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لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠٢١/٠٩/٢٢ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:

http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000465.0x0002f0

المراجع	IOR/L/MIL/5/790
العنوان	"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٠٤ أكتوبر ١٩١٩-٩ ديسمبر ١٩٢٠ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية في اللاتينية
الحجم والشكل	ملف واحد (١٣٢ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>الملكية العامة</u>

حول هذا السجل

الملف مصنف على أنه سري، ويحتوي على مراسلات وملاحظات وخرائط حول النقل عبر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين [العراق] والمناطق المحيطة بها بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى. تتناول الأوراق عدة أمور، منها:

- إنشاء وتحويل وصيانة وتوسعة السكك الحديدية في المنطقة، بما في ذلك تقارير دورية عن تقدم العمل من مدير السكك الحديدية في بغداد
- عمليات التخطيط والاستطلاع والمسح من أجل خط مباشر مقترح ("عابر لشبه الجزيرة العربية") بين بغداد وحيفا
- التكاليف والنفقات


• والانتقال من الإدارة العسكرية إلى الإدارة المدنية.

تتضمن أطراف المراسلات كلاً من: القائد العام للقوات المسلحة في بلاد الرافدين؛ مدير السكك الحديدية في بغداد؛ مكتب الحرب البريطاني؛ القائد العام للقوات المسلحة في مصر؛ والمفوض المدني في بغداد.

يحتوي الملف على خريطين تبينان خطوط السكك الحديدية في المنطقة (الأوراق ١٣٢-١٣٣). كما يتضمن الملف قصاصة من صحيفة "ذا بيونير ميل" بها مقال عن السكة الحديدية بين بغداد والبصرة، بتاريخ ٥ ديسمبر ١٩١٩ (الورقة ٩٢).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[أمامي] (٢٧٠/١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[أمامي-داخلي] (٢٧٠/٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢و] (٢٧٠/٣)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[ظ ٢] (٤/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[3] [270/5]



Mesopotamian Railway 45763 104 (3)

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

KAL235 B Baghdad 74/70 1 Sp B.G.

Secy.W.O. Ln. (102)


Q/5544/29 1/9 Your telegram 24th August 1929 MR2A aaa Para.1

This can at present juncture only be answered purely academically there will probably be no opportunity expense this year para.2. all railway material in country will be required for repair of existing railway system and none will be available for new construction para.3. No aaa As it is improbable any work will be done this year it is not feasible to forecast labour prospects beyond saying they may be regarded as good if labour is imported from India - General Baghdad.

M.P. 9/9




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[ظ3] (٢٧٠/٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[و٤] (٢٧٠/٧)



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

121/Rlys/562.

From:- War Office.

To:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia,

Despatched 2000 31/8/20.

86142 cipher M.R.2A. 1004. 31.8.20.


Your X. 9553 cipher August 11th. Pending report
by Sir Percy Cox Cabinet have decided to suspend all
further railway construction, but meanwhile you should
reply to my cipher wire of August 23rd No. 86040 M.R.2A/1002.

C.2. Copies to:-

S of S. U.S. of S. Sec.
A.G. Q. G. D.Q.M.G. M.G.C.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O. 1. 2 & A & B. 3. 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.T. 2 & B. 6.
D.S.D. D.Movs & Q.
A.D.Rlys. M.R.2A. D.F.W.
F.W.3. W.F. Lord Curzon.
I.D.C.E. Paris.
F.O. (Mr. Ollivant), F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
Ad (D.N.I.) Ad (Capt Lane).
I.O. (Col. Penys). I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Montasth.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤ظ] (٢٧٠/٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٠] [٢٧٠/٩]



PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

121/Rlys/562.

From: War Office.

To: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

Dosp. 1640 24.8.20.

86040 cipher M.R.2.a./1002 23.8.20.


Your X.9753 cipher August 11th.


1. Can you give an approximate indication as to how expenditure would be divided between this and subsequent financial years and time required for construction in each case.
2. What is value of existing track and rolling stock to be utilised in each case?
3. In anticipation of sanction is labour being retained and to what extent? If not, what prospects are there of obtaining additional labour?

C.2.Copies to: S.of S. U.S.of S. Sec.
A.G. Q.M.G. D.M.G. M.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.1.2.2a.2b.3.4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2b.6.
D.S.D. D.Movs.& Q.
A.D.Rlys. M.R.2a. D.P.F.
F.W.3. W.F. Lord Curzon.
I.D.C.E. Paris.
F.D.(Mr.Cliphant). F.O.(Mr.Osborne).
Ad.(D.N.I.). Ad.(Capt.Lane).
I.O.(Col.Pepys). I.O.(Mr.Garbett).
I.O.(Mr.Montearth).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥ظ] (٢٧٠/١٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦] [٢٧٠/١١]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧] [٢٧٠/١٣]



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

PRIORITY A.

From: G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.


To: War Office.

Desp. 1935 11.8.20.
Recd. 1200 12.8.20.


X.9753 cipher August 11th.

Part 1. Your 85432 M.R.2. July 2nd.

1. 13,000 pounds is approximate cost of detailed survey ? Kingarban to Arbluel. At present no officer available in Mesopotamia for survey. Preliminary reconnaissance done in 1918-1919. Cost of construction Kingarban to Arbluel (exclusive of rolling stock and locomotives for which at present price 320,000 pounds at least required) not less than 1,668,000 pounds. Improbable that any of this stock could be supplied by India. Above based on 50 pound rails costing 20 pounds per ton in England.
2. Cost of survey of Baghdad to Hit line 10,000 pounds. Preliminary reconnaissance already done. Cost of construction on standard gauge not less than 690,000 pounds allowing for the utilization of material for existing ? Samarrah-Shergat line. While Baghdad-Samarra section maintained existing rolling stock sufficient for military traffic only. The route most suitable for military purposes would permit extension westwards and would serve probable commercial demands. Estimates provide for lines lightly equipped but of permanent nature. All figures based on 2 shilling rupees.



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[ظ7] (٢٧٠/١٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨و] (٢٧٠/١٥)

artillery and Engineers attached in each case to a battalion with a corresponding reduction in transport in addition to transport required for machine gun corps. This last is estimated for the Kirkuk line to amount to 1 Mechanical Transport Company (50 3 ton lorries,) 19 Ford Van Companies, 2 Army Transport Companies and transport hired at a cost of some rupees 50,000 a month.

Part 3. This saving on the Ket lighters would be the amount of river craft to lift a 100 tons a day. Civil Commission has already expressed general concurrence and according to telegram No. 76223 of November 28th 1919 and (1 group undec.) 48 of June 9th 1920 has urged construction of both lines. He contemplates a branch line on the metre gauge from Baqubah to Samarrah which will serve that town and an important agricultural district much better than the existing standard gauge railway. At the same time he points out that no guarantee can be given that the Kingarban line would pass through Arbluel town as from Altunkupri. Other alignments may prove to be better on investigation.

4th and last part. On this line the first need is to reach Kirkuk. Civil Commissioner further emphasizes the fact that existing lines require considerable expenditure to complete and that there are great difficulties in obtaining personnel at present.


A consideration of the Baqubah-Samarrah line and the extension to Mosul via Kirkuk is strategically desirable line running up right bank of Tigris would be more difficult to defend than this one.

C.2. Copies to: S. of S. U.S. of S. Sec., A.G. C.M.G. D.Q.M.G. M.G.O., C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S. D.M.O. D.J.M.O., H.O. 1, 2, 2a, 2b, 3, 4., D.M.I., D.D.M.I., M.I. 2, 2b, 6., D.S.D., D.Movs. & Q., A.D.Rlys., M.R. 2a., D.F.W., F.W. 3., W.F., Lord Curzon., I.D.C.E., Paris., F.O. (Mr. Oliphant), F.O. (Mr. Osborne), Ad. (D.N.I.), Ad. (Capt. Lane), I.O. (Col. Pepys), I.O. (Mr. Garbett), I.O. (Mr. Montearth),

not
recd
Pst. Dept




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[ظ ٨] (٢٧٠/١٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩] [٢٧٠/١٧]



PHASE. SECRET.

121/3/1783.

From: War Office.

To: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

Dcsp. 2045 3.8.20.

85825 cipher M.R.2.a./997.

Your X.8364 March 18th and further to paragraph 5 of War Office cable 84553/M.R.2.a./963 April 17th. While Mesopotamia remains under control of Army of Occupation, right in the event of emergency to requisition railways rests with G.O.C. Under present arrangements G.O.C. is deciding authority whether emergency requires such steps to be taken but before taking action Civil Commissioner should be consulted.

These views are concurred in by India Office.

2. Regarding the position hereafter, when the Mandate has been brought into operation and military control has terminated a further communication will be forwarded to you but at present the matter is under discussion between India Office and Foreign Office.


C.2.Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL

D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.C.2.2a.3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2b.
D.M.8 Q. D.Q.M.G.
F.1.2.3.5.
W.F. D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
S.D.2. D.O. A.G.7.
Q.M.G.F. A.F.S.
M.R.2.a.

Treas.(Mr.Waterfield).
Lord Curzon.
F.O.(Mr.Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Ad.(D.N.I.).
I.O.(Col.Pepys).
I.O.(Mr.Garbutt).
I.O.(Mr.Stantiall).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩ظ] (٢٧٠/١٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠] [٢٧٠/١٩]



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

Despatched 1340 28/7/20.
Received 2200 30/7/20.

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

X. 9571 cipher July 25th. Part 3.

That although from military standpoint a line of water holes of (?) Elmet Rutbah and Eldjid may be desirable it will probably (group undec) railway alignment.


Note. Wadi Hussiniyah not shown on map but follows general southerly direction (group undec) ^{? Muha} iwir for 25 miles up to which distance it has been reconnoitred. Later appears to turn approximately west south-west for (?) 30 miles. (group undec) (?) Object of 3rd reconnaissance to investigate line up the valley of Wadi Amedj carry out further reconnaissance of Wadis Hussiniyah and Amedj. (?) Following conclusions (1 group undec) arrived at. That most practicable alignment up to the present appears (group undec.) Kubasih Karkubbez up right bank of Wadi Amedj to El Hamad through the plains (?) reported to exist from 26 to 55 miles (?) south of Akebah. Above represents preliminary reconnoissances to date.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.1. 2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4. 4a.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2B. 4. 6.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.Q.M.G. Q.M.G.6.
A.D.Rlys. M.R.2.
D.O. D.S.T. C.M.G.F.
D.F.(A). D.F.W. F.W.4.
Lord Curzon. I.D.C.E.
F.O.(Mr. Oliphant). F.O.(Mr. Osborne).
I.O.(Col. Penys). I.O.(Mr. Garbett).
I.O.(Mr. Monteath).
Ad.(D.N.I.). Ad.(Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠] (٢٧٠/٢٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢١) [١١]



D. Rly.

SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.H.Q., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 00.20 25.7.20.
Received:- 08.00 28.7.20.

X.9571 cipher July 25th. Reference your X86197 M.O.2. June 21st.

Part 1.

All map references to Asia series scale 1/M.I. It was decided as a result of Major Burton's reconnaissance between Kub(1 group undec.)h and Muh(?)airo in March that country traversed was quite possible for construction of railway.

His party was looted, records and maps being destroyed.

2. Major Holt carried out 3 further reconnaissance of preliminary nature. Object of first was to ascertain feasibility of a straight alignment followed from Kub(1 group undec.)h westward in the direction of Kasr Kubbaz crossing Shaib Amedj and continuing along water sheds between Wadis (1 group undec.)an (1 group undec.) Kejel (1 group undec.) Hamad and crossing slopes of the Jebel A,aza towards Fevalazrak. Owing to broken ground further south conclusion was drawn from this reconnaissance that line must pass within quarter of a mile of Kubbaz. Part 2 follows.


Part 2.

