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<b>Reference</b>	IOR/L/PS/10/491
<b>Title</b>	File 3516/1914 Pt 16 'German War: Persia; general; question of alliance'
<b>Date(s)</b>	12 Sep 1915-24 Dec 1915 (CE, Gregorian)
<b>Written in</b>	English and French in Latin
<b>Extent and Format</b>	1 volume (221 folios)
<b>Holding Institution</b>	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
<b>Copyright for document</b>	<a href="#">Unknown</a>

#### About this record

The volume concerns the situation in Persia during the First World War. The main focus is the British-Russian attempt to gain trust from the Persian Government, to avoid alliances with the Germans.


The volume covers:


- Discussion on Russian proposal to place the Shia holy shrines of Kerbala and Nejed in direct relations with Persia.
- 'Report of inter-departmental Committee on the Defence of the Persian Oil Field' (ff 194-199).
- Alleged alliance between Germany and Persia.
- Measures to be taken in southern Persia in the event of war.
- Proposed creation of a Persian force to be jointly officered by Russian and British officers.
- Reported Turkish advance on Kermanshah and desired Russian advance.
- Co-operation between Russian forces with General Nixon.
- Desire of Shah to abdicate.
- Proposed loan of British troops to the Persian Government.

- Proposed appointment of Zil-es-Sultan as Governor General of Fars, with support of British Indian troops.

The volume's principal correspondents are: George Buchanan, British Ambassador in Russia; Percy Cox, Political Resident in Persian Gulf; Charles Hardinge, Viceroy of India; Charles Marling, British Minister at Tehran; Walter Langley, Eyre Alexander Barby Wichart Crowe and Maurice de Bunsen, Foreign Office; Thomas William Holderness and Arthur Hirtzel, India Office; Bertram Blakiston Cubitt, War Office.

There is a letter in French, from the Russian Embassy in London.


























Previous File  
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P. 3516 1914. 16

Subject:  
German War - Persia  
General. SEP-DEC. 1915  
(Question of Alliance)


This File contains the following papers:—

YEAR.	P.	3249	3296	3470	3524	3567	3867	4081	4214	4245	4303
1915	P.	437	4318	4328	4340	4366	4373-5	4400	4412	4429	4475
191	P.	4518	4527	4550	4575-7	4578	4615	4677	4678	4699	4724
191	P.										
191	P.										

Memoranda.

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

1948. I. 1251. 250.—10/1915.





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④

Register No.  
**4734**  
1915

Put away with 3516  
**Secret Department.**

**Minute Paper.**

Letter from F.O.  
Dated } 24 Dec. 1915.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	24 Dec.	at	Persia  The proposed alliance.
Secretary of State.....	24	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India  
31 DEC 1915

FOR INFORMATION.

The G. of I.'s tel<sup>m</sup> n<sup>o</sup> 117 D.S. does not seem to me to ~~be~~ necessarily to imply a preference for benevolent neutrality. The possibility of an alliance against Turkey was first mentioned by Mr. Marking on 20<sup>th</sup> Nov., previous proposals having been limited to benevolent neutrality; & the idea was developed in a tel<sup>m</sup> of 22<sup>nd</sup> Nov. On 24<sup>th</sup> the G. of I. telegraphed referring to these tel<sup>m</sup>s & giving reasons why "an alliance with Persia wd. be of distinct advantage to India, provided it is not concluded on unduly extravagant political conditions." Then came Mr. Marking's 504 (not 524) of 1<sup>st</sup> Dec., & the G. of I.'s n<sup>o</sup> 117 D.S. of 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec.

7. 14  
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24/12

Previous Papers :-  
4675

18698. I. 483. 2000.-4/1915. [1000/14.]




As regards Mr. Marshall's doubt, the natural course  
wld. seem to be to begin negotiating for an alliance. If the  
Russian operations develop satisfactorily, & the general situation  
becomes more favourable to us, we shall become less & less  
disposed to concede extravagant terms - with the result that  
either the Russians will reduce them to ~~something~~ <sup>meet us,</sup> ~~something~~ <sup>some or later</sup>  
or the basis of the negotiations will ~~improvement~~ become  
one of neutrality instead of alliance. If on the other  
hand things go wrong we shall have either to accept the  
Russian terms or eventually break off.

I agree. I infer from the last para. of Mr Marshall's  
telegram that this is the course he recommends  
L. F. O.


J. W. H.

24/12

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
*From Viceroy, 3rd December 1915.  
(Repeated to Tehran, 117 D.S.)*

[P 4412] Foreign Secret. Persia. Reference to Marling's telegram 504 F, 1st December.

While realising that Marling must be sole judge of actual situation in Tehran, I cannot help suspecting that Shah's sudden desire for alliance with all Allies has been prompted by pro-German advisers at German instigation in order to give Germans time for completion of their plans without interference from Russian troops. Prompt action against rebel gendarmerie and mujahidin at Hamadan, whatever Persian Government may say, would appear essential in order to effect cutting communications of the German marauders with Turkey, and thus isolate them.

*India Office,* }

18912. I. 691. 500—5/1915.





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PERSIA.


POLITICAL.

Decypher Mr. Marling (Tehran) December 1st.  
D. 5.30 pm December 1st.  
R. o. 50 am December 2nd.  
No. 504 (K).

.....  
Shah sent for me today and said he was entirely  
convinced of necessity for Persia concluding an  
Alliance and doing so at once. He suggested that  
Alliance ought to be with all the Allies. I said  
that I thought this was unpractical and that even  
if only one other Power say France was brought in  
time might be lost.

He was extremely cordial.

Addressed to Foreign Office and Petrograd.





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⑧

Put away with 3516/14

Register No. 4699

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letter from FO Dated } 20 December 1915.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	22 Dec.	AA	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Persia.</u></p> <p>Proposed return of the Lil.</p>
Secretary of State.....	22	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*July*

*AC*

*23/12*

*None of us know how this figure was suggested*


Copy to Copy to India  
24 DEC 1915

FOR INFORMATION.

I do not know where Mr. Marshall gets his 50,000 men from. Doubtless if he had them he cd. dispense with the Lil.

Previous Papers:—

18098. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]





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4677-8

PERSLA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Mr. Harling (Teheran) December 18th.

D. 12.12 p.m., December 19th 1915.

R. 2.50 p.m.,

No. 546.



Your telegram No. 454. (4678)


Appearance of an expeditionary force of 50,000 men from India would I feel confident revolutionise position in Southern Persia and I should have suggested it before now had I not always understood Government of India would in no circumstances agree to its despatch, an impression borne out by small force employed in East Persia. Kawam who seems to be still loyal and Soulet would rally to us at once as would Bakhtiari of both branches of tribe.

It has been our failure to show material strength and recently our reverses outside Bagdad which have cost us our influence with our friends but a demonstration of our ability to act would restore confidence in us even at the 11th hour.


If we are able to send troops it matters little whether Zi-l-es Sultan goes or not. He would be Russian Minister's agent after their arrival and (?could) be appointed Governor-General of Fars without difficulty.


If he is to go without troops he might be of use provided that he is supplied with very large sum of money but his appointment would depend largely on situation in Teheran. He could get on good terms with Nji Ilkhani branch of Bakhtiari without difficulty but his appearance would further alienate other branch.











20/12

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10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall, S.W.


W. Chamberlain


I feel myself that it is impossible to press India to send the force requested by the Zils: whether any could be moved from Mesopotamia is a military question on which I will not hazard a definite opinion, but it seems a very doubtful proposition. I should certainly hesitate to put the idea before the G. of S. as one to be accepted by them.

The Zil might be of service; but I doubt if we ought to be very sanguine; and I suppose he will not go unless the terms are promised.

Mr. [unclear] now thinks that if the Shah will not stay on (which he may do after all) the SR-Shah ought to be invited: the majority of the British would apparently join him. Personally I dislike the idea extremely, both in itself and as a step in the face to British policy.

20. XII. 16





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P. 4677-8  
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Copy to India  
31 December

(196267/15).

POLITICAL

PERSIA

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Teheran)

Foreign Office, December 23rd, 1915. 12.30 p.m.


No. 465.

Your telegram No. 546 (of December 19th).

Government of India cannot spare any troops at present and idea of sending Zil will therefore have to be abandoned, until you consider the situation at Teheran renders the appointment desirable and feasible.

Repeated to Petrograd No. 3073.

RECEIVED IN  
24 DEC 1915





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3516  
14

Register No.  
**4677-8**  
1915

Put away with  
**Secret Department.**

Letter from *F.O.* Dated } 18 Dec. 1915.  
Rec. } 14

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	18 Dec.	W.H.	<u>Persia</u> Proposed app <sup>ts</sup> of Lieut. Col. Sultons as Gov <sup>r</sup> Gen <sup>l</sup> of Persia, with support of British-Indian troops
Secretary of State.....	18	F.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

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24 DEC 1915

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
*Handwritten notes:*  
~~Handwritten note~~  
H.S. sign letter.  
I cannot form the  
S.O.S. for troops  
at the present  
time. We are  
short of troops in  
India itself &  
Mesopotamia.  
Also  
20/12


21 DEC 1915. Letter to F.O.


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
17626.—I. I. 1355. 1000.—9/1914.











DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

from G.O.C., Exped: Pers, D.

conced in above Telegram


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Service.  
Foreign secret. Foreign Office are  
considering app<sup>ts</sup> of Ld as Gov<sup>ts</sup> Gen<sup>ls</sup>  
of Pers, if Bahktiaris can be got  
to agree in return for certain guar-  
antees & concessions, & if you can  
provide a backing of troops. It  
is understood that Ld thinks he  
can reach Shiraz with 2,000 or 3,000  
British-Indian troops & eventually  
get to Dehli with his own  
resources. Please telegraph your  
views with all possible speed. I  
am holding out no hopes to the  
F.O., but please consider the two points  
(1) if, as recent information appears  
to indicate German intention is to  
march into Persia & their real objective is  
Persia, a brigade at Shiraz might  
be worth more than in Mesopotamia  
(2) Pers under a strong Gov<sup>ts</sup> Gen<sup>ls</sup>  
devoted to British cause with British




backing might automatically relieve  
the pressure of Turco-German influence  
on N.W. frontier.

I put these ~~points~~ points before you  
but you will understand that I do  
not in any way press you.

N.B.

Addressed 9.9.1. repeated times



In any further communication  
on the subject, please quote  
No. 192200/15.  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

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4677  
1915

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15

FOREIGN OFFICE

December 18th, 1915.

Secret and Immediate.

Sir:-


I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, relative to the measure of control which German agents have succeeded in securing over Southern Persia.


Sir Edward Grey considers that it is of urgent importance that some definite effort should be made by His Majesty's Government in the south in the endeavour to prevent, or at least hinder, the threatened increase of these German Levies, and he is of opinion that the best, and indeed the only, means by which this object can be secured will be the immediate despatch to Fars of some strong Persian Governor General, who will rally round him the more orderly elements in the province and endeavour gradually to restore order and security in Southern Persia.

The man whom Sir Edward Grey would suggest for such an appointment is the Zil-es-Sultan, who is at present at Nice, and who would, as Sir Edward Grey understands, be prepared to proceed to Persia, provided, of course, that he received the

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.







(192200/15)

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the support and sympathy of His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government.

Sir Edward Grey is informed that the Zil considers he could guarantee to reach Shiraz if supported by some two thousand to three thousand British troops, and that from there he would eventually be able to proceed to Ispahan relying on his own resources.



It would, however, be necessary, if the proposal is entertained at all, to secure a preliminary arrangement with the Bakhtiari Khans whereby they would agree not to oppose the new Governor General in return for certain guarantees and concessions.



I am to request that Sir Edward Grey may be favoured with an early intimation of Mr. Chamberlain's views on this question, and that he may be advised as to whether it would be possible to allow the Zil the escort of British troops which he would require.

In the event of Mr. Chamberlain considering that the course suggested might be tried, Sir E. Grey is prepared to invite the Zil to come to London in order to discuss the conditions under which he would undertake this appointment, and the measure of support which would be essential to its success.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the War Office, and telegrams have been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Petrograd to ascertain the







(192200/15)

the views of the Russian Government and also to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran requesting his views on the proposal.



I am,



Sir,



Your most obedient,



humble Servant,

*Manic de Nassau*













know for a fact a considerable force including even Bakhtiari has left Ispahan for Kum) so that it is probable that enemy force may soon reach a figure too great to be crushed at once by Russian General Officer Commanding's troops which have to operate over a very wide front and against an enemy whose tactics will be to avoid decisive actions. It is most necessary ~~Majahids~~ and Gendarmirie should be crushed before Turks appear for if only a quarter of 40,000 suggested by my telegram No. 531 should reach Kermanshah all south west Persia will join them. In fact 10,000 more Russian troops may be able to effect to-day what thrice that number will find difficult in the spring or whenever Turks appear. It seems to me that they will arrive before the spring for although military operations are difficult and sometimes impossible in those regions in the winter their presence will attract recruits and there will be time to organize them.



I would urge that General Baratow's force be considerably increased without delay.



Addressed to Foreign Office, Sent to India Petrograd.






















22  
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unless required for official use.]

P  
4677  
1915

RUSIA

(192201/15).

MILITARY

Cypher telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).

Foreign Office. December 17th 1915. 1.15 v.m.

No. 3006.


-----  
Tehran telegrams Nos. 533 and 535.

Pray consult Russian Government as to whether im-  
mediate despatch of reinforcements can be arranged. I  
agree with Mr. Harling that this is the only hope of  
saving the situation.

Repeated to Tehran No. 451.

-----  
Copy to India  
24 DEC 1915







23  
25

Register No.  
**4615** Put away with **3516** **AM**

**Secret Department.**

Telegram Letter from *Viceroy* Dated *15* } *December 1915.*  
Rec. *16* }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	<i>16 Dec.</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>Persia.</i> <i>Proposed loan of British Officers.</i> <i>Views of G. &amp; J.</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>16</i>	<i>J. W. H.</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*H. J. G. G. G.*  
*Alc*  
*17/12*

Copy to *India* Copy to India  
24 DEC 1915

*D. M. O. (see within)*  
*India*

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


*Lt. letter to J.O. concurring.*


**18 DEC 1915** *Letter to J.O.*

Previous Papers :—

17826.—1. +J. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.







