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Reference	IOR/L/PS/10/965
Title	File 537/1921 Parts 1-2 'Persia: Oil'
Date(s)	28 Oct 1920-21 Nov 1924 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	1 volume (292 folios)
Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Copyright for document	Creative Commons Non-Commercial Licence

About this record

The volume contains correspondence and other papers relating oil exploration in Persia [Iran] by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), particularly the protection of oilfields in Arabistan [the southern part of Khuzestan Province] and agreements for new oilfields at Dasht-i-Qil, an area inland from Genawah [Bandar Ganaveh].Each part includes a divider which gives the subject and part numbers, the year the subject file was opened, the subject heading, and a list of correspondence references contained in that part by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.



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

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
1921
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PARTS 1 &2
PERSIA:
OIL
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DEPT

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

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
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

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

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
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YEAR.
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
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

Previous File.
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POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
537
1921.

SUBJECT:

Persia:- Oil.

Defence of A.P. Oil Co's fields &c,

Next file 3661/23

This file contains the following papers:—

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1922	P.	2347 2815 2981 4060 5071
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1924	P.	72 205 437 690 752 775 776 794 859 892 4160 4261 4281 4363 4527 4565 4572 4574
19	P.	
19	P.	
19	P.	

☞ If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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



A.M. Form 541.

P 4574 1924

Telephone No.: REGENT 8000
Telegraphic Address: "AIRMINISTRY, LONDON."
(All telegrams on the subject of this letter should quote the undermentioned Air Ministry Reference.)

AIR MINISTRY,
KINGSWAY,
LONDON, W.C.2.

November, 1924.

All letters on the undermentioned subject should be addressed to THE SECRETARY at the above address and should quote:—

Air Ministry Refce. S.17953/Pt.II/S.6. Your Refce.

SUBJECT:—
Protection of British subjects in Arabistan.

SIR,

I am commanded by the Air Council to transmit for your information a copy of letter which has been addressed to.....
The Foreign Office.
.....
on the above subject.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

W. A. Nicholson

U.S. of S. INDIA OFFICE. S.W.I.

(44347) Wt 21786/3643 10000 9/19 H & J, Ltd

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



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1924

S.17955/Part II/S.6.

20th November, 1924.

Sir,

With reference to Foreign Office letter E.9806/263/34 dated 14th November, relative to the protection of British subjects in Arabistan enclosing a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Tehran, I am commanded by the Air Council to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they have not received any further information on this subject from the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.

4527.

It appears to the Council that the telegram referred to is part of the correspondence proceeding between the Air Officer Commanding and His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz in connection with the instructions contained in paragraph 5 of Air Ministry telegram AM 417A dated 25th October, a copy of which was sent to your Department.

In view of the result of Sir P. Loraine's visit to Mohammerah, the Council consider that there is no immediate

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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

danger and they would prefer to await a reply from the Air Officer Commanding before considering the matter any further.

Copies of this letter are being sent for information to the Colonial Office, India Office, Admiralty, and War Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) W.A.WEBSTER.



P.4572/24

(8)

U.S. of State

25/11

In accordance with Sir H. Nelson's instructions on P.4261 I submit a typed note (with an appendix by Col. Hoskyn Johnston) as to the present position of the question of protecting the A.P.O.C. property in Arabistan.

The substance of the papers received since the date of Sir H. Nelson's minute above has been incorporated in the note.

L.D.H.
24.xi

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[illegible]
19/12/24

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

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THE PRESENT POSITION AS REGARDS THE PROTECTION
OF THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY'S OILFIELDS
AND PIPE LINE.

In the event of the safety of the A.P.O.C. Oil fields and pipe line to Abadan being so threatened by tribal disturbance or other form of disorder as to render it essential that British military protection should be applied, it is agreed that it would be to Air Headquarters, Baghdad, that an appeal for immediate assistance must be made. Owing, however, to the limited forces at the disposal of the A.O.C. Baghdad, the Air Ministry have declined to assume any definite responsibility for protecting the oilfields, or to commit themselves as to the strength of the force to be detached for this duty.

Assuming; however, that the emergency arises, and that the A.O.C. Baghdad, despatches a portion of the garrison of Iraq to ~~be~~ take the first measures to protect the oilfields etc in Arabistan, the Government of India are prepared, conditionally, to afford further military assistance, within a limited extent, either directly for the protection of the oilfields or to replace in Iraq the forces detached from there for duty in Arabistan. The attached note by Colonel Wilson-Johnston indicates how the question of assistance from India stands at present. It is of course understood that India has no liability, in either a military or a financial sense, for the protection of the oilfields, and that any force that could be sent from India for such purpose would be sent at the cost of Imperial Revenues.

The authority in a position to judge the imminence of a



a threat to the safety of the oilfields or of the British personnel employed by the A.P.O.C., is the man on the spot, viz: His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz. But as any military intervention whether simply for the rescue of British subjects in personal danger, or for the protection of the Oil Company's property, would involve an infringement, in greater or less degree, of Persian sovereignty, the Consul at Ahwaz is not authorised himself to call in the assistance of Air Head Quarters in Iraq. He will, when he deems the emergency to require it, so inform His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, repeating his message to Air Headquarters Baghdad; with the Minister will rest the task of obtaining the Persian Government's consent to the infringement of Persian sovereignty and of endorsing to Air Headquarters Baghdad, the appeal of the Consul at Ahwaz for assistance.
It is understood that the despatch of British forces into Persia for the protection of property, at any rate, is not to be authorised except with the specific approval of H.M. Government.

Though during the last two months or so the emergency under consideration has been imminent, it is to be hoped that the crisis in the dispute between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Persian Government is past, and that no danger of tribal warfare threatening the A.P.O.C. need now be seriously feared. The dispute however is not yet finally composed, and the danger has not yet wholly disappeared.

Political Department:
21st Nov. 1924.



(3) (10)

The present position as regards the protection of the Anglo Persian Oil Company's Oilfields.

Early in November the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in India submitted a joint note to the Committee of Imperial Defence which is now being circulated for information of the Committee. The following extract from this note shows how matters stand at present.

"Assuming the situation in India to be normal, Lord Rawlinson agrees that India would be prepared to send 2 Brigades of Infantry, 2 Armoured Car Sections and the necessary Ancillary Troops to help in the protection of the Persian Oilfields, provided that Imperial Troops are still in occupation of Basra. ~~That~~ These 2 Brigades would have to be replaced later by troops from England".

In their meeting of 28th July, 1924, the Committee of Imperial Defence agreed to ask the India Office to request the Government of India to send a Staff Officer from India to consult with the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq so that the ~~places~~ plans for the defence of the oilfields might be drawn up without delay. Colonel P.R.Chambers D.S.O., Deputy Director of Staff Duties, Army Headquarters, Simla, left Karachi for Iraq on 2nd November.

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17/11/24





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INDEXED

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted:—
53538/24

Subject: Protection of British subjects in Arabistan.

I
4572
1924

f.f. 4565/24

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to / from the Colonial Office of the

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the ~~Admiralty~~, Air Ministry, Foreign Office, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ War Office.

The Under Secretary of State
India Office.

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
14th November, 1924.

PAIS BRANCH 21 NOV 1924 INDIA OFFICE

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



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53538/1924.

PARAPHRASE
TELEGRAM From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.

(Sent 2.35 p.m. 17th November, 1924.)

No. 484.

Protection of British Subjects in Arabistan.

Reference my Secret despatch of October 29th His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran asked that matter might be re-considered. He suggested that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz should take entire responsibility for requests for urgent assistance from Baghdad. His Majesty's Government are unable to agree to this; Mr. Ovey has been informed as follows, begins. We have discussed your proposals with Air Ministry. We are unable to agree to proposal put forward by you that authority should be given to His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz to apply for assistance direct to Baghdad Any military assistance of a nature adequate to effect rescue of British subjects from a position of danger would entail some infringement of Persian sovereignty and require at least, Persian Government's tacit consent; this you alone could obtain. Ends.

AMERY.

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

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

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(IV) 13

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 9813/27/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Confidential.

4527/24

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
November 20, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence :

+281. Foreign office letter no: E 9290/27/34 of October 25.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram to, Hm. Chargé d'affaires, Tehran. no: 179 November 12	Protection of British subjects in Persian oilfields.

Copy to India 27/11/24.

RECEIVED IN 20 NOV 1924 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

2

Similar letter sent to { Air Ministry, Colonial "

14—1766 F.O.P. [12105] 10M 10/24 (4)





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(981 /27/34)

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Ovey (Tehran).

Foreign Office. November 12th 1924. 1.15 p.m.

No. 179.

URGENT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(4781/24)

Your telegram No. 257 (of October 24th - Protection of British subjects in Arabistan).

We have discussed your suggestions with Air Ministry and are unable to agree to your proposal that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz should be given authority to apply direct to Bagdad for assistance.

Any military assistance of a nature sufficient to be effective in rescuing British subjects from a position of danger would entail some infringement of Persian sovereignty, and would require at least tacit consent of Persian government, which you alone could obtain.

Addressed to Tehran No. 179, repeated to Ahwaz No. 4, for Sir P. Loraine.

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



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 9806/263/34
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P
4527
1924

Confidential.

E 4363/20
W.10
11.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
November 15, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To, Air Ministry. (with enclosure). November 14.	Protection of life & property in Persian oilfields.

RECEIVED IN
17 NOV 1924
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Similar letter sent to Colonial office
War
Admiralty.

14—1344 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 1/24 [11158] (4)



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

Copy

E 9806/263/34

P 4527 1924

Foreign Office, S.W.1.
14th November, 1924.

URGENT.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. S 17953/S.6 of the 11th instant, relative to the protection of British subjects in Arabistan, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

2. Sir P. Loraine is believed to have arrived at Mohammerah on November 12th and will no doubt discuss this question on the spot with His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz and with the local representatives of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

3. I am to invite the observations of the Air Council on Mr. Ovey's telegram, and to enquire whether they have received any further information on this subject from the Air Officer Commanding in Irak. Until the Secretary of State has ascertained the views of the Air Council, he does not propose to address a further telegram to Mr. Ovey, who will by now have received the Secretary of State's telegram No. 179 of November 12th.

4. Copies of this letter are being sent, for information, to the Colonial Office, India Office, War Office and Admiralty.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

D. G. OSBORNE

he Secretary
of the Air Ministry.



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4527
1924

X
AMENDED COPY

PERSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Ovey (Tehran).
10th November 1924.

D. 9.55 a.m. 10th November 1924.

R. 10.45 p.m. 10th November 1924.

No. 286.

.....

Following from Consul at Ahwaz No.105, begins:-

Addressed to Baghdad No.145, repeated to Tehran No. 105.

Your telegram No.2498.

Following for Aviation begins:-

I am making effort to preserve status quo in Arabistan until Sir P. Loraine arrives. If I fail and general lawlwssness involving probably sabotage supervenes I shall ask for protection for the pumping stations and X Ahwaz X. Provided Persian troops do not attempt to advance into Arabistan through Bakhtiari no danger to oilfields need be anticipated. Limited protection on lines proposed by Steel and Brown should therefore suffice for protection of British lives and property on pipe line until troops arrive from India.

Wholesale evacuation of British subjects would be impracticable and dangerous. At oilfields there are 350 Europeans and 1,000 Indians. At Ahwaz and on pipe line 80 British 500 Indians. At Abadan and Mohammerah 420 British, 3,000 Indians.

X In an emergency women at Ahwaz and on pipe line numbering 10 would be evacuated. So far as can be seen at present necessity for evacuation of women at oilfields numbering 25 should not arise. Ends.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.286, sent to India.

.....



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PUT AWAY WITH 537

Minute Paper.

Register No. 4261. 4281 4363

SECRET. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1924

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary	16. XII	WR	Persia. Protection of the A.P.O.C. oil fields
Secretary of State...	17	WRC	
Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

A.M. L
P.S. L

Copy to India 30/x and of P4281

20 DEC 1924

FOR INFORMATION.

India Office?

The earlier correspondence which you saw the other day (Sir F.O. letter to Air Min?) has been submitted, but you may care to see the Air Ministry's reply at once.

The "Joint responsibilities" in Iraq of the R.A.F. may very real at the moment, on the Nejd as well as the Mosul frontier, the prospects for life & property on the oil fields if hostilities do break out in Bakhtiari or Arabistan do not appear to rosy.

In the light of the Air Ministry's letter the F.O. could perhaps do no more or less than issue the telegram or letter at the

Political Party

Would you, in consultation with Sir A. Cobbe, prepare a short typed summary for the Sec. of State on the front position of this question. WS 13/11

Previous Papers :—

7145 2000 3.24

2



the bottom of this telegram; but it does not seem likely that the A.P.O.C. will be content with the letter.

Their reply has not been received as yet.

You are no doubt dealing with the question of troops from India: it would appear that if the emergency does arise first aid will probably have to be given by the Navy — which stands to lose most by disturbance of the A.P.O.C. power to supply fuel.

J.T. Montgomery
24.X.24

Seen thanks - India have been asked to send a Staff Officer to Irak to consider the question which would arise should troops from India be required. His views I foresee the individual of the A.P.O.C. will probably have listened to the Navy in the first instance
Cl Hobbs
27.X.24

Two more papers are added; viz: (a) a copy of Air Ministry telegram to A.O.C. Baghdad complementary to F.O. tel. 163 to Tehran; (b) Mr Orde's reply to the latter in which he strongly recommends that the responsibility for asking for assistance should be vested solely in the Consul at Ahwaz as the Legation in Tehran is not in a position to judge the gravity of the local position; there is a good deal of force in what he says, if the question is one of immediate measures for protection in a sudden emergency.

J.T. Montgomery
27.X.



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"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P 4363 1924

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to The Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
31 OCT 1924 , ~~192~~ .

Reference to previous correspondence :

Foreign Office letter no. E 9180/24/34 of Oct. 23.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Anglo-Persian Oil Coy. Ltd. Oct. 28.	Protection of British interests in Persian oilfields.

Copy to India
-6 NOV 1924

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
6 NOV 1924

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry.

14—1766 F.O.P. [12105] 10M 10/24 (4)



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

COPY
(E 9413/27/34)
S2/CON.(SP2)

P 4363 1924

18 20

ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY, LIMITED
Britannic House,
Great Winchester Street,
London, E.C.2.
28th October, 1924.

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.E 9180/27/34 of the 22nd instant, informing us of the decision taken by H.M.Government in the matter of rendering military protection to British interests in Khuzistan.

We regret that H.M.Government do not see their way to authorise H.M.Consul at Ahwaz on his own responsibility to send a request direct to Air Headquarters at Bagdad for the despatch of military assistance to protect British interests in the area threatened. We note, however, that while reference must be made, and the decision in the matter left to H.M.Representative at Teheran, Mr.Peel has been authorised, should he at any time consider that military protection were required, to repeat to the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq for the latter's information, any telegram that he might have to address to H.M. Representative at Teheran requesting the despatch of such assistance. We thank you for this arrangement, which we trust may produce the desired result.

We have &c.,
For the ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY Ltd.
(Signed) H.E.Nichols.
Director.

ıe Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

2





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No. E 9290/27/34.
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but to—
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Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P 4281 /24

Confidential.

pp 4261/24

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
October 25, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence :
4261 Foreign office letter no: E 9180/27/24 of October 23.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram from, Hm. Chargé d'affaires Tehran. no: 257 October 24.	Protection of British subjects and property in Persian oilfields.

RECEIVED IN 27 OCT 1924 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Copy to India 30/X/24.

2

Similar letter sent to Colonial office War Admiralty Air Ministry.

14—1766 F.O.P. [12105] 10M 10/24 (4)





P 4281 1924

NO DISTRIBUTION

Decypher. Mr. Ovey. (Tehran).
October 24th, 1924.
D. 10.40.a.m. October 24th, 1924.
R. 10.15.p.m. October 24th, 1924.
No. 257.

-----oOo-----

URGENT.

Confidential.

D. 4261 I have repeated your telegram No. 163 to Ahwaz telegraphing gist to Bagdad.

I heartily agree with proposal that Peel should repeat any application for urgent assistance to Air Officer Commanding Bagdad and urgently submit for following reasons entire responsibility be reconferred on him subject to your approval if considered desirable in which case he should repeat his application direct to you.

Three vulnerable points in order of importance are: oilfields, refinery, pipe lines.

First is protected by Bakhtiari; second is in Sheikh's territory in immediate proximity to Irak territory and accessible to British man-of-war.

Third can only be protected by large force despatch of which is extremely undesirable. Force could only arrive late and damage would be temporary and (gr.undec.).

It is impossible for me in Tehran to exercise any useful decision with regard to necessity for immediate assistance by air or other means to first or second or to British subjects.

Peel .....





- 2 -

Peel is in telephonic communication with oil-fields, he alone can know whether Bakhtiari or other tribes are threatening them. He alone can judge danger to refinery or British subjects at either place.

Telegraph line between here and Ahwaz is frequently interrupted. While priority telegram might reach me in a few hours ordinary telegrams take from twelve to twenty-four hours. Telegrams reach London probably before Tehran.

I do not wish to shirk any useful responsibility but I can see no advantage accruing from nominal responsibility in case of real urgency resting with me. I could only delay matters and report that I must necessarily accept Mr. Peel's views.

Question of despatch of force from India may perhaps come under different category. I can hardly believe this deplorable contingency need ever arise.

Military attaché concurs in above. Not repeated.



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

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AM 417A.

S.17953 Part 2. S E C R E T. Despatched 1430 25/10/24.

PARAPHRASE.

Cipher telegram from Air Ministry,
to A.O.C., Iraq (Baghdad).

AM 417A 25/10.

1. Anglo-Persian Oil Company have made enquiries at Foreign Office regarding assistance, should such a need arise.

2. There are two aspects from which this question can be considered (a) protection of pipe line, oilfields etc. and (b) safeguarding the lives of British subjects if there is real danger from uncontrolled elements in the population.

3. As regards the first consideration, Foreign Office have emphasised to Tehran their objections to any British naval or military intervention in the present troubles and have stated that specific approval from home should be given before any troops are employed.

As regards (b) we have informed Foreign Office we can draw no distinction between responsibility for protection of lives of British subjects in Arabistan and responsibility for protection of property, but that you would no doubt, in an emergency, do whatever was possible for protection of life only. In giving this opinion, we were thinking of the possibility of evacuating British personnel.

4. Consul at Ahwaz has been instructed to repeat to you any communication in this sense made to Tehran, but this is to save delay and to give you time to consider possible plans, and will only be to warn you that a request from Minister at Tehran may follow.

5. We should like to have your views as to what sort of assistance you might be able to give either by road, river or air,

as

as this presents a new problem which we have not previously considered.

Get into touch with A.P.O.C. representative and Peel and let us know what sort of assistance they are likely to expect. It should be made quite clear that any troops for the protection of A.P.O.C. property would have to come from India and that you cannot undertake it with your force.

6. Action is only to be taken after a direct request from Tehran. Previous instructions in this respect hold good.

7. Discuss problem with Senior Naval Officer before sending us your views, and keep in close touch with him.

Registry (Telegrams).

Copies to:-

Air Council.
D.D.O.I.
A.I.
D.O.S.D.
S.6.
C.I.G.S. (W.O.)
D.M.O.& I. (W.O.)
C.4. Ciphers (W.O.)(9)
Mr. Thomas (C.O.)
Mr. Clauson (C.O.)
Sir J.E. Shuckburgh (C.O.)
Major Hubert Young (C.O.)
N.I.D. Admiralty. (2)
Sir M.P.A. Hankey C.I.D. (2)
Mr. Macdonald (F.O.)
Mr. Oliphant (F.O.)
Mr. Osborne (F.O.) (3)
Lord Olivier (I.O.)
Mr. Monteith (I.O.)
Colonel Wilson-Johnston (I.O.)
P.S. to Prime Minister.



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Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P 4261 1924

Confidential.

I.P. 4160/24 ult. 23/10.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to The Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers.

Foreign Office,

23 OCT 1924 ~~, 192~~.

Reference to previous correspondence :

160 Foreign Office letter no. E 8546/24/34 of Oct. 14.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
m Air Ministry. Oct. 21.	
Hm. Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran telegramme no. 163. Oct. 22.	Protection of British subjects in Persian Oilfields.
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Oct. 22.	

Copy to India
30 OCT 1924

RECEIVED
24 OCT 1924
POLITICAL & PRIVATE

2

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry.

14—1766 F.O.P. [12105] 10m 10/24 (4)



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FY.

17953/S.6.

9180/27/34)

AIR MINISTRY,

London, W.C.2.

21st October, 1924.

P
4261
1924

afidential and Urgent.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to say that they have had under consideration Mr. Osborne's letter of the 13th instant, No. E 8576/27/34, relative to the protection of British subjects in the Persian Oilfields and proposing that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwas should be authorised in case of emergency to ask direct for protection from Air Headquarters at Baghdad without prior notification to His Majesty's Representative at Tehran.

It appears to the Air Council that such an arrangement would not be consistent with the terms or intention of the recommendations of the recent Interdepartmental Committee (the report of which was approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 28th 1924). It was an essential part of those recommendations as the Council understood them, that there should in no circumstances be any resort to action which would infringe the Persian sovereignty unless and until His Majesty's Minister at Tehran concurred that such action was necessary.

The Council would further observe that the recommendations of the Committee were based on the fact that it was impracticable for the Air Officer Commanding, having regard to the size of the forces at his disposal and to their prior responsibilities in Irak, to assume any definite responsibility for.....

2

s Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.



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

for the protection of the oilfields themselves. But it does not appear possible from this aspect to draw a distinction between responsibility for protection of property and that of protection for life. In an emergency the Air Officer Commanding would of course endeavour to supply any assistance to British subjects in a position of danger, but any authorisation at the present time to the British Consul at Ahwaz to apply direct to the Air Officer Commanding would, in the Council's opinion be inexpedient.

They would suggest that the possibilities of delay in account of any communication from the British Consul in regard to assistance for British subjects having to pass through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran would be reduced if he was instructed to send an information copy of any request for assistance direct to the Air Officer Commanding Irak, at the same time as to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

The Air Council trust that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will appreciate their position in this matter; they would in any case request that if the responsibilities of the Air Officer Commanding as recently defined by the Committee of Imperial Defence are to be varied or supplemented in the sense of making him the responsible authority for infringing Persian sovereignty and undertaking military operations against possibly Persians or Bakhtiaris or both, the matter should first be referred again to the Committee of Imperial Defence or if that entails under present conditions too much delay, at least discussed in a Conference between the Foreign Office and Air Ministry to which your department might wish to ask the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to send a representative.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) J.A. Webster.





P 4261 1924

28

COPY.

(E 9180/27/34).

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Ovey (Tehran).

Foreign Office, 22nd October 1924, 6.00 p.m.

No. 163.

::::::::::::::::::::

Confidential.

P. 4093.

My telegram No. 151 (of October 9th. Arabistan situation).

Anglo-Persian Oil Company have made enquiries of Foreign Office regarding military assistance to protect their property, should the need arise.

They have been informed that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz is not authorised to appeal direct to Baghdad for such assistance, but that the responsibility for making such a request must lie with you.

Air Ministry consider it impossible to draw a distinction between responsibility for protection of British property and responsibility for protection of lives of British subjects in Arabistan. They state, however, that in an emergency Air Officer Commanding Baghdad would endeavour to supply any assistance to British subjects in a position of danger if, at Peel's urgent request, you asked Baghdad to do so. In order to minimise risk of delay, Peel should be instructed that if he finds it absolutely necessary to ask you for such limited assistance, he should repeat his telegram to Air Officer Commanding Baghdad for information.

As regards wider form of protection of oilfields you will, of course, bear in mind the views expressed in my

telegram.....

2





telegram No. 151. Military assistance could only be provided by movement of troops from India, which could only be undertaken as a last resort.

Repeated to India.

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

Copy.

E 9180/27/34.

P
4261
1924.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

22nd October, 1924.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. S.2 of the 3rd instant, relative to the present situation in Arabistan, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to inform you that the decision arrived at by His Majesty's Government regarding military assistance to your company, in case of need, is as follows:-

2. As regards the immediate position in Arabistan, H.M.S. "Crocus" is now at Basrah and is ready to move to Mohammerah, in order to safeguard British interests there, upon the receipt of a request to do so from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

3. As regards the more general question of the protection of the oil fields and pipe line, I am to explain that the whole matter has received careful examination by the competent departments of His Majesty's Government, and the decisions reached are based upon the best military advice. It is not considered desirable to authorise His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on his own responsibility to send a request direct to Air Headquarters at Bagdad for the despatch of military assistance in order to protect British interests in Arabistan. The decision in this matter must be left to His Majesty's Representative at Tehran.

4. I am to explain, however, that in a case of grave emergency, the Air Officer Commanding in Irak would endeavour.....

Secretary,
Anglo-Persian Oil Company.





endeavour to supply assistance to British subjects in a position of actual danger. If His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz at any time were to consider that such a case had arisen, he would telegraph to His Majesty's Representative at Tehran asking that Air Headquarters at Bagdad might be moved to provide such assistance. In order to obviate the risk of delay, Mr. Peel will be authorised to repeat to the Air Officer Commanding in Irak, for his information, any telegram of the above nature which he might have occasion to address to His Majesty's Representative at Tehran.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

D. G. OSBORNE



PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(36) (32)

Register No. 4160.

Minute Paper.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1924.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary	23. x	WO	Persia. Protection in emergency of A.P.O.C. property. Responsibility for appealing to R.A.F. may for protection
Secretary of State...			
Committee.....	23	MCJ	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy to India 16. x.

FOR INFORMATION.

Military Secretary

for information & any remarks. The F.O. view as to the distribution of responsibility between the Consul on the spot (whose authority is limited to an appeal for protection of life in an immediate emergency) & the Legation seems correct — in theory at least.

D. Thomas
21. x. 24

Previous Papers :—

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
4 NOV 1924

Seen thanks — The Air Force reply will be interesting as they have said they have no troops to send it!
A.C. 30/10

7145 2000 3.24

2



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INDEXED

P 4160 1924

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 8576/ 27/ 34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

Confidential.

537/21 (1)

P.P. 892 | 24

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers.

Foreign Office,
October 14, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence :
India Office letter no: P 892 of march 7th.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From, Anglo-Persian Oil Company. October 3. To Air Ministry. (with enclosures). October 13.	Protection of Persian Oilfields.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 15 OCT 1924

Copy to India 16 OCT 1924

2

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office. War Office. Air Ministry. Admiralty.

14—1766 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 7/24 [11793] (4)



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2.

8576/27/34)

ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY.

P
4160
1924

Britannic House,
Great Winchester Street,
London, E.C.2.
3rd October, 1924.

Sir:-

We have the honour to state that we have received a cable from our Representatives in Mohammerah, with reference to the present crisis in Arabistan, informing us that should the need arise Military assistance would only be rendered to the Company at the direct request of H.M's Minister in Teheran.

We were under the impression that in the past the arrangement was that such request would be made to Air Headquarters Baghdad by H.M's Consul at Ahwaz, who is in the closest touch with the situation.

As it is only in cases of the gravest emergency that application for Military assistance would be made at all, we feel that the revised arrangement would not, in practice, be sufficiently expeditious.

Communications in Persia, even to and from Teheran, are not always perfect, and any delays in telegrams, whether caused by transmission or mutilations, might be fraught with grave consequences to our interests.

We would, therefore, draw your attention to the foregoing and hope that upon due consideration, orders may be issued for a reversion to the previous arrangement.

We have etc.,

For ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY Ltd.,

(Signed) H. E. NICHOLS.
Director.

he Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.



E 8576/27/34.

P 4160 1924

37 35

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
13th October, 1924.

fidential.
ent.

Sir:-

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited, relative to the protection of the Persian oil fields.

2. The Secretary of State proposes to reply in the terms of the draft enclosed herein, but he will be glad to learn before doing so whether the Air Council concur generally in this draft letter and, in particular, whether they see any objection to an assurance being given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that in the case of any immediate and personal danger to British subjects His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz would be justified in asking for protection from Air Headquarters, Bagdad, direct without prior reference to His Majesty's Representative at Tehran. I am to explain that such protection would be solely in order to safeguard the lives of British subjects in Arabistan in case Mr. Peel should anticipate real danger from uncontrolled elements in the population, and not for the wider purpose of protecting the oil fields and pipe line themselves, which subject has already been fully considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

3. If the Air Council concur, the Secretary of State

/proposes,

e Secretary
of the Air Ministry.

2





(34) (36)

proposes, at the same time as despatching his reply to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited, to telegraph to Mr. Ovey in the terms of the draft telegram enclosed herein.

4. I am to ask that a very early reply may be returned to this letter, copies of which are being sent for information to the India Office, Colonial Office, War Office and Admiralty.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

D. G. OSBORNE.

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

E 8576/27/34

P 4160 1924

(36) (37)

S.W.1.

October 1924.

e Secretary,
Anglo-Persian Oil Co.Ltd.,
Britannic House,
22, Great Winchester
Street,
E.C.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. S.2 of the 3rd instant, relative to the present situation in Arabistan, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to inform you that the decision arrived at by His Majesty's Government regarding military assistance to your company, in case of need, is as follows:-

2. As regards the immediate position in Arabistan, H.M.S. "Crocus" is now at Basrah and ready to move to Mohammerah upon the receipt of a request to do so from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

3. As regards the more general question of the protection of the oil field and pipe line, I am to explain that the whole matter has received careful examination by the competent departments of His Majesty's Government, and the decisions reached are based upon the best military advice. In the case of any immediate and personal danger to British subjects Mr. Peel would be justified in asking for protection from Air Headquarters Baghdad, but for the wider purpose of the protection of property of your company, Mr. Peel is not authorised on his own responsibility to ask Air....

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



Headquarters direct for the despatch
ilitary assistance. This is a matter
h must be left to the decision of His
sty's Representative at Tehran.

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



E 8576/27/34

(37) (39)

COPY.

F.O.

S.W.1.

October 1924.

Draft Telegram.

Mr. Ovey,

Tehran.

My telegram No. 151 (of October 9th: Situation in Arabistan).

Cypher.

In reply to enquiry by Anglo-Persian Oil Company I am informing them that in case of any immediate and personal danger to British subjects, His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz, would be justified in asking for protection direct from Air Headquarters, Baghdad, but for wider purpose of protection of property of Anglo-Persian Oil Company Mr. Peel is not authorised on his own responsibility to ask Air Headquarters direc for despatch of military assistance.

You should so inform Mr. Peel explaining that he should avail himself of this permission only in case of very real and immediate danger to lives of British subjects.

Air Ministry are instructing Air Headquarters, Baghdad, accordingly.

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



PUT AWAY WITH 537/21 (36) (40)

892.

Register No. [494.859 496 752 495 690]

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter / Telegram from — Dated — Rec. — 1924.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	29. ii	WR	Persia.
Secretary of State.	/ Mar	AM	Defence of the A.P.O.C. Oilfields
Committee.....	7	S	Sq l.'s position
Under Secretary..	6	WR	
Secretary of State.			

Copy to C.O. Air Mt. D.M.O. Asst Sec' C.I.D. G.Sq. Army Dept. [illegible]

- 8 MAR 1924

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

13 MAR 1924

Mr. Cadman to P.O. for [illegible]

6 MAR 1924 APPROVED POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

Letter to C.O. - 7 MAR 1924

2

Previous Papers :—

10 1379—2 2000 4/20



Military Secretary

Since our telegram of 21st Jan. No 221 (Flying)
was sent, replying to the Govt. the Admiralty's
memorandum absolving themselves from responsibility for
the oil fields, several new papers have been received.
The question of measures for the defence of the fields
is remitted by C.O. & A.O. to the C.I.D. for decision;
but the former agree that the Pol. Resident in the
Persian Gulf should be consulted on the local political
aspect before any action is taken in emergency, & the
latter stipulate that Hdqrs. Ministries also should be
consulted before troops are called for & the Govt. of India
be consulted before troops are sent.

Meanwhile the Persian Govt. Ministers while
disclaiming any intention of action likely to provoke trouble
is anxious to concert arrangements for the
oilfields' protection.

The telegram in which the Govt. states their
position deals with the matter from a purely
military aspect; and perhaps you would comment
on it in the first instance. From the Indian point
of view, the question has more, perhaps, an aspect
other than the purely military one of what, if any,
forces could be sent from India in emergency; that
there is a political background and for that reason it
would possibly be better to retain the papers in this
Office, rather than transfer them.

L. D. Scott
5. ii

MINUTE.

M

19 .

I presume it is only necessary to consider whether India can afford to send troops to protect the oilfields in emergency.

It is true that the army in India has been reduced to a minimum for the needs of India.

Though the Indian Govt cannot accept the liability to send troops, at the same time if the internal ~~situation~~ and external situation in India ~~is~~ admits of it at the time then seems little doubt that India would agree to send a Brigade of Infantry from the Field Army provided troops were needed urgently & provided the Imperial Govt agreed to replace such troops in India by trained troops at once if India demanded it. Land Transport for these troops would have to be provided by the Imperial Govt from Irak or by locally, but I cannot agree that the troops from India could and replace those in Irak who are better for mobile operations.

If India sent a Brigade it would be a Field army Brigade and are trained to work together & better fitted for mobile operations than the Infantry Garrison of Irak - apart from the time which would be wasted in the proposed relief in Irak.

The net result would be that if everything was quiet in India and a grave emergency arose in the oil fields troops could be sent from India & be replaced by Imperial troops, whereas if things were not quiet in India & there were any prospects of trouble in the oilfields the Imperial Govt would have to move troops out either to India or direct to the

* They practically say so.

2

(Form 16.)

5869—1 1000 11.22 [5804]



oilfields from military resources outside India.

It is no doubt possible that, if conditions in Persia continue to progress on present lines, before long the Persian Govt will undertake the defence of the oilfields or would object strongly to our sending any troops there. In the event of such a situation arising trouble in the oilfields would mean trouble with the Persian Govt.

A.T. Cobbe
21.2.24

Since Sir C. Cobbe's note was written further papers (P. 859 & 862) have been received & are placed on the file above the Sec. of S.'s Telegram. The second enclosure in P 862 seems to show that the further discussion of the question is academic; but on this basis it may be as well to put forward the Sec. of S.'s statement of their position to all Offices concerned.

E.F. Chamberlain
28/2

(It may be noted that the previous discussion has been mainly on the procedure for calling for military assistance, on the assumption, now shown to be rather unsound, that military assistance wd. of course be forthcoming.)

Draft Paper. Department.

1892

(40) (42)

Book

Confidential

U.S.S.
P.O.

Sir,

-7 MAR 1924

I am dir. by the Secy of St. for
to refer to corr. ending with
your letter No E 1366/27/34 of
the 21st Feby. regarding the
procedure to be adopted in the
event of it being necessary to
call in troops for the protection
of the A.P. Co's oilfields in
Persia, and

Copy to India (War + Army Depts)
13 MAR 1924

2

Ld. Olivier understands from
the enclosures in your letter last
that no such emergency is at
present visualized as could
justify the very serious violation
of Persia's sovereign rights involved
by the despatch of British troops
to the territory of Persia without the
prior consent of the Persian Govt.;
and he understands that the
Persian Minister of War is prepared
to undertake the responsibility

6678 5000 9/23 [6440A]



of protecting the oilfields from the menace of tribal disturbances in accordance with a plan acceptable to local British officers & endorsed by H.M.G. In case however, it may be thought desirable to consider what action would be necessary practicable in the event either of tribal disturbances so serious that the Persian Govt would welcome British military assistance in coping with it, or of the collapse of the Persian Govt with resultant disorder threatening ~~the safety of the oilfields~~, I am to forward a copy of a telegram in which the Govt. state their position in reply to an enquiry as to their views on the memo: accompanying the Air Ministry's letter of the 9th Jan. No 79553/S.6.

I am to point out that the situation is so far changed since the date of the Govt's letter of 18th May 1922 (which formed a sub-enclosure in I.O. letter P. 2347 of the 19 June 1922 to your address), that they are no

Draft Paper

L° 221 D. 2.13 Feb 44

Draft Paper. Department.

(43)

definitely
his Govt prefers to accept
any liability to despatch
troops to protect
oil fields or to reinforce the
garrison in Iraq to enable it to
do so; and I am to repeat
the stipulation made in Mr Curzon's
letter of 4th June 1922 to the C.O. that
the financial responsibility in
respect of any military assistance
that the H.M.G. might be able
to furnish would rest wholly,
so far as the H.M.G. are concerned,
upon H.M.G. Govt

A copy of this letter is being
sent to the C.O., Air Min., W.O.,
Admty & the Secy of the C.I.D.

(Sd.) L. D. WAKELY

APPROVED
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
6 MAR 1924

5/3 6/3

(which should also rest with the H.M.G.) will
reasonably rest the responsibility for deciding
whether it is on any particular occasion
desirable or necessary that military assistance
should be given, if available.

2. 13 Feb

2

6678 5000 9/23 [6440A]





INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1366/27/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P
E 892
1924

44

P.P. 859/24

Confidential.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
February, 21, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign office Letter no: E 1436/27/34 of February 18.

P.859.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From. Air Ministry. February. 12	
2a, Air Ministry. February. 16.	Protection of Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oilfields.

Copy to India (For Army Dept.)
13 MAR 1924

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
29 FEB 1924

2

Similar letter sent to War Office. Colonial ..

14—1344 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 1/24 [11158] (4)



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

COPY
(E 1366/27/34)
SECRET.
S.17953/S.6

P 892 1924

AIR MINISTRY,
Adastral House,
Kingsway,
London, W.C.2.
12th February, 1924.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to telegram No. 31 of the 29th January from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, relative to a statement by the Officer Commanding Persian troops Shuster that a detachment of troops would very shortly be sent to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oilfields. The Council observe that the Officer Commanding troops is reported to have stated that "with our assistance any hostile movement of tribes could be checkmated", and that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz considers that it would be unwise to oppose this measure and advises co-operation with the Officer Commanding for the protection of the Company's property.

Although they are not aware of the nature of the assistance contemplated they consider it necessary, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to remind the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, as explained in the memorandum which accompanied Air Ministry letter of 9th January, S.17953, they are not now in a position to afford any military assistance from Irak in safeguarding the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Oilfields.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) J. A. WEBSTER

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.





Copy

E 1366/27/34

P 892 1924

Foreign Office, S.W.1
16th February, 1924.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. S 17953/S.6 of the 12th instant, relative to the despatch of Persian troops to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oil fields, and to state, in reply, that in view of Sir P. Loraine's subsequent telegram, No. 80, of which a copy was enclosed in my letter of the 12th instant, the question of sending military assistance to the oilfields from Irak does not appear to arise.

2. Copies of this letter are being sent to the India Office, War Office and Colonial Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

The Secretary
of the Air Ministry.

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



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1436/ 27/ 34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P
1859
1924

P.P. 752/24

Confidential.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
February. 18, 1924.

P. 752.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign office letter no: E 1225/27/34 of February. 12.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram from, H.M. minister, Tehran. no: 63 February. 14.	Protection of oil-fields in Persia.

RECEIVED IN
20 FEB 1924
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Similar letter sent to War office. Colonial office. Air ministry.

14—1344 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 1/24 [11158] (4)

2



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

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P 859 1924

PERSIA

Decode. Sir P. Loraine. (Tehran).
February 14th, 1924.

D. 12.10.p.m. February 14th, 1924.

R. 10.50.a.m. February 15th, 1924.

No. 63. (R).

-----oOo-----

P 752.

Your telegram No. 39.

I have discussed matter with Prime Minister.

It has been agreed that matter of guarding shall be thoroughly discussed between consul at Ahwaz, Oil Company representative, and commander of troops and that final arrangements proposed shall be submitted to Prime Minister and myself before being put into execution.

Prime Minister thinks that arrangements may be completed by Persian New Year.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 63.

Sent to India.

2





P
775
1924

VN/BL. (104 groups) 879.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From Viceroy, Army Department, to Secretary of State for India.

Dated Delhi, 13th February, 1924. XX

Received 14th February, 1924. 8 a.m.

221-D. Reference your telegram P (sic) 221, January 21st. Presumably you do not intend to suggest that we have any liability, financial or military, for the protection of the oilfields, a suggestion to which we could not accede. We have previously indicated that we hold this view in paragraph 3 of our Foreign Secretary's letter No. 508 External, dated 18th May, 1922. Oilfields are an Imperial responsibility, and consequently only question which arises affecting the Government of India is the possibility of lending troops to His Majesty's Government, on payment, to re-inforce the Iraq garrison for the purpose of protecting them. In regard to this, circumstances have altered since paragraph 2 of our Foreign Secretary's letter above was written. Owing to reductions of military establishments we have no troops to spare. In very grave emergency we might be able to send a portion of the fourth Division of the Field Army but even this would be immobile, and could only be used to replace the Iraq garrison and release the latter for mobile operations. Moreover, if our own capacity for mobilisation is not to be impaired, it would be necessary to replace the troops sent to Iraq by other trained troops. Net result is that we cannot definitely undertake to diminish our existing military resources by sending troops to Iraq for protection of the Oilfields, and Iraq garrision is insufficient. Only sound solution of the problem would be to increase it, or to raise a special Imperial contingent for the protection of the Oilfields, to be kept in reserve in India at cost of his Majesty's Government.

RECEIVED IN
14 FEB 1924
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

2





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1288/ 24/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P
794
1924

50
48

P.P. 690/24
7761

Confidential.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
February, 15, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Colonial office letter to India office no: 4333/24 of February, 9.
P. 690

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To, Sir. M. Hankey, (From Mr. Oliphant) February, 14.	Protection of South Persian Oilfields.

2

Copy to India
13 MAR 1924

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
16 FEB 1924

Similar letter sent to Colonial office.
War
Air Ministry.

14—1344 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 1/24 [11158] (4)



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

P 794 1924

(51)

COPY.

FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.1.

February 14th 1924.

1288/27/34)

P.690.

The Colonial Office have sent us a copy of Marsh's letter of the 8th instant to you relative to the procedure to be adopted in the event of it proving necessary to call for the assistance of troops to protect the fields of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Persia.

The Secretary of State hopes that when the question comes before the Committee of Imperial Defence for consideration, the following principles will be borne in mind, in view of the fact that the oilfields are situated in Persian territory:-

(a) That before any troops are called for by His Majesty's Consular Officers in Southern Persia, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should be consulted: and

(b).....

tenant-Colonel

Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B.

2





(b) That the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be first obtained before troops are actually despatched.

It was thought best that I should put these two conditions into the form of a letter to you to avoid any confusion, as we do not know when pressure of work will enable the Committee of Imperial Defence to deal with the matter.

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT





B
2b

Communications on this subject
ould be addressed to—
HE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
d the following number quoted:—
4333/24

P
776
1924

Subject: Protection of the South Persian oil fields.

53

P.P. 690/24

Reference to previous correspondence: 4333/24 P.690.

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 9th ~~February~~ 1924

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the

~~Admiralty~~
Air Ministry.
Foreign Office.
~~India Office.~~
War Office.

RECEIVED IN
15 FEB 1924
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

MAILS BRANCH
15 FEB. 1924
INDIA OFFICE

Under Secretary of State
India Office
onial Office, Downing Street,
14th February 1924

2



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

P
776
1924

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence and with reference to the letter from this Department of the 8th instant on the subject of the protection of the Persian Oilfields, is directed to state that a copy of the letter and enclosure has been sent to the India Office, in addition to the offices mentioned in the last paragraph thereof.

P690.

[illegible] STREET,
13 February, 1924.

2





P
E 752
1924

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1225/ 27/ 34
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

434 etc 13/2
11.690/24

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers.

Foreign Office,
February, 17, 1924.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegrams, from, H.M. minister, Tehran. no: 50. February 7. to, H.M. minister, Tehran. no: 39. February, 9.	Arrangements for guarding oilfields in Persia.

Similar letter sent to { Colonial office, War office, Air ministry.

14 FEB 1924

Copy to India 14 FEB 1924

MAILS BRANCH 13 FEB 1924 INDIA OFFICE

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 13 FEB 1924

2

14—1344 F.O.P. [10484] 10M 1/24 [11158] (4)



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

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752
1924

(E 1225/27/34)

PERSIA.

Code telegram to Sir P. Loraine, (Tehran)

Foreign Office, 9th February, 1924. 4.p.m.

No. 39. (R).

Your telegram No. 50 (of February 7th Protection of oil fields.)

I am glad to learn that the Persian Prime Minister proposes to consult you before making any change.

You will no doubt keep Anglo Persian Oil Company's representative informed of developments in order that company may have an opportunity of stating their views.

2





[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

752
1924

PERSIA

Decode. Sir P. Loraine. (Tehran).
February 7th, 1924.

D. 11.35.a.m. February 7th, 1924.

R. 9.00.p.m. February 7th, 1924.

No. 50. (R).

-----oOo-----

(Not recd)

My telegram No. 31.

Prime Minister informs me that no instructions have been issued by him for government troops to assume guard of oilfields and that officer commanding had sent a small detachment of troops amongst tribes to prevent disorders arising out of quarrel between Haftlang and Chararlang section which might have spread to vicinity of fields.

Prime Minister considers, however, that present guarding arrangement is not satisfactory and expresses hope that after exchange of views better permanent arrangements can be made in interests of both Persian government and Oil Company.

Repeated to India.



B

A.

CONFIDENTIAL

P 690 1924

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
and the following number quoted :—
4333/24

Reference to previous correspondence : 1591/24.

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 24th January 1924

P.P.437/24

Downing Street,
9th February 1924.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you for the information of Sir Sydney Olivier, copy of the papers noted below, on the subject of Protection of the South Persian oilfields.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 11 FEB 1924

Date.	Description.
1924. 8th February.	To Lieut. Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey G.C.B. (with enclosure)

Copy to India
14 FEB 1924

Copy also sent to Foreign Office, War Office

2


SECRET.



P
690
1924

59

Downing Street,

8 February, 1924.

My dear Hankey,

P.4437.

With reference to my letter of the 23rd of January on the subject of the protection of the Persian Oilfields, the Secretary of State wishes me to forward to you the enclosed copy of a despatch from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, regarding the procedure to be adopted in the event of it proving necessary to call for the assistance of troops to protect the Oilfields.

January

Mr. Thomas is in sympathy with Lieutenant Colonel Trevor's desire that he should be consulted before troops are actually sent to the Oilfields, and he thinks the best procedure would be for His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan to send his request for the assistance of troops direct to the High Commissioner for Iraq if necessary at the same time repeating it to the Political Resident at Bushire, who would then be afforded

HANT COLONEL
R MAURICE HANKEY, G.C.B.

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



96 60

fforded an opportunity of commenting or protesting
ainst the action proposed, before troops were
tually despatched.

Mr. Thomas would be grateful if this
spatch might be considered by the Committee of
perial Defence when the main question is under
scussion.

We have sent a copy of this letter and
closure to the War Office, Foreign Office and
r Ministry.

Yours sincerely
(Sd) E. Marsh.

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



SECRET.

No.20-S. of 1924.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 6th January 1924.

P 690 1924

(59) (61)

My Lord Duke,

P.72.

I have the honour to invite a reference to secret despatch, dated the 17th November 1923 from His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq to Your Grace's address on the subject of the defence of the oil fields.

2. As Sir Henry Dobbs rightly observes, he has no political connection whatever with the country in which the oil fields are situated Arabistan being in Persia and therefore within the political sphere of H.M.Minister at Tehran, and more directly, as far as the Government of India are concerned, with my sphere.

3. The officer, who is primarily responsible for calling in the assistance of troops to protect the oilfields is H.M.Consul for Arabistan, within whose consular district the fields are situated. Any telegrams on such a subject which this officer may address to the High Commissioner he will in the ordinary course repeat to me; and to make sure I can of course instruct him specially to do so. In these circumstances I think it would be a good thing if His Excellency the High Commissioner were to consult the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf before actually deciding whether the employment of troops for the defence of the oil fields is necessary or not.

A

2

is Grace the Duke of Devonshire,
K.G.,P.C.,G.C.M.G.,G.C.V.C.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Downing Street, London, S.W.1



62

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraqand H.M. Minister at Tehran, and a copy, together with a copy of the High Commissioner's despatch mentioned to the Government of India and H.M.Consul for Arabistan, Ahwaz

I have, etc.,

(sd) A.E.TREVOR, Lieut.Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and
His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars.etc

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
ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE.
FASTEN Envelope by gumming this Label across Flap.
OPEN by cutting Label instead of tearing Envelope.
(Lablest)
Minute Pa
Under Secretary
Secretary of Stat
Committee.....
Under Secretary
Secretary of Sta
FEB 1924
Previous Papers

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(63)

Register No. 437.

Minute Paper.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1923

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary	30. i	WS	Persia
Secretary of State...	5 Feb.	ABC	
Committee.....	9	O	Defence of the oil-fields.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy to 14 FEB 1924
India

Secy Mil & Dep
For information
ABC 31/1
5.2
Ashley 2.2.24
RR 1/2.

SEEN
CAL. COMMITTEE
FEB 1924
1/2

18/2 15/2

FOR INFORMATION.

The Committee of Imperial Defence are to discuss the situation created by Iraq being no longer in a position to provide adequate forces for the protection of the oilfields. It is not, it would seem, necessary or advisable to suggest that the Committee should postpone their discussion of the subject until the views of the G. of I. are available. Whatever decision they arrive at will have, of course, to be examined in the light of the views of that Govt. when they are received in reply to our telegram of Jany 21st.

J.G. Simpson 26/1

Previous Papers :—

6051 2000 1.23

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

Reference: IOR/L/PS/10/965. Copyright for this page: Open Government Licence
View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100110704877.0x000086



SECRET

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted:—
1591/24.

P
437
1924

Subject: Protection of the South Persian Oilfields

I.P. 205 72/24

Reference to previous correspondence:

P. 205.

Letter to/from the Colonial Office of the 9th January 1924
from the Air Ministry: Reference No. S.17958/S.6.

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the

~~Admiralty.~~
~~Air Ministry.~~
~~Foreign Office.~~
~~India Office.~~
War Office.

Copy to India
14 FEB 1924

Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
25 JAN 1924

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
24th January 1924

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

COPY.

P
437

Downing Street,

23rd January, 1924.

My dear Hankey,

You will remember that in May 1922 the question of the protection of the Persian Oilfields was under discussion by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It was then agreed that a qualified promise of military assistance from Iraq under a scheme prepared by the Air Staff was sufficient to meet the needs of the situation. Since then this Office has been in correspondence both with the High Commissioner for Iraq and the Air Ministry on this subject and the Air Ministry have forwarded to the Committee of Imperial Defence copies of their letter of the 9th January and of a memorandum prepared by the Air Staff, which explains that, owing to the reduction of the Iraq Garrison, the Air Officer Commanding is no longer in a position to provide adequate forces even for the protection of the Oilfields during minor disturbances. The Air Staff point out, and the Secretary of State concurs in their view, that in these circumstances the High Commissioner and the Air Officer Commanding can no longer be held responsible for the defence of the oilfields or for the preparation of plans for dealing with any emergency which may arise there, but that these should now be regarded as an Imperial responsibility and as such should be examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SIR MAURICE HANKEY, G.C.B.

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

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

(66)

The High Commissioner has asked that the extent of his own responsibility in the matter should be clearly defined, and I enclose a copy of his Secret despatch on this subject. The Secretary of State would be glad if this could be circulated to the Committee, together with the Air Staff's memorandum, and a day fixed for the discussion of the subject.

If you could let us know the date fixed, arrangements could be made for the attendance of representatives of this Office should the Committee of Imperial Defence so desire.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/ E Marsh

Nov. Secret.

P.72.

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



PUT THIS WITH 537/21

(65) (67)

Register No. 42. [5023] 205

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter / Telegram from

Dated

Rec.

1923.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	19.i	W.	Persia
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....			Defence of the oil fields.
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

send AIR 19/1

Copy to

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

D. fr. telegram to India consulting

Telegram D. fr. D. 21st January.

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vious Papers :—

10 1379—2 2000 4/20



Minute

As a result of the reduction of our forces in Iraq the question of responsibility for the defence of the oil-fields in Arabistan has been raised in an acute form. This office has not yet been directly addressed on the subject, but it is clear from the attached correspondence, fragmentary though it be, that there is a likelihood of an attempt being made to saddle the Govt. of India with the responsibility. Up to the present the Govt. of India have only been responsible for the replacement of troops sent from Iraq to the oil-fields in the event of an emergency on the understanding that no financial liability should fall upon India and that the situation in India permitted of despatch (Flag A

The new proposal raises issues, military & political, of the gravest kind, and, prima facie, the considerations against it outweigh heavily those in favour. It will be seen that a conference in the near future is proposed by the C.O.. Recent events in Arabistan, the improved relations between the Sheikh of Mohammerah, the Bakhtiaris, & the Central Govt., would appear to lessen vitally the urgency of the question, and it seems desirable that the suggested conference should not be held until we are in possession of the views of the G. of I.. It is easy to forecast these views, for undoubtedly the G. of I. will return a blank negative to the proposal, but it would strengthen the hands of this office to be actually in possession of their views.

The question is not of such urgency as to justify a long telegram anticipating the arrival in India of the mail papers.

Secy. Military Dept.

For the favour of remarks

I concur in awaiting Indian views. I do not think they will say that they are prepared to send troops in present circumstances.
Aft letter 9.1.24

This is not the point. The point is that they may be asked to accept responsibility & decline to do so. If they decline what then? J.A.S. Simpson troops should not be sent 7/1/24



Minute Paper. Department.

(68)

A copy of an Air Force Memorandum has been added to the file. There is nothing in it to which this Dept. need refuse assent.

J.G. Simpson
12/1

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2847—2 3000 12.20 [2503]





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P. 205/24

(67) (69)

Approved for issue by Sir A. Hirtzel 21/1

Despatched 21 Jan 1924.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

DESPATCHED
21 JAN 1924

C

XX 18 words

++ 221. Please see papers sent by mail of January 3rd P 5023. Protection of oil fields. I should be glad to receive your views at an early date.

Not to issue before January 20th.

4958 1000 12/21

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

Sir,

Colonial

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

EXED

P
205
1924

SECRET

Telephone No.: REGENT 8000.
Telegraphic Address: "AIRMINISTRY, LONDON."
(All telegrams on the subject of this letter should quote the undermentioned Air Ministry Refce.)

AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY,
LONDON, W.C.2.

9 January, 1924.

Letters on the undermentioned subject should be addressed to THE SECRETARY at the above address and should quote:

Air Ministry Refce. S.17953/S.6. Your Refce.

SUBJECT:—

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to advert to Colonial Office letter of the 27th December No. 60033/1923, relative to the protection of the South Persian Oilfields and am to forward herewith for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council a copy of a letter and memorandum which has been sent to the Colonial Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. A. Wells.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office,
S.W.1.

Copy to India
17 JAN 1924

RECEIVED IN
11 JAN 1924
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

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



P
205
1924

(71)

SECRET. 9 January, 1924.

S.17953/S.6

Sir,

With reference to Colonial Office letter of 5023/23 the 27th ultimo, numbered as above, regarding the protection of the South Persian Oilfields, I am commanded by the Air Council to acquaint you for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that they understand that the matter is regarded as of such importance that it should be considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The problem to be considered only concerns the Air Council directly in so far as it is necessary to point out that they are no longer in a position to give effect to the qualified promise of military assistance from Iraq in the event of tribal disturbances and local outbreaks of lawlessness.

In these circumstances the Council are doubtful

Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

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

whether any useful result would be achieved by the preliminary conference proposed by the Secretary of State and suggest that the question be referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence as soon as possible. They presume that the necessary representation would be made by the Colonial Office.

The Air Staff Memorandum which was forwarded with Air Ministry letter of the 13th September has been revised to include later developments and a copy is enclosed.

Copies of this letter and the accompanying Memorandum have been sent to the Committee of Imperial Defence, Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office, and India Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Sgd. J.A. Webster

P
205
1924

SECRET.