3. The second reconnaissance was planned to ascertain first the feasibility of a line from Kub...h to Muhaiwir then west of Wadi Hauran and between Shaibagherri and the Wadi Hauran to Elhamad and secondly to ascertain feasibility of line Kub...h to Amedj and along the watersheds between the Wadis Hauran and Amedj. Following conclusions were drawn from this reconnaissance. First that an alignment via Muhaiwir either west of or up the Wadi Hauran is at an expensive and winding alignment. Secondly that between Wadis Amedj and Husainiyah presents a good possibility (1 group undec.) line (1 group undec.) running for many miles up the Wadi Husainiyah. Part 3 follows.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL. D.E.O. D.D.M.O. M.O.1.2.2a.2b.3.4.4a. D.M.I. D.D.M.I. H.I.2. 2B. 4. 6. D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2. D.Q.M.G. M.G.6. A.D.Rlys. M.R.2. Lord Curzon. I.D.C.E. XXXX Ad.(D.N.I.). F.O.(Mr.Oliphant). F.O.(Mr.Osborne). I.O.(Col.Pepys). I.O.(Mr.Garbutt). I.O.(Mr.Monteath). Ad.(Commander Lang).
NOTE BY G.2. x Probably B5179 12/6/20.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٢] [٢٧٠/٢٣]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٣] و [٢٥/٢٧٠]





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤١ و] (٢٧٠/٢٧)

CORRECTION.

S E C R E T.

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1730 6.7.20.
Recd. 1900 9.7.20.


X.R.36 cipher July 6th. Part 2. MTI 95

4. Your instructions noted regarding carriage of oil fuel for railway as long as oil fleet remains in military hands. Civil Commissioner considers transport of oil could be carried more economically through commercial agency. Question of oil freight charges is being considered with view to possible reduction provided no loss to Army is involved by such reduction. Further telegraphic report will be made shortly.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.1.2,2a,2b,3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2,2b.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.Q.M.G. D.Movs.& Q.
D.F.W. F.W.S. W.F.
F.I.2,3,5. D.O. A.G.7.
Q.M.G.F. Q.M.G.1,6,7,9.
A.F.S. M.R.2a,3. A.D.Rlys.
D.G.A.M.S.
Treas.(Mr.Waterfield).
Lord Curzon. F.O.(Mr.Oliphant).
F.O.(Mr.Osborne). I.D.C.E.
I.O.(Col.Pepys). I.O.(Mr.Garbett).
I.O.(Mr.Santiall). Ad.(D.M.I.).
Ad.(Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤ اظ] (٢٧٠/٢٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٥) [٢٧٠/٢٩]



Railways D

S E C R E T.

0162/373.

Paraphrase.

From:- War Office.

To:- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

Despatched:- 17.45 3.7.20.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-


85447 cipher H.O.2. Railways in Persia. Understand that in carrying out their operations Survey Parties of Persian Railway Syndicate are meeting with some difficulties. As construction of this railway is of great military importance you should do all you can to facilitate the work and whatever assistance in way of transport and supplies you can spare should be given.

G.2. Copies to:-

S. of S. U.S. of S. Sec.
A.G. C.M.G. D.C.M.G. H.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.1. 2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4. 4a.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2B. 6.
D.S.D.
A.D. Rlys. M.R.2.
Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Oliphant). F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Ad. (D.N.I.).
Ad. (Commander Lang).
I.O. (Col. Popys). I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Montath).
Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/٣٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٦] [٢٧٠/٣١]



Railways

16

93

SECRET.

Despatched 2135 2/7/20.

PARAPHRASE.

From:- War Office.

To:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

85433 cipher M.R.2A/988.


Your X. 9209 June 24th. (92)

1. Consideration is being given to your proposals. Meanwhile for Arbil line wire estimated cost of detailed survey and construction and quantity of metre gauge track and rolling stock required. How much of this must India supply?
2. Wire cost of survey and construction for Hit line. Will subsequent commercial needs be met by proposed alignment for purely military purposes and will future extension westward be possible.
3. Wire estimated saving in troops and transport for each line.
4. Does Civil Commissioner concur in your suggestions?
5. Full details for both lines should be sent by mail.

C.2. Copies to:- S of S, U.S. of S. Sec.
A.G. Q. I.G. D.Q. I.G. M.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D. M.O.
M.O. 1. 2 & A & B. 3. 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I. 2 & B. 6.
D.S.D.
D.Movs & Q.
A.D.Rlys. M.R.2A.
D.F.W. F.W.3. W.F.
Lord Curzon.
I.D.C.E.
Paris.
F.O. (Mr. Oliphant)
F.O. (Mr. Osborne)
Ad (D.N.I.)
Ad (Capt Lane).
I.O. (Col Poyss)
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Montesth.)




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٣٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٧] [٢٧٠/٣٣]



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1330 24.6.20.
Recd. 0830 25.6.20.

X.9209 cipher June 24th. Part 1.

1. May I again request that consideration be given to the question of railways in this country. The time is not yet when the civil administration should have the predominating voice in railway construction as certain railways are strategically necessary.

2. An example is the extension of the present line from (Ker)arban to ^(?)Arbi(?). This when completed to Arbil will give a line of communication with Mesul safe from Arab attack and will at the same time serve military purposes with regard to (group undec.) and southern Kurdistan.

3. Our position on the Euphrates will be greatly strengthened by the railway to Hit.


4. I strongly press for sanction for the construction of both these lines. With regard to the former reference is invited to my private correspondence in which its commercial advantages were set forth.

C.2. Copies to: S. of S. U.S. of S. Sec.
A.G. Q.M.G. M.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.L. 2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4. 4a.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I. 2. 2b. 6.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G. A.D. Rlys.
M.R. 2.

Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Cliphant).
F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Ad. (D.N.I.).
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Monteth).
Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٧ظ] (٢٧٠/٣٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٨ و] (٢٧٠/٣٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٣٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٣٧) [١٩]



PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

From: G.H.Q. Egypt.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1655 21.6.20.
Recd. 0630 22.6.20.

749/G. cipher June 21st.

Your 85179 M.O.2. June 12th.


Have directed Waterhouse to return as soon as work in Palestine finished as tribal situation makes it unlikely that reconnaissance can be undertaken over Jordan for considerable time.


Ker also returns next month. Will wire further details shortly of preliminary railway and pipe line survey as far as Jordan crossing which I understand is nearly complete.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL Ad. (Commander Lang).
D.H.O. D.D.M.O. P.O. (Mr. Osborne).
M.O.S. 2a. 2b. 3. 4. P.O. (Mr. Oisphant).
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. I.D.C.E.
M.I.S. 2b. 4. 6. Lord Carson.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. I.O. (Col. Pypys).
S.D.2. I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
D.Q.M.G.
Q.M.G. 6.
M.R.2.
D.D.R.





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٩] (٢٧٠/٣٨)







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٠] [٢٧٠/٣٩]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٠] (٢٧٠/٤٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢١ و) (٤١/٢٧٠)




2.


6. As regards stores from India this would appear to be for settlement between India Office, Civil Commissioner, and Indian Munitions Board.
7. The fixing of civilian rates is primarily for the Civil Commissioner who will no doubt consult with you. Military rates should then be fixed about 25 per cent less than civil rates.
8. Report approximate estimated date of completion of transfer.
9. India Office has seen and approved this telegram.


C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2B.
D.M.Q.
D.C.M.G.
F.I.2.3.5.
W.F.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.O. A.G.7.
Q.M.G.F.
A.F.S.
M.R.2.A.
Treasury (Mr. Waterfield).
F.O. (Mr. Cliphant).
F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
AG. (D.N.I.).
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Santiali).
Lord Curzon.





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٤٢)







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٢ و] (٢٧٠/٤٣)







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٢ ظ] (٤٤/٢٧٠)







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٣ و] (٢٧٠/٤٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٣ ظ] (٢٧٠/٤٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٤ و] (٢٧٠/٤٧)



121/IWT/1688.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

TO:- G.O.C., BAGHDAD.


41425/MRS/3243/27.4.20.

Your Q/5543/A April 14th.


What is approximate division of fuel oil to be delivered monthly at Baghdad, Kut, etc., as between

- (A) Fleet excluding vessels carrying oil.
 - (B) Other Army Requirements.
 - (C) Railways.
 - (D) Civil Administrations other than Railways.
 - (E) Sales to Civilians.
2. Give similar particulars regarding petrol and kerosine.
 3. x x x x x
 4. Can you give any idea of cost per ton of delivery at various destinations of this oil by military agency.

M.R.S. Copies to U.S. of S.
Q.M.G.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
D. Movs. & Quarters.
A.F.S.
C. of S. & S.
F.5.
India Office. ✓



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد VII"
[٢٤ ظ] (٨٤٨/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٥ و) [٢٧٠/٤٩]

121/182/1688. (25)

Copy of Telegram.

From G.O.C. Baghdad.

To Secretary, War Office, London.

Q/5543/1 14/5.

Your telegram 28/4 41425/MRP/3243.

1. Following are monthly requirements of Oil Fuel all in tons under headings given.

<u>BAGHDAD.</u>	(A) Fleet	665
	Oil carriers	210
	(B) Other army requirements	920
	(C) Railways	840
	(D) Civil Administration other than Railways not allowed for.	
	(E) Average sale to Civilians	125

Actual figures for fleet includes intermediate oil stations between K. and Baghdad.

<u>KUT.</u>	(A) Fleet	1087
	Oil carriers	243 includes supplies to Ali Gharbi.
	(B)	100
	(C)	380
	(D) as for Baghdad.	
	(E) Average	210

<u>AMARA.</u>	(A) Fleet	58
	Oil carriers	80
	(B)	200
	(C)	Nil
	(D)	Nil
	(E)	165

<u>BASRA.</u>	(A) Fleet	2,280
	Oil carriers	780
	(B)	1,280
	(C)	2,500
	(D)	Nil
	(E)	Nil

2. Following are monthly requirements, petrol and kerosene in tons,

<u>BAGHDAD.</u>	(A)	60
	(B)	1,180
	(C)	34
	(D) & (E)	400

<u>KUT.</u>	(A)	10
	(B)	14


<u>AMARA.</u>	(A)	14
	(B)	24

<u>BASRA.</u>	(A)	100
	(B)	250
	(C)	12
	(D) & (E)	207

(Over)




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/٥٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٦ و] (٢٧٠/٥١)



3. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

4. Taking total cost including maintenance of oil fleet at \$142,356 per annum, \$11,863 per month, the approximate proportionate cost of delivery of fuel oil, petrol, and kerosene works out per ton:-

Baghdad.	\$1. 16. 0d.
Kut.	\$1. 0. 6d.
Amara.	9. 2d.
Basra.	2. 3d.


These charges do not include pumping and storage charges. Information received shows that A.P.O.C. have purchased oil carrying barges with a view to despatch overseas and that they have not purchased towing steamers and do not propose doing so.

A.O.C., BAGHDAD.

Copies from MR3 to:- U.S. of S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.E.
Q.M.C.C.
D.Movs & Quartering.
A.F.S.
C. of S. & S.
F.S.
India Office. ✓




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/٥٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٧] و [٢٧٠/٥٣]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٢٧ ظ] (٢٧٠/٥٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٨ و] (٢٧٠/٥٥)



The A.P.C.C. are boring for oil at NAFT KHANA and expect shortly to be able to supply oil near Baghdad by pipeline. Understand they are not willing to purchase the oil fleet as they anticipate that the services of distribution of oil from ABADAN (I will cease) (dar-trust) in a year or so. Consequently (I) they are not prepared to expend so much capital in the purchase of a temporary organisation.


Para 6. It is therefore for two main reasons (a) the carriage of military stores, and (b) the carriage of oil, that the fleet must be maintained.

Para 7. Again, according to the terms of the sale by Lord Inchcape all ships sold have to be delivered in satisfactory condition. Certain have to be strengthened prepared and despatched overseas. It has been agreed that this is to be carried out by the I.W.T. This entails maintenance of dockyard and personnel. Consequent on the above reasons, a budget was submitted in Q/5167 of March 31st to deal with 600 tons cargo daily (for Base a) (automating) to Kut, and for 300 tons (of I this) to be carried on by river from Kut to Baghdad, and an oil fleet necessary to deliver ^{12,500} ~~2700~~ tons per month. Defence vessels medical vessels, subsidiary craft necessary, dockyard buoyage facilities for all. Considerable anxiety has arisen on question of pay of personnel for the above services and to allay dissatisfaction amongst I.W.T. officers owing to uncertainty of their employment I propose to publish June 1st an order giving (I personnel omitted) (I as is recommended) and necessary in order for above services, a definite contract until April 1st 1921, service to be on rate of pay referred to in my letter 31.3.20 Q/5167 unless should receive telegram from you to the contrary I submit such will be essential as whatever reductions or alterations in the strength of garrison will be carried out (I impossible) (all-treat) entirely to do without the I.W.T. before early next year.

