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<b>Reference</b>	IOR/L/PS/10/524
<b>Title</b>	'File 53/1915 Pt 2 German War: Turkey; the Caliphate and Pan-Arab movement'
<b>Date(s)</b>	1915-1916 (CE, Gregorian)
<b>Written in</b>	English in Latin
<b>Extent and Format</b>	1 volume (218 folios)
<b>Holding Institution</b>	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
<b>Copyright for document</b>	<a href="#">Public Domain</a>


#### About this record


The volume comprises telegrams, despatches, correspondence, memoranda, and notes, relating to the war with Germany and Turkey and implications for the Caliphate and the pan-Arab movement. The discussion in the volume relates specifically to the view of the Government of India on Sir Henry Arthur McMahon's correspondence and negotiations with Ḥusayn bin 'Alī al-Hāshimī, Grand Sharif of Mecca. Also included are the views of Colonel Sir Tatton Benvenuto Mark Sykes.


The volume includes the text of the Grand Sharif's letter and the text of Sir Henry McMahon's reply. Further discussion surrounds the advance on Baghdad, the protection of Muslim shrines and the deferment of any public pronouncement until the city had been captured by British forces.

The principal correspondents in the volume include: the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey); the Secretary of State for India; the Grand Sharif of Mecca (Ḥusayn bin 'Alī al-Hāshimī) and the Viceroy (Charles Hardinge).

The volume includes a divider which gives the subject and part numbers, the year the subject file was opened, subject headings, and a list of correspondence references contained in that part by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.

























Previous File  
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.  
53  
1915.

Subject:  
German War - Turkey  
The Khalifate  
and Pan-Arab movement


This File contains the following papers :-


YEAR.												
1915.	P.	4068	4068	4082	4095	4118	4151	4170	4171	4220	4223	
		4226	4243	4259	4262	4290	4299	4312	4354	4380	4387	
191	P.	4388	4414	4415	4413	4419	4501	4673	4745	4785	4786	4800
1916.	P.	131										
191	P.											


Memoranda.

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

19488. I. 1251. 350.—10/1915.









MINUTES.

Mr Robertes,

Would you please look into this?

*h.w.h.*  
18/1/16

Mr Oliphant,

The pencil minute at the end of the draft "Repeat to India" is ~~not~~<sup>perhaps</sup> in the hand writing of someone in the India Office? I rather fancy it must be.


The man who cyphered the telegram in question has no recollection whether the pencil minute was there or not when he did it, but the inference is that it was, as it appears on the manifolded copies.

I regret therefore that we must accept responsibility for the lache, the only consolation being that they do not occur oftener.


M.W.L.  
24.1.16.

Dear Hirtzel. We are sorry  
The words were not  
cyphered: and we can  
only grieve that the Government  
of India may no longer  
love us. L.O., 24 Jan

2-q.) Wt. 40797-11. 5000. 2/15. D & S.  
2-u.) " 20564-113. 2000. 10/15. "







In reply please quote :—

P. 131.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

INDIA OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.,

15th January 1916.

My dear Oliphant,


Please see enclosed copy of a letter from  
the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

The words "repeat to India" appear in the  
copy of Foreign Office telegram to Cairo No. 874  
dated 11th November as furnished to us. Possibly by  
some mischance they were not cyphered?

Yours sincerely.

*A. H. ...*

L. Oliphant, Esq.





Confidential.

Foreign and Political Department,  
Delhi.

16th December 1915.

My dear Hirtzel,

Will you kindly refer to the telegram from the London Foreign Office to the High Commissioner, Egypt, No.874, dated the 11th November 1915, a copy of which was sent to the Government of India with your weekly letter, No.46 dated the 12th November 1915. The message in question deals with the Arab negotiations.


From the copy received here it appears that the High Commissioner was instructed to "repeat to India". Sir H. McMahon in reply to an enquiry states that he received no injunction to repeat the message to us.


The telegram was of great importance and to prevent further misunderstandings we should be grateful if the matter could be cleared up.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) A.H.Grant.

Sir Arthur Hirtzel, K.C.B.,  
Secretary, Political Department,  
India Office,  
London.





Put away with  $\frac{53}{15}$

$\frac{131}{16}$

L. Shiphant &  
Co.

15 JAN 1916

My dear Shiphant,


Here is enclosed copy  
of a letter from the Foreign Secy to  
the S. & J.


The words "refer to India" appear  
in the copy of T.O. tel<sup>m</sup> to Cairo  
n<sup>o</sup>: 874 of 11<sup>th</sup> Nov. as furnished to us.  
Possibly by some mischance they were  
not cyphered?

Yrs. sincerely

AH  
14/1/16

(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel.





Confidential.



P  
131  
1916

DELHI. 9

The 16<sup>th</sup> December 1915.

My dear Hirtzel,

Will you kindly refer to the telegram from the London Foreign Office to the High Commissioner, Egypt, No. 874, dated the 11th November 1915, a copy of which was sent to the Government of India with your weekly letter, No. 46 dated the 12th November 1915. The message in question deals with the Arab negotiations.

From the copy received here it appears that the High Commissioner was instructed to "repeat to India". Sir H. McMahon in reply to an enquiry states that he received no injunction to repeat the message to us.

The telegram was of great importance and to prevent further misunderstandings we should be grateful if the matter could be cleared up.


Yours sincerely,

*A H Grant.*

To

Sir Arthur Hirtzel, K.C.B.,  
Secretary, Political Department,  
India Office,  
London.









10

Put away with 53

Register No.  
 4800

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from FO Dated 29 } December 1915  
 Rec. 30 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	30 Dec.	AK	Arabia  Sent of Sir A. McMahon's reply to Grand Sheriff
Secretary of State.....	30	T.W.H	
Committee /.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to *India* Copy to India  
14 JAN 1916

*copy*  
*ac*  
*30/12*

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers :—

17268. I. 1006. 2000.—7/1914.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 198266/1915

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



P  
4800  
1915

11  
6/12/15  
4745  
d. 2/12/15

SECRET.

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
INDIA and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.*

*Foreign Office,*

December 29th, 1915.

*Reference to previous correspondence :*

*Letter to from Foreign Office :*


*Description of Inclosure.*


Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon, Cairo. No. 172, Secret. Dec. 14th	Arab Question.

RECEIVED  
30 DEC 1915  
DIPLOMATIC DEPARTMENT

*(Similar letter sent to Director of Military Operations.*

[ 14 ]





No.172 Secret.

Dec.14th, 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward a copy of my letter of today to the Sherif of Mecca.

Time does not allow before the mail leaves of more than a few brief remarks.

(44/4) It will be observed that I have adhered  
(45/1) closely to the wording of the draft submitted in my telegram No.736 of Nov.30th as amended by your telegram of Dec.10th. I have done so especially in regard to the portion relating to Bagdad and Basra, but had to omit the word Mesopotamia, as there is no Arab equivalent for this English term which would assist the intended meaning of the formula as explained in the Viceroy's telegram of Nov.22nd, without exciting suspicions.


(43/2) I have also omitted any reference in the letter to the possibility of a future settlement of the Mesopotamian question on a financial basis, but I have verbally hinted something to this effect to the Sherif's messenger.


(45/1) I have availed myself of the sanction conveyed in your telegram of December 10th, to send a sum of £20,000 to the Sherif. It was at first intended to send only £10,000 on this occasion, but the urgency of the case renders in  
my


Right Honourable

Sir E Grey Bart. K.G. M.P.


etc. etc., etc.











4800

1915

THE RESIDENCY,  
CAIRO.

COPY .

13. To <sup>K</sup> <sup>A Hussein</sup> Sherif Hussein :-

After customary greetings and acknowledgment  
of previous letter :-

I am gratified to observe that you agree  
to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and  
Adana from the boundaries of the Arab territories.


I also note with great pleasure and satis-  
faction your assurances that the Arabs are deter-  
mined to act in conformity with the precepts laid  
down by Omar Ibn Khattab and the early Khalifs,  
which secure the rights and privileges of all  
religions alike.

In stating that the Arabs are ready to re-  
cognize and respect all our treaties with Arab  
Chiefs , it is of course understood that this will  
apply to all territories included in the Arab  
Kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain cannot  
repudiate engagements which already exist .

With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and  
Beyrout, the Government of Great Britain have taken  
careful note of your observations, but, as the inter-  
ests of our Ally France are involved, the question  
will require careful consideration and a further  
communication on the subject will be addressed to you  
in due course .

The Government of Great Britain as I have already  
informed you , are ready to give all guarantees of  
assistance and support within their power to the  
Arab Kingdom, but their interests demand , as you  
yourself have recognized, a friendly and stable admin-  
istration in the vilayet of Baghdad, and the adequate  
safeguarding

29





4800/15

(15)

THE RESIDENCY,  
CAIRO.

safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the urgency of these negotiations permits .

We fully appreciate your desire for caution, and we have no wish to urge you to hasty action, which might jeopardize the eventual success of your projects, but in the meantime, it is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies.

It is on the success of these efforts and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause, when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend.

Under these circumstances I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace, in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition .


As an earnest of our intentions and in order to aid you in your efforts in our joint cause I am sending by your trustworthy messenger a sum of twenty thousand pounds.


( Customary ending )

( signed ) H . McMahon.

17 Dec. /15

30





1

Telegram P., dated (and received) the 22nd October 1915.

From—The High Commissioner of Egypt,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

I have sent the following telegram No. 623 to London Foreign Office on 18th October.

Please see my despatch No. 121.

I submit herewith following summary of a letter from Sheriff of Mecca dated September 9th, which I received in reply to a letter sent to him by myself on August 30th—in this connection please see my despatch No. 94.

Though Sheriff finds its tone lukewarm and ambiguous on central point of future of Arab boundaries he has received my letter with greatest pleasure. Sheriff expresses his preference for and confidence in British Empire in all circumstances as dictated by his followers' real interests. Nevertheless he is disturbed by our statement that it is useless to discuss territorial limits of Arab power, while countries involved are still in hands of enemy. Though it may be a matter of necessity to settle Arab boundaries with more than one power and that only after the present war has come to end, matter is nevertheless one of life and death for Arab people. As Arab people are united on this point, they, therefore, must discuss question with Great Britain, as she is the one power in which Arabs repose confidence. To inspire their people with confidence and avoid possibility of finding themselves in opposition to England or any of her Allies, a settlement of boundaries of their country is necessary. In territories which they demand they have not included places inhabited by foreign race and in this connection their attitude is but a bare expression of necessities of their economic life, and not vain show of words.

Sheriff dismisses idea that His Majesty's Government hesitate to admit demands of Arabs because some of their people are still defending Turkish interests and reiterates his expression of loyalty to us. We may rest assured that all Arabs are only waiting result of present negotiations even including those who are obeying Turco-German orders. This result will depend on refusal or acceptance by His Majesty's Government of territorial proposals put forward by them and on a declaration by His Majesty's Government safeguarding their rights and religion.

Sheriff asks for directions as to course which he is to pursue and for a communication as to nature of our policy.

2

Telegram P., dated the 22nd (received 23rd) October 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

Arabia. Reference is invited to telegram\* from High Commissioner in Egypt of October 18th and telegram† from Foreign Office to High Commissioner, Egypt,

\*Serial No. (1).  
†Serial No. (3).  
of October 20th, both of which were repeated to Government of India. It was with great reluctance that I expressed concurrence in instructions made without consulting Your Excellency, but both Kitchener and Grey attached utmost importance to returning immediate and favourable reply to Arab overtures, and matter was represented to me as of an extremely urgent nature. Two telegrams which I saw for first time on 20th instant from General Officer Commanding Egypt to War Office reported young Arab party, which was represented by Sheriff of Mecca, included influential and large section actually in Turkish army, who are sworn to cause of Arab party. It was stated by Maxwell that Germans and Turks were already spending money to win support of party and negotiating with them, but that Arabs had a strong leaning towards England and were anxious that we should declare what policy of His Majesty's Government was to be. If their overtures were rejected or our reply delayed, they

red on 30 DEC 1915 with

INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S

Letter. No. 33 M

Dated 8 DEC 1915



2

would throw in their lot with enemy, and would thus increase our difficulties materially both in Arabia and Mesopotamia as well as with Senoussi, and would facilitate invasion of Egypt greatly. He considered we should run the risk of genuine *jihad* and united Islam against us unless definite and agreeable proposal was made to Sheriff. Lord Kitchener and Sir Edward Grey have accepted this view of situation. Your Excellency will receive copy of Maxwell's telegrams by mail which leaves here on 22nd October.

3

Telegram P., dated (and received) the 22nd October 1915.

From—The High Commissioner, Egypt,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

On the 20th instant the Foreign Office, London, telegraphed as follows:—  
No. 796. Please refer to your personal telegram\* of 18th instant.

\* Serial No. 1.

Cordial assurances on the lines proposed by you and with reserve about our Allies may be given. Unless it is necessary to secure Arab consent, the stipulation that Arabs will recognise as paramount British interests, and will work under British guidance, etc., should not be included, as this might give rise in France to an impression that we were not only endeavouring to secure Arab interest but at the expense of the French were endeavouring to establish our own interests in Syria. There is in speaking without reserve about Arab peninsula and holy places no difficulty. The general reserve you propose is however necessary more especially for boundaries on north-western quarter.

The proposed sphere of British control as regards Mesopotamia, namely Basrah Vilayat in view of special interests in Baghdad Province and area actually in our occupation will need extension. Of course, our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs will stand.

But the most important thing is to give an assurance that will prevent the Arabs from being alienated, and as the matter is urgent and there is no time to discuss exact terms, I must leave things to your discretion in the matter.

Simplest plan would be to give an assurance of Arab independence saying if they will send representatives we will proceed at once to discuss boundaries, but you can give it if something more precise than this is required.

Wingate should be kept informed by you.

4

Telegram P., dated the 22nd (received 23rd) October 1915.

From—The High Commissioner, Egypt,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

On the 20th instant the following telegram sent to Foreign Office, London, as No. 626.

Please refer to my telegram No. 623,† The messenger of the Sheriff of Medina, who brought his letter to Egypt, has arrived at Cairo, and is now awaiting our reply to Sheriff. He reports as follows:—

† Serial No. 1.

The fact that the English have not prevented the despatch of the sacred carpet or pilgrimage has much impressed Sheriff, and for all privations endured by Hedjaz the Turks are now held responsible. On the 2nd September his son Sheriff Abdullah left with 16,000 men for Nejed, ostensibly to support Bin Rashid, who had received from the Turks as price of his assistance in the projected attack on Basrah ten thousand rifles and ten thousand pounds, but to dissuade Bin Rashid from this enterprise in reality.



3

The Sheriff was much incensed by news of hanging in Homs Hama by the Turks of fifteen leading Arabs as also by well-known Wahhabi Sheikh to proclaiming him an infidel.

The Turks have summoned his third son Faisal to assist them in Syria and was to leave with twenty thousand men on the express condition of free access to all Arab Chiefs in Syria by Medina where arms were awaiting him. The messenger was instructed by Faisal to assure High Commissioner that of fighting for the Turks they had no intention. The Turks might even send him to canal in which case their attack would be mere pretence, the one object of Arabs being to conclude with England an agreement: the Arabs in Syria were under a signed compact to follow him.

It is stated by the messenger, who is of some consequence in Hedjaz, that the result of the negotiations with England is anxiously awaited by the Arabs. Sheikh of Rategh, in particular, was most friendly and with many other Chiefs is only waiting for some such guarantees to fall on Turks. Correspondence is passing between Imamin Yehhia and the Sheriff, as the Sheriff wishes to dissuade him from aiding the Turk. When asked by messenger why he would not show his hand he himself replied that so long as he had no definite treaty with England he had to reckon with possibility of the Allies making peace with the Turks, and he would then find himself at latter's mercy.

The merchants of Jeddah instigated by Turks have, my Agent, who accompanied carpet, reports, sent to the Porte a petition against Sheriff that all troops clothing had been transferred to Mecca Taif and that Sheriff was in considerable danger (from Turkish Government?).

5

2089  
No. 2090-W., dated Simla, the 27th October 1915.  
2091

*Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.*

A copy of the undermentioned telegrams is forwarded to the Army Department the Home Department the General Officer

\_\_\_\_\_ , for information.  
Commanding, Force "D"

From the High Commissioner of Egypt, dated the 22nd October 1915.  
From His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 22nd October 1915.  
From the High Commissioner of Egypt, dated the 22nd October 1915.  
From the High Commissioner of Egypt, dated the 22nd October 1915.

6

Telegram P., dated the 26th (received 27th) October 1915.


From—The High Commissioner, Egypt, Cairo,  
To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

The following telegram 644, dated 26th October, was sent to the Foreign Office:—

*Begins.*—Secret. Reference your telegram No. 796.\* Having regard to the urgency of matter I took suitable advantage of opportunity which presented itself to-day to send reply to the Sheriff of Mecca. Letter, full text of which leaves by bag to-day, is to following effect.

After referring to last letter received from Sheriff, I stated that districts of Alexandretta and Mersina and portions of Syria to the west of districts of Hama, Damascus, Aleppo and Homs should be excluded from area which is proposed by him as they cannot be regarded as purely Arab.

I also stated that we accept those boundaries (without prejudice to existing engagements with Arab Chiefs and with above modification) and as regards



4

territories therein, in which His Majesty's Government are free to act without detriment to interest of French Government, I gave assurances as detailed below :—

His Majesty's Government will (1) recognise and support independence of Arabs within above limits, (2) she will guarantee Holy Places against aggressions, (3) will give advice to, and assist Arabs in establishment of most suitable form of Government when the proper time is at hand, it being understood that desire of Arabs is that officials and advisers required should be British.

On their part Arabs will recognise that interest and position of His Majesty's Government call for special measures in Vilayats of Baghdad and Basrah of advanced administrative control.

I then expressed hope that this declaration will remove all possible doubt that may exist as to sympathy of His Majesty's Government towards Arab aspirations and lead to firm and abiding alliance, immediate result of which will be to expel Turks from Arab countries.

It is now my intention to communicate above terms to Foroki Aziz El Nasri in definite shape and facilitate their commencement of propaganda. Later on I will report how Arabs propose to act.

Since recent reports show that Sheriff's life is in some danger, the greatest possible secrecy is being observed regarding our direct correspondence with him. This does not of course affect communication to other Arab leaders of terms which we are offering.

This telegram is addressed to Foreign Office and sent to Government of India, to whom I am sending Arabic and English version of Mecca letter by next bag.

7

Telegram P., dated (and received) the 28th October 1915.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. McMahan, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., High Commissioner of Egypt, Cairo,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

\*Serial No. 6.

Please see my telegram\* of 26th instant. Mail bag leaves to-day by P. and O. mail

steamer in Captain's charge.

8

Telegram P., No. S.-1013, dated the 30th October 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, Bombay.

Sir H. McMahan is despatching mail bag to Government of India per P. and O. steamer which left Suez on the 28th October in charge of the Commander.

On arrival will you kindly take delivery of bag and forward it to this Department at Delhi.

9


Telegram No. 7662-W., dated the 1st November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, Bombay,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

Scaled bag from Egypt addressed Secretary, Foreign Department, Simla, and signed on label by Sir Henry McMahan, arrived on mail steamer yesterday. Post Office refused accept delivery but are now holding at request of Bombay Government. Please wire instructions.





Telegram P., No. 10-D. S., dated the 4th November 1915.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi,  
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Arabia. Kindly refer to your telegram\* dated the 22nd October and the telegram† to the Foreign Office, from High Commissioner, Egypt, No. 644, dated the 26th October.

\* Serial No. 2.  
† Serial No. 6.

The Government of India fully realise and with regret that as reported by you, you were prevented by circumstances from consulting us in connection with the overtures to the Arabs particularly in view of the discretion allowed to High Commissioner of Egypt with regard to our special interests in the area actually in our occupation and the Baghdad province. This discretion we consider has been exercised without due regard to the interests of India, by the inclusion of the provinces of Basrah and Baghdad in the proposed independent Arab State, "only special measures of advanced administrative control" in these two Vilayats being reserved to the Government of India or His Majesty's Government. We should not, we think, have been committed to a policy of this nature and before a pledge of such vital importance to the future of India was given we should have been consulted. The creation of a strong Arab State lying astride our interests in the Gulf and in the East has always been regarded by us with much diffidence as a not unlikely source of trouble ultimately and we entertain doubts in regard to any political or military advantages likely to accrue in this manner. If His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the termination of the war is likely to be hastened by an Arab alliance, we do not on general grounds wish to oppose it, although we object to the conditions on which it is proposed that it should be based in respect of Mesopotamia.

Some form of native administration in Baghdad Vilayat under our close political control and the eventual annexation of Basrah Vilayat have always been contemplated by us as a minimum. Annexation is apparently put out of the question by Sir H. McMahon's guarantee. By the surrender to an Arab Government of any kind of the Basrah Vilayat not only shall we be preparing trouble for ourselves at the head and along the southern littoral of the Gulf, but we shall be giving up the main fruits of our hard-won victories in Mesopotamia. Such a course will not only mean abandonment of enormous potential sources of revenue, but will also be resented by the European Commercial Community and the Indian people who look to Mesopotamia as a field for emigration and commercial expansion in return for the blood of their countrymen shed there. We sincerely trust that formula may be so amended as to admit of His Majesty's Government having free hand eventually in the disposal of Baghdad and Basrah Vilayats which have been won at such cost.

We hesitate to recommend the publication if any proclamation on the lines suggested by Sir McMahon in his private telegram to the Foreign Office of 1st instant pending orders.

Repeated High Commissioner, Egypt, and addressed Secretary of State for India.

No. H.-8910, dated Delhi, the 3rd November 1915.

*Endorsed by Army Department.*

A copy of the undermentioned paper is forwarded to the Foreign and Political Department.

Telegram No. 2094-E., dated the 31st October 1915, from the General Officer Commanding, Egypt, to the Commander-in-Chief in India.



6

Enclosure to Serial No. 11.

Telegram P., No. 2094-E., dated the 31st October 1915.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Egypt, Cairo.

To—The Commander-in-Chief in India, Delhi.

A copy of telegram No. 827\* (dated October 27th ?) from Foreign Office, to the Viceroy, repeated to High Commissioner, Egypt, has been seen by me.

\* Serial No. 3(?)

In my opinion we should seize this excellent opportunity of issuing a proclamation giving *verbatim* text of our proposals to the Sheriff of Mecca and Arab party; so far as Iraq and Mesopotamia are affected thereby. The High Commissioner, Egypt, has already sent the gist of these proposals to the Viceroy.

This is an opportunity of honestly and properly letting our intentions be known, and it would convince the Sheriff that we are sincere, and would also do an infinite amount of good. Suspicion would be aroused if we did anything short of this, and Arabs are peculiarly suspicious.

I am told by leaders of Arab party here that a certain Lieutenant Mowlood Mukhlis is a man of influence among the Arab party and would be useful for spreading our policy among Arabs. He is a Cavalry Officer from Musal and with 3 others, is reported to have deserted from the Turks 3 or 4 months ago.

12

Telegram P., dated (and received) the 4th November 1915

From—His Majesty's British High Commissioner of Egypt, Cairo,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi.

Please see last paragraph of my telegram† to Foreign Office No. 644-Secret. To-day we are sending you Arabic text of letter to Sheriff of Mecca by bag.

† Serial No. 8.

13

Telegram P., dated the 5th (received 6th) November 1915.

From—The High Commissioner of Egypt,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department).

Secret. I have sent following as No. 674, dated 5th November, to Foreign Office:—*Begins*. Please see Viceroy of India's telegram†, dated 4th instant.


† Serial No. 10.

I kept special interests of India fully in mind in framing reply to Sheriff and I endeavoured to safeguard those interests as far as was possible in the circumstances within restricted latitude which nature and urgency of situation allowed me.

The full text of clause relating to Mesopotamia is as follows:—"With regard to Vilayats of Baghdad and Basrah the Arabs will recognise that established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control (word 'advanced' shown before word 'administrative' in India's telegrams is not understood) in order to secure those territories from foreign aggression; to promote the welfare of local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests."

This formula was intended to give us everything short of open and definite annexation, *i.e.*, a free hand with regard to internal administration as well as development and commercial and industrial enterprise and also as regards military measures.

It practically amounts to our monopoly of all administration and control in those Vilayats read in conjunction with preceding clause and Arab representatives here interpreted it in that sense.



7

As regards potential inconvenience of a strong Arab State I fully share views of Indian Government but as yet even elements of such a State can hardly be said to exist and in my statement of mutual guarantees I have endeavoured to make any such future Arab State (within British sphere) subject to our creation, direction and control.

That Indian Government should have read into my statement a disregard of Indian interest I regret, but if this explanation does not reassure them, terms of Baghdad proclamation might be restricted to such general terms as to avoid all danger of alarming Arab suspicions by divergent statements.

To-day I received copy of a later letter just received from Sheriff by El Murghani of Soudan in which former urges supreme importance of immediate assurances by us of intentions specially in regard to frontiers as previously defined by him, to which he says Arabs are attaching very great weight. Of critical situation of Arabia and of great danger of Arabs being committed by Turkish pressure and German promises to a real *jehad* against us he warns Murghani.

This indicates urgency of situation under which I issued my recent statement. *Ends.*

14

Telegram P., dated London, the 8th (received 9th) November 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department).

I agree with views expressed in your telegram of November 4th\* on subject of Arabia and am pressing your views on Foreign Office. Please let me know at once if you have anything to say on McMahon's telegram† of November 5th. Assurances, if given, will be conditional on Arabs performing their part of bargain. This constitutes additional reason against proclaiming them as McMahon proposed to do. It would perhaps be better in these circumstances if Nixon issued no proclamation at all on occupation of Baghdad. If, however, one is thought necessary for local or Indian purposes, please, as soon as possible, let me have draft. It should not refer to the wider political issues which McMahon has raised.

15

*Secret.*

Cairo;  
October 28th, 1915.

SIR,

With reference to my telegram ‡ No. 644-*Secret*, of October 26th, addressed to the Foreign Office and repeated to Your Excellency, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I addressed to Sir Edward Grey (No. 131-*Secret*) on the 26th instant, enclosing copy of my reply to the Sheriff of Mecca's letter to me, dated September 9th.

I need hardly point out the necessity for keeping all our negotiations with the Sheriff most secret.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

A. HENRY McMAHON.

His Excellency,

The Right Honourable

Lord Hardinge of Penshurst,

P.O., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., etc., etc.,

Viceroy and Governor General of India.



8

Enclosure 1 to Serial No. 15.

*Ahead received  
4/7/15*

The Residency,  
Cairo,  
October 26th, 1915.

No. 131 Secret.

Sir,

With reference to my secret telegram No. 644 of to-day's date, I have the honour to enclose herewith the English text of the reply which I have despatched in Arabic to the Sheriff of Mecca.

The matter appeared to me to admit of no delay, and I have therefore lost no time in answering the Sheriff's letter, and have availed myself of the authority to act without further reference, accorded to me in your telegram\* No. 796 of the 20th instant.

\*Serial No. 3.

The composition of a reply which would be acceptable to the Arab party and which would at the same time leave as free a hand as possible to His Majesty's Government in the future has been a difficult task.

I have been definite in stating that Great Britain will recognize the principle of Arab independence in purely Arab territory, this being the main point on which agreement depends, but have been equally definite in excluding Mersina, Alexandretta and those districts on the northern coast of Syria, which cannot be said to be Arab, and where, I understand, that French interests have been recognized. I am not aware of the extent of French claims in Syria, nor of how far His Majesty's Government have agreed to recognize them. Hence, while recognizing the towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo as being within the circle of Arab countries, I have endeavoured to provide for possible French pretensions to those places by a general modification to the effect that His Majesty's Government can only give assurances in regard to those territories "in which she can act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France."

It will be observed that I have definitely specified France as the only Ally concerned. The use of the term "Allies" would, I understand, inevitably have aroused the suspicion of the Arabs, who would have conjured up visions of all our Allies putting forward claims in various parts of the Arab territories.


I believe I am right in the supposition that no territorial interests have ever been even tentatively claimed, either by Russia in Northern Mesopotamia or by Italy on the Arabian coasts of the Red Sea, and that it is therefore unnecessary, and indeed inadvisable, to provide for any such interests.