24  
26

Book

U. S. of S.  
S.O.


18 DEC 1915

In continuation of my letter P.4400 of the 11<sup>th</sup> inst. regarding the possibility of sending British officers to the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup>, I am directed by the S. of S. for I. to forward, for the information of the S. of S. for I.A., copy of telegrams <sup>on the subject</sup> exchanged with the S. of S. on the subject, these will be accepted on the


As regards the movements of Russian troops on Tehran, Mr Chamberlain wd. leave that question to the discretion of the British & Russian Min<sup>rs</sup>. But he wd. suggest that on occasion sh. be lost of urging the Russian Gov<sup>t</sup> to increase the price at General Barctoff's disposal


(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel.

Copy sent to D.M.O., W.O.  
(Capt. Padtem)  
5/1/16



I  
to your  
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Ad  
D. S.







26

Register No.  
4578  
1915

Put away with 3516 28

Secret Department.

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Letter from *FO. No. 189732.* Dated *14*  
 Rec. *15 Dec.* 1915.

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	<i>15 Dec.</i>	<i>W.H.</i>	<i>Persia</i> Probable effect of Shah's proposed abdication in favour of the Ex-Shah.
Secretary of State.....	<i>16</i>	<i>W.H.</i>	
Committed.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

**Copy to India**  
**17 DEC 1915**

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


*Off: Letter to F.O. deprecating.*


16 DEC 1915 Letter to FO

HP sign  
 with the omission  
 of the last para.  
 & the addition of  
 a caveat as to  
 changes suggested  
 by his being  
 reply. *W.H.*  
16/12

Previous Papers:—

18694 1. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1955/14.]





27

(29)

MINUTE.


(Persia Annual  
Report 1909)


\* Copy attached

For the part played by the Bakhtiari in 1909  
see the report below pp. 2, 6, 7, 8, 36-5. Mr Greenway  
of the A.P. Oil Co. showed to Sir C. Bannan & me  
yesterday a <sup>1</sup>lit<sup>m</sup> from the oil-fields which indicates  
that the local khans are now very well-disposed, & it  
wld. surely be most unfortunate

15618. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1918.







U. S. of S.  
S.O.

Brown

Immediate 16 DEC 1915

I am directed by the U. S. of S. for I.  
to acknowledge the receipt of your letter  
No. 189,732 of the 14<sup>th</sup> inst., & in reply to  
say that he wd. regard the restoration  
of the ex-Shah with serious misgivings.  
That Mohammed Ali wd. return as a  
Russian tool is a minor evil wh. might  
be tolerated in view of the immediate  
collapse of the pro-German democratic  
party which his return might be expected  
to bring about. But Mr Chamberlain  
feels that it wd. also bring about the  
defection of the Bakhtiars to the Germans.  
Since, after the part played by them in  
the revolution of 1909, it cd. hardly  
be anticipated that they wd. <sup>again</sup> welcome  
the restoration of the monarch whom  
they had ejected as anything but a  
menace to themselves. It is un-  
necessary to enlarge upon the prejudice





to British interests which the defection of  
the Bakhtiari led. involve.


The Gil-es-Saltan led. seems a ~~far~~  
preferable candidate if the consent of  
the Russian Gov<sup>t</sup> cd. be obtained.

Mr. C. thinks that it  
may be convenient to let  
S. say to have this  
provisional statement of  
his views at once, but  
he recognises that  
conditions change very rapidly  
at Teheran <sup>and</sup> that the  
Said <sup>has</sup> must be subject  
to revision in the light  
of information received  
from the field.

(S<sup>d</sup>) A. H. [unclear]







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unless required for official use.]

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decy her. Mr. Marling. (Teheran).

D. 4.20.p.m.

December 10th.

R. 11.10.p.m.

(K).


Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915


-----  
Most Secret.

Shah sent his great-uncle Kamran Mirza, formerly Naibes-Sultaneh, to Russian Minister this afternoon with following message which was to be communicated also to me.


His Majesty feels difficulties of his position for one so young and inexperienced as himself to be intolerable. It was he who had come to the conclusion that an Alliance with the two Powers was the only way out of Persia's difficulties but obstacles in his way were too formidable for him to (?venture) to deal with and he has therefore decided to abdicate in favour of his father; he himself would again become valid and live at the Court.


Russian Minister replied by requesting the Shah not to take any hasty decision but if his decision was irrevocable to give us (?group omitted ?time) to consult our governments and the ex-Shah. He also pointed out his Majesty's decision must be communicated by himself to the King and the Emperor. Kamran added that the Shah hoped that in the meantime Russian troops which are said to be engaged with rebels at Savan between Kum and Hamadan would not occupy Kum. Kamran has returned to the Shah to bring a reply to the Russian Minister's request.











*Puffly P 4575-7  
7.12.15*

*Percy Sykes 32  
(34)*

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
December 22nd, 1915.

*Put away with 3576/14*

*Dear Holderness,*

On the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, P.4575-7, I asked Mr. Marling by telegraph whether he would wish Sir Percy Sykes to be temporarily attached to his staff at Tehran.


Marling has now replied that he is expecting the arrival of Captain Rhys Williams and a Counsellor within the next few weeks, and that he will then have all the assistance he requires.

He is, at the same time, most grateful to the Government of India for offering to lend him the services of Sir Percy Sykes.

*Respectfully  
A. Nicolson*

*W*

RECEIVED  
24 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





33  
35

Register No.  
**4575-7**

Put away with **3516**  
**Secret Department.**

Letters from **70.** Dated **11, 14** } Dec. 191**5**  
Rec. **14**

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<b>14 Dec.</b>	<b>W.H.</b>	<b>Persia</b> Instruction at Tehran. Desire of the Shah to abdicate. Suggestion that Sir P. M. Sykes sh. be attached to the Legation, Tehran
Secretary of State.....	<b>15</b>	<b>J.W.H.</b>	
Committee .....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (see with in)  
*India*


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

*Sfr. letter to I.O. offering Sir P. Sykes's services.*

*15 December - 20 Letter to Sir Nicholson.*

Previous Papers :—  
**4578.**

17926.—1. 1. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.





34

(36)

MINUTE.

It is understood that the F.O. are going to send us a draft reply to the Russian aide-mémoire, for concurrence. The indications of recent events seem to be towards the opening of negotiations on the basis of benevolent neutrality, & the spinning of them out until it is clearly seen what the Russian operations are going to result in.

Sir Percy Sykes, formerly Consul at Herat & then Consul-General at Kabul, has just returned to this country from Kashgar, where he has been acting Consul-General for 6 months. He has had 20 years experience of Persia, has written what is now the standard history of the country, manages Persians extremely well (his consulate has given less trouble than Kabul, because he was able to get nearly all important disputes settled locally), & is on terms of personal friendship with many leading Persians (e.g. Jamshid Janna). Would he not be very useful to Mr. Marking at this juncture? The F. of S. have posted him to Muscat - for which he has no qualifications (he does not know Arabic), & where - if he does not die of heart-apoplexy (he is nearly 49, & full-blooded) - he cannot possibly be of any use, while his real qualifications will be wasted.

Sir C. Grey will say that he is anti-Russian. But that is not the case. He got on very well with

10016. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1918.



Russian officers & with the consulate-general at  
Meshed, except where the letter was held by Service  
Sabija, who was hardly on speaking terms with his  
own staff. It will be within the S. & S.'s recollection  
that a very dangerous Russo-Affghan incident was  
smoothed away the other day by Sir P. Lykes' personal (3194/15)  
influence with the Russian officer commanding on  
the Persian.

Spoken to Sir A. Hertzog. The suggestion  
has better be made by unofficial letter  
from me to Sir C. Nicholson.

15/12

J. W. H.

*I concur.*

*Al*  
15/12



Not for India  
Sir A.M. 16 Dec

35  
37

The Right Hon.  
Sir A. Nicolson Bart.  
~~H. S. P. etc. etc.~~  
I.O.

15 DEC 1915

Dear Nicolson

Mr Chamberlain asks me to  
~~be~~ ~~am~~ ~~directed~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~S. & S.~~  
let you know  
for I. to inform you that ~~desire~~ ~~to~~  
Sir Percy Sykes K.C.I.E., formerly H. B. I.  
General at ~~head~~ is now on  
leave in this country, & to enquire  
whether ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~opinion~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~S. & S.~~  
for I. his exceptional knowledge  
& experience of Persia & wide acquaint-  
ance with leading Persian statesmen,  
might ~~be~~ be very useful to ~~H.M.~~  
Sir J. Johnson, at the present juncture,  
if he were temporarily attached to  
the Legation.


Mr Chamberlain wishes that, in the absence  
the Mil. Attache or military service, there  
not now, as there generally is, any  
senior officer at Tehran, and


Mr Chamberlain wd. be happy to  
lend his services if the <sup>suggestion</sup> arrange-

ment commends itself to Sir E. Grey,  
he wd. be happy (for this reason among others) to lend Sir P.  
Sykes's services, the cost being ~~borne~~ divided equally  
between Indian & British revenues.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.







36  
38  
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*Sir J. K. Alderson*

*P4575-1/5*

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decy. her. Mr. Marling. (Teheran).

D. 4.20.p.m.

December 10th.

R. 11.10.p.m.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

(K).


Most Secret.

Shah sent his great-uncle Kamran Mirza, formerly Naibes-Sultaneh, to Russian Minister this afternoon with following message which was to be communicated also to me.

His Majesty feels difficulties of his position for one so young and inexperienced as himself to be intolerable. It was he who had come to the conclusion that an Alliance with the two Powers was the only way out of Persia's difficulties but obstacles in his way were too formidable for him to (?venture) to deal with and he has therefore decided to abdicate in favour of his father; he himself would again become valiad and live at the Court.

Russian Minister replied by requesting the Shah not to take any hasty decision but if his decision was irrevocable to give us (?group omitted ?time) to consult our government and the ex-Shah. He also pointed out his Majesty's decision must be communicated by himself to the King and the Emperor. Kamran added that the Shah hoped that in the meantime Russian troops which are said to be engaged with rebels at Saven between Kum and Hamadan would not occupy Kum. Kamran has returned to the Shah to bring a reply to the Russian Minister's request.







In any further communication on this subject, please quote  
No/87823/1915  
and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



37

39

P 4576/15

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India,  
and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,

Dec. 11, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter <sup>to</sup> from Foreign Office: 7 Dec. 6 no. 184930.


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Russian Amb. Dec. 8.	Proposed alliance with Russia.



(Similar letter sent to War Office.)

[ 13 ]





Copie.  
(187863)

Regent.

38  
40  
Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

Monsieur Sazonoff désirerait être informé le plus tôt possible de l'opinion de Sir Edward Grey concernant les demandes du Gouvernement Persan.

Monsieur Sazonoff les considère en partie exagérées et en partie inadmissible tout à fait, tel par exemple la formation et l'armement d'une armée de 50 m.h.

Il pense que si même toutes les exigences Persanes étaient admises, rien ne garantit que le Gouvernement Persan reste maître de la situation, qu'il se pourrait même que toutes les agitations en cours, produisent une hostilité en Perse qui rendrait le Gouvernement impuissant, et que de façon ou d'autres l'Angleterre et la Russie auront à recourir à leurs propres forces.


Monsieur Sazonoff pense qu'il serait très important pour notre orientation dans les question regardant la Perse et en particulier celle qui regarde notre avance sur Hamadan d'être tenus au courant des mesures que le Gouvernement Britannique décidera de prendre en Mesopotamie.

Monsieur Sazonoff aimerait à être renseigné sur ces points le plus tôt et le plus complètement qu'il sera possible.

Chesham House,

Chesham Place,

ce 8 décembre, 1915.





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and should be returned to the Foreign Office when done with  
unless required for official use.]

39

41

Copy 4570-1  
15

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling. (Teheran). December 9th.

D. 3.55 p.m. December 9th.

R. 10.0 a.m. December 10th.

No. 519. (K).

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

My telegram No. 513.

Prime Minister asked us to send dragomans to see him to-day. He told them that expressions of public opinion both in the capital and provinces against alliance and in favour of neutrality were so strong that he feared that he could not run counter to it. He asked what news Russian Minister had from Hamadan and appeared much relieved at learning that strong body of rebels had been routed.

I am inclined to think that His Highness while sincerely anxious to conclude alliance wishes to await result of Russian operations and to see what effect decisive defeat of rebels will have on public opinion before communicating conditions to us.

I believe also that his confidence of being able to bring about alliance has been much shaken by a sudden change of attitude on the part of the Bakhtiari which has caused Farman Farma much concern.


Russian Minister and I are to see Prime Minister tomorrow.

Chances of alliance are growing very slender and it is now only possible if we make largest concessions.

Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Petrograd.

RECEIVED  
13 DEC 1915







40

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42

Copy/4570-1/15

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
December 10th. 1915.

D. 10.0.a.m.

R. 7.7.p.m.

December 11th. 1915.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

No. 521. (K). -----


My telegram No. 519.


Prime Minister called yesterday evening late. He began by talking of resigning, as he said that (gr. undecypherable ?in) face (of) public opinion, he could not hope to carry through his policy of the alliance; offensive alliance against Turkey was impossible and would result in civil war. Persia did not wish to get involved in war, and preferred to remain neutral. He suggested that for the present he should continue his efforts to win over public opinion by pointing out advantages to Persia of alliance and of beginning negotiations when the country was less hostile to the idea.


We said that after 16 months experience, it was idle to talk of a policy of neutrality, which would inevitably result in Persia being forced to join our

enemies. No middle course was possible, Persia must be with us or against us, and the Government had better reflect seriously on the consequences to Persia both immediate and future if she allowed herself to be led by pressure of an ignorant and venal public opinion to join our enemies: negotiations should commence at once. Russian Minister added that His Highness should remember that there was a Russian force at Kasvin which might take matters into its own hands.