M.R.S. Copies to C. of S. & S.
F.S.
U.S. of S.
D. Movs.
A.P.S.
Q.M.G.
India Office. ✓




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٥٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٩ و] (٢٧٠/٥٧)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٩ ظ] (٢٧٠/٥٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٠] [٢٧٠/٥٩]



Paraphrase:

From:- G.H.Q., Mesopotamia

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 13.10 28.4.20.
Received:- 17.20 30.4.20.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

X.8612 cipher April 28th. Second and last part. MI (82)

Will settle minor details subsequently.

4.

(A) We pointed out in reply to wire that Army Department India would no longer be responsible for recruiting technical personnel, except for military formations, their responsibility for military formations, and that remaining quasi-civil ?Indians such as railways and ports would be recruited by Civil Administration Agency as these units were shortly to be transferred to civil ?employees (January 1920).


(B) It was pointed out by Civil Administration that railways needed special consideration and that, pending definite orders from His Majesty's Government (1 group undec.) his assumption of control of railways (1 group undec.) unable to initiate his own recruits settlement. We therefore instruct(?) Railways after consultation with Civilian Commissioner, to send a Railway Officer to India at once to arrange to take over dep. necessary for railway recruiting and asked India to carry on until April 1st or until ?railways were in a position to think over without interruption of recruiting. Colonel Stowell sent to India for this purpose in February. (January 1920).

(C) In April General Lubbock was sent to India in order to clear up situation with instructions to show correspondence that passed regarding transfer of railway and endeavour to arrange for some satisfactory ?recruiting arrangements to meet pressing needs independently of whether railways were administered by Army or civilians. So far no reports have been received from General Lubbock.

5.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/٦٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣١] و (٢٧٠/٦١)



2.

5. Noted.

6. Civil Commissioner agrees in order to avoid otherwise inevitable hindrances to finance being completed as for March 31st provided that we are prepared to comply with paragraph 6 of his wire ^{not rec} 3277 March 12th to India and provided that War Office accepts rate fixed for civilian traffic. Would be glad of instructions on this point. We have agreed to paragraph 4 as no expenditure is incurred. On return of General Lubbock from India administrative transfer will be completed.


NOTE BY C.2. Telegram very corrupt.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O. 2. 2a. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I. 2. 2b.
D.Movs. & C.
D.Q.M.G.
F.I. 2. 3. 5.
W.F.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D. 2.
D.O. 4. G. 7.
Q.M.G.F.
A.F.S.
M.F. 2. 2a.
Treasury (Mr. Waterfield).
F.O. (Mr. Oliphant).
F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Ad. (D.N.I.).
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.O. (Mr. Shontiall).
Lord Curzon.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٦٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٣٢ و) [٢٧٠/٦٣]



S E C R E T .

PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.
To :- War Office.

Despatched 1755 28.4.20.
Received 0800 30.4.20.

X. 8612 cipher April 28th. Part 1.

Your 64553 M.R.P.A. of April 16th. (2)

1. Director was informed: under Q. 5126/2 of March 30th
(not forwarded to you).


A. That until the transfer of railway to civil administration
was completed all applications for expenditure and sanction
to carry out capital works should be submitted to G.H.Q.

B. ? In order that there (?) may be (?) no difficulty
about transfer an account to be kept of all expenditure occurring
after March 31st (group undec.) this, so that adjustments
with civil could be made hereafter. Sanction has since only been
accorded for continuation, no record of numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7
(see Q. 5126 of December 15th 1919) which were included in the budget
in which the Civil Commissioner expressed his general concurrence
with the exception of the Daurah cantonment line (vide his telegram
3168 of March 10th addressed to the India Office). These works
were referred to (?) also with the request that we might be informed
if this expenditure had received the advice of the civil administration
to the India Office as (?) otherwise it would be necessary
to shut down all works in progress or unjustifiable expenditure would
be incurred. This action was taken firstly to ensure that
without our knowledge no fresh amalgamation concern was undertaken
and to efficiently watch over War Office interests and secondly
to ensure that what capital expenditure was undertaken was carried
out with the full consent and knowledge of the Civil Commissioner.

Trust




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/٦٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٦٥) [٣٣]



Trust that this dual action is clear and that Council understand it is our appreciation of the policy that funds for capital expenditure would not be provided? that determined our action.

Your telegram 84132 of March 13th noted. (66)

2. Passing of Director of Railways to civil noted.

3^x First part of your para. 3 mutilated please repeat.


Second part. We note guarantee of priority can only be granted. This compels us to retain craft up to military tonnage and personnel requirements which cannot be carried by railways. Minor details will be settled.

x Noteby C.2. Repeated as requested.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council. Q.M.G.F.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O. A.F.S.
M.O.2. 2a. 3. M.R.2. 2a.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. Treasury (Mr. Waterfield)
M.I.2. 2a. F.O.(Mr.Oliphant).
D. Mova. & Q. F.O.(Mr.Osborne).
D.Q.M.G. I.D.C.E.
F.1. 2. 3. 5. Ad.(D.N.I.).
W.F. I.O.(Col.Popys).
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2. I.O.(Mr. Garbett).
D.O. A.G.7. I.O.(Mr. Shontiall).
Lord Curzon.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٣ ظ] (٢٧٠/٦٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٦٧) [٣٤ و]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/٦٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٦٩) [٣٥]




- 2.
4. As regards difficulty in recruitment and your X.8495 April 10th ^{not rec.} What action did you take on 2363 of December 19th from India to you which suggests you might use the agency which Civil had been empowered to set up. This is in any case a question for Civil and India Office to arrange.
5. Regarding right of requisition see my 84366 April 1st. Under present arrangements cannot foresee any difficulties and for the future this is a part only of the question of the respective powers of the Civil Administrator and the G.O.C.
6. It is considered by the Council that there is now no point which should defer the transfer which should be completed at once. This disposes of your X.8506 April 10th Report completion.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.H.O.
M.O.C. 2a, 3.
D.M.I. D.D.H.I.
M.I.E. 2B.
D.Movs.
D.C.M.G.
F.L.S.3.5.
W.F.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.O. A.G.7.
C.M.G.F.
A.F.S.
M.R.2.
Treasury (Mr. Waterfield).
Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Ad. (D. N. I.).
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
I.C. (Mr. Shontall).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٦ و] (٢٧٠/٧١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/٧٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٧ و] (٢٧٠/٧٣)



SECRET.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To :- War Office.

Despatched 1205 10th April, 1920.
Received 0900 12th April, 1920.

X. 8495 cipher April 10th.

Your 84366 M.R.2.a. April 1st.

Para. 3. This is fully realised but


the ? army cannot be maintained unless recruiting difficulties are overcome prior to transfer. For this reason matter is laid before you and pressed for.

Para. 4. It is considered that as it is vital ^{to} military communications the right to requisition should be insisted on.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council, Treasury (Mr. Waterfield),
D.M.O. D.D.M.O. Lord Curzon.
M.O.2. 2a. 2b. 3. F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. I.D.C.E.
M.I.2. 2b. I.C. (Col. Pepys).
D. Move. I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
D.C.M.G.
F.1. 2. 3. 5.
W.F.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
S.D.2.
Q.M.G.F.
A.F.S.
M.R.2. 2a.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٧ ظ] (٢٧٠/٧٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٧٥) [٣٨ و]



PARAPHRASE.

S E C R E T.

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated G.H.Q. Egypt.

Desp. 1135 7.4.20.

Recd. 0830 9.4.20.

X.8474 cipher April 6th. (TT)

Second and last part. Necessary water for coaling away and for (?) consumption maintenance and operating staff to be furnished by additional pipe line fed from Hit and ample storage against emergency to be provided at each station.

Pure electrical traction and pumping is considered too vulnerable.

Rutba route which according to Arab information gives easier route would avoid Burka where there is no perennial water supply.

Crossing of Wadihauran which is steeply quarried and about 150 feet deep varying in width from 4 to 6 miles would be chief difficulty in route via ? Birmalussa. This obstacle would require much study and steeper grade than 1 in 200 ? and banking engine would be necessary.


It could be avoided by Hauranamedj watershed route suggested above, which would strike Wadihauran vicinity Rutba above which it is reported open and easy. Question as to whether route should keep south of Wadihauran altogether is dependent upon gradient of Djebelanzaza on which point Egyptforce may be able to report.

2. Reference pipe line. (?) No advantage in any deviation from railway route. Pumping stations could be fed, if waterless route selected, from same water main as rail road, stations being sited as required presumably closer on rising gradient east of Djebelanzaza than on falling gradient west of (group undec.) gi no (group undec.) (?) water patches observed.

3.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٧٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٩ و] (٢٧٠/٧٧)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٩ ظ] (٢٧٠/٧٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٠ و] (٢٧٠/٧٩)



PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated G.H.Q. Egypt.

Desp. 1340 6.4.20.
Recd. 0900 8.4.20.

X.8474 cipher April 5th.

Continuation of X.8450 of March 31st.

Precis of railway reconnaissance.

1. Condition of reconnaissance and weather is (group undec.)ted against collection of precise data.

Distances of heights and gradients are approximate only.

Reference I/M map. Route Kebeisa - Ainzazu - Kasrkhubbaz - Kasramedj - Sabun - Wadgemuaishir - Muhaiwir, to 2 miles east of Birmulussa. *Sit - Damascus Rd.*

Water-shed between Wadis Hauran and Amedj has not been reconnoitred owing to tribal situation. Country is practicable for railway at ruling gradient 1/100. Except at a few points earthworks light. The main difficulty is lack of water (?) west of Kebeisa as supply consists even along watered route of rain pools available for few months and wells at long intervals which suffice only for passing caravans and refill but slowly. Necessary to prove by systematic experiments (?) both that (?) (bo)ring produces water and that (?) constant (?) draught (?) on it may so lower level as to affect normal supply. Probably better to face alternative of waterless route almost certainly preferable from constructional standpoint from Kasramedj via Hauran - Amedj water-shed to *Rutba* and thence direct to

S. of the Army.


Kasr al-Rutba

employing throughout internal combustion tractor.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL M.R.2. I.O. (Col. Pepys).
D.M.C. P.D.M.C. F.1. I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
M.O.1. P.2a. 2b. 3. F.W.4. I.D.C. 3.
D.M.I. P.D.M.I. D.F.W. Lord Guescn.
M.I.2. 2b. 4. R. 2a. 6. W. 7. F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
D.S.D. D.Q.M.G. D.O. Ad. (D.N.I.).
G.M.G. 6. D.S.T. D.D.S.D. Ad. (Comdr. Lang).
A.D.R. S.D.2. Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/٨٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٨١) [٤١ و]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٨٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٤٢ و] (٢٧٠/٨٣)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/٨٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٤] [٢٧٠/٨٥]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/٨٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٨٧) [٤٤ و]



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

Despatched 1735 31/3/20.
Received 1100 2/4/20.

From:- G. O. C. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.
repeated G. H. C. Egypt.

Priority.

X. 8450 March 31st.

Continuation of my X 8408^x of March 23rd. Recon-
naissance has returned to Bagdad. In addition to wounded
casualties (?) during raid referred to in my above mentioned
wire attempt was made to stab another officer and (?) 7 of
party were killed and 2 wounded. Party with Anizah escort
then proceeded to point 2 miles east of Birmulussa whence it
has now returned. Further progress was made impossible by
confirmed report of large Ruwella force advancing to attack
Anizah. Concentration to meet this attack had involved their evac-
uation of El-Met and watershed between Wedis Hauren and Amedj
rendering this area quite unsafe and reconnaissance of it
impracticable. Am sending by post a precis of reconnaissance
(group undec).


Note by C2. No trace of telegram referred to. X. 8404 March
24th is probably the correct reference.

C.2. Codes to:-

ARMY COUNCIL	Fl. 5.
D.M.O. D.D.F.O.	F.W.4.
M.O.L. 2 & A & B. 3.	D.F.W.
D.M.I. D.D.I.	D.O.
M.I.2 & B	D.D.S.D.
M.I.4.	S.D.2.
M.I.R.&A.	I.O. (Col Peays)
M.I.6B	I.O. (Mr. Gerbett)
D.S.D.	I.D.C.E.
D.Q.M.G.	Lord Curzon
C.M.G.6	F.O. (Mr. Phipps)
D.S.T.	Ad (D.N.I.)
D.D.R.	Ad (Commander Leng)
M.R.2.	Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/٨٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٥ و] (٢٧٠/٨٩)



SECRET.

PAPAPHRASE.

From :- G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.
To :- War Office, repeated Egypt.

Despatched 1300 24th March, 1920.
Received 0915 29th March, 1920.