I venture to emphasize the fact that the eventual arrangement would be very greatly facilitated if France would consent to forego any territorial claims she may have to purely Arab territories, such as Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo. The inclusion of such districts in Arabia will be insisted on by the Arabs, and although they might possibly agree in regard to them to accept from France a similar arrangement to that which we are proposing elsewhere, it is obvious that this will give rise to trouble, and that much more satisfactory and lasting results will be possible in the future if the Arab question can be dealt with as a whole by Great Britain.

In face of the vital importance to the allied cause of the present issues involved, France could hardly be unreasonable on this point and the question of compensation elsewhere if necessary is well worthy of serious consideration.

It is, I consider, not going too far to say that the only hope of preventing this question becoming eventually one of trouble and anxiety to all concerned is to leave it in the direction of one power alone.

I would also once more lay stress on the religious importance attached to Damascus by Arabs, not only as one of the three points of departure of the Sacred Carpet, but as, in their eyes, one of the principal Holy Places.



In conclusion, I am of opinion that while the terms I have proposed are the minimum that could be offered with any promise of success, there is reasonable hope of their being accepted by the Sheriff individually and the leaders of the Arab party.

The letter was despatched yesterday in the hands of the Sheriff's messenger, Mahmoud Arif Arayfar, who is in the complete confidence of the Sheriff and appears to be a man of considerable intelligence and of some influence.

The opportunity was taken of verbally explaining the terms of the letter to facilitate its comprehension by the Sheriff. Further verbal assurances of sympathy and support were also given and, in particular, care was taken to allay any apprehension which the Sheriff might entertain regarding the possibly sinister motives towards himself of our assistance to the Idrisi of Asir, in whom he is said not to place complete confidence.

A copy of this despatch is being sent by this mail to India.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Sd.) A. H. McMAHON.

Right Honourable

Sir E. Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

Enclosure 2 to Serial No. 15.

TO THE SHERIFF OF MECCA.

(with titles)

I have received your letter of 19th Shawal with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the moment had not yet arrived when they could be most profitably discussed.

I have realized, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to our letter:—

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of Mecca.

Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of Government in those various territories.



10

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

With regard to the Vilayats of Baghdad and Basrah, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war—May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples.

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Arayfan, and he will inform you of various matters of interest but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

(Here follow the usual compliments.)

16

Telegram P., No. 32-D S., dated the 10th November 1915.


From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi,  
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Your telegram\* of 8th November regarding Arabia. In McMahon's telegram† of 5th November we find nothing to palliate in any way position he has brought about, and fact remains that

although, without imperilling the negotiations, he could apparently safeguard other interests in Mersina, Alexandretta and Syria, he yet found it necessary to guarantee to Arabs the rendition of territories in Mesopotamia won by our arms in face not only of Turkish but also of Arab opposition, without which Turks alone would have been of small account. Moreover, it appears from information received from Sir Reginald Wingate that the Moslem leaders in Egypt were quite ready to recognise, as a necessity, the incorporation in the British Empire of certain portions of Mesopotamia and would not oppose such a policy. Further, it need hardly be pointed out that by the fact of the creation of an Arab State and administration the financing of large irrigation schemes by which the prosperity of Mesopotamia might be enhanced a hundred-fold is not likely to be encouraged, and the whole country would be likely to lapse into a worse condition than even under Turkish rule and be a source of danger to commercial and political interests of Great Britain. In our opinion the possession of Basrah is essential for the protection of Abadan and for the security of British interests in the oil-fields region. As to actual *quid*

\* Serial No. 14.

† Serial No. 13.



11

*pro quo* to be given by the Arabs in return for these sweeping assurances we are still in dark, but trust it may be of sufficiently definite character to enable us to repudiate these assurances if Arabs fail to perform their part—at any rate as far as Mesopotamia is concerned.

We agree as regards proclamation that, in view of chaotic position created by McMahon's assurances, it will be best if General Nixon issued no proclamation at all on occupation of Baghdad, except perhaps a formal notice calling upon civil population to acquiesce quietly in our occupation and assuring them that their persons, property and religion will be scrupulously respected should they do so. In India, as soon as Baghdad is actually occupied, we propose to suppress the news for day or two and to publish following proclamation:—*Begins.* His Majesty's Government have authorised General Nixon to advance on Baghdad, his forces having once more defeated Turkish opposition on the Tigris in vicinity of Suliman Pak. Not only for military reasons is this advance necessary, but in order to relieve British ladies and British Indian subjects who, contrary to usage of civilised war, have been detained at Baghdad; and in order to break up a focus of German intrigue in Middle East. His Majesty's Government, however, desire that it should be clearly understood that stringent orders have been issued that every precaution should be taken to prevent sacred shrine of Shaikh Abdul Qadir, Gilani, and other tombs and shrines in vicinity from being in any way even accidentally damaged in course of the operations, in accordance with their unswerving policy of respecting the sacred policy of Islam and the susceptibilities of the Moslem community; and they wish it to be clearly understood that in regard to all other holy places in Mesopotamia, this policy has been and will be scrupulously followed, and that no obstacle whatever will be placed in way of Imams, Ulemas, Mujtahids and other religious persons following freely and as usual their ordinary religious practices, after occupation of Baghdad. *Ends.*

17

Telegram P., No. 33-D. S., dated the 10th November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah.

Reference correspondence forwarded with my endorsement 2091-W.\* of 27th October on subject of negotiations between High Commissioner, Egypt, and

\* Serial No. 5.  
Sheriff of Mecca. Subsequent correspondence shows that High Commissioner, Egypt, acting on discretion given him by London Foreign Office, has included Basrah and Baghdad Vilayats in territories where His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs. High Commissioner has modified this by following stipulation:—*Begins.* Arabs will recognise that established position and interest of Great Britain with regard to Vilayats of Baghdad and Basrah necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to safeguard our mutual economic interests to secure these territories from foreign aggression and to promote welfare of local populations. *Ends.*

Against this surrender of Indian interests in Mesopotamia we have protested in strongest terms. Secretary of State agrees and is pressing our views on Foreign Office, London. We have to-day again telegraphed further protest; copies of correspondence have been sent by post to you.

Secretary of State thinks, and we agree, that in view of chaotic position created by McMahon's assurances, it would be better for you to issue no proclamation at all on occupation of Baghdad, except perhaps formal notice calling upon civil population to acquiesce quietly in our occupation and assuring them that their persons, property and religion, should they do so, will be scrupulously respected; but further instructions on this point will shortly be conveyed to you.



12

18

No. <sup>2181-W.</sup><sub>2182-W.</sub>, dated Delhi, the 13th November 1915.  
<sup>2183-W.</sup>

*Endorsed by the Foreign and Political Department.*

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the Army Department  
Home Department  
General Officer Command-

ing. Force "D." for information, (1) in continuation of the endorsement by the Foreign and Political Department, No. <sup>2089</sup><sub>2090</sub>-W., dated the 27th October 1915.

\* (2) in continuation of the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, No. 33-D. S., dated the 10th November 1915.

2. It is requested that the papers forwarded be kindly treated as "*Extremely Secret.*"

Telegram from the High Commissioner, Egypt, dated the 28th October 1915.

Telegram from the High Commissioner, Egypt, dated the 28th October 1915.

Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 10-D. S., dated the 4th November 1915.

† Omit to Army Department. † Endorsement by the (Government of India  
( ) To General Officer Commanding, Force "D," only in the) Army Department, No. H.-8910, dated the 3rd November 1915 (with enclosure).

Telegram from the High Commissioner, Egypt, dated the 4th November 1915.

Telegram from the High Commissioner, Egypt, dated the 5th November 1915.

Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th November 1915.

Despatch from the High Commissioner, Egypt, dated the 28th October 1915.

Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 32-D. S., dated the 10th November 1915.

‡ Omit to General Officer Commanding, Force "D." ‡ Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Force "D," No. 33-D. S., dated the 10th November 1915.

19

Telegram P., No. 358, dated (and received) the 14th November 1915.

From—Sir JOHN NIXON, General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah, Aziziyah,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

(Addressed Secretary of State for India, sent to India.)

It appears from a communication§ received from the Government of India yesterday that, in the course of negotiations with Mecca the details (of which I have not yet learnt, the High Commissioner, Egypt, has with certain modifications included Basrah and Baghdad Vilayats in territories wherein His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the independence of Arabs and give it support.

Apart from the fact that such a commitment appears to be premature and will prejudice future of this great country and existing British interests at Basrah and Baghdad, it seems to me to involve complete misconception of attitude of inhabitants of Vilayats affected. It moreover overlooks the important and fundamental fact that four-fifths of the population of Basrah and two-thirds of Baghdad Vilayats are Shiah's (?).

I earnestly trust that before any final step is taken further consideration may be devoted to this subject and hope that reference may be made to me on issues affecting Mesopotamia.

Cox agrees with these views here expressed.





13

20

(Received with Office Memorandum No. 1993, dated Delhi, the 16th November 1915, from H. A. F. Metcalfe, Esq., Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy.)

(Secret.)

The High Commissioner for Egypt presents his compliments to the Viceroy and Governor General of India, and has the honour to transmit herewith the Arabic text\* of the letter addressed by Sir Henry McMahon to the Sheriff of Mecca, the English copy of which was enclosed in his despatch† to the Foreign Office, No. 131-Secret, of 26th October 1915, copy of which was forwarded by bag to His Excellency by last mail to India.

\* Not printed.

† Enclosure to Serial No. 15.

The Residency,  
Cairo, 3rd November 1915.

21

Telegram P., dated the 18th (received 19th) November 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi.

Arab negotiations. Please see your telegram‡ of 10th instant. Following from Cairo :—*Begins.* "Messenger has arrived with letter§ from Sheriff. Letter is long and requires careful translation to ascertain full meaning but following are main points. (A) He agrees to exclusion of Mersina and Minisandria Spartan (?) Alexandretta. (B) He maintains that Vilayats Aleppo and Beyrout are Arab and should be under Arab Mohamedan Government. (C) He maintains that Mesopotamia is Arab also, but as Great Britain has special interests there it may for the present be left out of discussion. Meanwhile he requests subsidy for what he terms "the Arab Kingdom." (D) Fourthly, he expresses fear lest European peace should leave Arabs at mercy of Turks and wishes Great Britain to bind herself not to abandon Arabs.

‡ Serial No. 16.

§ *Vide* Enclosure to Serial No. 15.

They will come in at once on these four conditions. Messenger states feeling amongst Arabs is very favourable to us. Sheriff impresses upon him readiness and intention of Arabs to begin work without delay.

Abdulla, son of Sheriff, has returned from Nejd bringing several Chiefs whom he detached from Bin Rashid's cause. Oppenheim having been expelled from Medina is said to have returned to Syria. Faisal, son of Sheriff, has left Mecca and is negotiating on behalf of his father with Arab Chiefs." *Ends.*

Please repeat to Nixon paragraph regarding Mesopotamia, adding that we have communicated to McMahon substance of his telegram of 14th November,

|| Serial No. 19.

358.||

21-A.

MEMORANDUM.

THE SHERIFF OF MECCA.

*Proposed issue of a proclamation giving the text of proposals to the Sheriff of Mecca and the Arab party, so far as Iraq and Mesopotamia are affected thereby.*

Endorsement by the Government of India in the Army Department, No. H-810,¶ dated the 3rd November 1915 (with enclosure).

¶ Serial No. 11.

Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Force "D," No. 33-D. S.,\*\* dated the 10th November 1915.

\*\* Serial No. 17.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 59-M., dated the 19th November 1915.



14

21-B.

No. <sup>232</sup>/<sub>2233</sub>-W., dated Delhi, the 19th November 1915. (*Confidential.*)

*Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.*

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded confidentially to the  
Army Department  
Home Department,  
Foreign and Political Department, No. <sup>2181</sup>/<sub>2182</sub>-W., dated the 13th November  
1915.

\* \* \* \* \*

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Force "D," No. 358, dated the 14th  
November 1915.

22

Telegram P., No. 65-D. S., dated the 20th November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political  
Department, Delhi,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah.

I have repeated to Sir Henry McMahon the substance of your telegram  
No. 358\* of the 14th instant. The  
\* Serial No. 19. substance of a letter† now received from  
Sheriff of Mecca in Cairo has been  
† *Vide* Serial No. 21. telegraphed to us by Secretary of State.

In it the former maintains that Mesopotamia is Arab, but as Great Britain  
has special interests there it may for the present be left out of the discus-  
sion.

23

Telegram P., dated the 19th (received 20th) November 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department).

Following telegram addressed to Aden is repeated to you :—Any positive  
evidence that you have to show that the Turks are being supported by the  
Grand Sheriff of Mecca should be telegraphed as soon as possible.

24

Telegram P., dated the 19th (received 20th) November 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department).

Arabia. Please see my telegram† of 18th November. Cairo telegraphs as  
follows :—*Begins.* Translation has now  
† Serial No. 21. been done carefully and the general sense  
of the second half of the letter, which is rather vaguely expressed, is given more  
fully in the following :—

*Begins.* Interest in Adana Mersina is renounced by Sheriff but retention  
of Beyrout, Aleppo Vilayats as purely Arab are insisted on by him.

Iraq cannot be abandoned by him for trading economic reasons, but he  
is prepared to "leave under British administration for a short time those  
districts now occupied by British troops against a suitable sum paid as  
compensation to Arab Kingdom for period of occupation" without prejudice  
to rights of either party in order to facilitate agreement and in consideration  
of guarantee offered by His Majesty's Government. Actual agreement with



15

Sheikhs to be respected. As to immediate action, Sheriff hesitates for fear of adverse opinion of Moslems of opposite camps and still more lest Arabs may be left to face Turco-German combination in the event of peace unfavourable to Entente. They are ready for action once they are sure that His Majesty's Government will effectively support them.

His Majesty's Government having disclaimed all intention of internal interference, there is no need to mention the question of British administrative officials. (Sheriff must be here alluding to Arabia only unless purposely vague.) Sheriff is forced by Arabs to his (? present) course of action, though he would prefer seclusion from all politics for himself. *End of telegram.*

25

Telegram P., No. 71-D. S., dated the 21st November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah.

Reference my telegram of the 20th instant, No. 68-D. S.

Secretary of State telegraphs on 19th instant, that McMahon reports translation done carefully giving general sense of portion of letter from Sheriff of Mecca, which, though rather vaguely expressed, is as follows:—*Begins.*

Interest in

\* politics for himself. *Ends.*

26

Telegram P., No. 145-A. P., dated the 20th (received 21st) November 1915.

From—The Resident and General Officer Commanding at Aden,


To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

Documentary evidence\* exists shewing that Sheriff of Mecca has assisted

\* *Vide* Serial No. 23.  
Turks in the form of a letter from Ahmad Tewfik (Commander of 7th Yemen Army Corps at Sanaa) to Hassan Izzat Bey Bimbashi, Commanding 1st Battalion, 115th Regiment, at Loheiya, found on latter when captured *en route* to Jeddah by sea. The letter tells Hassan Izzat distinctly that the Sheriff had received and held in charge money intended for Ahmad Tewfik's command and also that Sheriff would arrange for safe transmission to destinations in Asir and Yemen of money and that Hassan Izzat was to act as the Sheriff directed.

General Officer Commanding, Egypt, has the originals of the correspondence.

Repeated to Foreign Department of the Government of India, addressed to Secretary of State.





25
24

Register No.  
**4745**

Put away with **53**

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letter from FO. Dated 24.27 } December, 1915.  
Rec. 27 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	29 Dec.	W.H.	The War.
Secretary of State.....	30	W.H.	
Committed.....			The Aga Khani's news about an Arab Caliphate.
Under Secretary.....			Comments of Sir H. M. Macdonald & Sir R. D. Vignate
Secretary of State.....			

AC

30/12

Copy to India

Copy to India

31 DEC 1915

7 Jan 1916

**FOR INFORMATION.**


We have told the Grand Sheriff that "H. M. G. wd. welcome the assumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of true race," which seems to go somewhat nearer interference than Sir H. M. Macdonald wd. perhaps admit.

Previous Papers:—

4062

4531

15698. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1006/14.]





am.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
 No. **W195075** 1915  
 and address—  
 The Under-Secretary of State  
 Foreign Office,  
 London.

*Secret.*

(25) 4068 68501 (22)  
 H. (4/16) 7.

P  
**4745**  
 1915

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
 his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India,  
 and, by direction of the Secretary  
 of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned  
 papers.*

*Foreign Office,  
 Dec. 24, 1915.*

*Reference to previous correspondence:*

Letter <sup>to</sup> Foreign Office: ✓  
 from

*Description of Inclosure.*


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H.M. High Commissioner                      at Cairo.                      no. 161. Dec. 6.                      Ditto.                      no. 165. Dec. 7.</i>	<i>Arab Question.</i>

*(Similar letter sent to* ✓


RECEIVED  
 27 DEC 1915  
 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

copy of arab matter  
 by S. A. H.  
 25/12

12 ]







No 161

26

4745

1915

195075

December 5th 1915  
20 DEC 1915

Cairo

Sir

With reference to your despatch No 231 of the 2nd ultimo, in which are set forth the Agha Khan's apprehensions at the creation of an Arab Khalifate, I have the honour to observe that the policy of His Majesty's Government, to the effect that the Khalifate is a question which concerns exclusively the Islamic world, and is not a matter in which we have any intention of interfering, has been consistently followed by this Residency; nor do I think it probable or even possible that Arabs in the Sudan or Egypt ( who take much less interest in the matter than is generally supposed ) can have received encouragement from local officials in connection with an Arab Khalifate .


A copy of your despatch was forwarded to Sir Reginald Wingate, and his remarks upon it are as follows :-


\* The opinions expressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Agha Khan seem to me to be much as were to be expected from the Head of the Imaillia Sect, who would be opposed, on principle, to the establishment of a Sunnite Arabian Khalifate as well as the inclusion of the districts containing the Shiite Shrines within its territories.

In what degree Arab racial ambitions and affinities can be expected to over-ride Sectarian differences

The Right Honourable

Sir E Grey K.G., M.P.,





27


differences and to overcome predilections of the Shiites inhabitants of these districts to Persian as opposed to Sunnite Arab control , I am unable to state ; but such information on the subject as I possess inclines me to the belief that the ideas of a homogeneous Arab State and the realisation of Pan-Arab aspirations , would receive considerable support in those regions .


My personal acquaintance with the Agha Khan is slight , but it is a subject to me for speculation how far a Westernised Moslem of his type or even an advanced thinker such as Syed Ameer Ali are able truly to reflect the attitude of the bulk of their nominal co-religionists in matters of religious sentiment .

In any case I venture to hazard the opinion that neither of these individuals is in a position to represent the views of the Sunnite population of India on the question of the Khalifate .

I may add that in all conversations with Sudan Notables whose sympathies are practically entirely pro-Arab , I have been careful to explain that any support by His Majesty's Government to the cause of Arabian Independence was directed to assist the Arabs to secure their national aspirations and bore no reference to the Khalifate, or other religious question, with which , as a purely Islamic affair His Majesty's Government have no concern .\*

I am in complete accord with the above views and would only add that, with regard to the opinion of the Agha Khan that the Arabs have no claim to Bagdad and that that region and the Shrine of Kerbela ought more properly to be given to Persia , I believe that





that the Shiite Shrine and district in Mesopotamia is likely always to prove an incongruous element in any administration. The inhabitants are Arab Shiites : as Arabs they dislike the Persians no less than the Turks; as Shiites they would dislike a Sunnite Government; and, as Muslims of a fanatical type they would not welcome a supreme Christian control. They are moreover themselves divided into violent factions, so that effective foreign protection and control such as Persia can never provide would appear to be essential to order in their region .

At the same time they need not be taken too seriously, as may be seen from the passive manner in which they accepted and apparently have forgotten the looting of their Shrine by Turkish troops last winter.


In saying that the Arabs have no claim to Bagdad, the Agha Khan would appear to vitiate his title to speak with authority on this subject; as the statement indicates astonishing ignorance of the history past and present of both the Arabs and Bagdad .


I have the honour to be with  
the highest respect

Sir

Your most obedient humble servant

(sd) ? A.K. McMahon





No.165.

4745  
1915 195079  
Cairo  
20 DEC 1915  
Dec.7th, 1915.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No.161 of the 5th instant, relative to the interview between Sir Maurice de Bunsen and the Agha Khan, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Sir R Wingate enclosing the telegram, text of which forms a part of my above-mentioned despatch.


I have the honour to be,  
with the highest respect,

Sir,  
your most obedient,  
humble servant,


(Signed) A. H. M. MAND

The Right Honourable

Sir E Grey Bart. K.G. M.P.  
etc., etc., etc.







Enclosure in Sir H McMahon's despatch  
No.165 of Dec.7th, 1915.

Copy of Sir R Wingate's despatch of December 1st.

Sir,


I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of a copy of the Foreign Office letter of Nov.2nd, recording an interview between Sir M de Bunsen and the Agha Khan. In my telegram of Nov.23rd, of which I enclose copy, I have already given a personal opinion as to the significance of the views expressed by the Agha Khan.

I am aware of the close connection in Arabian and other Moslem minds between the cause of Arabian independence and the institution of an Arab Khalifa; but I feel strongly that to withhold British support of the former in deference to the susceptibilities of certain sections of Moslem opinion with regard to the latter, would be detrimental not only to our immediate interests but to our prestige and reputation amongst Moslems generally.

At the same time I am in complete agreement regarding the necessity to show that in supporting the Arabs we are moved solely by the desire to assist them to secure their national aspirations, without reference or prejudice to their religious pretensions in the matter of the Khalifate.

I have etc.


(signed) Reginald Wingate





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 196223 /1915

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



31  
4745  
1915

Secret.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the *Under Secretary of State for  
India* and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Dec. 27<sup>th</sup>, 1915.


Reference to previous correspondence :

Letter to Foreign Office :  
from

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Memorandum, Dec. 21<sup>st</sup></i>	<i>Arab Question.</i>

*Copy to Sec. of State*



(Similar letter sent to

[ 14 ]





MEMORANDUM.

At the meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 21st December with M. Picot of the French Embassy, the following points regarding the future French sphere in the proposed Arab State were discussed, and are to be submitted to the French Government by M. Picot:-

FRENCH TERRITORY, OR DIRECT ADMINISTRATION.

1.- Southern limit, approximately:-

TARTOUS-KILLIS-BIREDJIK-JEZIREH.

Eastward of this to be arranged with RUSSIA.

2.- Arab State, to include all lands to the South of this line with the following provisions:-

(a) Arab State to be divided between England and France into spheres of commercial and administrative interest, the actual line of demarcation to be reserved, but it was agreed that it should pivot on DEIR EL ZOR Eastward and Westward.

(b) That the LEBANON should in so far as is practicable retain its present constitution, but that it should comprise BEYRUT and the ANTI-LEBANON, and that the Governor should be nominated by the French Government.

(c) That the coast as far South as BEYRUT should be policed and protected by France.

(d) JERUSALEM to form an enclave, its boundaries yet to be defined.


The following points were reserved:-

(1) The allocation of the MOSUL Vilayet.

(2) The position of HAIFA and ACRE as outlets for Great Britain on Mediterranean from Mesopotamia.

December 21st, 1915.





ATAS  
21/12  
32

MEMORANDUM


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(a) Arab State to be divided between England and France into spheres of commercial and administrative interest, the actual line of demarcation to be reserved, but it was agreed that it should pivot on DEIR EL ZOR Eastward and Westward.  
(b) That the LEBANON should in so far as its practice retain its present constitution, but that it should comprise BEYRUT and the ANTI-LIBANON, and that the Governor should be nominated by the French Government.  
(c) That the coast as far South as BEYRUT should be policed and protected by France.  
(d) JERUSALEM to form an enclave, its boundaries yet to be defined.

The following points were reserved:-  
(1) The allocation of the MOSUL Vilayet.  
(2) The position of HAIFA and ACHE as outlets for Great Britain on Mediterranean from Mesopotamia.

21st Dec, 1915.

RECEIVED  
27 DEC 1915




Copy 47007/15

33

*From Viceroy, 22nd December 1915.*

Foreign Secret. Bin Saud. Political Agent, Bahrein, reports certain information given him by Bin Saud's doctor, Abdul Almai, whom he considers to be genuine and who professes to be very strongly anti-Turk. He is an Arab of Mosul, was educated at Constantinople and Beyrout and has visited Paris. According to doctor's account, in an abortive night attack on Bin Rashid, in the course of which, Bin Saud's brother was killed, Bin Saud himself was severely wounded, and again in the next fight he was slightly wounded. All Nejd firmly agrees that strongest efforts to create a diversion in Arabia are being made by Turks, and there is much coming and going between Sheriff of Mecca and Bin Rashid. Attack on Egypt is expected to take place shortly. Doctor farther states negotiations between Bin Rashid and other chiefs and Sheriff of Mecca are being presided over by Turks, that 40,000 camels are being purchased by Turks for an attack on Egypt, and that Ma'an railway has been completed.




(d) That the LEBANON should in so far as is practi-  
cable retain its present constitution, but that it should  
comprise BEYRUT and the ANTI-LEBANON, and that the Go-  
vernment should be nominated by the French Government.  
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policed and protected by France.  
(b) JERUSALEM to form an enclave, its boundaries  
yet to be defined.


The following points were reserved:-

- (1) The allocation of the MOUNT ALIBAN.
- (2) The position of HAIFA and ACEH as outlets for  
Great Britain on Mediterranean from Mesopotamia.

December 21st, 1915.







Caliphate

27

34


Military Secret.

191

*From General, Force "D," Basra, 20th December 1915.*

*(Addressed to General Officer Commanding, Egypt, repeated to Chief of  
General Staff and Secretary of State for India.)*

No. I.G. 1802, 19th December, 6 a.m. In continuation of my I.G. 1759, following extract from memorandum 66 C., dated 4th December 1915, from Political Agent, Bahrein, to Political Resident, Basra, is repeated for information. "Binsaud's doctor, whose information has been telegraphed to you, informs me Binsaud was somewhat severely wounded in abortive night attack in which his brother was killed, and again slightly wounded in next fight. He tells me it is firmly believed all through Najd that Turks are making strenuous efforts to create a diversion in Arabia, and that there is much coming and going between Binrashid and Shariff of Mecca. Also, it is expected that attack on Egypt will soon take place. The doctor, Abdullahsai, an Arab of Mosul, who was educated at Beyrout and Constantinople, and has visited Paris, professes to be very strongly anti-Turk. I think he is genuine."





Register No.  
4673

Put away with 53

**Minute Paper.**

Secy's Letter from India, 61 M

**Secret Department.**

Dated 26 November  
 Rec. 20 December 1915.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	21 Dec.	Atx	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>The War.</u></p> <p>The proposed proclamation at Bagdad                      correspondence between Sir J. Curzon                      &amp; Govt of India</p>
Secretary of State.....	21	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*What reply did we send to No 27?*  
Atx  
22/12


*S. of S.*  
 Please see print of telegram now attached  
Atx  
24/12


Copy to : S.O. } 21 Dec  
 and } 21 Dec

**FOR INFORMATION.**

Previous Papers :—


18698. I. 453. 2000—4/1915. [1006/14.]






*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
22nd November 1915.*

[P 4259] Foreign Secret. Your telegram dated 16th November. Sykes' telegram of 23rd October goes by next mail. Substance is that scheme A of inter-departmental committee alone guarantees security in Gulf and Mesopotamia, that an autonomous state in Irak is impracticable, and that as regards Arabian peninsula our policy should be to protect it as a whole from without, leaving internal affairs alone.







8

Enclosure 1 to Serial No. 19.

Telegram P., No. 129-232-I., dated the 25th October 1915.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Kut,

To—The Chief of the General Staff.

Following addressed to Chief General Staff and repeated Secretary of State, 12th Division, and Inspector General of Communications.

No change in situation.

Enclosure 2 to Serial No. 19.

Telegram No. S.-25374, dated the 26th October 1915.

From—The Chief of the General Staff,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Kut-al-Amarah.

With regard to procedure of addressing political telegrams, Government of India have ruled that all political telegrams, other than those of merely routine nature, which bear on matters coming within area of military operations should be addressed to you, and this will be done in future.

In cases where India Office repeat to Cox their telegrams addressed to Government of India, he has been instructed to arrange for their immediate communication to you. You will of course bear in mind the great importance of ensuring that copies of all political telegrams received by you are sent to Cox direct without delay, and of receiving his advice before any action is taken.

