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تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبيرها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

"مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة البريطانية

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/PS/12/3521

٢٠ نوفمبر ١٩٤١-٠٦ أبريل ١٩٤٤ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد (٣٨ ورقة)

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل


مراسلات بخصوص تقديم مساعدة مالية إلى بلاد فارس [إيران] في أعقاب الاحتلال البريطاني لأجزاء من البلاد بعد الغزو الأنجلو-سوفيتي في أغسطس ١٩٤١. تُناقش المراسلات ما يلي: الطرق التي يمكن تقديم المساعدة المالية إلى بلاد فارس من خلالها؛ التجارة بين بريطانيا/الهند وبلاد فارس؛ المساعدة المالية التي تأتي ضمن إطار مساعي الدعاية البريطانية الأوسع نطاقاً في أرجاء بلاد فارس، والتي تم مناقشتها في عدد من الرسائل (صص. ٢٣-٢٤، صص. ١٢-١٧، صص. ٧-٨) إلى جانب البنية التحتية وتطوير الأشغال العامة، والأنشطة الثقافية، والمساعدة الطبية، وإعادة تأهيل القوات المسلحة في بلاد فارس. الأطراف الرئيسية للمراسلات هم: المفوضية البريطانية في طهران؛ ووزارة الخارجية.

يشتمل الملف على فاصل يتضمن قائمة مراجع المراسلات الواردة به حسب السنة. ويوجد هذا الفاصل في


مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة البريطانية." [أمامي] (٧٩/١)




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
مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة البريطانية." [٢و] (٧٩/٣)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢ظ] (٧٩/٤)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣ظ] (٧٩/٦)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤و] (٧٩/٧)

EX 1
1210

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 6-B.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Bushire,
the 31st January 1944.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your circular letter No. 89 dated 17th October, 1943, which forwarded a copy of your saving telegram No. 143 of 5th October to the Foreign Office on the subject of plans for concrete assistance to Persia from the public relations aspect and from the point of view of permanently strengthening our position in the country,

2. I may say at once that I welcome any tendency in our propaganda to switch from the "win the war" topic to a general popularisation of British (which includes Indian) culture and commerce. Of these two, our publications in Persian are now beginning to give more emphasis to culture (in particular, by that excellent and very popular magazine, Ruzgar-i-Nau); but the commercial side still lags very sadly behind, and I suggest that the Department of Overseas Trade, London and the Director General of Commercial Intelligence, Calcutta, be asked to do everything in their power to encourage British and Indian exporters to provide our publicity offices with the material for commercial propaganda. They should, I suggest, be asked to do this now -- without waiting for the end of the war and without for the present considering the availability of goods for export -- in order that we may be able to utilise our present publicity organization in this country, before the operation of the treaty with Persia obliges us to out down our activities.

3. For similar reasons, I urge that the appointment of an Indian Trade Commissioner should in no circumstances be delayed until the pressure on ordinary commercial production is eased. If the increased import quotas noted in paragraph 6 (a) of your saving telegram under reference are to be fulfilled, Indian exports (which can be maintained for eight months in the year without calling on steamships) must necessarily be drawn upon, possibly even to a larger extent than those from the United Kingdom.

4. I particularly welcome the suggestion in your paragraph 6(c) that British firms should participate in the industrial development of Persia. Of the various possibilities Indian capital and enterprise are better qualified than those of any other country to undertake the development of irrigation projects. An opportunity for this exists in the vicinity of Bushire. The Mund river irrigation project in Dashti has for long been on the Persian Government's books. The first stage was due to be completed by the autumn of 1943 at an outlay of Rials 6 million (£ 86,000) and was expected to irrigate 25,000 hectares (62,500 acres). The second stage was to double the irrigated area at a further outlay of Rials 6 million. This compares favourably with the Persian Government's forecast for the Shabankarah scheme, also in the Bushire area, which was Rials 9 million for the first 10,000 / hectares.


His Majesty's Minister,
British Legation,
TEHRAN.

Reference to previous correspondence :

BUSHIRE.

Dated. Pers. 1st. February. 1944.

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤ظ] (٧٩/٨)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٥٠] (٧٩/٩)

- 2 -

It is therefore probable that, if Indian capital and enterprise can be enlisted for the scheme, a proposition can be evolved that will be mutually advantageous.

5. So far no action whatever has been taken by the Persian Government to initiate the Mund scheme, apart from a visit to the proposed site by M. Vajda, in the summer of 1942. It is well worth pressing on the Persian Government the political desirability of this project, which by providing first employment and then prosperity to the people of Dashti, would relieve Government of the recurrent lawlessness of that area, and the expense of continual disarmament expeditions.


6. To assist the reconstruction of the trade of South Persia, it is suggested that the Ministry of War Transport should be asked to give ample notice both to Indian merchants in the Gulf and to the Persian merchants of Bushire and Lingah, which can be done through this office, whenever they may be placing on the market any large launches or small steamers from their present fleet. If merchants can thus acquire a sufficient number of craft capable of standing well in with the shore, or of coming alongside the quays, Persian commercial connections with Bahrain and Dubai will be directly encouraged, and a stimulus thus given to a revival of the traditional British and Indian trade with South Persia which dates from our first connection with the waters of the Gulf.

7. With regard to the textile industry, an opportunity is likely to occur in a short time for British or Indian capital to interest itself in the It'imadih cotton mill at Bushire, an enterprise which has been making very large profits and which has the advantage of proximity to a Persian Gulf port. The present managing director, Mr. Hussein Agar, makes no secret of his intention to sell his holding, which is understood to amount to over 40%, in the mill and return to England after the war. Whether, however, we can advise British firms to invest their capital in this country must necessarily depend on our post-war policy; and the extent to which we are going after the war to resist discriminatory legislation against foreigners of the type that ruined our trade during the Pahlavi regime.