X. 8404 cipher March 24th.

Continuation my X. 8373 of 18th. (68)

Bedouins raided the reconnaissance party ? nearly 21 days ago
22nd ? March^x west of Muhaiwir^x One officer was wounded and
all kit looted. Party now with friendly Amarat returning to
Euphrates. On arrival of party will wire details.


x Note by C.2. i.e. "journey" not "day".

C.2. Copies to : Army Council. F.1. 5.
D.M.O. D.T.M.O. F.W.4.
M.O. 2. 3a. 2b. 3. 4. D.F.W.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. D.O.
M.I. 2. 3b. 4. R. Rb. 6b. D.D.S.D.
D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.O.M.G. I.O. (Col. Pepys).
Q.M.G. 6. I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
D.S.T. I.D.C.E.
D.D.R. Lord Curzon.
M.R.2. F.O. (Mr. Phipps).
Ad. (Commander Lang).
Paris.

x on W. Haunon, Lt.
Ramasous Rd.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/٩٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٦ و] (٢٧٠/٩١)



SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 16.25 19.3.20.
Received:- 15.30 25.3.20.

-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-

X.8382 cipher 19th March.


Your 784077 M.O.2 of 10th ^(6A) was not received until
after the reconnaissance parties had started.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL.

D.M.O. D.D.M.C. M.O.2.a.2b.3.4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2B.4.R.RB.6B.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.Q.M.G. Q.M.G.6. D.S.T.
D.D. R. M.R.2.
F.I.S.
D.F.H. F.W.4.
D.O.
I.C. (Col. Pepsy).
I.C. (Mr. Garbett).
I.D. C.E.
Lord Curzon.
F.C. (Mr. Osborne).
Ad. (Commander Lang).
Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/٩٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٧و] (٢٧٠/٩٣)



PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

From: G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1750 18.3.20.
Recd. 1350 24.3.20.

X.8364 ciphor March 16th.

Your 84110 dated 11th. (65)

1. P.7500 cannot be traced and therefore unable to confirm concurrence pending further information. Consider that considerable difficulties must arise unless the guarantees asked for in my telegram Q4996 dated March 16th are fully secured.

Situation in that telegram fully disclosed.

2. Am further of opinion that problems will arise on recruiting which may react very seriously on military situation and may even result in military control having to be re-established unless this political question is placed on a firm basis. See A.G. Number 2363 A.G.2.T. dated December 19th 1919 which suggest the closing of all railway recruiting. This paragraph can only be regarded as counsel as we are not competent to speak of civil administration of future recruiting arrangements but consider desirable that you should be answered.


3. Your paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 noted but consider that independent advisory board should be appointed, see my telegram Q.4109 dated March 1st.

4. In addition to guarantee asked for in my telegram Q.5167 dated March 16th we must hold the right to requisition railway material train personnel and service in the event of emergency. In case of emergency G.O.C. to be the deciding authority. On this important guarantee General Staff insistent.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL., D.M.O. D.D.M.C., M.O.2.2a.3., D.M.I. D.D.M.I., M.I.2.2b., D.Movs., D.Q.M.G., F.I.2.3.5., W.F., D.S.D. D.D.S.D., S.D.2., Q.M.G.F., A.F.S., M.R.2., Treasury (Mr. Waterfield), Lord Curzon., P.O. (Mr. Osborne), I.D.C.E., Ad. (D.N.I.), I.O. (Col. Pepsy), I.O. (Mr. Garbett).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٧ظ] (٢٧٠/٩٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٨و] (٢٧٠/٩٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٩٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٩ و] (٢٧٠/٩٧)



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

Despatched 1555 18/3/20.
Received 2200 18/3/20.

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.
repeated G. O. C. Egypt.

PRIORITY.

X.8373 cipher March 18th.

My X.807 (X8307) March 3rd. Reconnaissance has been combined with political Mission to IBN-RESID for which Civil Commissioner in his TR 268 of March 12th has requested India Office sanction. Party left ^{Kubba?} Kubaish for Muhawir March 17th.

Any W.
7/12
on Damascus
route.


If sanction for Political Mission has been received, party on arrival at Muhawir will proceed to longitude 40 as Military Reconnaissance and thence to ^{mail?} Birhail as Political Mission with railway survey officer unofficially attached and reports being sent back in duplicate independently. This arrangement avoids postage danger of returning on their track.

If Political Mission is not sanctioned and discretion is not given to go through to Palestine (see my telegram X.8307 of March 3rd) reconnaissance West of Muhawir will only be carried out if Political Officer on local information, considers out and return journeys safe.

C.C. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2 & A & B. 3. 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2 & B.
M.I.4
M.I.F.&B.
M.I.6B
D.S.D.
D.M.G.
C.M.G.6
D.S.T.
D.D.R.
M.R.2.
Fl. 5.
D.F.W.
F.W.4.
D.O.
D.D.3.D.
S.D.2.
I.O. (Col Pepys)
I.O. (Mr. Garbett)
I.D.C.E.
Lord Curzon
F.O. (Mr. Phipps)
Ad (Commander Lang.)
Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٩ ظ] (٢٧٠/٩٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٠] [٢٧٠/٩٩]



SECRET.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.H.Q. Egypt

To :- War Office.

Despatched 0410 12th March, 1920.
Received 0930 17th March, 1920.

E.A. 3019 cipher March 11th.


My E.A. 2998 February 24th. 58

Sending of survey party east Jordan
would in view of present situation only provoke incident and
guarantee obtained from Damascus would be ineffective.
Am postponing further reconnaissance till situation clearer.
If oil experts have not already sailed, suggest their departure
be delayed.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2b. R. Rb. 6b.
M.I.4.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
A.D.R.
M.R.2.a.
F.W.4.
W.F.
F.L. 5.
I.C. (Col. Fepys).
I.D.C.E.
I.O (Mr Garbett).
Lord Curzon.
F.O (Mr. Osborne).
Ad (Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٠٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥١] [٢٧٠/١٠١]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥١ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٠٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٢و] (٢٧٠/١٠٣)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٠٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٣و] (٢٧٠/١٠٥)

53


(2)

6. Acknowledge priority stating if you foresee any difficulties in carrying out above instructions. Civil are being similarly instructed by India Office. Your Cable Q. 4109 of 1st March will be dealt with later so far as not answered above.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2 & A. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2 & B
D.Mov.
D.C.M.G.
W.F.
S.D.2.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
F.L.2.3.5.
T.M.G.F.
A.F.S.
M.R.2.
Tressury (Mr. Waterfield)
Lord Curzon
F.O. (Mr. Osborne)
I.D.C.E.
Ad (D.N.I.)
I.O. (Col Pepys)
I.O. (Mr. Garbett.)




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٣ ظ] (١٠٦/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٤هـ] (٢٧٠/١٠٧)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٠٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٥] (٢٧٠/١٠٩)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/١١٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٦و] (١١١/٢٧٠)



PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

From: G.H.Q. Egypt.

To: G.O.C. Mesopotamia repeated War Office.

Desp. 1335 1.3.20.
Recd. 1800 1.3.20.

E.A.2303 March 1st. Your X.8273 February 27th. *attached (also X8221)*

As I cannot guarantee safety of your party west of longitude ? 40 and any trouble it meets with will make difficulties in Damascus for me. *See also 62*

I consider it should return without coming west of 40. My Survey party already knows enough of country as far as (Bur)ka and has good information east of that place.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL


D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2.2a.2b.3.4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2b.4.R.RB.6b.
D.S.D.
D.C.M.G.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
D.D.R.
M.R.2.

F.1.5.
D.F.W.
F.W.4.
D.O.
D.D.S.D.
S.D.2.
Paris.
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.O. (Mr. Garbott).
I.D.C.E.
Lord Curzon.

F.O. (Mr. Phipps).
Ad. (Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/١١٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٧و] [٢٧٠/١١٣]



S E C R E T.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.H.Q., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 16.55 24.2.20.
Received:- 16.45 1.3.20.

-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-

X.8258 February 24th.

Your 83787 M.R.2. February 19th.

Please see my telegram X.8221 February 15th, *attached*


Situation unchanged.

Will wire you fortnightly.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O. M.O.2, 2a, 2b, 3, 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. M.I.2. 2B. R. RB. 6B.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G. Q.M.G.6. D.S.T.
D.D.R. M.R.2.a.
F.I.5.
I.O. (Col. Pepys). I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
F.O. (Mr. ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Phipps).
I.D.C.B.
Lord Curzon.
Ad. (Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٧ظ] (١١٤/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٨] [٢٧٠/١١٥]



SECRET.

From G.O.C.Mesopotamia.

To G.H.Q.Egypt repeated War Office.


Desp.15.20. 27.2.1920.
Recd.21.00.27.2.1920.

X.8273. Feb. 27th.

With reference to my X.8221 Feb. 15th. Hope to
despatch reconnaissance travelling by camel about
March 10th. Representations by political officer
? states after reaching 40 degrees east longitude
safest way for party will be through Palestine.
Party will travel with tribal safe conduct, are
guaranteed protection by Abutai of Howait Behar, also
brother Nuri (1 gr. undec.)lan's representative at
Jaud, guaranteeing security from Ruwaliah and minor
tribes. Route through Kafa and Qasralazraq. Will
you please wire best route to Palestine from latter.
Propose with your concurrence to sanction discretion
of party to move as above, if Political officers
consider this safe from ? trouble. Reply clear the
line please.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٨ ظ] (١١٦/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٩و] (١١٧/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٥٩ ظ] (١١٨/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٠] [٢٧٠/١١٩]



S E C R E T.

PARAPHRASE.

Despatched 8.50. 24/2/20.
Received 0900 1/3/20.

From:- G.H.Q. Egypt.

To:- War Office.
repeated Baghdad.


E.A.2998.

Your 83787 E.R.2A. Latest reports sent by letter on
February 13th. Preliminary reconnaissance on west bank of Jordan
has been completed and before proceeding East of Jordan party
is now awaiting definite guarantees from Arabs and provisional
Arab escort.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL
D.H.O. D.D.M.O.
E.O.2A. S. 4. 2B.
D.H.I. D.D.H.I.
E.I.2 & B. R & B. 6B. I.I.4.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G.
Q.F.G.6.
D.S.T.
D.R.R.
E.R.2A.
F.W.4.
Fl. 5.
I.O.(Col Pepys)
I.D.C.E.
I.O.(Mr.Garbett)
Lord Curzon
F.O.(Mr.Phipps)
Ad. (Commander Lang.)



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦١] (٢٧٠/١٢١)

SECRET.

57

PARAPHRASE.

CEAR THE LINE.

From :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To :- G.H.Q. Egypt, repeated War Office.

Despatched 1520 27th February, 1920.
Received 2100 27th February, 1920.

X. 8273. February 27th.


With reference to/X. 8221 February 15th.

Hope to despatch reconnaissance travelling by camel about March 10th. Representations by political officer ? states after reaching 40 degrees east longitude safest way for party will be through Palestine. Party will travel with tribal safe conduct, are guaranteed protection by Alutai of Howait Behar, also brother Nuri (1 group undec.)lan's representative at Jauf, guaranteeing security from Ruwaliah and minor tribes. Route through Kafa and Qasralazraq. Will you please wire best route to Palestine from latter. Propose with your concurrence to sanction discretion of party to move as above, if Political officers consider this safe from ? trouble. Reply clear the line please.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council, D.S.T.
D.M.O D.D.M.O D.D.R.
M.O.2. 2a, 2b, 3, 4. M.R.2.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I F.I. 5.
M.I.2. 2b, 4. D.F.W.F.W.4.
M.I.R. Rb. 6b. D.O. D.D.S.D. S.D.2.
D.S.D. I.O.(Col. P eggs).
D.Q.M.G. I.O.(Mr. Gartett).
Q.M.G.6. I.D.C.E.
Paris. Lord Curzon.
F.O.(Mr. Phipps).
Ad.(Comma der Lang).



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦١ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٢و] (٢٧٠/١٢٣)

62

56

S E C R E T.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.C.C., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 13.20 19.2.20.
Received:- 22.30 25.2.20.

-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-

53.


X.8240 February 12th. Year S3670 M.C.2. of February 12th.
India has been asked to supply one Officer. Can find remainder
required in this country. Engagement of above Officer from
India will not be an additional cost to survey as he will be
absorbed in existing railway establishment.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2B. R. RB. 6B.
D.S.D.
D.C.M.G.
D.S.T.
D.D.R.
M.R.2.
F.L.5.
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
I.D.C.E.
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Phipps).
Ad. (Commander Lang).