20

Telegram P., No. 5-D. S., dated the 3rd November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah.


Please refer to my telegram No. 107C-S., dated the 24th October. On the 27th October Secretary of State for India telegraphed as follows:—"It is desired by His Majesty's \* \* \* \* \* and Moslem religion."

The draft of the proclamation it is proposed to issue is as follows:—"The Turkish armies have been driven from the field and the British flag flies over Baghdad. This occupation has resulted from the intrigues of Germany by whom Turkey was induced without just cause to draw the sword against Great Britain. Great Britain has retaliated by invading the soil of Turkey in order to break up a centre of German intrigue and to hasten the day of peace.

"The present campaign in Mesopotamia is however directed solely against the Turkish Government and the Turkish army. Towards the Arab population the British nourish feelings of warm friendship and goodwill, and they entertain a deep sympathy with the aspirations of the Arabs to detach themselves from Turkish dominion, to found an Arab State under independent Arab rule under which the Arab race will renew its past glories and will rise again as a great and prosperous nation, controlling Arabia. The Arabs may confidently rely on the benevolent assistance of Great Britain in order that this object may be achieved. With the help of Great Britain the foundations of this great Arab State shall be laid down and the natural aspirations of the Arab race will thus at length be realised.

"Muhammadans! Our name as a sure friend of your religion is too firmly established for lying tongues to injure it. The sympathy which Great Britain extends to Muhammadans is known to all the world. Thus, though at war with Turkey, Great Britain has allowed thousands of Muhammadan pilgrims from India and from British possessions in the Far East to visit Mecca for the pilgrimage, and though the port of Jeddah was under the Turkish flag she has despatched ships full of grain and supplies in order that the innocent residents of the Holy Places





9

should not suffer distress and want and this notwithstanding the fact that this privilege was abused by the Turkish military authorities in the hopes of gaining some slight military advantage.

"Similarly, here in Iraq Great Britain will in no way interfere with the religious life of the people and of their leaders nor with the Holy Places, but will in virtue of her power on sea and land enable pilgrims from distant parts to make the pilgrimage to the shrines of Kerbela, Najaf and Baghdad.

"So long therefore as the inhabitants of the occupied territories conduct themselves in a friendly manner towards us they will have nothing to fear at our hands, but on the contrary will receive friendly and considerate treatment such as the people of Basrah are now experiencing.

"Refuse therefore steadfastly to be misled by lies prompted by Turkish and German agents, realise that the hour of destiny for the Arab race has now come and that the hopes of the Arabs depend upon the co-operation and support of the British Government. Avail yourselves therefore of this unique opportunity."

"Let all the Muhammadans of Iraq abide firmly in an attitude of neutrality from which no harms can come to them and which will prove the foundation of peace and prosperity."

Please let me know if you have any modifications to suggest and whether you agree to its issue.

21

No. 2158-W., dated Delhi, the 8th November 1915.

*Endorsed by the Foreign and Political Department.*

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the Army Department for information with reference to the endorsement by the Foreign and Political Department, No. 2094-W., dated the 28th October 1915.

Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 27th October 1915.

Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah, No. 5-D. S., dated the 3rd November 1915.

22

Telegram P., No. I. G.—1603, dated (and received) the 9th November 1915.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

9th, No. 586. In his No. 16\* of October 23rd to Director of Military Operations, War Office, my views and Cox's were communicated by Sir Mark

\* Not received.

Sykes, to be placed before Prime Minister, Sub-Committee. I request reference to be made thereto.

As stated therein the formation of an autonomous state in Iraq appears to be unnecessary and impossible. There is no sign here, in Iraq, of the slightest ambition of the kind among the people who expect our administration and seem to be quite ready to accept it. As they have in India, other ideas may grow in the course of years, but we are of opinion that from the point of view of Iraq it is highly unnecessary and inexpedient to put into the heads of the backward people of the country what seems to us the visionary and premature notions of the creation of an Arabic state; notions which will only tend to make endless difficulties here for Great Britain and serve no present purpose but to stimulate a small section of ambitious men to turn their activities to a direction from which, for many years to come, it is highly desirable to keep them.

Moreover there is no personality who could be called on to assume the high position of ruler of an independent Arabic state, as far as we know.

713 F. D.



10

My views being as above and Cox concurring in them, I recommend the omission of the following passages in the proposed proclamation if any is to be issued. Firstly, from words "the campaign in" to words "at length be realised" and, secondly, from the words "realise that" to the words "unique opportunity," and, thirdly, the last paragraph from "let all Muhammadans" to "peace and prosperity", as we might be able, in the case of some of these Muhammadans, to obtain active co-operation. More follows.

23

Telegram P., No. I. G.—1603, dated (and received) the 9th November 1915.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D,"

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

Continuation of my I.G.—1603.\* Finally I urge for consideration that our communications to the public at Baghdad should be within my competence

\* Serial No. 22.

and restricted to subjects of local import and that, unless such issue be forced on us or until the end of the war, neither this nor any other proclamation involving such wide questions as are raised in Secretary of State's draft be issued in Mesopotamia at all as whatever is said will be construed to our disadvantage and it is better to let our deeds speak for the good of our rule and intentions. The issue of a press communiqué in India is different. Should the Government of India, in order to reassure Indian Muhammadans, desire to make such an issue I suggest it be the proclamation proposed in Secretary of State's telegram of October 27th subject to amendments suggested.

24

Telegram P., dated the 13th (received 14th) November 1915.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi.

Arabia. Your telegram† of November 10th. With the addition of sentence expressing our determination to respect all holy places, shrines, etc., as in your suggested notification in India I agree as to proclamation by Nixon.

† Diary No. 6335-W.

I do not, as regards latter notification, understand your reasons for suppressing news of occupation. This will certainly come out from other sources. I propose therefore as soon as I have certain news of it to publish it here.

See my telegram‡ of October 12th. Proposed reference to British ladies appears no longer suitable as Turkish Government have agreed to their

‡ Diary No. 5650-W.

exchange.

25

Telegram P., No. 48-D. S., dated the 16th November 1915.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Force "D," Basrah.

Please see our telegram§ of 10th instant, No.-33 D. S. Secretary of State agrees that proclamation to be issued on occupation of Baghdad should be confined

§ Diary No. 6225-W.

to a formal notice calling upon civil population to acquiesce quietly in our occupation and assuring them that their persons and property will be scrupulously respected if they do so.

You should add that, in accordance with His Majesty's Government's unswerving policy of respecting the sacred places of Islam and susceptibilities of the Moslem community, you have issued stringent orders securing the shrines



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and tombs from damage in the course of military operations and occupation, and directing that no obstacles whatever be placed in the way of Imams, Mujtahids, Ulemas, and other religious persons following freely and as usual the ordinary practices of their religion.

27

Telegram P., No. 50-D. S., dated the 16th November 1915.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi,  
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

In a telegram§ from General Nixon regarding future of Mesopotamia he refers us to Sir Mark Sykes' No. 1C, of 23rd October, to Director, Military Operations, War Office, in which Cox's and his own views were communicated. No copy of Sykes' communication referred to above has been received by us, and we should be obliged if you could obtain and communicate to us gist of its contents. Otherwise confusion is likely to result from this procedure.


28

Telegram P., No. 149, dated the 18th (received 19th) November 1915.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

In case Germans should cut Indo-European Telegraph Department wires from Tehran will you instruct Consuls in Persia to whom you can still send messages to issue proclamation which has been prepared for publication on fall of Baghdad. All wires from Tehran are interrupted at Kum already.

S. G. P. I., Delhi.—No. 713 F. D.—26-11-15—6.





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Register No. 4592

Minute Paper. Put away with.....  
Secret Department.

D.O. Letter from India Dated. 19 November 1915.  
Rec. 15 December

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to  
Mr. Seton (d/Memo) 23.12.15.

FOR INFORMATION.

*Perh...  
15/1/16*

Previous Papers:—

18998. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1006/14.]





(38)  
(91)

Reference Paper. *Secret* Political and Secret Department.

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Letter No. 4592 Rec. 191 .

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Referred to Secretary J. P. Dept: 21<sup>st</sup> day of Dec. 1915 .


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for information  
Atkinson


Seen and returned with thanks. If spare  
copies of the memorandum are received,  
may I have one?  
W. S. S. S.  
22/12/15

Pl. copy one  
22/12/15

16086.-2. I. 1638. 2000.-11/1913.







CONFIDENTIAL.



DELHI.

The 19<sup>th</sup> November 1915.

P  
4592  
1915

My dear Hirtzel,

*with 2 spare  
copies*

I enclose herewith a copy of correspondence

Letter from Sir Mark Sykes, dated 21st August 1915. ) with Sir Mark Sykes,  
Letter to Sir Mark Sykes, dated the 28th October 1915. ) together with a copy of  
Letter from Sir Mark Sykes, dated 7th November 1915. )  
~~Memorandum on Indian Moslems~~ ) the Memorandum on Indian


*with one  
spare copy  
other will  
follow)*

Moslems which may be useful should he approach the India or Foreign Office on the subject. I may add that the Memorandum was necessarily hurriedly prepared and owing to the illness of the officer who deals specially with the Pan-Islamic movement,

*Received  
Sir Mark Sykes  
on 15 Dec*

this







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this portion of the Memorandum is necessarily  
defective.


Yours sincerely,

*A. H. Grant*

To

Sir Arthur Hirtzel, K.C.B.,  
Secretary, Political Department,  
India Office, L o n d o n .

*Shel*





(COPY).


Viceregal Lodge,  
Simla,  
21st August 1915.

Dear Grant,

I shall be in India till at least 29th and  
A.G. will have my address.

Do you think it would be possible to prepare  
a memorandum on Indian Moslem feeling on the following  
lines :

- Sec. i. General distribution of moselems
- Sec. ii. Analysis of above on racial lines.
- Sec.iii. Ditto on religious divergencies
- Sec. iv. " on Intellectuals and Old School.
- Sec. v. Give common factors.
- Sec. vi. Sectional tendencies.
- Sec.vii. Attitude of various sections towards
  - A. Ottoman Caliphate.
  - B. Sherif of Mecca.
  - C. Pan-Islamism.
  - D. Pan-Arabism.
  - E. Indian Composite Nationalism ( including idea  
of Moslem and Hindu co-operation.
- Sec.viii. Deal with External and Internal Influences.
  - EXTERNAL.
    - Turkish Empire.
    - Pilgrimage.
    - European Education.
  - INTERNAL.
    - Various propaganda.
    - Moslem Unity.
    - Inter-religious Nationalism
    - Local Education.





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I feel if such a memorandum were available it would help a great deal towards getting a co-ordinated policy on this subject in relation to the I.O.- F.O. and Egypt. If it were ready by September 20th it would be in plenty of time as that is the very earliest I can be back. My idea is that such a memorandum would serve as a very useful instruction to those who study Islam from another angle than the Indian one and would help to complete the general report I must make at the end of my journey. Please let me thank you for your patience in my daily intrusions.

Yours very sincerely,


Sd/- Mark Sykes.

P.S. I have the Viceroy's sanction to write you this letter - of course I don't suggest you should prepare the memorandum but set some one else on to it.

Sd/- M.S.

To

The Hon'ble Mr. A.H. Grant, C.S.I., C.I.E.,  
Secretary to the Government of India in the  
Foreign and Political Department, Simla.







(COPY).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Foreign & Political Department,  
Simla, the 28th October 1915.

My dear Sykes,

I enclose herewith ten copies of a memorandum on Indian Moslems for which you asked in your letter of the 21st August. Owing to the illness of our expert on the Pan-Islam question, the memorandum could not be completed altogether, but I trust you will find it useful.

I am also sending "Commission de la Reforme de l'Universite d'el-Azhar" which you lent Sharp. He was under the impression you would return to Simla before his departure. I now return the book with many thanks.

I hope you have had an interesting and profitable time in Mesopotamia.


Yours sincerely,

Sd/- A. H. Grant.

To

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bt. J.P., F.R.G.S., M.P.,

C/o General Officer Commanding, Karachi.





(COPY).

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
British India Steam Navigation Coy., Ltd.  
(Incorporated in England)  
T. S. "Linga"  
7th November 1915.

My dear Grant,

Very many thanks for your letter and memorandum which is to my mind of immense value and most suggestive. Section IV shows that fundamentally the "intellectual" is in fact the young Turk of the Committee of Union and Progress - Their policy is to keep the name of Islam and fanaticism along with it but to smash the power of the Mollah, Ulama, Moulvi, Cadhi or Mufti and put the revolutionary lawyer, pleader or editor in his place. In section IV you see the same move and I have little doubt as to whence the inspiration comes.

With all differences of climate, history and tradition accounted for, we have the same humour, that is the attempt of a "modern" literate class to get a mass of ignorant fanatics under its control, and to destroy the "obscurantist" old school literate class which at present stands in its way.


In Turkey with our applause and assistance the C.U.P. pulled off the coup and now we see the result,  
the





the ignorant Turk and Arab fights for Islam, and the Ulema and the Shaykh ul Islam and the Sultan himself are powerless in the face of a collection of cosmopolitan rascals in the pay of Germany. I am sure it is up to us to realise this lesson and to back honest moderate conservatism as typified in the Azhar Reform movement a block revolutionary intellectualism for all we are worth.

One word of criticism on the memorandum on Pan-islamism - The writer says the idea of Panislamism in India is different to that in Turkey in as much as the Turks wish to Turkify - this really is not the case - The Committee of Union and progress as a revolutionary society wishes to control, and will use any instrument that comes along, it appears anti-national because it cannot convert the Arab educated or not, to its particular way of thinking and squashes the Arab, but it is pro-zionist, and as long as the Armenians were anti-Russian and pro-nihilists it backed the Armenian Tashmakist society - It has backed Persian Nationalism, and will back any thing that is likely to work in with anarchy, atheism and disintegration - it falls out with the Arabs because the Arab sense of breed, morale, and





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and cleanliness is so strong that Committee ideas  
cannot flourish in an Arab "<sup>idea</sup>milvair".


I will send you a full memroandum: please accept  
my best thanks and also my ~~higest~~ highest compliments  
to the author of the memorandum.

Yours very sincerely,


Sd/- Mark Sykes.

To

The Hon'ble Mr. A.H. Grant, C.S.I., C.I.E.,  
Secretary to the Government of India in the  
Foreign and Political Department, Simla.







(Confidential.)

### MEMORANDUM ON INDIAN MOSLEMS.

#### SECTION I. General distribution of Moslems.

The total number of Indian Moslems is 66.6 millions or more than one-fifth of the total population of India. Their distribution is far from uniform. In the North-West Frontier Province 93 per cent., in Baluchistan 91 per cent., in the Punjab 55 and in Bengal 53 per cent. of the inhabitants profess this religion. The proportion falls to 28 per cent. in Assam, 20 per cent. in Bombay and 14 per cent. in the United Provinces. Bihar and Orissa is the only other major province where it exceeds 10 per cent., while in the Madras Presidency it is 6½, in the Central Provinces and Berar it is only 4, and in Burma 3.5 per cent. In the Native States taken as a whole, the proportion of Muhammadans is much smaller than in British territory, but they are very numerous in the Baluchistan States and Kashmir and fairly so in the States of the Punjab, Bengal and United Provinces.

#### SECTION II. Analysis of above on racial lines.

(ii) The Muhammadans of India belong to seven distinctive groups—

- (a) Turko-Iranian in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (2,723,145).
- (b) Indo-Aryan in Ajmer-Merwara, Rajputana, the Punjab and Kashmir (15,334,727).
- (c) Dravidian in Madras, Mysore, Hyderabad, Travancore, Cochin, Chota Nagpur, Central Provinces and Berar (4,986,473).
- (d) Aryo-Dravidian in the United Provinces and Bihar (10,294,446).
- (e) Mongolo-Dravidian in Bengal and Orissa (21,419,408).
- (f) Mongoloid in Assam, Sikkim, Cooch Behar and Hill Tippera (1,794,897).
- (g) Seytho-Dravidian in Bombay, Baroda and Coorg (4,770,544).

#### SECTION III. Analysis on religious divergencies.

(iii) The main sects of Islam are the Sunnis and the Shihs, the latter number about 15 millions. The schism arose within the first century after the death of the Prophet, the Sunnis, or Traditionalists, accepting the Sunnat, or collected body of usage, as possessing authority concurrent with or supplementary to the Koran, a view which the Shihs reject. Shihs maintain that the Imamate, or temporal and spiritual headship of the faithful, was by divine right vested in Ali and his descendants through Hasan and Husain, the ill-fated grandsons of the Prophet. They necessarily reject as usurpers the first 3 Imams, Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman—whom the Sunnis respect. The former observe the annual feast of the Muharram in memory of the martyrdom of Ali and his two sons, while the Sunnis celebrate only the tenth day of Muharram, and abhor the *tazias*, or representations of the tombs of the martyrs, which the Shihs parade in procession. Sunnis are largely in excess in Turkey and India, Shihs in Persia, their chief seats in India being Lucknow and Hyderabad. The Shia movement, in fact, is strongest where there is least Arab intermixture in the population. Hence some have defined it as an Aryan protest against Semite domination.

#### Minor sects of Islam.


In Islam the sectarian movement usually follows one of two lines: it is either puritanical or pietistic.

#### The Wahabis.

A type of the first class of sect is that of the Wahabis, founded in Nejd in Arabia, early in the eighteenth century. It was an attempt to restore the primitive practices of Islam, which, in the view of the founder, had become corrupted during its world wide career of conquest. The new doctrine was introduced into India by Saiyid Ahmad Shah, who proclaimed a holy war against the Sikhs in 1826, and founded the colony of fanatics on the North-West Frontier. Wahabis accept the six books of traditions collected by the Sunnis but reject the glosses of the Church theologians and claim liberty of conscience and the right of private interpretation. They insist on the unity of God which, they say, has been endangered by the reverence paid to the person of the Prophet, to the Imams and Saints. Hence they condemn pilgrimages to shrines. They discountenance the use of rosaries, and regard tobacco as unlawful. From a political point of view the most dangerous doctrine of the sect was to assert that India is "the land of warfare", against the rulers of which to wage war is a religious duty. Much controversy has arisen regarding this doctrine which is undoubtedly accepted by some members of the sect. It would seem, however, that the fanatical element in the movement has for the present died out in many parts.

#### Sufism.

The second sectarian movement in Islam tends in the direction of Sufism—a strange combination of the pantheism of the Aryan race, and of the severe monotheism of their Semitic conquerors. Sufism aims at leading men to the contemplation of spiritual things by appealing to their emotions. The keynote of the system is that the human soul is an emanation from God, and that it is always seeking and yearning to rejoin the source from which it sprung. Ecstasy is the means by which a nearer intercourse is obtained and absorption in the divinity is the ultimate object to be attained. These doctrines, with more or less variance of practice, are accepted by the leading Sunni orders, such as the Chistiyas and Kadiriyyas. Outside these are the Be-shara, or non-orthodox orders, who, while calling themselves Musalmans, do not accommodate their lives to the principles of any definite creed. These furnish the most desperate Musalman fanatics.



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**The Ahmadiyas.** The wildest development of recent sectarianism in Islam is furnished by the Ahmadi sect, which has its headquarters in the Punjab. Its leader, Mulla Ghulam Ahmad, in a recent manifesto claims to be the counterpart of the Saviour of Christianity, and to be the Mahdi or Messiah expected by Musalmans and Christians alike. The Koran is to him the repository of all knowledge. The resurrection is at hand. While discouraging religious war, he is said to preach strongly against Christianity, Hinduism, the Shiah doctrines, and the movement in favour of English education.

**Moplahs, Bohras, Khojas.** Three notable phases of Muhammadan religious life are illustrated by the Moplahs, the Bohras and the Khojas. The first are found to the number of a million in Malabar. This tribe is remarkable for the savage fanaticism displayed in successive revolts against Hindus. The Bohras, or "traders" of western India, fall into two groups, the mercantile branch, originally Shiabs, and the land holding section, who are generally Sunnis. Both are mainly converts from Hinduism. The Khojas are active traders on the west coast of the Peninsula and in East Africa. The well-known Agha Khan of Bombay is their head.

**SECTION IV.** Intellectuals and old school. The precise meaning of "Intellectuals and old school" is not clear but the following facts may be of interest:—

In the last 10 years or so there has in certain parts of India been a great change in the attitude of Muhammadans towards the old Moslem educational system on the one hand and the modern educational system on the other. The figures given under the head "Education" sufficiently prove this. It is particularly interesting to note that the number of pupils in private institutions (which are institutions largely concerned with the teaching of Arabic, Persian and the Koran) is, within a few hundreds, the same in 1914 that it was in 1902; whereas the number of pupils in public institutions (which follow the ordinary courses, though their numbers include a certain number of *Maktabas*, &c.) has in the same period almost doubled. The Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal have quarrelled with the courses prescribed in the *Madrasas* with the result that the Local Government have published a highly modernised course for the majority of these institutions (the famous Calcutta Madrasa being excepted) which insists upon English in most of the courses. The discussions leading up to this change show that the feeling against the retention of Persian and the old traditional subjects (save in a minor degree or for special courses) is quite surprising. This reform of the *Madrasas* contrasts most strongly with the reforms contemplated in the Al-Azhar University at Cairo. The one is a radical change, the other a conservative compromise. It will yet remain to be seen how these courses in Bengal can be introduced and what will be their effect. This does not mean that there is total neglect of the traditional subjects. *Hadis* and *Tafsir*, &c., will be still taught, but less time will be devoted to them. The traditional curriculum still flourishes unchanged in many up-country *Madrasas* such as the institution at Deobund.


**SECTION V.** Common Factors. The only common factors running through all shades of Moslem feeling and Moslem thought in India would appear to be the vague idea of Islam which acts as a political catchword and as a fanatical war-cry: a conscientious though often artificial and superficial contempt for and dislike of all non-Moslems or infidels: and a desire to see the Moslem races raised once more to a dominant position. In fact the common aim would appear to be secular self-interest rather than religious propagandism.

**SECTION VI.** Sectional tendencies. Caste is a creation of Hinduism but the Muhammadan community is largely influenced by caste practices derived from its long contact with the Hindu system. Even among Muhammadans the evolution of the caste system has moreover proceeded on characteristically Hindu lines. In both communities foreign descent forms the highest claim to social distinction, in both promotion cometh from the west. As the twice-born Aryan is to the mass of Hindus, so is the Muhammadan of Arab, Persian, Afghan or Mughal origin to the rank and file of his co-religionists.

The highest class of men of alleged foreign origin will marry daughters of men who rank below them in social estimation but the converse process is vigorously condemned. Thus a Saiyid will marry a Sheikh's daughter but will not give his daughter in return and inter-marriage between the upper circle of *soldisant* foreigners and the main body of Indian Muhammadans is generally reprobated, except in parts of the country where the aristocratic element is small and must arrange its marriages as best it can. Speaking generally, it may be said that the social cadre of the higher ranks of Muhammadans is based on hypergamy with a tendency in the direction of endogamy, while the lower functional groups are strictly endogamous, and are organized on the model of regular castes, with councils and officers which enforce the observance of caste rules by the time honoured sanction of boycotting.

For further information please see also Section III.

**SECTION VII.** (a) Attitude of Moslems towards the Caliphate. The question of the Caliphate concerns only the Orthodox Moslems (Sunnis) who are in the great majority. The other sects have conflicting views on the subject. The Sunnis hold that the guardianship of the holy places must be in the hands of a Moslem Sovereign who derives his title to the Caliphate by nomination from his predecessor. This precedent of nomination has been followed since the 16th Century. For this reason the Orthodox Moslems regard the Sultan of Turkey as the rightful Caliph of Islam and owe him *spiritual* allegiance. The Wahabis and Shiabs, however, hold that the Turkish Sultans are usurpers as also do the Moslems of Morocco, while those of Arabia and Mecca in particular are



(b) Attitude of various sections towards the Sharif of Mecca.

(c) Pan-Islamism.

(d) Indian composite nationalism including the idea of Moslem and Hindu co-operation.

SECTION VIII  
Turkish Empire.

External pilgrimage.

External European education.

said to be awaiting a favourable opportunity to drive the Turks out of their country and choose a Caliph from amongst the Sharif families of Mecca.

As regards the attitude of Indian Muhammadans towards the Sharif of Mecca there is no direct evidence. As far as can be ascertained they regard the Sharif as merely a civil governor appointed by the Sultan of Turkey and not possessed of any religious authority.

In the case of a complex phenomenon such as Pan-Islamism, to the formation of which a number of subtle tendencies have contributed, it is necessary to disentangle one or two ideas to show how their operation appear to have produced the result.

The movement is religious as well as political. The former is practically universal; the latter, though widespread, has features peculiar to India and Turkey, but with different objectives.

The bonds of sympathy between Moslems in India and elsewhere is very strong and real, and their susceptibilities were wounded by the recent misfortunes befalling their co-religionists in Tripoli and Persia. Muhammadans imagined a Christian coalition to encompass the ruin of Islam which could only be averted by a Moslem federation justified on religious or humanitarian grounds. Such appears to have been the origin of the Pan-Islamic religious movement.

The Pan-Islamic political movement generally is based on the principle of nationality. The various Musalman peoples see in Pan-Islamism a means of safeguarding their rights and averting absorption and Turkish domination politically. Indian Muhammadans, apprehensive of absorption by Hinduism, see in the political Pan-Islamic movement a means for the continuance of Islamism as a national entity in India. The idea of Pan-Islamism among the young Turk party is widely different. The Turks wish to make Pan-Islamism an instrument for the effective domination of all other Musalman peoples. The absolute predominance of the Turkish element is with them an inviolable principle.

In 1907 was founded the All-India Moslem League. One of its chief objects is to cultivate harmonious relations with other Indian communities, especially with the great sister community of the Hindus. Since the foundation of the league there has been a growing tendency on the part of the élite Hindus and Muhammadans to strengthen the solidarity of political unity. But the absence of the essential factors which make for nationality, such as the possession of a common language and literature, common historic traditions, community of religion and of social customs, tends towards separation rather than consolidation. The object of the league will therefore take a long time to effect and great changes of religious feeling and social customs must take place before the masses of either community will follow their leaders. So long as Muhammadans kill for food or sacrifice the animal (cow) deemed sacred by the Hindus and so long as the Hindus of some parts of India suggest by the cult of Sivaji the revolt of Hinduism against Islam, occasions for deadly strife are bound to arise when the passion of religious animosity will overpower the sentiment of common nationality.

Most Moslems fear that the destruction of the Turkish Government will involve also the destruction of Muhammadan principles.

It is principally the religious bond which makes them so attached to Turkey. The greatest desire of the Moslem races is to see a strong, prosperous and educated Ottoman Empire. Its traditions appeal to their imagination and stir their sympathies. But it is an accepted doctrine that the recognition of the Sultan as Caliph does not involve any political allegiance to him. For this reason the Moslems of India and Egypt have not wavered in their secular allegiance.

The duty of pilgrimage is enforced by the law of Islam on every Moslem who is not exempted under the law. The interest of the Muhammadan public in questions relating to the pilgrimage is evidenced by the formation of Haj Committees in several of the large towns of India and by the establishment, in 1913, of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or Society of Servants of the Kaaba. The object of the former institutions is to disseminate useful information regarding various questions connected with the Haj. The ostensible object of the latter society is to safeguard the sanctity of the Kaaba and other sacred places of Islam from violation, to maintain an independent and effective Moslem sovereignty over those lands and to remove existing difficulties of pilgrimage to the Hedjaz. To this end the Society of Servants of the Kaaba has decided to publish a newspaper in Arabic in order to enlighten the Bedouins who harass Musalman pilgrims and thus put difficulties in the performance of pilgrimage. The object of the society is also to impress on Musalmans everywhere their duty to their religion.

There is abundant evidence that the leaders of the Muhammadan community are strenuously endeavouring to take advantage of the State system of education. The prejudice of Muhammadans against the learning of English is a thing of the past. Muhammadans do not go to Europe or America to the same extent as do the Hindus. Figures are not available as the majority of Indians who go abroad for education go with private scholarships or private means.