We are to meet Prime Minister and President of the Chamber this afternoon. Plot to assassinate Farman Farma has been discovered. Murderers were furnished with money, arms and horses by Germans, but one of them warned him. Success of Russian operations has had good effect here; they should enter Hamadan to-day or to-morrow. Repeated to Petrograd and India.









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42

44

P4575-6/15

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
December 12th. 1915.

D. 7.25.a.m. c  
December 12th. 1915.

R. 7.30.p.m.

No. 524. (K)14.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

-----  
My telegram No. 521.


We met Prime Minister and President of Council yesterday afternoon. They said that it was impossible to conclude an Alliance in face of public opinion at present and after four hours conversation President said that he would submit to (his) colleagues the following:

Persia is to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality and in order to have a force capable of putting down German agitation the Cossack Brigade is to be increased to 10,000 men with Russian officers. The two Powers to give or to assist Persia to obtain arms etc. to agree to a small increase of import duties on sugar and cotton goods to provide for expenses, and to some of the six points mentioned in my Telegram No. 442.

All I can say of this proposal is that it may keep the Government from resigning for a time; Government here confesses itself powerless and the situation is for the present in the hands of General Baratoff.

Addressed to F.O. Sent to India, Petrograd and Basra.

RECEIVED  
14 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPT





43  
45  
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*Copy*  
*Already submitted*

P  
4575  
1915

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
November 9th. 1915.

D. 11.a.m. November 9th. 1915.  
R. 5.30.p.m.

No. 442.

Urgent. (K). -----

Continuation of my immediately preceding telegram:

I then pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell us the terms on which Persian Government were willing to adopt benevolent neutrality. His Excellency after dilating on the necessity for conciliating public opinion produced them.

(1) Settlement of purely Russian questions, that is, collection of revenue by the Russian Consuls, and strict observance of Treaty of Turkman Shai.

(2) Revision of tariff.

(3) Request for arms etc. to form Persian Army.


(4) Persia to be represented at the Peace Conference if other neutral countries are allowed to send Delegates.

(5) Undertaking to withdraw Russian troops from all parts of Persia will be discussed in a friendly spirit at a later date.

(6) Recognition by Persia of 1907 Convention to be cancelled as well as other undertakings obtained by 1911 Ultimatum.

I








44

(46)

I said that consideration of public opinion could hardly have inspired the insertion of points (2) and (4). In 6 months here neither had been even mentioned in the Press or by the Minister, and as for (4) it looked as if it was made in Germany. I feared the list would not make a favourable impression in London. Russian Minister concurred and said that as regards (1) that Persian Government 4 months ago had not cared to discuss the questions involved, although he had repeatedly expressed his readiness to do so, and he was equally prepared to do so still. As to (5) conversations had taken place between the Persian Government and his predecessor, and could be renewed.

We agreed to inform our Governments of the Persian Government's proposals and recommend sympathetic consideration.

Addressed to F.O. sent to India and Petrograd.





(47) 45

Put with 3516  
14

Register No.  
**4550**

**Secret Department.**

Letter from to  
Telegrams from India,

Dated 9, 13, 11 } Dec 1915.  
Rec. 9, 13, 13 }

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 Dec.	AB	<u>Persia</u> Feasibility of co-operation between Russian forces with General Kurin Views of G. of I. & General Kurin
Secretary of State.....	13	J.W.A.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

H.D. sign. as amended Copy to  
unless Gen. Bannow thinks my words restoration of the word "further" (further) is in- correct, in which case it should be struck out.  
AL  
13/12

in E. Bannow agrees that the word "further" is correct.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Off. letter to G.O. agreeing w. G. of I.

14 DEC 1915 Letter to G.O.

Previous Papers:—  
4412

17896.—I. I. 1355. 1000.—9/1914.





46

Reference Paper.

*Secret*

Political and Secret  
Department.

48

Letter No. 4550

Rec.

191

Referred to Secretary, Military Dep<sup>t</sup>

13<sup>th</sup> day of

Dec.

1915.

*for favour of remarks*

*Atkinson*

*para. added to effect*

I should think it was most un-  
desirable to allow direct communication  
between Sir J. Wilson and the  
Russian Staff in the Caucasus.


Indeed there is no object in doing  
so as the Russians are not in a  
position to advance in Mesopotamia.

The War Office should be the only  
channel of communication between  
Wilson and the Russians.

I think the proposed draft  
meets the case, but perhaps  
we might add that there are  
various objections to inviting  
Russian cooperation in Mesopotamia.

*Eg. Dawson*  
13/XII/15

*2. of L's let<sup>r</sup>  
and perhaps states  
sufficiently*





47

(49)

Best

U. S. of S.  
S.O.

14 DEC 1915

Immed<sup>ly</sup>

From Gen<sup>l</sup> & Major<sup>g</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> Dec.  
S. of S. 11<sup>th</sup> Dec.

In continuation of my letter P. 1012  
of the 12<sup>th</sup> inst. I am directed by  
the S. of S. for I. to forward for  
the information of the S. of S. for I. A  
copy of tel<sup>ms</sup> from the S. of S. & General  
Mission regarding the possibility of  
Russian co-operation with the British  
forces in Mesopotamia.

Mr Chamberlain <sup>feels the force of</sup> ~~shows~~ the objections  
<sup>to the proposal</sup> of the S. of S. on this subject, & as  
will be seen from my letter above-  
quoted, it was not at his request that  
the Russian Gov<sup>t</sup> were addressed. Moreover,  
it is clear from Sir J. Buchanan's  
tel<sup>ms</sup> n<sup>o</sup>: 1643 of the 10<sup>th</sup> inst. that such  
<sup>of the kind contemplated by Sir J. Buchan</sup>  
co-operation is at present impracticable.  
He wd. therefore suggest that the Russian  
Gov<sup>t</sup> shd. be thanked for their Aide.






Memoire, & informed that the best assistance they can give is to maintain their pressure in NW Persia & the Caucasus (so as to make it impossible for the Turks to detach <sup>further</sup> forces from these regions for Baghdad), & that more than this is not asked of them.

With reference to the last para. of Sir G. Buchanan's tel<sup>m</sup> I am to say that Mr Chamberlain ~~does not think that~~ <sup>thinks that</sup> ~~the best channel of communication~~ <sup>the best channel of communication</sup> direct communication sh. be established between the Grand Duke & Sir John Nixon ~~will be through the~~ <sup>will be through the</sup> General Staff here.

(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel.

(see above / 15)



P 4550.

48

(50)

Telegram from Viceroy. X

Dated 11th December 1915.

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(Copy to...)

Foreign, Secret. Nixon's telegram I.G. 1724 of  
9th December.


The political objection to inviting immediate Russian advance to Baghdad, assuming that it is a military possibility, appears to be: firstly, it gives Russia eventual claim in Mesopotamia which might affect our interests; secondly, this would be further be embarrassing in view of McMahon's guarantee to Arabs; thirdly, Russian methods with the shrines of Baghdad and elsewhere might bring us into serious odium with whole Moslem world.


The first objections do not, I think, deserve much consideration. Our immediate object must be to defeat Turks and secure Baghdad, for its moral and political effect. The third objection might be met by arranging with Russian Government that in deference to our difficulties in India troops should be instructed to respect shrines and holy places.


Immediate Russian advance to Mesopotamia would however appear to be military impossibility with force at their disposal. Probably maximum effect of this force both on Persian situation and on Turkish advance on Tigris would be obtained by their immediate crushing of all hostile elements between Tehran and Kermanshah and effectively cutting Turkish communications with Tehran.


Repeated to Nixon #.

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13 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPT.









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P4530.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

RUSSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)  
December 10th. 1915.

D. 3.16.p.m. December 10th. 1915.  
R. 8.45.p.m.

No. 1843. (K). -----

Your telegram No. 3907.


Aide-Mémoire from Russian Government states that instructions given to Commander of Russian Expeditionary Corps in Persia are primarily to seize Hamadan and Laleken and to fortify himself in these two places; then if circumstances permit, he will proceed to capture Kum and Kermanshah. As regards further operations mentioned in your telegram above referred to, Aide-Mémoire states they cannot be taken into consideration until operations indicated above have been successfully concluded,

ref. alliance on  
Champlain

Aide-Mémoire adds that Grand Duke has asked Colonel Marsh to inform our General Staff that in order to enable him to support our forces operating in Mesopotamia it is indispensable for His Imperial Highness to be kept continuously informed of General Nixon's plans and movements.

Sent to Teheran.

RECEIVED  
13 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT






51

(53)

Sir E. Barron.

This req. appear to be an impossible request. It is doubtful if the Russian force in N Persia ~~has~~ exceeds 11,000 men. This is obviously insufficient - even if the ~~the~~ report that the Turks are marching on Herat is only bluff. Moreover, the whole of it is not available, since a part of it must be left to watch the capital - but marching indeed think the force insufficient to protect the capital against a German deal from Kerm. According to the newspapers the Russians have defeated an enemy force - but not apparently the main force - near Herat. That will believe the





situation in Persia a little, but will not  
make it any the more possible for us to  
press the Russians to count disaster with an  
inadequate force to help us out.

At

10/12/15

159

Military Secret.

[159]



Military Secret.

159

*From General Officer Commanding, Basra, 9th December 1915.  
(Addressed to Chief of General Staff, repeated to Secretary of State  
for India and Foreign.)*

I.G. 1724. In answer to S. 29,554 and M. 85 S. 29,974.

In order to prevent the whole of the Turkish reinforcements being turned down the Tigris, the closest and speediest co-operation of the Russians is necessary. My reinforcements are arriving slowly and up-river transport is difficult and slow.

The immediate object is the defeat of the Turks in the field. Unless this is speedily assured by every means at our disposal, issues of great political importance may be more prejudicially involved than by inviting the co-operation of the Russians.


I urge that the Russians be asked to march on Baghdad in as strong force as possible *via* Kermanshah and Khanikin, which is stated by the Russians to be the only practicable winter route.


Except between Hamadan and Kermanshah supplies and water are said to be plentiful.

In order to further these ends, and to ensure co-operation, I request that I may be placed in direct communication with the Russian forces through Marsh.


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(54)





[ 15 a ]





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4550.

RUSSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan. (Petrograd) December 8th.

D. 8.0.p.m.

December 8th.

R.11.30.p.m.


No. 1834. (K).


-----  
Mr. Harling's telegram No. 515.

From what Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day  
I am afraid there is no chance of Grand Duke sending any-  
thing like 30000 troops. Sent to Teheran.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915







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(184446/15).

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MILITARY

RUSSIA


Cypher telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)  
Foreign Office, December 5th, 1915. 6.30.p.m.  
No. 2907.

.....

Viceroy telegraphs urging Russian advance on Hamadan, Kermanshah and, if possible, Khanikin, as a threat against communications of Turkish force operating against our forces in Mesopotamia.

I should be glad to have some indication of scope which Grand Duke proposes to give to his operations in Persia. An advance on lines suggested by Viceroy would of course be very valuable.







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56

58

PERSIA

AMENDED COPY

POLITICAL

Decypher. "T. Marling (Teheran)  
December 7th.

D. 8.55.p.m. December 7th, 1915.

R. 10.45 p.m. December 8th, 1915.

No. 515 (K).

.....


I hear that Turkish Ambassador is announcing that Turkish troops in strength are moving on Kermanshah. Statement may be premature but it is certain that such a movement will take place and even if force is not very considerable its appearance will give tremendous impulse to German cause as being a proof that German promises can and will be fulfilled. It is said that German plan is to avoid a decisive action with Russian troops between Hamadan and Kasvin but even supposing that Russian operations are completely successful and that in consequence Germans are abandoned by most of their Mujahids their position is likely to be far more than restored by arrival of Turkish troops in Persia.

According to Russian Minister there are about 12,000 troops now in North Persia. Considering area over which they have to operate this seems by no means excessive. It is not for instance clear that they can ensure Teheran from a surprise ( 2 groups omitted) Kum but they will certainly not be able to cope with contingency above contemplated and should be very largely reinforced.

It is said that Grand Duke intended to send 30,000 troops but there are no signs of their arrival at present.

This discourages Government from pressing on negotiations for Alliance.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to India and Petrograd.





(59) 57

Put away with 3516/14

Secret Department.

Register No. 4537

Minute Paper.

Letter from War Office

Dated 9 } December, 1915.  
Rec. 10 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	11 Dec.	W.H.	<u>Persia.</u> Proposed alliance Views of Army Council Further developments at Tehran
Secretary of State.....	13	W.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

sent by W.H.  
13/12

Copy to Copy to India  
25 FEB 1916


FOR INFORMATION.

If it were the case that an alliance with the Russian Govt. would prevent the tribes in the W from turning against us, as the Army Council assume, no doubt it would be a very valuable asset. But the whole point of the F.O. letter - & the essence of the present situation - is that there are no grounds whatever for that assumption, but rather the contrary, as Mr. Mackenzie's letter 25/12 indicates.

It is to be hoped that the Russians have been as successful in dealing with the Turco-Germans as they represent. The more successful they are, the less reason there is for making "the largest concessions."

Previous Papers:—

16698. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1000/14.]





W 2283-87 10,000 8/14 H W V  
6466-931 20,000 10/14

58  
Form No. 3. (60)  
H. 4095

**SECRET.**

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to—  
The Secretary,  
War Office,  
London, S.W.,  
and the following number quoted.

WAR OFFICE,  
LONDON, S.W.,  
9th December, 1915.


P  
4537  
1915


0162/132. (M.O.1.)

The Secretary of the War Office presents his compliments to **The Under Secretary of State for India.** (Political Department) and is commanded by the Army Council to transmit for the information of **The Secretary of State for India.** a copy of the document noted in the subjoined schedule on the subject of **Alliance with Persia.**

Date	From	Description
8th December, 1915.	The Secretary War Office.	Letter No. 0162/132 (M.O.1). dated 8th December, 1915. to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT  
10 DEC 1915





59

(61)

SECRET

4537  
1915

0162/132. (M.O. 1.).

6<sup>th</sup> December 1915.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge your letter No. 184930/15 of the 6th December 1915.

