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المراجع	IOR/L/MIL/5/794
العنوان	"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	١٢ فبراير ١٩١٨-٢٨ مارس ١٩١٨ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية في اللاتينية
الحجم والشكل	ملف واحد (٢٢ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>رخصة حكومة مفتوحة</u>

حول هذا السجل


يحتوي الملف على مراسلات بخصوص السياسة والاستراتيجية العسكرية في مصر وبلاد الرافدين [العراق] خلال الحرب العالمية الأولى، وذلك استجابةً لتوصيات الفريق أول جان كريستيان سموتس، وزير الدفاع في جنوب أفريقيا وعضو مجلس الحرب الإمبراطوري.

تتضمن الموضوعات التي تناولتها المراسلات: مقترح سياسة دفاعية في بلاد الرافدين لتمكين نقل القوات والمعدات إلى فلسطين؛ إنشاء السكك الحديدية في فلسطين ومصر وبينهما؛ نقل القوات والمدفعية من فلسطين إلى فرنسا وسالونيك.

المتراسلون الرئيسيون هم: القائد العام في الهند؛ القائد العام في مصر؛ ومكتب الحرب البريطاني.




"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين"
[أمامي] (٤٨/١)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين"
[أمامي-داخلي] (٤٨/٢)






"السياسة إخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢ و]
(٤٨/٣)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ٢]
(٤٨/٤)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٣ و]
(٤٨/٥)





"السياسة إخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [و٤]
(٤٨/٧)



(4) *for*
SECRET.
SECRET. /6
SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

From:- War Office.

To:- G.O.C.-in-C., G.H.Q., Egypt.

Despatched:- 8.40 p.m., 27/3/18.

55164 cipher (D.M.O.) *Not need I.O.*

1. In continuation of my 54881 of 23rd March the situation in France necessitates the cancelling of the instructions contained in my 53711 of 7th March.
2. You will adopt a policy of active defence in Palestine as soon as the operations you are now undertaking are completed.
3. The 52nd Division (less artillery) will be sent to France as soon as shipping can be made available with the artillery of the 7th Indian Division. It is desired to send to France one other British Division either on arrival of 3rd Indian Division or before if you consider the situation in Palestine admits of this. Which Division would you send?
4. In view of change of policy, what heavy artillery can you spare? Personnel is urgently needed in France and if you cannot spare complete batteries could be made good later.
5. Despatch of all additional transport and railway material and labour for advance to Haifa has been cancelled, but your normal upkeep requirements will be met.
6. The despatch of 4 additional flying squadrons will be delayed.
7. Replacement of British by Indian units as already notified will be carried out. Further details concerning this will shortly be communicated to you.


M.O.X. Copies to:- C.I.G.S. (2) D.M.I. A.G. D.R.
D.C.I.G.S. M.I.1. G.M.G. D.I.
D.M.O. (2) M.I.2. M.G.O. D.I.
M.O.1. M.I.O. D.G.M.R.
M.O.2. D.S.D. (3) D.G.M.A.
M.O.3. Gen.Cox (I.O.)
D.Mov.

x Lowland (T.F.) Div.




"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٤٤]

(٤٨/٨)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٥٥]
(٤٨/٩)



SECRET.

From : G.O.C. in C. Egypt.
To : War Office.

Despatched 10.10 p.m. 26.3.1918.
Received 7.35 a.m. 27.3.1918.

G.K.T. 4347. March 26th. (14)

Your 54759 M.R.E A/437 March 22nd.

1. There is no immediate necessity to commence picking up Dabaa line, if you can supply standard gauge requirements as far as Haifa, but it will take some considerable time owing to labour difficulties. In addition to what I have here and what is still due to come from India on existing orders, I require 20 miles track complete, delivered here early in June, to reach Haifa. Please say definitely whether I am authorised to pick up Dabaa line or not.


2. The 84 engines were for main line only, the 7 engines required for Ludd-Artuf branch were not included nor were the 16 shunting engines. I cannot accept principle that the reduction of the force from 10 plus 4 to 9 plus 3 affects the engines and wagons I require. Unless my force is materially reduced it is essential that I should be able to run 22 trains per day, the reduction in tonnage taking place in the quantity landed by sea and not rail borne tonnage, as the former is at best precarious. I therefore hope you will be able to meet my requirements in full.

