but one such vessel will not suffice for the police of the Gulf, and I am equally certain that you cannot wash your hands of all responsibility for the police of the Gulf, nor provide for it by means of an occasional visit in the cool weather from a man-of-war, whose orders peremptorily forbid stay after the hot weather in April sets in.

"Nothing short of a formal written requisition from your Excellency in Council will justify the Commodore in leaving a single small vessel in the Gulf after April, nor will even that oblige any Officer up there to act as you wish, nor to comply with any requisition of the Resident, unless he, the Captain, agrees with him.

29

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [ظ ٣٣]

(٢٤/١٦)

16

"In short, I am firmly convinced that other arrangements must be made for the ordinary maritime police of the Gulf, and that they must be made immediately, unless we would risk the massacre of the Hindoos, *i. e.*, the bulk of the trading community at all the ports, and the interruption, with much loss of life and property, of the telegraph line.

"I will not trouble you with any of the various plans which have occurred to me for establishing such a police, unless you wish to have them; but all would be less costly than the old Indian Navy, and more effective than our present reliance on men-of-war, which cannot remain more than a few cool weeks in those seas.

"We must bear in mind that this revival of Wahabecism is only one undulation of the great disturbance to which most Mahomedans look forward in this or the coming year. I need not tell you that the mystical numbers of Daniel and the Apocalypse are discussed in many a mosque from Zanzibar to Bokhara, as well as in Dr. Cumming's church, and in Arabic and Persian pastorals to the faithful, as well as in the Doctor's little books, and with very much the same results, a conviction that some convulsion is to shake Islam and many heretical Christian churches about this time; 1867 is a date very usually given.

"You are more in the way of hearing of these things than I have been since leaving Sind; but few weeks pass without my hearing or seeing some evidence that there is a general expectation among Mahomedans of something going to happen, and that, according to their information and views, they look forward with fear or hope to what the next year or two will bring forth.

"No one knows better than your Excellency how these things affect a population like that on the shores of the Gulf.


"28th March.—Since I began this letter I have seen Colonel Pelly and the Commodore, and the additional information they gave me has shown me little to add to or alter in what I had previously written.

"But I was sorry to find Colonel Pelly very sore at your criticism on his proceedings. He says he has repeatedly, within the last two years, risked his own life in the discharge of his duty, and to accomplish that which is usually done by a display of,—if not the use of,—force, and he feels keenly the imputation of having exceeded his instructions, and unnecessarily resorted to force when it seemed to him that a blow, promptly and decidedly struck against the aggressors on their peaceful neighbours, was the best mode of keeping the peace.

"I hope to send you his official answer in a few days. Meantime, he must return at once. He left 'all standing,' as the sailors say, and the 'Pantaloons' going to the Gulf, on her way to the East African coast, affords the only chance of sending him up in a man-of-war, but he has neither the health nor the inclination to remain, unless he were

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٧/٢٤]

(٢٤/١٧)



34

17

assured it was necessary for the good of the public service, in which case, as on many previous occasions, he would postpone health, or life, or anything of the sort.

"But I do not see what is immediately to be done.

"The parricide Salem reigns at present at Muscat. He is described as a rude, ill-conditioned, uneducated man, not naturally fitted to rule; and it is possible that he may be speedily set aside, either in favour of some other member of the same family, or by one of the many Chiefs of Oman, or by the Wahabees.

"At any rate, while he lives and rules, I do not suppose you will recognize him as the successor of our ally, nor have anything to say to him, as long as he does not meddle with us, or oppress our subjects more than he does his own.

"I conclude his usurpations puts an end to all our treaty obligations, and that, whether he establishes himself or is set aside, we are free as to any renewal of the friendly relations we had with his father and grandfather.

"As to the Wahabees, the agents sent by the Ameer will probably have returned before Colonel Pelly can reach Bushire. If not, I think he should tell them that matters have so much altered at Muscat since they were deputed to meet him, that he cannot discuss Muscat affairs further at present, beyond giving them a general exhortation to abstain from aggression, to discourage piracy, and keep quiet within their own territory.

"On his way up and down, Colonel Pelly will look in at Gwador and Mussendom, and do what he can to allay the panic which, at the former station, prevailed up to a few days ago, with, as far as we could see, little immediate cause.

"But recent events furnish a strong additional reason for transferring the Mussendom station to the island of Anjam or Henjam, off the south coast of Kishm. Colonel Goldsmid knows all the arguments in favour of the change. I really know none against it, and I quite agree with him as to the mode in which it should be effected, *i.e.*, by negotiation with the Persian Government, which he would manage very well, if it were left to him.

"There will still remain the general question of the permanent maritime police of the Gulf, which cannot, I think, be postponed, for I am very certain that we must not rely on the ships of Her Majesty's Navy for ordinary purposes, and that, unless some other agency be organized, we shall risk the peace of those seas, and not only check a great and growing commerce, but hazard our line of telegraph communication.

"This letter has grown so far beyond what I intended, that I will only add that I am sorry to say the 'Octavia' has nearly 200 sick, and has lost the First Lieutenant and several men; whether it is small-pox, taken hence by some men who have been in our wretched European Hospital, or


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30

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٩٣٥]

(٢٤/١٩)



19

sidered as suitable objects of spoliation all over Europe in the middle ages.

"As I understand the subject, the majority of these Hindoos have been established in these countries for ages, quite independent of our connexion with their rulers. On the whole, the treatment of these people, cannot, I conceive, be really very bad, or the compensating advantages must be very considerable, or they would long ago have left the country.

"Such traders, however despised, manage to make friends and hold their own. This is the case, as you know, all over Central Asia, down to the very confines of British India.

"While, of course, I would do what I could to help and befriend the Hindoo traders in Muscat, Oman, and the Wahabee territory, that protection must, of necessity, be limited in extent and contingent on circumstances. I do not think that we should be ready to go to war to redress their injuries.