MILITARY PROTECTION OF PERSIAN OILFIELDS.

Note by the Air Staff.

1. On May 24th 1922 the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. agreed that a qualified promise of military assistance from Iraq under a scheme prepared by the Air Staff was sufficient to meet the needs of the situation as regards military protection for the Persian oilfields.

2. The maximum assistance which could be provided from Iraq under that scheme consisted of one squadron of aircraft based on Shaibah (with possible air reinforcements from Baghdad), 2 companies of infantry and a section of armoured cars.

3. The scheme also contemplated that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should organise a local volunteer force from its European employees. This latter proposal has not beenadopted and it is generally agreed that it would be undesirable to proceed with it.

4. It was stipulated that no military assistance from Iraq could be rendered unless the Air Officer Commanding considered the situation there would not be thereby endangered. It was also stipulated that any men or material so supplied from Iraq should at once be replaced from India or elsewhere. In any case the scheme envisaged no situation more serious than tribal disturbances and local outbreaks of lawlessness, particularly in the Arabistan area.

5. It was then considered that the contingency of disturbances on a larger scale and of a kind to which this limited measure of assistance would be clearly inadequate need not be provided for; in particular the possibility of disturbances between the Bakhtiari and the Persian Government were not taken into account.

6. In July 1923 the Air Officer Commanding Iraq reported that it was the intention of the Persian Government to attempt to bring both the Bakhtiari and the Sheikh of Mohammerah into



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subjection and that should Persian troops enterthis area disturbances would ensue which would endanger the oilfields and the Pipe Line.

7. The Persian Government are at present engaged in operations against the Lurs and so far their relations with Sheikh Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari remain cordial but the Air Staff consider the situation is not entirely stable and are of the opinion that definite plans for the security of the oilfields should be prepared.

8. The Air Officer Commanding Iraq has stated, and his view is concurred in by the High Commissioner, that in the event of serious trouble between the Bakhtiari and the Central Government a force of 4½ Battalions, 2 sections of Armoured Cars and supporting aircraft will be necessary for the adequate protection of the area and that as the Garrison of Iraq could not safely be depleted by 4½ Battalions the question assumes an Imperial rather than a local aspect.

9. H.M. Minister at Teheran is in agreement with the view that the defence of the oilfields has become a question of Imperial responsibility, and has made the following suggestions:-

(a) "The liability for the defence of the oilfields shall rest upon H.E. the High Commissioner at Baghdad and Air Officer Commanding Iraq".

(b) The Air Officer Commanding Iraq shall be responsible for formulating plans to deal with any emergency that may arise.

(c) Troops or material required, additional to any which can be safely supplied by the Garrison in Iraq shall be provided by the Military authorities in India, the units being earmarked for the purpose.

(d) The responsibility for the collection of military intelligence in Arabistan to remain, as hitherto, with the Air Officer Commanding Iraq.



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(e) H.M. Consul at Ahwaz shall be the authority empowered to apply to the High Commissioner Baghdad in case of emergency.

10. Owing to the reduction of the Iraq Garrison to a 4-battalion basis, the Air Officer Commanding is not how in a position to provide a force, except possibly a limited number of aircraft, for the protection of the oilfields during even minor disturbances, to meet which the original plan of defence was designed.

The Air Staff, therefore, consider that liability for the defence of the oilfields and the responsibility for formulating plans to deal with any emergency that may arise, should no longer rest with the High Commissioner at Baghdad and the Air Officer Commanding Iraq, but should be regarded as an Imperial responsibility and as such should be examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

11. At the same time it is realised that by reason of the proximity of his Command to the oilfields the A.O.C. Iraq will probably be the most suitable person to undertake responsibility for the collection of Military intelligence in Arabistan.

The High Commissioner also, although/as he has pointed out there is no political connection between Iraq and the oilfields will be the authority most readily accessible to H.M. Consul at Ahwaz in case of emergency.

12. The Air Staff are therefore in agreement with the views of H.M. Minister at Teheran, except as regards points (a) and (b) above - the liability for the defence of the oilfields and the responsibility for formulating plans - which, it is considered should be a definite Imperial responsibility.





B
2b

SECRET

P
5023
1923

Communications on this subject
ould be addressed to—
E UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
l the following number quoted:—
60033/23.

Subject: Protection of the South Persian oil fields.

4338
4937
5028

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to ~~from~~ the Colonial Office of the 1. December. No. P. 4338.

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Foreign Office. Admiralty

Copy to India

e Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

3 JAN 1924

lonial Office, Downing Street,
December, 1923.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
31 DEC 1923

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

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

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60033/1923. SECRET. Downing Street,
27th December, 1923.

Sir,

I am directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to the letter from this Department No.50947/23, Secret, of the 29th of October 1923, regarding the protection of the South Persian Oilfields, and to transmit herewith to be laid before the Air Council, a copy of a November Secret despatch which has been received from the High Commissioner for Iraq on this subject.
rec'd.

The Air Council will observe that Sir Henry Dobbs requests thatadecision should be reached as to the degree to which liability for the defence of the Oilfields should in future rest on the High Commissioner for Iraq.

His Grace considers that the question is one on which an early decision is desirable, and ventures to suggest that the matter might conveniently be discussed at a preliminary Conference between representatives of the Departments concerned before the general question of the defence of the oilfields comes up for consideration by the Overseas Defence Committee.

If

SECRETARY,
AIR MINISTRY.

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



If this suggestion meets with the approval of
Air Council, His Grace would be happy to instruct
[illegible]ntatives of this Department to attend at the
Ministry at whatever time would be convenient.
[illegible]s of this letter have been sent to the India Office,
[illegible]gn Office and Admiralty.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) G. GRINDLE

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



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SECRET.

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR IRAQ.

The Residency,

Baghdad, 17th November, 1923.

My Lord Duke,

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence regarding the Defence of the oilfields, ending with my despatch Secret A of October 17th and to enclose a copy of Confidential despatch No. 465 dated 15.10.23 from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Teheran to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. While I am of course willing to assume any liability in connection with the defence of the oilfields which His Majesty's Government consider should rest upon me, it appears to me that my actual responsibility, under the proposed scheme, will be limited to deciding what forces can be spared from 'Iraq for the defence of the fields. It is intended that the Air Officer Commanding should continue to collect military intelligence in Arabistan, but I have no political connection with that country whatever, and it therefore appears to me somewhat anomalous that I should be called upon to decide, without consultation with the Resident at Bushire, whether it is necessary or desirable that British Forces should or should not be sent into a country within his political sphere. For this reason, and for the future reason that, with the reduction of the Imperial Garrison of 'Iraq, it will become more and more certain that any troops required for the defence of the fields will have to be brought from India, it seems to me a matter for consideration whether the liability referred should not rather rest upon the Government of India.

3.

His Grace the Duke of Devonshire,
K.G., P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Downing Street, London, S.W.1.

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

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

3. I beg that Your Grace will consider the question raised in Sir Percy Loraine's despatch in view of the foregoing remarks, and that, if it is decided that the liability for the defence of the fields is to rest upon me, I may be informed very clearly of the extent of that liability.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Britannic Majesty's Minister Teheran and to the Political Resident, Bushire.

I have &c.,

(Sgd.) Nigel G. Davidson.

for High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

T.C.





COPY.

No. 465. British Legation,
CONFIDENTIAL. Teheran,
October 15th, 1923.

My Lord,

I have the honour to reply to Your Lordship's despatch No. 336(E.7785/119/34) dated August 2nd 1923.

1. Sir Henry Dobbs in his despatch No. S.O. 918 dated May 30th indicates that the British authorities in 'Iraq cannot as hitherto accept liability for the defence of the oilfields under the changed conditions, which now assume an Imperial rather than a local aspect. It is clear that should an emergency arise, the responsibility for dealing with it should be definitely allocated to a British Military Authority, who should have his plans carefully prepared beforehand.

2. Further, in the event of a serious emergency arising, it is probable that the reduced military garrison in 'Iraq will be unable to provide sufficient troops to deal with the situation, in which case these will have to be obtained at short notice from elsewhere.

3. As the defence of the oilfields has become a question of Imperial responsibility, I have the honour to suggest that:-

(a) The liability for the defence of the Oilfields shall rest upon His Excellency the High Commissioner at Baghdad and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

(b) The Air Officer Commanding shall be responsible for formulating plans to deal with any emergency that may arise.

(c) Troops or material required, additional to any which can be safely supplied by the garrison in Iraq shall be provided by the Military Authorities in India, the units being earmarked for the purpose.

(d)

e Most Honourable
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.
etc. etc. etc.
Foreign Office.



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

(d) The responsibility for the collection of military intelligence in Arabistan to remain, as hitherto, with the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

(e) His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz shall be the authority empowered to apply to the High Commissioner, Baghdad, in case of emergency.

4. I have received a copy of Sir John Salmond's proposals for the protection of the oilfields, forwarded to the Air Ministry in his despatch No.Air/548/9 dated July 4th 1923. I concur in these proposals with the exception of his suggestion that a volunteer force shall be organised from among the employees of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Your Lordship is already aware of the political reasons which render the formation of such a force undesirable.

I have, etc.

(For the Minister)

Signed. E. Monson.



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PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(82)

Minute Paper.

Register No. 4338.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1923

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary	23. xi	GR	Persia.
Secretary of State...	23	AM	Defence of the A.P.O.C.'s property, oilfields, pipe-line & Abadan refinery.
Committee.....	24.XI	P	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Fw 25-11

Copy to
Rs.
I.O.L.
Adm.
Co.

1 DEC 1923

FOR INFORMATION.

Military Secretary

You may care to see these papers. Only of the last two have you of the preceding items of correspondence referred to, some of the letters etc are not very intelligible.

pp 2–6 Views of Mr Peel, Consul at Ahwaz. (Sir A.T. Wilson's despatch of 28 Oct: 1920, cited on p. 3., is the bottom paper on this file.) Mr Peel's recommendation that 5000 & 10000 rifles should be held for issue to friendlies in time of crisis does not seem to have been pursued. This means: it is less easy to follow than it might be if we had schemes "A" "B" before us, which he

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Previous Papers :—

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

he is commenting upon. The same difficulty affects
Ff 7–9, Sir A.T. Wilson's comments on Mr Peel's letter
& memo.
Ff 10–15. Sir J. Salmond's report to the Air Ministry.
On p.12 he assumes that the threatening attitude
of the Persian War Ministry & the Bakhtiari Khans &
the Sheikh of Mohammerah portends the danger of a
critical situation in the near future. Such information as
we have over the 4 months since Sir J. Salmond wrote
tends to minimise the danger: the Bakhtiaris seem to
have taken Reza Khan's assault lying down, & Reza Khan
& the Sheikh of Mohammerah seem in a fair way to
reach an accommodation of their conflicting points of view.
But the danger has of course not disappeared altogether.

Of the three assumptions on p.13., No 3 may almost
certainly (as Col. Knox says) be ruled out, & Nos 1 & 2 are
very doubtful.

Sir J. Salmond's revised plan (Ff 14 & 15) requires a
minimum force of 4½ battalions, 2 armoured car sections &
2 flights R.A.F., in the best conditions i.e. if ample warning
is given — and a Brigade plus 2½ battalions in other
conditions: and in either case Iraq cannot supply
more than the armoured cars & aeroplanes.

It is presumed that Sir P. Lorraine will forward his
views to H.M.G. & that the Air Ministry & W.O. are already
dealing with Sir J. Salmond's report; but it might be
as well perhaps to distribute these papers to F.O., D.M.I., etc
in case any Dept lacks any part of the correspondence?

I see no objection to this. L.S.W.

See transfer

D.T. Monteath
18. xi. 23

20.XI.23

28/11

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onfidential.

No.492-S of 1923.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 8th September 1923.

4338
1923

From

The Hon'ble Lieut.Col. S.C.Knox, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To

D. de S.Bray, Esqr., C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Protection of the Arabistan Oilfields.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for the information of the Government of India copies of the marginally noted correspond-ence on the above subject. Not sharing the expert knowledge of local conditions in Ahwaz and Mohammerah possessed by Sir Arnold Wilson and Mr.Peel, I hesitate to offer an opinion as to the different view which they take of the problem of the defence of the Oilfields.

. Despatch No.116/XX11/4 dated 20th ne 1923, with enclosure from nsul, Ahwaz.
. Despatch dated Baghdad 29th June 23, with enclosure from Consul, hwaz.
. Despatch No.S.O.1246,dated Baghdad th July 1923, with enclosures from cretary to H.E. the High Commis-oner, Baghdad.

2. The general political recommendations put forward in Air Marshal Sir John Salmond's "Report" will no doubt receive very careful consideration in Tehran by H.M.Minister as well as in India - whose responsibility for replacing any military assistance sent to the Oilfields is a material part of the Air Staff Plan (vide para 2.(2) of the "Report")- and particularly, by H.M.Covernment in view of the principle affirmed by the Air Marshal that "the protracted defence of the Oilfields is an Imperial not a local responsibility".

Any comments of mine on these political recommendations would therefore be superfluous. Nevertheless perhaps I may

be



(84) (8/2) 2

be permitted to offer the opinion that with regard to the proposals contained in paragraph 3 of the fourth page of the "Report" that there is not the smallest chance of the Persian Government agreeing to condition No.3 and that any guarantee they might give as suggested in 1. and 2. would be quite valueless. If there is any truth in the rumours which reach me that the all pervading influence of Reza Khan, the war Minister in Tehran, shows signs of being on the wane, that would, perhaps, be a consoling factor in an otherwise difficult situation.

I have etc.,
Sd. S.G.Knox,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

SECRET.

His Britannic Majesty's
Consulate for Arabistan,
AHWAZ,
the 22nd June 1923.

No.116.
XXII/4.

Defence of the South Persian Oilfields.

Sir,

I have the honour to invite a reference to despatch No.S.O.918 dated the 30th May 1923 and enclosures from H.E.the High Commissioner Baghdad to His Britannic Majesty's Minister Tehran on the subject of the defence of the South Persian Oilfields.

2. During the visit of Group Captain Briggs to Ahwaz I prepared at his request a memorandum describing the circumstances in which an application might be made by H.B.M.Consul Ahwaz for the despatch of troops to Arabistan and I now enclose a copy of this memorandum for your information.

3. It is true that in my telegram No.29 dated the 15th May 1923, to H.B.M.Minister Tehran I suggested the use of troops to deal with certain emergencies but I had not then realised the limited nature of the support which the Air Headquarters

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



Headquarters in Iraq were able to provide. It is possible that I have now underestimated the value of the military support immediately available for the protection of the Oilfields and pipe line, but in this connection I would invite a reference to Sir Arnold Wilson's despatch No.W/8, dated Bushire the 28th October 1920, and to your telegram No. 438 dated the 13th May 1923 to H.B.M.Minister, Tehran. In the former Sir Arnold Wilson stated that he regarded a Brigade of Infantry and a cavalry regiment with a Battery of Mountain Artillery as an adequate force to be despatched to Arabistan in the event of trouble. In the latter you recorded the opinion that a battalion at Ahwaz and another at Maidan-i-Naftun would suffice on the understanding that we should have the Bakhtiaris and the Arabs on our side. I believe however that in the event of trouble we should have to reckon with a very considerable force of hostile Arabs and for this reason I have advocated the supply of arms, ammunition and money to friendly Chiefs and tribes rather than a display of the distinctly limited force which Air Headquarters in Iraq is able to guarantee.

4. If my reasoning is correct it follows that the establishment of a reserve at Basrah of anything from 5,000 to 10,000 rifles and a corresponding supply of ammunition for issue to the Sheikh of Mohammerah in any serious emergency is of vital importance. I understand that possibly 5,000 rifles are available at the moment.

I have etc.,

Sd. E.G.B.Peel,

H.B.M.Consul for Arabistan, Ahwaz.

To

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Copies of the above are forwarded with compliments to :-

His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad.

H.B.M.Minister and Envoy Plenipotentiary at Tehran.





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Note by Consul Ahwaz on the conditions which would determine his application for the despatch of troops to Arabistan.

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1. General. It is wise to regard the presence of a British force in Arabistan or Bakhtiari as calculated to produce a provocative rather than a tranquilising effect unless that force is in such strength as reasonably to ensure the success of the policy which it is intended to support.

2. The force contemplated by scheme "A" is not in my opinion sufficient to ensure a successful issue and it follows that the protection of the property and personnel of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company both at the Oilfields and on the pipe line can be best secured by diplomacy and negotiation aided where possible by the supply of arms, ammunition and money to friendly Chiefs and tribes. Should these methods fail altogether there seems no alternative but to evacuate the civil population and to cover that evacuation if necessary with the force contemplated by scheme "A".

3. Oilfields: It is unlikely that the Oilfields area could be successfully defended against an absolutely hostile Bakhtiari force with less than a division of all arms including troops for lines of communication .As there is no prospect of such a force being available in Iraq it follows that the methods indicated in (2) supra should be applied. Scheme "B" is thereby ruled out since any damage which might be inflicted on the Oilfields would normally have been completed before the concentration contemplated by scheme "B" could have taken place.

4. A different situation from that described in (3) supra would arise if the Haft Lang Bakhtiaris, pressed by Persian troops from the Ispahan direction or by Chahar Lang tribesmen supported by Persian troops from Behbehan in the South East, were driven to threaten damage to the

Oilfields

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

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Oilfields with a view to securing active British intervention on their behalf. In this event the despatch of a small force to the Oilfields in a strictly non-combatant capacity would relieve the threat provided always that its presence was desired by the Bakhtiaris themselves. But no request for the despatch of such a force would be made by the Consul at Ahwaz without the previous sanction of the British Minister in Tehran who alone could decide whether it would be possible to save the situation by bringing pressure to bear on the Central Government in Tehran.

5. Pipe Line and Pumping Stations.

The only source of danger which it is necessary to consider is anarchy in Arabistan. Such anarchy might spring from any one of three causes :-

(a) The death of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

(b) A purely Arab revolt against the authority of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

(c) A conflict between Persian Government troops and the forces of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I will deal with these causes seriatim:-

(a) No immediate threat to the pipe line or pumping stations need be anticipated. Our policy would be to force the Persian Government to recognise pro tem any son or sons of the Sheikh who seemed most likely to cope with the situation successfully, and to support the latter in the manner indicated in (2) supra. Evacuation would follow if the situation became desperate.

(b) The threat to the pipe line and pumping stations would be more immediate. Action should be taken as described in (2) supra followed by evacuation if necessary. It should be remembered that the intervention of British troops on the side of the Sheikh might introduce a fanatical element into the struggle and thereby increase the numbers and resisting power of the hostile faction.

(c) Danger to the pipe line and pumping stations need not be anticipated. There would be grave diplomatic reasons against any intervention by British troops. The problem of affording

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

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affording protection to the Company's property would be dominated by the larger issue namely, the extent to which H.M.~~xxxx~~ Government are prepared to redeem their pledge to support the Sheikh against encroachment by the Persian Government.

6. Abadan. So far as the protection of the Company's refinery at Abadan is concerned all political factors can be eliminated and the measures to be taken should be determined solely by military necessities.

Sd. E.G.B.Peel.
H.B.M.Consul for Arabistan,
Ahwaz.
the 11th June 1923.

SECRET. H.B.M.Consulate for Arabistan
No. (Ahwaz),
Baghdad, 29th June 1923.

Defence of the South Persian Oilfields.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.116/XXII/4 dated 20th June 1923, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a demi-official letter from Sir Arnold Wilson, dated 18th June, criticising the memorandum enclosed with my letter quoted above.

I have etc.,
Sd. E.G.B.Peel.
H.B.M.'s Consul, Ahwaz,
On tour, BAGHDAD.

The Hon'ble
the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Copies with copies of enclosure forwarded to :-

1. H.E.the High Commissioner for Iraq.
2. His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.
3. H.B.M.'s Vice Consul, Ahwaz.

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



ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY, LIMITED.
MOHAMMERAH.
PERSIAN GULF.
Dated 18th June 1923.

To

E.G.B.Peel, Esquire,
H.B.M.'s Consul, ~~xxxx~~ Ahwaz.

My dear Peel,

I offer the following comments for your consideration on your note of the 11th June, which I return herewith.

I have not seen schemes "A" or "B", nor have I received any reference on the subject from Briggs, I cannot therefore comment with full assurance or in great detail.

Subject to this proviso, however, I am inclined to regard it as unduly pessimistic regarding the presence of a British force in Arabistan being calculated to produce a provocative effect even if that force should be of any considerable strength- say a battalion. We know by experience that a force of this size had a very tranquilising effect in Arabistan at a time when we were in open war with the greatest Mohammedan power in the world and at a time when the Chief Mujtahid was actively preaching a Jehad against us, his son being actually in Arabistan at the time.

It is, however, possible that a small force might be provocative in Bakhtiari, although from our own experience during 1918, when a small force was sent to Tembi, this was not the case. My belief is that a small detachment is invariably regarded as the forerunner of a larger force.

Para. 2. I entirely agree that the protection of property and personnel of the A.P.O.C. both on the oilfields and on the pipe line could, under almost all circumstances be best secured by diplomacy and negotiations and by the supply of arms, munitions and money to friendly Chiefs and tribes.

The



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The despatch of troops seems to me to be likely only in the event of a failure of diplomacy and of a virtual rupture with the Persian Government, as in the case of Bushire, during and before the War.

Para 3. I should say that a considerably smaller force would suffice, and I understand that a Brigade can be sent from India should the Imperial Government so order, and this should suffice, I do not think it follows that any damage which might be inflicted at the Oilfields would normally have been completed before such a force could arrive. We could doubtless hold our own for a time by diplomacy, negotiations, arms and ammunitions, but only for a time and eventually such a force might be necessary.

Para 4. I agree.

Para. 5. I agree.

I think we have no reason whatever to consider that things are likely to reach such a pitch that evacuation would be necessary. Other forces would be called into play and equilibrium would be established provided H.M. Government were in a position to put a small force into the field at short notice.

I do not, however, agree that danger to the pipe line and pumping stations would not occur in the event of a conflict between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

The problem of affording protection to the Company's property must, I agree, be dominated xxx mainly by the general issue, but it is my deliberate opinion that the Bawi and the Chab, if they got out of hand, might do their best to deliberately wreck the pipe line and to do other damage, with a view to forcing H.M. Government to bring pressure to bear on the Persian Government.

Para 6. Your meaning is not quite clear to me.

The Persian Government would object almost as strongly to the presence of troops at Abadan as to the

despatch

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

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

despatch of a detachment to Ahwaz and the political factor could scarcely be excluded; but it is a fact that disorder at Abadan is always possible, apart altogether from the general political situation in Arabistan, as a result of a strike 1, of Persians, 2. Arabs, 3. Indians, 4. Iraqis, or a combination of any or all of these.

There is a definitely dangerous undercurrent at present at Abadan. We have not succeeded in eliminating entirely professional bad characters who find shelter at Abadan from the attentions of the Police in India and Iraq. We are endeavouring to improve our organisation to make it possible to identify and deal with individuals of this sort, and upon our ability to do so, and the ability of the military authorities at Basrah to despatch promptly to Abadan a small force with a view to quelling a possible civil commotion, the safety of Abadan must mainly depend.

I am sending a copy of this letter and of the memorandum therein to London, but am not sending it elsewhere.

Yours sincerely,

Sd. A.T.Wilson

SECRET. SECRETARIAT OF H.E.THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR IRAQ,
BAGHDAD, 20TH JULY 1923.

No. S.O.1246.

Sir,

In reply to your despatch No.350-S., dated 5th July 1923, regarding the defence of the South Persian Oilfields, I am directed to forward for your information copies of the marginally noted correspondence, and to inform you that His Excellency the High Commissioner is in general agreement with the views of the Air Marshal as therein stated.

Copy of despatch No.S.O.1234 dated 18-7-23 from H.E.the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, to H.B.M.'s Minister, Tehran. (with enclosures).

I have etc.,
Sd.M.Chaning Pearce,
Acting Secretary to H.E.the High Commissioner for Iraq.

Secretary to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.



SECRET.

The Residency,
Baghdad, 18th July 1923.

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No.S.O. 1234.

Sir,

I have the honour to invite a reference to my Confidential despatch No. S.O.918 dated 30th May 1923, with regard to the protection of the South Persian Oilfields and to forward for your information in this connection copies of the marginally noted correspondence.

Air Headquarters, Baghdad, despatch No. Air/548/9 dated 4-7-23 with copy of Appendix 2 thereto.

2. You will observe that the Air Officer Commanding has recommended that a larger force is now required under the existing conditions in South West Persia than could safely be transferred from the Iraq Command.

I have etc.,

Sd. H.Dobbs,

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

Sir Percy Lyham Loraine,

Bart, C.M.G.,

H.B.M.'s Minister, Tehran.

Reference:
Air/548/9.

AIR HEADQUARTERS,
BRITISH FORCES IN 'IRAQ,
BAGHDAD.

4th July 1923.

2

To
The Secretary,
The Air Ministry, London.

Subject :- PROTECTION OF SOUTH PERSIA OILFIELDS.

Sir,

I would ask your reference to the Air Ministry letter numbered S.17953/S.6 & addressed on the 18th March 1922 to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, by the terms of which I am instructed to report to the Air Staff any changes which may occur as regards possible dangers to the South Persia Oilfields.

It will be observed that under the provisions of the Air Staff Plan enclosed with that letter responsibility rests upon this Command, in case of emergency, and subject





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to two conditions, to send certain forces for their protection. These conditions are :-

(1) That Military assistance can only be sent if the G.O.C. or A.O.C. considers it will not endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the troops left behind.

(2) That any assistance sent in the shape of men or material be at once replaced from India or elsewhere.

Moreover the forces to be sent, which comprise aircraft, a section of Armoured Cars and two Companies of Infantry, to be drawn upon from the garrison located in the Basrah area, are intended as emergency and temporary measures only, to provide assistance in maintaining law and order; the protracted defence of the oilfields being an Imperial and not a local responsibility.

At the same time the suggestion is advanced that, if there be no diplomatic objection, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should organise a volunteer force from among their employees.

Your attention is also asked to the two secret papers C.I.D. paper No.172:C. and C.I.D.paper No. 173,C. printed for the C.I.D. the references of which are as noted in the margin. In the former of these, prepared in May 1922, it is stated by Lieutenant General Sir A.Haldane that from 4 to 6 Battalions together with 6 to 10 Armoured Cars should make the Oilfields and Pipe Line reasonably safe.

In the latter, the Army Council, in the following month, after consultation with Lieut.General Sir A. Haldane intimated their concurrence in the opinion he then expressed that two Companies of Infantry from the Basrah garrison should be adequate for the protection of the Oilfields against any emergency which could at that time be foreseen.

It is clear from these various letters and memoranda that the Air Staff Plan was designed as a measure to cope with tribal xxxxxxxxxxx disturbances and outbreaks of lawlessness in the Arabistan area and in a less degree

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

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in the Bakhtiari districts; and to afford protection to property in the event of strikes of certain of the Anglo Persian Oil Company's employees.

Other contingencies were at that time considered remote by those on the spot best qualified to form an opinion. It was counted most unlikely that either the Persian Government or the Bakhtiari Chiefs would instigate any disturbances which might threaten the royalties of which they are in receipt, while the attitude of the Sheikh of Mohammerah to the British authorities was entirely satisfactory and he had recently invested considerable sums of money in the Company.

Based therefore on the situation as it stood at that time the Air Staff plan was not designed as a measure to meet such very different needs and contingencies as would arise if political conditions in South West Persia underwent a considerable change.

There is abundant evidence that this change has taken place. Attached hereto as Appendix 1 are telegrams addressed by His Britannic Majesty's Minister Tehran to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. From these telegrams it is clear that the Persian Government have formed the intention, and that in their now renovated army they possess the means, of bringing both the Bakhtiari Chiefs and the Sheikh of Mohammerah into subjection to the Central Government and of ending the state of semi-independence which South West Persia has long enjoyed.

.egram No.128 from H.B.M.Minister Tehran.
to Foreign Office ,dated 30-4-1923.
.egram No.134 --ditto-- dated 5-5-1923.
.egram No. 140--ditto--dated 7-5-1923.

Moreover,although the recent crisis,by which advantage was taken of the Shalil incident of July 1922 to humiliate the Bakhtiari Chiefs, has been for some time averted,this intention has been by no means abandoned by the Persian War Minister,and a similar crisis may arise at any time. Should Persian troops in pursuance of this intention enter either the Bakhtiary or Arabistan areas

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



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areas, the Oilfields and Pipe Line in that area would be exposed to considerable risk. (92)

There can be little doubt that acts of sabotage would be committed against the Oil Company's property with the object of contriving the intervention of the British Government to protect it, while the deeply fanatical population of Arabistan would quickly take the cue and raise anarchy in their turn. The Sheikh of Mohammerah although owning titular control has in effect little authority and would be powerless to guarantee the safety of Ahwaz and the pumping stations.

I would submit that to meet these changed conditions some ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ adjustment of the Air Staff Plan has now become necessary and I beg to forward my recommendations in this respect.

I would most respectfully urge that in the first place our policy from a Military stand-point should be to ensure, and by a specific guarantee if this be possible, that:-

(1) No movement of Persian troops to the areas shall take place for whatever purpose without previous warning.

(2) That as the Persian Government must inevitably be unable to guarantee the safety of the whole area occupied by the Company, this warning shall allow time for ~~H.B.M.~~ H.B.M.'s Government to transfer troops for the protection of the Oilfields during the proposed operations.

(3) That the Persian Government will agree to allow British troops to enter this area for the purpose of protecting British personnel and property.

By this means acts of sabotage or more serious destruction would be avoided and the financial benefits which accrue to all the parties concerned from the security of the fields would be preserved.

On this basis, I submit hereunder a revised plan, together with copies (Appendix II) of reports by Group Captain E.F.Briggs, D.S.O., O.B.E., whom I sent to the Oilfields at the request of His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq.

Revised

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

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Revised Plan. It is most evident from the first part of report No. 1 that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are strongly opposed to the raising of a volunteer force from among their employees except at the refineries at Abadan where a small local security force already exists, primarily to deal with any minor disturbances which might arise in the form of rioting among the native employees. I have considered the arguments adduced and concur in the view held by the Company.

The area to be protected is divisible into two zones and it has been shown that if the Persian Government send troops either to the Bakhtiari or Arabistan areas sabotage and destruction are likely to be instigated in both zones. These zones are :-

(1) The Oilfields, North of a line through ABGUNGIK and DARA-I-KHAZINAH.

(2) The pipe line area through Arabistan from ABGUNGIK to Abadan.

The conditions and necessities of defence differ considerably in each zone.

The Oilfields zone is a basin some 7 miles by 4 surrounded by low hills. If a sufficiently previous warning be given by the Persian Government for the troops to reach this position before any Persian troops approached I consider that as a minimum one battalion at the Fields and one at Dara-i-Khazinah will suffice.

In these circumstances it is unlikely that the Bakhtiari would commit any act of hostility or of sabotage.

If on the other hand no warning were given or the Persian forces had already approached the area before our troops had reached their positions, I consider that not less than one brigade would be required in the area, exclusive of any force required for Line of Communication.

For the second (Pipe Line) zone including Abadan, the following garrisons would be necessary :-

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

(a) At Ahwaz — One battalion.

" Mullah Sanni
" Kut Abdullah
" Dorquaim — One battalion.
" Abadan — Two Companies.

(b) Two sections of armoured cars.

(c) Aircraft. (Two Flights.)

This force could protect the pumping station and plant and the refineries at Abadan and hold the tactical centre at Ahwaz. It could not guarantee the security of the Pipe Line which extends over a distance of some 150 miles. The damage however which could be effected to the Pipe Line itself is inconsiderable and could be easily repaired.

The total garrison thus required for the protection of the Company's area consists of :-

Infantry .....4½ Battalions.
Armoured Cars.....2 Sections.
Aircraft.....2 Flights.

In view of the fact that the garrison of Iraq could not safely be depleted by the Battalions above mentioned, the conclusion arises that the responsibility for the protection of the Oilfields and the Pipe Line areas now assumes an Imperial rather than a local aspect.

I have dealt only with the safeguarding of the Company's interests under what I consider are the conditions that may obtain in the near future as the outcome of the present policy of the Persian War Minister. This policy would appear to have for its object the subjugation of the whole of South Persia to the Central Government.

Its successful attainment however cannot but have far reaching consequences from a British Imperial stand-point.

Should war then break out between Great Britain and a foreign power which could by any means influence or determine the policy of Persia, as a neutral, towards ourselves, the sources of our oil fuel might be closed to us.

Sir Arnold T.Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., C.S.I., D.S.O., has read this report and is in agreement with it.

I have etc.,
Sd. J.M. Salmond,
Air Marshal,

Air Officer Commanding British
forces in Iraq.

Reference: IOR/L/PS/10/965. Copyright for this page: Open Government Licence
View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100110704878.0x000001



(98) 16

1st Report.

Paragraph 1. Suggestions for the raising, equipping and training of a Defence force from among the employees of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

This proposal has been considered a number of times and has invariably been rejected. The only men fit to bear arms are the British, Canadian and American employees and a force would of necessity have to be entirely constituted of volunteers. The arming of a heteregenous admixture of Indians, Lurs, Persians, Arabs, ~~xxxxxx~~ Armenians and Assyrians would be a source of danger rather than a means of protection. Should trouble arise the interests of the Company would best be served by the white employees remaining at their posts as long as possible, thereby instilling confidence amongst the native element. Negotiations would, it is considered, be far more efficacious than endeavouring to meet such trouble by a demonstration of force. The present high prestige of the Company amongst the tribes is not based on force, and any exibition of such unless immediately and entirely successful, would probably lower and eliminate to this valuable asset, apart from being provocative. The firing of a single shot at an inopportune moment, as might easily occur under a volunteer organisation during a state of tension, might result in disaster. This danger is such that the higher officials of the Fields and elsewhere, whose intimate knowledge of the local tribesmen extends over a period of many years, consider that no military firearms should be held at the Fields. The ~~xxxxx~~ training of such a force, even if conditions of work permitted and opportunity offered, could not be carried out without exaggerated reports of military preparations reaching the ears of the Persian authorities at Tehran and would undoubtedly result in diplomatic complications and the arousing of grave suspicions as to annexation of Persian territory by force. Valuable assistance in connection with pioneer work, supplies and transport, etc., could however be afforded by the Company's employees to any military force that under certain circumstances might be sent to the Oilfields or elsewhere.

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

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Any acts of sabotage would in all probability have as their origin the deliberate intention of involving British intervention, either representative or military. The Khans and their tribesmen know full well that permanent damage to the Company's property would react adversely on themselves and in consequence the extent of any damage done would in general be limited by ~~that~~ that amount sufficient only to procure such intervention.

In view of the above the unanimous opinion of a conference, including the Field Manager, Political Representative of the A.P.O.C. and the British Consul for Arabistan, recently held at the Fields, was strongly adverse to the raising of a defence force for the protection of the Company's property either in the Bakhtiari country or in Arabistan, with the exception of Abadan. Abadan however presents a somewhat different aspect in that tribal and political considerations assume small proportions. Trouble at Abadan is far more likely to arise internally in the form of rioting among the native employees than from the neighbouring tribes. A defence force exists in the form of one British Officer and 80 Arabs comprising a security force in addition to the Sheikh's guard of about 120 Arabs. A confidential scheme has already been drawn up to arm approximately 100 of the ~~Ex~~ European employees:
30 Rifles, a number of revolvers and other guns are at present available with a view to guarding the Power House and Pumping Station as being the most vital points. It is suggested that 50 rifles and 10,000 rounds of S.A.A. be either handed over to Abadan or held at Basrah for immediate issue on demand.

Paragraph 2.

Recommendations for the movement, locations and employment of the mobile force from Basrah assisted by Air Action.

General. In the event of military assistance being called for by H.B.M.Consul for Arabistan, it is probable that aerial demonstration will be the first demand, to be followed, if the situation becomes more serious, by demands for Armoured Cars, Fly Boats and troops.

(A) Aircraft.

Movement. One or more flights of Aircraft from Shaibah should proceed

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

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proceed to Ahwaz ~~xxx~~ Aerodrome and receive instructions direct from the Consul.

Location.

At Ahwaz. Provided that no immediate danger is anticipated from the tribes on the right bank of the Karun river, a local guard to be supplied by the Sheikh of Mohammerah should suffice at this Aerodrome.

Should, however, any doubts arise as to the security of this Aerodrome it is suggested that a guard of two Armoured Cars should proceed via Tanoomah across the desert to Ahwaz. Suitable landing ground and other facilities exist adjacent to Kot Abdullah Pumping Station (6 miles from Ahwaz) which should be used if the evacuation of the Ahwaz Aerodrome becomes necessary.

Employment.

Aerial demonstration, patrol of Pipe Line, reconnaissance, dropping of propaganda and messages (in the case of telephone and telegraph wires being cut) would be the first role of the Aircraft, to be followed later by bomb dropping and machine gun fire if necessary, and in accordance with Consular instructions.

(B) Armoured Cars. (i.e. political considerations?)

Movement.

Cars to proceed from Tanoomah to Ahwaz Aerodrome if required as per (A) supra.

Cars to embark at I.W.T. Basrah and disembark at Dorquaim Pumping Station provided roads are not impassable by reason of flood or rain- these cars should proceed up the pipe line to positions as per below.

Locaton.

This depends on the situation, but in general cars should be based at Dorquaim, Kut Abdullah and Mullah Sani Oil Pumping Stations, Ahwaz and Dara-i-Kazinah. It is considered that two cars at each of these stations should suffice.

Employment.

The cars should patrol the Pipe Line, the road from Mullah Sani to Dara-i-Khazinah via Bad-i-Qir bridge, and the upper road to the Oilfields. Circumstances may however necessitate an altera-

tion

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



(101) 19

alteration in this disposition. The preliminary use of these cars would probably be for demonstration; later for actual protection of property, and possible at a still later date to cover an evacuation of civil personnel.

(C) Fly Boats.

~~Xxxxxx~~ Movement.

It is considered desirable that one or more Fly Boats should accompany the transport of Armoured Cars as per (B) supra as far as Dorquaim and then proceed to Ahwaz.

Location.

Normally at Ahwaz, but river patrol below the rapids as required.

Employment.

To impede crossing of Karun by hostile tribesmen; as an additional protectional to the aerodrome; as a means ~~xxxxxx~~ of W/T communication; and to cover any transport of troops across Karun river or possible evacuation.

(D) Troops.

Movement.

Provided two companies are available at Basrah: (a) if no great urgency exists, to embark at I.W.T. and proceed to Ahwaz by river; (b) if time is an important factor, troops could disembark at Dorquaim and proceed by A.P.O.C. M.T. transport to desired locality. Should the situation demand their immediate presence at Ahwaz or Fields, troops can proceed in R.A.F. Transport via Tanoomah across the desert to Ahwaz, provided always that road and situation permit, and thence cross the Karun river. Passage to Fields can be made direct by M.T. from Ahwaz, or by M.T. from Ahwaz to Dara-i-Khazinah and thence by road or rail to Fields.

Location.

Generally at Ahwaz unless the situation demands their presence at the Fields or elsewhere.

Employment.

For purposes of moral effect; protection of the Fields, Pumping Stations and Stores. To cover any possible evacuation of civil

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

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civil personnel.

APPLICABLE TO ABADAN ONLY.

General.

In the event of military assistance being called for the following recommendations are submitted.

(A) AIRCRAFT.

One or more flights of aircraft from Shaibah to proceed and fly over Abadan.

Location.

Owing to the proximity of Shaibah at Abadan and the suitability of the Aerodrome in practically all weathers it is considered unnecessary, when demonstrations only are required, to make use of the existing aerodrome at Mohammerah. Should however circumstances demand, this latter aerodrome could be employed.

Employment.

Aerial demonstration to be followed by bomb dropping and machine gun fire, if circumstances demand, but only at a safe distance from the Oil Tanks and Refinery.

(B) ARMOURED CARS.

Cars to be embarked at I.W.T. Dockyard and to proceed on barges direct to Abadan. When the road from Basrah to opposite Abadan is completed, this route would in dry ~~wk~~ weather be preferable. The cars would then be transported across the Shatt-el-Arab on A.P.O.C. barges.

Location.

At Abadan. On the roads and tracks outside the fencing of the perimeter along the Pipe Line and on the road to Bawarda Petroleum loading station.

Employment.

To guard the Refineries, Oil Tanks and Pipe Line from Tanks to Bahmanshir Channel. Four Armoured cars should suffice.

(C) FLY BOATS.

Movement.

If available, a Fly Boat should be despatched forthwith to Abadan.

Location.

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



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Location.

On the Shatt-el-Arab off the A.P.O.C. property.

Employment.

To cover landing of Armoured Cars and troops as a means of W/T communication; and for bombardments as required.

(D) Troops.

Movement.

To embark at I.W.T. Dockyard and land at Abadan. One Company should suffice for any internal trouble.

Location.

In the vicinity of Refineries and loading Stations.

Employment.

To prevent entry inside the perimeter and for general protection of property.

Paragraph 3.

Means of co-ordinating the action of Paras 1 and 11 above.

As pointed out in para 1 the raising of local defence forces from among the employees of the A.P.O.C. is not considered desirable except at Abadan.

The O.C. Troops on arrival at Abadan to organise the defences, utilising the Security Force, Volunteers, and Arab Guard an additional support.

Sd.E.F.Briggs, Groupe Captain,
Commanding Basrah Group, R.A.F.

Group H.Q.)
R.A.F.
Basrah
15.6.23.)

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

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21 (104) (101)

Minute Paper.

Register No. P. 2 13. [5071/23]

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1923

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	20/1	[illegible]	Persia
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....	23	[illegible]	Protection of A.P.O. Coy's oilfields.
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to ✓

FOR INFORMATION.

The substitution of the Consul at Ahwaz for the Consul at Mohammerah in the original instructions as the authority empowered to apply for assistance is in accordance with recent developments in Arabistan.

J.G. Simpson
19/1/23

W.H. 25/1
E.B. 26/1
rec'd 29/1

SEEN POLITICAL COMMITTEE 30 JAN 1923

Previous Papers :—

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



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 70/70/34
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P
213
1923

Confidential

165
102

M.P. 2815/22

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to The Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
10 Jan. , 1923.

Reference to previous correspondence :
Foreign Office letter of 6 July. 1922 (E 6403/7/34).

8 15 22

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From Hm. Representative at Tehran No. 683 of 22 Nov. 1922.	Protection of South Persian Oilfields.

RECEIVED IN 12 JAN 1923 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office.

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

OPY
E 70/70/34)
o. 683.
ecret

British Legation,
Tehran.
November 22nd, 1922.

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103

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship with reference to your Despatch No. 239 (E 6403/7/34), Secret, of July 5th, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General at Bushire informing me that the Government of India have concurred in his suggestion that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz should be the authority empowered to apply to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Baghdad for military assistance for the defence of the oilfields.

P 2815/22

I have replied by telegram approving Colonel Trevor's proposal.

A copy of the Government of India's telegram No. 1208 S of October 7th is also inclosed herein for reference.

I am sending copies of this Despatch to the Government of India and to Sir P. Cox.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) Percy Loraine.

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e Most Honourable
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.





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TELEGRAM

From Col. Trevor to Sir P. Loraine.

No. 317.

Dated Bushire 17th November 1922 4.30 a.m.

Received Tehran 18th November 1922 6. p.m.

SECRET

Reference to papers forwarded under Legation endorsement No. 62 of September 4th, protection of South Persian Oilfields, para 4.

In view of the arrangements provisionally sanctioned in Foreign's telegram No. 1208 S dated October 7th, the Government of India have concurred in my suggesting it would be more suitable that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz should be the authority empowered to apply to the High Commissioner Baghdad for military assistance in case of emergency. According to present arrangements Consul at Ahwaz would have to request Vice-Consul at Mohammerah to ask for assistance which would of course involve delay and be rather anomalous. Consul at Ahwaz is also of course in a better position to judge whether situation in neighbourhood of oilfields justifies a call for assistance or not. Do you agree?

If so I propose with your approval to instruct His Majesty's Consular Officer at Mohammerah and Ahwaz accordingly. Presume you will bring this change of detail to the notice of the Foreign Office and High Commissioner, Mesopotamia.

(Signed) TREVOR.

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



108

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 IN SIR P. LORAINE'S DESPATCH NO. 683 of November 22, 1922.

Copy

TELEGRAM

Foreign Simla to Sir P. Loraine

NO. 1208 S Dated 7.10.22 10.45 p.m.

Received Tehran 8.10.22 12 noon

Your telegram of the 2nd of May No. 826.

Secretary of State for India has sanctioned with effect from the 23rd September 1922, proposals contained in your 257 S of May 3rd 1921, regarding Ahwaz, Mohammerah and Dizful as purely provisional arrangement up till March 1st 1923, pending consideration by Retrenchment Committee of whole case of expenditure in Persian Gulf and subject to modifications and conditions specified below.

(A) Ahwaz Consul for Arabistan usually to be officer of about 15 years Civil Service with Vice Consul of about 7 years service, Mohammerah and Dizful Vice-Consuls of about 10 years service, all officers will draw special pay of Rupees 200 per mensem in view of climate etc. and Consul at Ahwaz and Vice Consuls at Mohammerah and Dizful sumptuary allowance of rupees 100 a month each. Vice Consul Mohammerah will draw compensation allowance of 200 a month.

(B) Abolition of Consular Surgeon Mohammerah and (2) dispensary and sub-assistant surgeon at Ahwaz and transfer of medical charge of Consular staff to Anglo-Persian Oil Company doctor, vide my memorandum No.2,495 /240 Est. of August 24th.

(C)/

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



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(C) Lincoln on return from leave to continue to hold charge as Vice Consul at Mohammerah and receive while so employed special rate of Rs. 200, compensation allowance of Rs. 200 and sumptuary allowance of Rs. 100 in addition to his other emoluments as quarantine medical.

(D) Retention of Wallis as Vice Consul Dizful on contract pay, orders regarding his replacement on demobilisation will issue separately.

(E) Re-employment of Peel at Ahwaz on his return from leave in November.

(F) Holding in abeyance for the present of Mohammerah escort and substitution of locally recruited escort at Ahwaz.

(G) Discontinuance of personal allowance of Rs. 170 a month of Moonshi at Dizful.

(H) Reduction of local allowances proposed for Head-Clerks at Ahwaz and Mohammerah to Rs. 50 a month each.

(I) 50% of any increase in (?) any existing post and 15% of pay of any new shall be treated as bonus and liable to reduction if prices fall as in case of other Persian and Persian Gulf establishments.

(J) Kran exchange compensation will be drawn when admissible.

(K) A further communication will be made regarding Shushtar.

Addsd to Bushire repeated to Tehran.

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



110

Minute Paper.

Register No. P. 5041.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 192 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary	11.1		Persia
Secretary of State...			
Committee.....	12		Protection of the oil-fields.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy to
India
18 JAN 1923

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
17 JAN 1923

FOR INFORMATION.

H.E. F.O. support Sir P. Lorraine's objection to the issue of an invitation to the A.P.O.C. to form a local volunteer force.

J.A.S. 8/1

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Previous Papers—

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



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 14002/7/34
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P 5071 1922

537/21

Mr. Hobbs 4795 No.

INDEXED

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to The Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
28 Dec., 192 2

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 29 DEC 1922

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From Committee of Imperial Defence of 12 Dec. 1922.	Protection of Anglo-Persian Oilfields

Copy to India
18 JAN 1923

2

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office
War Office
Air Ministry

29 DEC 1922 CENTRAL REGISTRY FOREIGN OFFICE

14—[8628 B] 7 | 22 [9205] 5M 12 | 22 F.O.P. (2)



Sir,

(E 8407/7

Committee

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

P
5071.
1922

(112)

(109)

4002/7/34).

IDENTIAL.

20/H/5.

Committee of Imperial Defence,
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W.
12th December, 1922.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that your note (E 8407/7/34) dated August 29th, 1922, to the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, was considered by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee at their 28th Meeting on the 6th December, 1922.

The Committee took note of the fact that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston was opposed to the issue of an invitation to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to form a local volunteer force from among its European employees.

I am, etc.,
(Sd). J.R. Chancellor,
Secretary,
Standing Defence Sub-Committee.

e Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office.

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



(113)
116

COPY
(E 8407/7/34).

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and begs leave to inform him that the correspondence regarding the protection of the South Persia Oil Fields was referred to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran after a meeting had been held between representatives of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office in accordance with the recommendation in paper 168/C Secret of the 8th May.

2. After a perusal of the papers Sir P. Loraine now enquires whether he is to regard the instructions sent to him as including the issue of an invitation to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to form a volunteer force, and adds that it appears to him that the Persian Government would be fully justified in objecting to such action.

3. Sir E. Crowe is to add that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston shares Sir P. Loraine's view and is informing him accordingly. Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. Hankey will thus see that the opinion expressed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in their letter of the 19th July to the Secretary of the War Office, circulated in Secret paper 178/C is shared both by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and Lord Curzon.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
29th August, 1922.

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

Reference: IOR/L/PS/10/965. Copyright for this page: Open Government Licence
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

Put away with 534/21

(xi) (114)

Minute Paper.

Register No. P. 4060

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 192 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary ..... Secretary of State... Committee..... Under Secretary..... Secretary of State...	14.x		Persia Protection of A.P.O. Coy's oilfields

Copy to ✓

FOR INFORMATION.

The instructions issued by Sir P. Loraine to H.M.'s Consul at Muhammerah are in accordance with the procedure laid down in C.O. letter of 27th June last (P 2815 below).

J.A.S. 10/10/22

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
24 OCT 1922

17/10

19/10

2

Previous Papers—

5273 1500 3.22



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6178/7/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

UNDERSECRETARY

Secret

P
4060
1922

hwd
115
A.P. 2815
etc.
3943
$2/10

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

RECEIVED IN
6 OCT 1922

Foreign Office,
Oct 4, 1922.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Foreign Office letter of July 6, 1922 (E 6403/7/34).

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
from H.M. Minister, Tehran, dispatch No 550, Sept. 4, 1922.	Protection of South Persia Oilfields.

2

14 F.O.P. 5M 7 | 22 [8628 B] 5M 9 | 22 [8824]

Similar letter sent to War Office
Colonial Office





178/7/34)

550.

Secret.

P
4060
1922

British Legation,
Tehran.
September 4, 1922.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith, copies of the documents mentioned in the subjoined schedule.

References:- Foreign Office telegram No. 216 of August 28, 1922.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) Percy Loraine.

Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

To H.M.Consul at Mohammerah — Protection of South Persia Oilfields.
No. 8 September 4, 1922.

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

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g R E T.

8.

(114A)

(117)

British Legation,

Gulhek,

4th September, 1922.

Sir,

I have to transmit to you, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, the accompanying instructions regarding the defence of the South Persian Oilfields to be carried out in the event of an emergency arising.

These instructions do not in any way absolve you from the responsibility of keeping me fully informed regarding your area.

You should acknowledge the safe receipt of this Despatch by telegram.

A copy of this Despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Secretary to the Foreign and Political Department, Simla, His Excellency The High Commissioner, Baghdad and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Bushire, Ispahan, Shiraz and Ahwaz.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) Percy Loraine.

2

incoln Esq., M.B.E.,
is Majesty's Consul at
Mohammerah.





...ORET.

(118)

PROTECTION OF THE SOUTH PERSIAN OILFIELDS.

1. Area affected.

The area in which the Anglo Persian Oil Company's concessions are situated may be divided into the Bakhtiari or hill district, in the Southern portion of which the oil fields proper are situated, and the Arabistan or plain district between the oil fields proper and Mohammerah. For various reasons, trouble is least likely to break out in the Bakhtiari district, in view of the allowances made to the Bakhtiari Khans and the fact that they have always maintained cordial relations with the Anglo Persian Oil Company.

The Arabistan area is in another category. The populace is deeply fanatical and readily joined the Turkish "jehad" in 1915. Though this area is controlled by the Sheikh of Mohammerah, whose interest it is to maintain order, he cannot guarantee this area against an outbreak of lawlessness. The problem is, therefore, to a great extent that of overawing the tribes in Arabistan and, to a lesser degree, of ensuring the safety of installations throughout the Bakhtiari country and at Abadan.

2. Collection of information.

The Air Ministry has undertaken the responsibility for obtaining information regarding possible dangers to the oilfields, for the collection of which the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Mesopotamia is directly responsible. His Majesty's Consuls at Mohammerah and Ahwaz and His Majesty's

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



-2-

Majesty's Consul General at Bushire will render any assistance required in this respect by the Air Staff, at the same time keeping His Majesty's Minister at Tehran fully informed.

3. Force available.

In case of emergency, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Mesopotamia is responsible for providing military assistance for the protection of the South Persian Oilfields, provided that the despatch of these troops will not endanger the situation in Irak or the position of the troops left behind.

4. Procedure for requesting assistance.

If it appears that the oilfields are threatened by danger of such a magnitude that the local means of defence will be unable to meet it, His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah shall apply to the High Commissioner at Baghdad for assistance, informing the Government of India, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, His Majesty's Consul General at Bushire, and His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz of his action. The High Commissioner, Baghdad, shall communicate the request to his Chief Military Adviser. The latter will be responsible for providing the assistance required, if he is in a position to do so.

His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz will keep in the closest touch with His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah and keep the latter fully informed of the situation in his area.

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

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21 (116) (120)

Minute Paper.

Register No. P. [2815] {2981}

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 192 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary	25. iii	[illegible]	S. Persia
Secretary of State...			
Committee.....	29	[illegible]	Protection of the A.P.O. Coy's oilfields.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy to

India

17 AUG 1922

FOR INFORMATION.

In accordance with the recommendation of the C.I.D. the C.O. & the F.O. have consulted together in order to define the channel of communication by which requests for assistance ~~the~~ to the oilfields should reach the A/G.O.C., Iraq.

It has been decided that H.M.'s Consul, Mohammerah, shall apply to the Hgh Commr., Baghdad, for assistance, informing the G.O.C. & his superior officers of his action. The H.C., in turn, shall communicate the request to his Chief Military Adviser.

The C.I.D. have also agreed that the qualified promise of assistance

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Previous Papers—

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

given by the S. of S. for the C. is sufficient to meet the needs of the situation, and that the A.P.O.C. should be invited to organise a local volunteer force from its European employees.

Secy. Military Dept

For information

579½
1922

J.G. Simpson
18/7/22

Seen thanks
Alex Thorne
20/7/22

P 2781 (C.O. instructions to Sir P. Cox) has now been added to the file
gus.
21/7/

17 AUG 1922
RECEIVED
18 JUL 192



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12b.

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted :—
32576/1922

2981
1922

WH 12/4
2815 TC 21
#566/21 TC
534/21

Subject : Protection of South Persian Oil Fields.

INDEXED

Reference to previous correspondence :

Letter from the Colonial Office of the 29th of December, 1922.

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the—

Admiralty,
Air Ministry,
~~Board of Trade,~~
~~Department of Overseas Trade,~~
Foreign Office,
~~General Post Office,~~
Home Office,
India Office,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
Ministry of Food,
Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Labour,
Ministry of Munitions,
Ministry of Pensions,
Ministry of Shipping,
The Clearing Office (Enemy Debts),
~~Treasury,~~
War Office.
C'tee of Imperial Defence

Copy to India
17 AUG 1922

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
18 JUL 1922

CENTRAL REGISTRY
18 JUL 1922

Under Secretary of State,
India Office
Colonial Office, Downing Street,
17 July 1922

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

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

COMMISSIONER
MAJOR GENERAL
SIR PERCY COX, G.C.M.G.,C.C.I.E.,K.C.S.C.,
&c., &c., &c.





not meet it, His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah should apply to you for assistance, at the same time informing the Government of Iraq and his superior officers of his action. You would then communicate the request to your Chief Military Adviser, who will be responsible for providing the assistance required if he is in a position to do so. He will be guided in the discharge of this duty by the first of the three principles enumerated in the letter to the Committee of Imperial Defence of the 21st of December last viz:- "that military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding considers that it will not endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the troops that are left behind". Finally it will be for you to keep His Majesty's Government, the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran fully informed on all points connected with the request for assistance and the decision taken thereon by the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding.

4. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is being requested to notify His Majesty's Consuls in Persia that this procedure has been approved.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant.

(Signed) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL





IEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E. 6403/4/34
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

(P) 534/21.
P.P. 2347 re.
120
Mr S
to o.
124
P 2815 1922
Secret

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India.

and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
6 July, 1922.

Reference to previous correspondence:

✓

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
No. H.M. Representative Tehran Despatch No. 239. 5 July.	Protection of South Persia Oilfields.

Copy to India
17 AUG 1922

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
7 JUL 1922

2

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office.

14—F.O.P. 5M 4|22 [8306] (2)





COPY.

No. 239.

(E 6403/7/34.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

5th July, 1922.

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence on the subject of the defence of the South Persian oilfields.

2. You should be guided by the procedure laid down in Colonial Office letter No. 28734/1922 of June 27th, and should issue the necessary instructions to His Majesty's Consular officers in the Persian Gulf with a view to its adoption.

I am, with great truth and regard,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

Sir P. Loraine, Bart., C.M.G.,

&c., &c., &c.





y.

5143/7/34)

P 2815

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th. May 1922.

I feel sure you have received a copy of paper 168.C.Secret from the Committee of Imperial Defence of May 8th. regarding the protection of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oil fields in Arabistan. In paragraph 7 on page 2 the recommendation is that the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office should define the channel of communication by which requests for assistance should reach the General Officer Commanding.

Do you propose to write to us on the subject or would it suit you better to have a small meeting one day to disucss it? If so, will you let me hear what time and place would suit you.

(Signed) Lancelot Oliphant

John Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.

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



(127) (128)

2815

COPY.

(E 6403/7/34.)

28734/1922.

COLONIAL OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET.
27th June, 1922.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to Mr. Oliphant's semi-official letter (No. E 5143/7/34), dated May 25th, regarding the protection of the Anglo-Persian Company's oil-fields in Arabistan. At an informal meeting between representatives of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office which took place on June 21st, the following procedure was provisionally agreed upon for adoption in cases when assistance in the protection of the oil-fields is required from Iraq.

2. If it appears that the oil-fields are threatened by danger of such magnitude that the local means of defence will be unable to meet it, His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah shall apply to the High Commissioner, Baghdad, for assistance, informing the Government of India and his superior officers of his action. The High Commissioner, Baghdad, shall communicate the request to his Chief Military Adviser. The latter will be responsible for providing the assistance required if he is in a position to do so. He will be guided in the discharge of this duty by the first of the three principles enumerated in Paragraph 2 of the Note (No. 168-C.) circulated by the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 8th May, viz:- "that "military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer "Commanding or Air Officer Commanding considers it will not "endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the "troops that are left behind." As will be seen from Sir J. Chancellor's/

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he Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



(124)
(128)

Chancellor's letter to this Department of the 30th May, a copy of which is enclosed, the proposals contained in the note referred to were approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their meeting of the 24th May. It will be for the High Commissioner to keep His Majesty's Government, the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran fully informed on all points connected with the request for assistance and the decision taken thereon by the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding.

3. I am to say that Mr. Churchill approves the above procedure and proposes, if the Earl of Balfour agrees to instruct the High Commissioner accordingly.

4. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

I am, etc.,

(Sgd.) J.E. SHUCKBURGH.

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



COPY.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE,
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
S.W.
30th May, 1922.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Reference 20/H/5.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the memorandum of the Air Staff on the defence of the Anglo-Persian Oilfields, enclosed in Colonial Office letter No. 16846/1922 of the 19th April, 1922, (C.I.D.168-C), was considered by the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at their meeting of the 24th May, 1922.

The Committee agreed:-

(a) That the qualified promise of assistance from Iraq given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies was sufficient to meet the needs of the situation.

(b) That the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should be invited to organise a local volunteer force from its European employees.

I am, etc.,
(Sgd.) J.R. CHANCELLOR.
Secretary,
Standing Defence Sub-Committee.

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he Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.





COPY.

E 6403/7/34.

2815

126

130

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
5th July, 1922.

Sir,

I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 28734/1922 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the protection of the South Persian oilfields, and to inform you that His Lordship concurs in the procedure proposed therein.

2. The Secretary of State is therefore informing His Majesty's Minister at Tehran of the policy to be adopted, and is requesting him to issue the necessary instructions to His Majesty's Consular officers in the Persian Gulf.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

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

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. *May* 1922.

SECRET.
168-C.

Military Secretary, AD 16.5.22
Mr. Wheely, DSD
Sir W. Duke, 7-17-5
S.of S., P 2/5
SWS. 16/5.

14

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

PROTECTION OF SOUTH PERSIA OIL-FIELDS.

(Previous C.I.D. Paper No. 157–C.)

Note by Secretary.

AT their Sixteenth Meeting on the 26th November, 1921, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee arrived at the following conclusions:—

"(*a.*) That the Air Ministry should be invited to undertake the responsibility for obtaining information regarding possible dangers to the oil-fields.

"(*b.*) Since the Colonial Office and the Air Ministry are the Departments which will shortly be responsible for all matters in connection with Mesopotamia, these Departments should accept the liability for keeping up-to-date plans for the despatch from Mesopotamia to Ahwaz of a force for the preliminary defence of the oil-fields in an emergency."

2. The views of the Secretary of State for the Colonies on paragraph (*b*) of the above conclusions are stated in a letter dated the 21st December, 1921, which is printed as Annexure I to this note.

In that letter he explained that his qualified promise of assistance from Iraq is conditional upon the acceptance of the three principles stated below:—

"(1.) That military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding considers it will not endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the troops that are left behind.

"(2.) That any assistance sent in the shape of men or material be at once replaced from India or elsewhere.

"(3.) That all financial liability involved in the despatch of troops from Iraq to South Persia be borne by the Government Department which calls for such assistance. Should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company themselves apply for assistance, it is suggested that they be made responsible for all financial liability incurred."

2

3. A letter from the Colonial Office, dated the 19th April, 1922, transmitting a copy of a scheme prepared by the Air Staff for the protection of the South Persian Oil-fields in certain eventualities and accepting the responsibility for obtaining information regarding possible dangers to the oil-fields in accordance with paragraph (*a*) of the conclusions of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee, is printed as Annexure II to this note.

4. It will be seen from the Memorandum by the Oversea Defence Committee (C.I.D. Paper No. 157–C) that the turbulent and fanatical tribes in Arabistan, who are very susceptible to Mahommedan agitators, are the most serious menace to the security of the oil-fields; and it is also possible that the Bakhtiari, acting under outside influence, might abandon their present friendly attitude.

Lawlessness in Arabistan or a Bakhtiari attack are likely to be connected with anti-British agitation in Iraq; so that it is doubtful if the first condition under which military assistance would be available from Iraq could be complied with.

5. The action proposed to be taken by the Air Force in certain eventualities is set forth in paragraph 11 of the Air Staff Memorandum of the 19th April.

Reference: IOR/L/PS/10/965. Copyright for this page: Open Government Licence
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

In paragraph 12 of the Air Staff Memorandum it is proposed that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should, if there is no diplomatic objection, be requested to organise a volunteer force from their European employees for the immediate protection of their stations. This proposal offers a means of providing additional security to the oil-fields without throwing serious expenditure upon the Imperial Government.

6. The questions for consideration are :—

(1.) Whether the qualified promise of military assistance from Iraq given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies is sufficient to meet the needs of the situation as discussed at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee.

(2.) Whether the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should be authorised to organise a local volunteer force from among its European employees.

7. A subsidiary point is raised by the Air Staff in their Memorandum, namely, that the channel of communication by which demands for assistance should reach the General Officer Commanding (Air Officer Commanding) should be clearly defined by the Foreign Office and Colonial Office in consultation, since time may not permit of reference home.

(Signed) J. R. CHANCELLOR
(for Secretary, C.I.D.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
May 8, 1922.

ANNEXURE I.

Copy of Letter from Colonial Office to Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 21, 1921.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th November in which you report the conclusions arrived at regarding the protection of the South Persian Oil-fields.

2. You are doubtless approaching the Air Ministry on the subject of paragraph (*a*).

3. With regard to paragraph (*b*), Mr. Churchill feels that, as the garrison of Iraq constitutes the nearest Imperial force to the South Persian Oil-fields, he cannot refuse in case of emergency to send troops for their protection if and when required. But he must definitely decline to accept a position of responsibility for the defence of the fields. The garrison of Iraq is in the course of being reduced to the bare minimum required for local defence, and circumstances may well arise in which it would be impossible to send a single man out of the country.

4. Mr. Churchill regards the protection of the South Persian Oil-fields as a matter of Imperial concern, and outside the functions of this Office as the authority charged with the administration of the mandate for Iraq. He must accordingly make it clear that his qualified promise of assistance is conditional upon the acceptance of the three principles stated below :—

(1.) That military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding considers it will not endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the troops that are left behind.

(2.) That any assistance sent in the shape of men or material be at once replaced from India or elsewhere.

(3.) That all financial liability involved in the despatch of troops from Iraq to South Persia be borne by the Government Department which calls for such assistance. Should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company themselves apply for assistance, it is suggested that they be made responsible for all financial liability incurred.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

ANNEXURE II.

(Secret.)

Copy of Letter from Colonial Office to Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Sir, *Downing Street, April* 19, 1922.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to the letter from this Department of the 21st December, No. 59901/21, regarding the protection of the South Persian Oil-fields, and to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a scheme of defence which has been prepared by the Air Staff.

2. Subject to the conditions laid down in the Colonial Office letter of the 21st December, referred to above, Mr. Churchill accepts the views expressed in the Air Staff Memorandum, and he assumes that the Committee of Imperial Defence will now take up the matter with the other Government Departments concerned.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HUBERT YOUNG.

Enclosure to Annexure II.

Plan for the Assistance to be Afforded for the Defence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Property in South-West Persia.

Memorandum by the Air Staff.

Introductory Note.

The Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at a meeting on the 26th November, 1921, arrived at the following conclusions:—

(*a.*) That the Air Ministry should be invited to undertake the responsibility for obtaining information regarding possible dangers to the oil-fields.

(*b.*) Since the Colonial Office and the Air Ministry are the Departments which will shortly be responsible for all matters in connection with Iraq, these Departments should accept the liability for keeping up to date plans for the despatch from Mesopotamia to Ahwaz of a force for the preliminary defence of the oil-fields in an emergency.

2. The Air Ministry has accepted the responsibility under (*a*). As regard (*b*), the Colonial Office declines to accept responsibility for the defence of the South Persian Oil-fields, but will not refuse in case of emergency to send troops for their protection, if and when required, subject to the following conditions:—

(1.) That military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding considers it will not endanger either the situation in Iraq or the position of the troops left behind.

(2.) That any assistance sent in the shape of men or material be at once replaced from India or elsewhere.

(3.) That all financial liability involved in the despatch of troops from Iraq to South Persia be borne by the Government Department which calls for such assistance. Should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company themselves apply for assistance, it is suggested that they be made responsible for all financial liability incurred.

It is on the assumption that these conditions of the Colonial Office are accepted that the following outline plan is put forward:—

3. The area in which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concessions are situated may be divided into the Bakhtiari or hill district, in the southern portion of which the oil-fields proper are situated, and the Arabistan or plain district between the oil-fields proper and Mohammerah.

The work on the oil-fields in the Bakhtiari district has at no time during the last twelve years been interrupted even for a day by local disturbance, and in Arabistan only once, for about six weeks, on the occasion of the Turkish incursion in 1915 (Sir A. T. Wilson, the 8th October, 1920).

Reference: IOR/L/PS/10/965. Copyright for this page: Open Government Licence
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It is on this occasion, 1915, that a force was first sent to the oil-fields. It was gradually reduced to very small proportions in 1919 and 1920.

Possible Enemies.

4. In a paper submitted to the Oversea Defence Committee in August 1921 the War Office dismissed the idea of an attack by Bolsheviks owing to the absence of roads over an extent of 400–500 miles of inhospitable country.

They also agreed that it would be improbable that the Persian Government would instigate an attack in view of the 10 per cent. royalty of which they are in receipt. For a similar reason, the fact that they receive a 3 per cent. royalty on oil exported from the country, the Bakhtiari were stated to be unlikely to give trouble, and with this view Sir A. T. Wilson is in agreement. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company has always been on good terms with the Bakhtiari natives, and appears to be generally popular.

5. The Arabistan area, however, comes into another category. The populace is deeply fanatical, and readily joined the Turkish "jehad" in 1915. The Sheikh of Mohammerah, whose nominal control they own, has in reality little influence over them, and though it is to his interest to protect the pipe-line and pumping stations, in view of the important advantages he receives in the shape of rents, &c., and though he is entirely pro-British, he cannot guarantee these fields against an outbreak of lawlessness. This view is held both by Sir A. T. Wilson and the War Office.

The problem is, therefore, to a great extent that of overawing the tribes in Arabistan, and, to a lesser degree, the ensuring the safety of installations throughout the Bakhtiari country and at Abadan.

Important Points to be Protected.

6. The direct protection of the oil bores and pipe-line would be most difficult in view of the great extent of country involved, but the points of primary importance are fortunately few in number; these are the pumping stations, workshops and refineries. Taken from north to south, they are as follows:—

In Bakhtiari country—
Tambi, pumping station: 2–3 Europeans and 30–40 natives.
Daira Khazina, water-pumping station: 2–3 Europeans and 30–40 natives.
Mulla Sani, pumping station: 2–3 Europeans and 30–40 natives.

In Arabistan proper—
Ahwaz, workshops and stores: 20 Europeans and 260 natives.
Kut Abdulla, pumping station: 2–3 Europeans and 30–40 natives.
Derakwani, pumping station: 2–3 Europeans and 30–40 natives.
Abadan, refineries: 70 Europeans and 5,000 natives.

7. With the exception of Ahwaz and Abadan, referred to below, these pumping stations are enclosed in strong unclimbable wire fences. If small blockhouses be built at each of these posts manned by the company's employees, they should be capable of resisting attack for a considerable period.

8. At Ahwaz and Abadan the problem is greater, since the area to be covered is larger, but the provision of wire-enclosed perimeters (already constructed at Abadan) should render these places also safe from sudden rushes. Ahwaz may be taken as a convenient centre for occupation by troops, if required. It is 70 miles from Abadan and 60 miles from the actual oil-fields.

Communications.

9. The best communications are by river: width averages 300 yards; current, 6 miles per hour to 2½ miles per hour; navigable for craft drawing 5–6 feet:—

(*a.*) From Basra to Ahwaz is thirty-six to seventy-two hours by steamer. Three at least locally-owned craft can be counted as available, and will tow barges without difficulty to Ahwaz at all seasons. There are, however, rapids just below the town where steamers generally tranship cargoes. Four hundred and fifty men with ten days' rations can always travel by this route.

(*b.*) Ahwaz to Daira Khazina is approximately twenty-four hours by steamer

10. Road communications are primitive and cannot be relied on in hot weather. Under suitable conditions—

(*a.*) Basra to Ahwaz, Mohammerah to Ahwaz can be traversed by light motor transport in eight to twelve hours.

(*b.*) Roads passable for light motor transport are understood to exist between—

Ahwaz and Shush.
Ahwaz and Shustar.
Shustar and Disful.

(*c.*) There are two alternative light motor roads from Ahwaz to Daira Khazina and thence on to the oil-fields.

11. There is an aerodrome 1,400 yards by 800 yards at Ahwaz.

(i.) The squadron at Shaiba will carry out demonstration flights at intervals, landing as necessary on the Ahwaz aerodrome.

(ii.) A section of armoured cars and two companies of infantry from the garrison of Basra will be earmarked as a mobile force for despatch by road and river as required, provided conditions in Iraq permit.

(iii.) In the event of unrest being anticipated demonstration flights will be made on receipt of a request from a duly authorised source. During these flights propaganda leaflets will be dropped as required.

(iv.) In the event of unrest coming to a head, warning will be given and punitive action by air undertaken and continued till the situation is restored. This action will be undertaken from Shaiba reinforced, if necessary, from Bagdad.

(v.) If circumstances justify it, aerial action will be supported by armoured cars, and in the last resort by despatch of two companies of infantry by river to the scene of the disturbance.

The above procedure to assist in maintaining law and order (subject to the provisos alluded to in the introductory note above) should ordinarily suffice, but must be regarded as emergency and temporary measures only. The protracted defence of the oil-fields is an Imperial and not a local responsibility.

12. It is suggested that in addition to the measures mentioned the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should organise a volunteer force from their employees for the immediate protection of their stations, if there is no diplomatic objection, and that such schemes should be discussed with the General Officer Commanding (Air Officer Commanding).

13. Finally, the channel of communication by which demands for assistance should reach the General Officer Commanding (Air Officer Commanding) must be clearly defined by the Foreign and Colonial Offices in consultation, since time may not permit of reference home.

Air Staff, April 19, 1921.

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



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Register No. P. 2347.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter / Telegram from — Dated — Rec. — 1922.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	13. 6	WL	S. Persia.
Secretary of State.	14	ALL	Defence of the S. Persian oil fields in the event of emergency
Committee.....			Extent of India's liability
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to India C.I.D. R.A. W.O. Adm'y

22 JUN 1922

19 JUN 1922

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

M. & C.O. forwarding remarks with Enl.

Letter to C.O. 19 JUN 1922

Previous Papers—

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

Military Secretary

for information or remarks. The letter to Mr Howell is replying is flagged with a green slip, & the corr.ce between C.O. and C.I.D. is immediately below but he has not seen the Air Ministry's reply to C.O. letter of 29 Dec.

D. Thompson
10.VI.22

No remarks. This meets para 4(2) of Col Office letter.

A.P. Trotter
12.6.22

It would seem to be as well to lay India's views before the other Depts concerned at once, in order that there may be no misunderstanding as to her position if the emergency does arise.

Draft letter submitted.

raft Paper. Department.

135

131

Book

Confidential

U.S.S.
C.O.

Sir 19 JUN 1922

I am dir: by the S. of S. f. I.
to refer to the corr: ending with
a copy was enclosed in your printed
letter No 59901 of 29th Dec: last
on the subject of the protection
of the A.P.O.C's oil fields in
S. Persia, and to transmit
for the info: of Sec: Churchill
copy of the marginally noted
corr: with the F.O. on the
question.

Viscount Peel concurs in the
stipulations made by the F.O.
in regard to the dispatch from
India of troops to replace any
sent from Iraq to defend the
oil fields, (in the event of emergency) apprehends
& understands that
these stipulations do not in any
way conflict with the intention
of para: 4 of your letter of 21st Dec:
to Sir J. Chancellor.

A copy of this letter enclosures is being
sent to the C.I.D., W.O., F.O., & Admty?

(sd) Hy. Garnett

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F. Sec to F.O. Ps661 2.12.1.22
F.O. to I.O. 1'508/24 Ext. 2.18.5.22

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

From

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INDEXED

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P 2347 1922

No. 828 /24-Ext.

A.P. 5661/21
763/22
132
136

From

The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department,

To

L. D. Wakely, Esquire,
Secretary, Political Department,
India Office, London.

Dated Simla, the 18th May 1922.

Protection of Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Oil fields.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 7 JUN 1922

Sir,

I am directed to refer to your letter No.P-5661, dated the 12th January 1922, regarding the defence of the South Persian Oil fields.

2. As far as the Government of India are in a position to judge, one Infantry Brigade, with a proportion of other arms, seems the maximum that is likely to be required for this purpose. To this extent they are prepared to replace troops sent from Mesopotamia to the oil fields in the event of emergency, on the express understanding that (a) no financial liability whatsoever will fall upon India, and (b) that the external and internal situation of India at the time permits of their despatch to Mesopotamia.

3. It would further be stipulated that, in the event of troops being despatched to Mesopotamia for the purpose in question, the transaction would be one between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government, and that the Government of India should have no relation, direct or indirect, with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company or any third party. His Majesty's Government would therefore be required to accept the financial liability involved, and such liability would extend to all the charges which the Government of India propose to levy in respect of other troops supplied to overseas garrisons for the purposes of His Majesty's Government. This would of course include charges incurred in India in

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



(137) (133)

connection with maintenance and relief of the troops employed: a percentage charge to cover administrative and accounting work done in India, also in connection with the troops employed full non-effective charges: and the cost of supernumeraries.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

for Secretary to the Government of India.

With 3 spare copies.

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



PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

Register No. P. 5661

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(134) (138)

Letter / Telegram from

Dated

Rec. 192

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	7. i	Gh	Persia.
Secretary of State.	9	ABL	Defence of the A.P.O.C.'s fields & pipe-line.
Committee.....			
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to India 5 JAN 1922

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

M. & G. 1. (F.P.D.) forwarding Letter to Govt of I 12 January

2

Previous Papers—

2806—2 1000 11/20



Military Secretary

for information, or remark.

The C.I.D. decision (a) seems a little odd, if it expresses what is intended. The collection of "information regarding possible dangers to the oil-fields" would seem to fall naturally within the scope of political officers. Perhaps what is meant is information regarding dangers with which the R.A.F. could deal.

As regards decision (b) please see the C.O's reply to Sir T. Chancellor, & especially para: 4.(2).

As regards para 4.(3) of the C.O. letter, the Govt. Dept. most likely to call for assistance would be the Admiralty & next the F.O. India is not likely to raise the cry in any circumstances. But the suggestion that the APOC might raise the cry and be asked to pay the bill seems to be met by the opening words of para: 4 — "In Churchill regards the protection of the S. Persian Oilfields "as a matter of Imperial concern"; see in this connection Sir A. Cobbold's note of 10.2.21. — passage marked B in P.537/21

S. Montagu
2.1.

The question is one which must be settled by the C.I. It is certainly an Imperial concern, not Indian; in the event of trouble, no doubt India, if asked for assistance, would give it — provided she had not to pay — The idea of asking the APOC to is ingenious but it is unlikely that they would agree.

A. Chamberlain
5/1/22



Minute Paper. Department.

(139) (135)

The question is certainly not one of Indian concern in the first or even the second instance; but the extent to which India would be involved practically*, in the event of a tangible threat to the oil-fields developing, is potentially so serious that it seems desirable to forward the correspondence with an official letter.

E. I. Montagu
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4532—2 3000 8.21 [3413—1]



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

Draft Paper. Department.

136 140

The Defence of the A.P.O.C's oil fields in Arabistan

12 JAN 1922

The Pol: Sec[y] to the G.of I.

Sir,

With reference to the S of S's telegram of 12 Aug: last No 4087 I am directed to forward for the information of the G of I. copy of the marginally noted Corr[ce] received from the Col: Office regarding the defence of the ~~A.P.O.C's~~ ~~Southern~~ South Persian oil-fields.

The question being one in which India is not primarily, and Indian Revenues (~~not~~ ought ~~should~~) not to be at all, concerned, the S of S. has not seen fit to intervene in the correspondence, and does not propose to do so except at the instance of the G of I., who may decide him to lay before the C. I. D. any expression of opinion they may wish to offer in regard to the military assistance which

I.D. to S of S for Colonies 30.11.21
to C.I.D. 21.12.21
to Admiralty 29.12.21.
Sent in advance by Pol Sec's weekly letter of 5 Jan. 1922)

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4290 3000 7/21 [3413—2]



which would in all probability be demanded from India (at the expense of some other authority) in the event of a threat to the oil fields materialising.

(SD.) L. D. WAKELY.

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

B
12b.

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted :—
50901/21

P
5661
1921

(141)
Mr 3584 [illegible]
26 Oct 21
3576/14 (11) [illegible]

Subject: Protection of the A.P. Oilfields

Secret

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter *to* *from* *the Colonial Office of the* *of*

30 DEC 1921

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the—

Admiralty,
Air Ministry,
Board of Trade,
Department of Overseas Trade,
Foreign Office,
General Post Office,
Home Office,
India Office,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
Ministry of Food,
Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Labour,
Ministry of Munitions,
Ministry of Pensions,
Ministry of Shipping,
The Clearing Office (Enemy Debts),
Treasury,
War Office.

Under Secretary of State
India Office

Copy to India
5 JAN 1922

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
29. 12 1921

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



P
5661

(136)
142

CONFIDENTIAL.

59901/21.

Downing Street,
29 December, 1921.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to enclose for the information of the Air Council copies of correspondence with the Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence regarding the protection of the South Persian Oil Fields.

2. It will be seen that Mr. Churchill has accepted in principle, subject to certain specified conditions, the view expressed by the Committee of Imperial Defence as to the obligation to send troops from Iraq for the preliminary defence of the oil fields in case of emergency. Mr. Churchill feels confident that the Air Council will share his view on the point of principle. The practical question of the plans to be prepared to meet the emergency contemplated is one which he would be grateful for the Council's advice.

3. A copy of this letter and its enclosures is being communicated to the War Office, Foreign Office, India Office and Admiralty.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Sd) J. L. Thornecroft

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



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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE,
2, Whitehall Gardens,
London. S.W.
30th November, 1921.

Dear Mr. Churchill,

At the Sixteenth Meeting of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee held on November 26th, 1921, in connection with the question of the protection of the South Persian Oil-Fields, the Committee arrived at the following conclusions:-

(a) That the Air Ministry should be invited to undertake the responsibility for obtaining information regarding possible dangers to the oil-fields.

(b) Since the Colonial Office and the Air Ministry are the departments which will shortly be responsible for all matters in connection with Mesopotamia, these departments should accept the liability forkeeping up-to-date plans for the despatch from Mesopotamia to Ahwaz of a force for the preliminary defence of the oil-fields in an emergency.

Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) J.R. CHANCELLOR.

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Rt. Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P.,
COLONIAL OFFICE.





59901/21

Downing Street,
21st December, 1921.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November30th in which you report the conclusions arrived at regarding the protection of the South Persian Oil Fields.

2. You are doubtless approaching the Air Ministry on the subject of paragraph (a).

3. With regard to paragraph (b), Mr. Churchill feels that, as the garrison of Iraq constitutes the nearest Imperial force to the South Persian Oil Fields, he cannot refuse in case of emergency to send troops for their protection if and when required. But he must definitely decline to accept a position of responsibility for the defence of the fields. The garrison of Iraq is in the course of being reduced to the bare minimum required for local defence, and circumstances may well arise in which it would be impossible to send a single man out of the country.

4. Mr. Churchill regards the protection of the South Persian Oil Fields as a matter of Imperial concern, and outside the functions of this Office as the authority charged with the administration of the mandate for Iraq. He must accordingly make it clear that his qualified promise of assistance is conditional upon the acceptance of the three principles stated below:-

(1) That military assistance can only be sent if the General Officer Commanding, or Air Officer Commanding considers it will not endanger either the situation in

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIR JOHN CHANCELLOR, K.C.M.G., Iraq





144
145

Iraq or the position of the troops that are left behind.

(2) That any assistance sent in the shape of men or material be at once replaced from India or elsewhere.

(3) That all financial liability involved in the despatch of troops from Iraq to South Persia be borne by the Government Department which calls for such assistance. Should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company themselves apply for assistance, it is suggested that they be made responsible for all financial liability incurred.

I am, etc.,

(SGD.) J.E. SHUCKBURGH.

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

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

P 3584

Telegram, P.

537/21

146

From .... The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To .....The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

No. 1119.

Dated 10th (Recd. 11th) July 1921.

Information has reached me unofficially of imminence of disbandment of South Persia Rifles and in this connection have recently seen informally copies of Minister's telegrams 341 and 353 dated 16th and 27th June (copies of which appear to have been sent to Baghdad but not to Bushire).

It seems that in view of last paragraph of 341 Government of India may perhaps think it necessary to reconsider the question of permanent garrison for Arabistan referred to in your telegram 670-S of the 12th May.

If the putting of a regular garrison into Arabistan is not considered advisable it seems to me that the question requires consideration whether Anglo-Persian Oil Company should not maintain some sort of police force to protect its property and employees. If, as is apprehended by Minister and Major Noel there is x serious risk of the Bakhtiari tribesmen swallowing Bolshevik doctrine (and the Khans are in great dxad dread of this as I saw when I met them in April) the maintainance of a Quasi military guard by Anglo-Persian Oil Company to protect its employees property at Oil fields pumping stations and on pipe line would obviously be desirable in the company's interests.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 58M DATED 21st JUL. Recd. 9th AUG.

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
FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.
Secret Department.
24


FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.
143
147
Mr Hankey
Thanks. The question
of the defence of the
oilfields has been
referred to the Overseas Defence
Committee today -
I see you have not replied
to India's telegram at
all. The F.O. concur with
same modification -
11.8.21
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



P. 2649.

(144) (148)

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched Aug 12th 1921.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla.)

FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.

4097. Your telegram 11 May 670 S
Defence of Arabistan oil fields
Please see correspondence with
F.O. & C.O. sent by mails of 9th June
and 16 June & Col: Office who
were invited to comment- especially
on last sentence of your telegram
have not replied but I learn
that whole question was referred
to Overseas Defence Committee
on 11 August.

Rec & Sent X Mss 12/8/21. (48 words)

Send
H.F. 11/8/21

to F.O. 15 AUG 1921
A.M.I.
C.O. 16 AUG 1921

Garrett

In the light of Gen' Cobbe's
visit I think it might
be well to send an interim
reply.

IO 1587—2 1000 6/20

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



PUT AWAY WITH 3516/16

2679

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6545/170/34.
and address,
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

FOREIGN OFFICE.
S.W.1,
June 13th, 1921.

Sir:-

In reply to your letter No. P 2432 of 14 JUN 1921 the 6th instant, regarding the protection of the Oil Fields of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Arabistan and Bakhtiaristan, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that he concurs in Mr. Montagu's proposal to approve the action suggested in the Governor of India's telegram No. 670S of May 11th.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,
Lancelot Oliphant.

(P.2269)

JUN 1921

CENTRAL REGISTRY 14 JUN 1921

Under-Secretary of State,
India Office.

2





PUT AWAY WITH

17 JUN 1921

2664
1921

Copy.

Telegram - R.

From - The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Ahwaz,

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(Repeated Bushire and Baghdad reference his 5955).

No. 283.

Dated 26th (recd. 27th) April 1921.

Wilson's letter No. W-8, dated October 28th, 1920.

High Commissioner telegraphs Commander in Chief Mesopotamia has decided to abolish detachment still maintained at Ahwaz as soon as plant etc. at that place can be disposed of.

In circumstances question of future protection of Anglo Persian Oil Company's personnel and property raised in above mentioned letter becomes matter in which early decision is imperative, and I trust that orders will be issued as soon as possible.

Everything is all quiet at present but there will be very severe scarcity if not famine in this part of Persia this year which may aggravate situation.

----------:oOo:----------

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 42M DATED 26th MAY. Recd. 13th JUN.

2



PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

Register No. 2432. [2269]

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter / Telegram from — Dated — Rec. — 192 .

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	2. vi		Persia.
Secretary of State.	3-6		Defence of the A.P.O.C.'s oil fields & works in Bakhtiari & Arabistan
Committee.....			
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to

M.I. 8 JUN 1921

India (incl. letter from F.O.) 9 JUN 1921

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Dft. letter to F.O. & C.O.

Letters from to F.O. & C.O. 6 JUN

Previous Papers—

2806—2 1000 11/20

2

Reference is invited to Sir A. Wilson's letter & the Draft Letter noted on it at P. 537 — immediately below.

As the G.O.C. have had Sir A. Wilson's proposals before them since for quite six months it is a little inconsistent that they should have reserved their judgment even this' it turns out to be completely hostile, till the detachment at Ahwaz which constitutes the basis of the whole scheme is on the point of withdrawal.

A copy of Mr Norman's letter of 27th to Col. Trevor is put up. It was written before the present Persian Govt came into power, but as that Govt has recently shown itself sufficiently independent to cancel (according to the "Times") one British concession of long standing, Persian opposition to the "assertion of British "interference" in Arabistan would, even more now, be likely to be directed against the permanent location of a British garrison at the principal inland town of Arabistan on behalf of another British concessionaire.

What the G.O.C. apparently have in mind is the creation by, or under the auspices of the A.P.O.C. of a local levy force such as the Military Sec[y] suggests at the end of his note of 15th? Except under outside pressure such as existed during the war there seems little danger that the Bakhtiaris & the Sheikh of Mohammerah will not do their best to preserve the golden eggs of the goose that lays them; the trouble is likely to come, if at all, from the tribes of N. Arabistan between Bakhtiari and the area effectively controlled by the Sheikh.

The G.O.C.'s assumption that any regular military assistance required will be provided by the Mesopotamia garrison should prove sufficient of itself to "draw" the P.O. — who must be consulted on the point. But any crisis serious enough to threaten the oil fields & disturb the Bakhtiaris & Sheikh of Mohammerah would surely give the Mesop[a] garrison enough to keep its hands full.

W. Shuckburgh
23/5

Military Secretary

Has any observations.
L.D.B.
31/5

I concur. The ultimate source of reinforcements would probably be India, though the immediate one might be Mesopotamia if possible.



Draft Paper. Department.

(152)

Book

6 JUN 1921

U.S.S.
F.O.

Sir,

I am dirt by the Secretary of State to enclose a reference to Sir A.T. Wilson's letter W.8 of 28th Oct: last: to the G.O.C. regarding measures for the protection of the A.P.O.C's oil concession in Arabistan & Bakhtiari, and to forward to be laid before Earl Curzon a copy of a tel: recording the views of the G.O.C. on the question.

His Majesty's Government is disposed to agree with the G.O.C. that the security of the fields & the lower sections of the pipe line can safely be entrusted to the Bakhtiaris & the Sheikh of Mohammerah respectively in normal times under suitable arrangements concluded with them by the Company & the Pol: Resident, who will also no doubt be able to make adequate arrangements for the safeguarding of the pipe line through the more unruly tribes of Upper Arabistan. If this can be done, the location of a British garrison at Ahwaz would seem to be unnecessary; it would seem to be undesirable on political grounds in the light of the observations made by Mr Norman in his letter of 27th Nov: the arguments in which are likely to

by forwarded to F.O. under office endorsement P.S.S.J 2 Feb: 1921.

U.S.S. No 670 S 2.11/5

2

3413—2 3000 2.21



to have arrived added since Sir Percy Cox from
the change of Govt in Tehran since
the date of the letter.
Subject to Ld. Curzon's concurrence
I propose to approve
the action suggested by the C.I.G.S. with the modifications suggested in your letter of 28 May No E 5899/170/34
also consulting the Col. Office on the
question with especial reference to
the points raised in the last sentence
of the Telegram.
A copy of the corrs is also being sent
to the DMI.

(SD.) L. D. WAKELY.



Draft Paper. Department.

153

Book

6 JUN 1921

U. S. S.
C. O.

A.T. Wilson Esq. of I.
No 6-8 d. Oct: 28th 1920
4818. No 670 S d. 11.5.21.
F.O. P. 2269 d.

Sir,

I am dirs. by the Secy. of St. to forward to be laid before the Secy. Churchill copy of the marginally noted corre. regarding the protection of the A.P.O.C's concession in S. W. Persia.

The Secy. would be glad to be furnished with any observations which Mr. Churchill may desire to offer on the question, more especially in regard to the suggestion that, should a crisis arise in which the security of the oil fields or pipeline might be threatened, the military forces in Mesopo. should be relied upon to provide any assistance required.

I (Sd.) L. D. WAKELY.

2

3413—2 3000 2.21





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 5849/170/34.
and address,
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

2432

M 2269/21

150
154

FOREIGN OFFICE.
S.W.1.

May 28th, 1921.

INDEXED

Sir:-

With reference to your letter No. P 2269 of the 20th instant transmitting a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy of India regarding the protection of the oil fields in Arabistan, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that, in his opinion, it would be advisable for the Government of India to instruct Colonel Trevor to consult His Majesty's Minister at Tehran before submitting a scheme, in consultation with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, for the protection of the oil fields in Arabistan.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

Lancelot Oliphant.

RECEIVED IN
30 MAY 1921
REGISTRY

2

Copy to India
9 JUN 1921

Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

CENTRAL REGISTRY
30 MAY 1921
INDIA OFFICE



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

H.G/B.H.

P 2269

M 537/4 (155) F.O. DMO

5227.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From Viceroy, Foreign & Political Dept., to Secretary of State for India.

Dated Simla 11th May, 1921.

Received 10 a.m. 14th May, 1921.

17 MA 1921

670-S. Protection of Oil-fields in Arabistan. Wilson's letter, W8, October 28th, copy forwarded with Foreign Secretary's weekly letter, 2M, January 6th. Trevor asks for early decision in view of impending (? removal) ordered by Commander-in-Chief Mesopotamia of detachment at Ahwaz. We deprecate Wilson's proposal for location of permanent garrison in Arabistan as unnecessary, politically unsound, and contrary to His Majesty's Government's policy of evacuating troops from Persia. See also Minister's letter No.18, November 27th, to Trevor, copy sent Foreign Office. We consider that in normal times protection of Oil-fields should be secured through the Sheikh of Mohammerah whom we have supplied with arms, and the Bakhtiarn-s who seem to be fully alive to both their responsibilities and interests in the matter. If you approve, Trevor will be instructed to work out a suitable scheme in consultation with Anglo Persian Oil Company. In times of crisis military assistance should obviously be furnished from Mesopotamia.

Addressed to Secretary of State and repeated to Teheran, Baghdad and Bushire.

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



PY
8121/170/
169.

Transmitted to Foreign Office.

(152) (156)

Mr. Norman to the Acting Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

British Legation,
TEHERAN.
27th November 1920.

Sir,

I have lately been receiving many complaints from the Persian Government regarding the extent of our interference in the administration of Arabistan which appears from various official reports and telegrams receivedfrom His Majesty's Vice Consul at Ahwaz to amount almost to the administration of the province by our consular and political officers through the agency of the officials appointed by the Persian Government.

I am aware of the circumstances in which we were virtually compelled, during the war, to undertake the control of this province, but those circumstances no longer exist.

Sir Arnold Wilson has warmly advocated the continuance of existing arrangements, that is to say, of our administration of Arabistan, on the ground of the great improvements which we have introduced and of the general superiority of our administration to that of governors and other officials appointed from Teheran.

I fully recognise the efficiency of our administration, which reflects great credit on the political officers responsible for it, but it is impossible for me to justify to the Persian Government on these grounds, an interference which is deeply resented and which is inconsistent with the promises

and

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



(157) (153)

and assurances repeatedly given to the Persian Government, and recently reiterated by Lord Curzon in a speech in the House of Lords, to the effect that we shall in all circumstances respect the independence and integrity of Persia.

It is at the present time, when the question of the Anglo-Persian Agreement is about to be considered by the Majlis, more than ever important that we should avoid all appearance of intervention in the domestic affairs of Persia, or of seeking to anticipate the position which may be under the Agreement, obtained by British Advisers. I must therefore request you to furnish me as soon as possible a full report on this matter explaining in detail the nature and extent of the interference of our consular and political officers in the administration of Arabistan.

I have, etc.,

(SD.) H. NORMAN.

To
Lieut-Colonel A.P. Trevor, C.S.I.,C.I.E.,
Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Copy to:-
The Right Honourable,
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office, London.
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.
His Britannic Majesty's Vice Consul, Ahwaz.
His Excellency, the High Commissioner in Mesopotamia.

2



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

Register No. 537

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter / Telegram from — Dated — Rec. — 192 .

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	14/2/21	JCS	Persia. Defence of the A.P.O.C.'s oil fields Sir A. Wilson's views
Secretary of State.	19	AAA	
Committee.....	25	E	
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to
F.O. 2/2/21
D.M.I.

FOR ~~USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY~~ INFORMATION

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE. 9 MAR 1921

political situation has changed
good deal even since Sir A. Wilson's
it was written. We are with-
drawing from Persia and are faced
at the possibility of the total collapse
the existing regime in Persia
d its replacement by some creature
the Bolsheviks. The oil can hardly
an object of desire to anyone who
s not also control the Gulf. There
ms therefore little reason to expect any
empt to seize the oil fields for its own
e. What is to be apprehended is injury
destruction in order to damage us.
proprietary interests of the Bolshevists
uld make them oppose their to the
ut of their persons. In the low
ntry as we shall not be able to main-
in a garrison, & hiring out troops to the
.O.C. is a very questionable proposition,

Previous Papers—
similar cases seem to me already
ter at, that the A.P.O.C. should
e own part of the S.P.R.
Personally H.M.G. would have to find
ops if serious trouble, a real invasion,
ok place, but against minor & local
s under it seems necessary to provide by locally raised forces

21-2-21

2

2806—2 1000 11/20

The file behind this despatch contains the history of the measures ~~taken~~ adopted – and proposed but not adopted – during the war for the protection of the oilfields, in more detail than Sir A. Wilson's brief resumé affords. Two maps with it found at the back – flagged.

The salient point emerging from the file is that the oilfields themselves were not, for political reasons, garrisoned by troops. The chief danger was not so much to the wells as to the machinery at the pumping stations: & the protection of the wells was left to the Bakhtiari Khans, who have a proprietary interest.

For the reasons that were valid throughout the war Sir A. Wilson makes no suggestion that the oilfields themselves should be protected otherwise than by the Bakhtiaris' self-interest; his proposals are for the protection of the pumping stations etc in the lower country in Arabistan.

A novel point is raised in para: 20 in the suggestion that the cost of constructing military lines at the various stations & actually of maintaining the troops should be met by the A.P.O.C. who "would naturally expect to be consulted as to the location of troops and as to their employment in the event of emergency. Such an arrangement would rest in the direction of hiring out H.M. forces to the Company. It is true that the A.P.O.C. is a Govt controlled company, & this consideration may make the ~~arrangement~~ suggestion more easily digestible; there is certainly a good deal to be said on grounds of economy, & of logic, for asking the Co to meet from its revenues the cost of its protection; but it is a development which, if pursued further in the same line, might have far-reaching consequences.

J. Monteath
8/2/21

Military Sec?

for information or remark. The views of the Govt are awaited.

H.J. 8/2/21



159

There are 4 proposals in para 19.

(1) To erect block houses which however are apparently not to be occupied until an emergency arises as the peace garrison of 1 Batt: (4) is to be shut up in an unclimbable wire fence at Ahwaz.

(2) Accommodation, in addition to above is to be built at each Pumping station for the use of troops when they arrive after trouble has occurred

(3) In the event of trouble an estimate of the force required is given -

(4) one battalion as a peace garrison at Ahwaz

Presumably the intention is for 'A' (4) to occupy (1) when trouble is anticipated 'B' and (3) to occupy (2) when trouble has arisen

I doubt if the A.P.O.C would incur the building expense under these conditions. 'A' may occur too late in 'B' the troops wouldn't want buildings but would be employed in putting down the rising. (3) may or not be an accurate estimate - it must depend on the extent of the rising - at one time I believe the estimate was for a division.

A →

The presence of a battalion at Ahwaz would no doubt tend to keep the country quiet (& the G.O.C. may decide to keep one there) but I doubt if the A.P.O.C. would be willing to spend from £30000 to £50000 a year for this purpose if the general outlook remain satisfactory, further probably know that the G.O.C. would send troops there free if the outlook deteriorated seriously - In view of the value of the various pumping stations the A.P.O.C might possibly consider enlisting 50 or 100 local levies for each place which would be a cheaper proposal & might be considered as sufficient to guard the machinery pending the arrival of troops which would probably be ordered there if the outlook deteriorated seriously -

B →

A.T. Cobbe
10.2.21.

2



As regards A of Gen' Cobbe's note:-
In 1915 Gen' Wapshare estimated that in the event of the Bakhtiaris turning against us and attacking the oil fields a complete Division would be required, united for mountain warfare, to deal with the Bakhtiaris; while to deal with a simultaneous rising of the Arabistan tribes a Brigade, a cavalry regiment, one battery RFA and armoured cars would also be necessary. Gen' Sowing's concurred generally & by providing complete protection for the pipe-line by a closely spaced line of blockhouses brought his estimate of force required to secure an uninterrupted supply of oil up to 2 Divisions complete with Divisional Cavalry and one Cavalry Brigade.

But this, as Sir P. Cox pointed out, was on the assumption that the worst possible combination of circumstances occurred; and Sir A. Wilson is assuming now that the Bakhtiaris' self interest will prevent their rising. This estimate of the force necessary to deal with the Arabistan tribes coincides approximately with that of Gen' Wapshare. (for details of 1915 estimates see papers immediately above the maps flagged)

As regards B of Gen' Cobbe's note: it seems almost certain that the A.P.O.C. would, in the event of serious trouble, expect H.M.G. to send up troops at Govt's expense, as they did in the war; & if there were any haggling about it would point out that H.M.G. by doing so were no more than protecting the taxpayers money sunk in the oil-fields.

D Monteath
11.2.21

We must, I think, await the C. of I.'s views.

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
9 MAR 1921

14/3/21

14th 9/3
CIGS 2/3
CGS 7/3



537
1921

No. W. S. Dated Bushire, the 28th October 1920.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, the following observations on the military measures necessary to ensure the protection of the Oil Fields in Arabistan Bakhtiari.

2. It was, if my recollection serves me right, laid down by His Majesty's Government during the war that the protection of these fields was a vital British interest and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Mesopotamia was instructed to take any measures necessary to ensure the maintenance of a regular supply of oil from the fields to Abadan.

3. In Sir P. Cox's despatch of the 11th September 1917, No. 5310, and in my memorandum on Political and Tribal Developments in Arabistan, dated March 13th, 1918, the military measures which had been taken up to that date were described together with the occurrences which necessitated the despatch of troops, and the opinion was expressed that it would be necessary to maintain troops in Arabistan for some years after the war in order adequately to safeguard British interests.

4. More than three years have now passed since the enclosures to the first mentioned despatch were written and our troops have been, or are about to be, withdrawn completely from Arabistan. The present appears therefore to be a convenient juncture for the submission of a further report on the general question involved. I am dealing separately with the political situation generally, and in the present letter confine myself to the military aspect.

5. During 1918 and 1919, a detachment of Indian troops was maintained at Ahwaz, consisting generally of one Battalion or less of Infantry, with two or three squadrons of Cavalry; detachments were maintained at Shush, 18 miles south of Dizful, and at Tembi 8 miles south of the Oil Fields, Tembi at the time being the one and only Pumping Station and a vital and vulnerable spot.

In 1919 (I speak from memory) the detachment at Tembi was withdrawn, the Bakhtiari Khans once more becoming responsible for its safety.

In April 1920, the detachment at Shush was withdrawn and the garrison at Ahwaz was reduced to one regiment and latterly to two dismounted squadrons, accommodated in a semi-permanent camp on the right bank of the Karun opposite Ahwaz near a village called Aminiyeh.

6. It is necessary to explain at this point that this camp was originally selected in January 1915 on purely military grounds connected not with the maintenance of internal order in Arabistan, but to meet the advance of a strong Turkish Force from Amarah, whose objective was Ahwaz.

The camp which was located on rising ground was repeatedly attacked both by the Turks and Arabs and we were compelled more than once to reinforce it.

With the defeat of the Turkish Forces at Shaibah and the advance of the 12th Division from Ahwaz to Amarah, the Turkish menace disappeared, but it was considered convenient for various reasons to retain the detachment at Aminiyeh, and when later on it was decided to despatch a force to Shush, the convenience of having a self-contained camp on this bank of the river was apparent.

7. It is, however, open to question whether a camp on the right bank at Ahwaz is suitable for a force having as its specific objective the maintenance of internal order in Arabistan and the protection of the Oil Fields.

The camp at Aminiyeh is now being dismantled and we are free to consider the question afresh on its merits.

8. During the past two years additional Pumping Stations of equal power to that of Tembi have been erected along the pipe line on the left bank of the

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Karun at Mulla Sani 24 miles north of Ahwaz, at Kut Abdulla some eight miles south of Ahwaz and at Derokwain some 30 miles north of Mohammerah.

Each of these Pumping Stations, which are very powerful and costly, is surrounded by unclimbable fencing of expanded metal enclosing an area of about 400 × 600 yards.

The residential quarters are within a self-contained ring fence adjoining the main enclosure and in continuation of it, but separated by a road. Two or three European employees, some 30 or 40 natives, Indians, Persians and Arabs are employed on each of these stations, which are located close by, or within a few hundred yards, of the Karun.

9. In addition to this the Company have two large areas at Abadan covering about two square miles on the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, also surrounded, or in process of being surrounded by unclimbable fencing. Here are situated the Refinery, one of the largest single installations in the world, and a great number of tanks of crude and refined oil.

10. At Ahwaz, immediately above the rapids on the left bank, the Company have a large Workshop and Stores Depôt containing tools, drilling material, etc, and much valuable machinery.

11. At Darra Khazina on the left bank of the Gargar branch of the Karun, there has been established a powerful pumping station on which the Oil Fields depend for the supply of water, from 50,000 gallons upwards per diem being required. There is also a large dump of plant, etc.

12. The Oil Fields themselves are scattered over an area of many square miles and are constantly being extended.

13. The transportation services of the Company are maintained as follows :—

From Abadan to Ahwaz, transportation is almost exclusively by River Steamer. From Ahwaz to Darra Khazina likewise, material being transported from below to above the Rapids by a light line. There is, however, a good motor road, along the left bank of the Karun from Manikh just above Mohammerah to Ahwaz, from Basrah to Ahwaz in a direct line, from Ahwaz to Dizful, from Dizful to Shushtar and from Ahwaz keeping on the left bank of the Gargar to Darra Khazina and then to the Oil Fields.

An alternative and more direct route for light traffic runs from Ahwaz across the Karun by a bridge with a lifting span at Band-i-Qir and then to Darra Khazina, for the most part along the main Shushtar road.

14. Some 100 Europeans, some 400 Indians, and some 7,000 Persians are employed in the Oil Fields. At Darra Khazina the number of employees is about the same as that at other Pumping Stations. At Ahwaz the Company have some 20 Europeans, 60 Indians and 200 Persians or Arabs. At Abadan some 70 Europeans, about 1,000 Indians and some 3 or 4,000 Persians or Arabs are employed, the numbers varying greatly from time to time.

15. It will be seen that the undertaking described above is probably unique in the east in magnitude and in the extent of its operations, which have by no means reached their full development.

The output has been doubled during the past three years and there is no reason to think that for some years to come the output will not increase at the same rate.

Of some 50 borings which have been made and which have proved to be productive only 10 are now used at present, the production of these ten is as much as the existing pipe lines can deal with and it is probable that no single Oil Field in the world owned by one company is equally productive.

16. The work on the Oil Fields in the Bakhtiari has at no time during the past 12 years been interrupted even for a day by local disturbances, and in Arabistan only once for about six weeks, on the occasion of the Turkish incursion in 1915 referred to above.

The Persian Government are entitled to 10 per cent. of the net profits of the Company and a proposal is now under consideration to revise this on a basis of Rs. 2 per ton on all oil passed through the Companies' pipe lines. The

Bakhtiari Khans are entitled to 3 per cent. of the net profits in respect of oil found in their territories. The Shaikh of Mohammerah derives considerable revenue, both in the form of ground rents and indirectly in other ways from the presence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, though not so large as he would wish, or as his Bakhtiari neighbours enjoy.

The Ruling Chiefs and Governments concerned are therefore directly interested in the maintenance of the Company's operations at full efficiency.

17. Amongst the common people the Company enjoys a good reputation, particularly amongst the Bakhtiari where they are regarded as the friend of the people and benefactors of the tribes. They are also looked upon favourably, to the best of my belief, by the Arab population of Mohammerah and Abadan. In Arabistan itself they are in less close touch with the Arab population than might be desired, not through any fault of their own, but because the Arab has an invincible distaste for steady and laborious, though remunerative work, such as that offered by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and his place has been taken by Persians imported from the north.

18. The local position is therefore satisfactory and there is no present reason to anticipate that it will become less so; on the other hand we know by bitter experience that where foreigners and foreign interests are concerned, public opinion amongst a savage people is apt to change suddenly and the people at large are liable to act in a manner wholly contrary to their own interests and to what may reasonably be believed to be their private and personal feelings when their religious prejudices and fears are invoked by stupid or malicious priests or chiefs.

This is much less the case amongst the Bakhtiari than anywhere else, and I do not consider that it is necessary for the present to make plans for the military protection of the Bakhtiari Oil Field, but in Arabistan the case is different. The population are bigoted Shiah Arabs who in 1915, notwithstanding the influence possessed over them by the Shaikh of Mohammerah, cheerfully took up arms when the cry of Jehad was raised by the Turks and seceded on all sides from the Shaikh of Mohammerah leaving him with only one or two powerful tribes on whom he could rely, and these tribes were not sufficiently well armed to be in a position to do much against the rebellious elements, nor was the Shaikh of Mohammerah in a position to supply the deficiency.

The arrival of a small British Force at Ahwaz in 1915 successfully stabilised the situation and the Shaikh had little difficulty in bringing his rebellious tribesmen to heel and in point of fact his position is more satisfactory now and his control is more complete than at any time for the past ten years.

Should, however, further unfavourable developments occur in Arabistan, it is not improbable that we should witness a recurrence of the troubles that occurred in 1915.

19. I venture to suggest that having regard to the importance of the general question of the defence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's installations, that the whole question as to how this can best be done from a military point of view, should be specifically reviewed, a Military officer being specially sent to Arabistan to investigate the question. In the hope that this may be done, I beg to put forward the following proposals:—

(1) Block houses be erected by the Company, at their own expense, round all installations which are already fenced in at suitable intervals and round Abadan. If this was done I am of the opinion that one company could adequately protect the vulnerable and delicate machinery at these stations* and the lives of the Europeans against all probable attacks. Abadan would probably require a regiment to do this effectively, but Abadan would be the last place to be affected, and reinforcements would by that time have arrived.

* Tembi, Darra, Khazinah, Mulla Sani, Kut Abdullah, Daro Kwain.

(2) Accommodation for troops to be built by the Company at suitable places in each Pumping Station; such accommodation could be utilised in time

of peace by the companies' local workmen, and in time of disturbance by the Garrison, if sent.

(3) A Brigade of Infantry and a Cavalry Regiment may be regarded, with a Battery of Mountain Artillery, as an adequate force to be despatched to Arabistan in the event of trouble.

(4) A permanent garrison of one Battalion of Indian Infantry to be maintained in the future at Ahwaz on the left bank in lines surrounded by unclimbable fencing on a site to be selected near the Karun.

20. It is for consideration whether the cost of the construction of these lines and the cost of maintaining the troops should not be debited to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I cannot doubt that it would be in their interests to accept such a debit, but if they are asked to pay they would naturally expect to be consulted as to the location of troops and as to their employment in the event of emergency arising. There would seem to be no objection to this as nobody is in a better position than they are to know what developments are likely to occur and what the most vulnerable points are.

21. The foregoing proposals have not been discussed with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company specifically nor with the Shaikh of Mohammerah, but it is within my knowledge that the Shaikh of Mohammerah would welcome the maintenance of a permanent garrison at Ahwaz in order to help him to share the burden of responsibility which he at present bears for the safety of the above installations, and the views of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company can doubtless be obtained in London.

22. The Persian Government have for some years past raised no objection to the presence of our troops in Arabistan and it seems unlikely that they will do so in the above connection as their financial interests are so closely bound up with those of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and they have doubtless not forgotten that the disturbances in 1915 in Arabistan involved them in a claim for a very large sum from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for compensation under the terms of the concession.

Should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company pay for the cost of the force proposed in paragraph 19 (4) and for the necessary buildings the position of the force would be analogous to that of the detachment sent to the fields with the same object in December 1907 with the cognizance and consent of the Persian Government.

23. The foregoing proposals have been discussed with Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor, Deputy Political Resident, Bushire, who desires me to say that they have his general concurrence, so far as he is at present able to form an opinion.