I am to say in reply that in the opinion of the Council it is of the utmost importance to prevent the Persian Government from throwing in its lot against the forces of the Entente. From a military point of view it is worth paying a very high price to ensure having Persia or part of it on our side under existing conditions. The position of our troops in Mesopotamia cannot at the present moment be called satisfactory, and if the tribes situated east of the Tigris below Kut el Amara were to take up arms against General Nixon's forces the situation might become extremely serious. The Council would hope that a satisfactory arrangement might be arrived at with the Persian Government without our conceding all the demands which Mr. Marling quotes in his telegram No. 508 of the 4th December. It appears to them that in any case a liberal attitude in respect to financial considerations may in the end prove a true economy.

I am,


Sir,


Your obedient Servant,


(Sd) B. B. Cubitt

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.











(63) 61  
Put away with 3516  
14

Register No. P  
4518  
1915

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letters from F.O.  
Dated 8/9 Dec. 1915.  
Rec. 8/9

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	9 Dec.	AK	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Persia</u></p> <p>The proposed negotiations. Views of Russian Govt Reported Turkish advance on Kermanshah</p>
Secretary of State.....	9	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

28  
Hite within  
AC  
10/12

Copy to India  
Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

FOR INFORMATION.

The views of the Russians M. S. A. seem very reasonable. The terms wh. the Persians are supposed to be going forward are as preposterous in their way as those of the Arabs; & important as it is to spin out the time, there is a risk that we may slip into the idea of ~~hesitating~~ conducting the negotiations as though the alliance were something to be desired for its own sake - a risk wh. is the more real because Mr. Baring evidently does so desire it, & wants to conclude it with the least possible delay.

I wish to call attention to another danger wh. appears to me to be lurking in the present situation in the Middle

Previous Papers:—  
4495.

18998. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1000/14.]

cc  
10/12 J.W.H.  
J.  
11/12



East. If one interprets the tremendous activity wh. the Germans  
are now showing in the Balkans, Mesopotamia, & Persia, in the  
light of the very sane writings of a man of like St. Rohrbach &  
the less sane, but not negligible, utterances of the German press  
during the last few weeks, it is difficult to resist the con-  
clusion that the Germans are looking to Asia Minor & the  
Middle East to wrap them for the economic basis of the war.  
It is even possible - as Sir M. Lykes has pointed out in a  
recent let<sup>r</sup> to the D.M.O. - that, having driven us into the  
sea at Salonica, Gallipoli, & Beersa, but having failed in the  
great great offensive in the W., they will offer terms of peace  
wh. may be <sup>otherwise</sup> completely satisfactory to the Allies in Europe, but  
wh. will include the retention of the Ottoman Empire in its  
present form. The Powers will not like this, but war-weariness,  
& in this country that unfortunate tenderness for the Turk,  
wh. dawned to, & even after, the outbreak of war, has misguided  
our foreign policy), will constrain acquiescence. It is hardly  
necessary to point out <sup>(as I tried to do in my note on the report of the Inter-Dep't Committee)</sup> that this will mean the exploitation of  
all the best resources of the Middle East for the sole benefit of  
Germany, while the Allies will have no similar source of recruit-  
ment to draw upon; & it is not rash to prophesy another  
European war wh. Germany will begin almost as near to India  
as she is to England, & in which (the ground having been  
carefully prepared by the C<sup>o</sup> of Union & Progress) it will take  
not 18 months, but perhaps not more than as many days, to  
set India in a blaze.

The possibility, or probability, that something of this kind  
is Germany's policy has a very decided bearing on the Persian  
question, for Persia must be got into her scheme. In any alliance



62  
64

What we make with Persia now, or after the war, we must surely be certain that we have eliminated German influence. We have no guarantee that the mysterious Perso-German treaty, wh. we heard of from absolutely reliable sources a few weeks ago, & wh. has not actually been concluded, & does not actually contain provisions that will give Germany a secure hold after the war. One of the conditions wh. we are told Persia wants to impose on us is the removal of the requirement that she will not appoint foreign officials except with the consent of Russia & ourselves: if we agree, Persia may be full of German officials. Again, there is to be an international loan after the war - German capital. Persian independence is to be guaranteed i.e. Persia is to be free to make any arrangement she pleases with Germany. Persian integrity is to be guaranteed i.e. we are to lose the possibility of acquiring the Persian Gulf islands, which will be more than ever vital to the security of India if a German-Ottoman Empire is to be one of the heritages of the war.

These issues may seem remote. They are mentioned as reasons why we sh. not tie our hands in regard to a future that cannot yet be foreseen for the sake of a ~~per~~ momentary advantage which is <sup>itself</sup> at the best highly problematical.

---

It was to be expected that the Russians w<sup>d</sup> not swallow the Persian proposals. In



That no doubt they are right. But the proposals might at any rate be discussed, for the purpose of marking time & preventing an open rupture. A rupture means more to the Indian Govt than it does ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> Russia. It w<sup>d</sup> not greatly matter to Russia if Persia were openly hostile & Afghanistan caught fire. But it would matter a good deal to India.

9/12/15 J. W. H.

I do not see the basis for an agreement with the Persian Govt in present circumstances. They have very little to give, for they are without power, & their pretensions are exorbitant. Yet it is of great importance to India that they should be prevented if possible from going over to the enemy. Though they now give us no strength - not even protection for our nationals & consuls - their open defection would add to our difficulties. So it is well to negotiate as long as possible, - but diplomacy without power to back it is a very business. OK  
10/12



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RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) Dec. 7th.

D. 9.30 pm December 7th.

R. 11. 35 am December 8th.

No. 1829

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915



Your telegram No. 2909.

I told M de Sazonoff in the course of conversation this morning that Mr. Marling was afraid, judging by instructions sent to the Russian Minister that His Excellency did not quite realize delicacy of the situation.

I then gave him a verbal summary of the views expressed by Mr. Marling in his telegram No. 505.

M. de Sazonoff said that while quite alive to the difficulties with which we were confronted many conditions which the Persian Government would probably attach to alliance were open to grave objections. It would he thought be very

dangerous to let them have a large supply of arms which might be distributed amongst some of the hostile tribes and used against us. Russia had no arms to give but if any were forthcoming from other sources he would raise no objection provided the two Governments could exercise effective control their distribution and employment. In this connection he mentioned that the Chief of the General Staff was prepared if necessary to send some 20 Russian officers to take the place of the Swedes.


As regards financial requirements of the Persian Government His Excellency said he would never be able to induce Minister of Finance to consent to cancellation of debt of 40,000,000 roubles due to Russia or to grant Persia large monthly subvention during the war. Equipping of army of 50000 men would also require large sum and he did not see what services Persia could render us in return for such sacrifices as such an army could not be raised and trained for long time.

I did not gather from what His Excellency said that he proposes to adopt threatening tone at present though he thinks we should make it clear to the Persian Government should they show any disposition to side with our enemies how serious would be the consequences of such a policy.

He quite agreed with what Mr. Marling said in the last paragraph of his telegram and thinks that it would be better to await result of Russians at Hamadan before saying anything to the Persian Government.

Sent to Teheran.







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unless required for official use.]

*Mr J. Holdern*

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P  
4518  
1915

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Mr. Marling (Teheran) December 7th.

D. 8. 55 pm December 7th.

R. 10.45 am December 8th.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915


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
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
I hear that Turkish Ambassador is announcing that Turkish troops in strength are moving on Kermanshak. Statement may be premature but it is certain that such a movement will take place and even if force is not very considerable its appearance will give tremendous impulse to German cause as being a proof that German promises can and will be fulfilled. It is said that German plan is to avoid a decisive action with Russian troops between Hamadan and Kasvin but even supposing that Russian operations are completely successful and that in consequence Germans are abandoned by most of their Mujahids their position is likely to be far more than restored by arrival of Turkish troops in Persia.

According to Russian Minister there are about 12,000 troops now in North Persia. Considering area over which they have to operate this seems by no means excessive. It is not for instance clear that they can ensure Teheran from a surprise (2 groups omitted) Kum but they will certainly not be able to cope with contingency above contemplated and should be very largely reinforced. It is said that Arabs intended to send 30,000 troops but there are no signs of their arrival at present. This discourages Government from pressing on negotiations for Alliance. Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to India and Petrograd.

RECEIVED  
9 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT









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3516 (8)

14

Register No.  
**4495**

Put away with **3516**

**Secret Department.**

Letter from **F.O.** Dated **6** } December 1915.  
Rec. **7**

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	7 Dec.	AW	<u>Persia.</u> Proposed alliance Probable demands of Persians Govt. Views of Mr. Mackinnon.
Secretary of State.....	7	Z. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*See within*

Copy to India  
India  
N.O. 9.12.15.

**Copy to India**  
**17 DEC 1915**


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

*Sp. letter to F.O. giving views of S. of S. for 1.*

*9 December - Letter to Foreign Office*

Previous Papers:—

17026.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.





67

MINUTE.

(69)

The terms which the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> are thought to be going to offer are in themselves so coercitive that it can only be assumed that they are intended to be rejected - with the object (as the G. of I. suggested in their tel<sup>m</sup> of the 3<sup>d</sup> inst.) of giving the Germans time to complete their preparations.

As to the advantage to us of an alliance - the F.O. seems to make out a fairly conclusive case against the proposal. The G. of I.'s tel<sup>m</sup> of 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. will not be overlooked. But the advantages claimed there assume an alliance with an effective Gov<sup>t</sup>, & the essence of the present situation is that the Government of the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> hardly runs outside the Capital. Persia is de facto in a state of war with us; & the question is, shall we gain anything if the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> is de iure in a state of alliance with us, or how much if the de facto state of war is regularised by the <sup>formal</sup> defection of the Gov<sup>t</sup> to the Germans?

It is difficult to see how British Indian opinion can be deeply or permanently affected by the <sup>mere fact of an</sup> alliance ~~in itself~~ unattended by any visible advantage to us. If a Turkish force led by Von der Goltz appears at Khartoum, & the tribes in the W. are to join it, will the mere fact of an alliance - bought at a price which of itself must suggest that we are impotent - outweigh the effect, in India or Afghanistan? or relieve us of the necessity of defending - or buying - the oil-fields? It is possible that at some future date, if

10616. L. 1178. 2000.-9/1913.





the Persians can find 50,000 more, & the Allies arms  
ammunition & instructors, the balance may be redressed -  
possible, but improbable; & in the meantime the mis-  
chief will have done; & whether we win or lose, we  
shall be bound by the preposterous conditions of our  
past.

In this latter respect the prospect offered by these  
restrictions is even ~~worse~~ than that offered by the Arab  
restrictions. Here we can at least make the fulfilment  
of our promises depend on the effectiveness of Arab  
support: here it is not even pretended that the Persian  
Gov<sup>t</sup> can give us any support, beyond lending us  
magni nominis umbra.

Negatively, the case is for the alliance is perhaps  
a little stronger. If the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> is with us, &  
Persia against us, we can ~~take~~ <sup>point out once again to</sup> our Indian friends  
with some plausibility the wickedness of German intrigue  
which has misled the ignorant ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> hirelings, while the  
real Persia remains true to us. But will that distinc-  
tion impress the frontier & the Amir?

It appears to me that nothing will get us  
out of the somewhat tight place in which we now are  
in the middle east except our own right hands. If  
this war has taught any lesson it surely is that - by  
war, if at no other time - diplomacy without force, <sup>successful force,</sup> ~~behind~~  
it is bankrupt. The key to the present situation is that  
the enemy have force & we have not - ~~except so far as~~  
the Russians can help us; & until the tide turns in the  
west we can only accept any temporary eclipse in the east;



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MINUTE.

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serious as the immediate consequences of that policy may be.

The practical conclusion seems to be that we must wait & see the result of the Grand Duke's attack on Hamadan, which was due last Friday. If it was successful, we can tell the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> (in order to spin out the time & allow the Russians to advance further, if possible) that their larger demands are impossible, but that we are still willing to negotiate on the basis of the 6 original points (see L.O. letter of 23<sup>d</sup> Nov. & Mr. Marking's let<sup>r</sup> n<sup>o</sup> 462 of 9<sup>th</sup> Nov.); then, if Russian successes continue, we shall stiffen our attitude until <sup>either</sup> the 6 points are rendered in-  
necessitous or the negotiations can be abandoned as having served their purpose. If, on the other hand, the Russians fail, the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> will open their mouths still wider, & we must warn them solemnly that - while we are not able to entertain their demands - they will no longer be able to count upon our friendship after the war. They will then doubtless join Germany, & we must get our house in order in advance.

Secretary, Brit<sup>ish</sup> Dep<sup>t</sup>

for any remarks

Atk  
7/12/15

The D.O. post-enclosedly minutes the Gov<sup>t</sup>'s observations as the effect in London



of the rupture of negotiations.  
The effect will doubtless be bad  
because of the influence it will  
have on Afghanistan and the Pathan  
borderland. Coupled with the  
"revue in Mesopotamia" and  
the failures in the ~~the~~ real fact  
we are certain to have great  
effervescence in India, but  
I do not think the situation would  
be at all improved by accepting  
the preposterous terms Perina  
proposes. I agree with all Sir  
A. Kertzel says on that subject.

Egmond  
7/11/15

You may wish to discuss this tomorrow  
morning. My inclination would be to  
avoid an open rupture as long as  
possible, and not summarily to reject  
the proposals, however extravagant, so  
long as they could be discussed. There  
is the further question of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> what view the  
Presiden for: w? take. 7/12 P. Witt.



69

(71)

P4495/15

Book

9 December 1915

Mr Chamberlain

I submit this  
alternate draft in  
accordance with your  
verbal wishes, as I  
understand them.

8/12 J.W.H.

App'd  
8/12

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

I am directed by the S/S. for  
I. to acknowledge the receipt of your  
letter n<sup>o</sup> 184930 of the 6<sup>th</sup> inst. regarding the  
proposed alliance with Persia & in reply to say  
that he considers that an open  
rupture with the Persian Govt.,  
especially if it were followed by  
an alliance betw<sup>n</sup> that Govt. &  
the enemy, would have a very  
unfavourable effect on Muslim  
opinion in India and Afghanistan.