8. Presumably it is our intention to require the observance of the spirit of the Atlantic Charter by all the United Nations, and not merely to observe it ourselves when it comes to questions of commercial freedom. In this case, we may expect a marked revival of our trade with South Persia; and we should therefore do well to prepare now to make use of the Publicity reading rooms which have been established in most of our posts as rooms where samples of our goods can be exhibited (in particular by firms which can compete with Japanese piece-goods manufacturers, Swiss watchmakers or German firms such as Bayer, ~~and~~ Zeiss and Messag); or where local merchants can be given commercial information, or put in touch with our own exporters and importers. Samples would have to be kept up-to-date, and attractively displayed. None should, it is suggested, be displayed for more than 10 days at a time. It may be remarked that we have here an opportunity for getting into the market before the Americans; who have no publicity organization in Persia.

/ 9.


مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٥ظ] (١٠/٧٩)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٦و] (٧٩/١١)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [ظ٦] (٧٩/١٢)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٧] [٧٩/١٣]

OUTWARD TELEGRAM INDEXED (6) (7)

FILE COPR. T. Peel, & G. India Office.

E. 795/260/54.
[EN CLAIR].

686

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEHRAN.

M. 4. SAVING. February 11th, 1944.

Repeated to Cairo (Resident Minister) No. 16.
Government of India. F/AM (Saving) 4/16/44 SAVING.
Bagdad 7.

YVYVYV

5862 Your telegram No. 143 SAVING of the 5th October [propaganda policy in Persia in relation to economic assistance] has been carefully considered with the departments concerned, who are in general sympathy with your views and have made every effort to meet your recommendations.

2. To take first the specific recommendations in your paragraph 6:-

(a) Increased Import Quotas.

You will appreciate that the requirements of Middle Eastern countries must for some time to come continue to be treated as a whole. It is for M.E.S.C. to judge the relative needs of the various territories, and we cannot contemplate special shipments to one or other of the territories, which have not been correlated with M.E.S.C.'s general import programme. It is hoped in the near future to arrange a general increase in imports to the Middle Eastern area as a whole, from which Persia may expect to benefit in proportion to her needs. But there can in present circumstances be no question of granting Persia preferential treatment.

It must be borne in mind that it is exceedingly difficult to justify increased allotment of civil goods to Persia so long as the Persian Government remain inactive in purchasing goods already allotted under existing quotas (e.g. tea and cotton piece goods from India) and in clearing from ports and distributing goods already in the country (your telegram No. 15 paragraphs 2 and 7). Until the Persians show that they can digest what they are already getting they clearly cannot expect to be given more.

(b) Machinery and Diesels.

Some types of machinery, and Diesels in particular, are in very short supply and there is no prospect of the position easing. But some 300 tons of Diesel machinery (approximately 140 slow speed Diesel engines) have been programmed for Persia and it should be possible to supply the bulk of these by December 1944.

Diesel spares.

Spare parts for Diesel Engines are in equally short supply, but every effort is being made to keep existing engines running. Where these Diesel engines are of German manufacture the position is further aggravated by the lack of stocks of spares in the United Kingdom. Enquiries are still being pursued on the extent to which suitable parts can be obtained or manufactured in the United Kingdom and every effort will be made to meet the requirements. You will, of course, appreciate that it may not be possible to manufacture special types of spares while United Kingdom productive capacity is fully geared to our own war effort.

Miss Monroe (M.S. 1.)
Mr. Gilbert (M.S. 1.)
Mrs. Young (M.S. 1.)
Mr. Peel (M.S. 1.)
W/C Buxton (M.S. 1.)
W/C Stanville (M.S. 1.)
Maj. Newbury (M.S. 1.)
M. Warren (M.S. 1.)
Sgt. Wilson (M.S. 1.)

Also copied to:-

INDIA OFFICE

مجموعة ٢٨/١١٠ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [ظ٧] (١٤/٧٩)

2.

(c) Development of Trade with India.

I quite agree that this is desirable, but the immediate requirement is surely that the Persians shall be more active in taking advantage of facilities already offered by the Government of India (see under (a)).

As regards appointment of Indian Trade Commissioner, please see Government of India telegram No. 11322 to India Office.

(d) Transport Aircraft.

Air Ministry can allocate 3 D.H. 89's to Persia during months January, February, March 1944 (see Air Ministry Signal No. A. 627 of 22nd November to your Air Attaché).

(e) Capital Development.

A British firm, Sir A. Gibb and Partners is interested in the Lar Valley Hydro-Electric and Irrigation scheme (see correspondence enclosed in my despatch No. 15) and other British firms have shown interest in a water supply scheme for Tehran.

Generally speaking it is unlikely that capital equipment in quantities necessary for any substantial projects will be available for a considerable time. But there is much preliminary survey work etc. to be done in connexion with any such schemes, and our aim should be to keep the Persians in play until capital equipment becomes available. See also paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below.

(f) (i) Technical Help.

I agree that provision of technicians is desirable. Ministry of War Transport have written to M.E.S.C. inquiring what can be done. Supply of technicians from this country is of course extremely difficult at present.

(ii) Training of Experts for Textile Industry, Railways etc.

Your recommendations have been brought to the notice of the McCordale Committee on which the Ministry of Labour, Foreign Office, D.O.T., British Council and Industrial Associations are represented. This committee is exploring the best way to encourage British firms to accept foreign students and trainees. British Council have offered to put their organisation abroad and their welfare services at home at the disposal of firms or other bodies for this purpose; and it may well be that when the committee have decided on suitable coordination machinery, Persian textile and railway engineers could be brought to this country in considerable numbers on the scholarships offered by firms rather than as British Council scholars. I will keep you informed of developments.