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

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PERSIA: AFFAIRS OF ARABISTAN.

Letter from Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

No. W./9.

Bushire,
30th October 1920.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter of 20th October, I have the honour to invite a reference to Sir P. Cox's Despatch of the 11th September 1917, No. 5310, regarding the situation in Arabistan, and to its enclosures, and to my memorandum on Political and Tribal Developments in Arabistan from July 1917 to March 1918, which was submitted to the Government of India on 15th March 1918.

2. As already explained to the Government of India by telegraph, I was anxious, before proceeding on leave and before handing over charge of this Residency to my successor, to pay a personal visit of inspection to Arabistan in order to facilitate the re-transfer to Bushire of the responsibility for the administration of Consular Offices in this area, which since the outbreak of war have been under the supervision of Mesopotamia.

3. Immediately after handing over charge of the Office of the Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia to Sir P. Cox on the forenoon of 5th October, I proceeded, together with my Personal Assistant, Lieut. H. R. Lowis, Indian Army, by launch to Mohammerah, accompanied by the Shaikh of Mohammerah and his sons. From Mohammerah, after meeting Mr. Greenwood, the Acting General Manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I proceeded by car to Ahwaz, which was reached the same evening. On 6th October, accompanied by His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, I went to Shush, where I met His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Dizful, Major Meade, who accompanied me to Dizful. From Dizful I proceeded to Shushtar, whence Major Meade returned to Dizful.

4. On 9th October I left Shushtar, and from that day until the 20th I was touring in the low hills north of the Karun, reaching the oilfields on 20th October. Route reports and other notes of military interest dealing with this area have already been submitted to the Government of India with my letter of the 28th October.

5. I reached Ahwaz on the 21st and Mohammerah on the evening of the 22nd, where I took an official farewell of the Shaikh of Mohammerah. At Mohammerah I received news of the outbreak of hostilities between the Shaikh of Koweit and Bin Saud. I boarded the *Ivy*, which I met going downstream on my way to Basrah, and after a brief conversation with the Senior Naval Officer who was on board, I proceeded to Koweit and held a conference there on the 23rd with the Political Agent and the Senior Naval Officer as to the steps necessary to maintain public confidence and to discourage further hostilities. I returned by air to Basrah on 23rd October to give effect, with the assistance of the military authorities, to the proposals of the conference, which had meanwhile received the concurrence of the High Commissioner, and left Basrah again on the evening of the 24th for Koweit in the launch *Industry*. I left Koweit on the morning of the 26th in the *Lawrence*, which had gone to Koweit in connection with the disturbances, proceeded to Abadan to take in oil, made a detailed inspection of the refinery there, and received a further visit from the Shaikh of Mohammerah, who was much perturbed at the rumours that had reached him regarding the state of affairs at Koweit. Bushire was reached on the morning of the 28th, where Lieut.-Col. Trevor joined the ship on his way to Bombay *viâ* Bahrein, Kishm, Bandar Abbas, Charbar and Muscat.

6. The subject-matter of this report may conveniently be considered under four heads:—

(1) A brief retrospect of developments during the past three years.
(2) Postal arrangements.
(3) Telegraph arrangements.
(4) The existing and proposed disposition of political and consular agencies and officers, including hospitals and dispensaries.

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

The existing and proposed financial provision will be dealt with in a separate communication.

7. *Developments during the past three years.*—In my report of 1st July 1917, No. 9855, to Sir P. Cox, I wrote :—

"We do not know what the future holds in store for us. More than once in the past three years the fortune of war has temporarily gone against us and our allies in these regions, and on each occasion it has turned again in our favour.

"If our present position in Arabistan is maintained, we need not apprehend a rapid revulsion of local feeling, even if the situation in Persia or Iraq should again become temporarily unfavourable."

Events have justified this anticipation of the probable trend of events in Arabistan, which province has been wholly unaffected hitherto by the disorders which have prevailed in parts of Persia and of Iraq.

8. The Assistant Political Officer at Shushtar was withdrawn in May 1919, and his duties have since then been performed by the Assistant Political Officer at Dizful, who had been placed in telephonic communication, both with Shushtar, Shush and Ahwaz, to enable him to do so.

9. The Sagwand Tribal Levy at Dizful, after some vicissitudes, has established itself as a small but useful force of some 50 mounted men under a British officer with headquarters at Shush, supported by two Ford vans, on which are mounted machine guns manned by six Indian infantry (all supplied by Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force).

10. A Persian Deputy Governor has been installed at Dizful and a Judicial Department (Adliyah) recognised by the Persian Government has worked for two years with success.

11. The Dizful Bridge has been renewed, and is now the property of a Persian Company with a paid-up capital of 60,000 tomans, of which 35,100 has been locally subscribed, and 24,900 is held by the British Government, this amount representing the sums expended by, or on behalf of, the military authorities, who required the erection of the bridge on military grounds. The British Government shares pay 9 per cent. dividend.

12. Agencies of the Imperial Bank of Persia have been established at Dizful and Shushtar, and have already more than justified their existence.

13. Difficulties between the Shaikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari have been satisfactorily, if temporarily, settled, and do not present a lively problem at present.

14. Friendly relations with the leading landowners and priests have been maintained and improved, and there is now no important section of the tribal town or village community which does not desire a maintenance of the present system whereby a British consular officer is enabled to exert such influence over the local government as will force it to maintain order and give effect to its elementary duties.

15. There has been a continued increase in areas under cultivation, and in local revenue receipts; this has been effected not by increased incidence of taxation, but by careful check on receipts and expenditure.

16. Our relations with the tribes of Luristan, who depend on Dizful, have steadily improved. There has been a welcome cessation from highway robbery and inter-tribal dissensions which were formerly characteristics of the Luristan tribes, and it may be accurately stated that of the many divergent clans of Luristan there are none at this time that, by reason of misconduct, are debarred from free ingress to the town of Dizful, the southern gate of Luristan. While it would be premature to prophesy a millennium of eternal peace in an area at once so inaccessible and so rife with possibilities of undesirable incidents, it may fairly be stated that the portion of Luristan that is brought more directly under the notice of the Political Officer at Dizful, has shown, and is showing, an amiable tendency to appreciate the tranquillity of Northern Arabistan and to realise that this was not merely a transitory condition due to the military exigencies of flank protection. Although mention of the territory of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh may be considered extraneous to the matter of this report, it might, as a matter of interest, be noted that preliminary surveys and the initial steps in location of petroleum have been successfully carried out in that territory without incident.

17. It will thus be seen that the record in Northern Arabistan during the past three years has been one of steady progress on the lines initiated in 1915–17, and that



there have been no serious setbacks. Simultaneously, as will be explained later, there has been a steady decrease of political expenditure.

18. In that part of Arabistan controlled by the Shaikh of Mohammerah, the state of affairs has been equally satisfactory. The power and influence of the Shaikh of Mohammerah have increased, public order has been well maintained and trade is increasing, though less than would be the case if local affairs at Mohammerah were managed as well as at Ahwaz; pilfering of cargo at Ahwaz has reached a point at which it has become a grave scandal and a menace to trade.

19. The refinery at Abadan has doubled in size; the output has trebled since the war; powerful pumping stations have been erected at various points along the pipe line. Each station is complete with comfortable quarters for the Resident Engineer and their British, Indian and local staff.

20. *Bakhtiari Affairs.*—The long-talked-of expedition against the Kuhgelus materialised in the summer of 1918, when, at my request, General Headquarters found themselves in a position to place a section of a mountain battery under the command of a British officer, at the disposal of Sirdars Zaffar and Ashjaa. The expedition, which was accompanied by His Majesty's Vice Consul, Ahwaz, was completely successful. Its chief efforts were directed against the Taibi tribes, who had for years systematically plundered caravans using the Lynch Road. Their strongholds were occupied, hostages taken, and arrears of revenue collected. The effect of this expedition on the security of the Lynch Road has been most marked. No organised robberies by Kuhgelus occurred between the autumn of 1917 and the time of writing, but during the summer of 1920 pilfering has been rife owing to the absence of a recognised Ilkhani and Ilbegi for Bakhtiari.

21. In the early autumn of 1918 His Majesty's Government decided to finance a force of 500 Bakhtiari sowars with the object of maintaining the authority of the Ilkhani and Ilbegi in Bakhtiari and checking the activities of the brigands who at that time infested the Isfahan district. The subsidy was continued until March 1919, although the brigands were not finally destroyed until August of the same year. In November 1919 Sirdars Zaffar and Ashjaa, dissatisfied with the arrangements made at a general meeting of the Khans at Isfahan a few months earlier, and no longer able to count on financial support from His Majesty's Government, tendered their resignations and their successors have not as yet been officially appointed.

22. The close intercourse with the Khans established by His Majesty's representatives in Arabistan during the war has borne fruit. The former appear well content to accept the decisions of local Political Officers on questions affecting their interests in Arabistan instead of resorting to armed force as hitherto. They have waived their claim to maintain a force of 50 Bakhtiari sowars in Shushtar, who were supposed to assist the Governor-General to maintain law and order, but actually preyed on the inhabitants and incidentally cost the Persian Government Ts. 1,000 per month. Last year, for the first time for many years, revenue was collected and paid to the Persian Government from the extensive Bakhtiari estates in the Ram Hormuz district.

23. It is not to be supposed that an abandonment of such previous perquisities is in any way spontaneous, and it is certain that progress on present lines can only be secured by a continuance of the present régime, under which it is understood by the public at large that we are determined not to allow this fertile district to lapse into its former anarchy, while we are at the same time prepared to meet any legitimate claims on our good offices.

24. *Postal Arrangements.*—The Mohammerah Post Office was established in the nineties: that at Ahwaz took shape in 1913, that at Ababan in 1916, that at the oil-fields in 1919. The last two are destined primarily to serve the needs of the large Indian staff of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at these places; they are very much appreciated and highly profitable and are an important feature in the life of the community.

25. *Telegraph Arrangements.*—All offices in Arabistan are manned at present by the Mesopotamian Telegraph Department by arrangement with the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the Persian Government receiving a sum as compensation out of all proportion to the net receipts. The service is very efficient, but telegrams cannot at present be sent in Persian; this is now being arranged. The general

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question of future administration is under separate consideration. Our principal desiderata are:—

(1) Maintenance of our own telegraph offices at Mohammerah and Abadan in direct communication with Basrah.
(2) Maintenance of efficient telegraphic service at Dizful, Shushtar and Ahwaz.
(3) Maintenance of telephone between offices of His Majesty's Consular Officers at Shushtar, Dizful and Ahwaz.

26. *Existing and Proposed Disposition of Political and Consular Agencies and Officers.*—Existing arrangements as in force before the war were as follows:—

A Consular Officer of the Indian Political Department, with the title of Consul for Arabistan, has been stationed at Mohammerah since 1909, with the addition in 1915 that the powers of a Vice-Consul were conferred on the Assistant Surgeon who resides at Mohammerah for quarantine duties. Under the Consul for Arabistan in theory, but in practice virtually independent, was an officer of the Indian Political Department with the title of Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, whose duties in Ahwaz itself were light, and whose main functions related to the Bakhtiari Khans.

At Dizful, since 1911, a Political Officer of the Indian Political Department has been stationed "on special duty," no official application having been made to the Persian Government for the recognition of his consular status.

There was a Consular Agent at Shushtar, a local Persian, who had by no means given uniform satisfaction.

27. As already explained by me in my telegram of 9th October from Dizful, I recommend that the future disposition of officers should be as follows:—

(1) His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan should reside at Ahwaz in future, the duties for the present being combined with those of the Vice-Consul, Ahwaz.
(2) He should be at all times provided with an assistant, who would be designated His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, and who would be responsible for local and judicial work, other than serious cases, and would assist the Consul generally and would officiate for him during his temporary absence.

In this connection I should explain that whereas Mohammerah has shown no tendency to grow, and whilst consular and political work there has shown a tendency to decrease, Ahwaz has quadrupled in size during the past six years, and there is every indication that this rate of progress will be maintained.

28. The creation of Basrah as a free port, under the provisions of the Turkish Peace Treaty, will almost certainly result in goods destined for Ahwaz being landed, not at Mohammerah, but at Basrah, where exceptional facilities for rapid discharge, handling, and storage exist, and whence they can be transported by river boat direct to Ahwaz, not merely as cheaply as from Mohammerah, but more cheaply, owing to handling facilities and wharfage at Basrah. They would pass through Customs at Ahwaz, Ahwaz being "a port" under the Persian tariff and by virtue of the Karun River regulations. There is, moreover, every probability that, if and when railway construction in Southern Persia starts, the terminus of the railway will be, not at Mohammerah, but on the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab opposite the port of Basrah and then to Ahwaz direct. Not only will this line be no longer than the Mohammerah-Ahwaz line, but it will avoid the necessity of constructing a port at Mohammerah, only 20 miles away from Basrah, which has greater facilities than most ports in the East for handling cargo. Ahwaz will then become a point of entry both by river and by rail.

A surveyor sent by Sir Charles Greenway is, I understand, already in the country in connection with this line, which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company may possibly need for the purposes of their own business.

29. Consular duties at Mohammerah can be performed as at present by Dr. C. H. Lincoln, the Assistant Surgeon, who has performed them in an exemplary manner for the past three years in addition to his other duties, an arrangement which is at once satisfactory to local interests and economical from the point of view of Government. The dealings with the Shaikh on matters of political importance would normally not be conducted by him, but by His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan at Ahwaz. As, however, Mohammerah has been brought within three hours of Ahwaz by motor cars and motor boats, and as the Shaikh of Mohammerah has for the past three years spent almost as much time at Ahwaz as at Mohammerah, there seems no objection to the adoption of this course.



30. It is understood that His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan at Ahwaz would not ordinarily leave Arabistan, except with the previous concurrence of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and would not be absent from his post for more than a month. He would also hold charge of Bakhtiari affairs, and would deal with the Khans direct on these matters in the same way as is done now by His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, when they visit the plains in the winter. The necessity for the annual migration of the Political Officer with the Khans to the Persian Plateau no longer exists. It was initiated at a time when political conditions were very different from what they are now, when the Khans were wholly out of touch with His Majesty's Legation and almost equally so with His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan. Ahwaz, moreover, was a small town with only one or two British subjects and with very little political or consular work other than that relative to the Bakhtiari Khans, viz., the oilfields and the Bakhtiari road. It is now a large and growing town with about 100 British subjects resident on the spot. It is, moreover, most desirable in British interests that the conduct of our affairs in Bakhtiari country should be in the same hands as those in Arabistan, which are now so closely intermingled that separation is bound to lead to friction and delay. With these views Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor expresses his concurrence and agrees that under these conditions His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, should be gazetted Acting Consul for Arabistan as from 5th October in addition to his other duties. In this connection I would invite reference to para. 35 below.

31 During the past three years, the system which I now propose has been virtually in existence, as whilst in Baghdad I made a practice of dealing with all Arabistan affairs, as well as those of Bakhtiari, through or in consultation with Captain Peel, His Majesty's Vice-Consul, with results that have been most satisfactory.

32. As regards Dizful, the post is not one provided for on the cadre of the Indian Political Department, but I strongly recommend that this now be done, and the provision also be made, at all events for the next three years, for an assistant for him, who would be a junior officer under training and would hold charge of the Sagwand Levy. This would make it possible for His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Dizful, who has a full day's work, and cannot at present leave Dizful for more than a short period without detriment thereto, to tour occasionally in Pusht-i-Kuh, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are now working, and in Luristan.

33. We have at present at Shushtar a most competent Persian, of proved integrity, whose forefathers have served the Bushire Residency for the past 100 years, as Consular Agent on a salary of Rs. 500. This arrangement should be maintained, and he should be placed directly under His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan at Ahwaz, from which point it is only three hours by car to Shushtar and supervision is easy.

34. It should be mentioned that there is a likelihood in the near future of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company extending their operations to the plains of Lali and Andaka, north of the Karun. This will for some time to come involve additional work for the Political Officer and his staff, for which it is necessary to make due provision, it being remembered that work of this sort in practice imposes considerable strain on officers and demands local knowledge and practical experience which cannot be obtained elsewhere; it is therefore very desirable that there should be a small reserve of Political Officers on the spot, so that they can officiate for each other when one of them goes on short leave, and thus avoid the heavy delay and expense of frequent transfers.

35. To summarise my recommendations, I propose:—

(i) One senior officer as Consul for Arabistan at Ahwaz.
(ii) One junior but experienced officer as Vice-Consul, Ahwaz.
(iii) One junior but experienced officer as Vice-Consul, Dizful.
(iv) One junior officer under training as assistant to Vice-Consul, Dizful, with charge of the Sagwand Levy.
(v) One Assistant Surgeon at Mohammerah to hold charge as Vice-Consul as at present.
(vi) One Persian Consular Agent at Shushtar as at present.

This only involves the addition of one junior officer under training to the pre-war strength of Political Officers in this region.

The proposals made in this despatch have been discussed with Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor, who asks me to say that he has been rather out of touch with Arabistan since he gave over charge of the Mohammerah Consulate in April 1915, since when, as mentioned above, our officers in Arabistan have been supervised from Mesopotamia

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

Subject to this proviso, he cordially agrees with recommendations (ii), (iii), (iv), and (vi) above.

As regards recommendations (i) and (v), he would prefer to limit his concurrence to the tenure of their respective posts by the present incumbents at Ahwaz and Mohammerah, and to hold himself free to make fresh recommendations in the light of experience in due course.

36. The Government of India will observe that, notwithstanding the large number of Europeans and Indians in the oilfields and the important interests centred there, I have not proposed that there should be any Government representative there. I have reached the conclusion, after much consideration, that the balance of advantage lies in leaving the responsible representatives of the Company on the oilfields, as at Abadan, to work out their own salvation as far as possible with local interests and with their own employees, consular intervention being sought only in emergency. This plan has been followed for the past 10 years, and we have no reason to regret it.

37. On the oilfields the Company owes its immunity from serious disputes between Indian employees and between British and Indian employees, and between themselves and the local Persian labourers and residents, and surrounding nomads, mainly to the personality of Dr. M. Y. Young, C.I.E., who has carried the complete confidence of all classes. He was given judicial powers as a First Class Magistrate in 1918, and has used them, though somewhat reluctantly, with good effect without arousing any sort of resentment.

The time will come when Dr. Young will seek some fresh sphere of activity, and it will be the duty of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to see that he is succeeded by an equally sympathetic officer with a knowledge both of Persia and of India. I have no doubt that this will be done.

At Abadan the position is easier, as Mohammerah is only 9 miles away, and both the British and Indian employees are not slow to refer such differences as cannot be settled locally, to His Majesty's Vice-Consul.

38. The Vice-Consuls referred to above should have the powers of First Class Magistrates.

His Majesty's Consul for Arabistan should have the powers of a Judicial Assistant to the Political Resident. These powers have already been conferred upon Captain Peel, and the exercise of them has been found useful in practice, and of all the appeals against decisions of successive Judicial Assistants that have been received and dealt with by me at Baghdad during the past three years, only in one case did the Judicial Secretary, who advised me in these matters, consider that there had been any appreciable failure to comply with the due provisions of law and procedure. In no case was there a failure of justice, nor was any decision reversed on appeal.

39. It remains to refer to the question of a British representative at Behbehan. This is an important town which has for some time past come within the scope of the Bakhtiari Khans, and is of considerable potential importance from the point of view of British trade, and is, like other areas in this region, a potential oilfield.

The reasons for and against our taking active interest in its affairs have been fully brought out in previous correspondence. I need only record my opinion that steps should be taken as soon as we conveniently can to establish a Consular Agent of our own there under Ahwaz, who should be a Persian subject but not a local man; and that steps should be taken, in communication with the Bakhtiari Khans and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, to make a motor road as soon as possible from Ahwaz to Behbehan. This would only involve, as far as I know, the expenditure of a few thousand pounds, and it should prove a highly profitable venture, as have the Ahwaz-Shushtar and Ahwaz-Dizful roads, for which local money should readily be forthcoming, a company being formed, and a toll being put on motor vehicles using the road.

40. It may be of interest in this connection for the Government of India to know that since the armistice some 20 motor vehicles have been purchased by local merchants at Ahwaz and Shushtar, and that a regular motor service is being maintained between these towns and between Ahwaz and Mohammerah, which is understood to be very profitable to the promoters.

I am, &c.,
A. T. Wilson,
Lieut.-Col., I.A.,
Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


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



Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
537
1921.

Subject:

Persia :- Oil.

A.P.O. Co's development of new oil-fields.
Oil Boring at Dasht-i-Qil.
A.P.O. Co's agreement with Kashkuli Khans.

This file contains the following papers :—

YEAR.

1921 . P. 5451 5452 1922. P. 63. 494 644 649 763 823 1075 1619 1973 2026. 3166 3235 3779 3803 4201 4285 4542 4795

1923 . P. 2096 2822 3727 3911 3818

1924 . P. 368

19 . P.

Memoranda.

☞ If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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



P
368
1924

(167)

Copy of a letter No.6111, dated the 23rd November 1923 from the Surveyor General of India to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Education, Health and Lands.

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

Deputation of a Survey Party to foreign service with the Anglo Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah.

3911/23

With reference to your telegram No.765, dated the 14th September 1923, sanctioning the proposal for deputation of a Survey Party consisting of 2 Class II Officers, 1 Upper Subordinate Officer, 13 surveyors and 80 khalasis to foreign service with the Anglo Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah, for a period not exceeding one year, I have the honour to state that the party had to be augmented at the last moment by 1 more Upper Subordinate Officer, 2 more surveyors and 6 more khalasis to meet the requirements of the Company.

2. I accordingly beg to request that the Government of India may be pleased to sanction the deputation of this additional Survey personnel to foreign service with the Anglo Persian Oil Company, Limited for a period not exceeding one year, on the terms detailed for such officers and menials in paragraph 2 of my letter No.4737 dated the 1st September 1923, and your telegram under reference.

24 JAN 1924

No.957.

Government of India.

Department of Education, Health and Lands. (Lands).

Delhi, the 14th December 1923.

From

R.B.Ewbank, Esquire,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,

To

The Surveyor General of India.

Subject:-





168

Subject:-Augmentation of the Survey party deputed to foreign service with the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No.6111, dated the 23rd November 1923, I am directed to convey the sanction of the Government of India to the deputation of the additional survey staff mentioned therein to foreign service with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah, for a period not exceeding one year, on the terms sanctioned in the telegram from this Department No.765, dated the 14th September 1923.

I have etc.,

Sd. R.B.Ewbank,

Deputy Secretary.





PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(165) (169)

Minute Paper.

Register No. 3911 3818

SECRET. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1923.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary			Persia
Secretary of State...			A.P. Oil Co's explorations near
Committee.....	19.X	MR	Dasht-i-Qil
Under Secretary.....			Loan of a survey party by the
Secretary of State...			Survey of India

Copy to F.O. (tel within)

FOR INFORMATION.

The period of deputation is for "a period not exceeding one year for the present" in order to continue the work begun by a similar party lent for 9 months from October 1922. All expenses are borne by the A.P. Oil Co

J.P. Walton 19/10/23

SEEN POLITICAL COMMITTEE 23 OCT 1923

V.M. 21/10

Elch 22/10

EJB

Previous Papers :—

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



P 3818 1923

Copy of a letter No.4737 dated the 1st September 1923 from the Surveyor General of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Education Health and Lands.

In continuation of the correspondence resting with your Department letter No. 545 dated the 27th June 1923, sanctioning the extension of the period of deputation on foreign service with the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., of Surveyors Mohamed Abdulla and Mohamed Hashim up to the middle of October 1923, I have the honour to state that the General Manager of the Company has asked for a survey party to continue the survey work, initiated last year, during the ensuing winter (1923-24). The Party will be in charge of Mr. J.McCraken ,M.B.E., Extra Assistant Superintendent and will consist, in addition, of Mr. A.F.Murphy(another officer of the Class II Service), one Upper subordinate Officer, 13 Lower subordinates including the 2 surveyors whose extension of period of deputation upto the middle of October 1923 has been sanctioned in your above quoted letter, and 80 khalasies who will be supplemented by locally recruited men as and when required.

2. The terms,which are practically the same as before, have been agreed to by the General Manager of the Company. They are as follows :-

(a) All expenses of the personnel comprising the detachment from date of formation in India to date of return will be borne by the Company.

(b) Pay,allowances, etc.,will be admissible according to rules for the Survey of India on field service, including an outfit allowance of Rs. 500/- to Mr. Murphy, Rs.300/- to the Upper Subordinate Officer and Rs. 150/- each to the 9 new surveyors , Rs.100/- each for renewal of clothing

DATED SEP 20
Recd OCT 8 1923





clothing to the 4 surveyors who had worked last year, free issue of clothing to all khalasies, free transport for all and free rations or allowance in lieu thereof.

(c) The Company will bear the usual proportionate contribution for pension to pensionable men and the usual compensation admissible under rules for death or ~~dixkxnd~~ disablement to the others.

(d) Contract leave or bonus in lieu thereof will be granted by the Company to the personnel while on foreign service.

3. Mr. McCraken will not on this occasion be allowed an outfit allowance, but in view of his increased personnel and responsibilities, will be granted a detachment charge allowance (special pay) of Rs.50/- per mensem in addition to the Field Service allowance of Rs.100/- per mensem.

4. As time is short, I have in anticipation of the approval of the Government of India instructed Mr. Mc Craken to assemble his party and be ready to start by the middle of September 1923, and I beg that Government may be pleased to sanction the deputation on foreign service, for a period not exceeding one year for the present, of the detachment under the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd., Mohammerah from 10th September 1923 or such date from which the Party may actually be formed.

5. In conclusion I would observe that the proposed deputation of the detachment will result in a saving to the budget allotment of this Department, as the pay and allowances of the officers and subordinates will be borne by the Company.

6. I shall feel obliged, if sanction may be conveyed by wire at the earliest possible date.



172

Télegram . P.

From - His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

No. 73.

Dated (and received) the 12th September 1923.

URGENT.

Party, who should not wear uniform, can now, I think, start. I have requested Persian Government to renew last year's instructions.

This is with reference to your No.1108-S.



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

Telegram No. 765.

Government of India,

Department of Education, Health and Lands.

(Lands)

Simla, the 11th September 1923.

From Edlands, Simla. To Surveys, Calcutta.

My telegram 748 September 8th . Proposals in your letter 4737 September 1st regarding Survey party to Anglo-Persian Oil Company sanctioned subject to further condition that Company will be liable for any compensation e.g., wound and other extraordinary pension or gratuity admissible under rules even in case of pensionable men. Company should also be informed of terms in paragraph 4 Finance Department letter 64 E.B. dated 27th January 1922 regarding rate pension contribution. Party who should not wear uniform may now start.

P 3911 1923

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 73M DATED SEP 27. Rec'd OCT 16 1923

P
3911
1923

Telegram No. 768.

Government of India,

Department of Education, Health and Lands.

(Lands)

Simla, the 11th September 1923.

From Mdlands, Simla. To Surveys, Calcutta.

My telegram 748 September 8th . Proposals in your letter 4737 September 1st regarding Survey party to Anglo-Persian Oil Company sanctioned subject to further condition that Company will be liable for any compensation e.g., wound and other extraordinary pension or gratuity admissible under rules even in case of pensionable men. Company should also be informed of terms in paragraph 4 Finance Department letter 64 E.B. dated 27th January 1922 regarding rate pension contribution. Party who should not wear uniform may now start.



PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

P 3727 1923

4 OCT 1923

Telegram - P.

From - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

To - His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

No. 1108-S.

Dated the 7th September 1923.

Priority.

'Dasht-i-gil survey. Anglo-Persian Oil Company wish that during forthcoming winter work should be continued which was initiated last year. It is proposed that party should be sent consisting of two officers of Class II, 12 lower subordinate officers and 80 khalasis. The number of lower subordinate officers does not include two surveyors who are still out there. Any objection? As party is ready to start please telegraph urgently.

Foregoing is with reference to correspondence ending with your letter No.88 dated 5th October 1922.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 741M DATED SEP 18. Read OCT 1 1923


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

No. 545.

Government of India.

Department of Education, Health and Lands.

(Land Surveys).

Simla, the 27th June 1923.

From

Rai Bahadur A.K. Sarkar, B.A.,

Assistant Secretary to the Government of India,

To

The Surveyor General of India.

Extension of the period of deputation of two of the surveyors of the party lent to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 252 T, dated the 13th June 1923, I am directed to convey the sanction of the Government of India to the extension, on existing terms, of the period of deputation on foreign service up to the middle of October 1923, of surveyors Mohamed Abdulla and Mohamed Hashim to continue survey work in Persia on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah.

I have, etc.,
Sd. A.K. Sarkar,
Assistant Secretary.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 54M DATED JUL 5. Read JUL 23 1923.





PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(172) (176)

Minute Paper.

Register No. 2006

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1923.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary			Persia
Secretary of State...			—
Committee.....	24.7	WR	Extension of the period of deputation by 3 months of the survey party lent to the A.P.Oil Co for work in the Dasht-i-Qil District
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy to Fo. 25 May

FOR INFORMATION.

The whole cost of the survey party is met by the A.P. Oil Co.

J.M. Wilkinson 27/6

V.M. 26/6

E.A. 26/6

EGB 27

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
27 JUN 1923

Previous Papers : —

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



P
2006
1923

No. 361-62-2.

Government of India.

Department of Education, Health & Lands.

(Land Surveys)

30 MAY 1923

177

537/21.

M-4795/22

From

Rai Bahadur A.K. Sarkar,

Assistant Secretary to the Government of India,

To

The Surveyor General of India.

Simla, the 30th April 1923.

Extension of the period of deputation of the survey party lent to the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd., Mohammerah.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 59-T., dated the 29th March 1923, I am directed to convey the sanction of the Government of India to the extension, on existing terms, of the period of deputation on foreign service by 3 months (that is, up to the 15th July 1923) of the Survey party consisting of Mr. J.McCracken, M.B.E., Extra Assistant Superintendent, six syrveyors and such khalasis as may be required, of the Survey of India, to carry out survey work on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Sd/- A.K. Sarkar,

Assistant Secretary.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 33M I. DATED MAY 10. Rec'd MAY 28 1923.





P 4795 1922

11 DEC 1922

No.88.

British Legation,
Gulhak,
October 5, 1922.

PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the document mentioned in the sub-joined schedule.

Reference Sir P. Loraine's telegram No.93 of the 2nd October 1922.

I have, etc.,
Sd. Percy Loraine.

The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

From the Persian Government,
No.1139/2125.

Survey of the Dasht-i-qil area by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Translation.

From the President of the Council to His Majesty's Minister.
Mizan 8 1301 (October 1st 1922)
No.1139/2125.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In reply to Your Excellency's note of September 13th re the geologists who intend to survey, on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the lands in which the Company is interested I have the honour to state that the Ministry of Public Works has no objection to the survey in question and the Ministries of War and Interior have been written to ~~to~~ send instructions to their officials in that part of the country to render assistance to the surveyors.

I request Your Excellency to be good enough to ask the Company





Company to send a copy of the reports and operations of the surveyors to the Ministry of Public Works through the Foreign Office as besides the fact that the enquiries which the party will make will directly concern the operation of the company they will be of benefit to the Ministry of Public Works.

I avail etc.,

Sd. Qawam es Saltaneh.

P.S. I will also issue necessary orders.





No. 1007-112-3.
Government of India.
Department of Revenue and Agriculture.
(Land Surveys).

From

J.W. Hearn, Esquire,
Under Secretary to the Government of India,

To

The Surveyor General of India.

Simla, the 4th October 1922.

Loan of a survey party to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 3756 dated the 26th August 1922, I am directed to convey the sanction of the Government of India to the deputation on foreign service for a period not exceeding six months, of a survey party consisting of an officer of Class II, six surveyors (including two as reserve reinforcements) and 24 khalasis, of the Survey of India, to carry out the survey of an oil area near Dasht-i-Gil on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah Persian Gulf, on the terms mentioned in paragraphs 7 and 8 of your letter No. 371-T., dated the 7th July 1922, addressed to the General Manager of the Company, who have, it is understood, agreed to these terms. The members of the party should wear plain clothes, while in Persia.

2. A copy of the marginally noted correspondence is forwarded for your information.

I have, etc.,
Sd/- J.W. Hearn,
Under Secretary.

A/ Endorsement From the Foreign and Political Department No. 991/29-Ext. dated the 20th September 1922 and enclosure. B/ From His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, telegram No. 93, dated the 2nd October 1922.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 77M DATED OCT 26.
Rec'd NOV 13. 1922.





PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

(177) (181)

Minute Paper.

Register No. A 285

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1922

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	30. X		Persia.
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....	31		A.P.O.C's explorations near Dasht-i-Qil.
Under Secretary..			Loan of survey party by the Survey of India
Secretary of State.			

Copy to E.O.

FOR INFORMATION.

This file paper & those next below, inside the case, which have not previously been submitted, show that the way is now clear for the A.P.O.C's vigorous pursuit of oil in the Dasht-i-Qil district. The whole cost of the survey party (including value of instruments etc lost may be lost or stolen) will fall on the A.P.O.C.

Previous Papers :—

SEEN POLITICAL COMMITTEE 9 NOV 1922

10 1717 I 1351 2000 9/19





Telegram. P.

26 OCT 1922

From - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To - His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

P
4285

No.1180-S.
Dated 27th September 1922.

Has Persian Government's sanction been obtained to proposed survey of area Dasht-i-Gil? Please wire reply.
This refers to your telegram of September 1922, No.90.

Telegram.P.

From - His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(Repeated to Bushire No.235 with reference to my telegram No.222).

No.93.
Dated and received 2nd October 1922.

Party referred to in your telegram No.1180-S will be protected and assisted by local authorities under orders of Persian Government.

ENC. In INDIA FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S NO 72M
DATED OCT 5.
Rec'd 00128.1922.





Put away with 534/21

COPY.

P 4201 1922

Telegram -P.

From - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Deptt., Simla.

To - The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

(Repeated to Tehran).

No. 1151-S.

Dated 17th September 1922.

With object of surveying part of Dasht-i-Qil area at request of General Manager, Anglo Persian Oil Coy., Mohammerah, it is proposed to send a survey party at end of this month. This party will consist of one Class II officer, four surveyors, and 24 Khalasis, and it is proposed to supplement it by locally entertained men. Please telegraph reply. Do you see any objection?

Telegram - P.

From - The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Govt. of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(Repeated to Tehran No. 257).

INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 70M SEP 28. 16.1922.

No. 1536.

Dated the 18th (recd. 19th) September 1922.

I see no objection to proposed survey referred to in your telegram No. 1151-S. I believe Minister has obtained Persian Government's approval, and as I had already heard about project from Anglo-Persian Oil Company I have been making arrangements in consultation with Consul, Shiraz, for local escort, etc.





Telegram -P.

(1880) (184)

From - His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Deptt., Simla.

(Addressed Bushire ? 252).

No. 90.

Dated (and recd.) 20th September 1922.

I am pressing question but have not yet received sanction of Persian Government.

This refers to your telegram 257 of September 18th.

No. 948-112-2.

Government of India.

Department of Revenue and Agriculture.

(Land Surveys).

Simla, the 22nd Sept. 1922.

A copy of the undermentioned paper is forwarded to the Foreign and Political Department, for information.

By order,

Sd/- C.H. Martin,

for Under Secretary.

List of papers forwarded.

Letter No. 3756, dated the 26th August 1922, from the Surveyor General of India, and enclosure.

Copy of a letter No. 3756, dated Calcutta, the 26th August 1922, from the Surveyor General of India, to the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture.

Subject:- Loan of a Survey Party ~~of~~ to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah.

I

Telegram -P.

From - His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Deptt., Simla.

(Addressed Bushire ? 252).

No. 90.

Dated (and recd.) 20th September 1922.

I am pressing question but have not yet received sanction of Persian Government.

This refers to your telegram 257 of September 18th.

No. 948-113-S.

Government of India.

Department of Revenue and Agriculture.

(Land Survey).

Simla, the 22nd Sept. 1922.

A copy of the undermentioned paper is forwarded to the Foreign and Political Department, for information.

By order,

Sd/- C.H. Martin,

for Under Secretary.

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Letter No. 3756, dated the 26th August 1922, from the Surveyor General of India, and enclosure.

Copy of a letter No. 3756, dated Calcutta, the 26th August 1922, from the Surveyor General of India, to the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture.

Subject:- Loan of a Survey Party &c to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah.

I



185 185r

I have the honour to state that the General Manager, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., Mohammerah, has been in correspondence with me regarding the loan of two Survey Parties to carry out the survey of an oil area near Dasht-i-Qil in the winter of 1922-23. He has now intimated by telegram his agreement to the terms regarding expenses of the party, pay and allowances of the officers, the usual contribution to pension and compensation for loss, etc., according to Foreign Service Conditions as proposed in my letter No. 371 dated the 7th July 1922, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

2. The map showing the actual area to be surveyed has not yet been received from the Company to enable me to determine whether two survey parties will be necessary; but as the area concerned was partly surveyed by the late South West Persia Survey Detachment and the area remaining to be surveyed appears to be about 1500 square miles, I consider that one survey party consisting of a Class II Officer, 4 surveyors and 24 khalasis, supplemented by locally entertained men, would be able to finish the work in about 5 months. Two extra surveyors may be added to the party as reserve reinforcements.

3. In anticipation of the approval of the Government of India I have selected Mr. J. McCraken, M.B.E., who is a good all round Class II Officer with overseas experience to undertake the task. He has been instructed to assemble his party with necessary instruments etc. and be ready to start by the end of September next. The party should leave Bombay not later than the 1st October so that it may be able to get full advantage of the season.

This class of work is a useful experience for our surveyors while the area to be surveyed by the party will enable us to fill in existing gaps in our maps of the locality.

4.





(186) (962)

4. I beg therefore to recommend that the Government of India may be pleased to sanction the loan of a survey party to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., for a period not exceeding 6 months from the date of quitting its station in India on the terms proposed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of my above quoted letter to the General Manager of the Company.

5. In conclusion, I would request that the Government of India may be pleased to issue orders at as early a date as possible to enable me to make the final arrangements in time. It will be observed that the proposed deputation of the detachment will result in a saving to the sanctioned budget allotment of this Department for the current year as they pay and allowances of the officers and subordinates for the period will be borne by the Company.

Copy of letter No. 371-T., dated Simla, the 7th July 1922, from the Surveyor General of India, to the General Manager, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.

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1. With reference to your letter No. 18/328 dated 21st February 1922, I beg to inform that after examining the work likely to be required by you I think that it could be done more economically by only employing one party, thus saving you the expense of the pay etc. of the 2nd Officer. One officer would be sufficient for the triangulation and the surveyors could do any low ground during the winter moving into high ground as the weather grew hotter, continuing steadily until the whole area was completed.

I should be obliged however if you would send a copy





(187) (R2)

copy of each of the Degree sheets concerned marking on them approximately the area required to be surveyed; this would enable me to decide on the numbers of surveyors required.

As I may myself be on tour this information should be sent to J. McCraken, Esq., M.B.E., Survey of India, Missoorie, who is the officer I have in readiness for the work.

2. The topographical work would be done on the scale 1"=1 mile with 50 foot contour, but should you require any larger scale surveys of any particular areas or any lines of levelling run this could also be done if you inform me now especially as regards the levelling, to enable us to send the necessary instruments.

3. Mr. McCraken is an officer of good experience in all classes of survey and you may safely rely on him; he has had several years experience in Mesopotamia during the war.

4. The value of instruments supplied by us will be charged to you and on return the return value will be credited to you in accordance with our usual custom.

5. Your request that the Survey Party should take as few articles of value as possible and that a list of all articles and their value should be given you will be compiled. I assume that compensation will be paid by you for articles fairly lost or stolen.

6. To save time I have asked Mr. McCraken to correspond direct with you on matters of detail.

7. To enable me to the put the matter up to the Government of India for sanction, which I shall have to do I would ask your definite agreement to the following terms:-

(a) You agree to pay all the expenses of the party from time





time of departure from their stations in India to date of return under our usual rules.

(b) Pay, allowances, rations, etc. being under the rules for the Survey of India on field service, including an outfit allowance of Rs. 500/- to the Officer and Rs. 150/- each to the surveyors and a free issue of clothing to the Khalasis. Free transport of all being allowed also free rations or allowance in lieu.

8. In accordance with Government rules you will pay the usual proportionate contribution to pension to pensionable men and the usual compensation under Government rules for death or disablement to the others.

9. A telegram from you agreeing to the above will expedite arrangements as the party should leave Bombay not later than 1st October.

10. I attach an index showing the area surveyed by a detachment under Mr. Grant during and after the war in case you do not know of it. This is being embodied in new editions of our degree sheets (scale 1 inch = 4 miles) but any area of it of value to you may be incorporated on a larger scale with the maps to be prepared by Mr. McCraken.

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time of departure from their stations in India to date of return under our usual rules.

(b) Pay, allowances, rations, etc. being under the rules for the Survey of India on field service, including an outfit allowance of Rs. 500/- to the Officer and Rs. 150/- each to the surveyors and a free issue of clothing to the Khalasis. Free transport of all being allowed also free rations or allowance in lieu.

8. In accordance with Government rules you will pay the usual proportionate contribution to pension to pensionable men and the usual compensation under Government rules for death or disablement to the others.

9. A telegram from you agreeing to the above will expedite arrangements as the party should leave Bombay not later than 1st October.

10. I attach an index showing the area surveyed by a detachment under Mr. Grant during and after the war in case you do not know of it. This is being embodied in new editions of our degree sheets (scale 1 inch = 4 miles) but any area of it of value to you may be incorporated on a larger scale with the maps to be prepared by Mr. McCracken.

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

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Minute Paper.

Register No. P 3803

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1922.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary ..... Secretary of State... Committee..... Under Secretary..... Secretary of State...	16/9	H.S	Persia. The A.P.O.C's agreement with Sardet-ed Dowleh & modified agreement with the Kashkuli Khans

Copy to
Despatch to India.

FOR INFORMATION.

The enclosures in Sir P. Lorraine's despatch have all been seen before - they were submitted (P3166) with Col. Trevor's letter of 6 June & ref. 1.

Sir P. Lorraine's despatch, summarising the events leading up to the agreements, & commenting thereon, is new; & should be read with his despatch No 432 - P3779 below.

Sir Cheik's judgment on the new policy of Col. Trevor & Sir P. Lorraine, & also apparently of Sir A. Wilson, is somewhat warped by his antipathy to Sardet-ed Dowleh on personal grounds.

W. Monteath
16.9.

Previous Papers—

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
28 SEP 1922

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



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 8441/7/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P 3803 1922

Confidential

186 190

pp. 823 re. 3449 and 1419

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Sept 14, 1922.

RECEIVED IN 15 SEP 1922 INDIA DEPARTMENT

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter of Feb. 24, 1922 (E 1944/7/34). (P. 823)

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From H.M. Minister, Tehran, despatch No 427, July 3, 1922.	Anglo-Persian Oil Company's activities in Persia.

14 F.O.P. 5M 7 | 22 [8628 B] 5M 9 | 22 [8824]

Similar letter sent to Petroleum Department.



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P 3803 1922

PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[August 24.]

SECTION 7.

[E 8441/7/34] No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to the Earl of Balfour.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 427.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 8, 1922.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Mr. Bridgeman's despatch No. 315 of the 12th December last, to transmit to your Lordship herewith (1) copy of the official minutes of the meeting between Sir A. Wilson, Resident-Director Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and Soulet-ed-Dowleh; (2) translation of the agreement made between Sir A. Wilson and Soulet-ed-Dowleh on behalf of his son Mohammed Nasir, Ilkhani of the Kashgai tribe; and (3) translation of a revised agreement between Sir A. Wilson and the Kashgai and Kashkuli chieftains.

In order that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company might be able to explore for oil in Dasht-i-Qil and Bikarz, it was found necessary to come to some agreement with the chiefs of the Kashkuli tribe so that adequate protection might be afforded by those chiefs to the staff of the oil company employed in those operations. With this object in view an agreement was come to between Sir A. Wilson and the Kashkuli chiefs in October 1921, and at that time it was intended that Sir A. Wilson should likewise meet Soulet-ed-Dowleh before the spring 1922 migration of the Kashgai tribe so that the Kashkuli chiefs' fears that Soulet-ed-Dowleh might take umbrage at the agreement between them and the company might be dispelled, and also that Soulet-ed-Dowleh himself might have material proof that he was not being entirely left out of the picture.

Although the Kashkuli tribe pays taxes to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, their subservience to him is of a somewhat loose nature, but they are mortally afraid of him, and look to Kawam-ul-Mulk for protection against him. By an agreement made in December 1920, Soulet-ed-Dowleh recognised that Kawam-ul-Mulk should extend his paternal benevolence to the Kashkulis and should even nominate the Kalantars of the tribe, but notwithstanding that, they are too far removed from Kawam-ul-Mulk's immediate influence to be able to count on his protection if Soulet-ed-Dowleh should really wish to oppress them.

As the spring approached, Soulet-ed-Dowleh appeared to become highly apprehensive that his promised meeting with Sir A. Wilson would not materialise; the Kashkuli chiefs also became very much afraid that if Soulet-ed-Dowleh started his migration before that meeting he would wreak his vengeance on them for the agreement they had made in the winter of 1920 with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as it were behind his back and without his consent.

A high nervous tension was evident in both camps, which increased daily as no definite news of Sir A. Wilson's arrival was forthcoming. Various calming messages were, however, conveyed to both parties, which to a certain extent allayed their fears, though not entirely.

At last it was possible to inform them that Sir A. Wilson's expected arrival at Shiraz would take place about the middle of May.

It may be mentioned in passing that several robberies had taken place in the very early spring in which both Kashgai and Kashkuli had been concerned, and in response to complaints forwarded to Tehran, the Central Government had instructed Soulet-ed-Dowleh to apprehend and punish the robbers. This gave Soulet the pretext for which he had been seeking, and he immediately announced his intention of punishing the Kashkuli, nominally as the offending party concerned in this brigandage, but really as an act of vengeance for having stolen a march on him in making their agreement with the oil company. Happily for the Kashkulis, however, they became acquainted with Soulet's plan in time, and were able to gather together with certain other anti-Soulet elements of the Kashgai tribe and retire before the advancing Soulet, who, after a two-days' march away from the accustomed line of migration of his tribe, thought better of his action and gave up the pursuit.

Shortly afterwards Sir A. Wilson arrived in Shiraz.

Some weeks previously I had informed the Persian Government of the intended visit of Sir A. Wilson to Shiraz and its object, and had asked the Persian Government

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

to appoint a representative to be present at the negotiations between Sir A. Wilson and Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Although the Persian Government felt its position rather humiliating, it finally conceded that, as it could not give the company adequate protection itself in the proposed operations, the company must obtain what protection it could locally, and it agreed to nominate a representative, who, however, was not to have any power to bind it in any agreement which might be made, but that such agreement should subsequently be referred to the Government in Tehran for ratification or otherwise.

It had been hoped that Soulet-ed-Dowleh, as he approached the town of Shiraz in his tribal migration, might be persuaded to enter the town, where the meeting between him and Sir A. Wilson could have taken place in the presence of the Prince Nosrat-es-Saltaneh, Governor-General of Fars, but, despite all requests of the Central Government, Soulet refused to come within some few miles of Shiraz, and consequently Sir A. Wilson was obliged to go to his camp outside.

The Persian Government nominated Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan, the local Director of Finance, as its representative at the meeting, and on the 19th/20th May the interview took place, at which the agreements enclosed herewith were drawn up and signed.

Sir A. Wilson subsequently continued his journey to Tehran, with the object of obtaining the ratification of the agreements by the Persian Government.

Unfortunately, at the end of May when he arrived here, the Cabinet crisis was still continuing, but he was able to have an interview with Serdar Sepah, the Minister of War, together with the Under-Secretaries of the various State Departments, at which the agreements were discussed and agreed to in principle. I have now forwarded copies of the agreements to the present Cabinet, and have reasonable hope that prompt ratification will be accorded.

The foregoing narrative, which offers an extremely abbreviated account of what actually occurred, and of a lengthy exchange of views and correspondence between this Legation, His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz and the Persian Government, will acquaint your Lordship with the outline of events. I think, however, that some observations on the general bearing of the question may be of assistance.

In the latter part of last year the Persian Government protested against the Kashkuli Agreement, on the ground that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was not entitled under its concession to negotiate independent agreements with local chieftans, or at any rate to do so without prior consultation with the Central Government and subject to its ratification. Exception was furthermore taken to the Kashkuli Agreement on the ground that it concerned itself with the ownership of certain lands and waters in regard to which the Central authorities were alone competent to give an authoritative decision, and contemplated the arming of Kashkuli oil guards. Soulet-ed-Dowleh was himself the instigator of these remonstrances. His objects in raising up an opposition to the agreement were quite obvious; he wished to take the opportunity of reasserting his rather nebulous authority over the Kashkuli; he thought the Kashkuli were going to make a good thing out of their dealings with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and he felt it to be altogether unbecoming that their overlord—himself—should be deprived of a due share of the spoils; lastly, he was well aware that, in the then circumstances at Tehran, an anti-British attitude or opposition to any British interest was the cheapest and most impressive certificate of patriotism.

The question of the rights of the Central Government in respect of agreements locally concluded by the company is one in regard to which the concession may be variously interpreted. This issue, however, appeared to me a barren one to pursue; the more practical issue was evidently that the company should proceed with its work of development in the Kashkuli country as rapidly and as smoothly as possible. I decided therefore that the best course was to persuade the Persian Government of its own interest in any extension of the company's operations, to humour its susceptibilities, and to reach a situation where it would itself become a party to the agreement.

With these objects in view, and before Sir A. Wilson's return to Persia to undertake the fresh negotiations, I addressed a telegram to His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz, drawing their attention to the objections of the Persian Government to last year's agreement with the Kashkuli Khans, which I attributed, firstly, to that Government's fear of being subjected to hostile criticism in the Medjliss and the press for permitting the conclusion of direct agreements between the company and a group of local chieftains, the effect of which was to invest the latter with a sort of semi-independent position incompatible with the authority of the Central Government; and in the second place to the dissatisfaction felt by the Persian

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

Government at seeing a piece of business, in which they expected a beneficial participation, being concluded, while they were left out in the cold, whereas Soulet-ed-Dowleh seemed likely to profit by it, and the interests of the Kashkuli Khans were already assured.

I pointed out to Colonel Trevor and Mr. Chick that it was useless, pending Sir A. Wilson's arrival, to discuss the details of the settlement to be devised at the impending negotiations in Fars, and that as regards the procedure to be followed, that must depend on their own intimate knowledge of local feelings and conditions in regard to which I was not qualified to pronounce. The plan of campaign which I wished to be adopted, however, was to start negotiations with Soulet-ed-Dowleh as soon as Sir A. Wilson reached the vicinity of Shiraz, preferably in the presence of a nominated representative of the Persian Government, but, should that prove impossible, with documentary evidence that the negotiations were undertaken with the full knowledge and concurrence of the Persian authorities; that the negotiations should not aim at any substantial modification of the 1921 agreement, but should rather be conducted in such manner as to bring that agreement into harmony with the officially expressed desire of the Persian Government to be consulted, to neutralise Soulet-ed-Dowleh's opposition, and to allay the apprehensions entertained by the Kashkuli. Thereafter it would, in my opinion, be desirable that Sir A. Wilson should, if possible, proceed to Tehran to explain the matter himself to the Persian Government, in order to secure its formal assent to the revised agreement and to determine its responsibility in regard thereto. My main point was to get the Persian Government to stand in as a willing party to the transaction, rather than to leave it standing out and so open up a fresh source of disagreement and recrimination between it and the company from which the latter would be bound to suffer in the long run.

I have the honour to enclose herein copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz on the subject of the agreement subsequently made between Sir A. Wilson and Soulet-ed-Dowleh. After having myself discussed the matter with Sir A. Wilson during his visit to Tehran, I am compelled, to my regret, to record my disagreement with Mr. Chick's general conclusions. I consider that the meeting with Soulet-ed-Dowleh was both useful and opportune, and that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have solved an awkward situation at comparatively slight expense. I understand, moreover, that in Sir A. Wilson's opinion the agreement was as satisfactory an one as could be expected in the circumstances, and that if it be ratified by the Persian Government and proved workable, he intends to urge on his company the advisability of remodelling other local agreements in order to harmonise their character with that of the present agreement.

I fear that Mr. Chick has been somewhat led astray by his desire, however natural and justifiable on local grounds, to see the power and influence of Soulet-ed-Dowleh definitely smashed. I shall, however, take leave to address to your Lordship a separate despatch on this question of the leadership of the Kashgai.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and His Majesty's consul at Shiraz.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Official Record of Proceedings of Meeting between Sardar Ashair (Soulet-ed-Dowleh), representing his Son, the Ilkhani, and Sir A. T. Wilson, at Du Kuhak, near Shiraz, May 19/20, 1922.

Present:

On the 19th May (in addition to above):—

Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan, agent of Ministry of Finance in the Province of Fars, representing the Persian Government; but without power to sign or approve an agreement on their behalf.
Mr. S. Clegg, assistant to outfields' manager at Bikarz.
Mr. H. R. Lowis, secretary to Sir A. T. Wilson.
Khan Bahadur Mirza Mohammad Khan, C.I.E., acting as secretary to Sir A. T. Wilson.
Mirza Mehdi Khan Maawin-ul-Mamalik, at present munshi to Sardar Ashair (formerly acting in same capacity to Sheikh of Mohammerah).



On the 20th May :—

Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan.
Mr. S. Clegg.
Hadi Khan, Kashkuli.
Gholam Husain Khan, Kashkuli.

The last two named representing the signatories to the Kashkuli Agreement.

1. After somewhat lengthy preliminaries lasting from 11 to 1, and after the party had partaken of lunch, the draft Kashgai Agreement, prepared by Sir A. T. Wilson, was read out, as also the Kashkuli Agreement. Sardar Ashair then opened the discussion by objecting fundamentally to the Kashkuli Agreement on grounds which may be briefly summarised as follows :—

(1.) The Kashkuli are an integral part of the Kashgai, and as such are under the authority of the Ilkhani, to whom the management of the Kashgai has been delegated by the Persian Government ; as such they have no right to make such an agreement.

(2.) The lands in respect of which they have undertaken to sell their proprietary or grazing rights are not theirs to dispose of, but belong to the Persian Government ; the Kashkuli are subject to removal elsewhere at the option of the Ilkhani, who has more than once exercised this option ; and they pay taxes to Government, not direct, but through the Ilkhani, calculated on the number of their flocks and tents. In consequence, any payments in respect of lost grazing rights should be made to the Ilkhani.

(3.) The recognition of the rights of the Kashkuli to make such an agreement would create a dangerous precedent and was inconsistent with the maintenance of the position of Ilkhani ; other tribes, such as the Dareshuri, whose winter quarters adjoin Bikars and Mishun, would follow their example, and, if the company wished, for example, to work at Haft Dasht, north of Bikarz (in which area it is understood that Mr. Wyllie considers oil prospects favourable), they would have to make a fresh agreement on similar lines with the Kashkuli, and so on indefinitely.

(4.) The effect of the agreement had already been to weaken the authority of the Ilkhani over the Kashkuli ; they had looted 2,500 sheep from the Sheikh of Mohammerah's subjects in Zaidan, and Jahangir Khan and Isfendiar Khan Kashkuli had robbed a Government postal courier near Shiraz at Sinehsafid ; any action on his part to punish those responsible and to recover the looted property would be inevitably regarded as inspired by resentment against the tribe for having made an agreement with the company.

(5.) The Kashkuli tribe had in point of fact no responsible leader or leaders ; the younger chiefs were guided by the advice of their mothers or by irresponsible and interested advisers ; there was no one amongst them whom the Ilkhani or the company could make responsible ; the post of Kalantar was for practical purposes in abeyance.