**Moslem unity.**

The question of the Imamate or the spiritual headship of the Moslem Commonwealth is the chief battle ground of the two main sects of Muhammadans—Sunnis and Shihs. In other matters there is a bond of sympathy which is much in evidence whenever indications appear of any concerted movement destructive of Islamism. Thus it is that the independence of Islamic States, such as Turkey and Persia, is dear to Indian Muhammadans. They consider that the existence of independent Moslem States will not only prevent their absorption by Hinduism, a fear ever present to the Moslem mind, but also that independent Islamic States go far to guarantee, by their moral, as well as their political, support, the continuance of Muhammadans as a separate national entity in India.

**Inter-religious nationalism.**

The "Moslem League" which includes both Sunnis and Shihs is an organisation to strengthen the solidarity of political unity.

**Internal Local education.**

According to the census statistics of 1911 of the total population of India, only 59 persons per mille are literate in the sense of being able to write a letter to a friend and to read his reply. There are many Muhammadans, especially in Northern India, who can read the Koran, though they cannot write a word. No statistics of this form of literacy are available.

Of the different religious communities, the Muhammadans stand almost at the bottom of the list as regards literates. They have 69 males and 4 females per mille. The low position of the Muhammadans is due largely to the fact that they are found chiefly in the North-West of India where all classes are backward in respect of education, and in Eastern Bengal where they consist mainly of local converts from a depressed class. In Sind the Muhammadan population is exceptionally illiterate; in the rest of the Presidency proper the most educated classes are Bohras, Khojas, Memons and Telis.

The Statistical table below gives the Muhammadan literates per mille throughout India :

Province, State or Agency.	NUMBER PER MILLE WHO ARE LITERATE.	
	MUSALMAN.	
	Males.	Females.
INDIA	69	4
<i>Provinces</i> ...	69	4
Ajmer-Merwara	95	6
Andamans and Nicobars	195	34
Assam	67	2
Baluchistan	16	1
Bengal	79	2
Bihar and Orissa	79	5
Bombay	95	7
Burma	234	77
Central Provinces and Berar	167	10
Coorg	183	16
Madras	168	11
N.-W. F. Province	25	1
Punjab	27	2
United Provinces	58	6
<i>States and Agencies</i> ...	70	8
Baroda State	232	17
Central India Agency	107	12
Cochin State	138	7
Hyderabad State	103	13
Kashmir State	15	...
Mysore State	200	41
Rajputana Agency	44	3
Sikim State	632	...
Travancore State	171	13


*Note.*—The figures for Provinces are inclusive of the States attached to them, except in the case of Madras, where they exclude Cochin and Travancore.

The last 12 years have witnessed a remarkable awakening on the part of this community to the advantages of English education. Within this period the number of Muhammadan pupils in institutions of all kinds has increased by approximately 721,000 or by 73%. The number at school accordingly represents over 17% of those of school-going age. The number in the old-fashioned private schools remains stationary. The increase is almost wholly due to numbers in the public schools, which has increased by 98%. Still more remarkable has been the increase of Muhammadan pupils in higher institutions. The number of Muhammadans in Arts Colleges was 1,259 in 1902 and 3,792 in 1914; that in professional colleges has approximately doubled within the period, while that in English secondary schools has



advanced from about 55,000 to 161,000. In primary institutions (in which the vernacular is taught) the proportion of Muhammadan pupils is considerable, being 11·1% of those of school-going age as against 14·4% in the case of pupils of all creeds in primary schools. The Muhammadans now avail themselves largely of the ordinary institutions which are common to all communities, but special facilities are also afforded them in the shape of special institutions such as *Madrassas* and also Muhammadan hostels and scholarships and a few special Inspectors. In some parts of India, notably in Sind and in Bengal, efforts have been made by Government to impart a considerable element of secular education into the Mullah schools, the Koran schools and *Maktabas*, while Koran teaching and instruction in Urdu (even where it is not the ordinary vernacular) are still retained. These efforts have been successful. In April 1913, the Government of India issued an important circular to Local Governments regarding the encouragement of Muhammadan education. This circular gave high satisfaction to the community. While the Muhammadans have shown great keenness on the subject of secular education they are nevertheless eager to retain or introduce religious instruction in special Muhammadan institutions. The scheme for a Muhammadan University, initiated at the beginning of 1911 and not yet matured, partly reflects this feeling but was prompted mainly by other motives. It is proposed to locate this University at Aligarh, where the famous M. A. O. College already exists. This institution which was previously the nearest approach in India to an English public school has now increased its number, admitting pupils from ranks of society who previously did not aspire to such education, and under extra-educational influence has suffered deterioration.

(a) Total population of school-going age	...	...	38,273,073
(b) Muhammadan population of school-going age	...	...	9,997,095
(c) Total Muhammadans at school	...	...	1,099,449
(d) Muhammadans in primary ( <i>i.e.</i> , primary public institutions) institutions	...	...	1,108,218
(e) All creeds in primary institutions	...	...	5,518,071
(f) Percentage of total Muhammadans at school (c) to Muhammadan population of school-going age (b)	...	...	17
(g) Percentage of total Muhammadans at school (c) to total population of school-going age (a)	...	...	4·4
(h) Percentage of Muhammadans in primary institutions (d) to total population of school-going ages (a)	...	...	2·9
(i) Percentage of Muhammadans in primary institutions (d) to Muhammadan population of school-going age (b)	...	...	11·1
(j) Percentage of all creeds in primary institutions (e) to total population of school-going age (a)...	...	...	14·4





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Register No. 4561  
1915

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letters from 20 Dated 11.12 Dec 1915.  
Rec. 13

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	13 Dec.	UW	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>The negotiations.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Attitude of the French.</li> <li>2. Instructions to Sir H. McMahon regarding reply to Grand Sherif</li> <li>3. Views of Sir R. Briggate</li> </ol>
Secretary of State.....	14	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Just by. ae 15/12


Copy to India Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

FOR INFORMATION.

1. Mr. Scott, it appears, belongs to the old anti-British colonial party of Mr. Deland. He is also connected with Mr. Vitche, who in turn is connected with Mr. Huguenin of the Baghdad R. If a serious attempt is to be made to capture the French Govt, it seems to me that the best plan is to send Sir M. Sykes & Mr. St. John to Paris to reason with them.
2. F.O. have been asked to instruct Sir H. McMahon to report to the G. of I.

Previous Papers:—

18698. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1006/14.]







*L. G. Auzel*

P  
4561  
1915

(5)  
(54)

EGYPT

Decypher Sir H. MacMahon (Cairo) December 10th 1915.

d. 12.5 a.m. December 11th

r. 10.35 a.m. December 11th.

No. 761

.....

Arab question.

Selection of Picot as their representative on recent committee on this question is discouraging indication of French attitude. Picot is a notorious fanatic on Syrian question and quite incapable of assisting any mutual settlement on reasonable common sense grounds which present situation requires. It is unfortunate that adviser of French Government here, de France is man of similar type. Notwithstanding recent assurances to me I am informed that he sent a few days ago for a leading Arab notary of Damascus now in Egypt and told him as follows. "You can tell all your friends here from me and I tell you this in my capacity as representative of French Government that Syria shall never be part of Arab empire. Syria will be under protection of France and we shall shortly send an army to occupy it but we shall govern it in the way which most suits its people of all races and religions."


This is not helpful but while present attitude of French Government continues it appears useless for me to remonstrate with him.

In the meantime both desirability and difficulty of detaching arabs from our enemy are daily increasing. Conditions of Arabia never justified expectation of active or organised assistance such as some people think is object of our proposed mutual understanding. What we want is material advantage of even passive Arab sympathy and assistance on our side instead of their active co-operation with enemy.

This advantage will become of still more vital importance to us if as now seems probable time does not longer permit of action elsewhere and we have to await enemy's advance on Egypt.


Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to India.







In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 181834 1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

  
Secret.

(52)  
(55)  
4561  
1915

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for  
India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Dec. 11<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Letter to Foreign Office :  
from

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Let. to Sir H. McMahon, Cairo. No. 961. Urgent.	Arab Question


Copy to Sir A.H.  
12/12

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13 DEC 1915  
FOCAL

(Similar letter sent to

[ 14 ]





EGYPT

(181834/15).

Cypher telegram to Sir H. McMahon (Cairo).

Foreign Office. December 10th 1915. 6.40 p.m.

No.961. Urgent.

Your telegram No.736.

Importance of display of British or Allied force round which Arabs can rally is fully recognised here, but you will realise that present situation at Gallipoli and Salonica makes it out of the question for the moment to embark on any other expedition.

Attitude of French Government in regard to Syria is also very difficult and we have little hope of obtaining from them any assurance that will really satisfy Arabs.

On the other hand, we must try to keep the negotiations with the Sherif in being, and you are authorised to reply to him as follows:-

Points 1 and 2, as you propose.

As regards point 3, you should say that as the interests of others are involved, the point requires careful consideration by His Majesty's Government and a further communication in regard to it will be sent later.


Point 4. We should prefer to say that His Majesty's Government are, as the Sherif knows, disposed to give a guarantee to assist and protect the proposed Arab kingdom as far as may be within their power, but their interests demand, as the Sherif has recognised, a friendly administration in the Vilayet of Bagdad and the safeguarding of those interests call for much fuller and more detailed consideration of the future of Mesopotamia than the present situation and the urgency of the negotiations permit. (This need not, however preclude eventual consideration of a perpetual lease or any other reasonable financial proposal that may be made to us, though it will of course depend on extent and success of Arab co-operation).


Point 5. The first and narrower assurance you propose.


Points 6 and 7. As you suggest.

It should also be made clear to Sherif that when we spoke of our existing agreements with Sheikhs being upheld, we referred to Arabian peninsula no less than to Mesopotamia. Provided these agreements are faithfully observed, His Majesty's Government have no wish or intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.



















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Register No. 4413  
4419

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Telegram from Basra  
Letter from F.O.

Dated 2 } December 1915.  
Rec. 3 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	3 Dec.	Att	The War.
Secretary of State.....	4	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			Biri Sand
Under Secretary.....			Biri Reshid
Secretary of State.....			Grand Sheriff of Mecca. Arab feeling in Syria

partly.  
AL  
4/12


Copy to F.O. } 3 Dec (let<sup>r</sup>) (4413)  
Mil }  
India (30 papers) 10 Dec 1915 (4419)


**FOR INFORMATION.**

Satisfactory as far as it goes.

Previous Papers:—

18698. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1000/14.]





1 copy to G.O. (60) incl 3/2

Telegram from Holland, Basra  
Dated 2nd December 1915.

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4413  
1915

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
2663 B. Three Arabs of Shammar with 200 camels arrived at Zobeyr from Hail about 11th November to buy provisions. Following is substance of speech which they gave in reply to my question.


While Bin Saud was in Hassa Bin Rashid had skirmish with people of Qasim Aneiza Boreida but Bin Rashid suffered no reverse at hands of Bin Saud. No recent agreement made between Bin Rashid and Bin Saud, but latter broke agreement made two years ago. Turkish Officer came to Bin Rashid 10 months ago, but returned immediately. No Turkish Officer now with Bin Rashid.


<sup>Saud</sup> ~~Munsey~~ Sherriff Mecca came to Athala in Sadair to claim tax from Ataiba. He fought <sup>against</sup> Bareih clan Almatair who surrendered to him. Son of Sherriff last heard of <sup>in</sup> (him) Shagra in Sadair and then reported to be returning to Mecca. Sherriff of Mecca said to be <sup>in</sup> friendly relations with Bin Saud and impression given me was that no communication held between son of Sherriff and Bin Rashid.

Addressed to C.G.S. Simla, repeated to S. of S. for I.


RECEIVED  
3 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

















Copy.  
No. 404.

P  
4419  
1915

BERNE,  
November 23rd, 1915.

Sir:-


I have the honour to report that I received a visit on November 22nd, 1915, from a certain Moukhtar Bey Soulh, formerly Aide-de-Camp of the Crown Prince of Turkey and at present Inspector of the Baghdad Railway. Moukhtar Bey Soulh has just arrived from Aleppo and Constantinople accompanied by his sister who is seeking medical advice abroad.

He states that he was deputed by Committees in Syria and Constantinople to represent to the first British authority with whom he could establish contact that Syria and Arabia are ripe for revolt and have been so any time during the last four months.

Committees of notables have been secretly established in every town in Syria, as also in Constantinople, who would give every support to and rally round any Expeditionary Force landed in Syria for the purpose of raising the country in open rebellion. Certain declarations would be required by which the country might be assured of its complete independence of Constantinople in both a political and religious sense. The Mahomedans of Syria would not continue to recognize the Sultan as Khalif and wished to → nominate a Khalif of their own choice. Further, the people would require arms, ammunitions, supplies.

If

Evelyn Grant Duff, Esq., C.M.G.,  
&c., &c., &c.  
Berne.



Copy  
No. 404  
(1915)

BERNE,  
November 23rd, 1915.

131  
444

Sir:-

I have the honor to report that I received a visit on November 22nd, 1915, from a certain Munkhtar Bey Souh, formerly Aide-Camp of the Crown Prince of Turkey and at present Inspector of the Baghdad Railway. Munkhtar Bey Souh has just arrived from Aleppo and Constantinople accompanied by his sister who is seeking medical advice abroad.

He states that he was deputed by Committees in Syria and Constantinople to represent to the British authority with whom he could establish contact that Syria and Arabia are ripe for revolt and have been so any time during the last four months. Committees of notables have been secretly established in every town in Syria, as also in Constantinople, who would give every support to and rely round any Expeditionary Force landed in Syria for the purpose of raising the country in open rebellion. Certain declarations would be required by which the country might be assured of its complete independence of Constantinople in both a political and religious sense. The Mahomedans of Syria would not continue to recognize the Sultan as Khalif and wished to nominate a Khalif of their own choice. Further, the people would require arms, ammunitions, supplies.

If

Evelyn Grant Duff, Esq., G.M.G.,  
Sec.,  
Berne.



64  
64

If the foregoing guarantees were given and equipment supplied we could count on the Arabs and Syrians from Baghdad to the Mediterranean and a barrier would be raised against movements of Turkish troops from the direction of the Taurus.


Committee Agents are with the Anase Tribe who give tribal allegiance to Sheikh Hadjim Bin Mihied. One of these agents, Sami Bey Soulh, Conseiller Legiste of the Baghdad Railway Company, is own brother to Moukhtar Bey Soulh. Moukhtar Bey suggests that his brother should be sent for as soon as Baghdad is occupied by British troops. He describes him as an energetic well educated man who influences the Sheikh and who would prove useful.

Regarding the Baghdad railway Moukhtar Bey states that it is open from Islahieh south of the Amanus to Aleppo, and thence by Muslimié, Djerabus, Tel-al-Abiad to Rass-el-Ein. The long tunnel through the Amanus; as also the work in the Taurus which comprises 24 tunnels of some 23 kilometers in length, is, according to this informant, far from completion. He gave two years as an estimate for the linking up of the line between Anatolia and Aleppo.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) H. Picot,

Lieutenant Colonel.  
Military Attaché.





(62)  
53 (65)

Register No.  
**4414-5**  
1915.

Put away with.....

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Two letters from FO, Dated 2 } Dec 1915.  
Rec. 3 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	2 Dec.	W.H.	<u>Arabia</u> Negotiations with Grand Sheriff of Mecca Views of D.M.O. & Sir H. McMahon
Secretary of State.....	3	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to India [See within] (Caliphate file)

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers :-

16998. I. 453. 2000.-4/1915. [1006/14.]

J. 1/24  
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4/12







In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 181874 /1915

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

*Secret*

P  
4414  
1915  
66

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for  
India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Dec. 1<sup>st</sup> 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon Del. No. 736. Nov. 30 <sup>th</sup>	Arab Question


RECEIVED  
2 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(Similar letter sent to

[ 14 ]










There are many Shiah Arabs in Irak but there<sup>are</sup> also many Christian Arabs in the west, but neither fact appears to me to preclude general agreement on lines suggested. Every portion of Arab empire will require some different form of administration to suit its local conditions, and this alone will I think sufficiently postpone or prevent creation of united independent Arab State which India seems to apprehend.


Even such an Arab State established and controlled under entente auspices will present far less danger than survival of hostile Ottoman empire wherein Arabs would be under Turks, Turks under Committee of Union and progress and the latter under Germany a contingency which cannot be regarded as impossible if conclusion of (group undecypherable ?war) finds Turkey with an unbeaten army in Syria and North Mesopotamia. With regard to objections to Arab movement raised in other quarters I think it right to warn His Majesty's Government that Germans and Young Turks are doubtless endeavouring to employ certain indirect influences. French financial interests and Indian Mohammedanism were both brought into play on the recapture of Adrianople, and one must anticipate this influence again in this connection.


The Shereef's letter demands a reply, and I regret the delay which my absence has caused in submitting proposals.

In doing so now I am faced with the great difficulty which besets our treatment of the Arab question if the policy of awaiting in Egypt the threatened Turco-German advance is adhered to. This policy will jeopardise any attempt to secure Arab co-operation and it would appear unwise urging Arabs into premature activity which through want of our support and fear of Turkish retaliation might hasten their abandonment of our cause. (In this connection see also the Sirdar's views as stated in my telegram of November 16th).

The











our hands but require formula that satisfies Arab sentiment).  
What they obviously most desire is some assurance of our  
considering the question of a quit-rent or subsidy.


5. Assurance of the Shereef that Great Britain has no  
intention to conclude peace in terms of which freedom of Arabs  
from Turkish domination does not form essential condition.  
(On some assurance of this nature sole hope of successful under-  
standing depends. I would even suggest (that) stronger assurance  
to the effect that if Arabs play proper part in the war  
we bind ourselves not to desert them nor to conclude any  
peace etc. as above).

6. Appreciation of Shereef's desire for caution and dis-  
claim wish to urge him to hasty action jeopardizing Arab pro-  
jects but in the meantime he must spare no effort to attach Arab  
peoples to our cause and prevent them assisting the enemy, as it  
is of the success of these efforts and on active measures which  
the Arabs may hereafter take in our cause when the time comes  
that permanency of present arrangement must depend.

7. Inform him that, to facilitate his efforts in our joint  
cause, we are sending him some funds. (Since stoppage of Ottoman  
Government donations to the Shereef he is in pressing need of  
funds for the maintenance of Mecca and Medina and for the  
maintenance of his forces. It is most desirable to assist him  
generously and I would recommend grant of £50,000 to be given  
in instalments as matters progress. To be effective sum must be  
large and greater part of any money we give him will find its  
way to our own trade ports).


It is desirable to reply without undue delay as messenger  
is still waiting here.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India No. 736.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 181180 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

 Secret.

(71) 66  
4095  
4414  
1915

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Dec. 2<sup>d</sup>, 1915.

Copy to India  
10 DEC 1915

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Note prepared by the D. M. O. Nov. 29 <sup>th</sup> 1915.	Arab Question

(Similar letter sent to \_\_\_\_\_)

RECEIVED  
2 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

[ 14 ]





Copy.

Note on the Arab Movement.

P 69  
4414  
1915

(1) On the 23rd of November a meeting was held of the committee appointed to discuss with a French representative the question of Syria and the Arabs. (72)


The object of the committee was to persuade the French representative of the necessity of offering to the Arabs and Syrians, in the Syrian area to be allotted to the French, some measure of independence, conditional on their assisting the Allies, thus putting a check to Turkish and German aims in consolidating Mohammedan religious feeling with them.

(2) The attitude of the French representative was absolutely uncompromising. He held out no hopes whatever of the French making any offer of independence to the Syrians. He endeavoured to throw doubt on the Turks and Germans being able to stir up any religious Mohammedan movement. And he asked for proofs as to the strength of the Arab and Syrian racial movement, which he suggested was much exaggerated by the Cairo authorities.

(3) It may be well in this connection to allude to the expression of views, reported elsewhere, by the French Military Attaché, namely that, should an expedition to Alexandretta be undertaken, the French must insist on their supplying at least two thirds of the force.

(4) The attitude of the French can only be explained in one way - However much they may protest to the contrary, they are fully aware of the fact that the Syrians and Arabs would very much prefer to be under British than French tutelage - And they foresee the great embarrassment and difficulty which might result to themselves from this fact.

If



COPY.

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70  
2.

72

If Syria from the first is treated as a purely French possession and if, in the event of an expedition to Syria, the great preponderance of troops were French, making it obvious that no other Power had any interests, they realize that the difficulty is never likely to arise.

(5) To compel the French to fall in with our views it is only possible to reiterate arguments already put forward, and to emphasize them in such a way that it is obviously to their own disadvantage, as well as unfriendly to us, not to do so.

The arguments are briefly as follows:-


From information, the sources of which (Cairo and Constantinople) are not available to the French, it is known that the Arab and Syrian racial movement has great force, given the opportunity.

There is a chance, though it is every moment becoming fainter, of using it as a powerful weapon against the Turks.

There is the certainty that, if proofs are not given of the sympathy of the French and British with the movement, it will range itself on the Turkish side and that, provided the Turks play their cards cleverly, it will become solid against the Allies.

Consequent upon the above there is the most imminent danger that the Germans and Young Turks will succeed in what it has been their constant endeavour to achieve from long past, namely the military co-operation of the whole Mohammedan world in a religious war against the Allies.

From the above considerations it should be pointed out to the French that their refusal to act as we wish may endanger







3. <sup>(71)</sup>  
(74)

endanger all British possessions in the East, and may thus necessitate the removal of a very large part of the British Army from France, thus weakening the Allies in the French theatre dangerously; also that the French themselves may be faced with serious embarrassment and danger in North Africa.

The French must allow that we have studied the matter carefully and honestly. They must allow that no opportunity of damaging the enemy, however slight it may seem, should be neglected.

Even supposing, as suggested by the French representative, that our premises are incorrect, the French are liable to no drawbacks, except possibly sentimental ones, in making the offers suggested, since these offers are only conditional on the action of the Arabs against the Turks.

(6) Further, if other means fail, it may be desirable to point out to the French that, since their refusal to consider sympathetically our suggestions will, in our opinion, consolidate the Arabs and Syrians against the Allies, the result of which will chiefly be felt in Egypt by us, we must therefore reserve to ourselves the right to entirely reconsider the whole Syrian question.


(Sd). Chas.E.Callwell.


D.M.O.


(Sd). A.C.Parker,

Lt-Colonel.

*Nov. 29<sup>th</sup> 1915*









Decypher. Sir H. McMahon (Iudros)  
November 16th. 1915.

D. 7.0.p.m. November 16th. 1915.  
R. 9.20.p.m.

Unnumbered.

Copy  
4226/15

My previous telegram.


Following telegram from Cairo begins:

Careful translation has now been done and following gives more fully general sense of second half of letter which is rather vaguely expressed.

Begins: Shereef renounces interest in Adana Mersina but insists on retention of Beyrout, Aleppo Vilayets as purely Arab.

For trading economic reasons he cannot abandon Irak but is prepared in order to facilitate agreement and in consideration of guarantees offered by His Majesty's Government to "leave under British Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by British troops against a suitable sum paid as compensation to Arab Kingdom for period of occupation" without prejudice to rights of either party. Actual agreements with Sheikhs to be respected.

As to immediate action Shereef hesitates for fear of adverse opinion of Moslems of opposite camp and still more lest in the event of peace unfavourable to Entente Arabs may be left to face Turco-German combination. Once they are sure that His Majesty's Government will effectively support them they are ready for action. As to British Administrative officials there is no need to mention this question His Majesty's Government having disclaimed all intention of internal interference. (N.B. unless purposely vague Shereef must be here alluding to Arabia only) Shereef would prefer for himself seclusion from all politics but is forced by Arabs to his (?present) course of action. Salutation.  
I propose to defer my views on this question until my return to Cairo.





77 74

Register No.  
4388  
1915

Put away with 53

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

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Letter from F.O. Dated } 30 Nov. 1915.  
 had Dept let<sup>m</sup> 30 Nov. Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	30 Nov.	MS	<u>The War</u> Military operations in the Middle East. Views of Sir H. McMahon & the G. of S.
Secretary of State.....	1	Sec <sup>r</sup>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to  
 India 3 December 1915

**FOR INFORMATION.**

These two telegrams are inter-related, & have a very decided political bearing.

Sir H. McMahon's is based, evidently, on the views of Sir M. Lykes. It seems probable that either of the operations recommended by the latter, if successfully carried out - we cannot afford to risk any more failures - wd. have important political results, from wh. military results wd. also follow. Incidentally the German plan of campaign in Mesopotamia & Syria (if it be anything more than bluff) wd. be as effectually disturbed as by the capture of Bagdad - possibly more so.

As regards the capture of Bagdad, it seems to me - in spite of the best piece of the G. of S.'s tel<sup>m</sup> - that if it cannot be

Copy to India 3 December 1915

MS

Previous Papers:—

4354

18698. I. 483. 2000—4/1916. [1000/14.]



effected until Feb., or even March (according to Sir J. Nixon),  
it is <sup>doubtful whether it is</sup> ~~not~~ worth effecting at all. If after a defeat we ~~can~~  
do nothing for 2½ or 3½ months, it will surely be impossible  
to maintain the illusion of success necessary to counter German  
intrigues in Persia & keep Afghanistan quiet. Von der Goltz, if  
he is really serious, will not do nothing during that period: on  
the contrary, believing that his plans may be endangered by the  
capture of Bagdad, he will profit by the repite given him by  
our retirement to Kut, to bring off whatever loots he can as  
soon as possible, & if they are successful they will have had  
their effect in Afghanistan, & even in India, before we reach  
the gates of Bagdad once more.

Then again, the perspective of the campaign in the Near  
& Middle East has so far altered that the capture of Bagdad has  
probably lost some of its <sup>political</sup> importance. Previously, it wd. have stood  
as a set-off to Russian failure in the Caucasus & our own in  
the Jordanelles - the only other conspicuous features in the picture.  
But now there are two more - ~~the~~ our operations in the Balkans  
& the Turkish campaign against Egypt. In Jordanelles, the Balkans,  
& Egypt have been so much advertised that it is questionable  
whether a British success in any one of them wd. not make the  
capture of Bagdad politically superfluous, <sup>or whether</sup> ~~while~~ a British defeat  
in any one of them wd. ~~not~~ be outweighed by it.

From the political point of view therefore it seems to be  
of doubtful expediency, <sup>as things have turned out,</sup> to sacrifice <sup>more than necessary</sup> his <sup>own</sup> ~~own~~ <sup>troops</sup> ~~troops~~ in this  
enterprise. We cannot, of course, withdraw. We must continue  
to threaten Bagdad, & wd. send up enough reinforcements to deceive  
the enemy. Here in the spring we shall either be beaten every where -  
in which case credit question - or the Turks will be on the run, & we  
can enter Bagdad with small loss at their heels. If this view has any  
force, it will of course have all the more if, in the meantime, we have not the Bagdad R.S.





Political.



Financial Department.

I have shown these papers to Sir S. Barrow and discussed them with him. The suggestions made by Sir H. Innes involve a consideration, or the re-consideration, of the whole strategic position not only of H. M.'s forces but also of the Allied Powers. As such it is beyond ~~the~~ our province. ~~to advise~~ In certain circumstances it might be superfluous or it might be futile to launch next spring a great expedition against Bagdad. But that possibility, as far as I can judge, does not affect the preparations which are at present being made to re-enforce Sir J. Nixon. Their extent and their urgency are determined by other factors. Whether a Syrian expedition, in addition to the existing commitments of the Allies, is desirable or possible is a question on which this office can advise.

1/12/15 J. W. H


I concur. At present we are chiefly concerned in seeing that Sir J. Nixon is in a position to stand against any attack at Kut-el-Amara.

al  
1/12





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 180235 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

 Secret.

79 75  
P  
4388  
1915

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for  
India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Nov: 30<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:


Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon. Cairo. Tel. No. 733. Secret. Nov. 28 <sup>th</sup>	Situation in Egypt.

(Similar letter sent to

[ 14 ]







EGYPT.

Decypher. Sir H. McMahon. November 28th. (Cairo)

D. 9.25.p.m.  
November 28th.  
R. 10.40.p.m.

No. 733.

-----  
Secret. Since my return to Egypt the more I learn the feeling of the country and the anxiety now (?grow)ing in all classes of Egyptians, the more convinced I am of the danger we will incur in restricting measures for meeting Turco-German menace to defence of Egypt itself.

If we allow enemy to advance beyond Cilicia we must be prepared for following results.

I. Alienation of Arabs to German side. In place of their assistance whether active or passive we will meet active hostility. Turks will at once replace present Sheriff of Mecca by man hostile to us and whole position in Arabia will turn to our disadvantage for indefinite period.