G.2. Copy to :- D.C.I.G.S. D.S.D.
D.M.O. D.D.S.D.
M.O.A. A.G.
M.O.E, 2a, 2b. Q.M.G.
R.I.L a. (for circ.) M.G.O.
S.D.E, 2a, 2b. D.G.M.R.
D.Mov.
D.R.R.
D.I.W.D.

no receipt
eng
Genl. Cox.




"السياسة إله تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٥ظ]
(٤٨/١٠)







"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٦ و]
(٤٨/١١)






"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سمو تاس: مصر وبلاد الراءفءن" [ظ٦]
(٤٨/١٢)






"السياسة إلخ تبجاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٧و]
(٤٨/١٣)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ٧]
(٤٨/١٤)






"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [و٨]
(٤٨/١٥)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ ٨]
(٤٨/١٦)





"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [و٩]
(٤٨/١٧)



SECRET.

121/Transport/1041. (9)

From :- War Office.

To :- G.O.C.Mesopotamia.
Repeated C.in C.India & G.H.Q.Egypt.

Despatched 4.35 p.m.15-3-18.

121/9211(S.D.2.) *Not rec'd 10.*

54272 cipher.Your X.7099 March 10th.Proposal approved.

Batteries Nos.337,338, and 339 will serve in Palestine.50,000 rounds will accompany batteries to Egypt.No.336 will proceed to Salonika taking 6" 30-cwt equipments including the equipment and stores special to 6" 30-cwt howitzer in your reserve. At Salonika this battery will be re-armed with 6" 26-cwt equipments from reserve.The 6" 30-cwt equipments and stores will thus be available for maintenance of equipments with Greek Army.The ammunition in stock for these 30-cwt howitzers less the shell and fuzes should be sent to Salonika also.

M.T.Section accompanying 336 battery should be redesignated 1071 Co.and will be completed on arrival in Salonika.

Batteries should be sent complete with M.T.the sections of 1038 Co.A.S.C. with 338 and 339 batteries should be redesignated 1072 and 1073 companies and should be made up on arrival in ~~3336~~ Egypt to W.R.399/50 part XI.The section remaining with 335 company will in future be known as 1028 Co.A.S.C.

Wire strengths of batteries and A.S.C.units in officers,other ranks,guns and vehicles,also dates when units will be ready for embarkation.We shall then cable arrangements for conveyance Addressed G.O.C.,Mesopotamia, repeated C.in C.India and G.H.Q. Egypt.

C.2. Copies to:-D.C.I.G.S.
D.H.O.
M.O.1.
M.O.1.d.
M.O.2.
M.O.2.a.
M.O.2.b.
D.S.D.
D.D.S.D.
S.D.2.
S.D.2.a.
S.D.2.b.
A.G.
D.O.


Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
Q.M.G.3.
Q.M.G.4.
Q.M.G.5.
D.R.O.S.
S.R.1.
P.C.M.R.
M.G.O.
D.of A.
A.2.
A.G.1.
A.G.6.
D.D.E.O.S.

Copy to:-D.of T & Shipping.
D.O.D.Army.
India Office.

S.R.l.a.




"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتمس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٩ظ٤]
(٤٨/١٨)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٠٠]
(٤٨/١٩)



34988 (10)
SECRET

10

OPERATIONS.

From: C. in C. Egypt. Desp. 2.0 p.m. 16.3.18.
To : C.I.G.S. Recd. 6.45 p.m. 16.3.18.
M.A.972, March 16th. Your 53711, March 7th.

Do I understand by this that I am to pull up the Daiama track
Not need to.
vide 36486 A.M.R.2.b. 12516 of August 11th 1917. (2) to run


22 trains daily to Haifa and I cannot do with less, 182 main line
engines 16 shunting engines and 3700 wagons will be necessary.


All above should be in Egypt not later than July 1st. (3) Your
Not need to.
53884 of March 10th, unskilled labour must be provided either
from sources outside Egypt or from India.