(6.) The title of the Kashkuli tribe to the lands in question being shown to be invalid, and the ability of the Khans to give effect to the agreement being demonstral defective, the Ilkhani claimed that it should be cancelled and replaced by a fresh agreement with him only.

2. The reply of the Resident-Director to the above argument may be briefly summarised as follows :—

(1.) During 1919 and 1920 the company had sent geologists and surveyors to the lands in question ; the Kashkuli Khans had been requested, with the knowledge and approval of the Farman Farma (then Governor-General of Fars), to provide guards, and have done so without any question being raised by the Ilkhani.

(2.) The special status of the Kashkuli had been recognised in 1920 by an agreement between Sardar Ashair, Kawam-ul-Mulk and others, whereby the right of the latter (representing the other half of the tribes of Fars) to protect the interests of the Kashkuli was recognised.

(3.) The company, for reasons of its own, desired to start work at once in the autumn of 1921—and was advised that in order to do so it was necessary to



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come to an agreement with the Kashkuli, whose winter quarters lie so far distant from the winter quarters of the Ilkhani (east of Forozabad) that the latter would in practice be unable to force them against their will to give the requisite local protection and assistance to the company.

The company would have preferred to come to an agreement with the Ilkhani and with the Kashkuli simultaneously, or, first, with the former and then with the latter; but this course was found to be impracticable, owing to the strained relations existing between the Kashkuli Khans and the Ilkhani at that time, and owing to the fact that the dates of migration and lines of movement of the two parties made a joint meeting impossible.

(4.) At the time of signing the agreement with the Kashkuli, however, the company had publicly and formally announced its intention of coming to an amicable agreement on the subject with the Ilkhani, whose authority over the Kashkuli it had at no time questioned.

(5.) The company could not consent to cancel the Kashkuli Agreement, which was entered into in good faith on both sides, and which would still be necessary for the smooth working of these operations, even though they enjoyed to the fullest extent the goodwill of the Ilkhani, but were prepared to make it clear that they recognised the authority of the Ilkhani over the Kashkuli and to make the continued payment of subsidies to the Kashkuli dependent on the continued submission of the Kashkuli to the lawful authority of the Ilkhani.

3. The Sardar Ashair replied by demanding that the agreement offered to him should not be less advantageous to him than that of the company with the Bakhtiari Khans, who, he said, would never have tolerated subsidiary agreement between the company and tribes subordinate to the Bakhtiari Khans.

4. The question of Ilbegi was discussed; Sardar Ashair said that for practical purposes no such official had existed for many years past; the analogy of the Bakhtiari system did not apply; the matter was disposed of as shown in the agreement.

5. I finally intimated that, subject to the usual provisions, the company was prepared to give the Ilkhani a 3 per cent. interest in any companies formed for the extraction of oil in Kashgai territory, including the Kashkuli area, the Kashkuli Khans continuing to draw the 2,000*l.* per annum they already receive. The cost to the company of this concession is as follows:—

	Approximate Amount of Subsidary granted—	
	To Ilkhani.	To Kashkuli.
	£	£
For period of exploration	1,000	2,000
After oil is produced in paying quantities, in lieu of sums drawn during period of exploration	3 per cent. of shares	2,000

The Kashkuli Agreement provides for a payment of 2,000*l.* during period of exploration, to be replaced by a payment of 4,000*l.* after oil is struck, to be replaced at the option of the company by 3 per cent. of shares of Kashkuli Oil Company.

The additional outlay involved by the new agreement with Soulet is 1,000*l.* during period of exploration, 2,000*l.* after oil is produced in paying quantities.

6. After I had announced the company's readiness to make this concession, the Sardar Ashair changed the conversation, the meeting soon after came to an end, and negotiations, which had hitherto been pursued in the presence of the Prince, followed, at the Sardar Ashair's desire, a more subterranean course, our respective Persian secretaries being used as intermediaries. The principal obstacle was, of course, the Kashkuli Agreement, which Sardar desired to see cancelled, not confirmed. By next morning, however, after lengthy discussion lasting to a late hour, the two agreements in their present form were accepted.

7. Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli and Hadi Khan Kashkuli countersigned the agreement late in the afternoon and undertook to obtain the adherence of the other signatories. The former left the tribe early in the spring and joined Sardar Ashair, in whose camp he now resides; the latter joined us at Kamarij and came up with us to Shiraz: he was brought in by Mr. Clegg by car from Shiraz at the last moment, and,

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

though in very bad odour with Sardar Ashair, was well received; he returned with us the same night. Mr. Clegg took charge of the four copies of the agreement and, armed with a letter from Sardar Ashair and a gold watch for presentation on behalf of the company, went off to Baiza to obtain the signature of the young Ilkhani.

8. The Sardar Ashair struck me as a man of considerable ability and force of character, with a good head for business negotiations; it seems unlikely that he will have for many years to come a serious rival, unless the latter is actively supported by the Persian Government; and it seems clear that even were his son to be ousted from the post of Ilkhani, Sardar Ashair himself would continue to exercise great power for evil. It is not, therefore, a matter of regret that the company should have found it necessary to conclude this agreement with the Ilkhani through Sardar Ashair, as this circumstance, combined with the fact that a representative of the Persian Government was present throughout the negotiations, is calculated to give a greater permanence to the agreement than it would otherwise possess.

9. In conclusion, the writer must acknowledge the great assistance rendered to him during the negotiations by Khan Bahadur Mirza Mohammed Khan, C.I.E., whose great experience and dialectical ability were of much value. Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan did nothing to obstruct negotiations, and his presence was, in fact, of material assistance.

Shiraz, May 21, 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Agreement between Sir A. Wilson and Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

(Translation.)

AN agreement which has been entered into as follows between the Anglo-Persian Oil Compay (Limited), on the one part, hereinafter called the company, and Muhammad Nasir Khan, Ilkhani of the Kashgai, on behalf of himself, his heirs or successors, and of the headmen and tribesmen of the Kashgai on the other part, hereinafter called the Ilkhani, in respect of the protection and assistance required by the said company throughout the whole extent of the territories in occupation of the Kashgai tribe in their winter quarters for the purpose of the company's business under the concession which they hold from the Persian Government, and which agreement should be submitted to and approved by the Persian Government.

ARTICLE 1.

The company shall have the right to drill for oil and for water, and to make all investigations necessary for the purpose of their business in all parts of the said territories, and to construct and erect tramways, roads, buildings, machinery and telegraph apparatus of all kinds in any part of the said territories so far as may be necessary for the purposes of their business.

The company shall have the right to collect and use free anywhere in the said territories stone, gach, salt, sulphur, clay for building purposes, wood and water, whether from river or springs for the purposes of their work, provided that the taking of the water is not detrimental to cultivation in the boundaries in question.

The selection of routes and sites for such work shall rest with the company.

It is hereby explained that as long as the Persian Government have left salt and sulphur in their natural state and free, the company will utilise them free of charge.

In the event of the said articles being monopolised by any company or by anyone under any concession, the company will communicate with the Government, and effect an arrangement.

ARTICLE 2.

All lands whatever required by the company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil, including all or any natural springs of oil in the said territories, together with an adequate supply of water, so far as available, shall be granted by the said Ilkhani to the company free of charge, provided that the taking of the water is not detrimental to cultivation in the boundaries in question, and without let or hindrance from any of his relatives or dependants, or any of his tribesmen or of third parties.

And it is hereby agreed that, in consideration of the sums to be paid to the Ilkhani under articles 8 and 9, any claim for compensation, or subsidy put forward by a third party in respect of such land or of the protection to be rendered to the company by the Ilkhani shall be met by the said Ilkhani, or his heirs and successors, and that under no circumstances shall the company be made to pay compensation for the same. If the company finds itself obliged to pay other parties in order to ensure the safety of

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

their work, the amount paid may be deducted by the said company at their option from the amount due to the Ilkhani.

ARTICLE 3.

As soon as the company have been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantities to justify the laying of one or more pipe-lines to one or more spots on the coast or elsewhere, and, as soon as oil is being exported thereby, the company hereby undertakes to purchase, and the Ilkhani hereby undertakes to dispose of, his grazing and other rights over whatever Government or other land may be required by the company for their operations at the following rates: for every square of 100 yards on each side, 10 tomans for unirrigated arable land, and 5 tomans for non-arable land.

It is to be understood that it will still be incumbent on the company in accordance with the concession to acquire the said lands from the Persian Government in the manner specified in their concession or from the lawful owners, whoever they may be, by purchase or otherwise.

The Ilkhani further undertakes to sell whatever land may be in his own personal possession at the following rates: for every square of 100 yards on each side, 10 tomans for unirrigated arable land and 5 tomans for non-arable land. Irrigated land must be acquired by the company at a reasonable value in accordance with the concession they hold from the Persian Government.

Lands so acquired shall be the absolute property of the company for the period of their agreement and any extension or renewal thereof, and the company shall have full proprietary rights therein.

ARTICLE 4.

No one shall have any right to graze flocks on land so acquired or in temporary occupation of the company for the purposes of exploration, and should they do so, the Ilkhani undertakes to punish them. Should anyone transgress the company's boundaries and should they or any of their flocks meet with an accident (which God forbid) the company shall not be responsible.

ARTICLE 5.

All houses, shops, &c., which the company may build on land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes. The Ilkhani or his representative shall have no right to collect taxes from any of the people employed by the company or temporarily permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

ARTICLE 6.

The Ilkhani undertakes to give all the protec ion in his power to the company and to their staff and labourers in any part of his territory from theft, highway robbery, assault, &c.

Similarly, the Ilkhani undertakes to protect all the property of the company and of their employees which may be exposed to wilful damage or to possible loss or theft.

ARTICLE 7.

For this purpose (as long as the Persian Government have not detailed regular forces in accordance with the company's concession) it is further agreed that the company, in consultation with the Ilkhani and with the knowledge of the Persian Government, shall appoint permanent trustworthy guards at whatever place they may wish to work under a reliable Persian of good family, whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided and fixed by the company in consultation with the Ilkhani, and who shall remain there summer and winter.

If, in spite of the efforts of the said guards, a theft shall occur, the Ilkhani undertakes to recover the property stolen and to compensate the company for any damage sustained in his territory. In the event of the non-recovery of the stolen property, the value thereof shall be deducted by the company from the sums due to the Ilkhani.

The number of guards at any place where the company may operate shall be fixed by the company in consultation with the Ilkhani and with the knowledge of the Persian Government.

It shall be the duty of the above-mentioned head of the guards to keep order in the areas in his charge to such extent as the company may order him; he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes among the company's servants unless asked by the company to do so.

In case of misconduct the said guards are subject to dismissal or fine by the company. In the event of any heavier punishment being needed, the offender shall be

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

handed over to the representative of the Ilkhani, and the Ilkhani undertakes that punishment shall be inflicted, and to use his utmost endeavour to uphold the authority of the company's employees, thereby avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this contract.

ARTICLE 8.

Until oil is exported by the pipe-line from the said territories, the company shall pay to the Ilkhani the sum of 1,000*l.* per annum, payable half-yearly from the 21st March in arrears.

ARTICLE 9.

Should the company succeed in finding oil in paying quantities in the said territories and as soon as oil is exported by the pipe-line, the company agree to pay to the Ilkhani a further sum of 1,000*l.* annually, making a total sum of 2,000*l.* annually.

Whenever the company decide to issue shares to the Ilkhani in any new company or companies which may be formed for the extraction of oil in the said territories (including those covered by the agreement of the company with the Kashkuli Khans), the said Ilkhani shall be granted three shares out of every hundred shares issued by such company or companies. These shares will be issued in the name of the Ilkhani, and the dividends that may thereafter be declared annually by the said company or companies shall be paid annually to the Ilkhani.

The above shares shall be paid by the company to the Ilkhani in return for the protection and assistance he has undertaken to provide for the company's staff and work, on the condition that he has in fact provided it, but it is hereby agreed that the said amount of 2,000*l.* shall cease to be paid after the first declaration of a dividend on the shares.

The Ilkhani hereby undertakes not to sell, mortgage, transfer or otherwise dispose of such shares, if issued, and in order that such shares may permanently remain in his family, he hereby agrees to deposit the scrip with the company against a receipt for the same.

ARTICLE 10.

In the event of the company failing to discover oil in sufficient quantities in any place where they may be working, they shall have the right to stop work at their option, and the Ilkhani shall have no claim to any of the above payments.

ARTICLE 11.

It is hereby understood that should anyone be appointed by the Persian Government as the Ilbegi to participate in the management of the tribe belonging to the Ilkhani and should he interfere with this agreement or raise any claim, the Ilkhani himself will be answerable.

ARTICLE 12.

The Ilkhani solemnly declares that he will carry out all the conditions of this contract willingly and faithfully, and that he and his heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept fully responsibility for any claim or dispute by any person whether in their territory or beyond it questioning the validity of any stipulations of this agreement.

This contract cannot be cancelled except as provided as above, and shall remain in force for the period of the company's concession from the Persian Government or any extension or renewal thereof.

ARTICLE 13.

In the event of any difference arising between the company and the Ilkhani it shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties; failing a friendly settlement, the dispute shall be referred to three arbitrators, one of whom is to be nominated by the Ilkhani, second by the company and the third by the said two arbitrators, and the decision given by that body shall be accepted as final.

Signed and sealed at Dokohak this 22nd day of Ramadhan, 1340, equivalent to the 20th day of May 1922.

This agreement which consists of thirteen articles and which has been concluded between my son, Mohammed Nasir Khan, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is hereby confirmed and is correct.

(L.S.) ISMAIL KASHGAI.

(For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company),
A. T. WILSON.

(L.S.) MUHAMMAD NASIR KASHGAI.

May 20, 1922.



Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Muhammad Nasir Khan.

(Translation.)

AGREEMENT concluded between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Muhammad Nasir Khan, Ilkhani of the Kashgais, on behalf of himself, his heirs, successors, the headmen and tribesmen of the Kashgais.

The Ilkhani agrees to confirm the agreement, dated the 22nd Mizan Takhaqui II, 1300, concluded between the said company and the Kashkuli Khans, on the condition that :—

1. Firstly, the said khans obey all the orders and instructions of the Ilkhani in every respect, and do not procrastinate in carrying out their duties and obligations with regard to him. Secondly, that the said khans pay their revenues to the Ilkhani in accordance with tribal custom, and do not fail in paying the same at all. Thirdly, that if the khans should fail in any one of the two conditions mentioned above, the company should in no way support them.
2. The Ilkhani undertakes that, as long as the aforesaid khans duly observe and act upon the conditions mentioned in the first clause, he (the Ilkhani) will also accord them kindness and regards, and will not subject them to his wrath and displeasure.
3. The company undertakes to give the Ilkhani the 3 per cent. of the shares which it had given to the Kashkuli Khans in accordance with the agreement referred to, and it will pay the said khans only the sum of 10,668 tomans which the company had stipulated to pay to them.
4. The Ilkhani undertakes to see that the Kashkuli Khans abide by the conditions contained in clause 3, and bring about no trouble and annoyance for the company.

Written this 22nd Ramadhan, 1340, equivalent to the 20th May, 1922.

(L.S.) MUHAMMAD NASIR KASHGAI.

This agreement, which consists of four clauses and has been concluded between my son, Muhammad Nasir Khan, and the Anglo Persian Oil Company, is hereby confirmed and is correct.

(L.S.) ISMAIL KASHGAI.

We confirm this agreement on our own behalf and that of the other khans who have signed the agreement, dated the 22nd Mizan 1300, and we do undertake that neither we nor they themselves will create any difficulty or raise any objection for the company and the Ilkhani.

Dated the 22nd Ramadhan, 1340.

(L.S.) HADI KASHKULI.
(L.S.) GHULAM HUSAIN KASHKULI.
(For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company),
A. T. WILSON.

May 20, 1922.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Consul Chick to Sir P. Loraine.

(No. 39.)

Shiraz, May 24, 1922.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you a copy of my despatch No. 661 to His Majesty's consul-general for Fars (but without the enclosures thereto), on the subject of the agreement concluded between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Sardar Ashair.



Sir A. Wilson had a difficult task in dealing with such an avaricious, unprincipled and astute mountebank; it is not to be wondered at that the result of the contest was in the circumstances not as satisfactory as could be desired.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHICK.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Consul Chick to the Political Resident, Bushire.

(No. 661.)
Sir, *Shiraz, May 24, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your information, with one spare copy, a translation of the agreement concluded by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, Sardar Ashair, on behalf of his son Muhammad Nasir Khan, the Ilkhani of the Kashgai, as also a record of proceedings drawn up by Sir A. Wilson.* Sir A. Wilson arranged at my request to deliver copies personally to His Majesty's Minister.

You will note the supplementary agreement giving the conditions on which the Ilkhani (*i.e.*, Sardar Ashair) confirmed the agreement with the Kashkuli Khans. Hadi Khan, who was not empowered by the other khans to the purpose, appears to have signed out of unwillingness to annoy Sir A. Wilson and alarm at being for the time in the presence of his enemy; he has since expressed the opinion that the other khans (who have joined Ali Khan, brother of Sardar Ashair, and are still demanding of the Governor-General their emancipation from Sardar Ashair's domination) would not countersign the terms, or have any more faith in the latter's attitude towards the clan than he has himself.

Sir A. Wilson informed me that he was personally by no means satisfied with the present settlement; after two days in the company of Sardar Ashair he regarded the latter as quite unreliable in his performance of the terms of it; gave him till next spring perhaps before he again became a nuisance to the company and the effect of the present meeting wore off; and would regard it as a blessing were Sardar Ashair ousted from his position and a fresh Ilkhani appointed. The Persian adviser to the oil company, Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad, C.I.E., is further extremely doubtful whether the Persian Government will accept the agreements as they stand.

I was not present at the negotiations, as His Majesty's Minister concurred in my view that it would be better to remain behind the scenes. Owing to Sardar Ashair ignoring the repeated advice of the Persian Government to pay his respects to the Prince Governor-General, the negotiations took place at some 15 miles from Shiraz, and the Governor-General took no part in the discussion (although the draft and final agreements were shown to him), so that the opportunity suggested by Sir P. Loraine for me to seek an invitation from the Governor-General to be present with His Imperial Highness did not arise.

Apart from the critical question of the reception by the other Kashkuli Khans of the new arrangement, their willingness to submit to Sardar Ashair, and his own treatment of the clan in the next few months, the main drawback to the new agreement, which Sir A. Wilson understands as well as I do, is the position which would supervene on a change of Ilkhani—an event that in the natural course of things must occur within three years, if not sooner. For Sardar Ashair refused to allow his brothers to be parties to the terms or to admit the *de jure* ilbegiship of his nephew; and it will therefore be within the rights of the brothers if they accede to power, to refuse to endorse the terms made by Sardar Ashair. In the peculiar relationships of the ruling Kashgai family, such a clause as "heirs and successors" of the Ilkhani can have no binding effect on the anti-Soulat Party. Practically there can be no finality to agreements with such a tribal organisation as the Kashgai, unless and until the ilkhaniship is abolished and the government of the tribe separated into sections and brought directly under the control of the Provincial Government—a proposal which His Majesty's Minister reports to exist at Tehran.

My own view has been and is that, considering the local situation in Fars and the company's future interests, a meeting of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative with Sardar Ashair at the present juncture was unsound and inopportune, and that the result obtained may lead to further complications. Owing to the unexpected personal support given by the Minister of War to Sardar Ashair, the latter was for the

* See Enclosures 1 to 3.



moment in a stronger position than psychologically favourable for the company's negotiations. The monetary arrangements with Sardar Ashair are heavier than could have been made with his brothers had a change of régime been awaited; their reliance on Kashkuli support would have led them to confirm the Kashkuli Agreement without conditions, and avoided the friction which unfortunately seems now to be probable. In Sir A. Wilson's words to me, this agreement is merely a form of blackmail, for beyond keeping his hands off the local tribesmen and ceasing to intrigue against the company, there is practically nothing that Sardar Ashair can do to assist the company at the oil location in Bikarz.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHICK.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 8445/6/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

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P 3779 1922

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Sept 11, 1922.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 13 SEP 1922

Reference to previous correspondence:

✓

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From H.M. Minister, Tehran, despatch No 432, July 6, 1922.	Activities of Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

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



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[August 24.]

SECTION 6.

[E 8445/6/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to the Earl of Balfour.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 432.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 6, 1922.

IN my despatch No. 427 of the 3rd July I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the negotiations which took place in the neighbourhood of Shiraz between the resident manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the Qashqai chieftain, in regard to the agreement concluded last year between the company and the Kashkuli khans for the exploitation of oil deposits in the regions of Dashti-gil and Bikarz, and I alluded therein to the question of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's personal position as practical head of the tribe.

In this latter connection I beg leave to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying copies of despatches from His Majesty's consular officers at Shiraz and Bushire,* and I must begin by saying that I myself concur in the views expressed by Colonel Trevor.

Strictly speaking, Soulet-ed-Dowleh is not the ilkhani of the tribe, his son, Mohammed Nasir, being the titular holder of that position; the son is, however, a mere instrument in the hands of his crafty and unscrupulous parent, who actually wields the power and enjoys the prestige of the ilkhaniship.

The record of Soulet-ed-Dowleh before, during and since the war are so well known to your Lordship that no recapitulation of it is necessary here. It will suffice to say that this chieftain became engaged in active hostilities against British and British-organised forces, that he gave our military authorities some anxious moments owing to his success in investing Sir Percy Sykes's force in Shiraz, but was eventually and effectively chastised for his temerity. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has neither forgotten nor forgiven the defeat inflicted on him; he is a party who requires periodical chastisement, but unfortunately there is no one now in a position to administer it; while his respect for anyone is in direct ratio to his belief in their capacity to inflict it. I mention this because it is important to bear in mind that in dealing with people like Soulet-ed-Dowleh, force is the deciding factor. It is not unfair to postulate that there are three ways of dealing with Persians: force, money and kindness. Of the three, the two first alone make an impression on Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

Shortly before Sir Arnold Wilson's arrival in Fars, Mr. Chick represented to me that the circumstances were favourable for the deposition of Soulet-ed-Dowleh from his position of paramount authority over the tribe; there were numerous local complaints against his harshness, and against the brutal and lawless depredations of his tribesmen; his influence in the province was wholly deleterious, his attitude towards the Prince Governor-General amounted to overt insubordination, his relations with his life-long rival, Qawam-ul-Mulk, were worse than ever, and it was only restraining British influence which hindered Qawam-ul-Mulk, whose was an element of order, from seeking to overthrow the Qashqai chieftain. Mr. Chick indeed had at one moment reported to me confidentially that Qawam-ul-Mulk was so desirous in the general interests of the province of Fars that Soulet-ed-Dowleh should disappear for a time that he was willing himself to go a for a long trip abroad if the Qashqai leader were willing to act similarly.

The idea of killing two birds with one stone, that is of getting rid of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his mischievous influence, and also of enabling Sir A. Wilson to treat with a far more tractable negotiator than this chieftain, was not lacking in attractiveness. Moreover, Mr. Chick had expressed to me confidently the opinion that a mere act of deposition coming from the Central Government would of itself probably be sufficient to effect Soulet-ed-Dowleh's downfall, as most of his adherents would at once desert him and the numerous people who had suffered under his tyrannous and avaricious sway would forthwith raise up their heads and complete his discomfiture; that, in any case, the merest handful of Government troops would suffice as a nucleus around which to rally the malcontents, while Qawam-ul-Mulk and his Khamseh tribesmen would be ready to clinch the matter should Soulet-ed-Dowleh seriously show fight. Furthermore,

* Not printed. for Col Trevor's desp. see P 3166 below. for Mr Chick's see ibid: + P [illegible] above.

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

I ascertained here that a plan had been submitted to the Tehran Government for splitting up the Qashqai into four sections, each with an ilbegi at its head and the position of ilkhani of the whole tribe being definitely abolished. The scheme was, of course, a mere application of the doctrine of *divide et impera*, and its result, if ever adopted, would certainly be to diminish the power and influence of the tribe and to render it far more tractable from an administrative point of view.

After mature reflection, I decided to sound the Persian Government on the subject and merely to find out their views and intentions as regards Soulet-ed-Dowleh. I was aware that, before his resignation, Mushir-ed-Dowleh had been much annoyed by the repeated complaints from Persian sources against the Qashqai chieftain, and considerably nettled by the latter's arrogant demeanour. When the question, however, arose in an acute form, the long Cabinet crisis was in full swing and the Minister for War was virtually in supreme authority. It was therefore with Reza Khan that it became necessary to deal, and it was pretty certain that he would take a purely military view of the situation. The upshot of my communications with his Excellency, made through the channel of the Oriental secretary, was that the Persian Government would like nothing better than to break Soulet-ed-Dowleh, but they considered that he would resist deposition forcibly, and that they were not strong enough to ensure his obedience to their command if matters came to a tussle. I immediately decided not to pursue the matter, and caused Reza Khan to be informed that in such affairs I was quite willing to subscribe to his judgment. My reasons for doing so were the following: if I had succeeded in over-persuading the Minister for War I should have been assuming a responsibility which properly belonged to the Persian authorities and which I had no means whatever of upholding; furthermore, on grounds of principle, such action on my part would be wholly indefensible and in flagrant contradiction with the attitude which I have consistently maintained; secondly, if the attempt had been made in deference to any advice of mine, and had failed, Soulet-ed-Dowleh would certainly have come to know of it, he would have been antagonised and the prospects of Sir A. Wilson's negotiations would have been completely prejudiced.

Reza Khan sent me a message of thanks for my communication and added that in his view the only safe tactics were to temporise with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, to let him continue to believe that he enjoyed the good graces of the Persian Government and to await a more auspicious occasion for destroying his power.

Although Mr. Chick stigmatises the attitude of the Tehran authorities as pusillanimous, and perhaps correctly so, I am inclined to think that Reza Khan's view of the case was not an unsound one; but, apart from that, it is certain that nothing but pusillanimity in action can be expected from an authority which is pusillanimous in counsel.

I think that on p. 2 of his despatch Mr. Chick has somewhat misapprehended the observations which I addressed to him in regard to Qawam-ul-Mulk. I am well aware of that chieftain's good qualities and of his uniformly friendly disposition towards ourselves. He is, however, an intriguer, as all Persians are practically compelled by existing circumstances to be, albeit a far more respectable intriguer than Soulet-ed-Dowleh. My injunction was intended to warn Mr. Chick not necessarily to fall in with Qawam-ul-Mulk's point of view, whatever his friendliness to us, and especially to avoid being involved in the perpetual strife and intrigue between the two powerful factions represented by Qawam-ul-Mulk and Soulet-ed-Dowleh respectively, which are the curse of Fars politics.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and to His Majesty's consul at Shiraz.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.



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P 3235 1922

No. 450-S of 1922

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, with reference to this office letter No.417-S, dated the 6th June 1922.

By order, etc.,

Sd. W. F. Q. Shuldham, Captain,
Under Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire, The 21st June 1922.

in INDIA FOREIGN
RETARY'S NO 50M
ID JUL 20.
8 AUG 1922.

List of Papers.

Letter No.448-S, dated the 20th June 1922, from the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire to the General Manager, Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd., Mohammerah with enclosures.

Copy not forwarded to Tehran.

Copy of a letter No.448-S of 1922, dated Bushire, the 20th June 1922, from the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the General Manager, Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd., Mohammerah.

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the marginally cited papers regarding the Kashgai situation. I think Mr.Clegg has already telegraphed you the gist of Mr.Chick's telegram.

Telegram No.724, dated 14th June 1922 from H.M's Consul, Shiraz.
Extract from diary of H.M's Consul, Shiraz, dated 7th June 1922 (paragraph 227).

AUG 1922
K.F.O.
D.M.I.

It appears from the extract of Mr. Chick's diary that the Soulet's camp was attacked by Salar Nishmat exactly at the moment when Soulet arrived at the Imam Juma's garden in order to discuss matters with the Governor General over the telephone.

It is evident that the attack was timed to synchronize with Soulet's trip to the outskirts of Shiraz, and in view of the Governor





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Governor General's hostility to Soulet and his recent efforts to oust him, it almost seems as if this was a treacherous attempt to secure the downfall of Soulet and the succession of Ali Khan to the Ilkhani-ship. So far however there is no proof of the Governor General's complicity in the affair.

It appears that Kashkulis as well as Darashuris and others were in Ali Khan's party and it will not be a matter for surprise if Soulet takes measures of reprisals against the tribe. As long as this punishment is inflicted in the hot weather it will not affect the interests of the Company, but if the fighting continues in the cold weather it may easily do so.

I have, etc.,
Sd. A. P. Trevor, Lieut-Col.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Telegram R.
From - Chick, Shiraz.
To - Resident, Bushire.
No. 724.
Dated 14th received 15th June 1922.

Your telegram No. 1105.

See Diary entry 227 dated June 7th. On June 10th certain Kashkuli and Darashuri Khans with Ali Khan left Shiraz vicinity. Rumour unconfirmed of fighting about latter date between Ilkhani and two tribes mentioned on Fars-Boir Ahmedi border and that Soulet from Baiza left to assist his son.

Chick.

Extract





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Extract from H.M's Consul, Shiraz's Diary No.23, dated 7th June 1922.

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227 QASHQAI. On June 1st, when Sardar Ashair had left his camp at Qalaa Piri (about 14 miles from Shiraz) to meet Imam Jumaa in the latter's garden and discuss matters with the Governor General over the telephone, his brother Ali Khan Salar Hishmat with about 200 men attacked the camp. Sardar Ashair had hardly reached the garden before this news brought to him, and he at once hurried back to his men. Heavy firing between the opposing parties went on till after nightfall, and the next day. Some 4 men would appear to have been killed on the side of Sardar Ashair, 2 wounded on that of Ali Khan, who also carried off some of the former's horses.

Salar Hishmat has now camped near the Koran gate of Shiraz with some 180 men, said to include Darashuri, Kashkuli and Shishbuluki Khans; while Sardar Ashair has moved off to Baiza to rejoin the tribe, the fighting having put an end to the negotiations promoted by H.I.H. between Sardar Ashair on the one part, and his brothers and Qawam-ul-Mulk on the other.

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



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Minute Paper.

Register No. P. 3166

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1922

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary	8/8	H.F.	S. Persia.
Secretary of State...			
Committee.....	10	[illegible]	A.P.O.C. agreement with Sardar Ashaer (Soulet-ed Dowleh) to confirm the Agreement with the Kashkuli Khans
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
14 AUG 1922

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D.O.T.I.
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FOR INFORMATION.

Sir A.T. Wilson has succeeded in getting Soulet to confirm the Agreement with the Kashkuli Khans (P5451/21) - but at a price which is to be paid it seems not by the A.P.O.C. only but also by the Khans.

The latter are to get £2000 p.a. during exploration; after oil began to be produced, either a further £2000 p.a. or 3 per cent of the shares of the resulting Co.

Now Soulet states in: during the exploration period he is to get £1000 p.a. from the Co. without participation of the Khans, who will still get their £2000; after oil is found

Previous Papers—

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

found he is to get, apparently, the additional £2000 or 3 per cent of the Khans, & not the Khans who have lost a prospective £2000. If this is the proper interpretation — it is a little obscure but Col. Trevor seems to interpret it this way — the arrangement is a good one for Soulet to rub in his ascendancy of the Khans, who may come to the conclusion that Soulet is a bigger trump, judged by results, than the A.P.O.C.

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SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
14 AUG 1922

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

CONFIDENTIAL.

P 3166 1922

(19)

No. 417-S. of 1922 dated Bushire, the 6th June 1922.

From—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—D. de S. Bray Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Agreement concluded between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Ilkhani of the Kashqai covering the exploitation of oil in the whole of the Kashqai garmsir.

With reference to paragraph 9 of my letter No. 303-S., dated the 19th October 1921 [Serial No. (1)], Government of India will remember that when Sir A. T. Wilson, on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, concluded an agreement with the Kashkulis in October 1921, the latter stated very definitely that they feared the enmity of Soulet, which they considered would assume a more violent form in consequence of their having made an agreement with the Company. They further told Sir A. T. Wilson that they considered it was the Company's duty to shield them as far as possible from being molested by Soulet for having concluded such agreement, and this he promised to do (*vide* paragraph 3 of enclosure 5 to enclosure 11 of my above-mentioned letter).

2. The Persian Government having announced that the Company were not authorised, under the terms of the D'Arcy concession, to conclude agreements with the local Khans without their previous acquiescence and approval, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran entered into negotiations with them and secured their assent to a meeting between Sir A. T. Wilson and Soulet, at which a Government representative had to be present, with a view to concluding an agreement. Unfortunately for various reasons this meeting was postponed again and again by Sir A. T. Wilson until the season for migration of the tribes to the Sarhad had arrived with no agreement concluded. The Kashkuli Khans consequently became more and more restive thinking that they had been left in the lurch. Eventually two of them came with Mr. Clegg to Bushire to obtain assurances from me. I told them my latest news was that Sir A. Wilson would come about the end of April and they left content. However Sir A. Wilson's arrival was again postponed for another 15 days.

3. On April 23rd news was received from Kazerun that Soulet had encamped about ½ mile from that town with a following of some 250 sowars, which later increased to some 800 sowars and 400 tufangchis, and that he intended to attack and drive off the Kashkulis from the oil area round Bikarz as he had done once before in 1917. A message was therefore immediately sent to Soulet from the Residency urging him to take no action which would prejudice the Company's operations in Kashkuli territory pending his meeting with Sir A. T. Wilson, who was expected to arrive in Baghdad from England at the end of the month. In reply Soulet stated that he had waited a long time for Sir A. T. Wilson, and that he could not delay his migration to his summer quarters any longer. He added that it was not his intention to damage the Company's interests but he had received instructions from the Persian Government to punish the Kashkulis for raids and robberies carried out by them during the past year and for non-payment of revenue. These orders were however categorically denied by the Persian Government.

4. Soulet on leaving Kazerun proceeded towards Kashkuli territory and reached Shahijan when he suddenly turned North and proceeded towards the Sarhad. The reasons for this sudden change in his plans were believed to be (1) intrigues against him in Shiraz on the part of the Governor General, the Qawam and Ali Khan, half brother of Soulet, who desires to be made Ilkhani and (2) his belief in the exaggerated rumours which reached his camp regarding the opposition which the Kashkulis were prepared to make, and that they possessed machine guns.

5. This threatened attack by Soulet did, however, seriously affect the Kashkulis' arrangements, and the majority of the tribe fled to Boir Ahmedi country

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

thereby proving that they are not competent to protect the Company's operations in their territory should Soulet really mean business.

6. Sir A. T. Wilson arrived in Bushire on May 9th and proceeded to Shiraz the following morning with a view to meeting Soulet as soon as possible, and making arrangements with him, but he was now confronted with a much more difficult task than would have been the case had he visited Soulet a couple of months before, and it was feared that Soulet might demand an exorbitant, and perhaps prohibitive, subsidy before he agreed to confirm the agreement with the Kashkuli Khans whose rights to the Bikarz area he refused to recognize.

7. On May 19th the first meeting took place between Sir A. T. Wilson and Soulet in the presence of Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan, the Government representative, and on May 20th after lengthy discussions and negotiations had taken place two agreements were concluded with Soulet, on behalf of his son Muhammad Nasir Khan, the titular Ilkhani.

8. I enclose for the information of the Government of India a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz [No. 661, dated the 24th May 1922], giving cover to a record of the proceedings by Sir A. Wilson, and a copy of the actual agreement, together with a subsidiary agreement recognizing the Kashkuli agreement on certain conditions. It will be seen that the Soulet agrees to protect the employees of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company throughout the country occupied by the Kashqais in their winter quarters and not only in the Kashkuli "garmsir" (winter quarters) lands; for this he receives a consideration of £1,000 per annum until oil is found, when it is he will get £2,000 per annum and eventually 3 per cent. of the shares of any Company which may be formed to exploit oil in Kashqai territory.

9. On the other hand, the Kashkulis will apparently lose £2,000 a year after oil is found and the possibility of receiving 3 per cent. of the shares of any Company should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company think fit. It remains to be seen how the Kashkulis will take this. Personally I deprecate altering the term of the agreement with them in any way (unless it were decided to cancel it altogether in deference to the views of the Persian Government). The new agreement, it will be seen, is subject to ratification by the Persian Government, and it is not easy to foretell what attitude the Persian Government will adopt towards it. Sir A. Wilson proceeded direct to Tehran from Shiraz with a view to getting the agreement ratified, but before his arrival at Tehran, the Prime Minister resigned for the 3rd time and is believed to be determined to refuse to withdraw his resignation. Thus for the moment there is no Persian Government with which Sir A. Wilson can deal, possibly, however, if he can arrange the matter with the Minister for War who has not resigned but continues to perform his functions, this will be sufficient as Sardar Sipah is all powerful now-a-days and will no doubt continue to be so in the next Government.

10. I find it hard to reconcile the remarks in the third paragraph of his letter with those of Sir A. Wilson in paragraph 8 of his memorandum. I do not know Soulet personally but from what I have heard I should be more inclined to agree with the views expressed in Sir Arnold's memorandum than with Mr. Chick's. I think that the Qawam and Ali Khan and the others who are intriguing against Soulet will find him a very tough nut to crack. I fancy Soulet will remain *de facto* Ilkhani and a great power for evil in the Kashqai tribe for a long time. If either of his brothers is put in as Ilkhani, I do not think he would be able to hold his own against Soulet for long.

(Copy not sent to Tehran.)

Enclosure.

No. 661.

May 24th, 1922.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit for your information, with one spare copy, a translation of the agreement concluded by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with Soulet-ud-Douleh. Sardar Ashair, on behalf of his son Muhammad Nasir Khan,



the Ilkhani of the Qashqai, as also a record of proceedings drawn up by Sir A. Wilson. Sir A. Wilson arranged at my request to deliver copies personally to His Majesty's Minister.

2. You will note the supplementary agreement giving the conditions on which the Ilkhani (*i.e.*, Sardar Ashair) confirmed the agreement with the Kashkuli Khans. Hadi Khan who was not empowered by the other Khans to the purpose, appears to have signed out of unwillingness to annoy Sir A. Wilson and alarm at being for the time in the presence of his enemy: he has since expressed the opinion that the other Khans (who have joined Ali Khan, brother of Sardar Ashair and are still demanding of the Governor-General their emancipation from Sardar Ashair's domination) would not countersign the terms, or have any more faith in the latter's attitude towards the clan than he has himself.

3. Sir A. Wilson informed me that he was personally by no means satisfied with the present settlement: after two days in the company of Sardar Ashair he regarded the latter as quite unreliable in his performance of the terms of it: gave him till next spring perhaps before he again become a nuisance to the Company, and the effect of the present meeting wore off: and would regard it as a blessing were Sardar Ashair ousted from his position and a fresh Ilkhani appointed. The Persian adviser to the Oil Company, Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad, C.I.E., is further extremely doubtful whether the Persian Government will accept the agreements as they stand.

I was not present at the negotiations, as His Majesty's Minister concurred in my view that it would be better to remain behind the scenes: owing to Sardar Ashair ignoring the repeated advice of the Persian Government to pay his respects to the Prince Governor-General, the negotiations took place at some 15 miles from Shiraz, and the Governor-General took no part in the discussion (although the draft and final agreements were shown to him), so that the opportunity suggested by Sir P. Loraine for me to seek an invitation from the Governor-General to be present with His Imperial Highness did not arise.

Apart from the critical question of the reception by the other Kashkuli Khans of the new arrangement, their willingness to submit to Sardar Ashair, and his own treatment of the clan in the next few months, the main drawback to the new agreement, which Sir A. Wilson understands as well as I do, is the position which would supervene on a change of Ilkhani—an event that in the natural course of things must occur within three years, if not sooner. For Sardar Ashair refused to allow his brothers to be parties to the terms, or to admit the *de jure* Ilbegiship of his nephew; and will therefore be within the rights of the brothers, if they accede to power, to refuse to endorse the terms made by Sardar Ashair. In the peculiar relationships of the ruling Qashqai family such a clause as "heirs and successors" of the Ilkhani can have no binding effect on the anti-Soulat party. Practically there can be no finality to agreements with such a tribal organization as the Qashqai unless and until the Ilkhaniship is abolished, and the government of the tribe separated into sections and brought directly under the control of the Provincial Government—a proposal which His Majesty's Minister reports to exist at Tehran.

My own view has been, and is, that, considering the local situation in Fars and the Company's future interests, a meeting of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative with Sardar Ashair at the present juncture was unsound and inopportune, and that the result obtained may lead to further complications. Owing to the unexpected personal support given by the Minister of War to Sardar Ashair, the latter was for the moment in a stronger position than psychologically favourable for the Company's negotiations. The monetary arrangements with Sardar Ashair are heavier than could have been made with his brothers had a change of regime been awaited: their reliance on Kashkuli support would have led them to confirm the Kashkuli agreement without conditions, and avoided the friction which unfortunately seems now to be probable. In Sir A. Wilson's words to me, this agreement is merely a form of blackmail: for, beyond keeping his hands off the local tribesmen and ceasing to intrigue against the Company,



there is practically nothing that Sardar Ashair can do to assist the Company at the oil-location in Bikarz.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

H. G. CHICK.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E.,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars,

Bushire.

Sub-enclosure No. 1.

Official record of proceedings of meeting between Sardar Ashair (Soulat-ud-Douleh) representing his son the Ilkhani and Sir A. T. Wilson at Du Kuhak near Shiraz, May 19th-20th 1922.

PRESENT.

On May 19th (in addition to above).—

Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan, Agent of Ministry of Finance in the province of Fars, representing the Persian Government; but without power to sign or approve an agreement on their behalf.

Mr. S. Clegg, Assistant to Out Fields Manager at Bikarz.

Mr. H. R. Louis, Secretary to Sir A. T. Wilson.

Khan Bahadur Mirza Mohammad Khan, C.I.E., acting as Secretary to Sir A. T. Wilson.

Mirza Mehdi Khan Maawin-ul-Mamalik, at present Munshi to Sardar Ashair, (formerly acting in same capacity to Shaikh of Mohammerah).

On May 20th—

Prince Ibtihaj-us-Sultan.

Mr. S. Clegg.

Hadi Khan Kashkuli.

Ghulam Hussain Khan Kashkuli.

The last two named representing the signatories to the Kashkuli agreement.

1. After somewhat lengthy preliminaries lasting from 11 to 1 and after the party had partaken of lunch, the draft Qashqai agreement prepared by Sir A. T. Wilson was read out as also the Qashquli agreement. Sardar Ashair then opened the discussion by objecting fundamentally to the Kashkuli agreement on grounds which may be briefly summarized as follows: —

(1) The Kashkuli are an integral part of the Qashqai and as such are under the authority of the Ilkhani, to whom the management of the Qashqai has been delegated by the Persian Government; as such they have no right to make such an agreement.

(2) The lands in respect of which they have undertaken to sell their proprietary or grazing rights are not theirs to dispose of; but belong to the Persian Government, the Kashkuli are subject to removal elsewhere at the option of the Ilkhani, who has more than once exercised this option; and they pay taxes to Government not direct but through the Ilkhani calculated on the number of their flocks and tents, to the Ilkhani. In consequence, any payments in respect of lost grazing rights should be made to the Ilkhani.

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

(3) The recognition of the rights of the Kashkuli to make such an agreement would create a dangerous precedent and was inconsistent with the maintenance of the position of Ilkhani, other tribes such as the Darreh Shuri whose winter quarters adjoin Bikarz and Mishun would follow their example and if the Company wished for example to work at Haft-Dasht, north of Bikarz (in which area it is understood that Mr. Wyllie considers oil prospects favourable) they would have to make a fresh agreement on similar lines with the Kashkuli and so on indefinitely.

(4) The effect of the agreement had already been to weaken the authority of the Ilkhani over the Kashkuli; they had looted 2,500 sheep from the Shaikh of Mohammerah's subject in Zaidan, and Jahangir Khan and Isfendiar Khan Kashkuli had robbed a Government postal courier near Shiraz at Sinehsafid; any action on his part to punish those responsible and to recover the looted property would be inevitably regarded as inspired by resentment against the tribe for having made an agreement with the Company.

(5) The Kashkuli tribe had in point of fact no responsible leader or leaders; the younger chiefs were guided by the advice of their mothers or by irresponsible and interested advisers; there was no one amongst them whom the Ilkhani or the Company could make responsible; the post of Kalantar was for practical purposes in abeyance.

(6) The title of the Kashkuli tribe to the lands in question being shown to be invalid, and the ability of the Khans to give effect to the agreement being demonstrably defective, the Ilkhani claimed that it should be cancelled and replaced by a fresh agreement with him only.

2. The reply of the Resident Director to the above arguments may be briefly summarized as follows: —

(1) During 1919 and 1920 the Company had sent geologists and surveyors to the lands in question: the Kashkuli Khans had been requested with the knowledge and approval of the Farman-Farma (then Governor General of Fars) to provide guards and had done so without any question being raised by the Ilkhani.

(2) The special status of the Kashkuli had been recognized in 1920 by an agreement between Sardar Ashair, Qawam-ul-Mulk and others whereby the right of the latter (representing the other half of the tribes of Fars) to protect the interests of the Kashkuli was recognized.

(3) The Company for reasons of its own desire to start work at once in the autumn of 1921—and was advised that in order to do so it was necessary to come to an agreement with the Kashkuli, whose winter quarters lie so far distant from the winter quarters of the Ilkhani (east of Ferozabad) that the latter would in practice be unable to force them against their will to give the requisite local protection and assistance to the Company.

The Company would have preferred to come to an agreement with the Ilkhani and with the Kashkuli simultaneously, or first with the former and then with the latter; but this course was found to be impracticable owing to the strained relations existing between the Kashkuli Khans and the Ilkhani at that time, and owing to the fact that the dates of migration and lines of movement of the two parties made a joint meeting impossible.

(4) At the time of signing the agreement by the Kashkuli however the Company had publicly and formally announced its intention of coming to an amicable agreement on the subject with the Ilkhani, whose authority over the Kashkuli it had at no time questioned.

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(5) The Company could not consent to cancel the Kashkuli agreement, which was entered into in good faith on both sides, and which would still be necessary for the smooth working of these even though they enjoyed to the fullest extent the good will of the Ilkhani, but were prepared to make it clear that they recognized the authority of the Ilkhani over the Kashkuli and to make the continued payment of subsidies to the Kashkuli dependent on the continued submission of the Kashkuli to the lawful authority of the Ilkhani.

3. The Sardar Ashair replied by demanding that the agreement offered to him should not be less advantageous to him than that of the Company with the Bakhtiari Khans, who, he said would never have tolerated subsidiary agreement between the Company and tribes subordinate to the Bakhtiari Khans.

4. The question of Ilbegi was discussed; the Sardar Ashair said that for practical purposes no such official had existed for many years past; the analogy of the Bakhtiari system did not apply, the matter was disposed of as shown in the agreement.

6. I finally intimated that subject to the usual provisions the Company was prepared to give the Ilkhani a 3 per cent. interest in any Companies formed for the extraction of oil in Qashqai territory, including the Kashkuli area, the Kashkuli Khans continuing to draw the £2,000 per annum they already receive. The cost to the Company of this concession is as follows:—

	Approximate to amount of subsidy granted	
	To Ilkhani.	To Kashkuli.
	£	£
For period of exploration	1,000	2,000
After oil is produced in paying quantities, in lieu of sums drawn during period of exploration.	3 per cent. of shares.	2,000

The Kashkuli agreement provides for a payment of £2,000 during period of exploration, to be replaced by a payment of £4,000 after oil is struck, to be replaced at the option of the Company by 3 per cent. of shares of Kashkuli Oil Company.

The additional outlay involved by the new agreement with Soulat is thus £1,000 during period of exploration, £2,000 after oil is produced in paying quantities.

6. After I had announced the Company's readiness to make this concession, the Sardar Ashair changed the conversation, the meeting soon after came to an end and negotiations, which had hitherto been pursued in the presence of the Prince, followed, at the Sardar Ashair's desire a more subterranean course, our respective Persian Secretaries being used as intermediaries. The principal obstacle was, of course, the Kashkuli agreement which Sardar Ashair desired to see cancelled, not confirmed. By next morning, however, after lengthy discussion lasting till a late hour, the two agreements in their present form were accepted.

7. Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli and Hadi Khan Kashkuli countersigned the agreement late in the afternoon and undertook to obtain the adherence of the other signatories. The former left the tribe early in the spring and joined Sardar Ashair in whose camp he now resides: the latter joined us at Kamarij and came up with us to Shiraz. He was brought in by Mr. Clegg by car from Shiraz at the last moment, and, though in very bad odour with Sardar Ashair, was well received; he returned with us the same night. Mr. Clegg took charge of the four copies of the agreement and armed with a letter from Sardar Ashair and a gold watch for presentation on behalf of the Company, went off to Baiza to obtain the signature of the young Ilkhani.

8. The Sardar Ashair struck me as a man of considerable ability and force of character, with a good head for business negotiations; it seems unlikely that he

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

will have for many years to come a serious rival unless the latter is actively supported by the Persian Government; and it seems clear that even were his son to be ousted from the post of Ilkhani, Sardar Ashair himself would continue to exercise great power for evil. It is not, therefore, a matter of regret that the Company should have found it necessary to conclude this agreement with the Ilkhani through Sardar Ashair, as this circumstance, combined with the fact that a representative of the Persian Government was present throughout the negotiations, is calculated to give a greater permanence to the agreement than it would otherwise possess.

9. In conclusion, the writer must acknowledge the great assistance rendered to him during the negotiations by Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad Khan, C.I.E., whose great experience and dialectical ability were of much value. Prince Ibtihaj-es-Sultan did nothing to obstruct negotiations, and his presence was, in fact, of material assistance.

SHIRAZ; A. T. WILSON.

The 21st May 1922.

Sub-Enclosure No. 2.

Translation of an agreement which has been entered into as follows between Messrs. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, on the one part, hereinafter called the Company, and Muhammad Nasir Khan, Ilkhani of the Qashqai, on behalf of himself, his heirs or successors and of the headmen and tribesmen of the Qashqai on the other part, hereinafter called the Ilkhani, in respect of the protection and assistance required by the said Company throughout the whole extent of the territories in occupation of the Qashqai tribe in their winter quarters for the purpose of the Company's business under the concession which they held from the Persian Government, and which agreement should be submitted to, and approved by, the Persian Government.

Article 1.

The Company shall have the right to drill for oil and for water and to make all investigations necessary for the purpose of their business in all parts of the said territories and to construct and erect tramways, roads, buildings, machinery and telegraph apparatus of all kinds in any part of the said territories so far as may be necessary for the purposes of their business.

The Company shall have the right to collect and use free anywhere in the said territories stone, gach, salt, sulphur, clay for building purposes, wood and water, whether from river or springs for the purposes of their work, provided that the taking of the water is not detrimental to cultivation in the boundaries in question.

The selection of routes and sites for such work shall rest with the Company.

It is hereby explained that as long as the Persian Government have left salt and sulphur in their natural state and free, the Company will utilize them free of charge.

In the event of the said articles being monopolized by any Company or by anyone under any concession, the Company will communicate with the Government and effect an arrangement.

Article 2.

All lands whatever required by the Company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil including all or any natural springs of oil in the said territories together with an adequate supply of water so far as available shall be granted by the said Ilkhani to the Company free of charge, provided that the taking of the water is not detrimental to cultivation in the boundaries in question, and without let or hindrance from any of his relatives or dependents or any of his tribesmen or of third parties.

And it is hereby agreed that in consideration of the sums to be paid to the Ilkhani under articles 8 and 9, any claim for compensation, or subsidy put forward by a third party in respect of such land or of the protection to be rendered to the



Company by the Ilkhani shall be met by the said Ilkhani or his heirs and successors, and that under no circumstances shall the Company be made to pay compensation for the same. If the Company finds itself obliged to pay other parties in order to ensure the safety of their work, the amount paid may be deducted by the said Company at their option from the amount due to the Ilkhani.

Article 3.

As soon as the Company have been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantities to justify the laying of one or more pipe-lines to one or more spots on the coast or elsewhere and as soon as oil is being exported thereby, the Company hereby undertakes to purchase, and the Ilkhani hereby undertakes to dispose of, his grazing and other rights over whatever Government or other land may be required by the Company for their operations at the following rates:—for every square of hundred yards on each side ten *tomans*, for unirrigated arable land and five *tomans* for non-arable land.

It is to be understood that it will still be incumbent on the Company in accordance with the concession to acquire the said lands from the Persian Government in the manner specified in their concession or from the lawful owners, whoever they may be, by purchase or otherwise.

The Ilkhani further undertakes to sell whatever land may be in his own personal possession at the following rates:—for every square of hundred yards on each side ten *tomans* for unirrigated arable land and five *tomans* for non-arable land. Irrigated land must be acquired by the Company at a reasonable value in accordance with the concession they hold from the Persian Government.

Lands so acquired shall be the absolute property of the Company for the period of their agreement and any extension or renewal thereof, and the Company shall have full proprietary rights therein.

Article 4.

No one shall have any right to graze flocks on land so acquired or in temporary occupation of the Company for the purposes of exploration, and should they do so, the Ilkhani undertakes to punish them. Should anyone transgress the Company's boundaries and should they or any of their flocks meet with an accident (which God forbid), the Company shall not be responsible.

Article 5.

All houses, shops, etc., which the Company may build on land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes. The Ilkhani or his representatives shall have no right to collect taxes from any of the people employed by the Company or temporarily permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

Article 6.

The Ilkhani undertakes to give all the protection in his power to the Company and to their staff and labourers in any part of his territory from theft, highway robbery, assault, etc.

Similarly the Ilkhani undertakes to protect all the property of the Company and of their employés which may be exposed to wilful damage or to possible loss or theft.

Article 7.

For this purpose, (as long as the Persian Government have not detailed regular forces in accordance with the Company's concession) it is further agreed that the Company, in consultation with the Ilkhani and with the knowledge of the Persian Government, shall appoint permanent trustworthy guards at whatever place they may wish to work under a reliable Persian of good family whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided and fixed by the Company in consultation with the Ilkhani and who shall remain there summer and winter.

If, in spite of the efforts of the said guards, theft shall occur, the Ilkhani undertakes to recover the property stolen and to compensate the Company for any



damage sustained in his territory. In the event of the non-recovery of the stolen property, the value thereof shall be deducted by the Company from the sums due to the Ilkhani.

The number of guards at any place where the Company may operate shall be fixed by the Company in consultation with the Ilkhani and with the knowledge of the Persian Government.

It shall be the duty of the above-mentioned head of the guards to keep order in the areas in his charge to such extent as the Company may order him: he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes among the Company's servants unless asked by the Company to do so.

In case of misconduct, the said guards are subject to dismissal or fine by the Company. In the event of any heavier punishment being needed, the offender shall be handed over to the representative of the Ilkhani and the Ilkhani undertakes that punishment shall be inflicted and to use his utmost endeavour to uphold the authority of the Company's employees, thereby avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this contract.

Article 8.

Until oil is exported by the pipe-line from the said territories, the Company shall pay to the Ilkhani the sum of one thousand English pounds per annum payable half yearly from the 21st March in arrears.

Article 9.

Should the Company succeed in finding oil in paying quantities in the said territories and as soon as oil is exported by the pipe-line, the Company agree to pay to the Ilkhani a further sum of one thousand English pounds annually, making a total sum of two thousand English pounds annually.

Whever the Company decide to issue shares to the Ilkhani in any new company or companies which may be formed for the extraction of oil in the said territories (including those covered by the agreement of the Company with the Kashkuli Khans), the said Ilkhani shall be granted three shares out of every hundred shares issued by such company or companies. These shares will be issued in the name of the Ilkhani and the dividends that may thereafter be declared annually by the said company or companies shall be paid annually to the Ilkhani.