(g) Cultural Activities. Your recommendations do not entirely coincide with those submitted by Mr. Bingley to the British Council. Mr. Bingley's proposals, adoption of which in toto has been recommended by British Council comprise;

(i) opening of institutes at Shiraz, Kerman, Abadan, and Meshed in addition to existing institutes at Tehran and Isfahan, but not at Hamadan or Tabriz;

(ii) one professor and four teachers at Tehran University;

(iii)

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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [و٨] (٧٩/١٥)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

EX 1
686

3.

(iii) two teachers for Kerej Agricultural College, six for secondary schools and four for Tehran technical colleges, a games coach and a Boy Scout leader. It is hoped that Professor Miles, British Council's advisor on technical education who is now on a visit to Turkey will go to Tehran. If he does he will no doubt make recommendations for sending technical professors and lecturers from the United Kingdom.

(h) Medical Assistance.

I agree as to the desirability of maintaining this and hope that Government of India and P.A.I.C. can continue to help. Please let me know if you also require any assistance from here.

(j) Persian Armed Forces.

(i) We hope that procedure now agreed with United States authorities (see correspondence ending with War Cabinet Offices' telegram No. L.M.A.B. 110 of 2nd February to the J.S.M. Washington) will ensure that Persian Army requirements are met either from the United States sources or from P.A.I.C. I understand that the Persian Army has already received considerable quantities of motor transport and other material from United States sources.

(ii) Rehabilitation of Persian Navy.

This question was recently examined, and I fear that the position remains as described in No. 32 SAVING of 24th September, 1943.

(iii) Persian Air Force.

Training of pilots in the United Kingdom and the supply of Ansons has already been arranged. Air Ministry's other proposals should reach you shortly.

3. It is of course impossible to deal in any detail at the present stage with the prospects of post-war trade with Persia, but the following general observations may be of some guidance to you.

4. (a) In the period following the armistice with Germany, British output will still be earmarked on an extensive scale for service requirements. Relief demands will also be heavy for the goods Persia needs - viz, textiles, motor transport, drugs, machinery. But we hope for some increase in the amounts available for commercial exports.

(b) After the Japanese armistice there will be temporary problems of unscrambling, but we then hope to increase our exports very considerably.

(c) If we have to have recourse to directing our scarcer exports, Persia should on present evidence qualify for a fairly high priority. But in the meantime we shall have to keep the Persians in play as best we can (see paragraph 2 (c)).

5. Anglo-Persian financial relations after the war will be determined primarily by the need to secure the orderly and prudent spending of Persian sterling balances. Until these balances have been liquidated, there will be no case for granting loans or credits or for encouraging the investment of British capital in Persia. It will therefore be for the Persians themselves to finance any projects of capital works etc. which they may be planning.

This

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
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
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This can be done either by the Persian Government creating, by means of taxation or Government borrowing, a reserve fund to be drawn on after the war, or by enlisting private capital, e.g. in the form of public utility companies.


6. As regards the disposal of Persia's exportable surpluses it will be for the Persians so to adjust their internal economy that the prices of their commodities bear some relation to world prices in general, in order that goods may be exchanged with Persia on a mutually profitable basis.

[Copies sent to Mr. Smyth].

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٩] (٧٩/١٧)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٩ظ] (٧٩/١٨)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٠] (٧٩/١٩)

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FILE COPY
R.T. Peel Esq.
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. India Office
5th February, 1944. Office
M. H. (10)

551
With the Compliments
of the
Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs

7 FEB 1944

Dear Buxton,

In your letter to me of the 23rd November you gave your views on those paragraphs of Tehran telegram No. 145 Saving with which the Ministry of War Transport and Middle East Supply Centre are concerned.

The views of other departments have now been received, and a draft reply to Tehran, of which I enclose a copy, has been prepared here.

The only outstanding point is the question of Diesel spares (paragraph 1 (iv) of your letter). If you have now heard from Middle East Supply Centre on this subject, perhaps you could suggest a suitable addition to paragraph 2(b) of the draft.


I am sending copies of this letter and of the draft to Peel (India Office), Young (Treasury), Miss Monroe (Ministry of Information) and Gilbert (Board of Trade). I should be grateful if any comments or amendments could reach me by the 10th February.

Yours sincerely
(SE) C.W. Baxter


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7 FEB 1944
INDIA OFFICE

Wing Commander
D.A.J. Buxton,
Ministry of War Transport.


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
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
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٢ و] (٧٩/٢٣)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢١ ظ] (٧٩/٢٤)



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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٣ و] (٧٩/٢٥)

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distributing goods already in the country (your telegram No. 15 paragraphs). Until the Persians show that they can digest what they are already getting they clearly cannot expect to be given more.

(b) Machinery and Diesels.

Sometypes of machinery, and Diesels in particular, are in very short supply and there is no prospect of the position easing. But some 300 tons of Diesel machinery (approximately 140 slow speed Diesel engines) have been programmed for Persia and it should be possible to supply the bulk of these by December 1944.

Diesel spares .

(Ministry of War Transport to fill in).

(c) Development of Trade with India.

I quite agree that this is desirable, but the immediate requirement is surely that the Persians shall be more active in taking advantage of facilities already offered by the Government of India (see under (a)).

As regards appointment of Indian Trade Commissioner, please see Government of India telegram No. 11522 to India Office.

(d) Transport Aircraft.

Air Ministry can allocate 3 D.H. 89's to Persia during months January, February, March 1944 (see Air Ministry Signal No. A 627 of 22nd November to your Air Attaché).


(e) Capital Development.

A British firm, Sir A. Gibb and Partners is interested in the Lar Valley Hydro-Electric and Irrigation scheme (see correspondence


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x stating that ~~subject to~~ they hope to appoint one shortly.


مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣١ ظ] (٧٩/٢٦)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤ و١] (٧٩/٢٧)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤ اظ] (٧٩/٢٨)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٥ و] (٧٩/٢٩)

Council scholars. I will keep you informed of developments.

(g) Cultural Activities. Your recommendations do not entirely coincide with those submitted by Mr. Bingley to the British Council. Mr. Bingley's proposals, adoption of which in toto has been recommended by British Council, comprise;

(i) opening of institutes at Shiraz, Kerman, Abadan, and Meshed in addition to existing institutes at Tehran and Isfahan, but not at Hamadan or Tabriz;

(ii) one professor and four teachers at Tehran University;

(iii) two teachers for Kerej Agricultural College, six for secondary schools and four for Tehran technical colleges, a games coach and a Boy Scout leader. It is hoped that Professor Davies, British Council's advisor on technical education who is now on a visit to Turkey will go to Tehran. If he does he will no doubt make recommendations for sending technical professors and lecturers from the U.K.

(h) Medical Assistance.


I agree as to the desirability of maintaining this and hope that Government of India and P.A.I.C. can continue to help. Please let me know if you also require any assistance from here.

(j) Persian Armed Forces.


(i) We hope that procedure now agreed with U.S. authorities (see correspondence ending with War Cabinet Offices' telegram No. L.M.A.B. 110 of 2nd February to the J.S.M. Washington) will ensure that Persian Army requirements are met either from the U.S. sources or from P.A.I.C. I understand/

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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٥ ظ] (٧٩/٣٠)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٦ ظ] (٧٩/٣٢)




5. Anglo-war will be secure the sterling ba liquidated, loans or or of British be for the projects of planning. Government Government after the w e.g. in the 6. As reg surpluses i adjust thei their commo prices in g exchangedwi basis.

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٧و] (٧٩/٣٣)


5. Anglo-Persian financial relations after the war will be determined primarily by the need to secure the orderly and prudent spending of Persian sterling balances. Until these balances have been liquidated, there will be no case for granting loans or credits or for encouraging the investment of British capital in Persia. It will therefore be for the Persians themselves to finance any projects of capital works etc. which they may be planning. This can be done either by the Persian Government creating, by means of taxation or Government borrowing, a reserve fund to be drawn after the war, or by enlisting private capital, e.g. in the form of public utility companies.

6. As regards the disposal of Persia's exportable surpluses it will be for the Persians so to adjust their internal economy that the prices of their commodities bear some relation to world prices in general, in order that goods may be exchanged with Persia on a mutually profitable basis.


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
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
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٩] (٧٩/٣٧)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [١٩] (٧٩/٣٨)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٠] (٧٩/٣٩)

DA/No. 475(1303/4/43).

EXT
6848
1943

BRITISH LEGATION,
TEHRAN,
2nd December, 1943.

His Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and
has the honour to transmit herewith, copies of the documents
mentioned in the subjoined Schedule, on the subject of

Re:- Economic Propaganda.

Reference:— Our telegram Saving No.143 of 5th October, 1943.

Copy of letter from Khorramshahr No.96-T of 1st November, 1943,
and C.S. letter No.O.T.(B)216(CS133/24/43) of 29th November,
1943 to D.O.T., re:- Economic Propaganda.

No. 475(1303/4/43).
of 2nd December, 1943.

BRITISH LEGATION
TEHRAN

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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢١ و] (٧٩/٤١)

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Confidential.

No. 96-T.

EX 1
6848
1943

British Consulate,
Khorramshahr,
1st November, 1943.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your circular despatch
No. 89(1179/18/43) dated the 17th October 1943 in which you
asked for suggestions and observations on the saving telegram
which formed an enclosure to your despatch.

I am not aware of the plans the Persian Government may
have under consideration for the commercial development of
Ports in Southern Iran after the war, it seems clear however that
any such plans cannot altogether ignore the vast improvements
which have been effected, for purely military reasons, in
the Port of Khorramshahr during the past two years; and that
sooner or later some attention will have to be paid to putting
what remains of the facilities now available to the best commercial
use.

As an example of the development which has taken place
I would mention that two years ago the capacity of the Port was
roughly 1000 tons a month; there was no railway and no jetty;
while to-day the Port can deal with as much as 4000 tons of cargo
a day; there are jetties large enough to berth seven ocean going
ships at a time and a link of the main trans-Persian Railway
extends up to the Customs jetties and Port area.

With these facilities available there is no doubt that,
given due attention, Khorramshahr can be developed into a port of
considerable importance for dealing with trade, not only for
the interior of Persia but also with transit trade for markets
in Russia and perhaps even eastern Europe. I would accordingly
suggest that as an earnest of our intention to bring tangible
benefits in the economic field we should offer to the Persian
Government the services of expert technicians and town planners
to study the problem of developing on commercial lines the existing
facilities of the Port, which have been built purely with regard
to military necessity.

Such development would not only render invaluable service
to the Persian Government but also to our own trade, more particularly
that of India, which must inevitably search for new markets to absorb
the increased supply of manufactured goods which will be available
for export as a result of the industrialisation which has taken place
there during the war years.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Hon'ble the
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,

(SGD) ??? A.E. Stewart

H.M.'s Consul, Khorramshahr.

Sir Reader W. Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,
His Britannic Majesty's Minister,
British Legation,
TEHRAN.

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢١ ظ] (٧٩/٤٢)




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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٢ ظ] (٧٩/٤٤)



Sir R.
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5th Oct
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21 OCT 1944
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٣ ظ] (٧٩/٤٦)

- 2 -

(b) A special effort should be made to supply more machinery (especially Diesel engines) and spare parts (mainly for German engines).