An alliance with the Persian  
Govt. should have a moderating  
effect on that opinion for the  
time being, <sup>for such time</sup> and ~~as long~~ as it  
prevented Persia from being  
visibly detached from the  
allies & acting side by side with  
the enemy. The impression <sup>should</sup> ~~would~~  
~~not~~ Mr Chamberlain thinks, be  
~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> be ~~unduly~~ <sup>unduly</sup> affected by the price paid for  
the alliance, ~~as the sentiments~~  
~~of~~ Muslims in India & Afghanistan  
would not concern themselves  
with the ex. extravagance ~~of~~



of the Persian Cabinet's demands  
(with a possible exception as  
regards the holy places of  
Mesopotamia), though they might see in them a sign of <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ weakness in  
~~of our~~ Persia.

If, however, an alliance  
were immediately to provoke open  
rebellion of the nationalists against  
the Govt, and the Cabinet were  
manifestly unable to fulfil their  
engagements towards England &  
Russia, the <sup>good</sup> ~~possible~~ effect of  
its announcement <sup>would</sup> ~~would~~ produce  
in India & Afghanistan which  
disappear.

In answering the questions put  
to him Mr Chamberlain has  
put aside the further question whether  
the demands which Mr Marling anti-  
cipates may be made as the  
price of an alliance could in any  
circumstances be conceded. He  
imagines that the Russian Govt  
would decisively reject them as  
impossible, and rejection by that  
Govt would settle the question. But  
as he attaches importance to delaying  
an open rupture, he thinks that  
Mr Marling with the cooperation  
of his Russian colleague should  
endeavour to bring the Persian Govt  
back to a discussion negotiate on  
the basis indicated in this office letter P. 4303 of 23 Nov<sup>r</sup>  
(S) T.W. Adomess.



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(72)

U. S. of S.  
20.

See above for  
draft substituted  
for this


Immed<sup>te</sup>

I am directed by the U. S. of S. for  
P. to acknowledge the receipt of your  
letter N<sup>o</sup> 184930 of the 6<sup>th</sup> inst. regarding  
the proposed alliance with Persia, & in  
reply to say that in the existing con-  
ditions of that country he does not  
consider that the advantages of an  
alliance concluded on any such terms  
as those foreshadowed in Mr. Brinkley's  
let<sup>ter</sup> N<sup>o</sup> ~~1803~~<sup>508</sup> of the 4<sup>th</sup> inst. outweigh  
the obvious disadvantages; or that  
an alliance on any terms, so long  
as the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> is unable to take  
effective action on the side of the Allies,  
will materially or permanently affect  
British opinion in India & Afghanistan.

While therefore he wd. have no objection  
to negotiations on the basis indicated  
in his office letter P. 4303 of 23<sup>rd</sup> inst. —  
if only for the purpose of allowing time



for the Russian operations in the N  
to develop + their effect to be seen -  
he can suggest no alternative, in the  
event of their failure, but to warn  
the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> that if it joins our  
enemies it will obviously forfeit all  
claim upon our good-will after the  
war, and to leave it to take its  
course. The effect of a rupture,  
coupled with the reverse in Mesopotamia  
& the absence of apparent success in  
the Near East, will most probably be  
to create serious disturbances on the  
frontier + ~~even~~ possibly also in the  
interior of India: but in Mr Chamber-  
lain's opinion this is <sup>a situation</sup> ~~an~~ ~~inevitable~~  
which must in any case be faced,  
until ~~some~~ altered conditions elsewhere  
enable H.M.G. to release ~~to~~ sufficient  
forces ~~to operate~~ effectively <sup>to defend their interests</sup> in these  
regions



In any further communication  
on the subject, please quote

No. 184930/15.

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

P  
4455  
1915

FOREIGN OFFICE

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73

December 6th, 1915.

Secret and Immediate.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, herewith, for the early consideration of the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the War Office, relative to the proposed conclusion of an alliance with the Persian Government.

Sir Edward Grey would be glad to be favoured with an expression of Mr. Chamberlain's opinion on the considerations advanced in the enclosed letter and on the facts reported in the telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, a copy of which is also transmitted herewith. I am particularly to invite Mr. Chamberlain's observations on the possible effect which the rupture of negotiations with the Persian Government would now have on Moslem opinion in India, and on the extent to which this unfavourable impression would be mitigated by an alliance with the Persian Government concluded under the present conditions of Persian public opinion.

I am, Sir,


Your most obedient,  
humble Servant,


E. A. Lowe

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.









Copy

184930/15.

4495  
1915

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74

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
December 6th, 1915.

Secret and Immediate.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, herewith, for the early consideration of the Army Council, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, relative to the secret negotiations which it is suggested should be opened with the Persian Government for the conclusion of an alliance between that Government and the Governments of Great Britain and Russia.

The advantages of such an alliance would, in the circumstances of the case, be based, less on military considerations, than on the moral impression which would thereby be made on Moslem opinion in India, Egypt and elsewhere. It is hoped, moreover, that this alliance would go far to close the road from Constantinople to India, to protect the flank of the British forces operating in Mesopotamia and to secure the safety of the Anglo-Persian Company's Oil fields.

On the other hand, were His Majesty's Government to reject the terms advanced by the Persian Government, there is good reason to fear that the latter will place themselves unreservedly in the hands

The Secretary  
to the Army Council.





(184930/15)

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hands of our enemies, and a state of war with Persia would ensue.

In submitting these alternatives for the consideration of the Army Council, I am to observe that the Persian Government can rely on little support in the country itself, and that even if the existing Cabinet were to conclude an alliance with Great Britain and Russia, it is doubtful whether they would be in a position to enforce their decision upon the mass of the Persian people, or to ensure for their allies the advantages enumerated above. It is possible, indeed, that all Western and South Western Persia would refuse to recognize the engagements undertaken by the Tehran Cabinet, and that the Persian nationalist party, under the leadership of German and Turkish agents, and supported by the Gendarmerie and the Bakhtiari and other tribes, would rise in open revolt against the Persian Government who would appeal for the military support of Great Britain and Russia.

Sir Edward Grey is considering, therefore, whether the extravagant concessions which the Persian Government will exact in order to justify their policy to the country, will be outweighed by the positive advantages which would be secured by an alliance concluded in the circumstances outlined above, and I am to invite the views of the Army Council as to whether the military situation which would





(184930/15)

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would be created by an alliance, would be preferable to either a continuance of the present position, or the adherence of Persia to the cause of our enemies.

The question, in its purely military aspect, would seem to depend on the number of the Russian troops able to advance on Kermanshah, and the extent to which co-operation between these forces and the British troops at Kut el Amara is practicable.


A copy of this letter has been sent to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, who is being consulted as to the political issues involved, and I am to request that Sir Edward Grey may be favoured with an expression of the opinion of the Army Council at their earliest possible convenience.


I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,  
humble servant,

*(Signed) Eyre A. Crowe.*





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unless required for official use.]

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling. (Teheran) December 4th.

D. 3.40.p.m.

December 4th.

R.10.40.p.m.

No. 508. (K).

Urgent.

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915


P  
4495  
1915

I have not exact knowledge of extent of General Nixon's reverse, but judging from Viceroy's telegram No.118 of yesterday it appears to have been far more serious than indicated in any telegram I have received yet. If this is so, chance of concluding an alliance with Persia is most unfavourably affected.

Baghdad being (?) relieved and Nixon being presumably in no position to resume advance for the present, I submit it may be assumed that enemy will devote all his attention to his main objective, i.e. forcing Persia into war against us. This will best be achieved by sending all troops that can be spared from watching Nixon into Persia with practical certainty of raising at least the Western provinces against us. Appearance of Turkish army reinforced by gendarmerie and by local levies already being collected, will fire Persia with hope of driving out Russians, and this combined with promises held out by Germans as stated in your telegram No. 427 will make it extremely hard for any Cabinet to join us, except on terms of a most attractive kind. In fact we have to outbid the German terms so heavily as to outweigh disadvantageous military position in which we shall be to Persian eyes if and when Turkish force appears here.

I do not know how many Russian troops are now in







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(78)

Persia but all accounts place them at a far lower figure than we have been led to expect.



Russian Minister believes that the Grand Duke intends to send 40,000 altogether. In the contingency I foresee this will be none too many.


Having twice put us off Prime Minister, now promises to inform us of Persian requirements on Monday but I have learnt privately that following points are being considered by Cabinet.

1. Cession (to?) Persia (of?) territory embracing the holy places including Khadimain together with Baghdad.
2. Cancellation of all Persia's debts to the two Powers.
3. Two Powers to supply arms and ammunition for 50,000 men.
4. Large monthly subvention during war.
5. 1907 Convention to be abrogated.
6. Stipulations of 1911 ultimatum to be cancelled.
7. Large modifications of treaty of Turkmachai.
8. After the war loan of eight million pounds to be arranged by international Syndicate.
9. Revision of tariff.
10. Foreigners to possess real estate in Persia on the same conditions as in Turkey.
11. The Two Powers to guarantee the independence and integrity of Persia.

I have, of course, warned the Prime Minister against making exorbitant terms, such as point 1, but I have no great confidence that he will be strong enough to stand firm against the pertinacious pro-German party in the Cabinet, possibly the whole list may be presented to us.

If







77  
(79)


If my appreciation of Nixon's position and its consequences is approximately correct it appears to me immediate acceptance of Persian terms affords the only hope of securing the alliance, but on that, considering the opportunity there will be for the pro-Germans to prolong negotiations, the chance is not a rosy one.


? I / As regards point (II), I would remark that the bait of Holy places would secure us support of any number of tribesmen when Nixon is again able to advance. On the other hand his communications along the Tigris with the frontier tribes hostile would be to say the least of it, very seriously hampered.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India and Petrograd.






















81

83

*From Viceroy, 24th November 1915.*

*(Repeated to Tehran.)*

[P 4328]

Foreign Secret. Marling's telegrams on proposed alliance with Persia.

There is no doubt that an alliance with Persia would produce a good moral effect upon Mohammedan public opinion in India and tend to remove bad effect created by our war with Turkey. It would greatly reduce risk of any breach with Afghanistan and remove necessity of further frittering away our military forces in Persia. It should make pipe line secure and render it possible to reduce our forces on Karun.


For these reasons an alliance with Persia would be of distinct advantage to India, provided it is not concluded on unduly extravagant political conditions.


*From Viceroy, 3rd December 1915.*


*(Repeated to Tehran, 117 D.S.)*


Foreign Secret. Persia. Reference to Marling's telegram 504 F, 1st December.

While realising that Marling must be sole judge of actual situation in Tehran, I cannot help suspecting that Shah's sudden desire for alliance with all Allies has been prompted by pro-German advisers at German instigation in order to give Germans time for completion of their plans without interference from Russian troops. Prompt action against rebel gendarmerie and mujahidin at Hamadan, whatever Persian Government may say, would appear essential in order to effect cutting communications of the German marauders with Turkey, and thus isolate them.

















(86) 84  
H. Marshall  
G

6-12-15


Dear Sutton


Please see attached

P. to. to.

Thanks. The substance of the  
Petrograd to me has been repeated  
to India. I am glad to see  
Major Marshall's M/165 of 26th Nov.

W. Marshall





P 4412/15

Put away with 3576/14

85  
87

War Office,  
Whitehall,  
S.W.  
4th December, 1915.

My Dear Headley,

Reference <sup>wiring letter</sup> L.O. Minute No. P.4412 of <sup>4th</sup> 3rd instant,  
and Viceroy's telegram "Foreign Secret, Persia" of same date.  
The Russian intentions are explained in the following telegrams  
to the Foreign Office:-

Mr. Marling's	No. 464A. (K)	dated	November 17th, 1915.
"	No. 469 (K)	"	" 20th, 1915.
Sir G. Buchanan's	No. 1798 (K)	"	December 1st, 1915.
"	No. 1804 (K)	"	" 2nd, 1915.

and in Marsh's M.165 (R.P.L.70) dated 26th November, 1915., we  
repeated the latter to India in our 10447 dated 28th November,  
but I do not know if the Foreign Office or India Office repeat  
Mr. Marling's cables to India.

If the Viceroy is now in possession of the  
information given in all above telegrams there is not much more  
to tell him.


We are wiring to Marsh <sup>\*</sup> giving the latest news  
of Force D. so that he may inform the Grand Duke.

Yours Sincerely,

R.H. Headley Esq.  
Military Department  
India Office.

*R.H. Headley*

\* Draft sent to J.D. & F.D. for Concurrence  
by special messenger today.





86
88

Register No.  
4412

Put away with 3516

Secret Department.

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Letter from *FO*  
*Telegram from Viceroy*

**Formally acknowledged**

Dated } *3 Dec 1915*  
Rec. }

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	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>3 Dec.</i>	<i>at</i>	<div style="text-align: center;"><u>Persia</u></div> <i>Feasibility of a Russian advance on Herat and Kandahar.</i> <i>Views of C. in C. India</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>3</i>	<i>P. W. H.</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Send to H.A. sign*  
*RC*  
*3/12*

Copy to *S.O. 4 Dec (4 FO cables re Persia)  
India (see outline)*

**FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.**

*dft. telegram letter to S.O. suggesting communication to H.M. Amb., Petrograd.*


*dft. telegram to S. of I. informing them that immediate attack on Herat has been ordered.*



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*4 December - telegram to Viceroy  
Letter to Foreign Office*

Previous Papers :—

17026.—1. I. 1355. 1000.—4/1914.





MINUTE.

87

89

Secretary, Military Dep't

In favour of remarks. If the views of the  
C. in C. India are communicated to the Russian Gov't  
it seems not unlikely that they will recent being  
asked to order an advance mainly in order to  
get us out of a hole.


ATA



3/12/15


I agree with the view expressed  
in draft.

E. G. D. 3/XII









Gov<sup>t</sup> for such an advance <sup>mainly</sup> solely on  
the ground that it will facilitate  
British operations in Mesopotamia

(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel



DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)


Despatched Dec 4<sup>th</sup> 1915.