The above shares shall be paid by the Company to the Ilkhani in return for the protection and assistance he has undertaken to provide for the Company's staff and work, on the condition that he has in fact provided it, but it is hereby agreed that the said amount of two thousand English pounds shall cease to be paid after the first declaration of a dividend on the shares.

The Ilkhani hereby undertakes not to sell, mortgage, transfer or otherwise dispose of such shares, if issued, and in order that such shares may permanently remain in his family, he hereby agrees to deposit the script with the Company against a receipt for the same.

Article 10.

In the event of the Company failing to discover oil in sufficient quantities in any place where they may be working, they shall have the right to stop work at their option and the Ilkhani shall have no claim to any of the above payments.

Article 11.

It is hereby understood that should anyone be appointed by the Persian Government as the Ilbegi to participate in the management of the tribe belonging to the Ilkhani and should he interfere with this agreement or raise any claim, the Ilkhani himself will be answerable.

Article 12.

The Ilkhani solemnly declares that he will carry out all the conditions of this contract willingly and faithfully and that he, and his heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept full responsibility for any claim or dispute by any person, whether in their territory or beyond it, questioning the validity of any stipulations on this agreement.

This contract cannot be cancelled except as provided as above, and shall remain in force for the period of the Company's concession from the Persian Government or any extension or renewal thereof.

Article 13.

In the event of any difference arising between the Company and the Ilkhani, it shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties,

failing a friendly settlement, the dispute shall be referred to three arbitrators, one of whom is to be nominated by the Ilkhani, second by the Company and the third by the said two arbitrators, and the decision given by that body shall be accepted as final.

Signed and sealed at Dokohak this 22nd day of Ramadhan 1340 equivalent to the 20th day of May 1922.

This agreement which consists of thirteen articles and which has been concluded between my son, Muhammad Nasir Khan, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, is hereby confirmed and is correct.

(Signed) ISMAIL QASHQAI.
(Sealed) ISMAIL (SAULET-ED-DOWLAH).
For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
(Signed) A. T. WILSON.

May the 20th, 1922.

(Signed) MUHAMMAD NASIR QASHQAI.
(Sealed) MUHAMMAD NASIR.

Agreement concluded between Messrs. The Anglo-Persian Oil Compay and Muhammad Nasir Khan, Ilkhani of the Qashqais, on behalf of himself, his heirs, successors, the headmen and tribesmen of the Qashqais.

1. The Ilkhani agrees to confirm the agreement dated the 22nd Mizan Takhaqui il, 1300, concluded between the said Company and the Kashkuli Khans, on the condition that :—

Firstly, the said Khans obey all the orders and instructions of the Ilkhani in every respect and do not procrastinate in carrying out their duties and obligations with regard to him.

Secondly, that the said Khans pay their revenues to the Ilkhani in accordance with tribal custom and do not fail in paying the same at all.

Thirdly, that if the Khans should fail in any one of the two conditions mentioned above, the Company should in no way support them.

2. The Ilkhani undertakes that as long as the aforesaid Khans duly observe and act upon the conditions mentioned in the first clause, he (the Ilkhani) will, also, accord them kindness and regards and will not subject them to his wrath and displeasure.

3. The Company undertakes to give the Ilkhani the three per cent. of the shares which it had given to the Kashkuli Khans in accordance with the agreement referred to, and it will pay the said Khans only the sum of ten thousand six hundred and sixty-eight *tomans* which the Company had stipulated to pay to them.

4. The Ilkhani undertakes to see that the Kashkuli Khans abide by the conditions contained in clause three and bring about no trouble and annoyance for the Company.

Written this 22nd Ramadhan 1340 equivalent to the 20th May 1922.

(Signed and sealed) MUHAMMAD NASIR QASHQAI.

This agreement which consists of four clauses and has been concluded between my son, Muhammad Nasir Khan, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is hereby confirmed and is correct.

(Signed) ISMAIL QASHQAI.
(Sealed) ISMAIL (SAULAT-ED-DOWLEH).

We confirm this agreement on our own behalf and that of the other Khans who have signed the agreement dated the 22nd Mizan 1300 and we do undertake that neither we nor they themselves will create any difficulty or raise any objection for the Company and the Ilkhani.

Dated the 22nd Ramadhan 1340.

(Signed and sealed) HADI KASHKULI.
GHULAM HUSAIN KASHKULI.
For Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
(Signed) A. T. WILSON.

May 20th, 1922.

G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C216 F.D.—5-7-22—26—M.D.



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(208) (2pp)

Register No. P. 2026

Minute Paper.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 19 22

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	21.6		Persia
Secretary of State.	2/June		Relations of A.P.O. Cy with the
Committee.....			Persian Govt.
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to ✓

FOR INFORMATION.

The relations of the A.P.O. Cy. with the Persian Govt. show no signs of improvement. On p 7 of the attached correspondence will be found a letter in which the Persian Govt. declare every agreement which the A.P.O. Cy may have made with local Khans & or chiefs of tribes to be null and void.

This must not, of course, be taken too seriously, & possibly is, in essence, nothing more than a move in the game being played over the Khushtana Concession, i.e. a threat that if the A.P.O. Cy persists in its claim in the North, it may find itself thrown out of the South.

J.A.S. 25/5

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
24 JUN 1922

Previous Papers :—

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



20 MAY 1922

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2026
1922

No. 254-S of 1922.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No.199-S, dated the 4th March 1922.

INDEXED

By order,

Sd. ~~Illegible~~, W. Shuldham,

Captain,

Under Secretary to the Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire,

29th March 1922.

Telegram No.450 , dated the 10th March 1922 from the Political Resident , Bushire, to H.M.'s Consul, Shiraz.

Telegram No.302 dated the 11th March 1922 from H.M.'s Consul, Shiraz to the Political Resident, Bushire repeated Tehran 29.

Telegram No.65, dated the 12th March 1922 from the Political Resident, Bushire to H.M.'s Minister, Tehran repeated Shiraz.465

Telegram No.476 dated the 14th March 1922 from the Political Resident, Bushire to H.M.'s Consul, Mohammerah.

Telegram No. 70/477 dated 14th March 1922 from the Political Resident, Bushire to H.M.'s Minister, Tehran.

Telegram No.64 dated the 21st March 1922 from H.M.'s Minister, Tehran to the Political Resident, Bushire repeated Shiraz 32.

Telegram No.80 dated the 23rd March 1922 from the Political Resident, Bushire to H.M.'s Minister, Tehran repeated Shiraz 535.

Telegram No.536 dated the 24th March 1922 from the Political Resident, Bushire to H.M.'s Consul, Shiraz repeated Tehran 81.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S NO 26M
DATED 27th APR.
Recd. 15 h MAY.


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

Telegram R.
From - Trevor, Bushire.
To - Chick, Shiraz.
No. 450.
Dated 10th March 1922.
Priority.

Sharp and Clegg report that Kashkuli Khans are very nervous as to what Soulet will do when tribe moves up country, and seem to want some assurances from us. I was about to suggest that Wilson's meeting with him should be expedited, but I hear to-day that Wilson has gone on to England from Baghdad and date of return unknown. Do you think it would be good thing for Dr. Young or some one else on behalf of Company to see Soulet, or can you suggest any means of allaying Kashkuli Khans apprehensions ?

I do not think we can give any kind of assurance to Kashkulis till company have come to some arrangement with Soulet, do you ?

Trevor.

Telegram R.
From - Chick, Shiraz.
To - Resident, Bushire 302.
Repeated Tehran 29.
Dated and received 11th March 1922.

Your telegram No.450.

I think it would be better to consult H.M.'s Minister as I am unaware how far Persian Government would object to agreement with Soulet without presence of their representative.

It was certainly part of compact between Wilson and Kashkuli Khans last October that he should square Soulet before spring migration and now that latter owing to variety of circumstances is in more tractable frame of mind it is pity that Wilson will not be available for the present.

No other representative of company would create same impression on Soulet or stand same chance of overcoming his prejudices and safeguarding Kashkulis from molestation.

All recent evidence point to Soulet setting store by his direct





direct negotiations with Legation last autumn and thinking me none too friendly on oil question. I therefore suggest letter from H.M.'s Minister to Soulet explaining sudden change in Wilson's plans and asking him to allow meeting to stand over while maintaining attitude of non-interference in Kashkuli relations with the company with an assurance that company mean to have early settlement with him on several points would best allay Soulet's suspicions at delay and cause him to hold his hand till summer (?). Such letter I could hand Soulet's agent here. If answer favourable Kashkulis could be reassured by a copy being shown to them by company's agent.

Telegram R.
From - Resident, Bushire.
To - Minister, Tehran 65.
Repeated Shiraz, 465.
Dated 12th March 1922.
Priority.

Shiraz telegram No. 29.

Following is repetition of my telegram No.450 of the 10th March to Shiraz begins .... ends.

In the circumstances do you think letter as suggested by Chick would be best way of dealing with matter or perhaps telegram followed by letter as matter seems urgent. Meanwhile I can ask company to ascertain definitely when Wilson will be back and can see Soulet, and if this will belong delayed whether they can send special representative to see Kashkulis and try and reassure them. The Khans apparently think company is going to leave them in the lurch.

Telegram R.
From - Resident Bushire.
To - Lincoln, Mohammerah.
No. 476.
Dated 14th March 1922.

Following for Jacks begins. Sharp will have told you about attitude of Kashkulis in regard to Soulet. It seems advisable that Wilson should see latter as soon as possible. Can you ascertain when he will be able to do so. If not for sometime do you think special





representative better be sent to try and reassure Kashkulis. (212)

Telegram R.
From - Resident, Bushire.
To - Minister, Tehran.
No. 70/477.
Dated 14th March 1922.

Governor tells me he recently received telegram from the Persian Government that he should interview me and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative and notify the latter that no agreements should be made by company with Khans or local people except through the local Government. At present he is replying that Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative not here just now but he will discuss this when representative returns. As matters in this connection are being dealt with between Persian Government and Legation and former has all facts it seems unnecessary to have discussions here; in any case local representative of company has no power to make agreements.

2. My telegram No. 39 Karguzar has returned from tour to Dashtiqil and professes himself pleased with work company is doing.

Telegram R.
From- Minister, Tehran.
To -Resident, Bushire. 64.
Repeated Shiraz 32.
Dated 21st received 22nd March 1922.

Your telegram 65.

It is not advisable that I should write Soulet about this. It would provide pretext for fresh complaints by Persian Government, see your telegram 70. His Agent Sirdar Fakher has undertaken to explain matter to him.

Telegram R.
From - Resident, Bushire.
To - Minister Tehran. 80.

Repeated





213 5

Repeated Shiraz, 535.
Dated 23rd March 1922.

Your telegram 64.

Have just heard Sir A.Wilson due Baghdad April 15th and will interview Soulet as soon as possible, probably end of April and endeavour to come to satisfactory agreement with him. Perhaps latter's agent could be informed of intended visit.

Telegram R.
~~XXXXXX&XXSXXXXX~~
From - Resident,Bushire.
To - Chick,Shiraz,536.
Repeated Tehran. 81.
Dated 24th March 1922.

My telegram No.535.

Wilson suggests that if news of date is not sufficient to allay fear of Khans company's political officer might have meeting and make strictly limited agreement.Manager thinks this unsatisfactory and so do I but question arises will Soulet await meeting and will he defer threatened measures against Khans ? If Agent succeeds in explaining situation to satisfaction of Soulet how can this be conveyed to Khans in such a way as to satisfy them? At present they are afraid to start their migration.

No. 276-S of 1922.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 4th April 1922.

From

The Hon'ble Lieut. Col. A.P.Trevor,C.S.I.,C.I.E.,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To

The Hon'ble Mr. D.de S.Bray C.S.I.,C.I.E.,C.B.E.,

Foreign Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

PERSIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARES ALL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY AND KHANS OR CHIEFS OF TRIBES NULL AND VOID.

Sir,

With





Sir,

(214) 6 (210)

With reference to enclosure No.5 to my endorsement No.254-S dated the 29th March, I have the honour to forward herewith for the information of the Government of India copy of the marginally cited letter from His Majesty's Consul ,Ahwaz to His Majesty's Minister,Tehran enclosing copy of a letter addressed to the former by the Governor-General of Arabistan intimating that the Persian Government have declared that all agreements concluded by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with Khans or Chiefs of tribes are null and void.

dated 24th March with one enclosure.

The Persian Government claim that it is a breach of ~~xxtxixi~~ Article 3 of the D'Arcy Concession for the Company to conclude any agreement for the purchase of land etc without a reference being made to them for decision as to the ownership of the land the Company desire to acquire; the Company on the other hand contend that under the same article they are entitled to make such agreements and that as the Persian Government has never fulfilled its obligations under Article 14 they are compelled to make their own local arrangements for protection of their employees and works.

This is not the first time,however, that the ~~Persian~~ Persian Government have declared the Company's agreements null and void and they have never recognised the Bakhtiari Agreement.

I have etc ,

Sd. A. P. Trevor,
Lt. Col.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No.1111.
~~XII/2.~~

H.B.M.'s Consulate,Ahwaz.
24th March 1922.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for your information a/transliteration & translation ~~and~~ of a letter dated 20th March 1922 from H.E.Moayyad ed Dauleh Governor General of Arabistan, contesting the right of the Anglo Persian Oil Company to make agreements with local Khans and Chiefs of tribes.

I have merely acknowledged receipt of the letter and informed the





(215) 7 (211)

the Governor General that I am communicating the contents of his letter to H.B.M.'s Legation and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have etc.,

Sd. ~~Illegible~~, E.G.P. Peel,

H.B.M.'s Consul, Ahwaz.

To

H.B.M.'s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of H.I.M. The Shah of Persia, Tehran.

Copy with copy of enclosures forwarded with compliments to :-

(1) The Hon'ble the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire.
(2) The Manager Messrs. Strick Scott and Coy., Ltd. Mohamerah.
(3) M.Y.Young, Esquire, M.B., C.I.E., Oilfields.
(4) H.B.M.'s Consul for Arabistan, Mohamerah.

Translation of a letter No. 94 dated 29th Hoot 1300=20th March 1922 from H.E.Moayyad ud Dauleh Governor General of Shushtar, to E.G.P.Peel, Esquire, H.B.M.'s Consul, Ahwaz.

I would respectfully invite your attention to the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Persian Government has declared every agreement which the Anglo Persian Oil Company may have made with local Khans or Chiefs of tribes to be null and void as constituting a violation of the terms of the aforesaid Company's concession, and has instructed me to inform you accordingly.

Thus, all agreements and arrangements which have been made or may hereafter be contemplated by the Anglo Persian Oil Company with Khans and chiefs of tribes will without exception be refused recognition and will be regarded as null and void by the Persian Government; and further, no action should be taken which might violate the terms of the Anglo Persian Oil Company's concession dated the 9th Safar 1319, such as the determination of the ownership of lands which should as a matter of principle be referred to the Provincial Governor General (Ayalat va Hukumat-i-Kull) in order that the procedure of the Company within the limits of their concession may receive the sanction of the Central Government.

Furthermore





(216)

Furthermore, I am informed that Mr. Wilson (sic) the head of the aforesaid Company will shortly visit Bushire and Shiraz, I have therefore thought it necessary to ask you to inform him of the position described above as defined by the Persian Government, so that the terms of the Anglo Persian Oil Company's concession may be duly observed.

In conclusion I renew the assurances of my esteemed regard.

Sd. Mosyyad Ud Dauleh.

Governor General of Arabistan.

TRANSLITERATION.

No.94. dated 29th Hoot 1300.

Janabi Ajalli Dusti Mukarram Captain Peel Consul i Daulat i Inglis Muqimi Ahwaz, dam iqbaluhu.

Ba nihayati tauqir bikhateri muhtaram aali izhar minemayad ki Wizarati Umuri Kharejehye Daulati Aly-yeh Iran bar qarardadikeh Company i Hafti Iran va Inglis ba Khavanini Mahalleyeh va Ruasaye Il-lat va Ashayer basteh bashand chun bar khelafi Imtiaz-namehyi Companyi mazbur ast alghaye asra aalam va dustdarra niz auliyayi daulati aliyyehye Iran mukallif dashtahand leza maratibra ishar va khaternishan nemayed hamchu muamilat va qarardadhaye keh company Iran va Inglis ba khawanin va roasayi il-lat basteh xxxxx bashand va ya baad-ha dar maqami bastan bashand umuman nazdi auliyaye daulat alliyyehe Iran shanakhteh va shudeh mulgha shumurdeh khahad shud, ya bar khilaf muqarrirati imtiyaznamehyi companyi nafti Iran va Inglis muwarrekhehyi 9 Safar 1319, iqdami be amal nayayad, hamchininast tashkhisi malikiyati arazi ki usulan bayad companyi naft Iran va Inglis bi Ayalat va Hukumati kull ruju namayand ta ba istijazehi az markazi daulati alliyyeh dar Hududi imtiaznamehyi company raftaf shafad, Bealaveh khabar mirasad Jenab Mr. Willson raisi company mazbur qariban bi Bushire va Shiraz khahand raft lozuman muzahimat nidahad ki maratib ra bi tartibi ki faughan zahmat afza shudeh va az tarafi auliyayeh daulati alliyyehyi Iran aalam gardideh ast ba sharhi wasail bi ishan ishaar va aalam farmaid ki raayati muqarrirati fauq bar

khilaf



khilaf imtiaznamehyi companyi Iran va Inglis raftar na shudeh va iqdami bi amal nayayad mauqehra mughtanem shumurdeh ihteramati faiqeh ra tajdid minemayam.

MOAYYED UD DAULEH

Hukumati Arabistan.





PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

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Minute Paper.

Register No. 1619. (1973)

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1922

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..			Persia
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....	6.v	WL	Operations of A.P.O. Coy at Dasht-i-Qil.
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to ✓

FOR INFORMATION.

The Persian Govt. have raised the same objections to the agreement with Haider Khan of Hayat Daud as they did to the Kashguli agreement.

The interesting feature of this correspondence is that Sir A. T. Wilson intends to go to Tehran & settle the matter personally there. There can be little doubt that in that event the matter will be settled, though possibly the methods of settlement will not be such as to stand very close scrutiny.

J.A.S. 24/4/

Previous Papers :—

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
17 MAY 1922

WL 11/5
CRS 11/5
EGB 17/5

10 1717 I 1351 2000 9/19





INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 4708/7/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

P
1973
1922

M 823/22
10/9—

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

RECEIVED IN
12 MAY 1922
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Foreign Office,
May 11, 1922.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter No. E 1951/7/34 of Feb. 24, 1922.

(M.823)

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Minister, Tehran, No 92, February 16, 1922.	Activities of Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office
Petroleum Department.

14-F.O.P. 5 (a) 4|22 [8233A] (2)





4708/7/34)
92

British Legation,
Tehran.

P
1973
1922

16th February, 1922.

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Bridgeman's despatch No. 323 of the 13th December, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith translation of a note No. 2834/1768 of the 19th ultimo from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the agreement recently concluded between Serdar Haidar Khan C.I.E., and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited.

Your Lordship will observe that the Persian Government take exception to this agreement in the same manner as to that negotiated with the Kashkuli Khans. In my opinion the best way of dealing with these two questions is for the Resident Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to come himself to Tehran and endeavour to settle them direct with the Persian Government. I have made a proposal in this sense to Sir A. T. Wilson who is disposed to comply with it at a convenient date.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) Percy Loraine.

Most Honourable
The Marquis Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.





TRANSLATION

P 1973 1922

From the Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister.

No. 2834/1768 January 19th, 1922.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In reply to Mr. Bridgeman's note of the 13th December last forwarding a copy of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's agreement with Haidar Khan, I have the honour to state that when a similar agreement was made with the Kashkuli Khans it was pointed out to Mr. Bridgeman that the Government could in no way consent to such direct measures or agreements with the local Khans being tantamount to the recognition of the Company of certain rights for the Khans which they (the Khans) have not got. Such measures are in fact recognition of the Khans as true owners of lands, water and habitable places which either belong to the Government or to the people. The Khans are thus encouraged in this frivolous object. This fact is proved by articles 2, 3 and 4 of the agreement with Haidar Khan. Moreover the Company intends to organise a force through the Khans who are being provided with arms, ammunition and funds.

It is obvious that this attitude adopted by the Company is against the sovereign rights of the country and beyond the spheres of foreign institutions and is particularly contrary to articles 3 and 14 of the company's concession.

The attitude adopted by the Company in organising

out of/





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out of men whom it does not know forces at different places under the pretext of security of its pperations, is naturally against the interests of the Government and will eventually be the cause of trouble to the Company itself.

According to its concession the Company must apply to the local official governors of the provinces for ascertaining the ownership of the lands and for their own protection. Agreements must be made with the true owners of lands and waters with the cognition of the governors and the chiefs of tribes who will no doubt act according to their duties.

Under the above circumstances I feel confident that you will concur with me and will warn the Company so that it may not repent in future.

I avail

etc.,

(Signed) Assadullah (Moshar es Saltaneh)





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537/M
M 1075/22
21 APR

CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 8-M., dated the 23rd February 1922.

PERSIA.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company's activities in Dasht-i-Qil Area.

Endorsement from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 34-S., dated the 10th January 1922, and enclosures.

No. 134-S., dated Bushire, the 9th February 1922.

Endorsed by Under Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 53-S., dated the 13th January 1922.

1. Telegram No. 23, dated the 31st January 1922, from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, repeated Baghdad.

2. Telegram No. 24, dated the 31st January 1922, from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire.

3. Telegram No. 39, dated the 6th February 1922, from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Mohammerah and Baghdad for Wilson 236.

4. Telegram No 237, dated the 6th February 1922, from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, to the High Commissioner, Baghdad.

5. Telegram No 25, dated the 6th February 1922, from His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Bushire and Shiraz.

Enclo. 1.

Telegram R., No. 23, dated the 31st January (received 3rd February) 1922.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(Repeated Baghdad.)

In reply to Mr. Bridgeman's note dated the 13th December, transmitting translation of agreement dated the 6th October between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Haider Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, states as has already been pointed out with reference to agreement concluded with Kashkuli Khans it cannot be admitted conclusion of such agreement direct with local Khans which amount to recognition by company of possession by Khan of rights which in reality they have never possessed such as ownership of land, water, etc., which are property either of Government or people. Company's action encourages Khans in their pretensions as proved by Articles 2, 3 and 4 of agreement with Haider Khan. Persian Government after remarking that company intends to organize force with help of Khans who are being provided with arms, ammunition and funds declares company's attitude is clearly contrary to sovereign rights of Persia inasmuch as it oversteps limits of sphere usual to foreign institutions. Action is contrary to Articles 3 and 14 of company's concession; according to which company must apply to provincial Governors for purpose of ascertaining ownership of land and for ensuring its own protection. Agreements must be made with real owners of land and water with cognizance of Governors and tribal chiefs.

ENC. IN INDIA FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S NO 18M
DATED 30th MAR.
Rec'd 19th



Enclo. 2.

Telegram R., No. 24, dated the 31st January (received 2nd February) 1922.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

My immediately preceding telegram.*

*Enclo. 1.

I am communicating with Sir A. T. Wilson and think far best course is for him to settle matter here himself and am urging him to do so.

Enclo. 3.

Telegram R., No. 39, dated the 6th February 1922.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Mohammerah and Baghdad for Wilson 236.)

Your telegram† No. 23.

†Enclo. 1.

Karguzar informed me to-day that he has received instructions from Tehran to visit Genaweh and Dasht-i-Qil to see the oil and land. At present he has decided to await return of Fields Manager in about week's time to arrange about making his trip. If he makes tour with Manager and Clegg (as he says he will) his report may not do any harm, and may even be useful, but I do not trust him much.

Enclo. 4.

Telegram R., No. 237, dated the 6th February 1922.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The High Commissioner, Baghdad.

Kindly give the following to Wilson :—

Begins. My immmediately preceding telegram. Are you going to Tehran, and if so when.

Enclo. 5.

Telegram R., No. 25, dated the 6th (received 7th) February 1922.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire and Shiraz.)

Following from Wilson :—Your telegram of the 2nd February. If you see no objection please inform Persian Government that I will visit Bushire and Shiraz to make in person application to provincial Governor prescribed by Persian Government.

Private.—I hope to proceed from Shiraz to Tehran as suggested by you.

SGPI, Delhi—951(S) F&PD—10 3-22 - 20



No. 161-S of 1922.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 134-S., dated the 9th February 1922.

By order, etc.,

Sd/- W. Shuldham,
Captain,
Under Secretary to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire;
The 22nd February 1922.

List of papers.

Telegram No. 168 dated the 10th February 1922, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz to Minister Tehran 9 repeated for Wilson 169 and Bushire.

Telegram No. 28 dated 12th February 1922, from Lincoln, Mohammerah to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz repeated Tehran and Bushire.





Telegram R.

From - Chick, Shiraz.

To - Minister, Tehran 9.

Repeated Mohammerah for Wilson 169 and Bushire 168.

Dated and received 10th February 1922.

Mohammerah telegram from Wilson of the 6th February.

Your telegram to Wilson of the 2nd February was not repeated here. Please acquaint me with latest situation regarding company's agreements and Persian Government's demands and purport of application here. In view of remostrances from Tehran to Governor-General in November, local democrat intrigue in everything done by provincial Government and hostility to company I do not consider present moment altogether propitious for negotiations in Shiraz and unless settlement favourable to company's desires already decided on in Tehran should have recommended carrying on as at present.

Soulet no doubt owing to seeing no result from his objections in Tehran is I hear better inclined to deal with Wilson.

Is visit to Soulet part of Wilson's programme here ?

Chick.

Telegram. R.

From - Lincoln, Mohammerah.

To - ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~
Chick, Shiraz.

Repeated Tehran and Bushire.

No. 28.

Dated and received 12th February 1922.

Following from Wilson. Shiraz telegram dated the 10th February Before I actually visit Shiraz I will refer to you for advice as to situation. In any case it will not be for two months as I have much to do elsewhere first. If I come I shall visit Soulet.

Lincoln.





No. 174-S. of 1922.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, with reference to this office letter No. 429-S., dated the 30th November 1921.

By order,
Sd/- W. Shuldham,
Captain,
Under Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire;
The 26th February 1922.

List of papers.

Letter No. 12 dated the 23rd November 1922 from His Majesty's Charge d'Affares, Tehran to H.M's Consul-General, Bushire, with enclosures.

12.

British Legation,
Tehran,
23rd November 1921.

Sir,

With reference to correspondence ending with your telegram of the 17th instant, No. 225, I transmit to you herewith, for your information, translation of a note dated November 8th from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and copy of my reply dated the 17th instant, pointing out that the allegations made by the Persian Government were entirely unfounded, and requesting an official apology, and the recall of the Karguzar at Shiraz.

I am, et c.,

Sd/- R. Bridgeman.

Lieut-Col. A.P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
His Majesty's Consul General, Bushire.

Translation of note addressed to H.M's Charge d'Affaires by His Excellency Moshar-es-Saltaneh, Persian Minister, for Foreign Affairs.

8th November 1921.

M. le Charge d'Affaires,

According to information received from Fars the British Consul





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Consul, under the name of the protection of the oil fields, is organising a force. A certain Assadullah of the Kashkuli tribe who has been a lieutenant in the South Persia Rifles, has been promoted in rank and put in charge of about fifty men. So far as has been ascertained he has been provided with 30,000 rounds of amunition, 30 horses and 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to levy 300 riflemen. Some agreements have been entered into, on behalf of the Company, with some Kashkulis who have settled down in the oil fields for the sake of a small number of cattle and who pretned to be the owners of the land in question.

The evil consequences of such measures as above mentioned are clear. If a force is required for the district it is desirable that the matter should be referred to the Governor General of Fars and measures be taken in accordance with his views.

In the above circumstances, I have the honour to draw your attention of the evil consequences of the above mentioned measures, which will untimately lead to trouble, and to request you to prevent the Consul immediately from taking such direct measures in Persian soil and to inform me of the result.

I avail myself &c.

Sd/- Assadullah,

Mosher-es-Saltaneh.

British Legation,
17th November 1921.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 1702/1310 of the 8th instant to which I have deferred replying sooner in order that I might make a searching enquiry in regard to the allegations made by Your Excellency.

The accusation that His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz is organizing a force is entirely unfounded.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company has engaged thirty guards for the protection of the site in Dashti-i-Qil where it is proposed to make borings for oil. The Oil Company has supplied the





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the guard with thirty horses, thrity rifles and proportionate ammunition. Amrullah Khan Kashkuli, who is in command of the Guard has been given 500 tomans for the pay and expenses of the men until their arrival at the site of the boring operations. The statement that he has been given 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to raise 300 riflemen is entirely incorrect.

The site of the Oil Company's operations is in the middle of Kashkuli territory. I will, therefore, refrain from commenting on Your Excellency's statement that some Kashkulis have settled down in the Oil fields for the sake of a small number of their cattle and pretend to be owners of the land. I cannot however, refrain from expressing my regret that the Imperial Government should communicate to me reports so obviously at variance with well-known facts, and at the same time neglect to acquaint me with the source of these reports.

From the first sentence in Your Excellency's note under reply, I gather that the Karguzar of Fars is responsible for these frivolous charges against the Consul of a friendly power. In the interest of Anglo-Persian relations, it is desirable that the Foreign Office should have a more reliable agent at so important a post as Shiraz, and I hope that Your Excellency will lose no time in recalling the present Karguzar, whose record has been generally unsatisfactory and whose false reports on the present occasion have been the cause of much anxiety to the Imperial Government as well as to myself.

At the same time, I expect that the Persian Government will convey to me an expression of regret at the levity with which serious and utterly false accusations have been officially made against His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration. Sd/- R. Bridgeman.

Excellency, Moshar es Saltaneh,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.





PUT AWAY WITH

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229

Minute Paper.

Register No. 6449 1075 6443 823

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 1922.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	16. iii	[illegible]	Persia.
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....	24	[illegible]	A.P.O.C's agreement with the Kashkuli Khans for operations in the Dasht-i-Qil area
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to

P.O 20/2

Seen
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
31 MAR 1922

FOR INFORMATION.

Sir A.T. Wilson's action in concluding in a spirit of self-sacrifice - manner the agreement necessary to render operations at Dasht-i-Qil possible has aroused a hornet's nest of criticism both locally (under the active instigation of Soulet-ed-Dowleh = Sardar Ashaer) and in Tehran where the virulently anti-British gang including Nusrat-ed-Dowleh & Nasr-ul-Tujjar have been quick to seize an opportunity to make trouble with the Legation. Mr Chick, at Shiraz, backed up by Col: Trevor & coached, as requisite, by Sir A.T. Wilson, seems to have been able to shew them Mr Bridgeman's hands sufficiently in an

Previous Papers—

10 1939 2000 7/20



an offensive defence of the A.P.O.C.

The A.P.O.C. are also developing works in the Dasht-i-Kuh & hope to do so in Luristan.

Props. which carries the correspondence on the Dasht-i-Qil agreement a little further is now added.

28/3

Seen.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
31 MAR 1922

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Cmw 29/3
ESA 31/3



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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 429-S., dated Bushire, the 30th November 1921.

From—The Hon'ble Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Hon'ble Mr. D. de S. Bray, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

Subject.—Persian Government's attitude regarding agreement concluded between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

With reference to my letter No. 303-S., dated the 19th October 1921, I have the honour to forward for the information of the Government of India copy of the marginally cited correspondence which has passed between His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran, His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, Resident Director of Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited, and myself relative to attitude adopted by the Persian Government towards the agreement concluded by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with the Kashkuli Khans for protection of their employes and plant in the Dasht-i-Qil area.

Telegram No. 204, dated the 4th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.
Telegram No. 181, dated the 11th November 1921, from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.
Telegram No. 199, dated the 11th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.
Telegram No. 183, dated the 14th November 1921, from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.
Telegram No. 203, dated the 14th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul Shiraz.
Telegram No. 299, dated the 14th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah.
Telegram No. 225, dated the 17th November 1921, from the Resident, Bushire.
Telegram No. 189, dated the 18th November 1921, from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.
Telegram No. 208, dated the 19th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.
Telegram No. 147, dated the 25th November 1921, from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.

Doubtless the chief reason for their protests to His Majesty's Legation is the successful intrigues of Soulet-ed-Douleh in Tehran, whereby he has ingratiated himself with His Imperial Majesty the Shah and the Prime Minister, and is acclaimed a hero by the Nationalists and Democrats.

Soulet's object is, of course, to force the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to pay him as large a subsidy as possible to refrain from interference in affairs at Dasht-i-Qil, but if the Anglo-Persian Oil Company could ascertain before Sir A. T. Wilson meets Soulet whether the prospects of finding oil in Soulet's own special territory are promising, then possibly an agreement could be concluded with him which would be advantageous to both parties. I am, therefore, inclined to the view that it would be expedient for Sir A. T. Wilson to meet Soulet fairly soon in the latter's own country; but I shall be seeing the former at Mohammerah towards the end of this week and I will report further to Government after discussion with him.

Telegram P., No. 204, dated the 4th November 1921.

From—Chick, Shiraz,
To—His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran,

In continuation of my 203.

To show you that from 1919 onwards agreement was contemplated with Kashkuli clan, and none else, copies of correspondence by Bill, former Resident at Bushire, and my own predecessors are being posted to you. Fear lest Farman Farma should demand share was apparently chief reason why negotiations were not concluded with clan in 1919.

This is mentioned in order that you may be aware that British official opinion has been solid as to inevitability of direct agreement with Kashkulis.

Addressed to His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Tehran, No. 204; repeated to Mohammerah for Sir A. Wilson.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S NO 112M
DATED 26th JAN.
Recd 12th FEB



Telegram R., dated (and received) 11th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran,
To—CHICK, Shiraz, 146.

(Repeated Bushire, 131, and Mohammerah, 22, for communication to Resident Director.)

Your telegram No. 196, dated the 7th November.

I have communicated to Prime Minister information contained in section 263 of Shiraz Diary No. 34, dated the 19th October, on being assured that Tehran representative of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company perceived no objection to my doing so.

From statement in your telegram above mentioned that Governor General in receiving written protest from Soulet has asked you officially for information regarding agreement made by Oil Company with Kashkulis, I conclude you have not previously informed His Imperial Highness of what was being done. If this is so, it may account for following information which has been communicated to me by Minister for Foreign Affairs having been conveyed to Persian Government from Fars:—

(1) British Consul under pretext of presence of Oilfields is organising a force.

(2) A certain Assadulla *sic* of Kashkuli tribe *ex*-Lieutenant S. P. R. has been promoted in rank and put in charge of about 50 men.

(3) So far as has been ascertained, he has been provided with 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 30 horses and Ts. 10,000 in cash with instructions to levy 300 riflemen.

Persian Government probably instigated by Tehran agent of Soulet is much agitated and suspicious generally of agreement concluded with Kashkulis. I hope to be able to allay its suspicions and to induce it to collaborate in any way possible in assisting Oil Company's operations; but to attain this it is important I should keep it as fully informed as Company shall deem consistent with its interests of all that is being undertaken and that you should adopt similar attitude towards Governor General.

Persian Government is adopting line that if a force be required for protection of oil district matter should be referred to Governor General of Fars and measures taken in accordance with his views. If this seems impracticable to Oil Company, I will endeavour to convince Persian Government that arrangements made by Company from commercial point of view had better not be interfered with. But in that case the more information that I can give about arrangements made with Kashkulis and the more closely you keep in touch with the Governor General, the better.

I have suggested to Tehran representatives of Company that he shall telegraph Mohammerah in this sense.

I have requested Prime Minister to order "Asr Azadi" to publish denial of its outrageous insinuations against yourself and explanation of purpose of your journeys with which I have acquainted His Highness, and I have also informed him report that you supplied Kashkulis with arms and mules is quite unfounded. In these circumstances, you will appreciate importance of my being able to explain to His Highness nature and detail of arrangements between Kashkulis and Company which I cannot pretend as concluded without your cognizance.

Telegram P., No. 199, dated the 11th November 1921.

From—CHICK, Shiraz,
To—His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.

With reference to your telegram.

(*a*) It was arranged at meeting that Resident Director should despatch to me from Mohammerah translations of Persian agreement. On receipt one copy was sent to you, *vide* my despatch No. 19, dated October 29th, which you should receive shortly. I understood Wilson to say, when asked by me if he



thought it necessary to register the Persian original, triplicate copy of which was given to me, that he left it to my discretion, but that it had not been done by the Company in previous agreements. If Resident Director agrees, and you wish, a copy of the Persian agreement made in my office can be sent to you for information of Persian Minister, but I do not think it advisable for them to keep a copy in view of Soulet's intrigues.

(*b*) The day following my return from meeting I informed Governor General of the agreement; he knows Wilson and expressed his great regret at not meeting him. His Deputy read the agreement on November 5th during an official call. It was injudicious that intention to conclude agreement should be published in Shiraz before signature owing to Soulet's spies and anti-British intrigue. Governor General is too ill-disposed towards Soulet and too good friend to us to be responsible for the information quoted by you. He informed me that S. had complained direct to Tehran, and of his letter, also that he had written to the Karguzar. I was asked by His Royal Highness for details to enable him to reply to Central Government, and I requested him to write me officially.

(*c*) Authors of information were Soulet and Karguzar, according to a telegram from Prime Minister to Governor General, and former, although he knew from my interview facts of agreement and true position, has had no scruple in his misrepresentations.

(*d*) Governor General and Governor of Gulf Ports have both complained to me that since present Prime Minister took office vogue for Ministers has been to take notice of and act on any wild rumour that unofficial and irresponsible persons telegraph without referring to or believing local Government consequently giving officials most difficult task. I therefore venture to suggest that as Governor General is Soulet's direct superior Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers might be taken to task for permitting Soulet to communicate with them direct, in order to make mischief, a pack of lies about matters concerning British interests. While Soulet attacks I am strongly of the opinion that we should not act solely on the defensive, but let Persian Government understand that British have had so much trouble with Soulet in past that if he wants to make difficulties and create friction for Oil Company, taking advantage of the departure of South Persia Rifles, we shall ask to have Ilkhani changed. Complaint might also be made that in past month Qashqais have robbed two telegraph officials as well as merchandise and he has given no satisfaction at all.

(*e*) You will see that agreement with Kashkulis is purely commercial and differs very little from those with Bakhtiari and others. Only 15 men under Khan, as far as I know, have employed by Company from tribe residing in locality, to protect their property and employés which is same principle as with Bakhtiaris. No private Persian owning a garden outside Shiraz has less than two or three guards as Persian Minister must be aware. Can they think that for European lives and much valuable material 15 or 30 are unnecessary in wild mountain region? Governor General could not do otherwise than endorse Kashkuli guards. Of such a thing as a "force" there is no question. What others could be sent since Government sarbaz are useless. Are Indian troops desired by Persian Government?

Addressed Tehran, No. 199; repeated Mohammerah for Resident Director, Bushire, by post.

Telegram R., dated (and received) the 14th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,

To—CHICK, Shiraz, 147.

(Repeated Bushire, 133, and Mohammerah for Director, 24.)

Priority.—Your telegram No. 199.

Persian Government has right to complain of admittedly "secret" negotiations with tribal chiefs being conducted under auspices of a Foreign Consular representative. In view of friendly Governor General it should not have been



impracticable to negotiate agreement with his knowledge and advice. Failure to keep Local Government informed of such important negotiations during their progress has placed me in embarrassing position with Persian Government and appears to have provided Soulet with a serviceable weapon of intrigue and ground on which to base a misrepresentation of facts.

Before I take firm line with Persian Government which its discourteous accusations against British officials seems to call for, I must be able to reply to its allegations based on information received from Karguzar that *ex*-Lieutenant of the South Persia Rifles, who appears to have been put in charge of a force of 15 men for protection of Company's employees and property, has been furnished with (*a*) 3[illegible],000 rounds of ammunition, (*b*) 30 horses, (*c*) 10,000 Tomans in cash, (*d*) instructions to levy 300 riflemen.

You are doubtless aware of Oil Company's wishes to purchase 300 rfles from South Persia Rifles.

Please enable to reply.

Telegram P., No. 203, dated the 14th November 1921.

From—Chick, Shiraz,
To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

All four telegrams exchanged between the Governor-General and Prime Minister on the subject of the Kashkuli agreement have now been shown to me by His Imperial Highness' assistant. Telegram from Prime Minister principally repeats misrepresentatio s made by Sardar Ashair : it contains suggestion that Persian Government should be paid by Anglo-Persian Oil Company to provide guards (a practice certainly not in vogue at other sites which Company are exploiting), and also ridiculous statement that Kashkulis in locality are few in number. As Company may find nothing after drilling for years, Prime Minister might be also disabused of his idea that there is already well of oil, and told that there is nothing but desert and stones.

Amrullah Khan, who is in charge of oil-guard, is a son of former representative of Qasbqai tribe in Majlis at Tehran (Haji Muhammad Karim Khan). Soulet-ud-Doulah hates this branch, and this summer appropriated a village of theirs in Sarhad. Amrullah was only Qashqai Khan to serve in South Persia Rifles and enlist men ; all last year Sardar Ashair was in consequence urging him to desert and threatening him unless he did. His training and loyalty therefore should give him in our eyes all more title to the position. It was largely due to influence of his brothers and himself, who are strong Anglophiles, that rest of Khans combined for agreement, and during past three years they have done more for Company's surveys and all the others.

These facts probably account for the attack by Soulet-ud-Doulah on oil-guard arrangements in particular.

Private information given me by Governor-General is to effect that 10,000 Tomans were given by Soulet to his emissary to Tehran (Ghulam Hussain Khan) for bribing members of Majlis and Ministers: subsequently Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar, who is crony of Qawam-us-Sultaneh, was appointed by Sardar Ashair to watch and further his interests This was, of course, prior to agreement being made, and Sardar Ashair at the time was chiefly occupied with Qawam's attitude towards him and securing his own safety. But is it not probable that sole agitation by Persian Government and others is for interest of Sardar Ashair, and as set-off for bribes, etc ? Had an agreement been negotiated with him, I question whether single word of protest would have been uttered by present Cabinet.

Consequently I venture to think that we should treat this episode as a manoeuvre of Sardar Ashair, pure and simple, and take our stand on offer made by Director to endeavour to satisfy Soulet at a subsequent meeting, and also on right claimed by Company to deal with whom they please within limits of concession.

Presumably Anglo-Persian Oil Company, no more than any merchant, are obliged to communicate to Persian Government their business deals.



That most of Kashkuli tribe is hereditarily anti-Soulet is main point which Persian Government should recognise. That site for boring is in region occupied for many years by Kashkulis, main part of which clan is "yaghi" against Soulet-ud-Doulah, while remainder will not come within his reach, makes the problem extraordinarily difficult, so long as Persian Government continue to support him: it would have been easy matter had site been in country occupied by small clan subservient to him.

I see little likelihood of Soulet-ud-Doulah coming to terms with Anglo-Persian Oil Company for their objectives are diametrically opposed. Kashkuli are at present most compact and strongest formation amongst Qashqai tribesmen, numbering some 2,500 tents. Sardar Ashair wants to break them up, force their encampments off to South-East Fars, and revenge himself on some of their chiefs for their attack on him in 1918 in conjunction with British forces. Anglo-Persian Oil Company, on other hand, by their subsidy and wages would bring in more men to the clan, and increase their strength and unity; they want to keep clansmen in region in order to supply themselves with a permanent source of labour.

Kashkuli tribesmen are unlikely to relinquish without fighting the domains, which 40 years ago their fathers divided up among different branches of the clan, now that they realize there is money in them. Present difficulty would not have arisen, had Sardar Ihtisham been Ilkhani, for they have been his supporters for several years.

Ultimately, I foresee, our oil interests will oblige us to ask for Kashkuli tribe to be placed directly under Governor-General's superintendence, as they themselves desire, and for their separation from rest of Qashqai.

Addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, No. 203; repeated to Mohammerah for Resident Director.

Telegram R., No. 299, dated the 14th (received 15th) November 1921.

From—The Political, Mohammerah,
To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire and Shiraz.)

Following from Wilson. *Begins.*

Tehran telegram of November 11th and Shiraz telegram dated the 12th November.

I have no objection to Persian Government being shown or given a copy of agreement at your discretion.

Persian Government will, however, presumably object to it on principle as they did to Bakhtiari agreement. I would prefer that record of proceedings of conference should not be communicated to Persian Government in any form.

So far as Company are concerned, I should be glad to see offensive taken against Soulet in Tehran, as I see no prospect of being able to do business with him on any reasonable basis and shall probably defer my visit (?) accordingly. *Ends.*

Telegram R., dated the 17th November 1921.

From—Trevor, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, 225.

(Repeated Shiraz and Mohammerah, 2001.)

Your telegram 131 and 133.

As regards Persian Government representations in first telegram. Consul Shiraz, has doubtless dealt with first point, though I have not seen his reply, and I need not dilate on absurdity of idea of Consul raising force at moment when existing force just being disbanded. Only basis for it seems to be 15 men engaged with *ex*-South Persia Rifles Lieutenant Amrullah (Persian Government's second point) whose engagement was approved by Legation, *vide*



Mr. Norman's telegram No. 14, dated the 6th August, to Mohammerah. As regards third point, Sir A. Wilson mentioned to me that he proposed to ask permission to purchase 300 rifles and corresponding ammunition from the South Persia Rifles as reserve for use of guards and prospecting parties (Company will probably obtain prospecting concessions on Arabian side of Gulf shortly) and I said I saw no objection. As long as intention of Company is not to arm a force in Persia, to keep arms in reserve at Basrah and eventually to utilize most if not all of them outside Persia, I presume Persian Government can have no objection or indeed ground on which to base one. Fact that South Persia Rifles were getting rid of rifles afforded Anglo-Persian Oil Company chance of getting some cheap and hence request at this particular moment. Needless to say there is no idea of raising a force of 300 men.

As regards Persian Government attitude regarding protection of new field, Anglo-Persian Oil Company could only judge by past experience which has shown them that Persian Government has never attempted to protect their parties, and make their arrangements with tribes; in this connection please see my telegram No. 223.

Telegram R., dated the 18th (received 19th) November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affairs, Tehran,

To—High Commissioner, Baghdad, 380.

(Repeated Shiraz 149, Bushire 139 and Mohammerah 25.)

Following for Wilson. *Begins.* Mohammerah telegram No. 299, dated the 14th November.

I will do my best to counter Soulet's influence with Government here, but as a meeting between him and yourself had been arranged by your invitation to take place immediately after Christmas at Firuzabad, I think it would be a pity to neglect this chance of squaring Soulet by deferring interview.

I would urge you therefore to try and do business with him if you possibly can.

Telegram R., dated the 19th (received 20th) November 1921.

From—Chick, Shiraz,

To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, 208.

(Repeated Baghdad for Wilson, and Bushire and Mohammerah.)

Your telegram to Wilson, No. 380.

In the circumstances which have arisen place and date of meeting should be chosen with caution. Firuzabad was my suggestion, but by Christmas Soulet will be probably in his winter quarters, 70 miles further South-East, and visit to latter place is no longer expedient.

If Soulet finds that Persian Government cease to support his interests in matter of Kashkulis agreement during next few months, he may become more amenable and see his best plan is to come to terms with Director. But until it is clear they have ceased meeting would do more harm than good because Soulet would stand out for cancellation of agreement.

It would be distinctly risky for Wilson to venture into Soulet's own country in present situation when Soulet is puffed up with Government support and regaining part of Dareshuris.

I consider meeting should be deferred till spring migration when Soulet is in immediate vicinity of Shiraz; he should be more circumspect and Wilson in stronger position to bargain for what he needs in return for paying Soulet subsidy, namely document promising to keep his hands off Kashkulis and agreement.

But will not Persian Government say negotiations with Soulet should be through Governor-General?

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

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Telegram R., dated the 25th (received 26th) November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affairs, Tehran,
To—CHICK, Shiraz, 153.

(Repeated Baghdad 390, for Wilson, Bushire 147, Mohammerah 26.)

Your telegram No. 208.

I leave time and place to your and Wilson's discretion. Last paragraph. Objection might be obviated by informing Governor-General of visit and explaining generally that it was for purpose of discussion possibilities of oil exploitation in Kashgai territory, provided you and Wilson see no objection to such notification.

SGPI, Delhi—7.0(S) F&PD—12-1-22—2.



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Enclosure 1.

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No. 476-S, dated Bushire, the 23rd December 1921.

Endorsed by Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office letter No. 429-S., dated the 30th November 1921.

LIST OF PAPERS.

Letter No. 4418, dated the 6th November 1921, from the Governor-General of Fars, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 1.)

Letter dated the 31st October 1921, from Sardar Ashair Qashqai, to His Royal Highness the Governor-General of Fars. (Enclosure No. 2.)

Letter No. 1376, dated the 7th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to the Governor-General of Fars. (Enclosure No. 3.)

Demi-official letter dated the 7th November 1921, from H. G. Chick, Esq., C.I.E., His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to Sir A. T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., etc., Resident Director, Strick Scott and Company, Mohammerah. (Enclosure No. 4.)

Telegram No. 205, dated the 15th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran. (Enclosure No. 5.)

Telegram No. 206, dated the 16th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran. (Enclosure No. 6.)

Letter No. 29, dated the 18th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran. (Enclosure No. 7.)

Letter No. 307, dated the 8th November 1921, from the Karguzar of Fars, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 8.)

Letter No. 1384, dated the 8th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to the Karguzar of Fars. (Enclosure No. 9.)

Letter No. 337, dated the 17th November 1921, from the Karguzar of Fars, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 10.)

Letter No 1458, dated the 18th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to the Karguzar of Fars. (Enclosure No. 11.)

Telegram No. 210, dated the 27th November 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran. (Enclosure No. 12.)

Letter No. 4892, dated the 28th November 1921, from the Governor-General of Fars, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 13.)

Telegram No. 154, dated the 2nd December 1921, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire. (Enclosure No. 14.)

Letter No. 1527, dated the 5th December 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to the Governor-General of Fars. (Enclosure No. 15.)

Telegram No. 329, dated the 9th December 1921, from the Resident Director, Strick Scott and Company, Mohammerah, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated to Resident, Bushire (by Post), and His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 16.)

Telegram No. 240, dated the 11th December 1921, from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran. (Enclosure No. 17.)

Telegram No. 30, dated the 15th December 1921, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, to His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, repeated Bushire and Shiraz. (Enclosure No. 18.)

Enclosure 1.

Translation.

No. 4418, dated 5th Rabi, I 1340 (equal the 6th November 1921).

From—H.R.H. PRINCE NUSRAT-US-SULTANEH, G.C.V.O., Governor-General of Fars,

To—H. G. CHICK, ESQ., C.I.E., His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

According to a communication sent by Sardar Ashair, copy of which I enclose for your information, it is said that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has entered into certain negotiations with the Kashkuli Khans, concluded an agreement with them direct, and also given them arms.

783(s) F & P D

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 112M DATED 26th JAN.

In this connection it is necessary that I should ask you for certain information—

(1) Is this report correct or not? If it is, and an agreement has been concluded, it is necessary that you should inform me of the date and other details.

(2) If such an agreement has been concluded, it is stated in the concession of the Company that the Company or its representative has the right to enter into negotiations direct with the small chiefs of any locality, and take steps, or will the conclusion of the agreement with the Kashkuli Khans be dependent on special permission from the Persian Government?

(3) Is it correct that arms have been given to a number of the Kashkulis and a number of them engaged in service? Has such a right been given to the Company by their concession, or not?

(4) What validity will these agreements and the giving of arms have (if they have been made and given) without the knowledge of the Governor-General?

I shall be very much obliged if you will, as quickly as possible, give me full information regarding the above details, so that I may give the necessary explanations to the Government what is necessary may be communicated to the Ilkhani.

Enclosure 2.

Translation.

Dated 29th Safar, 1340 (equal)the 31st October 1921).

From—Sardar Ashair. Qashqai,

To—H.R.H. the Governor-General of Fars,

I hear that the Oil Company wishes to interfere in the Oil Well in the Mahur (Hills), and it is said that they have made an agreement with certain of the Kashkulis. I do not know whether this arrangement has been with the permission of, and by the orders of Your Royal Highness, or whether they want to interfere in such a place without the knowledge of Your Royal Highness. For the information of Your Royal Highness I merely wish to say, firstly, that the place, where the oil is, does not concern these persons with whom the agreement has been made, and an agreement by those persons will not be entitled to credit. Further, the interference of the Company in this place which concerns the district (or jurisdiction) of the Qashqai, must be according to the sanction and orders of the Government and Your Royal Highness: and I should make the arrangements for their safeguarding and security, otherwise, should they not think it necessary to obtain the permission and views of the Governor-General, it will not be devoid of difficulty, and if in this interference perchance anything contrary to expectation should be fall, I shall not be responsible.

I beg that Your Royal Highness will definitely state and determine what I should do in this matter, so that I may know by what right the Company are interfering in the Mahur (Hills).

Enclosure 3.

Translation.

No. 1376, dated the 7th November 1921.

From—H. G. Chick, Esq., His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—H.R.H. Prince Nusrat-us-Sultaneh, G.C.V.O., Governor-General of Fars.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness' letter* No. 4418, dated the 5th Rabi* I, enclosing a copy of a letter from Sardar Ashair.

*Enclosure 1.



In reply I beg to state :—

(1) That an agreement was concluded between the Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Kashkuli Khans on the 12th Safar 1340 with the sole object of assistance and protection being afforded to the operations of the Company in the winter quarters of the Kashkuli tribe.

(2) I have no copy of the concession of the Company in this Consulate but I understand that by it the company has a right to work anywhere in the Government lands or other properties throughout the whole of South Persia, and to make such arrangements as it thinks necessary.

(3) It is not true that arms have been given to any single Kashkuli The Company intended to employ a large number of the local people in their service.

(4) I understand that by the concession of the Company, the Government has given them permission to work everywhere in South Persia, and it is not necessary for them to obtain a second permission from the Local Government.

Finally I would inform Your Royal Highness that the Director of the Company had written to Sardar Ashair informing him that he wished to meet him for discussion during or after the winter. I have no doubt that any necessary arrangements will be made between the Director of the Company and Sardar Ashair at that meeting.

Enclosure 4.

Demi-official, dated the 7th November 1921.

From—H. G CHICK, ESQ., C.I.E., His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—SIR A. T. WILSON, K.C.I.E., etc., Resident Director, Strick Scott and Company, Mohammerah.

I thank you for English copies of the Kashkuli Agreement and papers in connection therewith, and also for the Hayat Daud agreement.

On October 29th I visited Sardar Ashair's tents near Chenar Rahdar, as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires directed. He had your letter in his pocket: it had been badly translated and he read Hangam for Nao jain. It was not a good opportunity for a private talk, as many people were visiting him: but he gave me a short time after lunch alone. He wanted to know, of course, "By what right" the Company had made an agreement with the Kashkulis. Said: "the land is not theirs", it belongs to the Government. "You must give me a paper to say that I am not responsible for any thing". "To-morrow I may want to send the Kashkulis somewhere else, or levy a force from them for work with me". "With whom was the agreement with the Bakhtiaris: with the Ilkhani".

I thought it best not to tell him, at a first interview, that the reasons were that he personally could not afford the Company protection, or provide labour, and that the Kashkulis would not agree to anything he arranged with the Company, being for the most part outside his obedience. So I contented myself with pointing out that he resided at such great distances that it was impossible for the Company to deal in all matters with him direct; and to obtain labour, and have the Company's property and employés guarded, the company were forced to make terms with local people in possession but none the less you intended to visit him, and as regards Nao jain and other matters hoped to come to some arrangement satisfactory to him. I suggested perhaps Firuzabad He had also alluded to arms being given to the Kashkulis; I assured him that it was not the case at all: the Company had arms for the protection of their material and employés, and they would employ special guards, but not give them any weapons. In conclusion, I told him that if he would wait patiently till the meeting with you, I felt confident his interest would not suffer.