(c) Development of trade with India.

This would of course be of mutual benefit to Persia and India and would also indirectly benefit British interests and influence. An essential step is the appointment of an Indian Trade Commissioner in Tehran.

(d) Air Transport.

Persia has poor ground communications and is therefore a promising field for the development of air transport. Persian State Airlines have urgently requested one or at most two small (DH 89) aircraft from us and provision of these would greatly ease present transport difficulties and increase the Central Government's authority in the provinces. If we do not provide them Americans will doubtless do so sooner or later.

(e) Public Works and Industrial Development.

There is enormous scope for irrigation and hydro-electric development in which British firms might participate. The first would help Persia's basic industry, agriculture, and at the same time provide water power for industrial development. The Tehran area has good possibilities of this kind which are being investigated by American irrigation adviser to the Persian Government. Furthermore, the capital has not yet a piped water supply. Similar development can be carried out in and near other large cities. With cheap power available industry (especially chemical), mining and transport could be developed with profit.

(f) Technical Help.

(i) The ex-Shah's programme of industrialisation required the help of European technicians to build and run factories. Many of these were Germans. It will be some years before the Persians are good enough engineers and administrators to be independent of foreign help; and we now have an excellent opportunity of getting rid of German influence, which is still very strong in the commercial community, by placing British technicians and machinery in the industries and factories. The Middle East Supply Centre has a nucleus of British specialists who are working to keep Persian industry operating and would be an excellent channel through whom permanent appointments of this kind could be made.

(ii) Experts are needed for the textile industry (especially the cotton section) to improve methods of production and to advise on the maintenance of existing equipment and the ordering of more machinery. They would also select young Persians for training in the United Kingdom. The railway needs trained men to take

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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤ و٢] (٧٩/٤٧)

- 3 -

over from the Americans after the war. These should receive their training in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, these young technicians would be able to replace British technicians if the latter should go. Their training in England could be effected by means of British Council scholarships. Candidates should be sent for theoretical training in the Universities and for practical training in the factories. British professors should be appointed to the Technical Colleges under the control of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Mines. The British Council is now teaching English to the students in these colleges and within a year or less it will be possible to give instruction on technical subjects in the English language. The Germans staffed these colleges with their own people and used the German language for instructional purposes, German being compulsory until as recently as the end of the last school term. Five professors are needed for the Tehran College and three for the Isfahan College.

(g) Cultural Activities.

The British Council could extend their activities by opening Institutes in Shiraz, Hamadan, Meshed, Tabriz and Abadan. Each would require a staff of three people, i.e. fifteen in all. The Tehran Institute could usefully employ another five. It would be invaluable having professors appointed by them to Tehran University, where six could be placed. One professor for the Kerej Agricultural College, twelve teachers of English in other institutions, ten in secondary schools, physical training instructors, games coaches and scoutmasters appointed and financed by the British Council enormously increase the scope of British cultural propaganda. After the war, given a stable Government in Persia, the financial liability of the British Council in this respect could probably be reduced to about two-thirds of the cost, the Persian Government bearing the rest.

(h) Medical assistance.

This is clearly one of the most effective forms of propaganda amongst a backward and disease-ridden country population, and valuable work has already been achieved by the enterprise of a local British subject (Miss Palmer-Smith) in establishing, with the help of willing and influential Persians, clinics and health centres in Tehran and the provinces; and by the recent provision of a mobile dispensary by G.H.Q. Paic. Latter work should if possible be repeated and extended and approach has been made in this connexion to the Minister of State, Cairo, and to the Government of India.

(j) Armed Forces.

It would greatly assist our credit, more especially with this section of the nation (ill-disposed towards us since the occupation, except for the Air Force), if we could (i) facilitate arrival of supplies and material recommended by United States Army adviser; (ii) definitely promise to rehabilitate the Persian Navy as soon as possible - perhaps when Germany is

/defeated

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٤ ظ] (٧٩/٤٨)

(4)

defeated and more small vessels are set free than can be employed in the Far East;


(iii) help the Air Force to reconstruct itself on British model.

7. All the above are ways in which it is suggested Persia could receive assistance which would justify our propaganda, remove to some extent the odium created by Allied occupation and its economic consequences and lay the foundations of lasting British prestige and influence in this country. Persians will, however, judge the advantages of association with Great Britain chiefly from what is offered for the post-war period. Hence British propaganda, if it is to convince the Persians on this point, must even at present be based to some extent on the advantages Great Britain is prepared to offer them commercially when the war is over. It is difficult at this stage to recommend the exact lines on which Great Britain's post-war trade policy towards Persia should run, as it will clearly depend on the political status of the country after the war and on Britain's policy in general towards her major allies. The question will, however, be "how and by whom will Persia's economic wants be satisfied"? Assuming that Great Britain wished to be one of the chief agencies in fulfilling this, the action she must take would be a continuation and widening of that suggested in the preceding paragraph. Details of Persian import requirements and development possibilities were sent in September 1942 by the Commercial Secretary to His Majesty's Legation to the Department of Overseas Trade, for the information of the Post-War Export Trade Committee presided over by Mr. Harcourt Johnston, P.C., M.P. The information in this report will be brought up to date and a further report furnished as soon as possible as a first step in the campaign to prepare for the resumption of British trade in Persia.


8. The previous paragraphs are concerned with what Great Britain might contribute to Persia. It will, however, also be necessary, if a strong position is to be built up in Persia, to take from her a share of her products bearing some relation to the value of those she buys from Great Britain; or at least to ensure that she is able to dispose of her own exportable surpluses in other markets under some system of international clearing (such as the Keynes Plan) that will prevent her becoming tied to a particular country in the way she was to Germany before the war. It is, however, useful to bear in mind that Germany's considerable popularity in Persia was due to the fact that trade between the two countries was a more or less mutually satisfactory exchange of goods. Only some system that satisfies the above condition will give lasting satisfaction to both parties and provide a secure basis for building up British influence in Persia.

[Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong.]


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
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
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
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٧ و] (٧٩/٥٣)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٧ظ] (٧٩/٥٤)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٨ و] (٧٩/٥٥)

With the compliments of Mr. J.I. COOK. H.M. TREASURY. (27) (28)

Mr. Pink is seeing Mr. Rumbold why we have not yet had replies to our letters of Nov. 12. Dear Pink, and

Gt. George St., S.W.1. 25th November, 1941.

In view of the telegrams which I see passing on the three corners route between India, Persia and the Foreign Office, I feel all the more strongly that Bullard ought to be fully seized of our point of view in regard to Persian finance and economics. You will remember that you suggested that my fuller telegram about Persian finance should not be sent off in view of the fact that you had already touched on this subject in Telegram No. 1042.

Unfortunately the Foreign Office have chosen not to circulate either this telegram or its answer, No. 1149⁺ from Tehran, to the Treasury. This makes it rather hard to say very much at the moment, but as soon as I obtain them I think we must concoct a full and definite line of advice for Bullard.

It occurs to me also that there will be a tendency for

I.T.M. Pink, Esq.,

^{+ This was an earlier telegram - not the answer.}

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٨ ظ] (٧٩/٥٦)

the Persian Government to take its ease and, if anything goes wrong, simply blame it on the British. This may be the case particularly in regard to the wheat position. In former years Persia was usually able to export a surplus of wheat. It is really for the Persian Government to take the hoarders by the neck and shake the wheat out of them. In addition, I think it has been fairly obvious for some time that Bullard is not in close touch with the U.K.C.C. representative, otherwise he would not have sent a telegram such as No. 1123. At a meeting recently, at which this telegram was discussed, it was found that the whole Persian programme had been met up to the end of December and I think Bullard has been so informed.

These are just preliminary observations until the copies of the latest telegrams arrive here from the Foreign Office.

I am sending a copy of this to Lumby (India Office).

He says that he is.

EWK

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. I. COOK.

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Sign
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٩و] (٧٩/٥٧)

28 29

Please see the note at EXT. 7431/41, flagged.
We have now received a further telegram from the Government of India on the subject of financial assistance to Persia.

The circumstances in which repetition to India of F.O. telegram No. 1042 was delayed are explained in the draft letter to the F.O. below.

As regards paragraph 2 of the Government of India's telegram, I think it is admitted on all sides that the immediate need of the Persian Government is for rials rather than for sterling or other foreign exchange. I understand from the Treasury, however, that the Persian Government can obtain the rials needed to carry on their administration by selling some of their surplus sterling to the Imperial Bank of Iran, who will give them rials in return. If this is so, the Government of India's argument that the Persians are not in a position to import very much really runs counter to their own case; since this restriction on imports should leave the Persian Government with more sterling with which to buy rials.

In view of this and of the other considerations set out in the note at EXT. 7431/41, it is proposed to do no more than ask the F.O. (a) to bear the Government of India's views in mind when the time comes to implement the treaty and (b) to let us have their views on both the Government of India's telegrams on this subject together. A draft for this purpose follows.

Not can the Persians export much in order to maintain their sterling reserves. But on the other hand expenditure by us in Persia on transport etc will give them sterling.


Sign
RM
25/11

Secretary, E.&O. Department,
For any observations.


Q.R. Lumbry
24. xi.

I concur
RM
25/11


مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٢٩ ظ] (٧٩/٥٨)




مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٠ و] (٧٩/٥٩)




مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٠ ظ] (٧٩/٦٠)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣١ و] (٧٩/٦١)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣١ ظ] (٧٩/٦٢)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٢ و] (٧٩/٦٣)

E.W.R. Lumby, Esq. (32)
India Office.
INDIA DIRECT (2)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

(E /34)
[CYPHER]

7469
7495
POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.
TO: PERSIA
1941

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEHRAN. NOV 1941

No. 1054. D. 2.30 a.m., 19th November, 1941.
19th November, 1941.

Repeated to Government of India No. 14873
Kuibyshev No. 3)
Angora No. 20)
Bagdad No. 19)
Cairo No. 73)

3 3 3

IMPORTANT.

Copies also sent to
Petroleum Dept.
M/Economic Warfare
War Office F.I.

Register
Please register these 2 telegrams and
return them to me. I have kept
one copy of each. Encl

7469. My telegram No. 1042 [of November 18th: proposed 22.xi.
Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty]. F.O. Ref: E 4551/3444/34 of 11. 7469

Persian Minister informed me November 19th that while his Government were in principle in favour of the Treaty, they were much exercised by the terms of our proposals. It would be a misfortune, he thought, if this Government were compelled to resign and Majlis might not approve the terms. The Minister asked in particular whether we could not agree more explicitly to Persia having a place at the peace conference and above all whether we could not improve Article 7 regarding economic help.

2. I told the Minister that I was sorry I could not meet him on either of these points. As regards the peace conference it was impossible to go further than I was proposing, since I could not visualise the circumstances in which peace would eventually be made.

3. As regards financial help I could not accept that the Persian Government were in difficulty there. They had considerable sterling balances available in this country which were at present frozen. These they would be able to use as soon as the Treaty was signed. I understood that Persian assets in the United States were now estimated at 11 million dollars. I suggested that what Persia needed was not money, but goods. We were doing our best to help in this and were shipping further supplies of wheat to Persia before the end of the year. The Minister remarked that his Government had not mentioned food in their telegram to him. I replied that this was none the less a most serious matter that confronted Persia. Her people were very short of food and we were trying to help them in this as in other matters.