89

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zm

Foreign secret. Your telegram 3<sup>rd</sup> inst.  
Russian advance in Persia. Following  
is substance of telegram from  
~~Gen~~ Capt. Williams acting attaché  
Ishran now at Petrograd ~~has~~ after  
after interviews with Klemm & Sazonoff.  
Grand Duke will attack Hamadan  
3<sup>rd</sup> inst. with 10,000 men mainly Cossacks  
Cavalry & artillery & expects no difficulty  
in routing 3,000 gendarmes & 8000  
Mujahids. Sazonoff suggested he sh.  
blockade Kharukin route if troops cd.  
be spared. Maul Kerkuk Simrah route  
reported impossible in winter. He thought  
German Austrian & Turkish ministers  
sh. be seized wh. wd. compel Persians  
Gov<sup>t</sup> to take one side or other. He  
~~thought~~ Williams en route for Ishran  
will visit Grand Duke at Tiflis.





CLEAR THE LINE.

Telegram from Viceroy  
Dated 3rd December 1915.

X



P  
4412  
1915


H. P. C.  
1915, Dec 1  
Persia

Foreign Secret. Persia. The Commander-in-Chief is most anxious for an early advance of Russian troops from Kasvin on Hamadan and if possible on Kermanshah. At Hamadan they would sever communications of the Germans in Persia with Turkey and Europe while their presence at Kermanshah would be a threat against the communications of the Turks who are following Nixon's force down the Tigris and would either check their advance or cause them to detach a force to watch Russians. In either case Nixon would profit and might gain more time for bringing up his reinforcements. No doubt an advance to Kani kin would have a still greater effect but the Commander-in-Chief doubts whether Russians could supply themselves there.

Repeated to Teheran, G.O.C. Forces "D".

RECEIVED  
3 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





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unless required for official use.]

91  
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P4412

RUSSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) December 1st.

D. 9.30 p.m., December 1st 1915.

R. 10.5 a.m., December 2nd 1915.

No. 1798. (K).

Copy to India

3 DEC 1915



My telegram No. 1796.

Following from Captain Williams:-

"I had long interview with Monsieur de Sazonoff this afternoon after seeing Mr. Klemm.

1. He informed me that the Grand Duke had received definite orders and would attack Hamadan to-morrow with a force of 10,000 men mainly Landstorm Cavalry and Artillery. Enemy consisted of 3000 Gendarmes and 8000 Mujahids. He anticipated no difficulty in routing them.

2. After examining maps of Western Persia he was strongly in favour of our blockading Turkish route through Khanikin into Persia if we could spare sufficient troops from Baghdad to do so joining up with Russian troops west of Kermanshah and cutting off retreat of German intriguers in Persia.

Mosul Kerkuk Sinnah route is reported impossible in winter.



3. He considered German, Austrian and Turkish Legations should be seized and their members imprisoned. If this caused a rupture with those countries no harm would be done as he considered it absolutely necessary for Persian Government to declare itself on one side or the other.


4. He had telegraphed to Teheran insisting on Persian Government presenting proposed terms of Alliance. Delay he considered was all in favour of German intriguers.

5. He thought that before proceeding to Teheran I should have interview with Grand Duke at Tiflis and was telegraphing to him accordingly; I propose leaving for London Hotel Tiflis on Friday.

6. He promised to telegraph instructions to Rome (sic) in accordance with Aide-Memoire which I left with him." Sent to Teheran.







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P4412

RUSSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) Dec. 2nd.

D. 9.30 pm December 2nd.

R. 9. 45 am December 3rd.

No. 1804 (K),


Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915

My telegram No. 1798.

Aide Memoire from Russian Government states they have received telegram from their representative at Tiflis announcing that necessary steps have been taken for Russian troops march on Hamadan, and that this operation will begin about December 3rd (tomorrow). As regards question of keeping a Russian Detachment near Teheran Grand Duke acting direct on request of Shah and fearing that in case of refusal Shah would leave Teheran has ordered detachment which was at Kerej. to withdraw to Yenghiman. But when Russia learnt that detachment of Persian Gendarmerie had occupied Kerej as soon as Russian troops had evacuated it Russian Minister at Teheran was instructed to warn Persian Government that if Gendarmerie were not recalled immediately Russian Detachment would return to Kerej.

Sent to Teheran.







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RUSSIA *CGM*

POLITICAL

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan. (Petrograd) Nov: 25th.

D. 10.30.p.m. November 25th.


R. 10.30.a.m. November 26th.


No. 1761.


-----  
Your Telegram No. 2798.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs quite realizes advantages of projected Alliance but fears Russia cannot make herself responsible for protection of Persia against attack outside Russian sphere. He has promised me an aide memoire embodying his considered views this evening or to-morrow morning.

Sent to Teheran.









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(97)

favour of Russia and England. Promise of eventual pecuniary assistance as well as promise of certain facilities with regard to liquidation of debts of Persian Government could also be made.


In return, Persian Government would have to take without delay certain measures which would be recommended to them by the two Legations, such for instance as rupture of diplomatic relations with enemy Powers: invitation to diplomatic and consular representatives of latter to leave Persia without delay; to dismiss Swedish instructors of gendarmerie; to assure help of Nomad tribes, and to enter into direct pour-parlers to this effect with chief of these tribes in the name of the Shah; to nominate to posts of governors of provinces, as well as to other important posts trustworthy men to be designated by the two Legations, and to put at the disposal of England and Russia all armed Persian forces, artillery arsenals etc:-

Russian Government would be glad to learn the views of British Government as soon as possible"

Aide Memoire ends.

On my reminding Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning of the views expressed in Tehran Telegram No 362 on Holy Places His Excellency said that Persian Government had ~~now~~ let both our Ministers know that they would like to be promised possession of them.







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*Copy.*

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).  
December 1st.

D. 9.28 p.m. December 1st 1915.

R. 11.14 p.m.,


No. 1796. (K).

Mr. Marling's telegram No. 501.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the Shah had telegraphed to the Grand Duke begging him not to send troops to Hamadan in order that Persian Government might have time to bring their influence to bear on gendarmerie. His Imperial Highness had in consequence refrained from taking immediate action but Captain Williams who had long conversation with His Excellency this afternoon tells me that Grand Duke has now received orders to attack Hamadan at once.

I am forwarding in subsequent telegram Captain Williams' report of his conversation.

Sent to Tehran.





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3516 (99)  
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Register No.  
**44100**

Put away with


**Secret Department.**

Letter from **FO** Dated 1 } December 1915.  
Rec. 2 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	4 Dec.	AK	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Persia.</u></p> <p>Proposed creation of a Persian force to be jointly officered by Russian + British Officers</p>
Secretary of State.....	6	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			
<p>Copy to India (see within) D.O. (see within)</p>			
FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.			
<p><i>Apt. letter to F.O. agreeing with Russian Govt that feasibility is doubtful but saying that F.O. are being consulted. Aft. telegram to F.O. asking for their views</i></p>			
<p>10 December - Telegram to Viceroy 11 December - Letter to Foreign Office</p>			
<p>Previous Papers:— <b>4373</b></p>			

17628.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.





98  
(100)

MINUTE.

(389/15) It hardly seems worth while to consult the G.C.I., who will as certainly say that the scheme is not feasible now as they did on 1<sup>st</sup> Febr. last.

It is not likely that the Persians Gen<sup>l</sup> would agree to anything but a single force, to be jointly officered by British & Russians - a wholly impracticable idea, if only because Russian officers in that part of the world are still as apt to be anti-British as British officers are apt to be anti-Russian.

What is wanted is a northern & southern militia officered respectively by Russians & British officers, neither of whom seem likely to be forthcoming - though I believe (in spite of the G.C.I.'s let<sup>ter</sup> of 1<sup>st</sup> Febr.) that at a pinch he would do something with military officers in civil employ.

Sir P. Lykes raised & commended a Reg<sup>t</sup> of Yeomanry in the S. African war; & ~~Major~~ Lt. Haig at Beersheva & Major Picheaux in Sicily are both raising local forces.

The difficulty of refusing is that what we cannot do, the Germans, if asked, can & will. But for the moment we must rely on the efficacy of a Russian blow at Herat to discredit the forces of disorder wh. we cannot deal with directly ourselves.

Sec<sup>y</sup>, Mil<sup>y</sup> Dep<sup>t</sup>  
for any remarks A.H. 3/2/15

42431  
1915

10616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1918.



I agree with Sir A. Kerigal that  
some Political and Civil  
Officers with a certain amount of  
Military training might with the  
assistance of Persian native  
Officers at least do as much  
as the Germans. There are others  
than the late Capt Shakespeare  
who have the needed enterprise  
and Military instincts.

E. J. Darnley  
4/12/15

There is e.g. Capt. J. M. Bailey, who is just  
returning to duty after nearly a year at the front.

On the whole, however, until the proposition is  
more seriously made, I think it is best to wait &  
see the course of events.

ED

I agree. No doubt we could find a few Political  
officers who would do the work well. But they would find  
themselves opposed by the Swedes & Germans & we should

Also Major E. J. Darnley  
late Military Secretary  
at Meshed.



MINUTE.

99

(101)

be called upon to strengthen their hands or possibly  
to rescue them.

4/12/15 - J. W. H.

I am not quite clear that  
this proposal ought to be ruled  
out quite so completely - at least  
in correspondence with the F. O.  
Ought not the S/S to F. O. at least  
to be made aware of the possibilities  
mentioned in the preceding minutes?

At  
5/12


It was only after some hesitation - & because  
1) it did not seem that the time had yet come  
2) the scheme seems impracticable, irrespective of the  
supply of officers - that I drafted. A draft letter  
to the Viceroy is now submitted, & a sentence has been  
added to the F. O. letter. It wd. seem better to consult  
the G. of I. before holding out hopes to the F. O.


At

9/12/15

S/S. India's telegram of 1<sup>st</sup> Feb<sup>y</sup> is flagged. - The  
difficulties there pointed out are real. I don't  
see how anything could be done by a few senior  
political officers sent, for instance, to Tsheran,  
unless the present conditions in the country were  
entirely changed. If the Persian govt. could oust  
the Swedes from the Gerdamerie and if the  
Gerdamerie were disposed to obey the orders of  
the govt. and accept British officers, something  
might be done. But with the Swedes & Germans







DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Despatched + 10 Feb 1915.

100

102

I cannot find the telegram  
to this statement was  
20 some little while ago  
the Russian committee. But  
remember having seen it in  
the files. J. W. H.


1529/15  
(Retamilla) 10/29/15


(389/15)

Foreign secret. Persia. Question of  
loan of Russian & British Officers  
will come up in connexion with  
alliance negotiations. Russians will  
lend 20. Can you provide any?  
I do not overlook your telegram  
of 1<sup>st</sup> Feb. but it appears to me  
that in an emergency even senior  
military political officers wd. be better than  
nothing. Services of Major Redd is  
available.

Copy sent to D.M.O. W.O.  
(Capt. Padden)  
5/1/16

17624 I. 1353. 1000.-9/1914.





101

103

Down

U. S. of S.  
F.O.


11 DEC 1915


I am directed by the S. of S. for J. to acknowledge the receipt of your letter n<sup>o</sup> 179401 of the 1<sup>st</sup> inst. regarding the proposed creation of a Persian ~~subsidary~~ force under British officers, & to say that while he regards such a measure as likely to be essential in the future, he shares the misgivings of the Russian M. S. A. as to its feasibility at present; he is, however, consulting the S. of S. as to the practicality of furnishing officers in existing circumstances.

(S<sup>d</sup>) A. Hirtzel

Copy to India  
17 DEC 1915

Copy sent to D.M.O., W.O.  
(Capt. Pashler)  
5/1/16





In any further communication  
on the subject, please quote

No. 179401/15.

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

P  
4:00  
1915

102  
H/4378  
A.

FOREIGN OFFICE  
December 1st, 1915. (104)

Secret.

Copy to India  
31 DEC 1915

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that the Persian Government have recently signified to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran their willingness to open negotiations for an alliance between Persia and Great Britain and Russia.


In this connexion the Persian Minister in London has suggested, as a purely personal proposition, that His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government should consider the creation of or appointment of officers to a Persian force, entirely approved of by the two Governments, which should by degrees be employed for the preservation of order in the country. The Persian Minister mentioned British officers for employment with this force.

I am to observe that it has been decided to open without delay preliminary negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance, and Sir Edward Grey would therefore be glad to be furnished with the views of the Secretary of State for India as to whether the creation and training of a force such as the Persian Minister suggests would, in this opinion, be feasible,

and

The Under Secretary of State,  
India Office.

RECEIVED  
2 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





(179401/15)

103

105

and whether any British officers would be available for the purpose. The views of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs are being solicited on the question of a Persian force, but no mention has been made to him of British officers, as he would, doubtless, contend that in northern Persia Russian officers should be employed.

A copy of this letter has also been sent to the War Office for their observations.

I am,


Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble servant,

*Maurice de Munster*







181069  
/ 15

*Immediate  
and  
Confidential.*



P  
4400  
1915

104

106

Reference: - Letter from Foreign Office, of even  
date (19401.)

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for  
India, and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit  
the accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the*


*Ambassador's margin.  
Chopra, No. 1782,  
November 29*


*Foreign Office,  
December 1, 1915.*


*Copy sent to War Office.*




[ 15 a ]









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unless required for official use.]

106

108

*Con* 4519/15 RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) Dec. 7th.

D. 9.30 pm December 7th.

R. 11. 35 am December 8th.

No. 1829

.....

Your telegram No. 2909.

I told M de Sazonoff in the course of conversation this morning that Mr. Marling was afraid, judging by instructions sent to the Russian Minister that His Excellency did not quite realize delicacy of the situation.

I then gave him a verbal summary of the views expressed by Mr. Marling in his telegram No. 505.


M. de Sazonoff said that while quite alive to the difficulties with which we were confronted many conditions which the Persian Government would probably attach to alliance were open to grave objections. It would he thought be very dangerous to let them have a large supply of arms which might be distributed amongst some of the hostile tribes and used against us. Russia had no arms to give but if any were forthcoming from other sources he would raise no objection provided the two Governments could exercise effective control of their distribution and employment. In this connection he mentioned that the Chief of the General Staff was prepared if necessary to send some 20 Russian officers to take the place of the Swedes.