M.O.X. Copies to:
C.I.G.S. M.O.2.b. S.D.2. D.Mov.
D.C.I.G.S. D.M.I. A.G. D.R.R.
D.M.O. M.I.2. G.M.G. D.I.W.D.
M.O.2. D.S.D.(3) M.G.O. Gen. Cox (I.O.)
M.O.2.a. D.D.S.D. D.G.M.R.




"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٠ ظ]
(٤٨/٢٠)








"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سمو تاس: مصر وبلاد الراءفءن" [١١ظ]
(٤٨/٢٢)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٢و١]
(٤٨/٢٣)



12

34973

8

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

From:- War Office.
To:- G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt.

Despatched:- 6.15 p.m., 14/3/1918.


54203 cipher M.O.2. We do not intend in any way to limit your artillery requirements to enable you to carry out the policy outlined in my 53711 of March 7th. On the other hand we cannot afford on any front to leave any artillery idle. With this in view please say after receiving the four batteries from Mesopotamia whether you can spare three six-inch howitzer batteries for France, in addition to the four batteries for Salonika. This would mean a net deduction from your present artillery strength of three batteries.

M.O.X. Copies to:-

C.I.G.S. (2)	D.M.I.	D.G.M.R.
D.C.I.G.S.	M.I.2.	D.Mov.
D.M.O. (2)	A.G.	D.O.
M.O.1.	Q.M.G.	
M.O.2.	M.G.O.	
M.O.3.	D.G.M.A.	
D.S.D. (3)	Gen.Cox.	




"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢١ ظ]
(٤٨/٢٤)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموّس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٣ و]

(٤٨/٢٥)



3+852 Gen. Cos
2. in office (13)

SECRET

OPERATIONS.

From:- G.I.G.S. Desp. 10.35 p.m., 7.3.18.
To:- G.O.C.-in-C.
G.H.Q., Egypt.

53711 Cipher. War Cabinet have considered General Smuts' proposals and they are of opinion that in consequence of the doubtful situation on Persian frontier, the approach of hot weather which affects transport of troops in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the advance of the Turks on the Caucasus front, the requirements of France in railway material and men and the difficulty of providing the full amount of shipping required, some modification is necessary.

Modifications are as follows:-


1 Indian Division and 4 batteries six-inch howitzers will be transferred from Mesopotamia to you. They will begin embarkation at Basrah about the end of March and should be complete in Egypt by end of May. The native battalions from India and the Indian Cavalry from France will be substituted for white formations as it will not be possible to ^{keep the whole of} ~~keep the whole of~~ your existing white formations up to full strength in any other way. By end of April the Indian Cavalry should all have arrived. It is probable that your requirements in land transport can be met, but I should like to know definitely on the above basis what these will be for your force.

As regards railway material and personnel, with track already promised you and the El Daba line we calculate you can complete doubling to Rafa and carry your standard gauge some distance beyond Haifa. Endeavours will be made to make up your locomotives to 152 and wagons to 3,245 by July, and after that date as shipping becomes available can send further locomotives and wagons. 1 Canadian Construction battalion will be sent you from France as soon as arrangements for replacing it are complete. These are now in hand and will shortly be completed.

and/




"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سمو تيس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٣١ظ]
(٤٨/٢٦)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموّس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٤١ أ]
(٤٨/٢٧)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٤١ظ]
(٤٨/٢٨)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٥١٥]
(٤٨/٢٩)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٥ ظ]
(٤٨/٣٠)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموّس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٦ أ]
(٤٨/٣١)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموّس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٦١ظ]
(٤٨/٣٢)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموه: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٧]
(٤٨/٣٣)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٧ظ]
(٤٨/٣٤)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٨و]

(٤٨/٣٥)



SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

CLEAR THE LINE.

From:- C. in C., India.

To:- C.I.G.S.

Handed in:- 10.45 p.m. }
Received:- 10.40 p.m. } 23/2/18.


14859 25rd. Your 52731 cipher February 21st.