4. Broadly the choice for Persia was clear. If she became an ally she would be in the same category as Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, to all of whom we were sending supplies and all of whom we had helped as far as we could in respect of their export trade. If, however, Persia was not an ally,

she/

REC'D. POL. DEPT.
22 NOV 41
INDIA

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٢ ظ] (٧٩/٦٤)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

2.

she could not expect to continue to receive the favourable treatment which we had been giving her, and we should then regard ourselves as under no treaty obligation towards Persia whatever.

5. I then read to the Minister the last two sentences of my telegram No. 1042 to you. The Minister continued to plead for the inclusion of something further in the Treaty which would give it a popular appeal. I replied that I had been through the text most carefully and I had accepted, subject to the approval of our Soviet ally, a number of Persian amendments. I could now go no further. As soon as you had received the agreement of your Soviet colleague, you would see the Persian Government and put the full text as now proposed before them. I hoped that the Minister would use his utmost influence to advise his Government to accept this Treaty without further delay. I was confident that it was in Persia's interests to do this.

6. The Minister would remember that we and the Soviet Government had withdrawn our troops from Tehran some time ago. There had been some criticism of us for that action. The Minister said that we were entirely right to try to get the confidence of the Persian Government and people. I said if that were so, it was now for the Persian Government to prove that the confidence of their friends was justified. I quite understood that the Persian Government might think that they might meet with some criticism from the Majlis, but since what they were doing was in the interest of their country they should have the courage to face up to that.


7. The Minister was friendly but worried. I hope that I may have been able to put some heart into him. I made it plain that I was not able to discuss amendments with him, and that the detailed text of the negotiations was in your hands at Tehran. This he readily accepted.

REC'D POL. SEC.
INDIA

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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٣ و] (٧٩/٦٥)



2/11

S.M. 32 h. h. h. h. h. 33
? find a H. D. sign. in copy, indicated, 21. 4
handwritten for the Sir of Bullard to work to it any further
U.S.S. action will have been taken in that case in this case but if
this Office had been

Below these papers will be found
(a) the text of Article 7 of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty originally suggested by the Foreign Office, and
(b) that suggested by the Persian Government.
The Persian draft was found unacceptable here, and the addition at the top of page 2 of Foreign Office telegram to Tehran No. 1021 was suggested instead. Sir R. Bullard's comments will be found in the side-lined passages in Tehran telegrams Nos. 1145 and 1149. The Foreign Office have now given the Soviet Ambassador a revised draft of the Treaty, and have suggested that his Government should instruct the Soviet Minister at Tehran to join with Sir. R. Bullard in informing the Persian Government that we must require them to accept this version. For the reasons given in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Office telegram to Tehran No. 1042, it has been decided to go no farther than the draft of Article 7 put forward in Foreign Office telegram No. 1021. Foreign Office telegram No. 1042 has crossed the Government of India's telegram No. 6514, which has thus arrived too late to be able to alter His Majesty's Government's decision.

There is a serious question in the proposed text. Another instance in my paper is to be completed to give a full answer to the question into the proposed text. Objections to such in fact, copy.
+ a from anywhere else

As I understand the position, the contention of the Foreign Office and the Treasury is that the Persian Government have plenty of sterling in hand, and that there is no question of their needing a loan to tide them over until they receive the next instalment of A.I.O.C. royalties. The presence of the British forces in Persia will also lead to an influx of sterling, including payments for goods and services supplied in connection with the transport of goods to Russia. On the other hand, Persia is unable in the present circumstances to import very much from the sterling area, so that the sterling acquired will remain in the country. The resulting situation, in which there will be a considerable amount of exchange in Persia but few goods to spend it on, may lead to inflation; and any loan or gift from His Majesty's Government would of course

/accentuate

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٣ظ] (٧٩/٦٦)

accentuate this danger.

I understand from the Foreign Office that an additional reason for their decision not to offer financial assistance is that intercepted telegrams between the Persian Foreign Ministry and the Legation in London have shown that the Persian Government does not really want a loan. (This, of course, does not mean that they would not like a gift.)†

† see the marked passage on p. 6 of the attached intercept. I understand that this has been confirmed by a later telegram which I have not seen.

The Foreign Office also tell me that, although they do not consider that the Persians need foreign exchange, they appreciate that owing to the disorganisation of the country and the subsequent shortfall of revenue they are badly in need of rials. To remedy this, the Foreign Office propose that the Persian Government should float an internal loan. They do not think it should take unduly long to raise money in this way.

It is proposed simply to tell the Foreign Office that while we do not feel that, on the basis of the Government of India's telegram, we can contest the decision not to give financial assistance to Persia, we would be grateful for material with which to reply to the Government of India in rather more detail than is given in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office telegram No. 1042. A draft for this purpose follows.

Consider that we ought to bring the Govt. of India's views to their notice and would be grateful for any additional points which can be put to them in reply. In accordance with the Viceroy's wish to be informed immediately when the Govt's views are not accepted, it is also proposed to send a brief reply to the Govt. of India's telegram.

The Secretary, E & O Department, for any observations.

note below. E. R. Lumbard.
20.XI.

Drafts submitted. If the telegram is to achieve its purpose, it should issue as soon as possible.

Reddell
24/11

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤ و٣] (٧٩/٦٧)

Secretary, External Department.

There are three issues raised in this correspondence.

(a) Whether we should give financial assistance to Persia. I agree that in view of our secret information that the Persians do not really want such assistance there is no purpose in pursuing the matter at the moment and that we cannot question the Foreign Office's decision to refuse to incorporate any undertaking on the subject in the treaty.