As regards financial requirements of the Persian Government His Excellency said he would never be able to induce Minister of Finance to consent to cancellation of debt of 40,000,000 roubles due to Russia or to grant Persia large monthly subvention during the war. Equipping of army of 50000 men would also require large sum and he did not see what services Persia could render us in return for such sacrifices as such an army could not be raised and trained for long time.

I did not gather from what His Excellency said that he proposes to adopt threatening tone at present though he thinks we should make it clear to the Persian Government should they show any disposition to side with our enemies how serious would be the consequences of such a policy.


He quite agreed with what Mr. Marling said in the last paragraph of his telegram and thinks that it would be better to await result of Russians at Hamadan before saying anything to the Persian Government.

Sent to Teheran.











(110) 108  
3516  
14

4373  
Register No.  
4366

Put away with

**Secret Department.**

Telegram  
Letter from Viceroy  
Letter from F.O.

Dated: 28<sup>th</sup> November 1915.  
Recd: 29<sup>th</sup> 2.188.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	29 Nov.	aw	<p style="text-align: center;">Persia.</p> <p>Negotiations regarding an alliance</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Views of Russian Govt</li> <li>2. Views of G. of I. as to possibility of satisfying Persian ambitions in Mesopotamia</li> </ol>
Secretary of State.....	29	D.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


*Aft. letter to F.O. concerning in dft. tel<sup>m</sup> to Petrograd as to (1), & forwarding (2).*

26 November: Letter to Foreign Office

Previous Papers:—  
4340

17826.—I. I. 1955. 1000.—9/1914.





109  
111

Book

Immed<sup>ts</sup>

U. S. of S.  
S.O.

P.4373.


30 November 1915.


I am directed by the S. of S.  
for S. to acknowledge the receipt of  
your letter n<sup>o</sup>: 179337 of the 28<sup>th</sup> inst.  
to say that he concurs in the  
terms of the tel<sup>ms</sup> which the S. of S.  
for S.A. proposes to address to H.M.  
Amb<sup>ts</sup>, Petrograd, regarding the proposed  
alliance with Persia.

I am at the same time to  
enclose copy of a tel<sup>ms</sup> from the  
S. of S. as to the possibility of <sup>satisfying</sup> ~~recognising~~  
Persian ambitions in Mesopotamia, & to  
say that H<sup>ts</sup> Chamberlain shares their  
views.

(S<sup>o</sup>) A. Hirtzel.

~~4-28 Nov~~





In any further communication  
on the subject, please quote  
No. 179337/15.

and address—  
The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

P  
4373  
1915 FOREIGN OFFICE

110  
112

November 28th, 1915.

URGENT.

Sir:-

*copy tel. to Mr. S. Buchanan*

With reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, P.4303, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you herewith the draft of a telegram which it is proposed, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, to address to His Majesty's Ambassador at Petrograd, on the subject of the proposed alliance with Persia.

I am,


Sir,


Your most obedient,  
humble Servant,

*W. R. Anderson*



The Under-Secretary of State  
India Office.





Registry No. 179337/15.

Draft.

Sir G. Buchanan  
No.  
Telegram.

F. O.,

November 29th, 1915.


No. 2849  
Your telegram No. 1766.


I agree in general with the lines proposed by Minister for Foreign Affairs for discussing terms of Alliance with Persia - but I consider that it would be imprudent to raise the question of the Holy Places of Nejed and Yerbela - It would in the opinion of competent judges, very likely lead to the dissemination of a report that we were dealing with and disposing of Moslem sacred places and this would be resented in whole Moslem world as an interference with religious matters while there is great doubt if the clergy at the two Holy Places would welcome Persian control or direct Persian influence - It would be most deplorable if at this juncture we were to alienate the clergy at those important <sup>centers</sup> countries.

I am of opinion that we should first be placed in possession of the Persian desiderata as soon as possible, and then we shall be in a position to see more clearly in what manner and to what extent we can best meet their wishes.











112  
114

wishes. The two Representatives at Tehran should press for this and for the moment give general assurance that financial assistance will be readily and speedily accorded - I entirely concur with the measures mentioned by Minister for Foreign Affairs which we should have to require the Persian Government to adopt in return.

Repeat to Mr. Marling.





113  
115  
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PERSIA.


POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Larling (Teheran)  
Foreign Office. November 26th, 1915. 2.55 p.m.  
No. 414.

-----  
Your telegram No. 479 (of November 23rd).  
Persian Minister here has received no instructions as  
to communicating terms of proposed alliance. You should, in  
concert with your Russian colleague, ask Prime Minister to  
inform you of terms suggested, in order that the two Govern-  
ments may take them into early consideration.  
We are desirous of proceeding with the negotiations  
with as little delay as possible.  
Repeated to Petrograd No. 2620.

Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915

RECEIVED IN  
27 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





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(116)

RUSSIA

P  
4373  
1915  
POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan. (Petrograd) Nov: 25th.  
D. 10.30.p.m. November 25th.  
R. 10.30.a.m. November 26th.  
No. 1761.


Your Telegram No. 2798.


Ministry for Foreign Affairs quite realizes  
advantages of projected Alliance but fears Russia  
cannot make herself responsible for protection of  
Persia against attack outside Russian sphere. He  
has promised me an aide memoire embodying his con-  
sidered views this evening or to-morrow morning.

Sent to Teheran.


Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915


RECEIVED  
29 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT











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118  
P  
4373


favour of Russia and England. Promise of eventual pecuniary assistance as well as promise of certain facilities with regard to liquidation of debts of Persian Government could also be made.


In return, Persian Government would have to take without delay certain measures which would be recommended to them by the two Legations, such for instance as rupture of diplomatic relations with enemy Powers; invitation to diplomatic and consular representatives of latter to leave Persia without delay; to dismiss Swedish instructors of gendarmerie; to assure help of Nomad tribes, and to enter into direct pour-parlers to this effect with chief of these tribes in the name of the Shah; to nominate to posts of governors of provinces, as well as to other important posts trustworthy men to be designated by the two Legations; and to put at the disposal of England and Russia all armed Persian forces, artillery arsenals etc:-


Russian Government would be glad to learn the views of British Government as soon as possible"


Aide Memoire ends.


On my reminding Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning of the views expressed in Tehran Telegram No 362 on Holy Places His Excellency said that Persian Government had ~~now~~ let both our Ministers know that they would like to be promised possession of them.






















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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

P  
4373  
1915

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
November 28th. 1915.

D. 10.a.m. November 28th. 1915.  
R. 2.35.p.m.


No. 490. (K).


-----

Your telegram No. 414. We have been constantly  
pressing Persian Government to communicate terms:  
Yesterday Prime Minister promised them in four days.

Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915

RECEIVED  
29 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





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4373  
1915

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling. (Tehran) November 26th.

D. 3.0.p.m.  
November 26th.  
R. 11.12.p.m.

Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915

No. 486.

-----  
Situation is developing somewhat unfavourably.

According to official accounts there are now some 3,000 gendarmes and a somewhat larger number of Mujahids in German pay at Hamadan and more are expected. Russian troops are moving in that direction from Kasvin but we do not know in what force.

Turkish Ambassador and Austrian Minister are returning to Tehran and it is asserted that a considerable number of Mujahids will accompany them. Some 40 Austrian prisoners of war are already (group undecypherable). It is possible that, with help of gendarmerie who are no more amenable to the Government here than in Hamadan, an attempt on Farma Farma may be made.


His Highness has been much impressed with a threat sent by Major Demare that if he does not join nationalist party or leave the country all his properties in west Persia will be destroyed. He has enquired of Russian Minister and me whether our Government would indemnify him if threat is carried out which is quite probable.


A signal Russian success at Hamadan would restore some measure of confidence to Cabinet but at present they are so much impressed by threats of Germans and gendarmes that they scarcely dare talk even of an alliance and we can get nothing definite from them as to completed demands.

Klein who is supposed to be bringing money is still at Kermanshah.

Addressed to Foreign Office and Petrograd.

28 NOV 1915  
CONTROL STAMP





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122  
124

4373-5  
15

RUSSIA

POLITICAL

(179374/15).

Cypher telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).

Foreign Office. November 28th 1915. 1.36 p.m.

No. 2839.

COPY TO INDIA  
3 DEC 1915

Mr. Marling's telegram No. 486.


It seems clear that we can only save the situation by meeting force with force and for this purpose a defeat by Russian troops of the revolted gendarmerie either at Hamadan or wherever they are accessible would be most effective. It is particularly important to make Farman Farma secure, and sole means of doing so is by having Russian troops within reach of Tehran. To occupy Teheran unless essential for protection of Legations might precipitate departure of Shah, who is already at Perabad, outside Tehran, and of some, if not all, of Persian Government, but troops should be near enough to prevent Gendarmerie and Germans occupying and becoming masters of Tehran. I trust therefore that Grand Duke may be able to order Russian troops accordingly.


I understand that Farman Farma's properties are extensive and that guarantee asked for would consequently involve a considerable sum. We should eventually have to recover it from Persia, but I am asking Mr. Marling for further details.  
Repeated to Tehran No. 418.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Tehran).  
Foreign Office. November 28th 1915. 1.35 p.m.  
No. 419.

My telegram No. 2839 to Petrograd.  
Please send estimate of amount involved.

RECEIVED  
29 NOV 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





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SWEDEN.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Mr. Howard (Stockholm) Nov. 25th

D. 8.45 pm November 25th

R. 11.45 am November 26th.

No. 1709

Copy to India  
3 DEC 1915

.....  
Persian gendarmerie revolt.


Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the use of term "Swedish Officers" in speaking of instructors of Gendarmerie.


He said they were not Swedish Officers and Swedish Government was in no way responsible for anything they might or might not have done. He hopes that you will make this clear on some occasion and he repeated that Swedish Government had always acted with absolute loyalty in regard to gendarmerie Officers and had invariably met our requests as far as possible as regards withdrawal or retention of Officers over whom they had control or as regards advice given to others. I admitted this was so as far as I remembered.


I think it would be much appreciated here if a statement could be made when next opportunity occurs to the effect that Swedish Government has always acted in most friendly way in regard to these questions and that they are not responsible for conduct of gendarmes see mydespatch No. 48 and 60.













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*W 4366*  
125  
(127)

(183288).

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Teheran).

Foreign Office, December 3rd 1915, 10.10 p.m.

No. 435. (K).


Your telegram No. 500 (of November 30th).


Reference was to certain highly secret negotiations which have been proceeding between High Commissioner of Egypt and Sheriff of Mecca with object of securing Arab support against Turks.


Arabs advance wide territorial claims, including Irak, and Macmahon has replied to Sheriff that His Majesty's Government accepts this subject to large measure of Administrative control which British interests demand in Mesopotamia.


Negotiations have been largely tentative and our promises are of course dependent upon active assistance by Arabs against Turks.











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P.4366 127

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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
November 30th. 1915.

D. 5.30.p.m.  
R. 9.30.p.m. November 30th. 1915.

No. 500. (K).


-----  
Government of India to Secretary of State for India  
No. 103. Firman.

I should be glad to be informed of the nature and  
scope of negotiations mentioned in first paragraph and  
to be (gr. undecypherable? allowed) to offer observations  
on the telegram in the light of them.


Copy to India  
10 DEC 1915

RECEIVED  
2 DEC 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





Presented to the Asiatic Society of London by the Asiatic Society of Bombay, 1856.




Sheet 130


From Viceroi, 28th November 1915.


(Repeated to Tehran, and General Officer Commanding Force "D" as No. 103 D.S.).


Foreign Secret. Persia. Your telegram of the 24th November. It appears out of the question in the face of McMahon's negotiations with Arabs to make any bargain with Persia involving territorial concessions in Mesopotamia. Such a transaction coming to knowledge of Sherif and Arabs could only arouse grave distrust and indignation, and give them ground for definitely breaking with us. Moreover, communities concerned in Mesopotamia, many of whom are refugees from Persian outrage, would probably resent such a transaction, and do their best accordingly to upset Arab rapprochement, and obstruct local pacification. These considerations, coupled with objections regarding cession to Persia of Holy Places already indicated by us make it desirable, we think, to keep Mesopotamia out of the bargain. If Persian Government press matter, it might be explained to them that His Majesty's Government have consistently declared that they have no quarrel in Mesopotamia with the Arab population, or with communities resident at the Holy Places which it is their policy scrupulously to respect, and that it is impossible therefore without a much fuller consideration of rights and wishes of these communities than is at present feasible, to give any guarantee as to future disposal of any part of Mesopotamia. The Persian Government should remember that it has never been the policy of Great Britain to dismember for their own advantage weaker States with whom they have no quarrel. Persian Government may rest assured, however, that any proposals in this matter they may subsequently make will be sympathetically considered so far as is compatible with justice to the communities concerned, and the maintenance of the Holy Places inviolate and intact.


128  
130













133 131  
3516  
74

Register No.  
4340

Put away with .....  
Secret Department.

Letter from 70.  
Telegram from Viceroy

Dated } 25 NOVEMBER 1915.  
Rec. }

**Formally acknowledged**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	25 Nov.	WA	<span style="font-size: 1.5em; color: blue;">Persia</span> Question of alliance. Persian ambitions in Mesopotamia
Secretary of State.....	25	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Sad as 25/11

Copy to

G.O. (let from Viceroy) 25.11.15.  
 " " to " " sent. 1/12/15  
 India (let from 70) 26 November 1915

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Sp. telegram to G.O. asking for their views.


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26 November - Telegram to Viceroy.

Previous Papers :—

17626.—1. 1. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.







MINUTE.

132

134

I do not know if the S. of S. will think it worth while to telegraph.

(1457/15)


The possibility of Persian annexation was discussed sketchily on p. 9 of the attached memo. But as the S. of S. has pointed out we cannot now give away such to some one else. A possible compromise wd. be an enlargement of the Sheikh of Mohammerah's borders, he being both a Persian subject & an Arab. But our relations with him, as the Persian Govt must know, are peculiar, & it is more than likely that they wd. not welcome anything that increased his power.