"As regards the police of the Gulf, my views, I believe, will be found not to be very different from your own. I incline to think that something must sooner or later be done.

"The great difficulty is to decide what this ought to be. Willoughby was always very strongly of opinion that it was very unwise doing away with the Indian Navy altogether; it was, in your latitudes, to the ships in the Royal Navy, what our Native army is to the English troops in the interior of India, a necessary and useful adjunct. But, the Indian Navy is gone, and the question is, how we can supply a substitute. I think that we shall all, on this side, be quite ready to listen to any well devised, and not very expensive, project which you may bring forward."

In a subsequent letter, dated Bombay 13th April 1866, I reported:—

"Colonel Pelly has returned to the Persian Gulf in the 'Pantaloons.' I would have asked him to remain till we heard further from you, but the Wahabee envoys may be at Bushire, and if he did not appear they would not easily understand the reason. The 'Pantaloons,' too, cannot wait in these seas without infringing Admiralty orders, so I told him to go, and suggested his holding himself in readiness to join you at Simla, *via* Kurrachee and Mooltan, should you wish to see him. There is so much which it is difficult to write, and so easy to understand by oral discussion, that I believe an hour's conversation with him would save you many hours' reading and writing, and it is so much easier to instruct or to obey a man you have seen, that I feel sure it would be every way advantageous if you could see him, so if you will telegraph your orders either to me or to Colonel Pelly at Gwadar with a note 'to be forwarded to Mussendorn or Bushire of 'Colonel Pelly has left,' they shall be obeyed, and if you wish him to come he may be with you in less

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [ظ ٣٥]

(٢٤/٢٠)

20

than three weeks from the date of his getting your message.

"We have no further news. I have seen Hajee Ahmed, the minister of the late Sultan, he confirms my previous impressions, that all will probably remain quiet for a time, but that first one then another outlying possession will set up for itself or drop off to Persia or the Wahabees, and that we must be prepared to take vigorous measures to repress any attempt to revive piracy."

In reply to my suggestion that Colonel Pelly should be invited to visit Simla, to confer with the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, in a letter dated Simla, April 21st 1866, observed:—

"I could not ask Colonel Pelly to come up to Simla, more particularly at such an inclement season of the year. If necessary, he might come across on my return to Calcutta. I do not, however, desire to arrange myself for the policy to be adopted in the Persian Gulf. I would prefer that all that was done was carried on either by or through your Government. What that policy is to be will mainly depend, no doubt, on the views of the authorities at home. If I have any influence in that policy, I should advise that we interfere as little as may be practicable in the affairs of the Arab tribes on the sea board, and, of course, still less with those of the tribes in the interior of the country. I would be slow to take up the cause of natives of India or their descendants, who call themselves British subjects, for injuries received in the country, and where I did so, I would confine that interference, as a rule, to remonstrance. Unless we act in this way, we shall make enemies and not friends of these Arab tribes, and our interference will be misrepresented, misunderstood, and when opportunity offers will be resented also.

"I would confine our labours, as a rule, to the suppression of piracy on the high seas. This seems to me quite as much as we can undertake with any advantage."

To these two letters I replied, in a letter dated Bombay, April 29th, 1866, which refers to the official Despatches received at the same time:—


"I am sorry you cannot ask Colonel Pelly to Simla, for a visit to Calcutta next season will hardly fulfil my object of enabling him to have the advantage of explaining his own views, and personally learning what are your wishes and orders.

'The fact is, that the official Despatches on Muscat and Persian Gulf affairs are so worded that it is very difficult to make out what it is desired we should do.

"We are not to be friends with Syud Salim, but he is not to be affronted, nor is anything to be done which will prevent our being friends, if he estab-

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٩٣٦]

(٢٤/٢١)



21

lishes his own power. We are to protect British interests, and, on no account, let the French or any foreign Power step into the place we have so long occupied as general protectors of commerce, but we are to let all who call themselves British subjects clearly understand that, if they go to Arabia to trade, they must do so at their own risk, and not look to us for protection.

"I must confess that, if I had nothing but these official letters to guide me, I should be sorely puzzled. The only thing quite clear is that, whatever may go wrong, there will be no one to blame but the unhappy Resident, who can quote nothing that seems like an order without coming across something that seems intended as the antidote, warning him against the very same thing, and leaving him only to be blamed if anything goes wrong.

"With the advantage of your own letters before me,—an advantage which Colonel Pelly does not possess,—I can understand clearly enough your own views. But you must forgive me for saying that it will be impossible to carry them out without a total reversal of our policy of the last half century in these parts.

"The policy of non-interference which you describe might have been a very convenient one two generations ago, as it would have been in China or Japan, in Turkey or Egypt.

"But for the last 45 years at least our policy, from Bahrein to Ras-el-Had, has been one of active interference, and avowed assumption of the duty and responsibility of protecting general commerce. Trade has greatly increased, not less, I believe, than fourfold in 40 years. It has been generally under the British flag, and carried on by men who claimed protection as British subjects, and received it from the Resident, who had always an efficient squadron at his command, and used it very freely to enforce his demands.

"This system has been popular even with the Arabs themselves. They begin to find commerce profitable, and though you cannot convert pirates into merchants in one generation, much is being done to reclaim them. They look with dread, so Syud Salim's own envoys tell me, to being cast off by us, and if we abdicate the position of general arbiters, and active preservers of the peace, which we have occupied so long, I have no doubt some other naval power, probably the French, will be invited, or will invite themselves, and step in.

"We send you officially memorials from the merchants here engaged in this trade, which will help to show its character, its wide ramifications to Calcutta, Rangoon, China, and Mauritius, and its great value and importance. The memorialists, you will see, are a very different sort of men from our Hindoo friends at Cabool and Herat, and have been used to a very different sort of protectorate; our abdication of which will, I feel sure, cause more stir than you seem to anticipate.