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٣ و] (٢٧٠/١٢٥)

S E C R E T.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.
To :- War Office.

Despatched 11255 15th February, 1920.
Received 1000 22nd February, 1920.

X. 8221. 15th February.

Reference your 83586 M.O. 4th February. Please see my telegram dated January 11th No. X. 3051. Conditions therein described still (? group omitted) and tribal situation and lack of rain prevent despatch preliminary survey reconnaissance, which as soon as possible will be sent out.


2. As soon as possible party for detailed survey will be collected.

3. If desired survey party can commence work on Baghdad-Hit section as soon as collected.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council. D.S.T.
D.E.O. D.D.M.3. F.D.R.
M.O.2. 2a. 3. 4. 2b. H.R.2.
D.H.I. D.D.M.I. F.1. 5.
E.I.2. 2b. R. Rb. 6b. I.O. (Col. Papsy).
D.S.D. I.O. (Mr. Garbutt).
D.Q.M.G. I.D.C.E.
Q.E.G.6. Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Phipps).
Ad. (Commander Lang).
Paris.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٣ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٤و] (٢٧٠/١٢٧)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٤ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٢٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٥] [٢٧٠/١٢٩]

S E C R E T.

121/3/1604.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- War Office.

To :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia, repeated G.O.C. Egypt.

Despatched 2000 12th February, 1920.

52 see also -
50 83677 cipher M.R.2.A/933 A9

Your X. 3157 January 31st and last paragraph
my 33586 February 4th. Wire what steps to obtain
necessary railway experts for detailed survey
have been taken quoting correspondence if any.


Addressed Mesopotamia repeated Egypt.

C.2. Copies to :-

Army Council.	D.R.R.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.	M.R.2.
M.O.2. 2a, 3, 4, 4r.	F.1. 5.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.	I.C.(Col. Pepys).
M.I.2. 2b, R. Rb. 6b.	I.D.C.E.
D.S.D.	I.C.(Mr. Garbett).
D.Q.M.G.	Lord Curzon.
Q.M.G.S.	F.O.(Mr. Phipps).
D.S.T.	Ad.(Commander Lang).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٣٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٦٠] (٢٧٠/١٣١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٣٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٧و] (٢٧٠/١٣٣)



Railway Reconnaissance (67)

SECRET.

From G.H.Q. Egypt.
To G.O.C. Mesopotamia repeated War Office.
Desp. 19.10.1.2.20.
Recd. 20.15.5.2.20.

E.A.2982 Feb. 1st.


46

48

Presume War Office 83397 answers your X.8100. We are assuming that you will do both preliminary and detailed survey up to longitude 40. Owing to unsettled state of ?country East of Jordan and lack of (1 gr. undec.) science we are experiencing considerable delay in proceeding with survey.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٧ظ] (٢٧٠/١٣٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٨ و] (٢٧٠/١٣٥)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٣٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٩و] (٢٧٠/١٣٧)

PARAPHRASE.

S E C R E T.

Despatched 1700 31/1/20.
Received 1015 5/2/20.

From:- G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.
To:- War Office.
repeated G.O.C. Egypt.

X. 8157. January 31st.


Reference 77219 para (?group omitted). Your 83397

dated January 31st. As reconnaissance will be mounted on camels and depends on speed of movement and minimum size for its safety Anglo-Persian oil Company here and at Meshammerah considers despatch of expert with our reconnaissance of no practical utility. He will however accompany any subsequent party sent out to make a detailed survey. Unless provision of necessary railway experts is obtained such survey cannot be undertaken. These experts are not at present available in the country.. See Para 2 of my X8100 January 20th.

C.2.Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL I.O.(Cpl Pepys)
D.F.O..DD.E.C. I.O.(Mr.Garbett)
E.O.2. & E & A. 3. 4. Lord Curzon
D.H.I. D.D.H.I. F.O.(Mr.Phipps)
E.I.2 & B I.D.C.E.
L.I.R & B Ad (Commander Lang.)
F.I.6B
D.S.D.
D.Q.F.O.
Q.I.G.6.
D.S.T.
D.R.R.
L.R.2.
Fl. 5.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٦٩ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٣٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٠] [٢٧٠/١٣٩]





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٠ظ] (٢٧٠/١٤٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧١و] (٢٧٠/١٤١)

from base on Euphrates when change of base from west to east is rendered desirable by greater ease of supply.


4. What co-operation of aeroplanes will be required from this side.

5. As to what are the functions and problems to be put before the 3 A.P. oil company experts instructed to report? above to Baghdad is not clear. It would appear superfluous to send any of these wires? on preliminary reconnaissance as representatives with you through survey party would report on whole.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O. 2. 2a. 3. 4. 2b.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I. 2. 2f.
M.I. R. Rd. St.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G.
Q.M.G. 6.
D.S.T.
D.R.R.
M.R. 2.
F. 1. 5.
I.O. (Col. Perys).
I. D. C. E.
Lord Curzon.
I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
Ad. (Commander Lang).
F.O. (Mr. Phipps).




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧١ظ] (٢٧٠/١٤٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٢و] (٢٧٠/١٤٣)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٢ظ] (١٤٤٤/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٣و] (٢٧٠/١٤٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٣ظ] (١٤٦/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٤و] (٢٧٠/١٤٧)



ARABERAS.

SECRET.

Despatched 1440 15/1/20.
Received 1130 20/1/20.

From:- G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

repeated G in C India, Base Commandant, 3rd
Batalion Basra and Munibard India.

Z. 8075. January 15th.


Week ending January 10th 1920 progress report:-

Petro Gauge:- Ur-Hillah connection. Ur-Hillah linking
completed but line not ready for traffic.

C.2. Copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL.
D.E.C. D.D.I.O.
I.C.2 & A. 3.
D.I.I. D.D.R.I.
I.I.2 & 3.
I.R.2.
S.R.1.
D.Lvs.
S.D.2.
D.S.T.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٤ظ] (٢٧٠/١٤٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٥] [٢٧٠/١٤٩]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٥ظ] (٢٧٠/١٥٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٦و] (٢٧٠/١٥١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٧٦٦ظ] (٢٧٠/١٥٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٧و] (٢٧٠/١٥٣)



SECRET.

From G.H.Q. Egypt.
To War Office, repeated G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

Desp. 18.25. 16.1.20.
Recd. 09.00. 19.1.20.

E.A. 2967 January 16th.

Reference para. 2 (A) of my E.A. 2947 January 1st.

Following report from Chief Engineer Palestine
Military Railway, on conversion of Haifa - Deraa line to

broad gauge:

(A) Minimum curve 25 metres maximum grade 2 per cent
both workable for standard stock, improvements to curve
and grade desirable but costly.

(B) 15 cuttings require widening.


(C) Existing tunnels will take broad gauge stock with
small margin of safety.

7 tunnels require alterations.

(D) Bridges require strengthening and one must be
replaced. Very rough estimate of cost excluding railway
steel, £200,000 Egyptian.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٧٧ظ] (٢٧٠/١٥٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٨ و] (٢٧٠/١٥٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٨ظ] (١٥٦/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٩و] [٢٧٠/١٥٧]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٧٩ظ] (١٥٨/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٠] (٢٧٠/١٥٩)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٦٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨١ و] (٢٧٠/١٦١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨١ظ] (٢٧٠/١٦٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٢و] (٢٧٠/١٦٣)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٦٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٣ و] (٢٧٠/١٦٥)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٣ ظ] (١٦٦/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٤و] (٢٧٠/١٦٧)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٤٨ ظ] (١٦٨/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٥و] [٢٧٠/١٦٩]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٥ظ] (٢٧٠/١٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٦و] [١٧١/٢٧٠]



Railway reconnaissance
between Mesopotamia & Palestine

33

SECRET.

From G.H.Q. Egypt.
To War Office.

Desp. 19.30. 1.1.20.
Recd. 15.00. 5.1.20.

E.A. 2947. January 1st.

My E.A. 2098 December 7th 1919.


1. Newcombe has returned from reconnaissance to Burka. Gist of his report is practically same as that wired in E.A. 2723 i.e. from Mafrak via Azrak to Burqa or by more direct route just south of Harrat-er-Rajil there is no difficulty in railway construction. Grade 1 over 100, maximum height (1 gr. undec.) feet. Large supply of water at Azrak is advantage of Azrak route. Except in springs no water at Burqa. From Burqa to Mulussa appears very easy but reported waterless.

2. Section from Jordan valley to Hedjaz railway is the crux of railway problem. There appear following alternatives:
A. Conversion of existing railway to broad gauge. Even if Deraa is in our sphere alteration of tunnels bridges grades and curves would probably be more expensive than new alignment
B. Diversion from Yarmuk Valley about Mekarim by Wadi (1 gr. undec.) and Pilgrim route to Mafrak. This avoids worst tunnels etc. of present line it is impossible to say without more precise definition of Sykes - Picot line whether this would be within area B. C.A. Rack, or rope section from Jordan valley to the Plateau thence construction easy. This would be too expensive to work without electric power from Yarmuk. D.A. line from Beisan down Jordan Valley thence up Wadi Zerka to Kallal-az-Zerka or Mafrak. This has strategical advantages of keeping line further from frontier, and if Jordan valley is irrigated, line down it may be commercially profitable. Difficulties of construction would however

be




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٨٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٧٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٧و] (٢٧٠/١٧٣)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٨٧٧ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٧٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٨٨ و] (١٧٥/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٨ظ] (٢٧٠/١٧٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٩و] (١٧٧/٢٧٠)



(P 8222) From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 17th December 1919.
(Copy by post to India and to General, Baghdad.)
(Received 18th, 11.15 a.m.)

(R.) 15207. My telegram dated 18th November. Railway policy.
Will His Majesty's Government please consider possibility of supplying forthwith, for Mesopotamia, the rolling-stock referred to in enclosures to my Despatch of 25th October, No. 32232.


I beg to point out net estimated increase in revenue resulting from supply of this rolling-stock will admit of our setting aside, allowing only an eight-year life, 12½ per cent. on capital value of stock towards renewals, i.e., Rs. 2,27,200.
(? And) assuming running of stock would always necessitate additional train mileage, the full possible additional working expenditure should not exceed (? 36½) lakhs of rupees per annum, while the probable increase in earnings is estimated at more than double this figure.

It is considered that additional traffic which provision of rolling-stock would (? would carry), substantially ensure railway paying expenses, other conditions being favourable.

Without these additions we have insufficient rolling-stock to accommodate traffic necessary to cover expenses, and I gather General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, who is representing matter separately, is equally impressed, on military grounds, with the importance of making this additional provision.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٨٩ظ] (٢٧٠/١٧٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٠] [٢٧٠/١٧٩]







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٨٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩١] (٢٧٠/١٨١)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩١ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٨٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٩٢ و] [٢٧٠/١٨٣]

THE PIONEER MAIL.

[December 5, 1919.]

December 5, 1919.]

BASRA-BAGHDAD RAILWAY.

[FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.]

BAGHDAD, 12TH NOVEMBER.

BASRA and Baghdad are getting nearer to one another by rail at the rate of about 1½ miles a day; and it is expected that metre gauge rail connection will be established by Christmas. A public train service will be introduced very shortly afterwards.

The line follows the Euphrates route, and may be said to consist of three sections:—Basra to Ur Junction (130 miles), Ur Junction to Hillah (164 miles), and Hillah to Baghdad (58 miles).

The first section, as far as Ur Junction, nine miles from Nasiriyah is the Nasiriyah Military Railway constructed in 1916. The railway progressed as the Army advanced. Preliminary investigations and careful survey were impossible, previous information regarding the country and the location of fresh water was scarce and somewhat unreliable, and the only necessity was to keep the railhead as near the fighting line as possible. Thus it is not to be wondered at that the alignment is not altogether that which would have been adopted had it been possible to make careful surveys for a commercial railway; and at some later date re-alignments, which will shorten the line some 17 miles, will doubtless be undertaken. This metre gauge section of the line is laid with 75lb rails and Indian broad gauge sleepers.