II. Syria must endeavour to propitiate the enemy, and this will alienate large element in Egypt.

III. New life will be given to Ottoman Government and Empire which must hence forward be largely German.


IV. Baghdad railway will remain in German hands.



V. Serious loss of prestige throughout the East.

Effect of number I. coupled with Senoussi's hostility puts against us all important religious influences to which Egypt is subject and will create situation here which may endanger success of defensive operations. Combined effect of above results will prejudice our position throughout the east in very dangerous and even vital manner.

Very








Very similar remarks apply to French possessions and interests in the East.

Incidentally I may point out relative advantages of giving or denying to enemy (1) trade and supplies of so large an area, and (2) a long coast line suitable for submarine bases on our flank. In view of vital issues at stake I feel it my duty to urge most strongly that alternative policy of meeting Turco-German advance in Cilicia may be re-considered.

Success will depend on rapidity of decision and action as time left is very short. In this respect also I fear time available will render preparation of strong defences which new conditions now demand for defence of Canal and Egypt and extremely difficult matter.

Repeated privately to Lord Kitchener.

my notes have  
been read two  
months ago.







Military Secret.

134

Copy

82


*From Viceroy, 30th November 1915.*

Reference your telegram of 25th instant, No. 3160. Independent examination prior to receipt of Nixon's 1008/64/0, 26th November, leads us to agree generally with estimate of Turkish strength at Ctesiphon and Baghdad and its rate of growth, except that we prefer to work on the figures 60,000 by end of January, as estimated by combined War Office and Admiralty staffs in their Memorandum of 19th October. Nixon is correct in his view that ruling factor in rapidity of our concentration is the supply of additional river transport, in which respect you have received repeated requests from us to hasten rate of supplies, and we are searching India for suitable vessels. In the meantime Nixon must do the best he can with what he has got, which on a rise of the river and by marching troops from Amara should enable him to get the Lahore and Meerut Divisions to Kut-el-Amara early in February. As regards his force, Nixon is in error in counting upon 34th and 35th Brigades which, *vide* our telegram of 25th instant, H. 9386, are to be withdrawn when replaced by Lahore and Meerut Divisions as their presence in India is necessary. It follows that Nixon's force may have to be increased from elsewhere, and in our opinion a safe estimate for the capture and retention of Baghdad under altered conditions involves addition of at least one more division which with the Lahore and Meerut divisions and drafts will make Nixon's force to five divisions in all.

This estimate of five divisions which we consider a safe one is, however, based on the following facts:—(1) That since 19th October, when the joint Admiralty and War Office Staff drew up their memorandum nothing has occurred or is likely to occur in the near East to prevent Turks sending the full amount of reinforcement then considered possible; (2) That Russia remains inactive in the Caucasus and north-west Persia.

If on the other hand it should be thought that any important modifications in above factors have taken place or are likely to do so we consider Nixon will be able to capture and hold Baghdad with four divisions and that it will not be necessary to draw an additional division from the main theatre unless it were freely available owing to the general strategic plan of operations.

To regard capture of Baghdad as impossible would be to give up our best means of countering the German intrigues in Persia and Von Der Goltz's plans for organising Persia and Afghanistan against India and should therefore be dismissed from our calculations. Our success hitherto in Mesopotamia has been main factor which has kept Persia, Afghanistan, and India itself quiet, and to give up the idea of Baghdad would be to relinquish initiative and would result in a further transference eastward of the theatre of war. For these reasons we approve Nixon's attitude in not discussing the alternative of adopting a defensive attitude as a permanency though he must necessarily remain chiefly on the defensive until his reinforcements can reach the front.





Register No.  
4386-7 Put away with 53 83  
1915

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letters from F.O. Dated 27, 29 } Nov. 1915.  
Rec. 29 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	30 Nov.	aba	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>Letters from Grand Sheriff of Mecca to</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Saïyid Ali el Moughani</li> <li>2) Sir H. M. Mahon</li> </ol>
Secretary of State.....	1	T.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

1. ac  
2/12

Copy to India  
14 JAN 1916

**FOR INFORMATION.**

1) is interesting, as showing the stress wh. the Grand Sheriff lays on the question of boundaries.

2) is the text of the letter summarised in Sir H. M. Mahon's tel<sup>g</sup> of 16<sup>th</sup> Nov. Two points may be noticed.


(a) From the content of para. (2) it is clear that the Sheriff understands our "existing treaties" to mean treaties with Sherifs in Mesopotamia. He was thinking of the Idrii & Bin Saud.


(b) Para. (6) is even more cryptic than it appeared to be in the tel<sup>g</sup>, for there seems nothing in the Sheriff's letter of 9<sup>th</sup> Sept. bearing on the question of foreign advisers or internal interference. It is possible, as Sir H. M. seems to have thought, that the reference is to his proclamation regarding the Arabian peninsula.


Previous Papers:—


4299

18998. I. 453. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]









No. 148. Secret.

Nov. 17th, 1915.

P  
4386  
1915

Sir,

*Worshipful*

With reference to my despatch No. 131 Secret of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a literal translation of a further letter which I have received from the Sherif of Mecca, dated the 5th instant, in reply to mine of the 24th ultimo.

179240  
NOV 26 1915


As this translation was only completed and corrected after the official bag had been closed and despatched to you, I have considered it advisable to despatch this document by special messenger to Port Said.

I have the honour to be  
with the highest respect,  
Sir,  
your most obedient,  
humble servant,


*(for Sir Mervat Tabat)*  
Sp. Mervat Tabat

Right Honourable  
Sir E Grey Bart. K.G. M.P.  
etc., etc., etc.

FOREIGN OFFICE.







12. Communication from the Grand Sharif of Mecca

Literal Translation


In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate.  
To His Excellency the most exalted and eminent Minister  
who is endowed with the highest authority and sound-  
ness of opinion. May God guide him to do His Will !'


I received with great pleasure your honoured letter  
dated 15th Zul Hijj (October 24th 1915) to which I beg  
to answer as follows :-

(1) In order to facilitate an agreement and to render  
a service to Islam , and at the same time to avoid all  
that may cause Islam troubles and hardships - seeing  
moreover that we have great consideration for the  
distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Gov-  
ernment of Great Britain - we renounce our insistence  
on the inclusion of the vilayets of Me'sina and Adana  
in the Arab Kingdom. But the Provinces of Aleppo and  
Beyrât and their sea-coasts are purely Arab Provinces and  
there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian  
Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather .

We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander  
of the Faithful-Omar ibn Khattab- and other Khalifas  
succeeding him, who ordained in the Laws of the Moslem  
Faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they  
treat themselves. He, Omar ,declared with reference to  
Christians " they will have the same privileges and  
submit to the same duties as ourselves ". They will  
thus enjoy their civic rights in as much as it accords  
with the general interest of the whole nation.

(2) As the Provinces of Irak are parts of the pure  
Arab Kingdom and were in fact the seat of its Govern-  
ments, in the time of Ali Ibn Abu Talib, and in the time  
of all Khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began  
the civilisation







the civilization

of the Arabs, and as their towns in those Provinces were the first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great:- therefore these Provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs far and near and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently we cannot satisfy the Arab Nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, - for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by the British Troops, without the rights of either Party being prejudiced thereby ( especially those of the Arab Nation; which interests are to it economic and vital ) and against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of Occupation, in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to support; at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential.

(3) In your desire to hasten the movement we see not only advantages but grounds of apprehension.

The first of these grounds is the fear of the blame of the Moslems of the opposite party ( as has already happened in the past ) who would declare that we have revolted against Islam and ruined its forces. The second is that standing in the face of Turkey which is supported by all the forces of Germany, we do not know what Great Britain and her Allies would do if one of the Entente Powers were weakened and obliged to make peace . We fear that the Arab Nation will then be left alone in the face of Turkey together with her Allies /but





but we would not at all mind if we were to face the  
Turks alone . Therefore it is necessary to take  
these points into consideration in order to avoid  
a peace being concluded in which the parties con-  
cerned may decide the fate of our people as if we  
had taken part in the War without taking our  
claims to official consideration.


(4) The Arab nation has a strong belief that  
after this War is over , the Turks under German in-  
fluence will direct their efforts to provoke the  
Arabs and violate their rights, both material and moral,  
to wipe out their nobility and honour and reduce them  
to utter submission as they are determined to ruin  
them entirely. The reason for the slowness shown in  
our action have already been stated.



(5) When the Arabs know that the Government of  
Great Britain is their Ally who will not leave them  
to themselves at the conclusion of peace in the face  
of Turkey and Germany, and that she will support and  
will effectively defend them , then to enter the War  
at once will, no doubt , be in conformity with the  
general interest of the Arabs .

(6) Our letter dated 29th Shau'āl 1333 ( September  
9 1915 ) saves us the trouble of repeating our opinions  
as to Articles 3 and 4 of your honoured last letter  
regarding administration, Government advisers & officials  
especially as you have declared, O Exalted Minister :  
that you will not interfere with internal affairs .

(7) The arrival of a clear and definite answer  
as soon as possible , to the above proposals , is  
expected. We have done our utmost in making concessions  
in order to come to an agreement satisfying both parties.

We know





4386/15- (26) (89)


We know that our lot in this War will be either a success which will guarantee to the Arabs a life becoming their past history , or destruction in the attempt to attain their objects. Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain:- but they , the Arabs , have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end.

May God keep you safe and victorious , as we devoutly hope and desire.

( unsigned )

Dated 27 el Hijj 1333 (November 5 1915)

(28)







In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. *176132* /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

*Confidential*

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for *India*,  
and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
*Nov. 27*, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office: ✓  
from



Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>High Commissioner at Cairo. no. 143, Nov 9.</i>	<i>Sherif of Mecca.</i>

RECEIVED  
29 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(Similar letter sent to ✓ )

[ 12 ]





No. 143

Nov. 9, 1915.

*duplicate copy*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report on the second mission to the Sherif of Mecca of the messenger, who is employed in the transmission of confidential communications between the Sirdar and the Sherif.

I have the honour to be,  
with the highest respect,

Sir,  
your most obedient,  
humble servant,



FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

(Signed) M. C. Hartman

Right Honourable

Sir E Grey Bart. K.G. M.P.

etc., etc., etc.





SECRET.

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1915

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REPORT OF SECOND MISSION OF MESSENGER "G" TO THE SHERIF  
HUSSEIN IBN ALI OF MECCA.

"G" left Suakin on 2nd October 1915 and proceeded in a private dhow to the anchorage referred to in the previous report (21.9.15) where he found an agent of the Sherif and six followers awaiting him.

He was asked if he had brought anything with him (cash for the guardians of the Holy Places and pious offerings) and on his replying in the negative but stating that he had an urgent message to the Sherif he was conducted to Jeddah whence an urgent telephonic communication (in code) was made to the Sherif by the latter's local representative.



"G" was then instructed to proceed at once and arrived at TAIF two days later.


Here he was conducted without delay to the Sherif to whom he delivered the following verbal message (in Arabic) :-

" In reference to recent communications and having regard to the well-known disposition of Your Highness it is reported for Your Highness's secret information that the Egyptian MAHMAL will leave Suez by ship for Jeddah about October 7th (27 Zilgada). As no military escort will accompany the MAHMAL this year it will be for Your Highness to make the requisite arrangements for the landing of the MAHMAL at Jeddah and its subsequent transport to Mecca".

"G" also handed the Sherif a letter from El Sayed Ali El Morghani, C.M.G., containing friendly greetings, acknowledging the safe receipt of the Sherif's previous letter, and stating that the earlier communication therein mentioned had apparently miscarried.

The Sherif, on receipt of the above message, sent urgent instructions to his representative at Jeddah in regard





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

to the reception of the MAHMAL, and directed "G" to proceed thither and to verify (for the information of those by whom he was sent) the satisfactory arrangements made and the fact that the Turkish authorities were not permitted to interfere in the matter.

"G" reached Jeddah in time to see the arrival of the MAHMAL and its handing over to the custody of the Arab authorities there.


On his return to TAIF the Sherif handed him a letter (translation attached) with instructions that he should deliver it to Sayed Ali El Morghani, and instructed him to deliver the following verbal message to the British authorities from whom he came : -



" A British War-ship arrived at TEWAL, an anchorage (mersa) between Jeddah and RABEGH and eight or nine hours distant from the former port, and anchored there. The sheikh of this place went out to meet the Commandant and asked him what he required. The latter said he intended to occupy and fortify the place. The sheikh asked him on whose authority he was acting, and was informed that an arrangement to this effect had been made with a certain Ibn Kreifan. The sheikh reported to the Sherif this occurrence, which also came to the ears of the Turkish Governor with the result that the latter's suspicions have been roused and a closer watch set on the coast which formerly had been left principally to the control of the Sherif's followers. The occurrence is regarded by the Sherif as most inopportune and liable to endanger his purpose. He begs that such an indiscretion may not be repeated."


"G" then obtained the Sherif's permission to return in order to attend the Bairam festivities at Mecca where he remained several days before leaving for the coast. He states that the relations between the Sherif and other Arabian Chieftains are cordial, and that an agreement between him and












In the name of God the Omnipotent and Compassionate.



"God will support those who truly believe in this world and  
"the world to come" (text)

The general state of affairs, more especially at the present  
time, has made almost all the inhabitants of the Gezira  
recognise the necessity of thinking about their future  
prospects; firstly in regard to the protection of the  
integrity of their religion, and secondly that of their  
tribal honour and life. This compels them to hold out  
certain demands among which may be mentioned their definition  
of many districts which are inhabited by the Arab race, in  
order to maintain their religious existence. This is the sole  
great fundamental reason. Then comes the moral reason which  
is connected with the holiness of the source of the Faith and  
the situation of their country.

As the principle of existing Governments, whether small or  
great, is mutual assistance and support, and as the balance  
of opinion in the country inclines towards the Government  
which controls Egypt for reasons too obvious to need  
enumeration, therefore we have mixed ourselves with her in  
this matter. When the country attains by the help of God what  
she desires, this noble Government to which we have alluded  
will have the right of precedence and the first consideration  
in regard to everything which the country may require from  
outside.

I have already explained the boundary which would enable us  
to preserve our dominions or existence. To this the answer  
was that the discussion of the boundary was premature. As  
the matter however is not so, and as it is most important  
and necessary to decide this now for fear that when we come  
in







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in future to insist on these boundaries we should fail in obtaining our desires and the result would then be quite the reverse. As the matter is of such vital import affecting our very life and existence, therefore we insisted on getting further explanations in regard to these boundaries so that we might first be able to know what the views of that Government were and thus be guided in our choice of the lesser of the two evils and the easier course by which to uphold the integrity of the faith and nationality as was more befitting. Here is a clear proof of the necessity for desperate measures in seeking the happiness of attaining the holy object. I refer to the proclamation issued by the Ottomans and which was based on the Fetwa of their sheikh of Islam, authorizing their troops to eat during the month of Ramadan last in the town of your ancestor (the Prophet) and in his holy presence. This was based merely on the supposition that they were prepared for the Jihad, while in fact they were living (quietly). Such an overt act, though but a small thing makes further explanation in regard to the nobility of the cause decided upon unnecessary. They have at least transgressed against God and against your ancestor and his family. We may be among those believers of whom he said-" There are men who acted in accordance with their "holy promise to God - some of them have and some are still "waiting and are making changes"

This is what we have united to do. May God help us and you to hold to our word. This is the purport of what you wanted to know and I have only reproduced it in conformity with your previous request. We ask the co-operation of your great zeal in the cause of protecting the honour of the faith no matter what the result of the present war may be, because you also have great moral and material interests to safeguard. Our inclinations, which you wish to understand, are confined





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within this circle and I have no doubt, honourable brother, that you are well aware of this and that I have no ambitions whatever for great names or titles.


You asked me, my dear friend, may God be with you, to explain to you what we require. Our first requirements are that God may protect you from every evil and give you always strength and good health. I also wish to be guided by your ideas with regard to our aforementioned friends who have full control of the country and as to whether they think of any necessity to make modifications in our demands as to the boundaries that have been described. If so this will be annoying, particularly to the Arabs and very likely it will affect all the Mohammedans and oblige them to meet events, no matter whence they come, with bravery and determination at the outstart.

They will then become positive that the cause for making such difficulties is the intention to exterminate the Arabs and destroy their faith and unity. I do not think in this case that there is any man who does not know that a General Call ( to the Jihad ) in the ears of the Mohammedan world will differ from the call of the Ottomans.


The Government to which I am referring could avoid the outcome of the effect produced by such a state of affairs, especially owing to the presence of a man like yourself who allows no reason for blame in the cause of God.


I have very strong and decided hopes that I am only stating in this sentence what is absolutely true with the greatest sincerity.


The second question is that we shall stand in need of funds partly to be used for the preliminary expenses and the greater portion to be retained until the time when with God's help the whole scheme is taken effectively in hand. As regards the arms, we have no need of them as this might











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TRANSLATION OF A NOTE ON BOUNDARIES.

(enclosed with letter).


Mersina (and) Adana (districts) to the 37° parallel,  
on which lies Killis, Birejik, Urfa, Hardin, Midiat, Geziret  
El Amaris, to the frontier of Persia.

On the East the Persian frontier to the Gulf of Basra  
(and) thence to the Indian Ocean - exclusive of Aden.

On the South the Red Sea - on the West the Mediterranean.

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The greatest proof that the inhabitants of this (?)  
place are united is (afforded by) the revolt of the HASHHAD  
(Kerbela) natives of Irak which (revolt) was however  
premature.





CONFIDENTIAL

*Copy*

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EGYPT

*Sir H. McMahon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30, 5.30 P.M.)*

*Ramleh, June 30, 1915.  
(June 3), 2.20 P.M.)*

(No. 306.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 380 of 26th June.

Nothing in the shape of formal proclamation has been issued. Purport of your telegram No. 173 of 14th April was communicated privately in certain quarters of Egypt and the Soudan, but no public announcement, as authorised in your telegram No. 262 of 20th May, has yet been made in either country.

An unsigned printed leaflet in Arabic has been distributed, as authorised in your telegram No. 274 of 21st May, on coast of Hedjaz by such aeroplanes and trading vessels as have been able to go there. It has not been distributed in the Soudan, but a copy was sent to Senoussi. It was in the following terms:—

“To the people of Arabia:

“It is already known to you that we, the English, went to war with Germany because she attacked, without any provocation, small States upon her borders whose independence she had solemnly sworn to guarantee.

“You also know that Germany, being hard pressed, cunningly induced the Turkish Government to assist her. This she effected by lavish expenditure of gold and by lying promises. Her real object was to obtain a proclamation by the Sultan of Turkey of a Jihad against ourselves and our Allies; for under the protection of our Empire are many millions of Mahomedans, of whom thousands are now actually fighting in our armies, and Germany hoped that they would be induced to attack us and so afford her help. Surely every true Mahomedan must regard with loathing this cynical employment of his religion as an instrument to be used by a foreign Power for the furtherance of its own selfish ambitions.

“Mahomedan subjects of British Empire and of France, Russia, and her Allies have shown their view of the matter by supplying thousands upon thousands of troops to help us in fighting against the Turks and their deceivers, and even the more honourable of the Turks must realise the baseness of what has been done.

“Perhaps, however, there are those amongst you who ask what may be our intentions after the war is over.


“Lest there be any misunderstanding, let the following be known:—

“The Government of His Majesty the King of England and Emperor of India has declared when this war ends it shall be laid down in the terms of peace, as a necessary condition, that Arabian peninsula and its Mahomedan holy places shall remain independent. We shall not annex one foot of land in it, nor suffer any other Power to do so. Your independence of all foreign control is thus assured, and with such guarantees the lands of Arabia will, please God, return along the paths of freedom to their ancient prosperity. Surely this is sufficient. Certain Arab chiefs have already assured us of their desire to be rid of Turks, and some are assisting our troops with their swords.

“To those of you who wish us well, but are perhaps afraid to show their feelings, we say: ‘Have no distrust of us; wait for a favourable opportunity, and, when it comes, shake off the oppressor’s yoke, and we will support you to the full extent of our ability, and will, with God’s help, make you a truly independent people.’

“But it must be with respect to your religion that you chiefly wish to know our attitude.

[780—11]



2

"The religion of Islam, as history proves, will always be scrupulously respected by the British Government, and it is for this very reason that in the past we have befriended and assisted the Sultan of Turkey. Now that his venal Ministers have induced him to forget all gratitude and attack us that were his friends, he must accept the consequences; but our policy of respect and friendliness towards Islam remains unchanged. The latest proof of this is that we wished to assist the inhabitants of the Holy Cities and pilgrims with gifts of corn; but German and Turkish officers seized the corn on its arrival at Jeddah, and thus forced us to cease sending corn for our enemies to [? group omitted] while the poor go hungry.

"In spite of this, His Majesty's Government, having heard that pilgrims and innocent inhabitants are suffering grievously from want of food, and moved by compassion and their continual friendship towards the Arabs, have now decided once more to allow food to be brought in by sea to Jeddah, and it will be for the Arabs themselves to ensure that this food is used for sustenance of themselves, and theirs to prevent its being seized by those who act contrary to the usages of [? war] and seek to take bread out of the mouths of the hungry."



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(101)

Register No. Put away with 53

4354

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letter from F.O., Dated 24 } Nov. 1915.  
Rec. 25 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	26 Nov.	AM	<p><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>El Farouki's proposals Views of Sir M. Sykes.</p>
Secretary of State.....	27	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			
AM 27/11			<p>Copy to India 26 Nov [of the Mahoni telegrams]</p>
			<p><b>FOR INFORMATION.</b></p> <p>An attempt is made on the attached map to show what the proposals amount to. The red line north of the blue trace of the Baghdad R<sup>r</sup> is the northern limit of the Arab state. From Biredjish down to the Euphrates to Der-es-Zor, SW across the desert following the broken red line to near Mezoub, then down the yellow line of the Hedjaz railway to Maan, &amp; presumably W to the Egyptian frontier - all this is the French sphere, (the French may annex anything N of the northern red frontier). The remainder is the British sphere (the strip shaded red between Basra &amp; the Gulf being annexed), except the central desert &amp; the Arabian peninsula, which are apparently independent under the protection of the Entente Powers (? including Italy).</p> <p style="text-align: right;">This</p>

Previous Papers:—

1899. I. 453. 2000.—4/1915. [1000/14.]



This will not meet French views, since they claim Mosul;  
& the Hausran (S. of Damascus) will be essential to them, owing to  
its fertility. Otherwise they are well provided for.

But under the reservation regarding European employes  
there is nothing to prevent Mesopotamians from remaining the  
wilderness which the Arabs themselves, since the Abbasid Caliphate,  
have made it. Surely there must be some positive guarantees on  
this point.

The reference to a Turco-Arabian ~~living~~ empire on the  
analogy of Austria-Hungary is interesting; ~~if~~ from the attached  
copy of an intercepted let<sup>m</sup> it wd. seem that a similar suggestion  
has been made to Persia.

Surely Sir M. Sykes is right in emphasising the necessity  
of the Arab State being protected against Germany & Turkey by France  
& ourselves. That is essential, if we are not to have another  
European war before 50 years are past.


Sir M. Sykes at least sees what Sir H. McMahon  
seems to have overlooked that no negotiations with  
Arabs are of any use unless accompanied by a  
force in Syria <sup>& Mesopotamia</sup> strong enough to hold the approaches  
from Asia Minor and to defeat the Turks in  
Syria & Mesopotamia. - The Arabs will not make  
the first move -

J. W. H.

27/11/15

The more these Arab projects are  
examined, the less practical they become.  
Sir H. McMahon's idea was that the Arabs should  
rise against the Turks; Sir Henry Sykes can only suggest  
that, if we make an impassable barrier between the Turks &  
Arabs, the Arabs will not rise against us, also





In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. /1915

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



P4354

Secret.

93  
102

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned  
papers

Foreign Office,  
Nov. 24<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. Mallett's Debs. nos 707 & 709.	Arab Question.




(Similar letter sent to

[ 14 ]









(104)  
(104)

would agree to any territory North of greater Arabian Frontier being French possessions under French flag.

Arabs would agree to Basrah town and all cultivated lands to the south being British territory.

Arabs would be prepared to make a treaty with Entente Powers.


1. Undertaking on their part to have no dealings with Turkey Germany or Austria for period of 15 years.


2. On the part of Entente powers to guarantee to protect independence of the Arabs.

Further a treaty of alliance with Entente Powers giving them freedom of movement in greater Arabia and use of railways in Arabian area for duration of the war. Entente troops in Arab territories to be on same footing as British troops in Flanders.

Entente troops to evacuate territories on cessation of hostilities.

Faruki insisted that this was dependent on Entente landing troops at a point between Mersina and Alexandretta and making good Amanus Pass or Cilician gates. He further stipulated that Sherif should not take action until this had been done. I agree that any other course is out of the question and that to call on Sherif or Arabs to take action until we had made above mentioned passes secure would be impossible. Faruki also urged necessity for immediate adequate action in the Gulf of Alexandretta adding that if Entente did not take this opportunity Germans would forestall them and once Turks or Germans got into Syria Arabs would in their own interests be obliged to reconsider situation. For my own part I am sure that there can be no doubt of Arabs merely troubling Turks in advances on the







the canal. If we allow Turks into Syria Arabs will side with them in order to obtain special consideration.

Germans have already suggested idea of Turko - Arabia on the same lines as Austria Hungary.

I will give observations on less important aspects in further telegram. Meanwhile I am convinced of necessity for efficient action at earliest possible moment to enable Arabs to move.







P4354

FILES ONLY.

Decypher. Sir H. McMahon (Cairo) November 21st.

D. 7.15 p.m.

November 21st 1915.

R. 11.15 p.m.,

No. 709.

Following for D.M.O. from Sir M. Sykes No. 20:-


Pending a continuation of my telegram No. 19 on hypothesis that Farukis interview is basis of our arrangements with Arabs, I submit:-

(1). With regard to France and Arabs our task is to get Arabs to concede as much as possible to French and to get our Haifa Outlet and Palestine included in our sphere of enterprise in the form of French concession to us. Thus we smooth the way for France with Syrians and in the matter where France has a <sup>(traditional)</sup> trading interest, deal directly with her.

Note. Arabs will always welcome any extension of our sphere of enterprise.

(2). With regard to Arabia proper I do not consider proposed Arab movement affects our position with regard to various Gulf and Red Sea interests. Gulf and Aden treaties will hold good and I am confident that suzerainty of Shereef in Arabia proper will be in practice purely honorary.

(3). With regard to our position in Irak, our establishment of civilian Government must hold for duration of the war and we should stipulate for this. Bagdad and Basrah provinces are divided from Arabia by schism, and are too disorderly and warcourous for newborn state to govern. When the time for evacuation comes the Shereef's Government will have to face the Shiah and Kerbela question and I anticipate will be glad enough to






107  
to get us to run the administration for them for some time to come in order to get revenue. Arab nationalism has little influence and the Khalifate none south of Bagdad in the cultivated area.

(4). I submit for the strategical and political consideration of India that the suggested Arab state cannot become a formidable power in itself so long as it is protected from German and Turkish influence by France and ourselves.

I anticipate that in the event of our giving the Arabs their opportunity that matters will shape themselves as follows:- influx of trade and money owing to opening of Syrian ports will keep things quiet in Syria and Palestine, and Government will be carried on on Turkish formulas with local personnel. Bagdad and Basrah provinces will continue to accept our provisional rule without demur. Governments of Mosul and Urfa will be disorderly and Arab State will probably have to ask for our assistance. Arabs of northern Arabia proper will fight indecisively among themselves.

(6). In the event of our letting this opportunity go Arabs in Syria and northern Mesopotamia will, I believe, fall in with the Turks in order to get the best terms for nationalist aspirations from those whom they would then regard as certain winners.





(385) Wt. 5000-70 5000 1/15 R. 1 & S. 128-235  
(3418-395) Wt. 2297-178 10,000 8/15 H.C.&S. 128

105  
Form P.B. 10. 108


**PRESS CABLE.** P43574

No. 4663

COPY FOR FILING.


PLACE OF ORIGIN.....athens..... F.O. }  
NAME FROM.....Paissios..... 1.0 } DECISION Passed on sub (2, 1, 0)  
To.....~~St. Petersburg~~ Petrograd  
DATE.....Nov 23..... INITIALS.....  
TIME HANDED IN..... DATE.....Nov 24.....  
TIME COPIED.....5.25 p.m.