1. The adoption of recommendations made by General Smuts is connected closely with our Persian policy as you know that the Government of India have always advocated conciliation recent events and particularly the Dunsterville Mission may require resort to force with result of reducing the possibilities of transfer of strength from Mesopotamia to Egypt. Should conciliation be given a fair trial now there still seems reason to hope that it may be successful at any rate to an extent sufficient to enable us to continue to rely entirely on the moral effect on the Persians of our troops on the Tigris.
2. Our offensive in Palestine will depend for results on continued opposition in force by Turks but should the enemy prefer to fall back before us trusting to our striking force being reduced by the lengthening of our lines of communication then it is not clear to me that any objective short of Aleppo will ensure that the enemy does not refuse our attack in Syria in order to attack Bagdad.
3. Our Mesopotamia situation directly reaches on our strength in India where reserve British battalions add considerably to our number of British troops and enable us to maintain in this country a proper proportion of British to Indian soldiers.
Moreover in the event of serious trouble here requiring immediate reinforcements transfer from Mesopotamia to India is always available.
4. So far as known here I think Marshall's present dispositions

are



"السياسة إلخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموه: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٨ظ]
(٤٨/٣٦)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٩٥١]
(٤٨/٣٧)

19

Page 2.

are:

On the Euphrates 1 division, on the Tigris 1-1/3rd cavalry brigades 2 divisions 4 batteries 6-inch howitzers, on the ^{DIALA} ~~Dinabek~~ 2/3rds cavalry brigade 2 divisions 4 batteries 6-inch howitzers, in reserve 1 cavalry brigade 1 division. Location of remaining 6-inch howitzers (4 of 30 cwt and 4 of 26 cwt) unknown.

It is my view that for pure defence these could be reduced by 1 Indian division 4 batteries 6-inch howitzers.

5. In short the problem is one of time and space.

The transfer of a division complete from Baghdad to Suez and vice versa would take 53 days and if available from India to Baghdad the infantry of a division would take 40 (?) group omitted) shipping can be provided.


On the other hand any intention of the enemy to move against Baghdad will be clearly indicated by his extending his railhead from Mosul, and his time allowance for a division of 4,000 rifles from Aleppo to Mosul should be 25 days with present railhead, and 14 days when rail head reaches Mosul.

It is imperative therefore that we should retain the power of rapid expansion to meet any advance in force and as the 13th Division affords a nucleus of British troops enabling the rapid expansion of Force D by 3 Indian divisions I urged its retention in Mesopotamia.

G. Marshall's views should be awaited particularly as to the political effect of my proposed reduction in those areas in the Euphrates and Tigris valleys now occupied by us and upon which juncture (? group omitted) depend so largely for supplies with resultant economy in shipping.




"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [١٩ ظ]
(٤٨/٣٨)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموه: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢٠ و]
(٤٨/٣٩)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ٢٠]
(٤٨/٤٠)





"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢١ و]
(٤٨/٤١)



From : C.I.G.S.
To : C.in C., A.H.Q. India.

Despatched 22.2.1918, 1.20 p.m.

52803 cipher.

Your ^{*}13883 of 21st. In regard to General Smuts' recommendations I can undertake to keep you fully informed; as indicated in my 52731 of February 21st, they are that our attitude in Mesopotamia should be purely defensive and that requirements surplus to defence in that theatre should be sent to Palestine. I am awaiting your views on this matter before advising War Cabinet. I trust that you will not require to see Gillman in these circumstances.

M.O. Copies to:-


C.I.G.S.
D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O.
M.O. 1. ~~sec. d.~~
M.O. 2. ~~sec. b.~~
M.G.S.

Dwt
bs 13
Pentox (10)

Request that Gillman should visit India on his return journey & talk over Smuts' recommendations.




"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢١ظ]
(٤٨/٤٢)






"السياسة إله تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموه: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢٢ و]
(٤٨/٤٣)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ ٢٢]
(٤٨/٤٤)






"السياسة إلخ تبعاً لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [٢٣ و]
(٤٨/٤٥)






"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموئس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [ظ٢٣]
(٤٨/٤٦)





"السياسة إسخ تبعا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الراقدين"
[خلفي-داخلي] (٤٨/٤٧)





"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين"
[خلفي] (٤٨/٤٨)