9638 b.

F

32

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٣٦ ظ]

(٢٤/٢٢)

22

"As for remonstrance with the Arabs, I need hardly remind you that it will be effective in exact proportion to their estimate of our power and intention to use it in enforcing our remonstrances.

"In acting as he did at Soor and Khatiff, Colonel Pelly, I believe, did exactly what his predecessors had been in the habit of doing under similar circumstances. We have sent you copies, I believe, of every letter we sent him. The position is one in which a very large discretion must always, I think, be entrusted to the Political Agent, and when it is impossible to refer for orders, he acts for the best; great allowances should, I think, be made for him, even if all does not turn out as he expected.

"I hope soon to submit a scheme for the maritime police of the Gulf, but I wish, in doing so, to send you a complete statement of our present marine, which will take some time to prepare.

"Believe me, &c.,

"H. B. E. FRERE."

"P. S.—I have just received a cypher telegram from Colonel Pelly, in which he says that he has gained a key to the allusion in one of the Wahabee letters to a religious war. 'Aboo Esau, who conducted Palgrave through Arabia, stated' (to the 'Wahabees?') that there was an agreement that he (Palgrave?) should return and avail themselves of the discontent and other circumstances in the Wahabee country, revolutionize it, and afterwards 'convert the people.' We must remember that this occurred when Palgrave was travelling under orders from Rome or Paris, and it shows that we do not escape the most serious misunderstanding by merely retiring within our own shell, and avoiding official intercourse with these people."


The following letter, dated Mahableswur, June 12th, 1866, relates to the appointment of a British Agent at Muscat. The Bombay Government had nominated Mr. Rozario, a Portuguese apothecary attached to the Residency, to be Consular Agent. The Government of India, without asking for or giving time for explanation, telegraphed to disallow the appointment.

"We find it very difficult to please you about Muscat. We understood you wanted to send thither a safe, discreet man, as Commercial Agent, who would perform the ordinary duties of a Consular Agent, receive and transmit any communications with the ruler, and not diplomatize.

"We thought we had exactly such a man in Mr. Rozario, the Portuguese apothecary, who had long been charge of the Residency there. He knew the place and its people well, was rather a favourite with all about the palace, and most highly respected by all, Arabs as well as Europeans, was not afraid to go, and we were in no danger of his diplomatizing

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [١٩٣٧]

(٢٤/٢٣)



23

without authority. Every one, Colonels Pelly and Disbrowe, the Arab Consul, the steamer and the naval people, spoke well of him, and seemed to think him just the man to be sent. If Syud Salim held his own and behaved well, Mr. Rozario would have paved the way towards a return of more intimate relations; if otherwise, he would have been in little danger, either for his own safety, or of compromising Government. He had frequently before been, for weeks and months at a time, left in charge of the current consular duties of the Residency when Disbrowe was absent.

"But because we did not say all this in a telegram, you conclude he is unfit, and cancel his appointment, and order us to send either a "Mahomedan gentleman or a British Officer.

"We shall of course do so, but it is only right that I should mention that, in times past, it has been found that "Mahomedan gentlemen" were more likely to represent themselves than the British Government at Muscat, and hence it has been usual to employ either an Armenian or a Jew, when no English Officer was there. I have no doubt we shall be able to find a competent Mahomedan, but you must not be surprised if you find the best Mahomedan in Asia, after a time, taking part either for or against Syud Salim, or representing some other interests than ours. It is only natural that it should be so, and we find it so in the Levant, as well as nearer India, in Afghanistan, &c.

"As for a British Officer, I must say I should like to know a little more of the disposition and power of the present people at Muscat before I trusted a stranger amongst them, at a time of the year when they and we all know that we cannot support him, nor even send a man-of-war to bring him off. I have one or two men who would do so, when we see our way a little more clearly, but it would require great tact and experience to prevent doing either a little too much or too little, and, if the people were inclined to be troublesome, a British Officer would offer many more points open to affront than a Native Agent or than such a man as Mr. Rozario.

"Believe me, &c.,

"H. B. E. FREERE.


"P.S.—In this Presidency our apothecaries hold, I believe, a very different position from that held by the same grade in Bengal. Here we have several of them in charge of civil stations, where I know our Officers would not change them for Assistant Surgeons.

"I mention all this to justify our original nomination, and to satisfy you that you need not have been apprehensive that we would appoint improper persons to such a duty. I do not wish you to reconsider your orders about Mr. R., which I regard as final."

[A Mahomedan was subsequently sent, and died. The Government of India then directed a British

33

"مذكرة بشأن مسودات البرقيات المتعلقة بشؤون مسقط وزنبار" [٣٧ظ]
(٢٤/٢٤)




24

Officer to be sent, and he is now there. During his brief incumbency we have twice been drawn into active support of the parricide Sultan against his Uncle Toorkee and his insurgent subjects.]

H. B. E. FREER.

July 20th, 1868.



PERSIAN GULF.

Persia has, I suppose, three principal motives in seeking to hoist her flag on steamers in the Persian Gulf,—

- 1st. A laudable desire to revive a trade which in former times was considerable.
- 2d. To find good markets for her opium.
- 3d. At least to vapour about like Persians. Perhaps, to realize their cherished wish to obtain, by means of an imposing squadron in the Gulf, a political influence there, that may gradually bring under their subjection certain Chiefs and tribes who do not now acknowledge, if they ever did acknowledge, the authority of Persia.

With regard to the first, it should be remembered that we know, from Arabic and Persian authors, such as Abool-feda, and the travels of the merchant Sooleiman, who, with much intelligence, wrote of his own times, between eight and nine centuries since, that fleets of large vessels belonging to the Persian Gulf, almost as numerous as those of China then so engaged, carried on an extensive trade with India and beyond, and that it declined only when the flourishing Mohommudan colony in Canton, presuming at length on the peaceful habits of the natives, indulged the arrogance of Islam in enacting intolerant laws. Then an excited and outraged people rose and exterminated them, as similar provocation, five centuries later, cost all the Portuguese in Japan their position and their lives, and as, again, in late days so nearly led in India to a general massacre of Europeans, men, women, and children. But, when possessing a steam fleet, Persia may again pursue a legitimate and profitable trade and pilgrim transport in the Gulfs and in the eastern seas.