TEXT:— Informations sures de constantinople 5 novembre arriva de berlin envoie 1250000 livres dont 250 mille ont ete remises a ambassadeur perse sous condition que quelques membres nouveau cabinet perse qui sont pas favorable projet double monarchie turcoperse seraient eloignes du gouvernement stop gouvernement perse seroit reconstitue des personnalites favorables a idee formation double monarchie autres 100 mille furent remise au comite neoperse pour maintenir influence propagande turcogermanophile qui avait diminuee dernièrement stop [arriva constantinople delegation secreta du han d afganistan composee de un prime famille han et un ulema delegation se presenta golts pacha ]  
Paissios






# 'Eastern Turkey in Asia' [109r] (1/2)





'Eastern Turkey in Asia' [109v] (2/2)







107  
110

Register No.  
4312

Put away with 53

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Telegram from Viceroy  
 Letter from F.O.

Dated 22 }  
 Rec. 23 } Nov. 1915.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	24 Nov.	ats	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">Arabia.</p> <p>G. &amp; J.'s views on the Grand Sheriff's letter.</p>
Secretary of State.....	25	J. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*July*  
ats  
25/11


Copy to  
 F.O. (24 Nov.)  
 dated 26 November 1915


FOR INFORMATION.

No action, beyond sending copy to F.O., seems necessary until Sir H. McMahon's views are received.

Previous Papers:—  
4273  
4276

16698. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]





108  
111


P  
4312

From Viceroy, 22nd November 1915.  
(Repeated to Cairo.)

RECEIVED IN  
23 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

42243  
4226

Foreign Secret. Arabia. Your telegram of the 19th November presents Sheriff's letter in a less favourable light than your telegram of the 18th November. If His Majesty's Government are disposed to give guarantee to assist and protect the proposed Arab kingdom as far as may be within their power, would it not be desirable to say at once that although the interests of Great Britain demand a friendly administration in the vilayet of Baghdad, such special interests must necessitate much fuller consideration of future of Mesopotamia than the present situation and urgency of the negotiations permit? Formula on these lines containing no specific mention of Basra would give us free hand afterwards, without, I hope, unduly exciting the Sheriff's suspicions.





16

112  
17

FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.

Secret Department. *Copy*

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
19th November 1915.*

[P 4226] Foreign Secret. My telegram dated 18th November. Arabia. Following from Cairo:—


“ Careful translation has now been done, and following gives more fully general sense of second half of letter which is rather vaguely expressed.


“ Shereef renounces interest in Adana Mersina, but insists on retention of Beyrout, Aleppo Vilayets as purely Arab.

“ For trading economic reasons he cannot abandon Irak, but is prepared in order to facilitate agreement, and in consideration of guarantees offered by His Majesty's Government to 'leave under British Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by British troops against a suitable sum paid as compensation to Arab Kingdom for period of occupation' without prejudice to rights of either party. Actual agreements with Sheikhs to be respected.

“ As to immediate action Shereef hesitates for fear of adverse opinion of Moslems of opposite camp, and still more lest in the event of peace unfavourable to Entente, Arabs may be left to face Turco-German combination. Once they are sure that His Majesty's Government will effectively support them they are ready for action.

“ As to British Administrative officials there is no need to mention this question, His Majesty's Government having disclaimed all intention of internal interference. (N.B.—Unless purposely vague Shereef must be here alluding to Arabia only.) Shereef would prefer for himself seclusion from all politics, but is forced by Arabs to his (?present) course of action.”





14

17

FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.

Secret Department.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
18th November 1915.*

[P 4220] Foreign Secret. Your telegram dated 11th instant. Arab negotiations. Following from Cairo:—

“Messenger with letter from Sherif has arrived. Letter is long, and requires careful translation to ascertain full meaning, but main points are as follows:—

“First, he agrees to exclusion of Mersina and Minisandria (*sic* ? Alexandretta).

“Secondly, he maintains that vilayets of Beirut and Aleppo are Arab and should be under Arab Mohammedan Government.

“Thirdly, he maintains that Mesopotamia is also Arab, but, as Great Britain has special interests there, it may be left out of discussion for the present. Meanwhile he asks for subsidy for what he terms ‘the Arab Kingdom.’


“Fourthly, he expresses fear lest a European peace should leave Arabs at the mercy of Turks, and wishes Great Britain to bind herself not to abandon Arabs.

“On these four conditions they will come in at once.


“Messenger states feeling amongst Arabs is very favourable to us.


“Sherif impressed on him readiness and intention of Arabs to begin work at once. Sherif's son, Abdulla, has returned from Nejd bringing several chiefs whom he detached from Ben Rashids. Oppenheim is said to have returned to Syria having been expelled from Medina. Faisal, son of Sherif, has left Mecca and is negotiating with Arab chiefs on behalf of his father.”


Please repeat to Nixon paragraph regarding Mesopotamia, adding that substance of his telegram of 14th November, No. 358, has been communicated to McMahon.
















(113)

Put away with 53

(116)

Register No. **4299**  
[4262] 1915

**Minute Paper.**

Letter from F.O. Telegram - Aten

Dated 21<sup>st</sup> Nov. 1915  
Rec. 22 Nov. 1915

**Secret Department.**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	22 Nov.	Atk	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>1. Views of Sir M. Sykes, as to the lines on which we sh. negotiate.</p> <p>2. Evidence of Grand Sheriff's assistance to the Arabs</p>
Secretary of State.....	23	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 26 November 1915  
F.O. [4262] 22 Nov.  
me

**FOR INFORMATION.**


1. F.O. have been asked to get this repeated to India.

2. Does not amount to much.

Previous Papers:—

4243  
4262

18695. I. 483. 3000—4/1915. [1000/14.]





In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 174633 /1915

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

4299  
1915

Secret.

114  
117

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,  
November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to  
from Foreign Office:


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon. Tel. no. 706.	Arab Question


Copy to India  
26 Nov 1915

RECEIVED IN  
22 NOV 1915  
GENERAL DEPARTMENT

(Similar letter sent to







P  
4299  
1915

(118)

EGYPT.

Decypher. Sir H. McMahon (Cairo) November 19th.

D. 8.55 p.m.

November 19th 1915.

R. 10 p.m.,

No. 706.


Following for D.H.O. from Sir M. Sykes No. 18.

"I am waiting here for an opportunity of seeing General Officer Commanding and the High Commissioner in accordance with your instructions. By the favour of <sup>Sir M.</sup> ~~Mr.~~ Cheetham I have seen correspondence relating to Arab movement and Sheriff. Two difficulties strike me. (a) Arab want of confidence in our might; (b) difficulty of making arrangements with Arabs, inoffensive to French susceptibility based on financial interests and historical sentiment.

I suggest as a means of coping with the difficulty (a):- that we blockade Cilician Gates, or deny Turkey access to Syria via Adana Plain as the first step. As the second step the occupation of the line Aintab, Birijik, Suverek, Diarbekir, and establish touch with Russians while Turkish and German masses are immobilized by Anatolian and Armenian winter snow, leaving Arabs to do as they please south of this line. Details of this scheme and quantity of troops required should reach you by November 24th.

Difficulty (b) could be coped with as follows:- Entente to agree with Arabs to recognise, respect and protect Arab provisional Government, or Governments in the vilayets of Beyrout, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Hedjaz and the Sandjak of Derzor Urfa during the war

RECEIVED IN  
22 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT







WAR.


Guarantee of above areas as the minimum of independent Arab territory after the war. Arabs to engage not to grant concessions directly or indirectly to financial groups of Central Powers for the period of 25 years, nor to establish diplomatic relations with them for a period of ten years. Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to engage not to obtain concessions in vilayets of Aleppo, Beyrout, Damascus, and the Sandjak of Urfa without approval of the French Government and to recognise the spirit of previous agreements between French Government and the Ottoman Government with regard to educational establishments in the same area in suggested Arab independent state or states. I further suggest that vilayets of Bagdad and Basrah are incapable of self-government and a new and weak state could not administer them owing to Shia and Sunni dissension. We might agree with Arabs to administer these provinces on their behalf allocating certain revenues to their exchequer or exchequer(?s) (this corresponding to their demand for subsidy) and further agreeing that in the event of populations of vilayets of Bagdad and Basrah not producing a sufficient number for administrative personnel under British supervision, deficit will be made good from Arab State or States.


I make these suggestions because I believe the situation is critical. I feel that Arab nationalism as such presents no danger to India now or in future unless we confine ourselves to the canal defensive and let





let Turk and German masses assemble in Syria and northern Mesopotamia and re-establish their prestige and so work a real Jihad with Arab support. This would entail strong repercussion in north Africa, both French and Italian, as well as in Persia the Caucasus, and Afghanistan, eventually engrossing a larger force of entente troops under less favourable circumstances than at present. I submit that Russia, Italy, and France are all directly affected by this situation. At present Arabs are anti-Turk, and Taurus and Armenian snow hampers our enemy's movements. I therefore believe now is our chance of foiling German plan involving all entente powers in defensive operations against Islam.






P  
4262  
1915  
X  
Telegram from Resident at Aden  
Dated 20th. November 1915.

Put away with 53

145 A.P. There is documentary evidence to show that the Sheriff of Mecca has assisted Turks in a letter from Ahmad ~~Aslan~~ ~~Tawari~~ Tewfik (Commander of 7th Yemen Army Corps at Sanaa) to Hassan Izzat Bey Bimbashi, Commanding 1st Battalion 115th Regiment at Loheiyah, found on latter which (? when) captured en route by sea to Jeddah. The letter distinctly tells Hassan Izzat that the Sheriff had received and held in charge money intended for Ahmad Tewfik(?'s) <sup>command</sup> also that Sheriff would arrange for safe transmission of money to destinations in Asir and Yemen and that Hassan Izzat was to act in accordance as the Sheriff directed. Originals of the correspondence are with G.O.C., Egypt.

Addressed to the S. of S. and repeated to Foreign Dept., Govt. of India.









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122

Register No.  
4290  
1915

53  
 Put away with.....

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

*the Foreign Sec. n° 53 M.* Dated 29 Oct. 1915.  
*(G.O.C. Force B, Basrah n° 1294 24/14.10.15)* Rec. 22 Nov.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	27 Nov.	W.A.	Advance on Baghdad.
Secretary of State.....	30	J. W. H.	Protection of Mohammedan shrines etc. Deferment of any public pronouncement until city has been captured.
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*put by*  
24  
30/11


Copy to J.O. Mil (24) 23 Nov


**FOR INFORMATION.**

*This explains why the G. of I. proposed to hold up the news of the eventual capture of Bagdad for a few days*

Previous Papers:—  
415/15.

18698. I. 453. 2000—4/1916. [1006/14.]





(Copy)

Telegram - P.

From--- The General Officer Commanding Force "D", Basrah,  
To----- The Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(Repeated to Chief of the General Staff).


No. 1394 I.G.


Dated the 14th (and recd. the 15th) October 1915.


P  
4290  
1915


(4118) Please refer to your telegram 1034 S., to Sir Percy Cox. The Government of India must judge for themselves as to the extent to which the feelings of Indian Mohamedan are likely to be adversely affected by the idea of the capture of Baghdad and of the need for reassuring it, but there are several reasons why the issue of a proclamation on the lines suggested would be inconvenient for the Military point of view on the following grounds (1) After a successful action at Ctesiphon it is not unlikely possible that I might have to fight again between there and Baghdad or even at Baghdad itself, so that until Baghdad is occupied for certain I would prefer that no proclamation should be issued. In fact until Government of India have been informed of what has actually taken place and so are in a position to issue notification to prepare public opinion I should prefer their awaiting fait accompli and the suppression of the news of our reaching Baghdad. (2) It is probable that any public announcement made by us in advance that our troops would under no circumstances bombard specific shrines, would be taken advantage of by the enemy to occupy such places with troops or to place batteries under cover of the shrines or even to fire into them themselves, and accuse our troops of doing so. (3) If a reference is made to British ladies in any proclamation which might be issued here this might give Turks a hint to remove them. On the whole I would recommend that copy of the circular letter which I communicated to Chief of the General Staff in my telegram No. 1361 of October 11th and which I issued to the tribal Sheikhs should now be given by the Government of India

INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S  
Letter. No. 58 M  
Dated 29 OCT 1915









(Copy)

Telegram - P.

From --- The Secretary to the Government of India  
in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,


To----- The General Officer Commanding, Force "D", Basrah.

No. S. 1076.


Dated the 24th October 1915.

Please refer to your telegram No. 1394 I.G., of 14th instant. Government of India agree that until capture of Baghdad is a fait accompli publication of proposed proclamation here should be postponed for reasons put forward by you. They also share your view that copy of circular letter sent by you to tribal Sheikhs should now be made over to the Press, and this is being done.

Received on 22 NOV 1915 with  
INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S  
Letter. No. 58 M  
Dated 29 OCT 1915







7

126 125

19


FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.


Secret Department.


*From Viceroy, 11th November 1915.*

[P 4151] Foreign Secret. Arabia. Your telegram 8th November. We find nothing in McMahon's telegram of 5th November to palliate in any way position he has brought about, and fact remains that although he could apparently, without imperilling the negotiations, safeguard other interests at Alexandretta, Mersina and Syria, he yet found it necessary to guarantee to Arabs the rendition of territories in Mesopotamia won by our arms in face not only of Turkish but also of Arab opposition, without which Turks alone would have been of small account. Moreover, from information received from Sir Reginald Wingate, it appears that leaders in Egypt were quite ready to recognise as a necessity the incorporation of certain portions of Mesopotamia in the British Empire and would not oppose it. Further, it need hardly be pointed out that financing of large irrigation schemes by which the prosperity of Mesopotamia is enhanced a hundredfold is not likely to be encouraged by fact of the creation of an Arab State and administration, and the whole country would be likely to lapse into a worse condition than under Turkish rule and be a source of danger to British political and commercial interests. The possession of Basra is in our opinion essential for the protection of Abadan and the security of our interests in oil-fields. We are still in dark as to actual *quid pro quo* to be given by Arabs in return for those sweeping assurances, but trust it may be of sufficiently definite character to enable us, if Arabs fail to perform their part, to repudiate those assurances—at any rate as far as Mesopotamia is concerned.

As regards proclamation we agree that in view of chaotic position created by McMahon's assurances it will be best if General Nixon on occupation of Bagdad issued no proclamation at all except perhaps a formal notice calling upon civil population to acquiesce quietly in our occupation, and assuring them, should they do so, their persons, property, and religion will be scrupulously respected. In India we propose, as soon as Bagdad is actually occupied, to suppress news for day or two, and to publish following proclamation:—" [R.] His Majesty's Government have authorised General Nixon to advance on Bagdad, his forces having once more defeated Turkish opposition on Tigris in vicinity of Suliman Pak. Not only for military reasons is this advance necessary, but in order to relieve British ladies and British Indian subjects who, contrary to usage of civilised war, have been detained at Bagdad; and in order to break up a focus of German intrigue in middle East. His Majesty's Government, however, desire that it should be clearly understood that stringent orders have been issued that every precaution should be taken to prevent sacred shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir, Gilani, and the other tombs and shrines in the vicinity, from being in any way even accidentally damaged in course of the operations, in accordance with their unswerving policy of respecting the sacred places of Islam and the susceptibilities of the Moslem community; and they wish it clearly to be understood that in regard to all other Holy Places in Mesopotamia, this policy has been and will be scrupulously followed, and that no obstacle whatever will be placed in way of Imams, Ulemas, Mujtahids and other religious persons following freely and as usual their ordinary religious practices, after occupation of Bagdad."









M.O.2b. B20/3/483.




P  
4259  
1915


4259  
128

The Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State, and begs to state with reference to India Office letter P.4223 of November 17th, that there is no objection on the part of the Army Council to the India Office repeating to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Sir M. Sykes's telegram No.16 of 23rd October regarding the future of Mesopotamia, copy of which is herewith enclosed. Sir M. Sykes is on his way home and considerable delay might be involved in asking him to repeat the telegram as suggested.

La

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.







SECRET.

*From Sir Mark Sykes, M.P., to War Office.*

(No. 16.)


23rd October, 1915, 7.45 p.m.

Have conferred with Sir P. Cox and Army Commander, Force D, on the report of the Committee on Asiatic Turkey. Following is their opinion:—


1. Any scheme which involves the retention of the Turkish Empire in Asia beyond the Anatolia Peninsula would be in opposition to our highest interest and leave us in a dangerous situation in the middle east. It would be contrary to the intentions with which we entered the war, see Prime Minister's speech at Guildhall and the first desideratum in the report. It is essential that German trade establishments, industrial enterprises and commercial ventures should be permanently excluded from the area south of the line Acre—(one group undecipherable) Wanduz. As the only guarantee of the security in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia Course A, Map 11, is the only satisfactory solution offered in the report. A natural corollary to this scheme is that Arabia as a whole should be recognized as within our sphere of influence.
2. It would be contrary to British interests that the present tract of the Baghdad should be completed or form part of the Mesopotamia railway system, or that the Baghdad Railway Company should continue, even though the control should be transferred to the Entente Powers, as for many years to come through communication between Irak and Europe northward should be as limited as possible, both for political and strategic reasons.
3. Railway communication under British control between Irak and the Mediterranean is important and desirable, but it is not essential to defence of Irak which, if held alone, can be supported by the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. If, therefore, the construction of a British controlled line between Baghdad and a Mediterranean port should be obstructed by future political circumstances, this would not forbid our retention of Irak.
4. The defence and administration of Irak should be an Imperial responsibility.
5. The Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah once they are formally under our control are quite able to make a large proportionate contribution to their own defence, both in men and money. From personal experience, I can confidently say that this equally applies to the Mosul province.
6. The formation of an autonomous state in Irak seems to be impossible owing to the want of any local ruling family or cohesion of political party with sufficient prestige or capacity to assume the government.
7. The riparian population and semi-nomads in the area at present under our control show an increased inclination to settle down gradually to agriculture and irrigation, and they only await settled government to do so on a larger scale. Once settled government is introduced there is every reason to believe that the existing population will increase rapidly.
8. The collection of revenue and taxes in all the areas which we effectively dominate is essential as it confirms and continues the tradition of settled government and prevents disorder which would degenerate into anarchy.
9. It is advisable that all matters primarily connected with the Shiah shrines of Irak or their belongings, either financial or administrative, should be left entirely in the hands of the religious hierarchy.
10. With regard to Arabia and the Persian Gulf, from the point of view of our present position in Irak it is desirable that our policy should be to protect Arabia as a whole from without, leaving each situation to develop on its own lines from within, though it may be preferable to regard the Sherif of Mecca, if he should assume the Khaliphate, as an ally, rather than as a protege like the Sheikh of Koweit.
11. Question of Caliphate seems to arouse little interest in Irak and the less said about it the better.


Copy to India  
26 NOV 1915

(B848) 25 10/15 H&S 1907-1wo











4226

Put away with 53 (131)

In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 172416 11915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

*Secret.* Put with papers  
C.A. to India

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned  
papers.

Foreign Office,  
November 18<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Tel. from Sir H. McMahon. November 14 <sup>th</sup>	Arabic Question
2. Tel. to Sir H. McMahon. no. 887 Nov. 17 <sup>th</sup> 26 Nov 1915	


(Similar letter sent to \_\_\_\_\_)

RECEIVED  
18 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

14









130  
133

Register No.  
**4226**  
1915

Put away with 53.

Secret Department.

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Letter from *F.O.*  
*Ad. Jacob, Aden*

Dated *18/4* } Nov. 1915.  
Rec. *18* }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>18 Nov.</i>	<i>all</i>	<p style="font-size: 1.2em; color: blue;"><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>Further translation of Grand Sheriff's reply</p>
Secretary of State.....	<i>18</i>	<i>J.W.H.</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to

*F.O. (24 Nov)*  
*Aden (see within)*

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FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

*Off. telegram to G.O.I. repeating.*

*Dlt telegram to Aden of inquiry as to Grand Sheriff's attitude*


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*19 November - telegram to Viceroy*  
*- Aden (re Aden telegram)*


Previous Papers:—

*4220*  
*(4223)*

17026.—1. I. 1355. 1000.—9/1914.







P  
4226  
1915

(131)  
134

MINUTE.

This version of the Gd. Sheriff's reply does not seem to afford even a basis for negotiation, & in any case renders the deft. letter to the F.O. submitted this morning no longer appropriate.

It sd. be repeated to Aden.

I attach a letter received this morning from Lieut. Col. Jacob at Aden. He says they have evidence that the Gd. Sheriff is aiding the Turks. His remedy\* for bringing the Arabs off the force is an advance from Aden - a measure which I have urged from the first. But apart altogether from this particular proposal, what is important about his letter is that this officer who knows the Arabs better than most people insists that "we cannot expect them to resist the Turks if we do nothing ourselves". In other words, the whole policy of negotiations & assurances is futile. The Gd. Sheriff in this tel<sup>g</sup> says practically the same thing. The Arabs will not move unless we provide them with a material force to which to rally.

\* An excellent one if troops were available but unfortunately they are not.

It seems worth while to ask Aden for evidence of the Gd. Sheriff's alleged attitude.

It is the old story. The Arabs will not move until they are more sure as to who will win. I see no harm in asking Col. Jacob for his


15616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1915.




widener. But the Grand Sheriff would admit  
that he has been playing a double game.

J. W. H

VICE







135  
136

**DRAFT TELEGRAM.**

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
SECRETARY OF STATE


TO  
*Resident, Aden: Report to*  
VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.  
(Retamilla)


P  
4226  
Despatched *19* November 1915  
(repeated) JM

*Foreign secret. Please telegraph as  
quickly as possible any positive evidence  
you have that Grand Sheriff of  
Yemen is supporting Turks.  
Addressed Aden repeated 2.9.15.*

17024. I. 1353. 1000.—9/1914.








and Arabia + by the <sup>the Turkish</sup> Caliphate here not at  
all an future advance to unadvisable but  
this prolonged period of inaction will ruin our  
cause up'country. It is not like  
the Arabic war which is active & we wish so  
long as he does us idle here; we will the  
strength & success ever espouse our cause  
which Khalid looks so triumphant elsewhere.  
We are panacea; an advance from Aden  
if the Turks can be held up at Gallipoli  
extra troops to be found with the Turks  
we can take the whole country & we shall  
by this advance drive in all our Arab  
parties who are all from Scandinavia in the face  
we cannot expect them to resist the Turks  
if we do nothing ourselves.  
The capture of the Lebanon, was scarcely  
a successful operation at Gallipoli, with not a  
far more deadly than the Dutch pre the  
the fall of Barr & Bagdad. The loss of the








135  
138

to even all inland Arabic cities - not  
just in and take them - & of the un-  
the Islamic State can be restored & be  
allowed to play an anti-Turkish role.  
It has more sense to deprive the  
Turks of the Caliphate, of united Islamic  
Turkish power, even if it is the Caliphate,  
can do less harm in a complicated Pan-Islamic  
Arab hierarchy. The political network, however,  
recessing Kalender, & it is the E. Arabs who,  
of supported us, can at the juncture come into  
them on versus the Turks. of the hidden  
Arabian sons of the desert of the long played for  
of Constantinople a part in the can be put in  
this direction, - any way is found to control the  
Dec of a triumphant Turkish State.  
Now has been by enough & we do nothing of  
the Arab mind & their aspirations. It is not  
easy to upset the existing mind. After all  
of First World War & then was  
by the British Resident & then was  
by the British Resident. It is good to work  
apart at this. Nothing is done nothing has been.









Decypher. Sir H. McMahon (Audros)  
November 16th. 1915.

D. 7.0.p.m.  
R. 9.20.p.m. November 16th. 1915.

Unnumbered.

My previous telegram.


Following telegram from Cairo begins:


Careful translation has now been done and following gives more fully general sense of second half of letter which is rather vaguely expressed.

Begins: Shereef renounces interest in Adana Mersina but insists on retention of Beyrout, Aleppo Vilayets as purely Arab.

For trading economic reasons he cannot abandon Irak but is prepared in order to facilitate agreement and in consideration of guarantees offered by His Majesty's Government to "leave under British Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by British troops against a suitable sum paid as compensation to Arab Kingdom for period of occupation" without prejudice to rights of either party. Actual agreements with Sheikhs to be respected.

As to immediate action Shereef hesitates for fear of adverse opinion of Moslems of opposite camp and still more lest in the event of peace unfavourable to Entente Arabs may be left to face Turco-German combination. Once they are sure that His Majesty's Government will effectively support them they are ready for action. As to British Administrative officials there is no need to mention this question His Majesty's Government having disclaimed all intention of internal interference. (N.B. unless purposely vague Shereef must be here alluding to Arabia only) Shereef would prefer for himself seclusion from all politics but is forced by Arabs to his (?present) course of action. Salutation. I propose to defer my views on this question until my return to Cairo.





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4223  
1915

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141


J. M. O.  
L.O.

14th Nov. 1915.


The G. & L. for I. presents  
his compliments to the J. M. O.,  
& is directed to request that, if  
the Army Council see no objection,  
Lt. Col. Sir M. Lykes may be  
instructed to report to the G. & L.,  
Foreign Dep<sup>t</sup>, his let<sup>rs</sup> 2: 16 & 23:  
Oct. regarding the future of Mesopotamia.


A.H.  
17/1/15

✓











140  
143

Register No.  
**4220**  
1915
Put away with **53**

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Letter from **F.O.**

Dated **16** Nov. 1915.  
Rec. **17**

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<b>17 Nov.</b>	<b>W.H.</b>	<p><b>Arabia</b></p> <p>Substance of Grand Sheriff's reply</p>
Secretary of State.....	<b>17</b>	<b>J.W.H.</b>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Ind L copy*  
*AKS*  
*7/11*  
*See minute on 4226*

Copy to  
Indis (see within)  
F.O. (see over)

**FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.**

*off. letter to F.O. commenting on (not sent)*  
*off. telegram to F.O. I. respecting*

*18 November - telegram to Viceroy*



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Previous Papers:—

*470-1*

17626.—1. I. 1355. 1000.—9/1914.





P  
4220



MINUTE.


144  
144

I have told F.O. what S. of S. said on 1/10/15,  
and understand that a further caution will be given.

With reference to Sir J. Muir's letter 354 of 14/10/15,  
it will be seen that F.O. cut out some of  
his language in reference to Sir H. McMahon.

The Gd. Sheriff having reserved his opinion for  
future discussion, it seems more than ever necessary  
to be careful what we say to the French.







U. S. of S.  
S.O.



Not sent - see  
minute on  
4226/15  
Immediate

I am directed by the S. of S. for  
S. to acknowledge the receipt of your  
letter n: 172022 of the 16<sup>th</sup> inst. regarding  
negotiations with the Grand Sheriff of  
Mesca.

Mr Chamberlain writes with satis-  
faction that the Grand Sheriff proposes  
that, in view of St. Britain's special  
interests, Mesopotamia sh. be left out  
of discussion for the moment. Mr  
Chamberlain trusts that in any com-  
munications that may in the meantime  
be made to the Grand Gov: a similar  
reserve may be exercised, so that  
British interests may not be unnecessarily  
prejudiced.







DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Rotamilla)



Despatched 18 Nov. 1915.



P  
4220  
1915

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146

Foreign secret: Your telegram 11th inst.  
Arab negotiations. Following from  
Cairo begins messenger with letter...  
on behalf of his father ends. Please  
refer to <sup>note</sup> previous para. regarding  
Mesopotamia adding that substance  
of his tel. <sup>358</sup> of 14<sup>th</sup> inst. has been  
communicated to Mr. Ingham.

17624. I. 1353. 1000.-9/1914.





(172022/15)

P  
4220  
1915

Foreign Office,  
November 16th, 1915.

Secret and Immediate.

Copy to India  
26 NOV 1915

Sir:-

With reference to your letter P. 4024 of the 6th instant, relative to the assurances given by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt to the Grand Sherif of Mecca, regarding the future policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Arab question, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram which he has despatched to Sir H. McMahon, embodying the observations of the General Officer Commanding the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, as to the inclusion in these assurances of the Vilayets of Bagdad and Basrah.