A few days ago the Legation telegraphed that the Persian Government had heard that I had given arms to Ardeshir Khan. I replied asking for an apology, and to know the name of the slanderer.

On the 5th instant the Prince Governor-General sent a message that Sardar Ashair had written a letter of protest to him regarding the agreement, and, His Royal Highness thought, had also telegraphed to Tehran through the Karguzar. I showed the Deputy Governor-General my copy of the agreement, and asked him to write officially.

Herewith copies of the correspondence which followed (I have sent it to Legation also). The Prince is strongly anti-Soulat so he is not likely to get much support from His Royal Highness.

But since our meeting the Persian Government have acted very foolishly in respect of Sardar Ashair, as a result of the stories (largely anti-Qawam) with which he has been filling their ears, making himself out to be the only true patriot in the south. They have threatened the Governor-General, if he used force against Sardar Ashair (saying they heard he was going to attack him by the help of Qawam and S. P. R.) and they have made the Shah confer a decoration on him without reference to the Governor-General. In consequence Soulat has thought better of paying any taxes: he had paid no compenstaion to Qawam or anyone else for qashqai robberies: and is, as Persians say, holding "wedding festivities" to celebrate the departure of the South Persian Rifles.

He is, I am convinced, strongly anti-British at heart, being a man who never forgets past hostilities: his overtures to the Legation were dictated by fear of S. P. R. attack, not real desire for friendly relations. I think he will put obstacles in the way of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (as being British penetration disguised) wherever he can, however much you fill his pockets.

His position in the tribe is, however far from strong: Qawam too is incensed against him, and backs Ali Khan.

At present his brother and rival, Ali Khan, has 1,000 tents in the Marvdasht, who will not return to Soulat including Ahmad Khan, chief of the Shishbuluki; he cannot assert himself over the Kashkulis while in winter-quarters: and, most important of all, three quarters of the Darehshuri are still in Bakhtiari country, and are unlikely to return.

His annoyance about the Kashkuli agreement arises from the fact that to crush them—and he wants to crush them—he must create jealousies amongst them: this autumn his intention had been to force them away down to eastern Fars, and break them up: but they slipped away to our meeting, and are probably quite secure till the spring.

(Post closing. to be continued.)

Demi-official letter, dated Shiraz, the 7th November 1921.

From—H. G. Chick, Esq.. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—Sir A. T. Wilson, K.C.I.E, etc., Resident Director, Strick Scott and Company Mohammerah.

Following is the continuation of my letter of to-day sent to catch the post so that you might be aware what was passing.

There were only three alternatives as regards Desht-i-Qil: (i) to make an agreement with him alone (when he could not have given you his own men, or substantial assistance on the spot, and the Kashkulis would have cut up rusty and demanded money for themselves); (2) to make an agreement with him and them jointly—impossible because more than half the Kashkuli Khans will not put themselves in his power; (3) to make an agreement, as you did, with them: and subsequently give him a subsidy on conditions, to pacify him as long as he is in power.

He wants to kill Jahangir Khan (a mortal enemy): he hates Hadi Khan and Amrullah Khan and that section, and would not allow them a shahi if their money passed through his hands for distribution: and he wants to get power



over Ilyas Khan and his section. He would like to use the Company as a means to this.

I think once he is down at Chah Kazimha, your people and the Kashkulis should have no trouble till the spring, beyond complaints to Tehran. For that I suggest you should prime your representative in Tehran with the facts, so that he may keep a "stiff upper lip" to anything the Persian Government may pass on from Soulat (after all the Persian Government are beholden to the Company for royalties, and I suppose you have a big stick there).

But now that Soulat is so cock-a-hoop, I think it would be unwise for you to venture into the heart of his country, and put yourself in his power at Firuzabad or Jirreh. I think you had better wait till he passes Shiraz on the spring migration, when within a few miles of Shiraz he will have to be circumspect, and you will be on firmer grounds for arguing: as he will no doubt try to make you upset the Kashkuli agreement altogether.

Meanwhile we must pray for a change of this "nationalist" wind at Tehran, and a chance of Ali Khan being made Ilkhani as Qawam wants. Saulat is beyond straight dealing with Europeans; even after his protestations (of friendship to the Legation) we have had two Assistant Superintendents of Telegraphs robbed by *Qashqais* on the Isfahan road, and he would not pay a shahi of compensation.

Enclosure 5.

Telegram No. 205, dated the 15th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

After perusing Persian agreement yesterday His Imperial Highness remarked to me that he had been asked to arrange for guards by the Government or Company, he would not have been able to put in other tribesmen at site and would perforce have had to ask Kashkuli Khans to furnish them.

He resents the tone of the telegrams from Qawm-us-Sultaneh to himself, which was in nature of a rebuke, for they were founded on misrepresentations of Sardar Ashair. His Royal Highness begged me especially to tell you this, and also, so that it may be clear to you that he was not author of reports—that he has no direct correspondence with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In Prince's opinion influence on behalf of Sardar Ashair is being used by Haji Muin-ut-Tajjar with Persian Ministers. Governor-General wishes to give all assistance he can to Anglo Persian Oil Company, a few cash presents to Ministers concerned by the Company would, he considers, make the Persian Government quite indifferent to this agreement.

Equally with myself, Governor-General is of opinion that Sardar Ashair cannot afford assistance to Company at the site of boring, and he shares my doubt whether Sardar Ashair will be sensible and give up his policy against the Kashkulis to accept Company's offer.

His Imperial Majesty put forward the view also that Soulat would be unlikely to acquiesce in an agreement in the title of Ilkhani, had that been proposed, for the reason that at any moment in the future his brothers might outbid him for that position for the sake of what the agreement brought in: such complications would of course greatly hamper the Company.

Addressed to Tehran, No. 205; repeated to Mohammerah for communication to Resident Director.

Enclosure 6.

Telegram No. 206, dated the 16th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul Shiraz,

To—His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran.

In reply to allegations made by the Karguzar with reference to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, mentioned in your telegram, answers are (*a*) 20,000 rounds.

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

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S. A. A. (b) 10 horses, horses and ammunition are property of Company and kept at site of boring in Khan's charge, latter being responsible for safe custody, while paid servant of Anglo-Persian Oil Company (c) Untrue, he receives monthly wages of Tomans 65. (d) Absolutely false.

Karguzar telegraphed all these wild allegations before asking me for information ; he cannot know of Company's desire to purchase 300 rifles, and his statement is mere vague defamation made to excite Persian Government more as I have not been informed of it myself by either Company or you. All I have heard of it was from Inspector General, South Persia Rifles, a few days before he left, when he told me privately that he had just heard from Officer Commanding, Kazerun, that Company were negotiating for the purchase of 300. rifles, and that was his first news.

That you should think that through any fault of mine you have been placed in embarrassing position causes me much regret. I would respectfully submit (1) I informed you by my telegram No. 172 that in view of Soulat's attitude and other reasons I did not desire to be present at agreement but I was ordered by you to go.

(2) I was not one of parties of agreement and my name is not on it : I was not authorized by either of parties to communicate their business affairs to others.

(3) As far as I know there is no precedent that local Government should be informed of intention to make agreement. To your knowledge has it been done in the case of the several other agreements of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. If so, I am unaware of it. Under instructions I participated in several business agreements at Bushire, but neither before or after was local Government informed to best of my remembrance. I understand, in any case, that under concession Company are entitled to do business deals with whom they please whether a whole tribe or single person.

(4) Surely position is that it was not anticipated either by you or myself that opposition of Sardar Ashair would be supported and his lies fathered by Persian Government : otherwise you could have yourself informed Government knowing that agreement was to be negotiated, more effectively than I the local Government. If Governor General had been officially informed by me it would not have prevented Central Government supporting Soulat, and would merely have been the means for them to shift some of their resentment and protest on to His Imperial Highness thus adding a reason for his downfall which Prime Minister and others are trying to obtain. His Imperial Highness is quite pleased with agreement, and even now he is not complaining of not being informed of it.

(5) His Imperial Highness knows nothing about south of province, and is always asking me for advice, I fail to see what advice he could have given me about agreement. I should have had to write to him officially, and once the intention was known in a Persian Government establishment it would have leaked out every where, while I was at special pains to avoid having negotiations thwarted by intrigue. Governor General is one of our very few friends in Shiraz, and you can have very little idea of opposition and obstacles in town to anything British whether commercial or not.

Enclosure 7.

No. 29, dated the 18th November 1921.

From—H. G. Chick, Esq., C.I.E., His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—R. F. O. Bridgeman, Esq., C.M.G., M.V.O., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

I have the honour to transmit to you translations of correspondence between the Karguzar of Fars, Asadullah Mirza, and myself regarding the agreement concluded by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with the Kashkuli Khans You will have already received a translation of my letter No. 1376 to His Royal Highness the Governor-General, to which reference is made in this correspondence, for it was sent to you with my despatch No. 23 of November 7th.



You will approve, I trust, of my second reply to the Karguzar intimating that the question was under reference to His Majesty's Legation, and declining to be drawn into local argument. If the Karguzar is correct in stating that he has received instructions that any agreement should be with the knowledge of Sardar Ashair (as well as the Governor-General), it is proof that the attitude of the Persian Government is chiefly in the former's interest.

Enclosure 8.

Translation.

No. 307, dated the 7th Rabi' I. 1340, 8th November 1921.

From—The Karguzar of Fars,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

According to information received in the Karguzarate, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Dasht-i-Qil have made some agreements with the Kashkuli clan, recruited a number of Sowars and Tufangchis from the same Kashkulis under the command of Amrullah Khan, who was in the South Persian Rifles, and given them an amount of money, cartridges, horses, etc.

In particular in the course of a letter received yesterday at the Karguzarate from Sardar Ashair, he writes: Regarding the oil-well, as certain of the Kashkulis without any right have made an agreement with the Company, I officially draw the attention of the Karguzarate to the fact that, as these Kashkulis are not the owners of the properties, their agreements are not reliable, and will lead to difficulties."

Therefore I respectfully beg to enquire from you: —

(1) whether such steps have been taken by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, or not;

(2) in case it is correct, has the said Company such rights as to conclude agreements direct with tribes and clans without the information of, and reference to, the Governor-General and local officials in Fars, and to arrange for armed forces,

(3) as the Kashkulis are not the owners in that locality, what reliability will those agreements have, especially when they are effected without the information of the Governor-General, local officials and the head of the Qashqai tribe? I request you kindly to inform the Karguzarate of the facts of the case regarding these questions.

Enclosure 7.

No. 1384, dated the 8th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,
To—The Karguzar of Fars.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Highness' letter No. 307,* dated the 7th Rabi' I.

*Enclosure 8.

His Royal Highness the Governor-General of Fars had previously written to me, asking identical questions, and enclosing the copy of a letter from Sardar Ashair regarding the agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Kashkuli Khans.

If your Highness will refer to my letter No. 1376† of the 6th Rabi' I to His Royal Highness the Governor-General, you will find fully explanations and answers to the questions which you have asked.

†Enclosure 3.

Enclosure 10.

Translation.

No 337, dated 16th Rabi' I 1340, equal the 17th November 1921.

From—The Karguzar of Fars,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

In accordance with your letter No. 1334,* after referring to the office of the Governor-General of Fars, I took cognizance of the reply which you had written to His Imperial Highness, No. 1376, regarding the operations of the Oil Company at Dasht-i-Qir.

* Enclosure 9.

In reply I beg to state that none has any objection (*lit* discussion) as regards the operations of the said Company within the limits of its concession and rights given to it by the Persian Government: but in respect to the conclusion of an agreement with single subjects and tribes in that locality like the Kashkulis according to the instructions which have reached the Karguzarate every proceeding and agreement, which the said Company wishes to make with them, must be with the knowledge of the Governor-General of Fars and Sardar Ashair. In this connection, of course, the necessary instructions must have already reached the Consulate from the British Legation in Tehran, and you will inform the Oil Company, and acquaint and oblige me accordingly.

Enclosure 11.

Translation.

No. 1458, dated the 18th November 1921.

From—The His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,
To—The Karguzar of Fars.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness' letter No. 337†, dated the 16th Rabi I's and to state that this and your former letter No. 307‡ have been communicated to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran for any action which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires may deem necessary.

† Enclosure 9.
‡ Enclosure 8.

Enclosure 12.

Telegram R., No. 210, dated (and received) the 27th November 1921.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Shiraz,
To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire, Mohammerah and Baghdad for Wilson.)

Prime Minister has telegraphed to the Governor-General that according to Article 14 of the concession guards must be arranged by Persian Government and according to Article 3 ownership of land to be worked must first be settled with Governor-General to ascertain whether it is Government or private property. Therefore agreement between Company and the Kashkulis which infringes these articles must be null and void and Prince is to inform Consulate accordingly. Finally Prime Minister asks for copy of agreement. There is no mention of Soulat in the telegram which adds that you have been similarly notified.

I have suggested in reply that Prime Minister be told that copy has been sent you and will be shortly available for inspection, therefore no need to make fresh copy here, but rest of matter is out of my hands and in yours.



Enclosure 13.

Translation.

No. 4892, dated 27th Kabi' I 1340, (equal the 28th November 1921.)

From—His Imperial Highness the Governor-General of Fars,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

After enquiring after your health I beg to state that I have received a telegram from the Prime Minister with regard to the Oil Company. He has particularly ordered me to point out and convey to you the following.

I. According to clause 14 of the Concession of the Company, the responsibility for the protection of the material and machinery used in the operations and exploitation of oil by the Company is left to the Persian Government.

II. In accordance with clause 3 of the said concession, it should be ascertained whether the lands, in which the Company undertakes operations, belong to the Persian Government, or to various individuals: and in either of these two cases the Company should act according to the duty laid down in clause 3.

He has also especially notified and decided that a letter containing the following details should be written to the British Legation in Tehran, and that I also should inform you of its contents: "The Company is bound to act according to clause 3 and clause 14 in any district wherever they wish to begin to extract oil. In other words, they must previously refer to the Government in connection with the question of security and the protection of their material and machinery, and also in the matter of ascertaining the ownership of the lands, so that what is needful may be known. Therefore the agreement with the Kashkulis is contrary to what is laid down by the Concession, and it must be cancelled and annulled. They should refer to the Governor-General and the Government in order to ascertain the ownership (of the lands) and (arrange) security."

Meanwhile His Highness the Prime Minister has called on me to send him a copy of the agreement telegraphically, so I request you to send me a copy of the same.

Enclosure 14.

Telegram R. No. 154, dated the 2nd (received 3rd) December 1921.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Following for Wilson.

Shiraz telegram 210.* I have communicated copy of English translation Kashkuli Agreement to the prime Minister. I have received no communication from him, such as that referred to in Chick's telegram.

*Enclosure 12.

I am informing His Highness of the report I have received from Shiraz expressing hope that after he has acquainted himself with the terms of the Agreement he will not find it ? and pressing him to do nothing to upset it before affording me opportunity of discussing matter with him with a view to amiable settlement Persian and British interests being identical as regards the oil exploitation in the South.

I should be grateful for your views as to the contentions of the Prime Minister regarding alleged infraction of Article 3 and Article 14 of the concession.

Addressed to Mohammerah, 27; repeated Shiraz, 157, Bushire, 154, Oil Concession.

783(a) F & P D



Enclosure 15.

Translation.

No. 1527, dated the 5th December 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—His Imperial Highness the Governor-General of Fars PRINCE NUSRAT-US-SULTANEH, G.C.V.O.

In thanking Your Imperial Highness for the information contained in your letter No. 4892,* dated the 27th Rabi' I 1340, regarding the statements of His Highness the Prime Minister, I have the honour to reply that such matters are out of my competence and concern the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and His Majesty's Legation to whom I will communicate a copy.

*Enclosure 13.

As to the request of His Highness the Prime Minister for a copy of the agreement with the Kashkuli Khans to be telegraphed to Tehran, on the 2nd Rabi' II, I received from His Majesty's Chargé D'Affaires a telegram stating as follows: "I have communicated to the Prime Minister a copy of the English translation of the Kashkuli agreement." Therefore as His Highness is already aware of the details of the agreement, as a Persian copy will be received by the Legation at Tehran within a week, and as it is extremely long and will afford the Consulate much trouble to copy and Your Imperial Highness much more trouble to telegraph, I venture to suggest that a reply should be sent to His Highness the Prime Minister to the effect that a copy can be obtained from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires who will have it both in English and Persian.

Enclosure 16.

Telegram No. 329, dated the 9th December 1921.

From—The Political, Mohammerah,

To—{ Mininister, Tehran. Resident, Bushire, (by post). His Majesty's Consul Shiraz.

Following from Wilson *Begins*—"Your telegram† of December 2nd. Status of lands in question is apparently similar to that of Bakhtiari Oil Fields which are purchased from Khans without protest by Persian Government. Lands will not be purchased until oil is found in paying quantities and should Persian Government decide that they belong to State agreement will be modified accordingly. As lands in question are uncultivated financial interests of Persian Government are not affected.

†Enclosure 14.

Persian Government under article 14 accepts certain obligations, but there is nothing in Concession to preclude Company from making its own arrangements with *de facto* local authorities as only persons capable of ensuring protection at all times and we have always done so, thereby saving Persian Government very heavy expenditure."—*Ends.*

Addressed Tehran, repeated Shiraz, copy to Bushire by post.

Enclosure 17.

Telegram R., dated Shiraz, the 11th December 1921.

From—The Political Resident Bushire,

To—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, 240.

(Repeated Shiraz and Mohammerah by post, 2179).

Shiraz telegram No. 216.

As regards Prime Minister's point about provision of guards by Persian Government under article 14 of Concession, please see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 223. Persian Government have never taken any steps to protect Company's borings at Maidan Naftun nor at Kishm, nor so as I am aware elsewhere; further while declining to recognize Company's agreement with



(239) (235) 18

Bakhtiari Khans they never made slightest attempt to protect Company's work themselves. In the circumstances when work has to be done in tribal area it appears necessary for Company to make its own arrangements.

As regards point about settling ownership of land, section 3 does not lay down any specific procedure for determining whether land is Government property or private or in latter event procedure for acquiring land, consequently Company having no reason to suppose Dash-ti-Ail land was Government but every reason to believe it tribal were I think within their rights in coming to agreement with tribal chiefs by mutual consent as they had done on several previous occasions.

Enclosure 18.

Telegram R., dated the 15th (received 16th) December 1921.

From—His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,

To—Political ' Mohammerah, 30.

(Repeated Bushire, 161, and Shiraz, 160.)

Your telegram No. 328.

Following from Sir A. T. Wilson. Prime Minister sent Head of British section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss Kashkuli Agreement with me.

Persian Government objects—

(*a*) to money payments being made by Company to Kashkulis,

(*b*) to formation by Company even of small guard of 30 men.

With regard to (*a*), Persian Government considers payments of large sums of money to what it describes as Bandits will lead to trouble.

With regard to (*b*), Persian Government proposes to fulfil clause 14 D'Arcy concession and to provide necessary guards itself. I asked how it intended to furnish guard and was promised details later. As we cannot object to Persian Government furnishing guard which by clause above mentioned it is bound to do, I propose, if you agree, to inform it that as it had not hitherto made any attempt to carry out its obligation to furnish guard to protect Company's borings either at Maida Naft or Kishm Island (I am not sure about Kasr-i-Shirin) Company was clearly justified in making arrangements with *de facto* local authorities as only persons capable of ensuring protection at all times but that when Persian Government has actually furnished guard and latter have been found efficient Company will consider question of modification of Kashkuli agreement with a view to meeting Persian Government's desires.

783(s) P & P D





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ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 8M DATED 23rd FEB.

Rec'd 13th MAR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 34-S., dated Bushire, the 10th January 1922.

Endorsed by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 12-S., dated the 4th January 1922.

1. Telegram No. 95, dated the 4th January 1922, from His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Shiraz and Bushire 734.

2. Telegram No. 96, dated the 4th January 1922, from His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Bushire 735.

3. Telegram No. 736, dated the 4th January 1922, from His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Bushire.

4 Telegram No. 10, dated the 7th January 1922, from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, repeated Ahwaz.

Enclo. No. 1.

Telegram R., No. 95, dated the 4th (received 5th) January 1922.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Shiraz and Bushire 734)

Following from Wilson.—*Begins.*

Your telegram dated the 15th December only reached Consul, Mohammerah, on the 24th December and reply has been delayed owing to his absence at Bushire.

I do not think Persian Government have correctly appreciated position. Reserve of 30 men in question relieves us of anxiety regarding petty raids by nomads who are present in thousands in vicinity in winter, but it is goodwill of tribesmen and not protection of 30 men on which we mainly rely. Company is operating at several points several miles distant from each other and 60 miles from coast, no force which could be maintained by Persian Government in this almost waterless and uncultivated wilderness would be adequate protection for us from attention of tribesmen whose cupidity would be aroused by presence of a Persian force in their midst.

Agreement is expressly designed to protect us from "bandits" to whom Persian Government allude and I fear any other system such as instructions to Soulet to send a guard would be disastrous.

If Persian Government, reversing their policy for last 20 years, wish to provide us with guards themselves I suggest they should first send a representative to Kasr-i-Shirin, Pusht-i-Kuh, Bakhtiari, Kashkuli and Kishm Island who can study local conditions and make recommendations.

Meanwhile, I beg they will refrain from jeopardising promising field on academic grounds. It is obvious from letter of appointment of Head of guards that latter are really nominees of tribesmen. Representatives of Persian Government amongst Kashkulis is Fathulla Khan, Kalantar. Cannot he be ordered by Governor-General to provide guard so as to save face of Persian Government if this is their objection?

Enclo. No. 2.

Telegram R., No. 96, dated the 4th (received 5th) January 1922.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire, 735.)

Following from Wilson.—*Begins.*

Your telegram of the 30th December. Climatic conditions and pressure of work in other directions precludes me from visiting Tehran at present, but I shall be glad to do so at a later date should Persian Government still so desire.



Enclo. No. 3.

Telegram R., No. 736, dated the 4th (received 5th) January 1922.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire.)

Your telegram No. 172, dated the 30th December.

In view of apparent anxiety of Persian Government to despatch cossacks to oilfields I venture to suggest so far from making proposal contained in Wilson's telegram No. 95, we ought to discourage Persian Government from sending representatives to study conditions at scenes of oil Company's operations.

Enclo. No. 4.

Telegram R., No. 10, dated the 7th January 1922.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Ahwaz 42.)

Enclo. No. 1. Ahwaz telegram No. 95.

If Persian Government could be induced to take course suggested in last paragraph of Wilson's telegram, this would be much best from local point of view.

If this not possible, suggestion in penultimate paragraph of Wilson's† wire would seem to be good way of shelving matter. I agree with Peel that it is highly undesirable to take any steps which would encourage Persian Government to send cossacks to fields, and that in fact everything should be done to discourage this, but I do not think despatch of "Mamur" to Kasr-i-Shirin would do any harm, probably conditions would change before he could get further.

†Enclo. No. 1.

SGPI, Delhi—873(S) F&PD—15 2-22—20.



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494 MT.

No.492-S of 1921.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 28th December 1921.

From

The Hon'ble Lieut-Col. A.P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Mr. D. de S. Bray, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department,
Delhi.

Subject:- Anglo-Persian Oil Company's activities in the Pusht-i-Kuh and Luristan areas.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for the information of the Government of India copy of a short note prepared by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company regarding (Dated the 16th December 1921) their activities in the Pusht-i-Kuh and Luristan Areas.

It will be noted that at present the base for these operations is at Ali Gharbi on the river Tigris, but Sir A.T. Wilson recently informed me that it would probably be much more convenient for the Company to use Dizful as their base, if the comparative tranquility of the tribal area produced by the military administration of N. Arabistan during the war continues now that the Persian Government has resumed sole charge of the Administration.

I have etc.,
Sd. A. P. Trevor, Lieutenant Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S NO 112M
DATED 26th JAN.
Recd.13th FEB.





(242) (20 758)

Copy of a letter No. nil Confidential, dated 16th December 1921, from Messrs. Anglo-Persian Oil Coy., Ltd., Mohammerah, to His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah.

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your No.2552 of 13/14th instant conveying the request from the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, for a note on this Company's activities in Push-i-Kuh and Luristan, which we have pleasure in submitting.

PUSHT-I-KUH. Our base for operation for this area is Ali-Gharbi, from where a Tram line is being laid into the drilling locations in Dehluran and Dalpari for the conveyance of material. We propose to drill two wells meantime, one at Dehluran and one at Dalpari, work on the former has actually started. Further developement in this area ia dependent on the result of Geological Surveys which are now in progress.

One well is now being drilled at Naft Khanah, and it is also intended to sink a well at Chia Sourkh.

Two Geological parties are in Pusht-i-Kuh, one is working south east from Qasr-i-Shirin, and the second north east from Dehluran. We employ in the Pusht-i-Kuh area:-

54 British and Canadian subjects.

80 Indian Subjects.

1602 Arabs and Persians.

LURISTAN. Owing to the unsettled state of the Minab and Dizful districts we have been unable to take active measures for the development of Luristan, but we propose to send Geological parties into the area via Panjireh this cold weather should tribal conditions permit of this.



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Hn 7/03/22

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1951/ 7/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Feb. 24, 1922.

RECEIVED IN
25 FEB 1922
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
bespatch from Hon. Charge d' affairs Teheran, no: 323, Dec 13.	Activities of Anglo Persian Oil Company.

Similar letter sent to Colonial Office / Petroleum Department

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



Copy.
(951/7/34)
No. 323.

British Legation,
TEHRAN.
13th December, 1921.

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My Lord,

With reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, No. 315, forwarding translation of an Agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited and the Kashkuli Khans, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith translation of an agreement signed on October 6th between the Resident Director of the Company and Sardar Haidar Khan, C.I.E., Zabit of Haiyat Daud and Kharag, relative to the lease of land at Genaweh and to the road and possible pipe line through the Khan's territory to Dashti-Qil.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) R. Bridgeman.

Already rec'd from India

The
Marquis Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.





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T R A N S L A T I O N.

AN AGREEMENT entered into BETWEEN Messrs. Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited, on the one part and hereinafter called "The Company" and Sardar Haidar Khan, C.I.E., Zabit of Haiyat Daud and Kharag, on behalf of himself and his brother Muhammad Khan his heirs and successors and on behalf of all his tribesmen, hereinafter called "The Zabit," in respect of the privileges and lands required by the said Company in the territories of the former, for the purposes of their business under the exclusive rights of the concession granted to Mr. W.K. D'Arcy by the Imperial Government of Persia in the month of Safar 1319 equivalent to the month of May 1901.

ARTICLE 1.

The Company shall have the right to search for obtain and use water and to construct tramways, roads, paths, houses sheds, bricks and reservoirs whether for their staff or for their work, to erect tanks, pumping stations, telegraph lines and telephone lines and all kinds of machinery to lay pipe lines and to carry out such construction work as they may deem necessary in any part of the said territory.

ARTICLE 2.

All lands required by the Company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil whether arable or non-arable in the territories of Hayat Daud together with an adequate supply of water so far as it is available shall be granted by the said Zabit to the Company free of charge, and without let or hindrance from any of his relatives, dependents or any of his tribesmen. And it is hereby agreed that, in consideration of the sums paid to the Zabit laid down in Article 3 any claim for compensation put forward by a third party in respect of such land shall be met by the said Zabit or his heirs and successors and that under no circumstances shall the Company be held liable to

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

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

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pay compensation for the same. The Company shall give the Zabit due notice of the areas of land which they may need to take up in any part of the said territory in connection with the oil works and the Zabit undertakes to hand over the same to the Company for the exclusive use of their works.

ARTICLE 3.

As soon as the Company has been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantities to justify the laying of a pipe line and as soon as the said pipe line has been completed and the oil is being exported thereby, the Company hereby undertake to rent or purchase at their option and the Zabit hereby undertakes to rent at the option of the Company whatever land may be required by the Company for their operation at the following rates:-

For every Jarib of 1000 square Zarhs, ten tomans per Jarib for arable land and 5 tomans per Jarib for non-arable land whether owned privately or belonging to the tribes or to sell at the rate of one hundred tomans and fifty tomans per Jarib respectively.

All lands acquired by the Company as above shall be the absolute property of the Company for the period of their concession or any extension or renewal therefrom and the Company shall have full proprietory rights over these lands. At the expiry of the concession or any extension thereof, all immovable property left in situ by the Company shall be handed to the Zabit or his heirs and successors in trust for the Persian Government, to whom such property reverts under the Concession granted to Mr. D'Arcy by the Persian Government.

All lands rented or acquired by the Company under this Agreement shall be measured in Jaribs by the Company's Engineer the number of Jaribs shall be fixed by them and demarcated on the ground by stone or gutch pillars. A map

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



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should be executed and copy sent to the Zabit. One copy should be signed by the Company and retained by the Zabit and the other copy should be signed and sealed by the Zabit and returned to the Company.

ARTICLE 4.

Should the Company desire to occupy land which is either inhabitated or under cultivation they should give three months notice to this effect to the Zabit whose duty shall be to remove the tenants within that period. The condition regarding the removal of the inhabitants shall apply to the embankments of tribes and their subdivisions only but not to settle villages.

All tribal land acquired by the Company from the Zabit whether arable or non-arable and whether inhabited or uninhabited should be paid for in full to the Zabit and the latter must supply other land to the cultivators or pay them for the same. With regard to private property it is agreed that half the price thereof shall be paid to the owners of the land as certified by the Zabit and the other half shall be paid to the said Zabit. The Zabit holds himself responsible for any further claim made by the owners of land acquired or rented by the Company under this agreement.

ARTICLE 5.

The tribes and cultivators shall have no right to graze their flocks on any land acquired by the Company under this agreement or in temporary occupation for purposes of exploration and should they do so the Zabit undertakes to punish them. Should they transgress the Company's boundaries and should any of their flocks or cattle meet with an accident the Company shall not be held responsible.

ARTICLE 6.

The selection of sites for buildings, housing machinery



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

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machinery and any other necessary works shall rest with the Company. The Company shall have the right to collect free from anywhere in the Zabit's territory whether within or without the area sold as above to them, all salt, sulphur stones, clay, wood, water, whether from rivers or springs necessary for their work.

All houses, shops, etc. which the Company may deem necessary to build on the land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes and the Zabit or his representative shall have no right to collect such taxes from any of the people so employed by the Company or otherwise permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

ARTICLE 7.

The Zabit undertakes to give all the protection in his power to the Company or to any of their Staff or labourers in any part of their territory, from all thefts, highway robberies, assaults, etc.

Similarly, the Zabit undertakes to protect all houses, effects, stores, roads, pipe-lines, all kinds of machinery, and any of the Company's property or of its employees which may be exposed to wilful damage by townsmen, tribesmen or cultivators or to possible loss by theft.

ARTICLE 8.

For the above purposes it is agreed between the Zabit and the Company that the former shall appoint in consultation with them permanent trustworthy guards under a reliable man of good family, whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided by the Company and who shall remain there summer and winter. If in spite of the efforts of the said guards thefts should occur the Zahib undertakes to recover any property stolen and to compensate the Company for any damage sustained within his territories. In the event of non-recovery of stolen property the value thereof shall be



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

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be deducted by the Company from the sums due to the Zabit.

The number of guards required in any district where the Company may operate shall be fixed by the Company's representative. Their salaries will be paid monthly in arrears by the Company on the following scale:- Eight Tomans per mensem of the solar calendar without food for unmounted guards and ten tomans without food or foddar for mounted guards. Two tomans food allowance shall be given for each man until the next harvest and ten tomans for each horse for fodder, etc.,

These allowances to be subject to monthly revision in communication with the said Zabit monthly thereafter.

The Company shall provide arms and ammunition for these guards and the said Zabit shall be responsible for their safe custody by the said guards.

Two or three head guards shall be appointed for places of importance to be guarded at twelve tomans per month.

The salary of the Head of the Guards shall be fixed from time to time by the Company in communication with the Zabit and the Company shall erect a dwelling at Ganawah for the representative of the Zabit.

ARTICLE 9.

The engagement of watchmen by the Company shall be confined to such persons only as are approved of by the Head of the Guards who will be appointed by the Zabit in consultation with the Company. The said watchmen are subject to dismissal or fine by the Company. In the event of any heavier punishment being required the offender shall be handed over to the Zabit and the Zabit undertakes that punishment shall be inflicted and to use his utmost endeavours to uphold the authority of the Company's representative on account of their employees, thereby avoiding unnedessary trouble

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

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

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to both parties of this contract.

ARTICLE 10.

It shall be the duty of the above-mentioned Head of the Guards to keep order in the areas in which the Company may operate, but he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes amongst the Company's native employees unless asked by the Company to do so.

ARTICLE 11.

This contract shall remain in force for any period that the Company retain their Concession with the Persian Government and for the period of any extension or renewal thereof or any less period during which the Company may desire to work in the Zabit's territories.

ARTICLE 12.

In the event of the Company failing to discover oil or if oil should be discovered in such small quantities as to be unworkable and the Company desires to stop work on the Zabit's territory, they shall have the right to do so and the Zabit shall have no claim to the above payment. Due notice of the cessation of work shall be given by the Company to the Zabit, whose guarantee of protection shall cease on the removal of the Company's staff and movable property from the Zabit's territory.

ARTICLE 13.

The Zabit solemnly declares that he will carry out all the conditions of this contract faithfully and loyally and that he or his heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept full responsibility for any claim by any person in his or their territory questioning the validity of any of the stipulations in this contract.

In the event of any difference arising between the Company and the Zabit, whether in respect of the meaning of any of the foregoing articles or otherwise, such matters shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties. Failing a friendly settlement, the points in dispute shall



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

(251) (246)

shall be referred to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to arbitrate and to settle them, and his decision shall be accepted as final by both parties. This agreement however, cannot be cancelled except as provided above.

Dated this 4th day of Safar 1329 equivalent to the 6th day of October 1921.

(In Persian)
Signed/ - Haider Khan
Hayat Daudi.

Signed/ - Muhammad Khan
Hayat Daudi.

For Messrs. Strick Scott and Company Limited,
Managing Agents Anglo-Persian Oil Company,

Signed/ A.T. Wilson.
Resident Director.

Witnesses:-

S. Clegg.
British Vice Consul.
Bushire.

M. Khalil,
Chief Dragoman to Residency.





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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1944/1/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Feb 24, 1922.

RECEIVED IN
25 FEB 1922
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office Letter no E 1951/1/34 of Feb 24.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Despatch from, Hm. Chargé d'Affaires Teheran, no 315, Dec 12	Activities of Anglo-Persian Oil Company

Similar letter sent to { Colonial Office. Petroleum Department.

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



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British Legation,
Tehran,
12th December 1921.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acquaint Your Lordship that an agreement, of which I enclose a copy, was signed on October 14th last between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited and the Kashquli Khans.

This agreement, which provides for the right to make experimental borings for oil in the Kashquli hills with the protection of the Khans, and to make roads etc. thither from the Coast, was first planned in June last.

The matter of getting all the Kashquli Khans to attend a conference and to sign terms was in itself no light task, owing to their personal enmities, and natural propensities for intriguing and marauding, and the fact that Soulat ed Dowleh was intriguing to bring about dissension with a view to being brought into the partnership himself complicated it still more. In view of Mr. Consul Chick's local knowledge and long experience of Soulat ed Dowleh and Kashgai affairs in general, I authorised him to be present at the meeting between Sir A. Wilson and the Khans.

His presence there was subsequently the pretext for outrageous attacks on him in the press at Shiraz, and of complaints by the Persian Government in regard to which I have the honour to refer Your Lordship to my despatch No. 316 of the 7th instant.

Mr. Chick/

The Most Honourable
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston K.G., G.C.S.I.,G.C.I.E.,
Foreign Office.





Mr. Chick was also accused by the Persian Government of organizing an armed force, see my Despatch No. 299 of the 30th ultimo.

The Persian Government acting on information received from Soulat ed Dowleh and from the Karguzar at Shiraz, was very suspicious of the political nature of the agreement: From the first it took up the line that if any force were necessary for the protection of the oil fields the matter should have been referred to the Governor General of Fars, who would provide the necessary guard. Towards the end of November the Prime Minister issued telegraphic instructions to the Governor General that according to article 14 of the concession the guard must be arranged by the Persian Government, and according to article 3 the ownership of the sites for the boring must first be settled with the Governor General in order to ascertain whether it was Government or private property, and that the Agreement, which infringes these articles, must be notified to the Consulate as being null and void.

I have furnished the Prime Minister with a copy of the agreement, and am discussing the question with him. I hope to be able to convince His Highness that the agreement is in no sense detrimental to Persian interests.

I have, etc.,

(Sgd.) R. BRIDGEMAN.





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Translation.

An agreement was entered into as follows between Messrs. the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd., on the one part hereinafter called the company and (1) Abul Fath Khan Kashkali on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Abul Hasan Khan Kashkuli, to include the descendants of Akbar Beg and Askar Beg Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(2) Hadi Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Haji Muhammad Karim Khan Kashkuli, to include Hasan Kuli Beg and all his descendants and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(3) Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Kazim Beg Kashkuli and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(4) Ilyas Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Ali Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(5) Fathullah Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Haidar Ali Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(6) Muhammad Quli Khan on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Hasan Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants hereinafter called the Kashkuli Khans, in respect of the

privileges/





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privileges required by the said Company throughout the whole extent of the territories in occupation of the Kashkuli tribe in their winter quarters, for the purposes of the Company's business under the concession which they hold from the Persian Government.

Article 1.

The Company shall have the right to drill for oil and for water and to make all investigations necessary for the purpose of their business in all parts of the said territories and to construct and erect tramways roads buildings machinery and telegraph apparatus of all kinds in any part of the said territories so far as may be necessary for the purposes of their business.

The Company shall have the right to collect and use free anywhere in the said territories stone gach salt sulphur clay wood and water whether from rivers or springs for the purposes of their work. The selection of routes and sites for such work shall rest with the Company.

Article 2.

All lands whatever required by the Company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil including all or any natural springs of oil in the said territories together with an adequate supply of water so far as available shall be granted by the said Kashkuli Khans to the Company free of charge and without let or hindrance from any of their relatives or dependants or any of their tribesmen or of third parties. And it is hereby agreed that in consideration of the sums to be paid to the Kashkuli Khans under articles 8 and 9 any claim for compensation reward

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



or subsidy put forward by a third party in respect of such land or of the protection to be rendered to the Company by the Kashkuli Khans shall be met by the said Khans or their heirs and successors and that under no circumstances shall the Company be made to pay compensation for the same. If the Company finds itself obliged to pay other parties in order to ensure the safety of their work the amount paid may be deducted by the Company at their option from the amount due to the Kashkuli Khans.

Article 3.

As soon as the Company have been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantities to justify the laying of a pipe line and as soon as oil is being exported thereby the Company hereby undertake to sell whatever land may be required by the Company for their operations at the following rates: for every square of 100 yards on each side ten tomans for arable land and five tomans for non-arable land.

Lands so acquired shall be the absolute property of the Company for the period of their agreement and the Company shall have full proprietory rights therein.

Article 4.

No one shall have no right to graze flocks on land so acquired or in temporary occupation of the company for the purpose of exploration and should they do so the Kashkuli Khans undertake to punish them. Should anyone transgress the Company's boundaries and should they or any of their flocks meet with an accident (which God forbid) the Company shall not be responsible.

Article 5./





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Article 5.

All houses shops etc which the Company may build on land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes and the Kashkuli Khans or their representatives shall have no right to collect taxes from any of the people employed by the Company or temporarily permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

Article 6.

The Kashkuli Khans undertake to give all the protection in their power to the Company and to their staff and labourers in any part of their territory from thefts highway robbery assault etc.

Similarly the Kashkuli Khans undertake to protect all the property of the Company and of its employes which may be exposed to wilful damage or to possible loss or theft.

Article 7.

For the above purpose it is further agreed that the Company shall appoint permanent trustworthy guards to the number of thirty at present to be increased as necessary at the option of the Company, under a reliable man of good family whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided by the Company and who shall remain there summer and winter.

If in spite of the efforts of the said guards thefts should occur the Kashkuli Khans undertake to recover the property stolen and to compensate the Company for any damage sustained in their territory. In the event of non-recovery of the stolen property the value thereof shall be deducted by the Company

from/





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from the sums due to the Khans.

The number of guards at any place where the Company may operate shall be fixed by the Company.

It shall be the duty of the above mentioned head of the Guard to keep order in the areas in his charge to such extent as the Company may order him, he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes among the Company's servants unless asked by the Company to do so.

In case of misconduct the said guards are subject to dismissal or fine by the Company. In the event of any heavier punishment being needed the offender shall be handed over to the representative of the Kashkuli Khans and the Kashkuli Khans undertake that punishment shall be inflicted and to use their utmost endeavours to uphold the authority of the Company's employes thereby avoiding unnecessary troubles to both parties of this contract.

Article 8.

Until oil is exported by the pipe-line from the said territories the Company shall pay to the Kashkuli Khans the sum of 10,000 tomans per annum payable half yearly from 21st March next in arrears in equal proportions to the signatories of this agreement.

The division amongst their relations of the sums paid as above to the six signatories is their own concern and does not affect the Company. But it is to be noted that Hadi Khan has agreed to pay 250 Tomans annually from his own share and that of his section to Hasan Quli Beg, and also that Abul Fath Khan has agreed to pay 250 Tomans annually from his own share and that of his section to Hamza Beg.

And/





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And it is hereby agreed, with the consent of all the Kashkuli Khans, that in addition to the sums payable as above, the Company shall pay

(1) to Ghulam Hussain Khan Kashkuli, on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Kazim Beg Kashkuli and all their tribesmen and dependants, the sum of 334 Tomans annually in order that their share may be brought to a total of 2000 tomans annually, and (2) to Muhammad Quli Khan Kashkuli, on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Hasan Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants, the sum of 334 Tomans annually, in order that their share may be brought to a total of 2000 Tomans annually.

Article 9.

Should the Company succeed in finding oil in paying quantities in the said territories and as soon as oil is exported by the pipe-line the Company agree to pay to the Kashkuli Khans a further sum of 10,000 Tomans annually making a total of 20,000 Tomans annually, divisible amongst the said Khans in the same way as above.

Whenever the Company decide to issue shares to the Kashkuli Khans in any new Company or companies which may be formed for the extraction of oil in the said territories, the said Khans shall be granted three shares every hundred shares issued by such company or Companies. These shares will be issued in the name of the Kashkuli Khans and the dividends that may thereafter be declared annually by the said company or companies shall be divided equally amongst the said Khans.

The/





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The above shares shall be paid by the Company to the Kashkuli Khans in return for the protection and assistance they have undertaken to provide for the Company's staff and work, on condition that they have in fact provided it, but it is hereby agreed that the said amount of 20,000 Tomans shall cease to be paid after the first declaration of a dividend on the shares.

The Kashkuli Khans hereby undertake not to sell mortgage transfer or otherwise dispose of such shares, if issued, and in order that such shares may permanently remain in the Kashkuli Khans family they hereby agree to deposit the script with the Company against a receipt for the same.

Article 10.

In the event of the Company failing to discover oil in sufficient quantity they shall have the right to stop work at their option and the Kashkuli Khans shall have no claim to any of the above payments.

Article 11.

The Kashkuli Khans solemnly declare that they will carry out all the conditions of this contract willingly and faithfully and that they and their heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept full responsibility for any claim or dispute by any person whether in their territory or beyond it questioning the validity of any stipulations on this contract.

This contract cannot be cancelled except as provided as above and shall remain in force for the

period/





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period of the Company's concession from Persian Government for any extension or renewal thereof.

In the event of any difference arising between the Company and the Kashkuli Khans it shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties; failing a friendly settlement the dispute shall be referred to one of His Majesty's Consular officers for arbitration and his decision shall be accepted as final.

Signed at Chihil Chashmeh on this 21st day of Mizan, Takhakui-il equivalent to 11th September 1300.

for Messrs. Strick Scott and Co.,Ltd.,
Managing Agents Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd.,

sd/- A.T.Wilson

Resident Director.

14.10.21.

sd/- Abul Fath Khan
Hadi Khan
Ghulam Husain Khan
Ilyas Khan
Fathullah Khan
Muhammad Quli Khan

Witnessed by several minor Chiefs.

Ardashir Khan,
Muhammad Reza Khan,
Farajullah Khan,
Hamzeh Khan
Hassan Quli Beg.





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23 FEB 1922

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 12-S., dated Bushire, the 4th January 1922.

Endorsed by the Under-Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 476-S., dated the 30th November 1921.

1. Letter No. 1606, dated the 26th December 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, with three enclosures.

2. Telegrams Nos. 170 and 171, dated the 30th December 1921, from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, repeated Bushire.

Enclo. 1.

Copy of a letter No. 1606, dated the 26th December 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf Bushire.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch No. 16, dated 23rd November 1921, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, from your information.

Enclo. 2.

Copy of a letter No. 16, dated the 23rd November 1921, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

With reference to correspondence ending with Bushire telegram of the 17th instant, No. 225, I transmit to you herewith, for your information, translation of a note, dated 8th November, from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and copy of my reply, dated the 17th instant, pointing out that the allegations made by the Persian Government were entirely unfounded, and requesting an official apology, and the recall of the Karguzar at Shiraz.

Enclo. 3.

Translation of a note addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires by His Excellency Moshar-es Saltaneh, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The 8th November 1921.

M. LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES,

According to information received from Fars the British Consul, under the name of the protection of the fields, is organising a force. A certain Assadullah of the Kashkuli tribe who has been a Lieutenant in the South Persia Rifles, has been promoted in rank and put in charge of about fifty men. So far as has been ascertained he has been provided with 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 30 horses and 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to levy 300 riflemen. Some agreements have been entered into, on behalf of the Company, with some Kashkulis who have settled down in the oil-fields for the sake of a small number of cattle and who pretend to be the owners of the land in question.

The evil consequences of such measures as above mentioned are clear. If a force is required for the district it is desirable that the matter should be referred to the Governor-General of Fars and measures be taken in accordance with his views.

In the above circumstances, I have the honour to draw your attention to the evil consequences of the above-mentioned measures, which will

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 2M DATED 2nd Feb. Recd. 20th FEB.

ultimately lead to trouble, and to request you to prevent the Consul immediately from taking such direct measures in Persian soil and to inform me of the result.

Enclo. 4.

British Legation,
17th November 1921.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note* No. 1702-1310 of the 8th instant to which I have deferred replying sooner in order that I might make a searching enquiry in regard to the allegations made by Your Excellency.

* Enclo. 3.

The accusation that His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz is organizing a force is entirely unfounded.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company has engaged thirty guards for the protection of the site in Dashti-Qil where it is proposed to make borings for oil. The Oil Company has supplied the guard with 30 horses, 30 rifles and proportionate ammunition. Amrullah Khan Kashkuli, who is in command of the guard, has been given 500 tomans for the pay and expenses of the men until their arrival at the site of the boring operations. The statement that he has been given 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to raise 300 riflemen is entirely incorrect.

The site of the Oil Company's operations is in the middle of Kashkuli territory. I will, therefore, refrain from commenting on Your Excellency's statement that some Kashkulis have settled down in the oil-fields for the sake of a small number of their cattle and pretend to be owners of the land. I cannot, however, refrain from expressing my regret that the Imperial Government should communicate to me reports so obviously at variance with well-known facts, and at the same time neglect to acquaint me with the source of these reports.

From the first sentence in Your Excellency's note under reply, I gather that the Karguzar of Fars is responsible for these frivolous charges against the Consul of a friendly power. In the interest of Anglo-Persian relations, it is desirable that the Foreign Office should have a more reliable agent at so important a post as Shiraz, and I hope that Your Excellency will lose no time in recalling the present Karguzar, whose record has been generally unsatisfactory and whose false reports on the present occasion have been the cause of much anxiety to the Imperial Government as well as to myself.

At the same time, I expect that the Persian Government will convey to me an expression of regret at the levity with which serious and utterly false accusations have been officially made against His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

R. BRIDGEMAN,

His Excellency,
Moshar-es-Saltaneh,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclo. 5.

Telegram R., No. 81, dated the 30th (received 31st) December 1921.
From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah.

(Repeated Bushire, 170.)

Persian Government has raised with me question of Kashkuli agreement. Please ask Wilson whether he could conveniently come to Tehran to settle this matter. I have told Persian Government that seems to me best manner of proceeding. Fairley concurs.

Enclo. 6.

Telegram P., No. 32, dated the 30th (received 31st) December 1921 (Confidential).

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah.

(Repeated Bushire, 171.)

My telegram* No. 31. If Wilson concurs he might find it inconvenient to leave for Tehran for another two or three weeks. The position of the present Government is shaken by financial straits and the position may be clearer by then.

* Enclo. 5.

No. 19-S., dated Bushire, the 5th January 1922.

Endorsed by the Under-Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, with reference to this office letter No. 429-S., dated the 30th November 1921.

Letter No. 1-14-S., dated the 4th January 1922, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, with enclosure.

PRÉCIS.

Letter from Saulat-ud-Daulah regarding Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Kashkuli agreement.

No. 1-14-S., dated Bushire, the 4th January 1922.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, etc.,

To—Sir Percy Loraine, Bt., C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, Tehran.

I have the honour, at the request of Sir A. T. Wilson, to forward herewith translation of a letter which he has received from Saulat-ud-Daulah agreeing to meet him.

During my recent visit to Mohammerah I spoke to Sir Arnold and he expressed himself as quite willing to see Saulat.

Circumstances have changed however since then, and as the Persian Government class the Kashkulis as "Bandits" perhaps it would not improve matters much for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to make any agreement with Saulat, who might certainly equally well be classed in the same category if not as bandit-in-chief.

However if Sir A. T. Wilson can visit Tehran shortly he will be able to discuss the matter with you.

Translation of letter from Saulat-ud-Daulah Qashqai to Sir A. T. Wilson.

I beg to thank you for your letter of 16th Safar which reached me through Mr. Chick.

I am obliged by your friendly sentiments which I heartily reciprocate.



With regard to your references to the oil-field in the winter quarters of the Kashkulis and of the Muhammad Salihi, as these winter quarters are not the special property of the Kashkulis and are occupied by other Qashqai tribes, and as the Kashkulis cannot be trusted to discharge their obligations under the agreement, you would have done better to discuss the matter with me first in order to avoid disappointment.

You said in your letter that you were anxious to meet me and enquired as to whereabouts. I am now near Shiraz and am leaving for Firuzabad and shall be there for a few days. I shall then go South returning to Firuzabad in early spring: if you wish to meet me at any time please send word to me through Shiraz in advance.

SGPI, Delhi—810 (S) F&P D—26-1-22—24.

CENTRAL INDIA 4 FEB 1922

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

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 1052/296/34.
and address—
not to any person by name,
but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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PUT AWAY WITH 537/21

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Feb 3, 1922.

RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 4 FEB 1922

Reference to previous correspondence:

CENTRAL REGISTRY 4 FEB 1922 INDIA OFFICE

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Despatch from Hm. Chargé d'affaires Teheran no: 299, Nov. 30.	Alleged raising of troops by Hm. Consul at Shiraz.

23 FEB 1922
Copy to India per by post 20/2/22

Similar letter sent to

14—F.O.P. 5000 1/22 (7665)





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No. 299

British Legation
Tehran,
30th November 1921.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith the translation of a note dated November 8th from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs complaining of actions alleged to have been taken by His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, and copy of my reply dated the 17th instant, wherein I pointed out that these allegations were entirely unfounded, and requested an official apology, and the recall of the Kargusar at that town.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble servant,

(Sd) R.Bridgeman

The
Marquis Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.
&c., &c., &c.





(267) (262)

Translation of note addressed to H.M's Chargé d'Affaires by His Excellency Moshar-es-Saltaneh, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

8th November 1921.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

According to information received from Fars the British Consul, under the name of the protection of the oil fields, is organising a force. A certain Asadullah of the Kashkuli tribe who has been a lieutenant in the South Persia Rifles, has been promoted in rank and put i in charge of about fifty men. So far as has been ascertained he has been provided with 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 30 horses and 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to levy 300 riflemen. Some agreements have been entered into, on behalf of the Company, with some Kashkulis who have settled down in the oil fields for the sake of a small number of cattle and who pretend to be the owners of the land in question.

The evil consequences of such measures as above mentioned are clear. If a force is required for the district it is desirable that the matter should be referred to the Governor General of Fars and measures be taken in accordance with his views.

In the above circumstances, I have the honour to draw your attention to the evil consequences of the above mentioned measures, which will ultimately lead to trouble, and to request you to prevent the Consul immediately



immediately from taking such direct measures in Persian soil and to inform me of the result.

I avail myself &c.

(Sd) Asadullah.

Moshar-es-Saltaneh.



(262) (263)

British Legation,

17th November 1921.

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Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 1702/1310 of the 8th instant to which I have deferred replying sooner in order that I might make a searching enquiry in regard to the allegations made by Your Excellency.

The accusation that His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz is organising a force is entirely unfounded.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company has engaged thirty guards for the protection of the site in Dashti-i-Qil where it is proposed to make borings for oil The Oil Company has supplied the guard with thirty horses, thirty rifles and proportionate ammunition. Amrullah Khan Kashkuli, who is in command of the Guard has been given 500 tomans for the pay and expenses of the men until their arrival at the site of the boring operations. The statement that he has been given 10,000 tomans in cash with instructions to raise 300 riflemen is entirely incorrect.

The site of the Oil Company's operations is in the middle of Kashkuli territory. I will, therefore, refrain from

His Excellency,
Moshar es Saltaneh,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.



from commenting on Your Excellency's statement that some Kashkulis have settled down in the Oil fields for the sake of a small number of their cattle and pretend to be owners of the land. I cannot, however, refrain from expressing my regret that the Imperial Government should communicate to me reports so obviously at variance with well-known facts, and at the same time neglect to acquaint me with the source of those reports.

From the first sentence in Your Excellency's note under reply, I gather that the Karguzar of Fars is responsible for these frivolous charges against the Consul of a friendly power. In the interest of Anglo-Persian relations, it is desirable that the Foreign Office should have a more reliable agent at so important a post as Shiraz, and I hope that Your Excellency will lose no time in recalling the present Karguzar, whose record has been generally unsatisfactory and whose false reports on the present occasion have been the cause of much anxiety to the Imperial Government as well as to myself.

At the same time, I expect that the Persian Government will convey to me an expression of regret at the levity with which serious and utterly false accusations have



have been officially made against
His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz.

I avail myself of this
opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurance of my high
consideration.

(SH R. Bullymore





PUT AWAY WITH

537/21

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Minute Paper.

Register No. P. [5451 5452] b3

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated

Rec. 192 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	4. xii	[illegible]	Persia
Secretary of State.			
Committee.....	2 Jan[y]	[illegible]	Proposed operations of the A.P.O. Coy in Kashguli country.
Under Secretary..			
Secretary of State.			

19 JAN 1922

Copy to F.O. 17/1/22. C.O. 3/1/22 Admty. 3/1/22

Draft of F.O. papers

FOR INFORMATION.

The negotiations between the A.P.O.Coy. and Haidar Khan of Hayat Daud and the Kashguli Khans appear to have been carried through most successfully. Sir A.T. Wilson is clearly a tower of ~~strength~~ to the Coy.

The record of the proceedings at Sir A.T. Wilson's meeting with the Kashguli Khans is edifying.

Tehran's weakness for the Saulat is unfortunate.

J.G.Simpson 22/12/21

Previous Papers—

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
10 1939 2000 7/20
JAN 1922

Some further papers on this subject - including exchange of confidences between F.O. & APOC - are added.



14 JAN 1922



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M 5451 5452 / 11 no 7

In any further communication on this subject, please quote No. and address— E 14148/76/34. not to any person by name, but to— "The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P 63 1922

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

Jan 3, 1921.

4 JAN 1922

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
From, Anglo Persian Oil Company, Dec 23.	Operations at Dasht-i-Qil.
To, ditto, Jan 2.	
Despatch No, Hm Minister, Teheran, no: 3, Jan 2.	