Under the second head, it is to be observed that speculators in Persia are at present allured by the profits realized on their increasing cultivation of opium. Its superior quality is already appreciated in Java. They export it to that island from Bushire, principally in British bottoms. They are gradually exploring other markets for it in the eastern Archipelago. In this matter we can say nothing to Persia. Our remonstrating against this competition, which in time may prove damaging to our Indian revenue, is out of the question. It would be too ludicrous; for ours is the Government which has persisted in this forced traffic,—forced by means of 32-pounders in some of the finest merchant vessels that any where sail under the British flag. And it goes on, notwithstanding that Mr. Marjoribanks, President of the Committee, Captain Elliot, Her Majesty's Superintendent at Canton, and our clergymen in

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
"الخليج العربي؛ مسقط وزنبار" [٣٨ ظ] (٨/٢)

2

China, stated that it can only be regarded as a most pernicious poison, which it is painful to any friend of humanity to see still poured into the sources of human happiness, the misery, demoralization, and frightful ravages occasioned by it exceeding belief, and the detestable disgrace and sin of this forced traffic leaving little to choose between it and piracy; while, as reported by the Reverend Mr. Welton, the millions of people taunt our missionaries, vent their indignation at our hypocrisy, and say, "Persuade your countrymen to relinquish the abominable trade, and then we may listen to your exhortations on the subject of Christianity." Nevertheless, the scandalous profit is too great to be parted from. The Jamsetjees, Mathesons, and Jardines amass colossal fortunes by it, and consequently are honoured and dignified in their native countries. Certain classes of Persian merchants are now hopeful of supplanting them in several ports in the introduction of the filthy drug. The Persian soil and climate are favourable to its production. The Persian Gulf is a convenient line for its exportation. Before long we may see Persian Agas and Khans ennobled by their King for their enterprise in emulating the successful activity of those arch contrabandists.

Thirdly, with regard to the Shah's project of placing a steam fleet in the Gulf, it is not new. It was reported to me when I was last Governor in Bombay, by a British Officer employed there. The French Captain Picard, commanding the "Hermione," visited Bombay, where his beautiful 54-gun frigate was much admired. At his request, I furnished him with introductions to Kurrachee, but he did not think it necessary to acquaint me with the main object of his onward cruise to the north-west. He proceeded to the Gulf, made acquaintance with the Imaum and other Chiefs and ports there, and left those favourable impressions which gracious messages from his Government, his own urbanity, and the talents of his selected complement of Officers failed not to produce. Soon after, it was rumoured in the Gulf and at Bombay, that the Emperor intended to provide the Shah with four steamers, for service in the Persian Gulf.

It stands to reason that, around an empire so vast as ours in India, there will be here and there positions of some importance, politically, commercially, or strategically, which, if not brought within the sphere of powerful, though friendly, influence on our part, will become moulded to the views of other great States, when the latter have leisure to look so far afield for judicious extension of foreign ties. And this may be compatible with very little ill-will towards us, or none at all, as in the instance of Russian diplomacy in Persia. During the first thirty years of this century our influence greatly preponderated in the Councils of the Government at Tehran, as well as at the Viceregal Court in Tabreez. I do not refer to the extravagant expenditure by Malcolm, though, to be sure,



one similarly accredited by the Persian Court, to act under a British arbitrator. I believe that, supposing Colonel Merewether, or Lieutenant-Colonel Goldsmid, or Major Pelly, were entrusted with the undertaking, this feud of ages could in three months be satisfactorily settled. In the meantime, we ought not to hesitate to assure the Persian Government that, when a favourable condition of affairs may exist at Cabool, we shall be glad to direct our Government in India to consider at what time and place it will be best to enter upon this friendly office.


MUSCAT AND ZANZIBAR.

The Imaams of Muscat have been faithful to us. The late Imaam, Syud Toorkee, like his father before him, evinced uniformly the best disposition towards the British Government. Requisitions on their friendship, owing to the constant presence of our Indian Navy vessels, the vigilance of those cruisers in hunting slavers, and the frequent operations of our surveyors on the coast and in parts of the interior, have been continual. Of late years also the goodwill of Thoweynee had been much called on, and proved active, in aiding our operations in laying and working our electric line of communication with India.

In honour and in policy we must not allow Persia to attempt aggressions, or to revive ancient pretensions, against the independence of Muscat.

When I undertook, in 1861, to adjust Syud Thoweynee's quarrels with his brother, Syud Toorkee, at Sohar, and with his *nephew*, Syud Majeed, at Zanzibar, I had recourse, in the latter case, as the only possible basis, to requiring an acknowledgment of the independence of Zanzibar, in consideration of the payment by Zanzibar of an annual subsidy. At the same time, I felt that the Imaam's compliance must prove a painful wrench to his dignity. In fact, it lost him Zanzibar for ever. Nor do I think that anything short of the Arabic eloquence of the Rev. Mr. Badger (a padre whom they all like) could have persuaded him. So advised, he yielded, and, finally, with so much good temper as to convey to me his thanks for all the pains taken with the matter, and his acknowledgment that we "had given him something more than the bone to gnaw."