*to H. McMahon.  
Tel. no. 8844  
Tel. no. 1420*



Sir E. Grey would suggest that Sir John Nixon might be informed of the action taken by this Department on his above-mentioned telegram, and be told that the Sherif maintains that Mesopotamia is Arab, but as Great Britain has special interests there, it may be left out of dis-

The Under Secretary of State  
for India.

cussion

RECEIVED  
17 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





discussion for the present.

A copy of the telegram from Sir H. McMahon contain-  
ing the above-mentioned statement on the part of the  
Sherif is also enclosed herein for convenience of re-  
ference.



I am,



Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble Servant,


*W. Ransley*











P  
4220  
1915

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150


Decypher Sir H. McMahon (Mudros)  
D. 5. 45 pm November 14th.  
N. 10. 15 am November 15th.

*Copy to India  
26 Nov 1915*

.....  
Following telegram received from Cairo.  
"Messenger with letter from Sherif has arrived.  
Letter is long and requires careful translation to ascertain full meaning but main points are as follows:-  
First he agrees to exclusion of Mersina and Minisandria (sic ? Alexandretta).  
Secondly he maintains that vilayets of Beirut and Aleppo are Arab and should be under Arab Mohammedan Government.  
Thirdly he maintains that Mesopotamia is also Arab but as Great Britain has special interests there it may be left out of discussion for the present. Meanwhile he asks for subsidy for what he terms "The Arab Kingdom".  
Fourthly he expresses fear lest a European peace should leave Arabs at the mercy of Turks and wishes Great Britain to bind herself not to abandon Arabs.  
On these four conditions they will come in at once. Messenger states feeling amongst Arabs is very favourable to us.  
Sherif impressed on his readiness and intention of Arabs to begin work at once. Sherif's son Abdulla has returned from Mejd bringing several chiefs whom he detached from Ben Hashids. Oppenheim is said to have returned to Syria having been expelled from Medina. Faisal son of Sherif has left Mecca and is negotiating with Arab chiefs on behalf of his father".  
I will communicate my views later.

Sir H. McMahon.

RECEIVED  
17 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





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51

Register No.  
470-1

Put away with 53

**Minute Paper.**

**Secret Department.**

Letters from FO.  
 Telegram from Genl. Nixon

Dated 12 4 } Nov 1915.  
 Rec. 12 15 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	15 Nov.	At	<u>Arabia.</u> Text of Sir H. McMahon's reply to Grand Sheriff. French attitude towards Arab Caliphate. Sir J. Nixon's views on the restrictions.
Secretary of State.....	15	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*W.C. Hingal*

*I ~~am~~ grow more & more uneasy about Sir H. McMahon's proceedings.*

*I presume that the F.O. are satisfied that he will not under any circumstances allow himself to be drawn into any intrigues about the Caliphate. But I think a great caution to him would not be drawn away.*

*Can you convey this informally to the F.O.?*

*At*  
*15/11*

Copy to India (See within)

P.O. 15-11-15 (470)


by -do- (-do-) by Post. Clerk.


**FOR INFORMATION.**

see minute on 4220/15

Previous Papers:—

1898. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]





Copy to Foreign Office  
in Egypt.

~~Military Secret.~~

72

149

152

*From General Nixon, Aziziyah, 14th November 1915.*


*(Sent to India.)*

358. From a communication received from Government of India yesterday, it appears that High Commissioner of Egypt in the course of negotiations with ? Mecca, the details of which I have not yet learnt, has with certain modifications, included Basra and Baghdad vilayets in territories, wherein His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise and support independent Arabs.

Apart from fact that such a commitment appears to be premature and will prejudice existing British interests at Basra and Baghdad and future of this great country, it seems to me to involve complete misconception of attitude of inhabitants of vilayets. It, moreover, overlooks the important and fundamental fact that four-fifths of the population of Basra and two-thirds of Baghdad vilayets are Shiabs.

I earnestly trust that further consideration may be devoted to this subject before any final step is taken, and hope that on issues affecting Mesopotamia, reference may be made to me.

Cox agrees with these views.





P  
4170  
1915

30 15 Nov  
153

Telegram from General Nixon X  
Dated A ziziyah, 14th Nov. 1915.

358. From a communication received from Govt. of India yesterday it appears that High Commissioner of Egypt in the course of negotiations with ? Mecca, the details of which I have not yet learnt, has with certain modifications included Basra and Baghdad Vilayets in territories wherein H.M. Government are prepared to ~~recognize~~ recognize and support independent Arabs.

Apart from fact that such a commitment appears to be premature and will prejudice existing British interests at Basra and Baghdad and future of this great country, it seems to me to involve complete misconception of attitude of inhabitants of Vilayets. It moreover overlooks the important and fundamental fact that four fifths of the population of Basra and two thirds of Baghdad Vilayets are Shiah.


I earnestly trust that further consideration may be devoted to this subject before any final step is taken and hope that on issues affecting Mesopotamia reference may be made to me .

Cox agrees with these views .


Addressed to Secretary of State for India, sent to ~~India~~  
India .

Sir A. H. H. 1 copy  
Mls: Secy









COPY.

P  
4171  
1915

(5)  
154

Memorandum on Sir E. Grey's conversation with the  
French Ambassador.

I am afraid that this conversation leaves some ambiguity  
in our position.


I have already said that I regret the offer made by Sir  
H. McMahon, but this offer was not merely conditional on "a sep-  
aration" between the Arabs and the Turks but on the immediate  
active cooperation of the Arabs with us against the Turks.


I venture to urge that it is of the first importance  
that this should be made clear to the French as well as to the  
Arabs, and that Monsieur Cambon should be told that it is only  
on this condition that McMahon's offer is binding on us or  
that we seek the assent of the French Government to the propos-  
al regarding Syria.

(Initialled) A.C

12/11

Handed to Sir A. Nicholson  
12/11







+ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
8th November 1915.


[P 4065] Foreign Secret. Your telegram dated 4th November, Arabia. I agree and am pressing your view on Foreign Office. If you have anything to say on McMahon's telegram of 5th November please let me know at once. Assurances, if given, will be conditional on Arabs performing their part of bargain, which is additional reason against proclaiming them as McMahon proposed. In these circumstances it would perhaps be better if Nixon issued no proclamation at all on occupation of Baghdad, but if one is thought necessary for local or Indian purposes please let me have draft as soon as possible. It should not refer to the wider political issues raised by McMahon.


152

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No. 422

Paris,

November 6. 1915.

4171/15

Workhouse 11/7

Sir:-

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the representation made by Earl Granville in accordance with the instructions contained in your Telegram No. 2464 of the 30th ultimo on the subject of the Arab question, and the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to the French Representative at Cairo abstaining from any activity and above all from mentioning the Khalifate in his relations with Arabs.

I have the honour to be with great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient


humble servant,

S<sup>r</sup> Bertie of Thame


The Right Honble.

Sir Edward Grey Bart., K.G., M.P.,

&c. &c. &c.








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
M. Briand to Lord Bertie of Thame.


Par une note en date du 30 octobre dernier, l'Ambassade de S.M. Britannique, se référant à un entretien récent de Son Excellence Sir Edward Grey avec M. Paul Cambon au sujet de la création éventuelle d'un Etat arabe indépendant et d'une entente préalable avec la France sur les limites de cet Etat, a attiré l'attention du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères sur la nécessité de conserver à cette affaire le caractère le plus secret, notamment en Egypte, en raison du nombre d'Arabes qui sont dans le cas de fréquenter la Légation de France.

Lord Granville indiquait tout particulièrement qu'il était très important que la question du khalifat ne fût pas mentionnée.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à Son Excellence Lord Bertie of Thame qu'il est pleinement d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il ne saurait être question pour le représentant de la France en Egypte de prendre aucune initiative dans cet ordre d'idées, notamment en ce qui concerne la question du Khalifat qui présente une si grande importance pour les possessions musulmanes de la France en Afrique. Son rôle s'est borné jusqu'ici à recueillir, au cours d'une conversation dont Sir H. Mac Mahon a pris l'initiative, certaines indications  
que










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In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 166807 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

  
*Secret.*  
*P 4171/15.*

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.


Foreign Office,  
NW. 12<sup>th</sup>,  
1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to from Foreign Office:


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<u>Let. to Sir H. McMahon,</u> Cairo. <u>no. 874 NW. 11<sup>th</sup></u>	Arab Question




(Similar letter sent to


[ 14











159  
162


proclamation at Bagdad or in Egypt. The next step should be to make clear to them that promises made by McMahon are dependent on immediate action by them in sense of their offers and will not be binding on us unless they do their part at once.


I concur with Sir E. Grey that the clause placing the whole of Greater Arabia under British protection would saddle us with embarrassing and useless liability and destroy possibility of such agreement with France as he wishes to make; but our special position and interests in Mesopotamia must be safeguarded as far as is still possible after McMahon's pledges".

I agree with Secretary of State for India that no proclamation should be issued at Bagdad. We must now await result of your letter to the Shereef.

If Arabs do their part we will fulfill promises made through you, but in next communication made to them we should state that they should act at once. In my opinion an effective Arab movement against Turks would be worth the future inconvenience as regards Bagdad, but I share doubts as to chances of securing this movement.

Repeat to India.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 162822 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



Secret

P 477/15

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163

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Nov. 12<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon, Cairo. No. 131. Secret Oct. 26 <sup>th</sup>	Arab Questions

NO Copy sent India  
K. J. [unclear]  
[unclear]



(Similar letter sent to





No.131 Secret.

Sir,

With reference to my secret telegram No.644 of today's date, I have the honour to enclose herewith the English text of the reply which I have despatched in Arabic to the Sherif of Mecca.

The matter appeared to me to admit of no delay, and I have therefore lost no time in answering the Sherif's letter, and have availed myself of the authority to act without further reference, accorded to me in your telegram No.796 of the 20th instant.


The composition of a reply which would be acceptable to the Arab party and which would at the same time leave as free a hand as possible to His Majesty's Government in the future has been a difficult task.

I have been definite in stating that Great Britain will recognize the principle of Arab independence in purely Arab territory, this being the main point on which agreement depends, but have been equally definite in excluding Mersina, Alexandretta and those districts on the northern coast of Syria, which cannot be said to be Arab, and where I understand that French interests have been recognized. I am not aware of the extent of French claims in Syria, nor of how far His Majesty's Government have agreed to recognize them. Hence, while recognizing the towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo as being within the circle of Arab countries

Right Honourable

Sir E Grey Bart. K.G. M.P.

etc., etc., etc.





162  
165


countries, I have endeavoured to provide for possible French pretensions to those places by a general modification to the effect the His Majesty's Government can only give assurances in regard to those **territoires** "in which she can act without detriment to the interests of her ally France."

It will be observed that I have definitely specified France as the only Ally concerned. The use of the term "Allies" would, I understand, inevitably have aroused the suspicion of the Arabs, who would have conjured up visions of all our Allies putting forward claims in various parts of the Arab territories.


I believe I am right in the supposition that no territorial interests have ever been even tentatively claimed, either by Russia in Northern Mesopotamia or by Italy on the Arabian coasts of the Red Sea, and that it is therefore unnecessary, and indeed inadvisable, to provide for any such interests.

I venture to emphasize the fact that the eventual arrangement would be very greatly facilitated if France would consent to forego any territorial claims she may have to purely Arab territories, such as Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo. The inclusion of such districts in Arabia will be insisted on by the Arabs, and although they might possibly agree in regard to them to accept from France a similar arrangement to that which we are proposing elsewhere, it is obvious that this will give rise to trouble, and that much more satisfactory and lasting results will be possible in the future if the Arab question can be dealt with as a whole by Great Britain.

In







In face of the vital importance to the Allied cause of the present issues involved, France could hardly be unreasonable on this point and the question of compensation elsewhere if necessary is well worthy of serious consideration.


It is, I consider, not going too far to say that the only hope of preventing this question becoming eventually one of trouble and anxiety to all concerned is to leave it in the direction of one power alone.


I would also once more lay stress on the religious importance attached to Damascus by Arabs, not only as one of the three points of departure of the Sacred Carpet, but as, in their eyes, one of the principal Holy Places.


In conclusion, I am of opinion that while the terms I have proposed are the minimum that could be offered with any promise of success, there is reasonable hope of their being accepted by the Sherif individually and the leaders of the Arab party.


The letter was despatched yesterday in the hands of the Sherif's messenger, Mahmoud Arif Arayfar, who is in the complete confidence of the Sherif and appears to be a man of considerable intelligence and of some influence.

The opportunity was taken of verbally explaining the terms of the letter to facilitate its comprehension by the Sherif. Further verbal assurances of sympathy and support were also given and, in particular, care was taken to allay any apprehension which









11.—To The SHERIF of MECCA.  
(with titles)

I have received your letter of 19th<sup>(9 29<sup>th</sup>)</sup> Shawal with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.


I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the moment had not yet arrived when they could be most profitably discussed.


I have realized, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.

The districts of KERSINA and ALEXANDRETTA and portions of SYRIA lying to the West of the districts of DAMASCUS, HAMA, HOMS and ALEPPO cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, FRANCE, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter : -

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the Independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.





Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of Government in those various territories.


On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European Advisers and Officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

With regard to the Vilayets of BAGHDAD and BASRA, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.


I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.


I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were











168 171

Register No.  
**4151**  
**[4118]**

Put away with **53.**

**Secret Department.**

Telegram from Viceroy  
 Letter from Govt. of India w/29 m

Dated 15 Oct 11 Nov  
 Rec. 10 Nov 11 Nov 191

**Formally acknowledged** \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	12 Nov	ALX	<b>Arabia</b> negotiations with young Arabs. further views of G. of I. Drafts of <del>proposed</del> notification to be issued in India.
Secretary of State.....	12	P. G. H.	
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India [see within]

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Dft. letter to G.O. agreeing generally.

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Alternative drafts for consideration at conference tomorrow at 11.0


ALX  
 13/11


13 November - telegram to Viceroy  
 15 November - Letter to Foreign Office

Previous Papers:—

4082

18694 I. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1955/14.]






169  
172


Sir A. Hirtzel has brought  
this over, by Mr Chamberlain's  
desire, for Sir E. Grey's  
concurrence in the  
annexed Dft reply to  
the Viceroy.

No. 13 Nov.

J. Munro  
Ed.

Exp X  
K.D.  
13/11/15






To the Viceroy. Your Foreign Secret, Arabian <sup>173</sup>  
I agree to as to proclamation by Nixon  
with addition of sentence expressing our  
determination to respect all Holy Places, shrines  
&c. as in your suggested notification in India.  
As regards latter notification I do  
not understand your reasons for  
suppressing news of occupation which will  
certainly come out from other sources. I  
propose therefore to publish it here as  
soon as I have certain news of it.  
Proposed reference to British ladies  
appears no longer suitable as Turkish  
Govt. have agreed to their exchange  
See my telegram 12<sup>th</sup> Oct.

*Handwritten notes:*  
C. of I have  
been  
seen  
see

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
13th November 1915. (173A)

[P 4151] Your Foreign Secret, 11th November, Arabia. I agree as to the proclamation by Nixon, with addition of sentence expressing our determination to respect all holy places, shrines, &c., as in your suggested notification in India.  
As regards latter notification, I do not understand your reasons for suppressing news of occupation which will certainly come out from other sources. I propose, therefore, to publish it here as soon as I have certain news of it.  
Proposed reference to British ladies appears no longer suitable, as Turkish Government have agreed to their exchange, see my telegram 12th October.







India Office (174) (177)  
15 November 1915


To the F. O.

I am re. & enclose  
to the information of the S. of S.  
to F. O. copy of further telegrams  
exchanged between the Secy.  
the Sec. of S. for India in regard  
to the suggested issue of a proclamation  
by General Sir J. H. Dyer on the occupation  
of Baghdad.

As Sec. C. suggests to Sir  
S. Jey's consideration that it  
might be well to instruct W.  
Chamberlain to issue a proclamation  
which embodies that part  
of the proposed Indian notification  
which deals with the holy places  
& shrines & with the respect wh.  
H. L. Govt. desire in all cases to  
be shown religious objects & persons.

(sd) T. W. Halderness.

Copy to India  
26 Nov 1915





U. S. of I.  
I.O.

172  
175

Immed<sup>ts</sup>

In continuation of my letter  
P. 4053 of the 6<sup>th</sup> inst. regarding the  
negotiations in progress with the Arabs,  
I am directed by the S. of I. for I.  
to forward, for the information of the  
S. of I. for I.A. copy of a further let<sup>ts</sup>  
that has been received from the S. of I.

dt- 11 Nov.


As Sir E. Grey is aware, Mr Chamber-  
lain's views are in general accord with  
those of the S. of I. on this subject; &  
he wd. propose to approve the course  
suggested with regard to the issue of  
proclamations. It wd., however, seem  
to be his longer object to the  
release of the <sup>British prisoners held</sup> British prisoners at  
Bagdad, seeing that the Turkish Gov<sup>t</sup>  
have already agreed to their release.

Mr Chamberlain wd. suggest that Mr



Min<sup>2</sup>, Icham, sd. also issue a notice  
embodying the best sentence of the  
proposed proclamation.

Mr. Chamberlain sees no necessity for  
withholding <sup>in this country</sup> the news of the ~~essential~~  
occupation of Bagdad, <sup>if and when it</sup> ~~in this country~~  
reaches us.



P.4151.

From Viceroy, 11th November 1915.

Foreign Secret. Arabia. Your telegram 8th November. We find nothing in McMahon's telegram of 5th November to palliate in any way position he has brought about, and fact remains that although he could apparently, without imperilling the negotiations, safeguard other interests at Alexandretta, Mersina and Syria, he yet found it necessary to guarantee to Arabs the reversion of territories in Mesopotamia won by our arms in face not only of Turkish but also of Arab opposition, without which Turks alone would have been of small account. Moreover, from information received from Sir Reginald Wingate, it appears that leaders in Egypt were quite ready to recognise as a necessity the incorporation of certain portions of Mesopotamia in the British Empire and would not oppose it. Further, it need hardly be pointed out that financing of large irrigation schemes by which the prosperity of Mesopotamia is enhanced a hundredfold is not likely to be encouraged by fact of the creation of an Arab State and administration, and the whole country would be likely to lapse into a worse condition than under Turkish rule and be a source of danger to British political and commercial interests. The possession of Basra is in our opinion essential for the protection of Abadan and the security of our interests in oil-fields. We are still in dark as to actual *quid pro quo* to be given by Arabs in return for those sweeping assurances, but trust it may be of sufficiently definite character to enable us, if Arabs fail to perform their part, to repudiate those assurances—at any rate as far as Mesopotamia is concerned.


As regards proclamation we agree that in view of chaotic position created by McMahon's assurances it will be best if General Nixon on occupation of Bagdad issued no proclamation at all except perhaps a formal notice calling upon civil population to acquiesce quietly in our occupation, and assuring them, should they do so, their persons, property, and religion will be scrupulously respected. In India we propose, as soon as Bagdad is actually occupied, to suppress news for day or two, and to publish following proclamation:—"[R.] His Majesty's Government have authorised General Nixon to advance on Bagdad, his forces having once more defeated Turkish opposition on Tigris in vicinity of Suliman Pak. Not only for military reasons is this advance necessary, but in order to relieve British ladies and British Indian subjects who, contrary to usage of civilised war, have been detained at Bagdad; and in order to break up a focus of German intrigue in middle East, His Majesty's Government, however, desire that it should be clearly understood that stringent orders have been issued that every precaution should be taken to prevent sacred shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir, Gilani, and the other tombs and shrines in the vicinity, from being in any way even accidentally damaged in course of the operations, in accordance with their unswerving policy of respecting the sacred places of Islam and the susceptibilities of the Moslem community; and they wish it clearly to be understood that in regard to all other Holy Places in Mesopotamia, this policy has been and will be scrupulously followed, and that no obstacle whatever will be placed in way of Imams, Ulemas, Mujtahids and other religious persons following freely and as usual their ordinary religious practices, after occupation of Bagdad."

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,  
13th November 1915.


[P 4151] Your Foreign Secret, 11th November, Arabia. I agree as to the proclamation by Nixon, with addition of sentence expressing our determination to respect all holy places, shrines, &c., as in your suggested notification in India.



As regards latter notification, I do not understand your reasons for suppressing news of occupation which will certainly come out from other sources. I propose, therefore, to publish it here as soon as I have certain news of it.

Proposed reference to British ladies appears no longer suitable, as Turkish Government have agreed to their exchange, see my telegram 12th October.




MS. A. 10. 1915. 176v  
INDIA FORNIGEREN  
Lectur. 10. 176v
















the Tigris in vicinity of Suliman Pak. Not only for  
military reasons is this advance necessary but in order to  
relieve the British ladies and British Indian subjects who  
contrary to the usage of civilised war have been detained  
at Baghdad and in order to break up a ~~z~~ focus of German  
intrigue in Middle East. His Majesty's Government, however,  
desire that it should be clearly understood that stringent  
orders have been issued that every precaution should be  
taken to prevent sacred shrine of Shaikh Abdul Qadir,  
Gilani, and the other tombs and shrines in the vicinity,  
from being in any way even accidentally damaged in the  
course of the operations in accordance with their unswerving  
policy of respecting the sacred places of Islam and the  
susceptibilities of the Moslem community; and they wish it  
to be clearly understood that in regard to all other Holy  
Places in Mesopotamia, this policy has been and will be  
scrupulously followed and that no obstacle whatever will  
be placed in the way of the Imams, Ulemas Mujtahids and  
other religious persons following freely and as usual their  
ordinary religious practices after occupation of Baghdad. Ends.

After consulting General Officer Commanding, please  
telegraph your opinion on proposed proclamation and please  
let us know whether similar proclamation might not suitably  
be issued simultaneously in Mesopotamia itself and in









177  
180

Register No.  
4095

Put away with 53

Secret Department.

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Letter from F.O.

Dated } 9 November 1915.  
 Rec. }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	9 Nov.	WA	<u>Arabia</u> Conference regarding French interests in Damascus Hama Hama + Aleppo
Secretary of State.....	9	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Please inform  
the F.O. that I  
have nominated  
Sir J. Holderness  
& Sir G. Hartal to  
represent this office.  
  
W.S.  
10/11

Copy to  
India

Copy to India

12 NOV 1915

12 NOV 1915

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
~~Not~~ Submitted for instructions



10 November - Letter to Foreign Office.

Previous Papers:—

W.S.

18994 I. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1855/14.]








MINUTE.

French interests in the districts named be rather  
outside the Indian sphere; & I still cherish the hope  
that it will not be India to whom the task of  
governing or controlling Mesopotamia will be entrusted.  
But in the meantime it wd. not be safe for this  
Office not to be represented.

15616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1913.







P4095/15.

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
10 Nov. 1915.


In reply to your letter N<sup>o</sup> 167429 of the  
9<sup>th</sup> inst. I am directed by the U. S. of S.  
for I. to inform you that he has  
nominated Sir J. S. Holderness & Sir A.  
Hirtzel to represent this Office at the  
forthcoming conference regarding the attitude  
to be adopted by H. M. G. towards the  
Arabs.


(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel.



*AH*  
10/11/15


Copy to India  
12 NOV 1915













182 53 185

Register No.  
**4082**  
1915

Put away with.....

**Secret Department.**

**Minute Paper.**

altus from 70. Dated 6, 8 } Nov. 1915.  
Rec. 6, 9 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	9 Nov.	WA	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arabia</u></p> <p>Negotiations with Young Arabs. Further views of Sir H. McMahon Text of Grand Sheriff's letter</p> <p>Copy to India [see within]</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>FOR INFORMATION.</b></p> <p>In view of Sir H. McMahon's further explanation I venture to hope that the offending clause will be allowed to remain. It is quite true that our interests on the Mediterranean do not require it; but besides Mesopotamia there is the Arabian peninsula to be thought of, &amp; it is most important to exclude foreign influence from the Hedjaz &amp; the Yemen &amp; all down the E coast of the Red Sea.</p> <p>The problem of Palestine has not been expressly mentioned in these negotiations. Jerusalem ranks third among the Moslem holy places, &amp; the Arabs will</p>
Secretary of State.....	9	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Within*  
*ay*  
*9/11*

Previous Papers:—  
4053

18698. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14]



lay great stress on it. But are we going to hand over  
our own holy places to them without conditions? Whatever  
may be the attitude of western Christianity on this subject,  
the very strong feelings of Russia will have to be reckoned with.


I think the French, to say nothing of our Italian  
allies, would resent a Proclamation which practically  
appropriated to G. Britain a protectorate over the whole  
of Arabia, including the greater part of Syria.

The question of Jerusalem illustrates the absurd  
& visionary character of the scheme. There is also the  
question of the Lebanon.

9/11/15 P. W. H.

I agree & I think that the  
clause in question would involve  
us in liabilities disproportionate  
to any possible advantages to be  
derived from it. ac






NEGOTIATIONS WITH GRAND SHAREEF.


P  
4082  
1915

Memorandum by Secretary of State for India.

I have read with concern terms of Sir H. McMahon's letter to the Grand Shareef. His assurances in regard to future of Basrah and Bagdad, even as explained in his telegram, No. 674 of November 5th, go much further than I contemplated and will cause great disappointment in India where Arabs are not popular and Mesopotamia has been regarded as India's reward for her exertions. On this point please see Viceroy's telegram with which I concur. But we must of course abide by McMahon's promises if the Arabs do their part. I cannot decide here what weight attaches to information as to Arab feeling collected in Egypt but my information is that Grand Shareef is a nonentity without power to carry out his proposals, that Arabs are without unity and with no possibility of uniting and I believe in reality and efficacy of suggested Arab revolt in Army and elsewhere. Please observe that our friends Idrisi and Bin Sand are believed to be hostile to Grand Shareef and his friends Imam and Bin Rashid are pro-Turk whilst one of Shareef's sons is actually on his way to support Bin Rashid presumably against Bin Sand.

Until therefore it is proved that Grand Shareef and Faragi both can and will carry out their promises, I agree with the Government of India in deprecating issue of any proclamation at Bagdad or in Egypt. The next step should be to make clear to them that promises made by McMahon are dependent on immediate action by them in sense of their offers  
and








and will not be binding on us unless they do their part at once.


I concur with Sir E. Grey that the clause placing whole of Greater Arabia under British protection would saddle us with embarrassing and useless liability and destroy possibility of such agreement with France as he wishes to make; but our special position and interests in Mesopotamia must be safeguarded as far as is still possible after McMahon's pledges.

6-11-1915.









EGYPT.

Decypher. Sir H. McMahon (Cairo) November 7th.

D ; 9.8 p.m.

November 7th 1915.

R. 11.20 p.m.,

No. 677.

*Copy to India  
12 Nov 1915*

P  
4082  
1915

Your telegram No. 860.


Arabs attach very <sup>great</sup> importance to inclusion of Damascus Hama, Homs and Aleppo in Arab boundaries and have, in fact, repeatedly expressed the determination to fight for those territories if necessary.

Provision that Arabs are to seek advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that all European advisers and officials are to be British was inserted <sup>at</sup> express (request of) Arabs who were anxious that the same provision should apply to all Arabia especially in territories above mentioned where they do not welcome the idea of French influence. It was, however, explained to them that owing to our obligations to our ally France, we had not a free hand as regards all Arabia and therefore the above mentioned provision applies, as is clearly stated in the preamble of our assurances, to those portions only of Arab territory wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France. This the Arab representatives here fully understood and admitted.


I regard the provision as very important to safeguard, not only our own present interests especially in Mesopotamia, but to prevent Arabia becoming a future source of trouble and danger. I therefore trust that it will be maintained unweakened with regard to all Arab territory in our sphere.

There is nothing in my assurances to prevent some similar understanding between France and the Arabs regarding the hinterland of Syria, i.e. Aleppo, etc., but for the future peace of Arabia if it is not possible to avoid such hinterland altogether it would be wise to restrict it to the smallest limits possible. It was suggested by the Arabs that in my recent assurances we should promise our good offices in obtaining any agreement between them and France, but I considered that my instructions hardly went so far without reference to you for which time did not allow.

RECEIVED IN  
9 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT







In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 163827/1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



190  
190

P  
4082

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Amr. Agent, Cairo No 126. Oct. 19.	Policy of Great Britain towards the Arabs.

COPY TO INDIA  
26 NOV 1915

RECEIVED  
9 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(Similar letter sent to





No. 186.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 625 of the 18th instant, containing a summary of a letter which I have just received from the Sherif of Mecca, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the letter itself which is dated Mecca, September 9.