(b) Whether we should accede to the Persian request that we should buy their produce and facilitate their imports. I agree on the whole with the Foreign Office that we should not enter into any obligation on this point as part of the treaty. We are in fact doing everything that is possible in view of the shipping and port situation to assist Persia's imports. We may have to buy some more Persian produce (e.g. Persian cotton) but it seems best not to pursue this at the moment.

(c) Whether we should support the Government of India's proposal that the Persians should be given an Economic Adviser. This has nothing to do with the treaty as such. It seems to me to be a sound idea that there should be more qualified economic and financial advice at Tehran than there is at present. Whether it should take the form of an American Economic or Financial Adviser attached to the Persian Government or of the strengthening of the staff of H.M. Legation by the addition of an economic expert who would carry some guns is a point which is more open to question. I am at present rather inclined to favour the latter. The advice of an expert attached to the Legation would be available informally to the Persian Government and he could be appointed without consultation with the Russians.

My/

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٤٣ ظ] (٧٩/٦٨)

My impression is that the Legation is at present very weak on the commercial side.

There are three issues raised in this correspondence.

(a) Whether we should give the Persians assistance to Persia. I agree that in view of our better information there is no reason why we should not really want such assistance there is no purpose in pursuing the matter at the moment and that we cannot question the Foreign Office's decision to refuse to incorporate any undertaking on the subject in the treaty.

(b) Whether we should accede to the Persian request that we should buy their produce and facilitate their imports. I agree on the whole with the Foreign Office that we should not enter into any obligation on this point as part of the treaty. We are in fact doing everything that is possible in view of the shipping and port situation to assist Persia's imports. We may have to buy some Persian produce (e.g. Persian cotton) but it seems best not to pursue this at the moment.

(c) Whether we should support the Government of India's proposal that the Persians should be given an Economic Adviser. This has nothing to do with the treaty as such. It seems to me to be a sound idea that there should be more qualified economic and financial advice at Tehran than there is at present. Whether it should take the form of an American Economic or Financial Adviser attached to the Persian Government or of the strengthening of the staff of the Legation by the addition of an economic expert who would carry some work is a point which is more open to question. I am at present rather inclined to favour the latter. The advice of an expert attached to the Legation would be available informally to the Persian Government and he could be appointed without consultation with the Russians.

Copy to
Tr
H.A.P.
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مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٥ و] (٧٩/٦٩)

(35)
(34)

DRAFT.
Ext. 7431/41.

IMMEDIATE - BY HAND.

C.W. Baxter, Esq., *CMG, MC*
Foreign Office.

22 NOV 1941

Dear Baxter,

Will you please refer to the Government of India's telegram No. 6514 of November 19th (further copy herewith) on the question of granting financial assistance to Persia.


Copy to J.I. Cook,
Treasury,
H.A.F. Rumbold,
E & O Dept.

24 NOV 1941

This telegram has crossed the repetition to India of Foreign Office telegram to Tehran No. 1042 of November 18th, instructing Sir R. Bullard, in conjunction with the Soviet representative, to inform the Persian Government that we must require them to accept ^a ~~the~~ version of the Treaty which, inter alia, goes no further than the present draft of Article 7. While we do not, in these circumstances, feel that we ~~can contest this decision, we should like to~~ ^{consider that we} ~~ought to~~ ^{be able to give} the Government of India's

/ a somewhat
view

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٥ظ] (٧٩/٧٠)




views to your notice. If there are any points,
a somewhat fuller account of the reasons which
additional to those made
have led to its adoption than is contained
in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office telegram No.
1042, which you think we might put to the Govt. of
India in reply, would you please let us know.
provide us with some material for this purpose.

I am sending a copy of this letter
to Cook, at the Treasury.


Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) R. PEEL

Copy to J. L. Cook,
Treasury,
H.M.S. L. Hancock,
E. & C. Dept.
3 & 4 NOV 1928


مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٦ و] (٧٩/٧١)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٦ظ] (٧٩/٧٢)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٧و] (٧٩/٧٣)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٧ظ] (٧٩/٧٤)


essential foodstuffs will involve large expenditure at a time when insecurity and disorganisation have greatly affected revenues.

3. It may be that Persian Government's conception of the extent of financial assistance required will go far beyond what H.M. Government could contemplate. But in our view the grant of short term credits on easy terms is inevitable and should be admitted forthwith while making it clear in such manner as Bullard may find most appropriate that these credits will not go beyond sum contemplated in 1940.

4. It was with these considerations in mind that we ourselves suggested to Bullard the appointment of American financial and economic advisers and we have much sympathy for other arguments which he now advances.

SECRET
COPY
1941
INDIA OFFICE

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٨ و] (٧٩/٧٥)




Ext. 7392/41.

Extract from Secret Telegram No. 1149, sent
from Tehran to Foreign Office, dated
16th November, 1941.


4. The question of financial assistance is admittedly more difficult but apart from the fact that, as I have said before, we shall have to assist Persia financially sooner or later, I would advance three arguments in support of my proposal (a) Persia would naturally think it highly unlikely that we gave British protection to the late Shah, and refused help to present régime, (b) grant of financial assistance would give us the right of criticism of finance and revenue administration. The suggestion has been made in various quarters (most recently as a private enquiry from Simla) that foreign adviser should be employed by the Persian Government. Only adviser we could recommend would, I think, be Americans. (sic). Previous experience has not been happy but in present circumstances Americans might be less hostile to British influence, while the Russians being dependent on American help, might be less hostile to the adviser. Negotiation of an agreement for financial assistance would enable us to raise the adviser question if we thought fit, (c) in considering the amount

of/

مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٨ ظ] (٧٩/٧٦)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [٣٩ و] (٧٩/٧٧)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة البريطانية." [٣٩ظ] (٧٩/٧٨)



مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة
البريطانية." [خلفي] (٧٩/٧٩)