His late murder by his son has made the longer payment of this subsidy (\$40,000) odious to his brother at Zanzibar, and scarcely less so to us to enforce it. The only immediate solution by us of this difficulty, as the case stands, appears to be that now in the course of adoption, by which we are to receive the amount from Zanzibar, and to pay it to Muscat. However, I am strongly of opinion that the suggestion submitted by me in 1862 would be more satisfactory. It would cancel the hateful



obligation on the part of Zanzibar, and indemnify the Muscat Treasury. I aimed also at an acceptable revision of the Treaty of 1845, executed with Syud Thoweynee's father, who was sovereign of the now disjoined States of Muscat and Zanzibar. It now permits export and import of slaves within certain limits on the eastern coast. This deprives its general restrictions of the traffic of much of their value. I presume that, if its widespread horrors in the interior, caused by the continuance of it, were well understood, an annual disbursement of 8,500*l.* would be well expended in its annihilation. Article III. of that Treaty clearly exempts from search, and therefore from the visits of our cruisers, a tract of coast extending from 1° 57' to 9° 2' S. latitude. These points lie north and south of Zanzibar, with the usual offing in reserved waters. In consideration for such payment by us, this obnoxious clause would by consent be expunged. Muscat would be reimbursed. Zanzibar would be released from an irksome position. Our cruisers would save time, cost, and health. Misunderstandings (for instances of which *vide* my proceedings regarding Her Majesty's sloops of war, "Lyra" and "Sidon") arising from the violation of an imaginary boundary when in chase would be ended. I cannot find Lord Russell's opinion of my proposal of March 1861. It disappeared. It suggested instead, if I am not mistaken, that the time had come to disregard the treaty. Such a disclaimer would, I conceive, be viewed throughout those countries as an act of signal bad faith. Far better, I think, to redeem it. The Sultan naturally can no longer be well contented to tender the subsidy in any form to or for the parricide. We had trouble enough to induce him to agree to such an adjustment of his differences with the late Imaum. We have now a great object to attain, and the means of attaining it—nothing less than to render thoroughly effective our own means, and the cooperation of our Zanzibar ally, for destroying the occupation of the Arab slavetraders on the east coast of Africa. It would be a great step gained in the cause of humanity. I am sure this would be admitted by all who have travelled in Oman and South Africa, and by all Officers of our cruisers on the east coast. But it will not quite exterminate the slave trade in that quarter, so long as the efforts of the French Government, and such of its representatives as Commodore de Langle, are so lukewarm in the duty of suppressing it.

When last in Bombay, I was informed by our Agent at Zanzibar, that in the previous year, 30,000 sovereigns sterling had been there imported on account of it, by the proprietors of the thriving sugar plantation, in Réunion.

Also, the Portuguese still give vitality to the trade. We waste our sympathies sadly. There is a good deal of talking platitudes. But that position in De la Goa Bay offers us a field for the exercise of genuine humanity, in adopting vigorous measures

"الخليج العربي؛ مسقط وزنبار" [٤٠، ظ] (٨/٦)


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for suppressing their slave trade. We might insist on free access there at all times. We might have a station there by right. When employed in South Africa in 1854, I then forwarded to the Duke of Newcastle a copy of the treaty executed between Admiral Watson and the Pemba Chiefs, by which they ceded to Great Britain the south side of the Bay.


This copy had been for many years in the possession of a Dutch family, one of whom gave it to me. I recommend that we should assert our rights, and that we should construct a station-house there; or least, that the bay should be subjected to the constant vigilance of our cruisers. A few years subsequent to this, Admiral Keppel, I believe, endeavoured to arrest the building of a fort by the Portuguese, one object of which, of course, was to thwart our joint claims there. They always maintain a station on shore. In that manner, and owing to our not having, at the time of my report, brought the position at all within the cruising ground of our naval station at Simon's Bay, they had virtually closed to us and others the mouth of the St. George river. It is navigable for 200 miles, and it is the route through which they deal with the Kaffirs and with the Dutch Boers beyond the Vaal. Thence the Portuguese export, under their flag and that of Spain, the staples of the interior, viz., gold dust, ostrich feathers, and slaves. Some Kaffirs, such as those fine tribes the Barralong, the Basutos, and the Bachaanas, have never been prevailed upon to join in the latter trade. Others are more mercenary, and owing to the exemption from search enjoyed in the reserved waters of Zanzibar, and to the loose French relations with Madagascar and the Comoros, mutual facilities exist for the enterprise of slavers employed by the Portuguese and the Zanzibar people.

Our relations with Chiefs and tribes on the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, in Oman or on the East coast of Africa, would in my opinion be best conducted by our several agencies being recast in the form which I submitted when in Bombay for the approval of the Government India (March 1861). The Royal Navy having undertaken all the service on the East African cruising ground, it is perhaps desirable that the Foreign Office should have the Zanzibar appointment, and pay all the cost. Their Consul will generally get on better with the Royal Navy than an Officer sent from Bombay. But I apprehend, that neither the Foreign Office nor the Government of India is at present well provided with Officers fitted for so delicate a duty. One, who may not be conversant with Arabic history and customs, and with the Arabic and French languages, will never be of much use there. He will not have due influence with the natives, and will at any time be liable to be over-reached by the French Agents and adventurers. Any one who has been in the way of observing the clever management of affairs, by agents employed in distant countries by the

"الخليج العربي؛ مسقط وزنبار" [١٤ و] (٨/٧)



"الخليج العربي؛ مسقط ووزنبار" [١؛ ٤؛ ظ] (٨/٨)



"زنبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٢ و٤] (٨/١)

(42)

ZANZIBAR, ARABIA, AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

There are so many questions raised in the papers we have before us, connected with these localities, that it will be necessary to separate them and take up each in succession, in order to give any opinion that will be worth reading.

1. Transfer of diplomatic relations to the Foreign Office.

1st. Shall the management of our relation with the Chiefs and Governments of these territories, or of any of them, be transferred to the Foreign Office?