The second section of the line started in August, 1918, discontinued in October 1918, and recommenced in March this year, being laid with 50lb rails and metre gauge sleepers. The route followed is Ur, Khidhr, Samawah, Rumaithah, Diwaniyah, Jarbu'iyah, Hillah. The principal bridge is across the Euphrates about a mile above Samawah. It is a pile bridge of 13 spans of 30 ft. and a 40ft. swing span. Other bridges are a 450ft. pile bridge over the Suwair spill channel, a 56ft. bridge with 18ft. swing span over the Shuwait, just below Rumaithah, and a 120ft. pile bridge with 38ft. swing span across the Hillah Canal at Jarbu'iyah. The country traversed is mostly cultivated or capable of cultivation and the district populous.

The alignment in the centre of the section differs considerably from that it had been proposed to adopt, when it was first ordered to undertake construction in July, 1918, and has involved surprisingly little earthwork, considering it traverses country which is subject to the Euphrates floods. There will, however, be a very considerable number of minor bridges and irrigation openings on this section. The location of this middle section of the through railway has perhaps presented the most interesting problem which both the Government

and the railway authorities have had to consider.

That the development of the country would necessitate through railway connection has long been recognised. It had been projected before the war to extend the Baghdad Railway to Basra via Karbala and Najaf, following what has come to be known as the "desert route". Such a line, comparatively cheap to construct, whilst giving facilities to Karbala and Najaf, which doubtless they require, and will be provided with as development proceeds, would not, however, make for the development of the fertile area between Basra and Baghdad through which the line now under construction passes. The decision has not, however, always rested between these two alternatives. During the war the question of a through route via the Tigris was on more than one occasion mooted. This, however, may be considered an accident of local military conditions; and the country is rather to be congratulated that the military exigencies did not involve the construction of the Amara-Kut link during the war, for this in all probability would have committed it to this trunk line of railway for some years to come. The Basra-Amara and Kut-Baghdad lines were constructed to meet military requirements and exigencies, and were never portions of any development or commercial scheme for an initial trunk line between Basra and Baghdad, though they came nigh to being so considered.


Prior to the necessity of deciding on the exact location of the Euphrates through route, the standard gauge Baghdad-Hillah line had been constructed in early 1918 to bring into Baghdad the grain from the Hillah district and the country south of it. Thus, when a final decision had to be made there existed a standard gauge railway to Hillah and a metre gauge line to Nasiriyah and the project became the linking of these two railways, though not necessarily their terminal stations. The present alignment throughout its length was not at first chosen. It was proposed to deviate between Samawah and Imam Hamzah via 'Atshan Wa'ar and Musafiyah, crossing the two branches of the Euphrates, the 'Atshan, 3 miles, and the Sabil, 12 miles, from Samawah and traversing the low-lying country between the two branches of the river known as "The Island" which might better be styled, during the flood season, "The Lake". A complete survey had not been possible and the work on this stretch was actually commenced. The early floods of this year made it quite clear, however, that this route would be a very difficult one to maintain, and it was decided to abandon it in favour of the present route.

The third section of the line, the Baghdad-Hillah length, requires only to be converted to metre gauge by the shifting of one rail, a


process which will necessitate the closing of the line for a few days only. This section is laid with 75lb. rails and Indian broad gauge sleepers. The mere linking of Basra and Baghdad by rail does not, however, solve the problem of a train service. It remains to complete the terminal facilities at Baghdad and these are complicated by the fact that on the right bank Baghdad is already served by two other gauges, the standard gauge (4' 8½") of the Baghdad railway and the 2' 6" gauge on the Fallujah branch; whilst the river Tigris cuts Baghdad itself in two. A railway bridge connecting the two banks is at present out of the question, but it is hoped to provide a wagon ferry which will virtually result in rail connection between Basra and the Persian Lord via Baghdad, for the railway on the left bank is metre gauge.


The terminal facilities at the Basra end will in time be modified to admit of handling the commercial traffic at the port more conveniently and more cheaply, but the goods terminal station will remain, where for all practical purposes it now is, alongside the wharves. Trains for Baghdad or even for Persia, if the wagon ferry is provided, will be marshalled in the port within a few yards of the ship's side. Initially it is hoped that a daily through passenger train will run each way between Basra and Baghdad in 28 hours whilst the goods trains will be scheduled in about 48 hours. Later, as the line consolidates there should be considerable improvement in the passenger timings down to say a 12 hour or less, but for this modern bogie rolling-stock, now under consideration for provision, and some passenger engines will be required. The goods capacity of the line will be ample to meet all present requirements. For the purposes of working, the through line will be divided into three sections.—Basra to Ur and Nasiriyah, Ur to Diwaniyah, and Diwaniyah to Baghdad; engine changing stations and railway colonies being established at Ur and Diwaniyah.

At these places, and also at Samawah and Hillah, it is proposed to provide some accommodation for the refreshment of passengers.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٨٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٣ و] (٢٧٠/١٨٥)



Mesopotamia
Railways

93

27

SECRET.

From: G.H.Q. Baghdad.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1150 19.12.19.
Recd. 1000 28.12.19.


X.7907 19.12.19.


Progress report for week ending December 13th
1919. Metre gauge Aghillah connection with bend
rail head mile 149.11 (1 group undecipherable)
Jarbuliyah bridge swingspan complete 40 feet span
in position-abutments complete. Sappers for whole
bridge 190 (1 group undecipherable).

C.2.Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.C. D.D.M.C. S.D.E.
M.C.S.S.A.S. D.G.M.G.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. D.S.I.
M.I.S.S. India Office.
M.R.S.
S.R.I.
D.Mov.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٣ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٨٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٤و] (٢٧٠/١٨٧)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٤ ظ] (١٨٨/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٥و] (٢٧٠/١٨٩)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٥ظ] (٢٧٠/١٩٠)







"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٦] (٢٧٠/١٩١)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/١٩٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٧] (٢٧٠/١٩٣)



Mesopotamia
Railway. (97)
23

SECRET.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- War Office.

To :- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

Despatched 2100 11th December, 1919.


82778 cipher M.R.2.a/904. (20)

Reference your X. 7779 of November 29th.


Give estimated cost of constructing line to
Qaiyara on alignment proposed by you and laid
in standard gauge with materials as stated.


Also give approximate time of construction.

C.2. Copies to :-
Army Council,
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2b.
S.R.1.
D. Mov.
S.D.2.
D.S.T.
India Office.
M.R.2.a.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٧ظ] (١٩٤/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٨ و] (٢٧٠/١٩٥)



SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Repeated:- India.

Despatched:- 18.30 11.12.19.
Received:- 09.15 12.12.19.

X.7839 December 11th.

Reference X/7735 of November 17th.


As season now suitable and present distribution of labour favourable for commencing must press for sanction to commence QAIYARRAH Extension.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 3
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. & B.
M.I.R. & B.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
S.D.2.
D.Movements.
D.Q.M.G.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
A.G.12.
S.R.1.
D.R.R.
M.R.2.a.
P.W.1.4.
F.1.5.
W.F.
India Office.



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٨ ظ] (١٩٦٠/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٩و] (٢٧٠/١٩٧)

To :- War Office, repeated Mesopotamia. 99

Despatched 1255 7th December, 1919.
Received 0800 8th December, 1919. 21

E.A. 2908. 11 15

Your 82306, my E.A. 1073.

1. As soon as permission of Arab Authorities is obtained Lieutenant Colonel Newcombe with one other officer will start for preliminary reconnaissance via Azrak and Kurka. Reconnaissance will take 2 to 3 weeks.

2. There is no objection to taking on the oil pipe engineers as part of the R.A.E. as well; suggest by "postal maintenance" is meant only the supply of spares stores and fuel.

No machines or personnel could be supplied.

3. As soon as possible I will ascertain what the attitude of the Arab Authorities at Damascus would be towards the survey party for detailed reconnaissance.

Lt. Col. Newcombe will on his return be able to give information as to the attitude of the Bedouins.

It is difficult to say how the project will be viewed by above at present during the excitement caused by our withdrawal and consequent changes.


4. I consider it is most inadvisable that any of the party for the detailed survey of the oil pipe line should be sent out before the return of Lt. Col. Newcombe and his report on the attitude of the Bedouins.

5. A report is being obtained as regards the conversion of the Haifa Beirut railway to standard gauge.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council Q.M.G. D.S.T.
D.P.O. D.D.M.O. D.P.R. M.R.S.
M.C.2. 2a. 2b. 3. 4. (for Air Ministry)
D.I. D.D.M.I. A.S. F. 2. 5.
M.F.2. 2b. R. Rb. 6b. I.C. (Gen. Paris).
F.S.D. F.O. (Mr. Hixson).
D.C.M.G. Sec. F.D.C.E.
Lord Curzon, Paris. Versailles.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٩٩ظ] (٢٧٠/١٩٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٠٠) [و] (٢٧٠/١٩٩)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٠ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٠٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٠١) [١٠١]



(101)

S E C R E T.

PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To :- War Office, repeated War Section, Simla and
E. of O. Basra.

Despatched 1310 29th November, 1919.
Received 1103 7th December, 1919.

X. 7776 cipher November 29th.

Following is progress report for week
ending November 22nd.


Metre gauge, Ur-Hillah connection rail head at mile
142.5. Emergency (1 group undec.) military line towards
Kifri, plate laying at mile 24.2, temporary track
earthworks at mile 33.2. Temporary Myalah high level
bridge opened to railway traffic.

Sallahiyah 96 per cent.

C.2. Copies to :- Army Council.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2. 2a. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. 2D.
M.R.2. (2).
S.R.1.
T. Mov.
S.D.2.
D.S.T.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠١ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٠٢)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٠٢) [٢٧٠/٢٠٣]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٠٤)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٣] [٢٧٠/٢٠٥]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٣ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٠٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٠٧) [١٠٤]



PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

121/3/1322.

From: War Office.

To: G.O.C. Mesopotamia repeated C. in C. India.

Desp. 1725 29.11.19.

82576 cipher M.R.2.a.

Refer my 80022/M.R.2.a. July 26th where proposal to despatch from France 45 miles rails was made in the event of Kirkuk extension being sanctioned.

This material will not now be sent owing to delay in obtaining decision due to serious financial questions involved.

At earliest rails would not be available at site before end March by which time or very soon after you could release Kut-Baghdad track or portion thereof.

Presume you can rely on that source of supply in event of Government sanctioning extension.


Acknowledge.

Addressed Mesopotamia repeated India.

C.2.Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
F.I.S.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
S.D.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.2.2a.3.
M.R.2.a.
W.F.
M.I.2.2b.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٤ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٠٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٠٥) [٢٧٠/٢٠٩]



Railway reconnaissance.

15 (105)

PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

From: G.H.Q. Egypt.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1820 22.11.19.
Recd. 0900 27.11.19.

11

E.A.2873 November 22nd.


Reference your telegram No.82306.

Paragraph 3. Propose send at an early date party consisting of political officers survey officers and possibly R.F.C. officers with subsequent light cars for preliminary reconnaissance. Will inform you approximate route and date of starting but consider that our reconnaissances should be independent and that any attempt ? to meet will be useless.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL M.I.1.
D.M.O. D.P.M.O. F.1.5.
M.O.2.2.2b.3. I.O.(Col.Pepys).
M.O.4 (For Air Ministry). F.O.(Mr.Kidston).
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. Sec.I.D.C.E.
M.I.2.2b.R.Rb.6b. Lord Curzon.
D.S.D. Paris.
D.Q.M.G. Versailles.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
D.R.R.
M.R.2.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٥ظ] (٢٧٠/٢١٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٦] و [٢٧٠/٢١١]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢١٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٧] [٢٧٠/٢١٣]



SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.H.Q., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 19.35 18.11.19.
Received:- 09.00 25.11.19.

X.7739 November 18th.

Reference your 82141 M.R.2.A of November 5th.

It is essential to sanction also that such progress as can be made with the provision of quarters should be undertaken. In my X.7334 dated August 14th I omitted to mention that progress was being made in the provision of bricks for items 6, 7 and 8.

Expenditure this year would not be more than 58,000 Rupees.


Anticipated that expenditure up to 28 Lakhs for quarter may be one of the principal works in 1920-1921. Proper housing of staff to work the lines in operation is a first consideration towards efficiency and unless quarters are provided early difficulties in respect of obtaining and keeping the staff will be greatly accentuated.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.C.2. 2a. 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.R. & B.
M.I.2. & B.
M.R.2A.
M.R.3.
S.R.1.
D.Movs.
F.1.5.
D.F.W.
F.1.3.4.
W.F.
Q.M.G.1.
D.Q.M.G.
D.E.O.S.
D.S.D. D.D.S.D.
S.D.2.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٧ظ] (٢٧٠/٢١٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢١٥) [١٠٨]



Mesopotamia
Railways.