CENTRAL INDIA REGISTRY 14 JAN 1922

Copy to India 19 JAN 1922

Similar letter sent to

14—F.O.P. 5000 9/21 (6940)



Sir,



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HSC/OFF.
(E 14188/76/34.)

272

ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY, LIMITED.
Britannic House,
Great Winchester Street,
LONDON, E.C.2.
23rd December, 1921.

Sir,

We have the honour to inform you that we are undertaking development operations at Dasht-i-Qil, situated some 60 miles North of Bushire, where prospects for finding oil are considered to be favourable.

Dasht-i-Qil is in the territory occupied by the Kashkuli tribes in their winter quarters, and we have concluded with the Khans of these tribes an Agreement, somewhat on the lines of that with the Bakhtiari Khans, under which we are afforded facilities for conducting our operations in return for a share-holding interest in a Company which is to be formed in the event of oil being found in commercial quantities. We have also concluded a satisfactory Agreement with Sirdar Haidar Khan, C.I.E., Zabit of Naiyat Daud and Kharaq, through whose territory it is necessary to pass in order to gain access to Dasht-i-Qil from the sea-board. If you so desire we shall be pleased to send you, for your information, copies of these two Agreements.

We would like to take this opportunity of recording our appreciation of the very valuable assistance and advice that has been afforded to us in the course of our negotiations by His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel A.P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., and His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, Mr. H.C. Chick, C.I.E. The services rendered by the latter gentleman, in particular, have been of the greatest possible value, and, indeed,/

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.





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-2-

indeed, Sir A.T. Wilson, who acted as our representative in the negotiations, reports that it was entirely owing to Mr. Chick's accurate and detailed knowledge of the Khans and of the tribal affairs generally, that it was possible from the start to make proposals in a form which it was possible for the Khans to accept unanimously. If you would be so good as to convey to Mr. Chick an expression of the thanks of our Board we should be very glad.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) H.E. NICHOLS.
Managing Director.
For THE ANGLO-PERSION OIL COMPANY,Ltd.





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No.3.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(E 14149/76/34)

2nd. January 1922.

Sir:-

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, expressing their appreciation of the assistance and advice afforded to their representative, Sir A.T.Wilson, by Colonel Trevor and Mr.Chick, in connection with recent negotiations conducted by Sir A.T.Wilson with the chiefs of the Kashkuli tribe regarding the company's proposed operations at Dasht-i-Qil.

2. I shall be glad if you will convey to Colonel Trevor and Mr.Chick an expression of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's thanks for their valuable assistance and advice.

I am, with great truth and regard,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State).

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

Sir P.Lorraine, Bart., C.M.G.
&c., &c., &c.





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E 14148/76/34

P 63
Foreign Office.
S.W.1.

2nd. January 1922.

Sir:-

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd. ultimo, and to inform you that His Lordship has requested His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to convey your thanks and expressions of appreciation to His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, for the assistance and advice afforded to Sir A.T.Wilson in his negotiations with the Kashkuli chiefs regarding your proposed operations at Dasht-i-Qil.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

The Managing Director,
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company.





No.305-S of 1921.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 20th October 1921.

5452

From

The Hon'ble Lt.-Col. A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Mr. D. De S. Bray, C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department, D e l h i.

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 54M DATED 24th NOV. Recd. 12th DEC.

Subject:- Survey of Genawah anchorage.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer the Government of India to my letter No.303-S. dated 19th October 1921 relative to the operations of the Anglo Persian Oil Company connected with the exploitation of the oil in the Dasht-i-Qil area and the formation of Genawah as a base for this enterprise.

2. Already a considerable quantity of material and stores has been and is being landed daily at Genawah for test boring operations and the construction of the road to Dasht-i-Qil, and if oil is found in paying quantities, of which the Company's geologists are very optimistic, this base will become a very busy port and large quantities of machinery, material and stores for condensing plants, pipe line, pumping station, buildings etc. and ~~xx~~ in all probability a railway will have to be handled.

3. I, therefore, venture to suggest that, as the R.I.M.S. "Palinurus" is at present in the Gulf completing the survey of Katif harbour and approaches, the Government of India will be pleased to issue the necessary instructions for her to carry out a brief preliminary survey of Genawah during this cold weather. ~~x~~ Some discussion about this proposal took place yesterday between the Resident Director and the Commander of the "Palinurus" who were both staying at the Residency and I gathered that only a cursory survey of the anchorage outside the 5 fathom line, which could be carried out by taking soundings from the ship, is required, with a

view





view to ascertaining the best points for ships to anchor in the two prevailing winds N.W.and S.E., and that such a survey would take a very short time. The existence of such a survey would of course be of considerable assistance to the Company's present operations, and to British interests generally in the future.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Director, R.I.M., Bombay.

I have, etc.,

Sd. A.P.Trevor,
Lt.-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



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

No.1664-M.

Government of India.

Marine Department. Delhi.

The 21st November 1921.

To

The Director, Royal Indian Marine.

Subject:- Proposed survey of Genawah anchorage.

Sir,

I am directed to refer to letter No.3105-S of 1921, dated the 20th October 1921, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the address of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, a copy of which has been sent to you direct, relative to the survey of Genawah anchorage.

2. The Government of India consider it important to assist the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in their enterprise, but do not view the proposal to survey the Genawah anchorage to be of such pressing necessity as to be allowed seriously to interfere with the general survey programme as proposed in paragraph 3 of your letter No.5552-M., dated the 27th July 1921. I am therefore to request that you will kindly state whether it will be possible for the R.I.M.S. "Palinurus" to carry out this survey while she is in the Persian Gulf, without seriously interfering with her other work and without additional cost.

3. If it should be possible for the R.I.M.S. "Palinurus" to undertake this preliminary survey, I am to request that the necessary orders may be issued and the Government of India informed accordingly.

I am, etc.,

Sd. H.R.Pate,

Offg. Depy. Secy. to the Govt. of India.





CONFIDENTIAL.

5451

No. 303-S., dated Bushire, the 19th October 1921.

From—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf,

To—The Hon'ble Mr. Denys DeS. Bray, C.I.E., C.B E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

Subject :— *Boring for oil at Dasht-i-Qil.*

As the Government of India are doubtless aware the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have for many years past been having geological and other surveys made of the portion of Fars to the north-west of Daliki with a view to ascertaining the probable location of the oil-field from which "shows" of oil are found near Daliki.

In 1920 the Company's geologists definitely fixed on Dasht-i-Qil, about 35 miles north-west of Daliki and 30 miles north-east of Genawah on the coast north-west of Bushire as being the most favourable site for a boring.

The country round Dasht-i-Qil is very wild and barren; during the hot weather it is practically uninhabited and waterless, and in the cold weather it is the winter resort of the Kashkuli Section of the Kashgai tribe.

While the geological surveyors were locating the best site for boring, other surveyors were trying to find the best route for a road and possible pipe line to the coast. The first surveyors thought that the best way would be to utilize the existing Shiraz road to near Daliki and strike into the hills in a north-westerly direction from there; it was during this phase of the survey that I hoped the Bushire-Borasjun Railway would be useful to the Company and that they might buy it.

However, during the end of last cold weather, and the beginning of last hot weather, fresh surveyors, Colonel Collier, late of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and Mr. Sharpe, one of the Company's Engineers, made a very careful survey and found that a much easier and shorter route for the road and pipe line to the coast from Dasht-i-Qil existed *viâ* Mishun Goomeroon and Mehmadsadi to Genawah.

A survey shows this route to be 52 miles to the coast as opposed to 83 miles by the other route to Daliki and thence 55 miles, a total of 138 miles.

Directly the site for the proposed boring was located and the alignment of the road and possible pipe line roughly fixed, it became necessary for the Company to make agreements with the Khans through whose territory the road would pass and with the Kashkuli Khans in whose cold weather habitat the boring would be made.

The question of the road had to be settled with Sarkar Haidar Khan of Hayat Daud, and this was satisfactorily done on the 6th October 1921 by Sir Arnold Wilson, Resident Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, assisted by Mr. Clegg, temporary British Vice-Consul at Bushire, and Agha Khalil, the Residency Dragoman. After a somewhat lengthy discussion with the Khan a very satisfactory agreement was signed, and I append, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the Resident Director's letter describing the negotiations and enclosing a copy of the agreement.

Dated the 8th October 1921.

Sir A. Wilson returned to Bushire from Bandar Rig and Genawah on the evening of the 7th October, and stayed two days preparatory to negotiating an agreement with the Kashkuli Khans. During this period certain telegrams were exchanged with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, copies of which are appended to complete the record. On the afternoon of the 9th, Sir Arnold Wilson left for Chihil Chasmah, a place near Dasht-i-Arjan, accompanied again by Mr. Clegg, to meet the Kashkuli Khans whose presence at this place for the purpose had been arranged by His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. The meeting took place on the 13th and 14th October. A very lengthy discussion took place, but in the end a very satisfactory agreement was made and signed. The only awkward point on which the Kashkuli

ENC. in INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NO 94M DATED 24th NOV.

Khans insisted was that they were unable to carry out any agreement if the Company did not assist them against the Soulat-ud-Dauleh *de facto* Ilkhani of the Kashgai tribe. It had been hoped that perhaps it would be possible to avoid this, but it soon became obvious that this was impossible, and it was arranged that Sir A. Wilson would meet Soulat immediately after X'mas with a view to coming to some arrangement with him, and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was asked to acquaint Soulat with this fact. I attach, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a note by His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and the Resident Director reporting the negotiations and enclosing a copy of the agreement.

No. 179, dated 15th October 1921, from His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, annexed.

It is very satisfactory that these agreements have been made with so little delay, and the Company has certainly gained in this respect by having the benefit of an experienced administrator and Political Officer like Sir A. Wilson to conduct the negotiations.

In anticipation of the agreement with Haidar Khan, Mr. Sharpe, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative at Bushire, had sent a large quantity of stores and material to Genawah, and work has already begun on the road. The Company hope to be able to commence work at Dasht-i-Qil early in the cold weather as soon as there is water there which will not be till after the first rain, which will, it is hoped, come before the end of November.

If this letter or any of the agreements and correspondence written is printed, I beg that I may be supplied with ten copies.

539 F&PD



List of enclosures.

1. Telegram No. 124-104, dated the 29th September 1921, from Minister, Tehran, to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, repeated to Resident, Bushire.

2. Telegram No. 177-1628, dated the 2nd October 1921, from Resident, Bushire, to Minister, Tehran, repeated Consul, Shiraz.

3. Telegram No. 1195, dated the 6th October 1921, from Consul, Shiraz, to Minister, Tehran, repeated Resident, Bushire.

4. Telegram No. 185-1702, dated the 7th October 1921, from Resident, Bushire, to Minister, Tehran, repeated Consul, Shiraz.

5. Telegram No. 186-1709, dated the 8th October 1921, from Resident, Bushire, to Minister, Tehran, repeated Consul, Shiraz.

6. Telegram No. 129-108, dated the 8th (received 10th) October 1921, from Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, to Consul, Shiraz, repeated Resident, Bushire.

7. Letter, dated the 8th October 1921, from Resident Director, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to Political Resident, Bushire, describing the negotiations with Haidar Khan.

8. Telegram No. 189-1720, dated the 9th October 1921, from Resident, Bushire, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, repeated Consul, Shiraz.

9. Telegram No. 133-113, dated the 14th October 1921, from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, to Consul, Shiraz, repeated Resident, Bushire.

10. Telegram No. 179-1249, dated the 15th October 1921, from Consul, Shiraz, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, repeated Resident, Bushire.

11. Letter, dated the 18th October 1921, from Resident Director, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to Resident, Bushire, forwarding copy of agreement between Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Kashkuli Khans together with sundry other documents, and an official report by His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and himself on the negotiations.





Enclosure 1.

Telegram P., No. 124-104, dated the 29th September 1921.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

(Repeated Bushire.)

My Oriental Secretary has received a letter through Sardar Fakher from Soulat-ud Dauleh declaring that mischief makers caused his misunderstandings with the British and that he is anxious to establish old friendly relations. The Soulat also authorised Sardar Fakher to add certain verbal messages. These were :—

(1) Soulat objects to appointment of Sardar Ihtisham at Kazerun where he is excellently placed to intrigue among Kashgais during winter.

(2) Soulat wants to withdraw his deposit with the Imperial Bank of Persia, but apparently would like to do so with our full approval.

(3) Soulat objects to your direct relations with Kashgai Khans especially in matter of oil exploration. He maintains that as Ilkhani he is only authority with which you and Company should negotiate.

(4) Generally he is anxious you should strengthen his position dealing with Kashgais through him alone.

(5) In return for our co-operation he undertakes to work loyally for Persian Government and in harmony with us.

Soulat is of course quite untrustworthy, but in view of Sardar Ihtisham's incompetence he is at present only possible Ilkhani. Pending therefore any future tribal arrangements we should support his authority as far as our own interests will allow. I am therefore disposed to acquiesce in his desire that we should stand aside and allow him and his partisans at Tehran to arrange removal of Sardar Ihtisham from Kazerun. I also consider we should let him have his deposit without further reserve.

In the Kashkulis we have a more delicate problem. What we have to consider is what will happen if we try to eliminate Soulat when making all arrangement for the exploitation of oil in their territory. Can he effectively interfere with the projects of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company or damage our interests generally by inciting his Ill to assume a hostile attitude towards us?

I shall be glad to learn your views by telegraph.

Enclosure 2.

Telegram P., No. 177-1628, dated the 2nd October 1921.

From—The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.)

The second point mentioned in your telegram to Shiraz, No. 124, as having been raised by Soulat is the only one on which I am in a position to comment, and as regards this I agree with view expressed in penultimate paragraph of Consul, Shiraz, despatch to you No. 11, dated the 25th July.

I fear that if the Soulat is ignored he will be able to make himself extremely unpleasant to Anglo-Persian Oil Company's party at Dasht-i-Qil, and interfere with the movements of survey parties desirous of examining the country between there and Kazerun.



Enclosure 3.

Telegram R., No. 1195, dated the 6th October 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,

To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Resident, Bushire.)

Priority.—Your telegram No. 124.

You should have since received my despatch 15 of September 18th with copies of correspondence explaining present relationship of Soulat to Kashkulis and unlikelihood of his being in a position to interfere in region where Company will work.

Negotiations were already far advanced before your telegram reached me. I have got all the Kashkuli Khans down to Dashtarjin with the Governor-General's assistance and Sir A. T. Wilson arrives there on October 14th personally to sign agreement for work to begin at once as is extremely important. Tax collector and henchman of Soulat is with them. I will reply separately to those other points of message to you but as regards negotiations with Company I submit that lines of your reply might be as follows:—

(1) He had not been titular Ilkhani for some three years past and is not now. In principle therefore he personally can no more claim to be consulted about such negotiations than for instance Ihtisham Ilkhani.

(2) It might be pointed out to him that as for five months yearly he resides near Isfahan for rest is far away in Eastern Fars and is never resident within 200 miles it would not be practical business for Company to make him responsible for opposition party.

(3) Director of Company has emphasized to this Consulate in writing that any payment made by Company (apart from royalty to Persian Government for concessionary rights) is to be *de facto* controlling authorities for protection. Soulat does not fill that position as neither he nor any of his family reside on the spot or for that matter are ever within 100 miles of it.

(4) Soulat is well aware that with the exception of one or two minor Kashkuli Khans all have been for a long time opposed to him will not trust themselves in his presence and he is unable to compel them to do so. Company might have to wait years before Khans would be prepared to assemble in Soulat's presence and agree to terms arranged between him and Company: while Khans would be certainly not agreeable to terms without their consent particularly if any payment for protection were to be made to Soulat by Company for distribution and money did not reach Khans. Such agreement would be useless to Company. Soulat might be further informed that Company do not intend altogether to ignore his special personal position though in this present agreement he is not directly concerned and it is hoped that, later on meeting may be arranged between him when in south with representative of Company with useful results to parties.

His Majesty's Consul-General, Bushire, telegraphs he is sending British Vice-Consul as representative of Consulate-General for meeting with Wilson. I will not proceed to meet them if you think it useful that by my staying away Soulat should not have that reason for complaint against me personally.

Perhaps also you will think my presence as second official representative undesirable.



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Enclosure 4.

Telegram R., No. 185-1702, dated the 7th October 1921.

From—The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Shiraz.)

Priority.—Shiraz telegram No. 172. Beg to request that action should not be taken on this nor reply sent to Soulat until I have had opportunity of discussing question with Sir Arnold Wilson, Resident Director of Company, who is expected to-morrow: I do not think section (3) expresses his views quite correctly as I think remarks in question referred solely to Kashkuli Khans and not to Soulat, as regards whom his view at recent meeting here was "that difficulty regarding Soulat could not be solved by ignoring it" but that "no means could at present be found for coming to an arrangement with him and that it was not desirable *at present* to do so."

Possibly in view of Soulat representations to Legation, and of the surveys in other parts of Kashgai country which I understand Company desire to make, Sir A Wilson may consider that time has arrived to try and make some arrangement.

It seems to me that Consul, Shiraz, as officer who deals almost exclusively with Kashgai affairs, ought certainly to be present at meeting especially as he has made all arrangement so far; I had proposed to send Clegg for other reasons which I am explaining to Chick, but will not now do so unless you agree with Chick that it would be better for him not to go.

Enclosure 5.

Telegram R., No. 186-1709, dated the 8th October 1921.

From—The Hon'ble the Political Resident in Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Shiraz.)

My telegram No. 185.

I have discussed question with Resident Director with following result. Resident Director suggests:—

(1) That reply to Soulat's agent by Minister should not refer to question of his status as Ilkhani.

(2) That reply should state Company far from wishing to ignore him hope to send representative to meet him in low country during cold weather and are confident that meanwhile he will do nothing which might impede their operations.

On general question my own view is that Soulat is for practical purposes *de facto* Ilkhani and Wilson still considers that sooner or later Company will have to make their peace with him and believes it possible to do so without offending Kashkulis. He will discuss this point later with Consul, Shiraz. His fear is that Soulat will himself constitute an opposition party unless he is dealt with separately by them.

Enclosure 6.

Telegram R., No. 129-198, dated the 8th October 1921.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

(Repeated Bushire.)

Bushire telegram No. 185, repeated to you.

I share Consul-General's view that you should obviously be present at meeting.



Enclosure 7.

Dated Bushire, the 8th October 1921.

From—Sir A. T. Wilson, Resident Director, Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited, Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited,

To—The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to enclose for your information an original copy of the agreement concluded on October 6th between the undersigned on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, and Sarkar Haidar Khan, C.I.E., with regard to im pending operations at Dasht-i-Qil, together with a rough translation. A revised and certified translation will be forwarded to you in due course.

2. I take this opportunity of thanking you for making available the services of Mr. S. Clegg and Agha Khalil their presence greatly facilitated the conclusion of the agreement.

3. For your information I beg to place on record the following observations:—

Paragraph 1.—The reference to Mohammad Khan was inserted at Haidar Khan's own request. Mohammad Khan himself was not present but the document was both signed and sealed by Haidar Khan on his behalf.

4. *Paragraph 3.*—It will be understood that the Company under this agreement is not liable to pay rent of any sort to Haidar Khan until oil is actually found in paying quantities and exported. The prices agreed on as rent and purchase price respectively are exceedingly liberal and could not be justified but for the fact that it is improbable that any considerable area will be required in Hayat Daud. The price quoted are practically identical with that paid to the Shaikh of Mohammerah as rent under the agreement of 16th July 1909.

5. The purchase price is based on ten years' rental. In view of the liberal price to be paid to the Zabit for waste land under this agreement and of the considerable revenue that should accrue indirectly to him from the operations of the Company he can neither now nor in the future have any claim to shares in the Company unless the policy of the Company in this matter should undergo radical alterations.

6. The reference to the Persian Government in paragraph 3 was a source of some anxiety to Haidar Khan but he finally consented to allow the clause to stand. His attitude was that he had never seen anything but evil from the Persian Government and he objected to any provision which might give them possible ground for interference in the territories under his control.

7. *Paragraph 7.*—The Khan expressed grave doubt as to his ability to render efficient protection to the Company in the case of concerted attacks on his territory by the Boir Ahmadi or the Darashuri tribes. I informed him verbally that he would not be strictly held to account in the event of *force majeure* being used against him to an extent beyond his reasonable power to resist, but I added that we looked to him to prevent such occurrences not merely by precautionary measure such as extra guards, but by the same diplomatic means as had enabled him to maintain his district in reasonable security for the past 20 years.

8. *Paragraph 8.*—Pay of guards was discussed at some length. The figures given are on the high side but as Haidar Khan pointed out every man employed as a guard is a man fewer at the plough, and able-bodied men can always command a good salary in the market at Basrah and elsewhere, and emigrate freely to earn their living.

I trust it will be possible to reduce food allowances next June. The number of horsemen required is likely to be quite small.

9. Haidar Khan attached great importance to the provision of arms by the Company on the ground that the arms in his possession were ineffective for the most part and ammunition was scarce.

10. It is his intention, and the proposal was welcomed by me, to employ his son, Allah Karam Khan in the combined capacity of Head of Guards and



Representative of the Zabit with the Company at Genawah. Allah Karam Khan talks English quite well, and is a person of considerable influence and ability and he is already on excellent terms with the Company's local representatives. If and when his appointment materialises it will probably be necessary to pay him from Tomans 100 to 150 per month, and the subsidy of the Company to Haidar Khan during the preliminary operations will, for practical purposes, be given in this form.

Translation.

An agreement entered into between Messrs Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited on the one part and hereinafter called "The Company" and Sarkar Haidar Khan, C.I.E., Zabit of Haiyat Daud and Kharag, on behalf of himself and his brother Muhammad Khan his heirs and successors and on behalf of all his tribesmen, hereinafter called "The Zabit." in respect of the privileges and lands required by the said Company in the territories of the former, for the purposes of their business under the exclusive rights of the concession granted to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy by the Imperial Government of Persia in the month of Safar 1319 equivalent to the month of May 1901.

Article 1.—The Company shall have the right to search for obtain and use water and to construct tramways, roads, paths, houses, sheds, bricks and reservoirs whether for their staff or for their work, to erect tanks, pumping stations, telegraph and telephone lines and all kinds of machinery to lay pipe lines and to carry out such construction work as they may deem necessary in any part of the said territory.

Article 2.—All lands required by the Company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil whether arable or non-arable in the territories of Hayat Daud together with an adequate supply of water so far as it is available shall be granted by the said Zabit to the Company free of charge, and without let of hindrance from any of his relatives, dependents or any of his tribesmen. And it is hereby agreed that, in consideration of the sums paid to the Zabit laid down in Article 3 any claim for compensation put forward by a third party in respect of such land shall be met by the said Zabit or his heirs and successors and that under no circumstances shall the Company be held liable to pay compensation for the same. The Company shall give the Zabit due notice of the areas of land which they may need to take up in any part of the said territory in connection with the oil works and the Zabit undertakes to hand over the same to the Company for the exclusive use of their works.

Article 3.—As soon as the Company has been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantity to justify the laying of a pipe-line and as soon as the said pipe-line has been completed and the oil is being exported thereby, the Company hereby undertake to rent or purchase at their option and the Zabit hereby undertakes to rent at the option of the Company whatever land may be required by the Company for their operation at the following rate :—

For every jarib of 1,000 square Zarhs, ten tomans per jarib for arable land and five tomans per jarib for non-arable land whether owned privately or belonging to the tribes or to sell at the rate of 100 tomans and 50 tomans per jarib respectively.

All lands acquired by the Company as above shall be the absolute property of the Company for the period of their concession or any extension or renewal therefrom and the Company shall have full proprietary rights over these lands. At the expiry of the concession or any extension thereof, all immovable property left *in situ* by the Company shall be handed to the Zabit or his heirs and successors in trust for the Persian Government, to whom such property reverts under the concession granted to Mr. D'Arcy by the Persian Government.

All lands rented or acquired by the Company under this agreement shall be measured in jaribs by the Company's Engineer the number of jaribs shall be fixed by them and demarcated on the ground by stone or gutch pillars. A map should be executed and copy sent to the Zabit. One copy should be



signed by the Company and retained by the Zabit, and the other copy should be signed and sealed by the Zabit and returned to the Company.

Article 4.—Should the Company desire to occupy land which is either inhabited or under cultivation they should give three months' notice to this effect to the Zabit whose duty shall be to remove the tenants within that period. The condition regarding the removal of the inhabitants shall apply to the embankments of tribes and their sub-divisions only but not to settle villages.

All tribal land acquired by the Company from the Zabit whether arable or non-arable and whether inhabited or uninhabited should be paid for in full to the Zabit and the latter must supply other land to the cultivators or pay them for the same. With regard to private property it is agreed that half the price thereof shall be paid to the owners of the land as certified by the Zabit and the other half shall be paid to the said Zabit The Zabit holds himself responsible for any further claim made by the owners of land acquired or rented by the Company under this Agreement.

Article 5.—The tribes and cultivators shall have no right to graze their flocks on any land acquired by the Company under this agreement or in temporary occupation for purposes of exploration and should they do so the Zabit undertakes to punish them. Should they transgress to Company's boundaries and should any of their flocks or cattle meet with an accident the Company shall not be held responsible.

Article 6.—The selection of sites for buildings, housing machinery and any other necessary works shall rest with the Company. The Company shall have the right to collect free from anywhere in the Zabit's territory whether within or without the area sold as above to them, all salt, sulphur stones, clay, wood, water whether from rivers or springs necessary for their work.

All houses, shops, etc., which the Company may deem necessary to build on the land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes and the Zabit or his representatives shall have no right to collect such taxes from any of the people so employed by the Company or otherwise permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

Article 7.—The Zabit undertakes to give all the protection in his power to the Company or to any of their staff or labourers in any part of their territory, from all thefts, highway robberies, assaults, etc.

Similarly, the Zabit undertakes to protect all houses, effects, stores, roads, pipe-lines, all kinds of machinery, and any of the Company's property or of its employees which may be exposed to wilful damage by townsmen, tribesmen or cultivators or to possible loss by theft.

Article 8.—For the above purposes it is agreed between the Zabit and the Company that the former shall appoint in consultation with them permanent trustworthy guards under a reliable man of good family, whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided by the Company and who shall remain there summer and winter. If in spite of the efforts of the said guards thefts should occur the Zabit undertakes to recover any property stolen and to compensate the Company for any damage sustained within his territories. In the event of non-recovery of stolen property the value thereof shall be deducted by the Company from the sums due to the Zabit.

The number of guards required in any district where the Company may operate shall be fixed by the Company's representative. Their salaries will be paid monthly in arrears by the Company on the following scale :—Eight tomans per mensem of the solar calendar without food for unmounted guards and ten tomans without food or fodder for mounted guards. Two tomans food allowance shall be given for each man until the next harvest and ten tomans for each horse for fodder, etc.

These allowances to be subject to monthly revision in communication with the said Zabit monthly thereafter.

The Company shall provide arms and ammunition for these guards and the said Zabit shall be responsible for their safe custody by the said guards.

Two or three head guards shall be appointed for places of importance to be guarded at twelve tomans per month.



The salary of the head of the guards shall be fixed from time to time by the Company in communication with the Zabit and the Company shall erect a dwelling at Genawah for the representative of the Zabit.

Article 9.—The engagement of watchmen by the Company shall be confined to such persons only as are approved of by the head of the guards who will be appointed by the Zabit in consultation with the Company. The said watchmen are subject to dismissal or fine by the Company. In the event of any heavier punishment being required the offender shall be handed over to the Zabit and the Zabit undertakes that punishment shall be inflicted and to use his utmost endeavours to uphold the authority of the Company's representative on account of their employees, thereby avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this contract.

Article 10.—It shall be the duty of the above-mentioned head of the guards to keep order in the areas in which the Company may operate, but he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes amongst the Company's native employees unless asked by the Company to do so.

Article 11.—This contract shall remain in force for any period that the Company retain their concession with the Persian Government and for the period of any extension or renewal thereof or any less period during which the Company may desire to work in the Zabit's territories.

Article 12.—In the event of the Company failing to discover oil or if oil should be discovered in such small quantities as to be unworkable and the Company desires to stop work on the Zabit's territory, they shall have the right to do so and the Zabit shall have no claim to the above payment. Due notice of the cessation of work shall be given by the Company to the Zabit, whose guarantee of protection shall cease on the removal of the Company's Staff and movable property from the Zabit's territory.

Article 13.—The Zabit solemnly declares that he will carry out all the conditions of this contract faithfully and loyally and that he or his heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept full responsibility for any claim by any person in his or their territory questioning the validity of any of the stipulations in this contract.

In the event of any difference arising between the Company and the Zabit, whether in respect of the meaning of any of the foregoing articles or otherwise, such matters shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties. Failing a friendly settlement, the points in dispute shall be referred to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to arbitrate and to settle them, and his decision shall be accepted as final by both parties. This agreement, however, cannot be cancelled except as provided above.

Dated this 4th day of Safar 1329 equivalent to the 6th day of October 1921.

(In Persian)

HAIDAR KHAN HAYAT DAUDI.

MUHAMMAD KHAN HAYAT DAUDI.

For Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited.
Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited.

A. T. WILSON,
Resident Director.

Witnesses.

S. CLEGG,
British Vice-Consul, Bushire.

M. KHALIL,
Chief Dragoman to Residency.

Enclosure 8.

Telegram R., No. 189-1720, dated the 9th October 1921.

From—The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Shiraz.)

My telegram No. 186.

Satisfactory agreement has been concluded between Haidar Khan of Hayat Daud and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for land guards, etc., required for their base at Genawah and the road to Dasht-i-Qil area.

Enclosure 9.

Telegram P., No. 133-113, dated the 14th October 1921.

From—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

(Repeated Bushire.)

With reference to Shiraz telegram 177.

Soulat's representative has been informed verbally in the following sense :—

We desire to refrain from interfering at all in the question of the Kazerun Governorship, but in Soulat's own interests we would suggest that he should try to arrive at some definite arrangement with Sirdar Ehtesham so as to preclude possibility of fraternal conflict.

Deposit and interest will be handed over to Soulat's nominee by Consul, Shiraz.

Practical difficulties of avoiding direct relations with Kashkulis were explained in sense of your telegram 172 and 163 (?) but assurance was given that Oil Company do not intend to ignore Soulat's special position and that they hope a meeting may be arranged between him and their representative with useful results to both parties. Meanwhile Company hope that Soulat will do nothing to impede their operations.

Limit of your relations with Khans of other clans explained in sense indicated by you, your offered assistance in regard to Maliyat was rejected by the representative of Soulat on the ground that such intervention would amount to the Kashkulis becoming an appendage of the Consulate.

It was also suggested that a meeting should be arranged between you and Soulat with a view to discussing matters in a non-contentious spirit.

Enclosure 10.

Telegram R., No. 179-1249, dated (and received) the 15th October 1921.

From—His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz,
To—His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

(Repeated Bushire.)

Priority.—Just returned from meeting with Wilson and Kashkuli Khans whole family of whom were present with three exceptions represented by deputies. Agreement signed and very satisfactory.

Secret.—Only important point made by them was that Company should assist them in avoiding action of resentment of Soulat. Wilson promised them to visit Soulat immediately after Christmas, and wrote letter asking latter to fix place of meeting when he intends explaining reasons why Company could not make Soulat party to agreement proposed he will then offer to



make a grant at once on principle that Soulat should keep hands off Khans, *i.e.*, no imposition of fines or plunder them and to deal with him in event of working other parts of Kashgai country.

Enclosure 11.

Dated the 18th October 1921.

From—Sir A. T. Wilson, Resident Director, Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited, Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited,

To—{ The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire (2 copies).
His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz (2 copies).

I have the honour to enclose copies as per attached list of documents relating to the agreement signed on October 14th last between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, and the Kashkuli Khans.

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

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

List of Enclosures.

1. Translation of agreement with Kashkuli Khans, dated 14th October 1921.
2. Translation of letter from Sir A. T. Wilson to Fathullah Khan Kashkuli, Kalantar, dated 14th October 1921.
3. Letter, dated 14th October 1921, from Sir A. T. Wilson to Lieutenant Amrullah Khan Kashkuli.
4. Translation of letter, dated 18th October 1921, from Sir A. T. Wilson to Soulat-ud-Dauleh.
5. Official record signed by His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and Sir A. T. Wilson of proceedings leading up to signature of Kashkuli agreement.
6. Brief diary of movements of Sir A. T. Wilson from October 9th to October 16th.





Enclosure 1.

Translation.

An agreement was entered into as follows between Messrs the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited, on the one part hereinafter called the Company and (1) Abul Fath Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Abul Hasan Khan Kashkuli, to include the descendants of Akbar Beg and Askar Beg Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(2) Hasi Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Haji Muhammad Karim Khan Kashkuli, to include Hasan Quli Beg and all his descendants and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(3) Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Kazim Beg Kashkuli and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(4) Ilyas Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Ali Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(5) Fathullah Khan Kashkuli on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Haidar Ali Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants.

(6) Muhammad Quli Khan on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Hasan Khan Kashkuli and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants hereinafter called the Kashkuli Khans, in respect of the privileges required by the said Company throughout the whole extent of the territories in occupation of the Kashkuli tribe in their winter quarters, for the purposes of the Company's business under the concession which they hold from the Persian Government.

Article 1.—The Company shall have the right to drill for oil and for water and to make all investigations necessary for the purpose of their business in all parts of the said territories and to construct and erect tramways roads buildings machinery and telegraph apparatus of all kinds in any part of the said territories so far as may be necessary for the purposes of their business.

The Company shall have the right to collect and use free anywhere in the said territories stone gach salt sulphur clay wood and water whether from rivers or springs for the purposes of their work.

The selection of routes and sites for such work shall rest with the Company.

Article 2.—All lands whatever required by the Company for the purpose of their preliminary exploration for oil including all or any natural springs of oil in the said territories together with an adequate supply of water so far as available shall be granted by the said Kashkuli Khans to the Company free of charge and without let or hindrance from any of their relatives or dependants or any of their tribesmen or of third parties. And it is hereby agreed that in consideration of the sums to be paid to the Kashkuli Khans under Articles 8 and 9 any claim for compensation reward or subsidy put forward by a third party in respect of such land or of the protection to be rendered to the Company by the Kashkuli Khans shall be met by the said Khans or their heirs and successors and that under no circumstances shall the Company be made to pay compensation for the same. If the Company finds itself obliged to pay other parties in order to ensure the safety of their work the amount paid may be deducted by the Company at their option from the amount due to the Kashkuli Khans.

Article 3.—As soon as the Company have been successful in finding oil in sufficient quantities to justify the laying of a pipe line and as soon as oil is being exported thereby the Company hereby undertake to purchase and the Kashkuli Khans hereby undertake to sell whatever land may be required by the Company for their operations at the following rates: for every square of 100 yards on each side ten tomans for arable land and five tomans for non-arable land.



Land so acquired shall be the absolute property of the Company for the period of their agreement and the Company shall have full proprietary rights therein.

Article 4.—No one shall have any right to graze flocks on land so acquired or in temporary occupation of the Company for the purpose of exploration and should they do so the Kashkuli Khans undertake to punish them. Should anyone transgress the Company's boundaries and should they or any of their flocks meet with an accident (which God forbid) the Company shall not be responsible.

Article 5.—All houses shops etc. which the Company may build on land sold as above or temporarily occupied shall be free of all local taxes and the Kashkuli Khans or their representatives shall have no right to collect taxes from any of the people employed by the Company or temporarily permitted to settle on the land in their possession.

Article 6.—The Kashkuli Khans undertake to give all the protection in their power to the Company and to their staff and labourers in any part of their territory from thefts highway robbery assault etc.

Similarly the Kashkuli Khans undertake to protect all the property of the Company and of its employees which may be exposed to wilful damage or to possible loss of theft.

Article 7.—For the above purpose it is further agreed that the Company shall appoint permanent trustworthy guards to the number of 30 at present to be increased as necessary at the option of the Company, under a reliable man of good family whose pay and that of the guards shall be provided by the Company and who shall remain there summer and winter.

If in spite of the efforts of the said guards thefts should occur the Kashkuli Khans undertake to recover the property stolen and to compensate the Company for any damage sustained in their territory. In the event of non-recovery of the stolen property the value thereof shall be deducted by the Company from the sums due to the Khans.

The number of guards at any place where the Company may operate shall be fixed by the Company.

It shall be the duty of the above-mentioned head of the guard to keep order in the areas in his charge to such extent as the Company may order him he shall have no right to interfere in any disputes among the Company's servants unless asked by the Company to do so.

In case of misconduct the said guards are subject to dismissal or fine by the Company. In the event of any heavier punishment being needed the offender shall be handed over to the representative of the Kashkuli Khans and the Kashkuli Khans undertake that punishment shall be inflicted and to use their utmost endeavours to uphold the authority of the Company's employees thereby avoiding unnecessary troubles to both parties of this contract.

Article 8.—Until oil is exported by the pipe line from the said territories the Company shall pay to the Kashkuli Khans the sum of 10,000 tomans per annum payable half-yearly from 21st March next in arrears in equal proportions to the signatories of this agreement.

The division amongst their relations of the sums paid as above to the six signatories is their own concern and does not affect the Company.

But it is to be noted that Hadi Khan has agreed to pay 250 tomans annually from his own share and that of his section to Hasan Quli Beg, and also that Abul Fath Khan has agreed to pay 250 tomans annually from his own share and that of his section to Hamza Beg.

And it is hereby agreed, with the consent of all the Kashkuli Khans, that in addition to the sums payable as above, the Company shall pay—

(1) to Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli, on behalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Kazim Beg Kashkuli and all their tribesmen and dependants, the sum of 334 tomans annually in order that their share may be brought to a total of 2,000 tomans annually; and

(2) to Muhammad Quli Khan Kashkuli, on bahalf of himself and all the descendants of the late Muhammad Hasan Khan Kashkuli



and all their heirs and successors and all their tribesmen and dependants, the sum of 334 tomans annually, in order that their share may be brought to a total of 2,000 tomans annually.

Article 9.—Should the Company succeed in finding oil in paying quantities in the said territories and as soon as oil is exported by the pipe-line the Company agree to pay to the Kashkuli Khans a further sum of 10,000 tomans annually making a total of 20,000 tomans annually, divisible amongst the said Khans in the same way as above.

Whenever the Company decide to issue shares to the Kashkuli Khans in any new Company or Companies which may be formed for the extraction of oil in the said territories, the said Khans shall be granted three shares every hundred shares issued by such Company or Companies. These shares will be issued in the name of the Kashkuli Khans and the dividends that may thereafter be declared annually by the said Company or Companies shall be divided equally amongst the said Khans.

The above shares shall be paid by the Company to the Kashkuli Khans in return for the protection and assistance they have undertaken to provide for the Company's staff and work, on condition that they have in fact provided it, but it is hereby agreed that the said amount of 20,000 tomans shall cease to be paid after the first declaration of a dividend on the shares.

The Kashkuli Khans hereby undertake not to sell mortgage transfer or otherwise dispose of such shares, if issued, and in order that such shares may permanently remain in the Kashkuli Khans' family they hereby agree to deposit the script with the Company against a receipt for the same.

Article 10.—In the event of the Company failing to discover oil in sufficient quantity they shall have the right to stop work at their option and the Kashkuli Khans shall have no claim to any of the above payments.

Article 11.—The Kaskuli Khans solemnly declare that they will carry out all the conditions of this contract willingly and faithfully and that they and their heirs and successors shall be its guarantors and shall accept full responsibility for any claim or dispute by any person whether in their territory or beyond it questioning the validity of any stipulations on this contract.

This contract cannot be cancelled except as provided as above and shall remain in force for the period of the Company's concession from Persian Government or any extension or renewal thereof.

In the event of any difference arising between the Company and the Kashkuli Khans it shall be settled in an unofficial and friendly manner between the two parties; failing a friendly settlement the dispute shall be referred to one of His Majesty's Consular officers for arbitration and his decision shall be accepted as final.

Signed at Chihil Chasmah on this 22nd day of Mizan, 1300 Takhakui-il equivalent to ~~11th September~~ 14th October 1340./1921

For Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited,
Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited,

A. T. WILSON,
Resident Director.

The 14th October 1921.

Witnessed by several minor chiefs and Kadkhudas.

ABUL FATH KHAN.
HADI KHAN.
GHULAM HUSAIN KHAN.
ILYAS KHAN.
FATHULLAH KHAN.
MUHAMMAD QULI KHAN.

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

Enclosure 2.

Translation of a letter from Resident Director, Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited, Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, to Fathullah Khan, Kalantar of the Kashkuli tribes.

It is hereby agreed that in consideration of the special services to be rendered by Fathullah Khan Kalantar and of any future Kalantar for the time being the sum of 500 tomans shall be paid by the Company in two instalments on the 1st Nauruz and on the 1st Mizan.

Enclosure 3.

Letter of Appointment.

To

Amrullah Khan,
Kashkuli.

1. You are hereby appointed to be Head of the Kashkuli Guards in the areas in which Messrs. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, propose to work in the Kashkuli country.

2. Your salary will be fixed at Tomans 40 per month *plus* Tomans 25 in lieu of all allowances from 1st October 1921.

3. The salary of your men will be as follows :—

From 1st October or from date of engagement, whichever is latter— Tomans 8 for each month of the solar calendar for each unmounted man.

Tomans 10 for each month of the solar calendar, without food or fodder, for each mounted man.

In addition to this for the present the sum of Tomans 2 will be given to each unmounted man as food allowance and in addition Tomans 10 to each mounted man for fodder and unkeep of his horse.

These latter sums will be subject to alteration according to the price of food at the next harvest.

4. Amongst every ten men under your command one man may be appointed as a Vakil and he shall receive Tomans 2 per month extra. The appointment of these Vakils up to the number specified will be at your discretion.

5. Horses, rifles, ammunition, uniform and equipment will be provided by the Company for the present and you will be in every way responsible for their safe custody and maintenance in good condition, but it will be open to the Company in a year's time to call upon you to make your own arrangements for uniform, equipment and horses.

6. The Company rely upon you to use your utmost endeavours to give effect to the terms of the Agreement between themselves and the Kashkuli Khans and to assist the Agents of the Company in every way possible in their work to promote order and good feeling amongst their employees. You will not, normally be required to move outside Kashkuli territory, but should you be required to do soneither you nor any of your men will have the right to make any additional demand upon the Company.

7. The period of your Agreement with the Company is for one year, renewable at the option of either side.



Enclosure 4.

Translation of letter, dated 18th October 1921, from Resident Director, Messrs. Strick Scott and Company, Limited, Managing Agents, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, to Soulat-ud-Daulah.

After compliments.—With reference to the message which was communicated on your behalf to His Majesty's Legation through Sardar Fakhar, I take this opportunity of confirming the reply which I requested His Majesty's Minister through the Residency at Bushire to send, so far as the interests of this Company were concerned, namely, that far from wishing to ignore the position which you occupy in the province of Fars, I hoped before long to meet you in person.

Owing to the fact that you have until now been in the high country I have been unable to do so, but when you are in the low country I shall hope to have the pleasure of meeting you with a view to negotiations.

Please write to me through the Sheikh of Mohammerah informing me of your whereabouts and of the date that would be convenient for a meeting. In the meanwhile I look confidentially to you to avoid any action which might be inimical to the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in their work in the Kashkuli country so that subsequent negotiations between us may not be impeded.

I understand that there are springs of oil at Naujain and elsewhere in your neighbourhood and I shall hope to investigate them at the same time.

Enclosure 5.

Official record of proceedings leading up to signature of agreement dated 14th October 1921 between the Kashkuli Khans and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited.

1. The first meeting took place on the afternoon of October 12th and was of a preliminary nature only. On the afternoon of October 13th, representative Khans of all families having arrived, the agreement was drafted in Persian.

2. The method of division was explained to Hadi Khan who has from the beginning been the strongest supporter of the Company and in fact induced the other Khans to collect for this conference. Hadi Khan represented that in deference to our wishes he would agree to forfeit a sum of 250 tomans in favour of Hasan Quli Beg hoping that by so doing Abul Fath Khan would agree to forfeit a similar sum to Hamza Beg.

The object of this was to meet the views of Sir A. T. Wilson, who was anxious to have as few parties as possible, not more than six, to deal with both now and subsequently.

3. The principal point made by the Khans during the conversation was the enmity of Soulat-ud-Dauleh which they feared they would incur in a more violent form than previously owing to their having ignored him in signing the agreement with us. They made it clear, however, that they by no means wished, and could not consent, to see him a party to the contract. Their view was that it was incumbent on the Company and on His Majesty's Government to shield them so far as possible from the consequences of having, at the desire of His Majesty's Government and of the Company, concluded this agreement. After discussion between His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and Sir A. T. Wilson it was decided that when the latter met Soulat-ud-Dauleh he would explain to the latter the reasons why we were unable to make him a party of the agreement, namely, that he was not in a position to protect the Company at Dasht-i-Qil nor to offer them assistance there he would further represent to him that the Company would possibly desire to explore for oil in other parts of the Qashgai country (*e.g.*, Naujain near Jireh) when they would be glad to seek his assistance and to pay for it and further subject of the approval of the Board of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that provided he

would keep his hands off the Kashkulis in the sense of not imposing fines on them or plundering section of the tribe, Sir A. T. Wilson would be prepared to make some payment to him at once.

Should he reject such an offer the Company in consultation with His Majesty's Representatives would invoke other agencies to neutralize his activities.

On hearing that Sir A. T. Wilson intended to deal direct with the Soulat and hoped to settle him with silver rather than with leaden billets (which they said was their affair) they appeared satisfied and did not again revert to the question. On the morning of the 14th, all the Khans of the clan, with the exception of Saharigir Khan (represented by his uncle Muhammad Quli Khan) and Isfandiar Khan (represented by his brother Ardashir Khan) sat to hear the terms of the draft agreement: the subsequent discussion, with a brief interlude for lunch, lasted until about 4 o'clock. Eventually all clauses were accepted practically as drafted with the following exceptions :—

(1) the price per unit to be paid for non-arabal land was raised from 2 tomans, at which figure Sir A. T. Wilson commenced negotiations, to 5 tomans on the understanding that as in the case of the later Bakhtiari agreement, superficies required for roads was to be free and not to be reckoned in measurements for acquisition purposes ;

(2) the usual clause regarding reversion of property to Persian Government at expiry of concession was omitted in deference to reluctance of Khans to agree to any excuse for the intervention of the Central Government in their affairs ;

(3) *Hadi Khan's position.*—Before the meeting Hadi Khan represented that it was entirely due to his own efforts than the meeting had come off at all, and that in the future the Company would need his co-operation, as the only businessman amongst the Khans, whose affairs were in chronic disorder, to ensure the smooth working and due execution of the agreement : on these grounds he claimed special treatment, apart from the equal shares given to him and others. His representations had the support of His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

It was pointed out to him that if any mention of this were made in the agreement, or were to become known in any form, it might raise jealousies which would greatly embarrass the Company. Sir A. T. Wilson eventually promised him an annual payment of 500 tomans to be made secretly, without written agreement or receipt, conditional on the agreement going through, and on Hadi Khan's continuing to prove of material assistance to the Company. This was gratefully accepted by Hadi Khan.

(4) *Equal division of monies.*—After the agreement had been read through twice and the meeting had adjourned for lunch or was found that Ghulam Husain Khan (with him Ardashir Khan) and Muhammad Quli Khan were objecting to a division into six parts and wanted a division into five parts instead of six parts, to which the other four families were perfectly agreeable. Their point of view was that there should be one share for each of the five surviving sons of Qasim Khan who left issue. As there seemed likely to serious ill-feeling and dissension over this matter, and as the whole difference between the amounts due to Ghulam Husain Khan and Muhammad Quli Khan under the two schemes was 334 tomans a year each, Sir A. T. Wilson agreed, at the suggestion of His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, that the Company should increase the total annual subsidy from 10,000 tomans to 10,668 tomans a year.

(5) *Fathullah Khan's position.*—Though at first all parties seemed to agree to this solution, Fathullah Khan (carrying with him Ilyas Khan) took umbrage at an arrangement whereby two families the number of whose followers was negligible, and whose



power to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in consequence practically *nil*, would receive more than he himself or than Ilyas Khan; these two Khans as Fathullah Khan correctly pointed out, would have to bear the brunt of all responsibilities under the agreement and they share 90 per cent. of the tribe between them.

Moreover Fathullah Khan is at present official Kalantar, *viz.*, head of the clan for the time being.

He was persuaded with some difficulty to return to the meeting (which he had left abruptly) to explain his grievances, when His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, proposed and Sir A. T. Wilson agreed, that the Company should separately remunerate the Kalantars who would be the official representative of the Khans and have most of the work to do.

Sir A. T. Wilson offered him 500 tomans annually: Fathullah Khan having been finally and at great length assured that his personal share was 1,666 and not 1,000 tomans as it would have been under the five parts scheme, expressed himself fully satisfied and indeed grateful and Sir A. T. Wilson confirmed the arrangement by a separate letter.

4. Three copies of the agreement were then signed, one copy being retained by the Khans, one by Sir A. T. Wilson and one copy handed to His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, for record in his archives. A number of minor chiefs and heads of "tribes" or tribal sub-divisions signed the agreement in the margin as concentery witnesses.

5. *General Notes.*—(*a*) The total sum thus payable to the Khans (including Hadi Khan's recent subsidy) is 11,668 tomans, which is somewhat less than the total figure of 12,000 tomans to which Sir A. T. Wilson was prepared to commit the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(*b*) The Khans were shown printed copies of the Bakhtiari and Pusht-i-Kuh agreements: they appeared generally well acquainted with the provisions of the former documents, Abul Fath Khan having apparently taken the advice of the Bakhtiari Khans on the question last year. All the Kashkuli Khans were thus satisfied that they were being dealt with on the same lines as the Bakhtiari.

(*c*) The agreement is advantageous to the Khans, in that they draw a minimum oi 20,000 tomnas as soon as the pipe line is in use, as compared with £3,000 under the Bakhtiari agreement.

(*d*) It is favourable to the Company in that the latter are under no obligation immediately on finding adequate oil to float a new Company, though the Khans naturally expect a share in profits in due course.

(*e*) It is favourable to the Company in that the unit of measurement for acquisition is somewhat more liberal than under the latest Bakhtiari land agreement; on the other hand it must be borne in mind that the Company acquired the great bulk of their lands in the Bakhtiari country under the 1911 agreement, and that the enhanced rates now current only apply to acquisitions during or after 1921.

6. Mullah Ali Baba Begdili, on the recommendations of His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, was given a cash present of 100 tomans. This man is the head clerk and confidential adviser to Fathullah Khan and Ilyas Khan, and is likely to be a useful man to the Company both now and hereafter, and is worth conciliating.

7. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and Sir A. T. Wilson laid much stress on the importance of unity amongst the Kashkuli Khans and all branches of the tribes and their remarks will, it is to be hoped, in conjunction with this agreement, bear fruit.

8. The Khans made a point of asking that as far as possible Kashkuli labour should be used in Kashkuli territory in preference to outsiders. Sir A. T. Wilson promised that this should be arranged as far as possible.

9. The Khans urged the importance of starting a bazar at Mishun which would become a centre for tribal purchases and sales. Sir A. T. Wilson promised to co-operate: he added that should the Khans wish to build a bazar

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themselves the Company would not wish to compete with them and would welcome any measures calculated to bring population to the fields and prosperity to the tribes, *e.g.*, by encouraging the tribes to bring in charcoal, etc., for sale: the Company would further give facilities so far as possible for the despatch of tribal goods to outside markets *viâ* Genawah by native merchants.

10. It was explained to the Khans in reply to these enquiries that should minerals other than those enumerated in the agreement be found, their exploitation would be a matter for separate arrangement, and that in the case of sulphur, etc., the Company only claimed the right under the agreement to mine what was actually needed for the operation of the Company in Persia.

11. Lieutenant Amrullah Khan Kashkuli, late of the South Persia Rifles, 2nd Cavalry, was given a letter of appointment as head of the guards at Dasht-i-Qil in which his pay and that of his men was laid down and the Khans made no objection to his being given this appointment.

12. After the meeting Abul Fath Khan referred to the deduction from Hadi Khan's share and from his own on account of Hasan Quli Beg and Hamza Beg saying that Hasan Quli Beg in particular was capable of giving the Company considerable assistance and that theoretically both Hasan Quli Beg and Hamza Beg were entitled to more than they had been allotted. Abul Fath Khan's object in making this representation was that the Company should relieve him (and Hadi Khan) of their financial obligation in regard to these two men. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, said that the agreement could not now be altered but that if the Company should find Hasan Quli Beg could and did do useful work and if he remained at their request in the vicinity of the fields during the summer as Abul Fath Khan suggested, they would consider the possibility of giving him some remuneration.

13. Abul Fath Khan endeavoured to obtain a cash present for Mirza Farajullah his confidential clerk who was not in fact present. It was suggested to him that he should revert to the question when the Resident Director visited Dasht-i-Qil.

14. After dinner just before the Resident Director left Chihil Chasmah for Dashtarjin the Khans succeeded in obtaining from the Resident Director, with the concurrence of His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, three months' advance of subsidy.

These were made by draft on the Imperial Bank of Persia, Shiraz, as follows:—

	Krans.
Abul Fath Khan Kashkuli	4,165
Hadi " "	4,165
Fathullah " "	4,165
Ilyas " "	4,165
Ghulam Husain Khan Kashkuli	5,000
Muhammad Quli Khan Kashkuli	5,000
Kalantar of Fathullah Khan Kashkuli	1,250
Total	27,910

CHIHIL CHASMAH;
The 14th October 1921.

H. G. CHICK.
A. T. WILSON.



Enclosure 6.

Brief diary of movements of Resident Director from October 9th to 16th.

October 9th.—Left Bushire accompanied by Mr. S. Clegg by Ford Car 4 P.M., October 9th : arrived at Borazjun 7 P.M., met Ghazanfar-es-Saltanah who requested Sir A. T. Wilson to intervene on his behalf with His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, and was most profuse in expression of friendship.

October 10th.—Left Borazjun 6 A.M , arrive Rudak 10 A.M. Found no horses or mules ready so walked to Kamarji about 1½ hours up the pass and borrowed horses from Quli Khan to Kahdar (2 hours) where Ford Venette awaited us kindly supplied by Captain Villiers Stuart, Officer Commanding, South Persia Rifles, Kazerun. Went by cart to Kazerun (½ hour) and spent night there with Officer Commanding, South Persia Rifles. Baggage arrived by night.

October 11th.—Left Kazerun 7-30 A.M., arrived Pul-i-Abgineh with kit and servants 8-30 by Ford Vanette : fresh mules and horses kindly supplied by Officer Commanding, South Persia Rifles, Kezerun, awaited us here. Arrived Dashtarjin 6 P.M., very well received by local people everywhere.

October 12th.—Left Dashtarjin 10 A.M. for Bineh Safid half way to Khaneh Zinian and awaited arrival of His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz's party, who appeared about midday, proceeded with them to Chihil Chasmah ½ hour's distance where camp was pitched. Introductory conversation with Khans during afternoon and evening. Frost at night.

October 13th.—Conversations with Khan. Water in mug under bed in tent frozen solid.

October 14th.—Negotiations with Khans culminating in signature of agreement about 4 P.M. Mr. Clegg at once left with baggage for Dashtarjin. Sir A. T. Wilson followed at 8-30 P.M.

October 15th.—Left 6-30 A.M. for Kazerun, arriving 3-30 P.M.

October 16th. —Left 6 A.M. by Ford Venette for Rahdar, arriving 7 A.M. rode to Rudak arriving 10 A.M. Left in Ford Car 11 A.M., arriving Bushire 6 P.M.

A. T. WILSON.

BUSHIRE ;

The 18th October 1921.

SGPI, Delhi—539,S) F&PD—16-11-21—34.





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

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

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

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