There is no doubt that in the management of the existing relations we come frequently in collision with Turkey, with Egypt, and with Persia, all of which are within the circle of European diplomacy, and there are Ambassadors, Consuls General, or other agents appointed by the Foreign Office, and exclusively under their control, for the management of the interests and relations of these powers with the British Empire. The Courts and Governments of these territories are becoming more or less Europeanized in their opinions and in the principles of their administration. It would seem at first sight natural that our Imperial diplomacy should extend as far as the relations of either of these Governments should carry it, and that when they come into collision with the acts or interests of India, now that India is a dependency of the Crown, the decision and settlement of the questions that arise should be dealt with as a matter of Imperial diplomacy, to be settled in the Foreign Office. The obligation, moreover, undertaken by England to suppress slave dealing in all parts of the world, is a new feature introduced into the diplomacy of these Indian seas, and the management of this is entirely a matter of Imperial diplomacy attaching to that Office. But, notwithstanding that on these broad grounds there would be an apparent congruity, in transferring to the Foreign Office the future management of relations with the Chiefs and Governments of these parts, and it would be a great relief to the Governments of India to be saved from the trouble and inconvenience of interfering to settle the many questions that arise requiring such intervention to prevent the public tranquillity from being disturbed, still the transfer seems to me an impossibility unless the Foreign Office is prepared to remodel all existing arrangements, so as to bring them within the scope of their official supervision. All our existing relations with Muscat, with Zanzibar, and with petty Chiefs and places of the Persian Gulf, have been settled by treaties, engagements, or mere agreements, concluded by British Officers in the name and on behalf of the Governments of India or Bombay. In some, as more par-

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38

"زنزبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٢٤٤] (٨/٢)

2

ticularly in the engagement by which Syud Mujeed was established as Sultan at Zanzibar, while his brother, Syud Thuwenee, was secured in the peaceful sovereignty of Muscat, it was settled that an annual sum should be paid by the former to his elder brother, and the Government of India guaranteed this payment. Will Her Majesty's Government accept this guarantee as one to be enforced, and eventually met from Imperial resources? On the other hand, could the Government of India be called upon to make good a payment resulting from a failure in the Sultan of Zanzibar to fulfil his engagement, without the Government of India having had a word to say in the negotiations and other measures which culminated in the default.

The existing relations with Southern Arabia, and with the Persian Gulf, had their origin in the necessity the Indian Government felt to suppress piracy in the Indian seas. We found a useful ally in this work in Syud Suyee-i, the father of Thuwenee and Mujeed, who for upwards of 40 years governed Oman with great vigour, and who was himself a merchant as well as a ruler, and had ships which he annually sent with cargoes to Calcutta as well as to ports of Western India. The trade relations of Arabia and the Gulf are entirely with India, and it would be hard to compel those who have complaints to make, or interests at stake arising out of this trade, to look only to the Foreign Office for redress, or for their settlement. On this account, as well as because the existing treaties are all made with India, it seems to me necessary that the management of our relations with these countries should be committed to Officers appointed by, and corresponding with India.


The slave trade suppression duty has supervened, having been assigned to the Indian Officers, because they were officials on the spot. If the Foreign Office does not think they perform this duty well, it might be committed to separate Officers appointed for the purpose, or left, as it in a great measure is at present, to the navy captains, who have Acts of Parliament and instructions from the Admiralty to guide them, and who now act very independently of the Indian Governments and their Officers.

The question I propose next to consider, because it is in some way connected with the first, is second, whether it is advisable to send a diplomatic Agent or Commissioner of high position and character, to inquire into all existing arrangements, and to put them on an improved footing.

Undoubtedly, matters in Southern Arabia, Zanzibar, and the Gulf are at present in much confusion. The causes of this and the remedies I shall hereafter refer to. I do not think any person sent from this country would do any good, so long as the relations with the Chiefs and Governments remain on their present footing. Such an appointment would weaken the influence and authority of the existing diplomatic Agents and would not be favour-

2. Appointment of a special Agent or Commissioner.

"زنزبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٣ و٤] (٨/٣)



43

3

ably viewed by the Indian Governments which now conduct these affairs. If, notwithstanding the objections stated, it should be resolved to transfer the management of these affairs wholly or extensively to the Foreign Office, there can be no doubt, that in that case, as a preliminary and means of carrying out such an arrangement, an appointment of the kind proposed would be indispensable. Otherwise, all that we can do with propriety would be to suggest to the Government of India the expediency of appointing such an Officer, leaving the decision and the selection of the person to that authority. I cannot bring myself to believe that the Government of India would decide this question in the affirmative. If it should do so, the Officer deputed should be supplied by the Admiral with a vessel of war beyond the usual strength, besides having Government steamers as yachts, or partly armed, to give to his mission due prestige and authority.

3. Claim of the Sultan of Zanzibar to be exempt from the obligation to pay subsidy.

A third question has been mooted, and we have the opinion of the Government of India upon it; and that is, whether Syud Mujeed, the present ruler of Zanzibar, has any claim to be relieved, or, on the grounds of policy should be relieved, from the obligation to pay an annual amount to the Ruler of Muscat, as settled and agreed to by him, and guaranteed by us, in the arrangement made between him and his brother Thuwenee? Syud Mujeed pleads that his brother having been assassinated by his son, the present Ruler of Muscat, that act frees him from any obligation to make any payment to the assassin. Nay, he might further plead that that atrocious deed imposed on him the obligation to avenge his brother's death, and, according to all Asiatic ideas, gave him full right to assert a claim to the succession, as next brother in age to the deceased, and as was done by Syud Toorkee, the third son of Syud Suyeed, but not successfully. In fact, according to all Asiatic notions, the death of Syud Thuwenee in the manner it occurred, would be considered by any one in the position of his brother, Syud Mujeed, as freeing him from the obligation of making any further payments, so that that question would stand as between him and his nephew, the assassin, upon the simple ground whether he was in a condition to resist the payment by a resort to arms. Here, however, our Government comes in and says, "We forbid a resort to arms. It was to prevent this that we mediated the arrangement between you and Thuwenee. We insist on that being carried out to the letter, in favour of the successor of Syud Thuwenee, whosoever he may be."