108
12

SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Repeated:- War Section, Simla
I.G.C., Basra.

Despatched:- 13.20 18.11.19.
Received:- 09.00 25.11.19.

X.7734 November 17th.

For week ending November 8th progress report is as follows:-


Metre gauge. Ur-Hillah connection. Rail-head miles 123.
Emergent Military line towards Kifri - temporary track.
Earthworks miles 3 1. Plate-laying miles 24 - 2.
Temporary Diyalah high level bridge 87.5 per cent.
Sallahiyah bridge 70 per cent.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.C.2. 2a, 3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. & B.
M.F.2.
S.R.1.
D.Movements.
D.S.T.
S.D.2.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢١٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢١٧) [١٠٩]



PARAPHRASE.

S E C R E T.

121/3/1604 (M.O.2.).

From: War Office.

To: G.O.C. in C. Egypt repeated G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

Desp. 1615 14.11.19.

82306 cipher M.O.2. November 14th.

1. Your E.A.2723, October 4th. It is most important for us to establish definitely before the final settlement with Turkey a practicable route exists for a standard gauge railway between HAIFA and BAGHDAD lying wholly within Area "B" (Sykes-Picot Agreement).

Such a railway is the most important factor in our future strategic policy as regards Palestine and Mesopotamia, as it will probably eventually be accompanied by an oil-pipe and air route.

2. It is understood that no commercial line across the JORDAN Valley is possible south of the existing line from HAIFA to DERRA, in which case trace of the projected line eastwards should be assumed to start from DERRA.

3. Preliminary railway reconnaissance should be carried out immediately. An expert Engineer should be sent to make an aneroid reconnaissance of the shortest route within Area "B" between DERRA and Burka with a view to meeting reconnaissance projected by G.O.C. Mesopotamia, in his X.7457, air reconnaissance being utilized as necessary.

Above Engineer may be joined shortly by one or two oil pipe Engineers who will be sent from home to investigate the route for oil pipe, which will be dependent on railway, but may diverge from it in places.

Railway reconnaissance should not however be delayed on this account owing to urgency of preliminary report.

4. Permanent air route will probably eventually follow that selected for railway. To obtain general information required by R.A.F. advantage should therefore be taken of railway reconnaissance.

5. After receipt of preliminary reports, detailed reconnaissances for railway and pipe line will be carried out as it is important to get a definite trace laid down at the earliest possible date.

With regard to the pipe line survey the following arrangements are proposed.

It is desirable for political reasons to emphasise the point that this work is being undertaken for military (strategic) purposes.

It will, however, actually be carried out by a party of some 20 oil pipe specialists belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

It is suggested that these men should be officially taken on by you under the provisions of Field Service Regulations, Part II, paragraph 142, if you see no objection.

They will be technical experts of the demobilized officer class and will include the personnel of a Flight consisting of four aeroplanes for photo-survey work, which the Company is anxious to send out.

You are requested to give your views on the practicability of employing these civilians as suggested above as it is recognised that the partial maintenance of this flight may devolve upon you, which may be inconvenient.


The main point is that while they must of course be subject to the usual military restrictions and comply with any military instructions which are necessary, yet at the same time they will be technically responsible to their Employers - The Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Copy to Pst Dept.

It




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٠٩ظ] (٢٧٠/٢١٨)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢١٩) [١١٠]



It is hoped that you will be able to arrange this as it is important that any difficulty should be got over. Further details of the composition of the party and its requirements in supplies, transport and equipment, will be communicated to you later.


6. Please also report on the probable attitude of the Bedouin towards the suggested reconnaissance parties, and what measures will be necessary for their protection.

7. Pending the final organization of the detailed reconnaissances referred to in paragraph 5 above, you should start at once on the preliminary reconnaissance outlined in paragraph 3, and at the same time furnish a report on the practicability of conversion to standard gauge of the existing HAIFA-DERAA.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
D.M.C. D.D.M.O.
M.C.2.2a.2b.3.
M.C.4. (for Air Ministry).
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2b.R.Rb.6b.
D.S.D.
D.Q.M.G.
Q.M.G.6.
D.S.T.
D.R.R.
M.R.2.
M.I.1.
F.I.5.
I.O. (Col. Pepys).
F.C. (Mr. Kidston).
Sec. I.D.C.E.
Lord Curzon.
Paris.
Versailles.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١١٠ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٢٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد VII"
[١١١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٢٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١١٢) [٢٧٠/٢٢٣]

(112)

time being the construction of a Wagon Ferry at Baghdad would have been of less use without its conversion.

(7) The War Office therefore reconsidered the question and 5th Nov. in their 82141⁺ of 5th November have now sanctioned the conversion ~~of~~ of the Baghdad-Hillah line and also the construction of the Wagon Ferry at Baghdad in order to link up the right and left banks of the Tigris and release the steamers which are doing the work of linking up at present.

11th Aug. With reference to G.O.C. Mesopotamia's telegram No. 7334^x dated 11th August and War Office reference to para. 10 the items therein mentioned are as follows:-

1. Completion of Samawa Hilla link.
2. Conversion of the Hillah-Baghdad line.
3. Port of terminal metre gauge station.
4. Wagon Ferry and link.
5. Locomotive sheds and water supplies.

Note. All above are necessary for operating the line.

(9) 8th Oct. In War Office No. 82220 dated 8th October para. 1 the telegrams quoted therein were sent to the G.O.C. Mesopotamia asking him to cease undertaking works without sanction.


Para. 2 sanctions the completion of the remaining 12 miles to Kifri provided that by so doing labour is not retained which could otherwise be repatriated.

Para. 3 regarding Qaiyara extension, as it is impossible to supply 60 c.m. materials the expediency of utilising broad gauge sleepers from the Nasiriyeh line, 50 lbs. rails from Basra Amara line, spare sidings of the Kut-Baghdad line, and laying standard gauge to Qaiyara is suggested as a temporary measure.

Para. 4. deals with the subject of telegram No. 81256 which G.O.C. Mesopotamia said he had not received in time to stop work on the Kifri line.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[١٢١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٢٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٢٥) [١٣و]



PARAPHRASE.

S E C R E T.

From: G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated India.

Desp. 1320 12.8.19.
Recd. 1600 14.8.19.

X.7334 August 11th.

Your 80115 cipher M.R.2.a. July 30th.

2. Approximate estimates under following headings construction and working expenses in lakhs of rupees are: A.29 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14 2/3:

B.1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -33 $\frac{1}{2}$: C.11 $\frac{1}{2}$ -15 1/3: D.6 $\frac{1}{2}$ -14: E.2 $\frac{1}{4}$ -1 1/3.

3. Excluding cost of permanent way and other material already in the country, estimated at rupees 22 lakhs.

4. There will be no saving until Kut-el-Amara line is dismantled after which estimated monthly reduction in expenditure is 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs.

5. Earnings estimated at rupees 200,000 monthly rising to rupees 500,000 ? before close of 1920, but these figures are pure conjecture.

6. Reduction of majority of portion of fleet probably saving 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling per year plus capital value of ships available for sale. Also save whole Kut-el-Amara and Amara river bases with staffs rest camps, hospitals, ice plants, steam repair yards and electric installations.

7. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs rupees per month.

8. Fifteen lakhs rupees excluding rails and rolling stock.

See my telegram No.X.7324 dated August 7th.


9. 2 lakhs a month. For 2 trains daily.

+ 10. Items 1-2. Part of item 3 terminal metre gauge station at Baghdad, item 4 and part of item 12, i.e., locomotive sheds and water supplies. Re future of I.W.T. fleet see also my telegram No.X.7323 August 8th.

C.2.Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL., D.S.D., D.M.O., F.I.S., D.D.S.D., D.D.M.O., D.Mov., W.F., S.D.S., M.O.2.2a.3., M.R.2.a., M.R.3.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٣] (٢٧٠/٢٢٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١١٤و] (٢٧٠/٢٢٧)



S E C R E T.

From:- War Office.

Paraphrase.

To:- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

Despatched:- 20.00 4.7.19.

79440 cipher M.O.2. Your X.5697 of March 22nd.

Cancel War Office letter 121/3/1322 of March 21st.

It is necessary that strictest economy should be observed and that Railway expenditure should be limited to military requirements explicitly approved by War Office.

Works which appear not of immediate military necessity are included in Railway works outlined in your Q/2684/23 of February 5th and these must be postponed.

Work on following lines may proceed

- (a) Snuraimiyah Mosul in 60 cm. gauge.
- (b) Baghdad Quraitu.

As to Basrah Baghdad line further communication will be sent but work in progress on this may continue.

At present conversion of Hillah Baghdad line is not to be put in hand.


In view above reply how far estimate in your Q/2684/42 of May 2nd can be reduced.

C.2. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL.	C.I.G.S.
M.R.1.2.3.	D.C.I.G.S.
D.F.W.	F.1.5.
F.W.5.	D.D.S.D.
M.O.2. 2a. 3.	S.D.2.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.	W.F.
Cont. Sal.	




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٤] [٢٧٠/٢٢٨]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١١٥] [٢٧٠/٢٢٩]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد VII"
[١٥١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٣٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[١٦ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٣٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٧ و) [٢٣٣/٢٧٠]

- 2 -

(١٧)

Basrah and Baghdad will be established in October or November.

(2) The conversion of the Baghdad-Hillah line to metre gauge.

Though on the face of it a retrograde step I think this is necessary. A transshipment at Baghdad where most of the traffic will originate or terminate will not be a great inconvenience, while a break of gauge at Hillah would seriously reduce the efficiency of the Basra-Baghdad line.

Moreover this plan will give for the time being a continuous metre gauge line from Basrah to Khanikin. It will also enable us to concentrate into one central workshop at Baghdad all Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon work both standard and metre gauge.

There can be no doubt that the cost of a transshipment yard at Hillah, the annual cost of transshipment itself, and the maintenance of separate metre gauge Loco Shops on the Basrah-Hillah system, would cost more than the conversion of the Baghdad-Hillah line and its eventual re-conversion to standard gauge.

The conversion of the Baghdad-Hillah line will if possible be carried out so that it will be complete by the time the Ur-Hillah link is finished.


(3) Terminal metre gauge station at Baghdad.

It is proposed to locate this alongside the standard gauge station of the Baghdad-Samarrah line, and the General layout of the station yard, transshipment yard and engine shed is being based on the assumption that both standard and metre gauge lines will be under the same administration. Should the existing Baghdad-Samarrah line be under a separate administration it might be necessary to modify the arrangements proposed.

The station yard with the Loco Shed &c will be carried out simultaneously with (2) and (3) above.



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[١٧ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٣٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١١٨ و) [٢٣٥/٢٧٠]

- 3 -

(4) Metre gauge link and wagon ferry between the Right and Left bank systems.

This link will be essential until the Tigris is bridged. The only suitable site for the ferry lies about 5 miles below Baghdad and the total length of the link, will be about 7 miles.

All material and barges for the ferry and connecting lines are available in the country, except some shore girders which are available in India. It is hoped to get a ferry of some sort established before the dismantling of the Kut line commences, in order to facilitate transshipment of material.

(5) Central Loco & Carriage & Wagon Shops at Baghdad. section 17

These will be planned for both standard and metre gauges their siting and layout will, therefore, be based on the assumption mentioned in (3) above, viz that both gauges are under the same administration.

The existing temporary shops at SHUAIBAH, Kut and Baghdad consist mostly of temporary buildings of mud and brick, but there are two shops at SHUAIBAH which will be moved eventually.

Suitable shedding for new shops was ordered early in 1918 and was arriving when hostilities ceased, and was never erected; this shedding and the Shuaibah shops will be ample for the central shops for sometime to come. Its erection will be taken in hand as soon as the design of layout is complete and the land is acquired. Sufficient machinery for the equipment of the central shops is available in the country including that now at Shuaibah, Kut and Baghdad.


The completion of these shops is of the utmost importance to the future efficiency of the whole system, but it must be at least 12 months before they will be in a position to any work and their completion will probably take 2 years.

(6) Station buildings and Goods Sheds.

None exist at present, save a few buildings of mud and brick. Approximately 75 wayside stations besides



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[١٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٣٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(١٩١ و) [٢٣٧/٢٧٠]

- 4 -

(119)

terminal stations at Basrah and Baghdad have to be built.

The completion of all these will probably take 2 to 3 years.

(7) Offices for the Railway Administration.