The original Arabic is- probably purposely and as is the custom of the Sherif - couched in vague terms. The construction moreover in some cases is faulty; so that a translation of the document has presented difficulties. It has therefore been thought better to render the Arabic text as nearly as possible, the general sense being, as a rule, tolerably clear.

The major part of the letter, already summarized in my above-mentioned telegram, may be summed up as a plain intimation that the Sherif of Mecca and the Arab communities whose policy and ideas he represents, are ready to side with us in the present war on the condition that we can accept their main demands and especially the territorial boundaries defined in the Sherif's previous communication forwarded to you in my despatch No. 94 of August 26.


The remainder of the letter refers to arrangements to be made for sending grain and money to Mecca. The grain has as a matter of fact already left and the money is following. The latter paragraphs were not dealt with in my telegraphic report as not directly bearing


The Rt. Honble.

on

Sir E. Grey Bart. M.G.,

etc. etc. etc.





189  
192


on the important political issue under discussion, I may  
however draw attention to the Sherif's statement, in con-  
nexion with his request for supplies, that his intention is  
to confirm our declarations that we are waging war only on  
the party which has usurped the rights of the Caliphate  
and not on Moslems in general.


I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

*d. A. M. Mahon*





"Translation"

4082  
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163827  
3 NOV 1915

(170)

(193)

10. Communication from the Grand Khalif of Mecca

To His Excellency the Most Exalted, the Most Eminent -  
The British High Commissioner in Egypt; may God grant him  
Success.


With great cheerfulness and delight I received your  
letter dated 19th Shawal 1333 (30th August, 1915) and have  
given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the  
impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of  
coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point.

It is necessary to make clear to Your Excellency our  
sincerity towards the Illustrious British Empire and our  
confession of preference for it in all cases and matters  
and under all forms and circumstances. The real interests  
of the followers of our religion necessitate this.


Nevertheless, Your Excellency will pardon me and permit  
me to say clearly that the coldness and hesitation which you  
have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries  
by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no  
use and is a loss of time and that they are still in the  
hands of the Government which is ruling them, etc., might  
be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

As these limits and boundaries demanded are not those  
of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should  
discuss them after the war is over but our peoples have seen  
that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by  
these limits and their word is united on this.

16







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4082/15  
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Therefore they have found it necessary to first discuss this point with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal viz: the Illustrious British Empire.

(Literal translation of the above passage) *ital*

5 1/2 " And therefore they saw the discussion in it first the place of their confidence and trust the axis of final appeal now and that is the illustrious British Empire"

Their reason for this union and confidence is mutual interest, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions and

the feelings of their inhabitants, so that they may know how to base their future and life, so not to meet her (England?) or any of her allies in opposition to their resolution which would produce a contrary issue, which God forbid

(Literal translation of above passage as follows) *ital*


5 1/2 " the feelings of its inhabitants to know how to base their future and life for not to meet her or one of its allies in front of their resolution when the thing comes to a contrary result, which God forbid".


For the object is, O. honourable Minister, the truth which is established on a basis which guarantees the essential sources of life in future.


Yet within these limits they have not included places inhabited by a foreign race. It is <sup>the</sup> a vain show of words and titles.


May God have mercy on the Caliphate and comfort Moslems in it.

I am confident that Your Excellency will not doubt that *it* is not I personally who am demanding of these limits which include only our race but that they are all proposals of the people who, in short, believe that they are necessary for economic life. 17









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With regard to our demand for grain for the natives and the monies (surras) known to the Wakfs Ministry and all other articles sent here with pilgrims caravan, O. High Excellency, my intention in this matter is to confirm your proclamations to the whole world and especially to the Moslem world that your antagonism is confined only to the party which has usurped the rights of Caliphate in which are included the rights of all Moslems.

Moreover, the said grain is from the special Wakfs and has nothing to do with politics.

If you think it should be, let the grain of the two years be transported in a special steamer to Jeddah in an official manner, in the name of all the natives as usual, and the captain of the steamer or the special Mamur detailed as usual every year to hand it over on his arrival at the port, will send to the Governor of Jeddah asking for the Mamur of the grain at Jeddah or a responsible official to take over the grain and give the necessary receipt signed by the said Mamur, that is the Mamur of the grain himself. He should make it a condition that he would accept any receipt but that signed by this Mamur.


Let the captain of the steamer or the "Mamur" (detailed with the grain) should be instructed that if he finds anything contrary to this arrangement he should warn them that he will return home with the cargo. Thereupon the Mamur and the special committee detailed with him which is known as the committee of the grain for the natives, will take over the grain in the proper form.

Please accept my best regards and salutations.

If you choose to send a reply to this please send it with bearer.

29th Shawal 1333  
9th September, 1915.

P





In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 164658 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.

194  
197

*Secret.*

P  
4082  
1915

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
November 6<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Louv Serhi, Paris. Tel. No. 841 Nov. 4 <sup>th</sup>	Arab Question

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6 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(Similar letter sent to \_\_\_\_\_)

[ 14







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unless required for official use.]

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1915

FRANCE.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Lord Bertie (Paris)  
November 4th. 1915.

D. 6.10.p.m.  
R. 8.20.p.m. November 4th. 1915.

No. 841.


*Copy to India  
12 November 1915*

-----  
Your telegram No. 2464.

Negotiations with the Arabs.

French Government realize the danger of touching  
on question of Kha(?)lifat and no negotiations are  
being conducted by their representative at Cairo al-  
though he naturally has to receive many Arabs. They  
have full confidence in his discretion.

RECEIVED  
6 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





196  
199  
53

Register No.  
4068  
 1915

Put away with.....

**Secret Department.**

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Letter from F.O. Dated 6 } hour. 1915.  
 Rec. 8 }

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	8 Nov.	act	<u>Arabia</u> Negotiations with Grand Sheriff & young Arabs. Sir H. McMahon's <del>views</del> reply to G. of I.'s comments.
Secretary of State.....	8	J. W. H.	
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to  
 F.O.  
 4/15/15 3 copies sent 8/11/15  
 2. etc. (see notes)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Att: telegram to G. of I. informing them of present position, & inviting further remarks, & instructing as to proclamation


8 November - telegram to Viceroy


Send  
 AL  
 8/11

Sent, 8-11-15  
 SWB

Previous Papers :-

18694 I. 479 2000.-4/1915 [1355/14.]





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


(Retamilla)

Despatched + SPE, 8.11. 1915.


P  
4068  
1915

Foreign secret. ~~Arabia~~ Your telegram  
to Mr. Arabia. I agree ~~in general~~  
with you <sup>and am</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>strongly</sup> pressing your view  
strongly on F.O. ~~Meanwhile words~~  
~~are being sent~~ & if you have  
anything to say on Mr. Nicholson's telegram  
please let me hear of it  
of Mr. Nicholson. ~~It is essential that I sh.~~  
~~hear quickly~~ <sup>Assurances, if given,</sup> ~~It is assumed that~~  
~~will be~~ <sup>once.</sup> ~~assurances are conditional on~~  
Arabs performing their part of bargain,  
which is additional reason against  
proclaiming them as Mr. Nicholson proposed.  
In these circumstances it wd. perhaps  
be better if Union used no proclama-  
tion <sup>at all</sup> on occupation of Bagdad, but  
if one is thought necessary ~~to~~ <sup>for</sup>  
local <sup>or Indian</sup> purposes, ~~it sh. contain no~~  
~~reference to these wider political questions~~  
Please let me have draft as soon as

17624. 1.1353. 1000.-9/1914.



possible. ~~It should not refer to~~  
~~the wider political issues raised by Khatib.~~  
[When does Union expect to advance? ?] Q. W. H.  
Fall of Bagdad is being diligently dis- mit  
counted in German press. al



In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No. 165761 /1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



Secret.

P  
4068  
1915

198  
201

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under Secretary of State  
for India and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,  
Nov. 6<sup>th</sup>, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:


Letter to Foreign Office: Nov. 5<sup>th</sup>

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir H. McMahon. Tel. no. 674 Nov. 5 <sup>th</sup>	Arab Question


RECEIVED IN  
8 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT


(Similar letter sent to












regarding potential inconvenience of a strong Arab state but even the elements of such a state can hardly as yet be said to exist and I have endeavoured in my statement of mutual guarantees to make any such future Arab state (within British sphere) subject to our creation, direction and control.

I regret that Indian Government should have read into my statement a disregard of Indian interests but if this explanation does not reassure them, terms of Bagdad proclamation might be restricted to such general terms as to avoid all danger of alarming Arab suspicions by divergent statements.

As regards the urgency of the situation under which my recent statement was issued I have received to-day a copy of a later letter just received by El Murghani of the Sudan from the Sherif in which the latter urges the supreme importance of immediate assurances by us of intentions especially in regard to frontiers as previously defined by him, and to which he says the Arabs are attaching very great weight. He warns Murghani of critical situation of Arabia and of great danger of Arabs being committed by Turkish pressure and German promises to a real Jihad against us.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India.





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4/6/15. MINUTE.


1. The first thing to get at is the necessity for enlisting Arab support. Sir H. McMahon ~~calls~~ speaks of "vital importance" para. 8, & Mr. Herbert of "almost supreme importance" para. 1. Neither of them tells us why. We may all admit that it wd. be better that the Arabs sh. be for us than against us. But not a particle of evidence is produced as to its supreme or vital importance. Of course the condition of Egypt may be such that the accession of Arabs to the enemy wd. make it untenable: if so, we ought to be told so. If not, I cannot imagine any other consideration that can justify the desperate gamble that is proposed. Mr. Herbert tells wildly about danger to India (para. 2) through Indian sympathy with the Arabs. So far as I know Indian Muslims have no particular sympathy with them, rather the contrary, for it is the Arab plunderers & the extortions of the Arab Grand Sheriff of Mecca that make their lives a burden on the Hajj; & only this week the Aga Khan <sup>(who has no use to gain)</sup> warned Sir E. Grey that Indian Muslims are "not well disposed towards our Arab Khilafate", & that for us to be mixed up with it "would cause great trouble in India".

Again, paras. 15 & 16 Mr. Herbert speaks of "gratuitously creating a new war theatre in the E."

15616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1913. But what does that really amount to? What is it

+ memo. by Mr. Aubrey Herbert - not left on file.

paper attached





MINUTE.


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supposed that the Arabs can do, even supposing for the moment that they can combine? The first requirement of the Grand Sheriff - & the same is true of all the rest of them, as we know from experience in the case of the Idrii & Beni Saud - is arms & ammunition (we might add money). Can the Germans & Turks supply these in sufficient quantities to make the Arabs a military factor of any importance?

2) The next thing to get at is any evidence that the Arabs are capable of combining either for us or against us. Mr. Herbert says that "till recently Arab unity & brotherhood... seemed as remote as the young Turkish organisation appeared 10 years ago." No evidence <sup>has yet been</sup> produced that it is less remote now. He seems to have fallen under the spell of El Meiri (para. 12 sup.), whom, however, he admits to be "rather a visionary" (para. 14). The Grand Sheriff has never been claimed to have secured the unswerving support of other Arab potentates - on the contrary, he has shown considerable anxiety as to our relations with some of them (such as Idrii) & their possible effect on himself. And we know in our own recent experience of the following antagonisms:-

Idrii, anti-Sheriff : Inman pro-Sheriff & pro-Saud  
Beni Saud, --- : Beni Rashid ---

Note that in both cases the same men are pro-Sheriff &








MINUTE.

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pro-Turk. Mr Herbert himself tells us para. 10 that one of the Ed. Sheriff's sons is on his way with a large force to support Beni Rashid i.e. against Beni Sand. It is submitted that we can state nothing great or uncorroborated expectations of the kind held out to us.

3) The same is true of El Saughi's story of the Arab officers & troops in the Turkish army who are ready to revolt at the young Arab signal. No evidence is produced; & what prospect is there of the success of such a series of sporadic revolts (since the Arab troops are not concentrated in any one place) as ca. be the only result?

4) The Aga Khan said to me the other day:  
"it is no use attempting to win Arab support; the Arabs will take money from both sides, & then in the end do what they intended to do all along" i.e. ~~side~~ <sup>join</sup> with the side which they think is going to win. This is a fortiori tone of promises & assurances. Is it credible that, if & where we receive our greatest in the Tardenelles (the effect of which in Egypt & all Muslim countries will be very great indeed), promises of an Arab empire are going to raise the Arabs in our support, or keep them on our side?

5) And after all that has been said & written on the subject it ought not to be necessary at this





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
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time of day to repeat that the Arab Empire is a dream. It has not the material to which. Except for the strip along the coast of the Mediterranean & the Red Sea <sup>Bagdad + Basra</sup> (the importance of wh. I do not deny & wh. is probably all that the young Arabs think about), "Arabia" is not a country of settled inhabitants, but of wandering tribes. In Iraq we have the Shammar & the Anazeh, in northern Arabia another Shammar (Bani Rashid), in the centre the Nakhli tribes of Najd (Bani Saud). There are innumerable others; but the chiefs of the 4 named are big men, & the only really big man in that part of the country (I cannot speak for the W side of the Syrian desert, though Miss Bell told me once that there is a powerful man there). But they are no more capable of administering severally or collectively than Red Indians. And I have seen no evidence - & do not for a moment believe - that they contemplate making themselves the puppets of a young Arab Committee & of dreamers of the type of El Mesri. The task of this body is immeasurably greater than that of the C.V.P. The latter had to capture the centre of a comparatively organised administration; the former have to collect water in a sieve.

Grand Sheriff of  
 ... the Aga Khan tells  
 ... is ... a ...  
 ... main ...  
 ... been studying the  
 ... Islamic question in  
 ... it, says the same  
 ...

6) But it is only on the hypothesis of a consolidated & centrally administered polity that the

15616. I. 1178. 2000-9/1915






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Permanent blessings can accrue which Mr Herbert  
foresees in para. 8. Even on that hypothesis we sh.  
need to have a very firm control over it - & ex hypothesi  
it is only to be "supported, not controlled" para. 6 -  
to prevent it from becoming to the Germany of the  
next generation what Turkey has been in this. For  
if there is one lesson wh. this war has taught, &  
wh. Germany had foreseen & will never forget, it is  
the vital importance to her of the middle east.  
And when she begins to recover it is there that her  
renewed activity will first show itself. I have  
never believed that any Muslim state sh. be treated  
with her - she can make appeals which we cannot.  
An Arab state (if it were practicable) sh. be no  
more <sup>of</sup> a buffer than any Ottoman state has  
shown itself to be. And if an Arab state is  
a coherent political entity is impracticable, how  
will a handful of tribes, whose greedy & intriguing  
Sheikhs can always be played off against us, be  
any safeguard to our interests? The process of  
peaceful penetration will begin again; the Germans,  
who in 10 years undermined 2 centuries of British  
"monopoly" in Mesopotamia, will have us at their  
mercy; & in half a century we shall be fighting  
this war over again.

15610. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1913.







MINUTE.

206  
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7) Do not let us be deceived by Mr Herbert's  
lovely picture of Young Arabia in para. 13. A similar  
one has painted of the Young Turks. Islam is  
Islam - a closed book: there is no seed of progress  
in it, & whether its central organization at the any  
moment is theist or atheist, it is always the  
religious idea that it must exploit, for that is  
<sup>the</sup> sole raison d'être of Islam.

8) It is to be observed that Sir H. McMahon  
makes no mention of the deliberations of Mr Herbert  
& the Young Arabs, & it is difficult to guess  
under what influences he has thrown overboard  
~~over~~ all his habitual prudence & sagacity. I hear  
from a private military source that there is much  
friction between him & Sir John Maxwell, & it  
may be that he is being <sup>unwisely</sup> misled by his military  
advisers. These personal factors cannot be left  
out of account.

9) When the F.O. lightly say (tbl<sup>m</sup> of 6 line.)  
our primary & vital object is not to secure a new  
sphere of British influence, they appear to me to  
have completely forgotten the lesson mentioned above  
para. 6). Granted that we do not want a new  
sphere of influence for its own sake, what is  
vital to the security of India & (I believe) the  
peace of the world, is that it sh. not pass into

15616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1913.







MINUTE.

(207)  
(213)  
the control of any other power. If the war has  
not taught this, what has been the meaning of  
our whole policy in Turkish Arabia & the Persian  
Gulf for the last century? And unless the  
cause of the Allies is literally in extremis I can  
see no justification whatever for this extraordinary  
volt face. The 4<sup>th</sup> para. of the telegram would,  
if published, cover its author with ignominy.

10) Is it not possible to consult Lord Curzon?

At  
6/11/15

I agree with Sir A. Hertzog that the importance  
of the persons with whom the High Comd. is negotiating  
is, on the evidence before us, very doubtful. They  
profess to represent a large Arab party within the  
Turkish army and the general body of chiefs in  
Arabia. But as to an Arab party within the Army  
we have here <sup>only</sup> the word of Ferid, the Director from  
the Turkish Army. It may be that the High Comd.  
has independent corroboration evidence of an exact  
kind, but of this we have no knowledge. As to the  
general body of chiefs being privy to the movement,  
the evidence before us points to the Sherief of  
Mecca as composing both the head & the party; and we  
have positive evidence that he has much & means  
in Arabia.

As far therefore as we can form an independent  
judgment, the negotiation is on very shaky ground.



But if our advisers & responsible agents in Egypt are to be trusted, we have to accept their word that there is a sufficiently large & solid Arab party in & out of the Turkish Army, who can be won over & who is well worth winning over. Thus, not only because it would weaken the Turkish forces, but because it would prevent our fort<sup>s</sup> & the British fort<sup>s</sup> in India from being confronted with a by a solid & united Islam. That is a tangible object. We have had it in view throughout our negotiations with Turkey, and on the premises put before us by the authorities in Egypt it is worth attempting to secure from the Arabs at a price.

As regards the price to be paid, I assume that payment will be made only in case of Ferid's & the Grand Sheriff making good their promises. If, as it likely, they do not make good, Sir H. McMahon's engagements about the boundaries of Arabia and the political independence will, I suppose, be treated by us as void. It is embarrassing to be under engagement - even though they may be voidable. But it is something to think that if our anticipations that the scheme is a mere ~~bubble~~ prove correct, we shall not lose much.

A question arises as to how the guarantees are to be given. Is there to be a bi-lateral treaty with reciprocal promises, or is a unilateral proclamation by the British fort<sup>s</sup> to the Arabs of Arabia to suffice? I gather that the latter is contemplated. The only person with whom a treaty could be made is the Grand Sheriff. He cannot pledge any one but himself, and he would insist on secrecy. There could be no up-rising from this of Arab the Arabs at large.

As to proclamations our experience of their value is not a happy one. We have tried them on the Arabs already,



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
but they have left the Arabs cold. When we have discovered this, we have said that our promises are henceforth void, as there has been no response.


If the French accept the proposition that is to be made to them, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for us later on to assert more than an administrative control over Basra & Bagdad: So long, that is, as the guarantee to the Arabs holds good. From our point of view that is the main objection to attempting to exclude French territorial acquisitions in Syria. From another point of view ~~an~~ objection to including Syria, or any part of it, in Arabia is that there is no Arab ruler in existence there and the population is not wholly Arab. Syria may be ripe for autonomous gov<sup>t</sup>, ~~but~~ without being added to the territory over which the Grand Shariff wishes to be lord.

As regards the omission of the clause placing the whole of Greater Arabia under British protection and guidance, I confess I am not attracted by the clause. It is one thing to make separate treaties, as we are doing, with friendly Arab chiefs, and to take a vast region en bloc into our protection. Obviously <sup>the latter would be</sup> ~~it is~~ a great extension of responsibility; and would have to be made effectual by adequate military & naval forces. We should again figure as the great benefactor and <sup>shall</sup> we get a bad name & very little else for our pains.

with strictly  
and absolute,  
another

6/11/15 - J. W. H





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2 NOVEMBER 5

Sir,

Sir H. McMahon.

No.:


The Aga Khan came to see me to-day, and dwelt very strongly on the fact that Moslems in India were not well-disposed towards an Arab Khalifate. It would, therefore, be a great mistake for us to get mixed up in a movement for such a Khalifate, and it would cause great trouble in India.


I said that we were prepared to favour an independent or autonomous Arabia in the country inhabited by the Arabs; but any thing that we promised to the Arabs, or any action that we took to support them, would be of a political and secular character. We regarded the Khalifate as a thing which should be settled by Moslems for themselves, and in which neither we nor any non-Moslem Power should interfere.

The Aga Khan expressed some apprehension that the Arabs in the Soudan and in Egypt might receive encouragement from local officials in connection with an Arab Khalifate; but he expressed himself quite satisfied with what I had said. He asked me, however, that it should be made very clear, in all communications with the Arabs, that we really intended to stand aside as far as the Khalifate was concerned.

I think

Copy to India  
26 NOV 1915






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2.

I think it desirable to put this on record and to transmit it to you; and a copy should be sent to Sir Reginald Wingate. It is evidently a matter on which there is, amongst Indian Moslems, some suspicion, which we must be careful not to increase.

The Aga Khan seemed of opinion that the Arabs had no claim to Bagdad, and that that region and the Shrine of Kerbela ought more properly to be given to Persia.

But I did not enter upon a discussion of this subject.







214  
214

Register No.  
**4053**

Put away with **53**

**Secret Department.**

Telegram  
Letter from *Viceroy*

Dated *4* }  
Rec. *5* } Nov. 1915.

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	<i>5 Nov.</i>	<i>WA</i>	<u>Arabia</u> Views of G. of I. on Sir H. McMahon's communication to the Grand Sheriff of Mecca.
Secretary of State.....	<i>5</i>	<i>J. W. H.</i>	
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Copy to* India 26 November *Copy sent to D.M. I.*  
H.O. 6 November. *7.4.16.*

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.



*Off. letter to F.O. supporting.*

*6 November - Letter to Foreign Office*

*App. as amended*  
*at*  
*5/11*

Previous Papers:—  
*4053*

18894 I. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1855/14.]





215

Immed<sup>te</sup> & Secret

U. S. of S.  
I.O.


Boor

6 November 1915

With reference to the tel<sup>m</sup> from H.M. High Comm<sup>rs</sup> for Egypt d<sup>te</sup> 6th of 26<sup>th</sup> Oct. regarding his negotiations with the Grand Sheriff of Mecca, I am directed by the S. of S. for I. to forward for the information of the S. of S. for I.A. copy of a telegram that has been received from the S. of S. on the subject.

C. is aware that the detachment of Arab beds from the Turkish cause is regarded by H.M. as of great military and political importance in the present phase of the war, and that for reasons of high policy it was decided to give the High Comm<sup>rs</sup> of Egypt full discretion to convey to the Grand Sheriff of Mecca such assurances as would prevent the party he represents from being alienated from the Allies. That Sir H. McMahon has exercised this discretion to the best of his judgment in difficult and pressing circumstances is beyond doubt. But the terms employed by him with regard to the Basra and the Bagdad vilayets were, from the point of view of imperial as well as purely Arab interests, unfortunate, and may prove embarrassing in the event of a successful conclusion of the Mesopotamian campaign. It

It will be seen that the S. of S. are of opinion that the discretion has been left to Sir H. McMahon "has been exercised without due regard to British interests, by the instructions of the provinces of Bagdad & Basra in the proposed independent Arab State." In this opinion Sir Chamberlain fully concurs - indeed he wd. go further &



~~any that is proposed, no less than British  
instruments will be justified by any  
arrangement which does not include  
the conversion of the vilayets of Basra  
& which does not place the vilayet of  
Bagdad under absolute British control,  
whenever from that control a way lies.~~

natural result of this  
campaign, if successful, should  
be the annexation of the vilayet  
of Basra and the extension of  
British predominance over the  
Bagdad vilayet.

~~The grounds for this opinion are  
fully set forth in the report of Sir  
M. de Bunsen's Committee, [to document  
wh. so far as Mr Chamberlain is aware,  
has never been considered by the C.I.D.,  
or by Mr G.] the recommendations  
of which are cut across by the assur-  
ances given by Sir H. McMahon, if  
those assurances are to be regarded as  
binding. [Mr Chamberlain cannot  
but feel that the future of <sup>great</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>economic & strategic</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>region,</sup> the <sup>importance</sup> ~~importance~~ of wh. is not  
underrated by the enemies of the  
Entente, is being endangered, without  
due consideration, in the hope of  
winning the ~~support~~ <sup>united</sup> support  
of a race wh. has shown itself in-  
capable of union, & the <sup>importance</sup> ~~value~~ of whose  
assimilation, <sup>or hostility</sup> he is not disposed to rate~~

As to the importance of this  
objective, I am to refer to

with refer  
telegram  
ok of  
to pass

West



(215)  
(216)

I trust

very high. And he feels this the more strongly because he believes that Arab sentiment towards Britain will continue to be throughout the war to be influenced far more ~~of~~ ~~directly~~ effectively by the success of British arms than by any assurances however flattering to Arab ~~Common~~ opinion.


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
I Mr. Chamberlain ~~therefore~~ <sup>trusts</sup> hopes that further instructions will be sent to Sir H. McMahon, before he is further committed to the young Arab party, in the sense of the last sentence of the penultimate para. of the 9. of 1.1.1915. ~~Mr. Chamberlain has not been~~ <sup>with reference to</sup> ~~favoured with a copy of~~ Sir H. McMahon's ~~letter~~ <sup>letter</sup> referred to in the last para., ~~but~~ he trusts that until the draft of the proclamation to be issued at Bagdad has been received & carefully considered, no public pronouncement on the subject may be made in Egypt or elsewhere.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the S.O.

(So) J.W. Holiness

with reference to Sir H. McMahon's telegram referred to by the Govt of India in the last para. of their telegram






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(217)

Telegram from Viceroy. X  
Dated 4th November 1915.  
Received 9.30 p.m.

RECEIVED IN  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT  
5 NOV 1915

Foreign, Secret. Your telegram of the 22nd October and  
McMahon's telegram to Foreign Office ~~no~~ 644 of 26th October. (3849)  
Arabia. We fully realise and with regret that circumstances (3931)  
prevented your consulting us in connection with Arab over-  
tures as reported by you, particularly in view of discretion  
left to High Commissioner of Egypt in <sup>connection</sup> conjunction with our  
special interests in Baghdad Province and area actually in our  
occupation, which we consider has been exercised without due  
regard to Indian interests, by the inclusion of provinces of  
Baghdad and Bussorah in the proposed independent Arab state,  
only "special measure of advanced administrative control" in  
these two vilayatis being reserved to H.M. Govt. or the Govt.  
of India. We think we should not have been committed to such  
a policy and that we should have been consulted before a  
pledge of such vital importance to future <sup>of</sup> India was given. *double*  
We have always regarded ~~with~~ <sup>as</sup> with much <sup>of</sup> creation  
of strong Arab state lying <sup>outside</sup> outside our interests in the East  
and in Gulf, as a not unlikely source of ultimate trouble, and  
we doubt either military or political advantage likely to  
accrue from it. If H.M. Govt. are satisfied that an Arab  
alliance is likely to hasten termination of war we do not  
wish to oppose it on general grounds, although we object to  
conditions affecting Mesopotamia on which it is proposed that  
it should be based. We have always contemplated as a minimum  
eventual annexation of Bussorah vilayat and (?some ~~form~~  
form) of native administration in Baghdad vilayat under our  
close political control. McMahon's guarantees apparently put-  
ting annexation out of the question. By surrendering Bussorah  
vilayat to Arab Govt. of any kind, we shall not only be pre-  
paring trouble for ~~ourselves~~ <sup>at the heart of</sup> ourselves) and  
along southern littoral of the Gulf, but shall be giving up  
main fruits of hard won victories in Mesopotamia. This will *not*







(2)

not only be abandoning enormous potential sources of revenue, but will also be resented by Indian people, and the European commercial community who look to Mesopotamia as a field for commercial expansion and emigration in return for the blood of their countrymen there shed. We sincerely trust that formula may be amended so as to admit of H.M.Govt. having *free* hand in eventual disposal of Bussorah and Baghdad vilayats, which have been won at such a cost.

Pending orders, we hesitate to recommend publication of any proclamation on lines ~~as~~ suggested by McMahon in his private telegram to Foreign Office of 1st November.

Addressed to S. of S. and repeated to Cairo as No. 10 D S.