I am sorry to see in the letter of the Government of India a doubt expressed upon the fact that Syud Salim did assassinate his father. The deed was perpetrated in open durbar. He shot him in the presence of hundreds, and the convulsions and troubles that followed were evidence conclusive of the crime. For some time our Government hesitated whether to acknowledge the assassin. We took

39

"زنزبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٣٤٤ ظ] (٨/٤)

4

measures to remove our agent of the Indian merchants, whose safety was likely to be compromised in the disturbances, from the scene of this act of violence; and it was only after the parricide son had succeeded in establishing himself that the Indian Government, from motives of policy, recognized him as the *de facto* ruler. We cannot now ignore the circumstances under which this sovereignty was obtained. But we have lost our opportunity for rectifying and improving the relations between him and his uncles. He had evidently, nay, he has now, no means whatsoever of acting offensively against Zanzibar. He relies upon us entirely to enforce his claim to the subsidy agreed upon. He relies upon us for a great deal more. There is the farm of Bunder Abbas, which the Persians have given him notice to close. He looks also to our assistance with arms, if not with money, to enable him to resist further aggressions from the Wahabees of Nejd. He has from the first of his usurpation been in a position to accept from us any terms as the condition of obtaining the moral support of our recognition, and the further support of our good offices and eventual assistance in his other difficulties. What would have been more easy than to have suggested as one of his conditions, and as a means of securing our intervention to prevent troubles from the assertion of the claims of his uncle of Zanzibar, that the money payment engaged to be paid to his father should be permanently remitted?

Until lately we had only a Native Agent at Muscat, and the present appointment of Captain G. Atkinson is not a permanent one. We have had, therefore, very imperfect information as to the policy, disposition, and fitness of Syud Salim. We know nothing of the relations subsisting between him and the Wahabees. It has been our aim hitherto to use our influence to prevent the extension of Wahabee dominion, because it is cruel and fanatical in the extreme, and we see in it an obstruction to our endeavours to suppress piracy and promote beneficial commerce. We do not know whether Salim is pursuing a course likely to assist or obstruct our views in this respect. And yet the Government is drifting into a course of measures which have the effect of upholding this Chief as our especial *protégé*. Whether this conduces to give us popularity, or to make us odious to those whom we desire to conciliate, we have had no means of judging. If we are to do so much for Muscat, we ought at least to have a permanent resident British Officer to manage our relations, and to keep us well informed of all that passes.

4. Amongst the troubles brought upon us by our relations with Muscat, is the farm tenure, by which that Government has hitherto held Bunder Abbas from Persia. Syud Salim has failed in the payment of the rent or tribute settled as a condition of his tenure. His people further are alleged to have been guilty of acts of violence, even of piracy, which gives Persia another plea upon which to forfeit the lease. Persia evidently desires to extend

4. Notice by Persia of the forfeiture of the lease of Bunder Abbas to Muscat, and of the intention to resume.

"زنبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٤٤ ظ] (٨/٦)

6

British Officers could not consent to receive their orders, and to be under the capricious authority, of any mandarin who might be sent to hold local command. We must not fall into the same error again. Before, therefore, at all entertaining the proposition, we must know exactly the footing on which the steam fleet is to be entertained. If it be placed on a footing corresponding with that of the contingent troops entertained at the expense of the Native Princes of India who have subsidiary relations with us, then he might readily entertain the proposition. In that case, however, the wishes of the Shah's durbar would have to be communicated to the Ambassador, under whose discretion all orders would be issued, and the diplomatic agents in the Gulf, acting in communication with the Ambassador, would find this steamer force a most useful auxiliary in carrying out the views of the Government for the suppression of piracy and the preservation of tranquillity in the adjacent seas. But even on this footing, it may be questioned whether it is worth our while to go to the first expense of providing the vessels, and to trust to Persia for the regular payments necessary to maintain them in efficiency. The credit of Persia, and her reputation for probity and punctuality in her dealings, is scarcely high enough to warrant our entering into such engagements. There is too much likelihood that the entire expense both of providing and of maintaining this war-fleet would be thrown on the British Government. Under the probability of this, would it not be preferable if we deem it desirable that there should be an establishment of war steamers in the Gulf, that we should provide and maintain them for ourselves, and so be able to employ them according to our views of expediency, unembarrassed by any interference from the Persian or from any other Native Court?

6. I look upon it as quite premature to entertain the proposition to send Commodore Crittenden, or any Officer possessing similar experience of the naval duties in the Persian Gulf, to assist the Ambassador at Teheran in negotiating the contemplated arrangement for the establishment of a Persian steam fleet in that quarter. We have first to determine whether to entertain the proposition at all, and this, even if we are not disposed to negative it absolutely on broad grounds of general policy, still, without further information, as before pointed out, regarding the footing on which the Officers are to stand towards the Persian Government, and other details, which the Ambassador needs no assistance to enable him to ascertain, it would, I think, be extremely unwise to send a naval man to settle details. It would show an eagerness on our part to jump at the first proposition, which would give the Persians great advantage in the subsequent negotiations. We should be committed to an acceptance of it on the present vague and

6. The proposition to send an experienced naval Officer to assist the ambassador at Teheran in settling the details of such an arrangement.

"زنزبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [٥٤ و] (٨/٧)

45

7

uncertain basis, and, in my opinion, the offer as now made would be best answered by a declaration that the naval police of the Gulf has hitherto been undertaken and maintained by the British Government, and that we have no intention to withdraw from the obligations and duties incident to this undertaking.