The present accommodation is temporary; under the existing organisation each separate system is under the control of an Assistant or Deputy Director on the spot. This organisation must cease when the 3 systems are linked up and control must then centre in the head office. This means largely increased accommodation in the head office, and it is, therefore, essential that new offices should be built without delay.

(8) Housing for the Railway Staff


Practically nothing exists at present beyond the mud brick and timber huts put up at various places during the War. This is a work of the utmost importance if we are to secure staff at reasonable rates. Little can be done this year beyond brick burning and the whole programme of housing for some 15,000 Officers and men must take 3 or 4 years to complete.

(9) Terminal facilities at Makina, Basrah and Magil Port.


Makina Station was originally laid out with a view to Military needs and for a port very much smaller than that now existing.

It will eventually have to be moved to a new site in order to give a more convenient entrance to the new port, and the lines giving access to the wharves must be completely changed. These changes have always been kept in view in the layout of the port; plans for the new station and access to the port are practically complete. This work involves no difficulty but it cannot be attempted at present.

At present Makina is the nearest station to Basrah and Ashar (on the river) both some 3 miles away. An extension into Ashar will be essential to meet civil and commercial needs and it is hoped if labour is available to set this



"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[١٩١٩] [٢٣٨/٢٧٠]





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٣٩) [١٢٠]

- 5 -

120

done as soon as the through line is open. Plans for this extension have already been prepared.

(10) Permanent Bridges.

The pile bridges over the Atshan, Sebel and Hilla branches of the Euphrates will have to be replaced by masonry bridges in the course of the next 4 or 5 years.

It is not proposed to attempt this at present.

A large number of minor bridges and irrigation culverts throughout the whole system, which consist at present of timber or corrugated iron pipes must be replaced gradually by masonry structures.

(11) A bridge over the Tigris at Baghdad will eventually be a necessity for the efficiency and economical working of the whole system. It will replace the wagon ferry mentioned in (4) above. It would probably be sited just above Baghdad and should carry a road and footway as well as the track. Its cost is not likely to be much under £100,000. but its construction presents no great engineering difficulty and with adequate preparation it could be built in two low water seasons (July - November).

It is proposed to get out preliminary plans this year so that orders for the necessary plant and girders can be placed when the construction of the bridge is decided on.

(12) Locomotive Sheds, Water Supplies, Signals, Interlocking etc.


Loco Sheds of steel and corrugated iron were ordered early in 1918 from India and are nearly all in the country. Sufficient sheds are available to meet the needs of the near future; with the exception of Makina none have yet been erected. Pumping plant in the country or on order will meet the needs of the system for some time.

Little or nothing has been done in the way of Signals, but orders are now being placed for installations of the simplest kind.

No interlocking will be attempted at present.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٢٠١٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٤١) [١٢١ و]



- 6 -

(13) The construction of a metre gauge line from Baghdad to the new Cantonment on the left bank (about 8 miles) in accordance with recent orders is being undertaken at once; it is assumed that this line will be permanency and it will be constructed accordingly.

It will be realised from the above that although very little is needed at present in the way of plant or machinery from outside Mesopotamia, the amount of work to be done in the country is considerable, and, taken in conjunction with the programme of the irrigation and Works Departments, far beyond the present labour resources of the country. Importation of Indian labour on a considerable scale will, therefore, be necessary to complete the programme outlined above, as well as for the operation of the railways themselves until sufficient Arabs and other local inhabitants can be found and trained to railway work.

It is not proposed to carry out any permanent work on the Basra-Amarah or Baghdad-Dhibban line until it has been decided whether these lines are to be retained as a permanency. Nor is it proposed to carry out any permanent works on the Baghdad-Samarrah line build, but not completed by the Baghdad Railway Company, or on the Samerrah-Baiji Extension built during the War, until the future status of this lines has been finally determined.


(Signed.) G. LUBBOCK.

Brig.-General.

Director of Railways.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد ١٧"
[٢١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤٢)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٤٣) [١٢٢]



SECRET.

From War Office.

To G.O.C. Mesopotamia, repeated C. in C. India.

Desp. 22.00. 13.1.19.


73864. cipher M.O.2.

The Government has agreed to the following policy with regard to railway construction in the Middle East.

- (1) The backbone of all future construction in Mesopotamia will be a through line via Euphrates from Basrah to Baghdad. The section of the line between Nasrieh and Hillah will accordingly be completed as early as possible. Metre gauge will be adopted but the permanent way will be constructed so as to admit of conversion from metre to standard gauge should this policy ever be adopted. No conversion at present is however contemplated.
- (2) The metre gauge line will be extended to Khanikin. If negotiations with the Persian Government subsequently allow this line may be further extended in the direction of Kermanshah.
- (3) The survey for a line to Mosul via Kifri and Kirkuk will be completed, but the projected survey towards the Wazna Pass will be abandoned. (This decision cancels first para. of my 73595 cipher (M.R.2.a.) 728 of 11th January).
- (4) At present no extension along the Tigris towards Mosul or along the Euphrates towards Hit will be carried out.
- (5) Work on the extension to Neh from Mirjawa will be stopped.
- (6) With reference to (1) above the metre gauge line between Baghdad and Kut may be taken up on completion of the through Euphrates line. The material will then be available for other metre gauge projects.
- (7) With regard to the construction of a line towards the Persia Plateau from the head of the Persian Gulf, no policy has yet been laid down but any surveys now being carried out in this area may be continued on the lines suggested by General de Candolle.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٢٢ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٤٥) [١٢٣] و



Draail

123

PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

43669

India Office

From: War Office.

To: G.O.C. Mesopotamia repeated C. in C. India.

Resp. 2300 8.11.19.

82220 cipher M.R.2.a./885.

1. Your X.7667 October 11th. Paragraph 4 of my 80022 of July 26th has been divorced from context which makes it clear that quotation was an appreciation of policy which was awaiting a final decision.

First paragraph of my 80115 of July 30th confirms this.

2. As regards Kifri extension. Provided that by so doing you do not retain in the country labour which could be otherwise repatriated as you have now got so far remaining 12 miles only to the Kifri road may be completed with the materials available. In this connection wire net reduction now being effected monthly in the railway construction personnel including labour corps employed on railways. Further extension must await Government decision but personnel must not be retained in anticipation of sanction.

3. Regarding Qaiyara extension. Now practically impossible to supply of 60 c.m. materials. If vitally urgent we would consider following expedient. Utilise broad gauge sleepers from Nasiriyah line and 50 lb. rail from Busra Anara and spare sidings of Kut-Baghdad. Lay standard gauge to Qaiyara. Extension being of temporary nature only and carrying little traffic could be maintained with this section rail if you utilise light standard gauge engines.

This proposal is against policy laid down in my 79557 of July 9th but appears only method of providing railroad at Qaiyara until well after winter rains.

Economy will be effected in transshipment and in shipping charges on materials from overseas. Cable your views only when a definite decision will be given.

4. Your Q/5120 October 15th. As telegraph company state original was delivered correctly in Baghdad on September 21st delay in acknowledging and acting on my 81256 of September 19th not understood. Last paragraph also not understood. My 87048 was acknowledged by D.Railways in his A/3501 of September 26th and he has already taken action.


5. Immediate reply requested.

Addressed Mesopotamia repeated India.

C.2.Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
I.M.C. D.D.M.O.
I.S.I. D.D.S.D.
M.I.S.2b.R.Rb.
S.D.2.
F.I.5.
D.Mov.
D.Q.M.G.
W.F.
M.C.2.2a.3.
M.R.2.a.
L.R.R.
P.F.1.4.
A.G.12.
S.R.1.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٣١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤٦)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٤٧) [١٢٤ و]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٤١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٤٨)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٤٩) [١٢٥]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٥١ ظ] (٢٥٠/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٥١) [١٢٦ و]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٦١ ظ] (٢٥٢/٢٧٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٥٣) [١٢٧و]






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٧١ ظ] (٢٥٤/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٥٥) [١٢٨ و]



Mesopotamia
Railways

(128)

Hira Office

PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

43527

From: Railways, Baghdad.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1655 14.10.19.
Recd. 1750 18.10.19.


N.7588 cipher October 14th.

For week ending October 11th following
is progress report. Metre gauge Ur Hillah connection.
Railhead miles 87 emergency military line towards Hira
temporary track earthworks miles 23.7: plate laying
miles 20. Havelhigh bridge 25%. Temporary Dialha
high level bridge 62%.

C.2. Copies to: ARMY COUNCIL
D.F.O. D.M.F.O.
F.O. 2. 2a, 3.
D.M.F. D.D.M.I.
M.F. 2. 2b.
M.R. 2.
S.P. 1.
D.Mov.
S.D. 2.
India Office.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٨ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٥٦)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٥٧) [١٢٩]



43504

India Office

SECRET. PARAPHRASE.

From :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia

To:- War Office.

Despatched 12.53 11.10.19.
Received 15.10 14.10.19.

X.75Z 11/10.

The telegrams and letters that have passed between us on the Basrah Baghdad Railway do not make it quite clear whether/ ^{or not} the wagon ferry at Baghdad which is part of general Marshal's original scheme is accepted and sanctioned. Months ago the ferry barges and ^{all} material were collected and completed and the time to complete the work has now come. The expenditure required on project is about two Lakhs viz: overdue subsidies of workmen and : actual laying of track. Without this all public stores for troops and garrisons in Persia and on left bank of Tigris as well as private goods for same destination must be ferried across and steamers maintained there (1 gr. unce.) as well as labour for double handling. Kindly wire reply early.


CC. Copies to :-

Army Council.
D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.O.S. 2.
M.O.S.a.
D.R.R.
K.R.S.
M.R.S.
S.R.l.
D.Mov.
F.l. F.S.

D.D.S.D.
S.P.S.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.E.R. & B.
M.I.S. & B.
India Office.
D.F.O.S.
D.S.L.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٢٩١ ظ] (٢٥٨/٢٧٠)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
(٢٧٠/٢٥٩) [١٣٠]



Railways

130

2

OPERATIONS.

SECRET.

PARAPHRASE.

Despatched 1810 4/10/19.
Received 0830 8/10/19.

From:- G.H.Q. Egypt.

To:- War Office,
repeated G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

E.A. 2723 October 4th.

Your 81510.

250

1. Have discussed question with Miss Bell who went to Burka in 1913 - 14 and others who are well acquainted with conditions in Arabian desert.

2. Conditions as regards railway construction on line proposed in Baghdad's X 7457 for reconnaissance may be summarized as follows.

(A). In making line from Hedjaz railway about Amman by Kasr Azrak towards Burka and Kuban towards Euphrates there are no particular engineering difficulties. Country is undulating but not serious gradients. Numerous wadis which flood in winter and would require bridging.

(B). On this route there is no perennial water and any which might be obtained by boring in wadi beds would most probably be brackish.

(C). Harrat or Radjil is volcanic and covered with lava rocks but railway could run from Kasr to Burka without great difficulty.

3. Lawrence will probably be able to confirm above. Is this sufficient? I do not consider that any further information would be gained by route or aeroplane reconnaissance unless line of flying levels were taken by a railway surveyor. This would require at least a month and an expert whom it would be difficult to find. Do you require it to be done?


4. As already pointed out in my telegram E.A. 2650 there would be almost insuperable engineering difficulties in constructing a railway from vicinity of Amman to Haifa without entering area A.

M.O.X. Copies to :-

A.C. D.M.O. D.D.M.O. M.O.2&A&B.
M.O.3. M.O.4. D.M.I. M.I.2 & B. M.I.R & B. M.I.G.B.
D.S.D. D.Q.M.C. Q.M.G.S. M.R.2. A.I.1.
I.O.(Col.Pepys). F.O.(Mr.Kidston). F.O.(Sec.I.D.C.E.).
Lord Curzon. Paris. Versailles.




"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٠ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٦٠)






"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٣١] و [٢٦١/٢٧٠]





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣١ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٦٢)






"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [١٣٢١ و] (٢/١)






"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [١٣٢ ظ] (٢/٢)





"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [١٣٣ و] (٤/١)






"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [١٣٣ و] (٤/٢)






"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [١٣٣ ظ] (٤/٣)






"رسم تخطيطي مفهرس يُظهر السكك الحديدية في بلاد الرافدين" [٣٣ ١ ظ] (٤/٤)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[١٣٤و] (٢٧٠/٢٦٩)





"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات] في بلاد الرافدين، المجلد IV"
[٣٥ ظ] (٢٧٠/٢٧٠)