7. The existing difficulties and troubles in the Persian Gulf. Revival of piracy.

7. There can be no doubt that things are not now managed in the Gulf of Persia with the same promptitude and efficiency that they used to be. So long as the Indian Navy was in existence, it was the especial duty of that navy to have one or more vessels always cruising there; and the Officers, who were accustomed to the duty, and well experienced in dealings with Native Chiefs, and quite competent to settle, according to their own judgment and discretion, petty claims and quarrels, were most useful assistants of our diplomatic agents, giving them a ready means of acting wherever there was an appearance of trouble of any kind arising. At present, the duties performed by the Indian Navy have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Navy, but there is no roster of vessels told off for continual service. For six months of the year the climate is so unfavourable to Europeans that, except under pressing necessity, no vessel is ever sent there. The vessels that go have no Native crews, for boat service under the tropical sun of the Gulf. The Commanders and all their Officers are totally ignorant of the languages spoken. They obtain from the diplomatic agents interpreters or assistants, through whom all their communications are necessarily made, and by whose advice they are, of course, guided; but they are impatient to have their cruise completed, and never can be zealous agents for the maintenance of a maritime police. The remedy for this,—and it is a remedy that must be adopted, sooner or later,—is, to revert to the old scheme of maintaining vessels of our own, adapted to the service, and commanded by Officers, a large proportion of whose lives has been spent in performing the duty. There must be a regular routine of service to be rendered by Officers of this description, in order to make the maritime police of the Gulf efficient. The suppression of piracy and of slave dealing are duties repugnant to the feelings and habits of the population, whose laws and whose ideas countenance both. Unless, therefore, we show ourselves continually in sufficient strength to repress the disposition to resume the habits of their fathers and grandfathers, we must expect to see everything fall again into the same anarchy, and life by violence, that prevailed when we commenced our measures of repression at the beginning of the present century. There is no nation but ourselves that has any direct interest in maintaining the tranquillity of the Indian seas. The duty falls upon us, as the *de facto* sovereigns of India. We have no rivalry or collision to fear from any European

41

relations of these States should rest with the
Foreign Office to whom the Officers concerned
should be subject, as they are the Persian Embassy
with the Foreign Office.
ZANZIBAR AND MUSCAT.

These papers have come to me with the ex-
haustive memoranda of the Departmental Officer
and the Members of the Political Committee. It
is quite unnecessary that I should add to this
voluminous collection any recapitulation of the
origin and causes of the difficulties in which we are
involved. These causes are set forth in full detail
in the papers adverted to; the question is, what is
now to be done?

1. As to maintaining the arrangement made by
Lord Canning's Government, or through its
intercession, regarding the payment of a
subsidy of 40,000 dollars to Muscat by
Zanzibar.
2. The adjustment of the future relations be-
tween Zanzibar and Muscat, and Muscat
and Persia.
3. The authority to which, in future, the Officers
connected with these States or territories
shall be subject.
4. The authority to which is to be entrusted the
control of the Persian Gulf, and the means
by which such control is to be effected.

The first appears to me,—and I somewhat regret
the fact,—no longer an open question. The Go-
vernment of India has decided, and the Secretary
of State has approved the decision, to recognize
Syud Salim as the hereditary successor of his
father, Syud Thoweynee, and the *de facto* ruler of
Muscat, without reference to the atrocious and
unnatural deed of blood by which, unquestionably,
he obtained his position. The Chiefs and his other
subjects are said to have accepted him, and the
Government of India has acknowledged him; this
being the case, we must regard him, I fear, as
entitled to all the rights and immunities of his
murdered predecessor. We cannot now question
the act which has been done by the Government of
India, and approved by us. I cannot, however, but
think that we should have stood higher in the
estimation of the Chiefs of Oman, if we had hesi-
tated to recognize the succession of the paricide,
as a matter of course, and permitted Syud Majid to
make some other arrangement, with our approval,
for Muscat.

For the second point, I think we might suggest
to the Government of India, to give full authority
to the Governor in Council at Bombay, to readjust
the future relations between Zanzibar and Muscat,
and Muscat and Persia, subject to the confirmation
of the Home Government.

For the third, I am disposed to think that, point
No. 2 having been settled, the control of the future

relations of these States should rest with the Foreign Office, to whom the Officers concerned should be subject, so long as the Persian embassy is with the Foreign Office.

But, in reference to the fourth point, I am of opinion that the Persian Embassy itself, in all affairs connected with Persia and the Gulf and the adjoining States, would be more advantageously placed under the India Office, and that there should be a separate small maritime service, as suggested by the Government of India and Sir Bartle Frere, for the control of the Gulf, under the orders of the Government of Bombay.

F. CURRIE.

July 24th, 1868.

1. As to maintaining the arrangement made by Lord Carnarvon's Government, or through its interference, regarding the payment of a subsidy of 10,000 dollars to Muscat by Zanzibar.
2. The adjustment of the future relations between Zanzibar and Muscat, and Persia.
3. The authority to which, in future, the Officers connected with these States or territories shall be subject.
4. The authority to which, in future, the means of control of the Persian Gulf, and the means by which such control is to be effected.

The first appears to me—and I somewhat regret the fact—no longer an open question. The Government of India has decided, and the Secretary of State has approved the decision, to recognize Syed Salim as the hereditary successor of his father, Syed Thowayeb, and the de facto ruler of Muscat, without reference to the sardars and unattached chiefs of blood by which, unquestionably, he obtained his position. The Chiefs and his other subjects are said to have accepted him, and the Government of India has acknowledged him; this being the case, we must regard him, I fear, as entitled to all the rights and immunities of his unattached predecessor. We cannot now question the act which has been done by the Government of India, and approved by us. I cannot, however, but think that we should have stood higher in the estimation of the Chiefs of Oman, if we had been able to recognize the succession of the party, as a matter of course, and permitted Syed Salim to make some other arrangement with our approval for Muscat.

For the second point, I think we might suggest to the Government of India, to give full authority to the Governor in Council at Bombay, to regulate the future relations between Zanzibar and Muscat, and Muscat and Persia, subject to the confirmation of the Home Government.

For the third, I am disposed to think that point No. 2 having been settled, the control of the future