The S. of S. have twice already stated their objections to handing over the Sheik Shurrah to Persia.

am not certain of that  
etc

I wd leave out reference to the Sheikh of M. To bring him in wd not help a bargain with Persia; and it is only because a bargain may have to be struck that the question arises.

25/11/15 P. W. H





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Despatched 26 Nov 1915 X

133


135


2pm

Foreign secret: Marling's let<sup>ter</sup> of  
26 Nov. Persian ambitions in  
Mesopotamia. Please telegraph your  
views as quickly as possible. ~~Should~~  
~~any extension of British of Indian~~  
~~territory be practicable.~~

Mehraon's negotiations  
with Arabs create a  
difficulty in the event of  
bargain with Persia  
being thought desirable.

ac







134  
136


Sir Arthur Hertzl,  
The S. of S. send you  
this and says that he  
has already pointed out  
to Sir E. Gey that the  
F.O. have made a half  
promise of Bagdad to  
the Arabs. He does not  
tell how they can promise  
it to the Shah of Persia  
as well.

7th  
25. XI.











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P4340/15.

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

(176358/15).

Cypher Telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)

Foreign Office, November 24th. 1915. 7.0.p.m.

No. 2798. (K).


Urgent.


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
I am very much afraid that Shah and Persian Government may leave Teheran and join the gendarmerie. To prevent this it seems desirable to encourage their project of an Alliance. There is no time to discuss details. I have authorized British Minister at Teheran to join his Russian colleague in negotiating and have given him discretion. I hope Minister for Foreign Affairs will do all he thinks possible to favour negotiations.

Repeated to Teheran No: 410.











138  
3516 (140)

Register No.  
**4328**  
1915

Put away with ~~3516~~ 14

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letter from F.O.  
Telegram from Vicroy,

Dated 24 }  
Rec. 24 } Nov. 1915

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	24 Nov.	Atk	<p><u>Persia</u></p> <p>1. S. of S's views on question of alliance.</p> <p>2. Instructions to Mr. Marling</p>
Secretary of State.....	25	J.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

July  
AC  
25/11


Copy to  
F.O. of 1. 29 Nov. 15.  
India of 2. 26 Nov 1915


**FOR INFORMATION.**

The S. of S. seems to pitch their expectations rather high. It will at all events be some time before they are all realised. Meanwhile it is to be hoped that the delay in reaching Bagdad - with all the exaggerated reports to which it will undoubtedly give rise - will not react unfavourably on the situation at Tehran.

Previous Papers :-  
4317-8

18998. I. 483. 2000-4/1915. [1000/14.]





P  
4328  
1915

RECEIVED IN  
24 NOV 1915  
GENERAL DELIVERY

*From Viceroy, 24th November 1915.  
(Repeated to Tehran.)*



Foreign Secret. Marling's telegrams on proposed alliance with Persia. There is no doubt that an alliance with Persia would produce a good moral effect upon Mohammedan public opinion in India and tend to remove bad effect created by our war with Turkey. It would greatly reduce risk of any breach with Afghanistan and remove necessity of further frittering away our military forces in Persia. It should make pipe line secure and render it possible to reduce our forces on Karun.


For these reasons an alliance with Persia would be of distinct advantage to India, provided it is not concluded on unduly extravagant political conditions.

139

(F)







140  
142  
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PERSIA

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Tcheran).

Foreign Office. November 23rd 1915. 12.30 p.m.  
No.409. Urgent.


-----  
Your telegram No.475.


I had understood from your telegram No.467 that you had let Persian Government know that you and your Russian colleague were ready to enter into conversations as to an alliance. You should join your Russian colleague in this directly he is ready to do so and I will await any definite proposals which may result from those conversations.

Would there be any prospect of Persian Government asking Russian forces to suppress the Gendarmerie at Kum who appear to be mere marauders? I should like to know if you and your Russian colleague consider that anything could be done by those means.

Repeated to Petrograd No.2778 for the information of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.







(143) 141  
3516  
14

Register No.  
**4317** Put away with  
1915

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Letter from F.O., Dated } 23 Nov. 1915.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	23 Nov.	W.H.	<p><u>Persia</u></p> <p>1. Situation at Tehran</p> <p>Question of alliance</p> <p>2. Attack by Swedish gendarmes on Iranian Gossachs at Hamadan</p> <p>Copy to India 26 November 1915</p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOR INFORMATION.</p> <p>1. Mr. Marbury's tel<sup>ms</sup> are coming in very irregularly, n<sup>o</sup> 472 having been rec<sup>d</sup> after 475, &amp; 474 apparently not at all. There is nothing in n<sup>o</sup> 472 to modify what he said in our letter of today. All these months we have been playing to prevent Persia from going over to the Germans, &amp; have <del>been</del> <sup>deliberately</sup> allowed outrage after outrage to be put upon us rather than risk driving them over. Unless there is reason to believe that that policy was wrong &amp; that the German hostility of the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> does not matter to us (in Afghanistan, Beluchistan &amp; elsewhere), we must obviously persevere how that, for the</p>
Secretary of State.....	23	W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


*Noted.*

*In Mr. Marbury's defence of Mr. Marbury's opinion against my objection is very much to the point & carries weight. I am not wholly convinced but I will stand firmly to party & inevitable exaggeration. I would only add that while in Persia the situation changes almost hourly, I think our position would have been stronger if we had pursued a clear policy by definite means & had not tried to twist the methods to every shifting change of the Persian authorities.*

W.H.  
23/11

Previous Papers:—

1898. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]



first time, we have something like a real hold over them.  
I would venture two remarks in mitigation of the S. of S.'s  
minute on 4303. (a) I do not think Mr. Mackay (unlike  
Sir H. Lowry, who was wrong in his estimate) changes  
his mind on the same data. The situation changes, & means  
must be adapted to ends. It was always a toss-up whether  
the Russian advance wd. ~~drive~~ frighten the Govt into our  
arms or into those of the Germans. The report seemed to  
show that up to a certain point it wd. have the former  
result, & beyond that point the latter. Therefore I think  
Mr. Mackay was ~~for~~ justified in venturing to stop it - temp-  
orarily - at that point. (b) I do not think that he  
regarded the proposed alliance & consequent concessions in  
the light of rewards - certainly the Persian Govt deserve nothing  
but punishment at our hands, if we are to consider their  
merits - but merely as the most effective means of getting  
them to do what we require, or at least of spinning out  
the time & postponing the crisis that wd. be caused if &  
when the Govt left the capital.

2) The answer to the S. of S.'s query ~~regarding~~ the pay-  
ment of the gendarmes is in the negative so far as direct  
payments go. It is ~~now~~ <sup>some</sup> months since we ceased to finance  
that <sup>force</sup>. But it is undoubtedly true that in so far as we have  
made advances to the Persian Govt we have to some extent made  
it possible for them to pay the gendarmes. But I very much  
doubt if they have done so. In fact at all events we know  
that pay had been in arrears for two or three months. It wd. seem  
certain that it is the Germans who have been the paymasters.



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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran) November 21st.

D. 12.35 p.m.

November 22nd 1915.

R. 9.55 p.m.,

No. 472.



(2 groups undecypherable) Persian Government and the Shah are at present this moment (sic) genuinely alarmed at the situation to which their German intrigues have brought the country, and they feel that Persia must adopt a more definite attitude. Neutrality, even the benevolent neutrality they profess themselves ready to practise, will always leave the door open to complaints from one party or the other, and they would like to put an end to all ambiguity and declare Persia definitely committed to one side or the other. The Government and the Shah prefer to go with us, and if the question of Alliance were raised I feel (3 groups undecypherable).



For their Alliance they would of course demand more than the six points reported in my telegram No. 442, and first of all they will require assurances of protection against aggression from Turkey.

His Majesty's Government are of course much better able than myself to gauge the consequences to ourselves if Persia entered the war against us, but I feel that they far outweigh any disadvantages of the present or the future attendant on the conclusion of a Persian Alliance.

If Persia joins Germany willingly or otherwise, German aims of immobilizing forces in India that are required









required elsewhere, of making our military position in Mesopotamia insecure, and of stirring up trouble in the Caucasus may well be realized.


If on the other hand Persia becomes our ally German plans here assuredly fail. They are promising Persia in the event of the latter's joining them, that in 2 or 3 months a Turco-German army corps will be sent from Constantinople. I do not suppose that they ever intended anyhow more than (?to) send a small force as the nucleus of an army to be formed and organised under German and Turkish officers for use against us in Mesopotamia and Afghanistan. This scheme would be certainly abandoned, if no response could be expected in this country. Moreover with the Persian Government's open hostilities of German propaganda here would soon collapse; they could keep a certain number of small tribes with them, but all the greater ones would stand by the Persian Government: our responsibilities from a military point of view would therefore not be great.

Persian demands as the price of her alliance may be grouped under two heads - financial and political. She will want money in some form, but certainly nothing at all commensurate with the cost of prolongation of the war for a single week.

As to political demands, they may be comprised under the six points above-mentioned, or others may be added. Whatever they are they will certainly be aimed at freeing Persia from the hold the two powers have over her in (2 groups undecypherable). Apart from purely geographical conditions our hold has mainly been established in the recent past through Persia's financial dependence on the two Powers, and it may be safely assumed that such is (2 groups







144

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
(2 groups undecypherable)ing here that if all Persia's debt were extinguished to-morrow, and a large sum given to her to start afresh with, her financial embarrassments will in a very few years again reduce her to dependence on us, so that we shall again have requisite lever in our hands to <sup>re-</sup>establish our present hold.


The balance of advantage in favour of Alliance therefore seems to me to be enormously on our side, and I venture to urge great concessions can be made to Persia to secure her Alliance.

I suggest that the Russian Minister and I be authorised to open negotiations for this purpose at once while the Persian Government is well disposed. If the Persian Government's demands are too exorbitant negotiations can be dropped, and meanwhile we at all events gain time.

I hear on first rate authority (that) the enticements which the Germans are holding out to Persia are being increased daily, and impossible of realization as they are, they produce a certain effect on the credulity of the Persian mind.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India and Petrograd.





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PERSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran) November 22nd.

D. 1.10 p.m.

November 22nd, 1915.

R. 11.30 p.m.

Unnumbered (R).

no. 474

-----

Gendarmerie under Swedish Officers have attacked Persian  
cossacks at Hamadan. It is said that the latter lost heavily  
and part went over to Gendarmes. Fate of Consul unknown.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India, Petrograd  
and Stockholm.



Sir A. Hertz


*I presume that no further  
payments on account of the  
gendarmerie will be made  
from allied resources as long  
as the state of things continues.  
I am under the impression that  
it is our money (by way of  
indemnities or advances) which  
has hitherto provided their pay.*

*Is not this so?*

*23/11*







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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Mr. Marling (Teheran) Nov. 22nd.

D. 8. 15 pm November 22nd.

K. 12.30 pm November 23rd.


No. 476 (K).

.....

Your telegram No. 404.

I am very unwilling to embarrass the Government at present with any demands that would humiliate them and seem unfriendly, but as a matter of fact we must hold them responsible for property of bank telegraphs (sic) as well as private effects and compensation for outrage on individuals. Otherwise I think that as suggested in my telegram No. 471 yesterday we should demand dismissal of the two Swedish Officers.







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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher Mr. Marling (Teheran) Nov. 22nd.

D. 6.10 pm November 22nd.

R. 11. 45 am November 23rd.

No. 477 (K).

.....

Persian Government has applied (? for)  
retro-active effect of moratorium from January. I  
am sending an affirmative reply. If we succeed in  
keeping Persia we must give money; if on the other hand  
they go over to Germans it was not (sic ? it must not  
be) paid to them.


Russian Minister agrees.

In any case Imperial Bank of Persia cannot, as  
Persian Government are aware, find money without  
importing silver.

Russian Minister has informed me that no silver is  
available in Russia so that if importation becomes  
necessary arrangements to send it from London must be  
made.









(150) 148  
3516  
74

Register No.  
4303

Put away with

**Secret Department.**

Letter from FO.

Dated 20, 22 } Nov. 1915.  
Rec. 20, 22 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 Dec.	Att	<p><u>Persia</u>                      Situation at Tehran &amp; in the provinces.                      Question of a defensive alliance</p>
Secretary of State.....	22	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to  
India 26 November 1915

*As amended  
at  
22/11*


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

*att. letter to F.O. Commentary*

23 November - Letter to Foreign Office

Previous Papers:—  
 ✓ 3939  
 ✓ 3470

17626.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.





MINUTE.

179

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
I am conscious that the clause in the draft expressing willingness to consider further financial concessions is contrary to the expressed views of the S. of S. It can easily be cut out. But it appears to me that we have now for the first time the Persian Govt inclining towards us ex animo, & I venture to think that it is worth while to offer them something material.

If the Persians are really intent on an alliance financial concessions will be necessary. If now suggested by Mr. Buxton, the offer would of course be provisional.

22/11

J. W. H.

Financial assistance is now the last part of the matter & we need not tangle about it. But the moment there is the least improvement in the situation, Mr. Buxton is all for turning away the tools by which the improvement was worked. Because having been found effective when Persians had lamentably failed, I am all for maintaining the pressure. Before we talk of alliances & rewards, we must think of <sup>a</sup> British prisoners of war & other British citizens taken & held prisoners by the Gendarmes. Until this outrage is redressed, it is surely closed to talk as Mr. Buxton does. Also  
22/11





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152

Brook

23rd Nov. '15.

U. S. of S.  
T.O.

Immed<sup>to</sup>

I am directed by the S. of S. for  
S. to acknowledge the receipt of your  
letter n<sup>o</sup>: 175326 of the 22<sup>nd</sup> inst. regarding  
the possible desire of the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup>  
to conclude an alliance with this country  
& Russia against Turkey. ~~Secretary.~~  
~~Secretary.~~

Until the details of the Persian  
demands are known effective criticism  
of the proposal is difficult. But Mr  
Chamberlain wd. observe in the first  
place that an alliance directed solely  
against Turkey wd. seem to be of little  
value, & that the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> since,  
as Mr. Marking points out in his let<sup>r</sup>  
n<sup>o</sup>: 464 A of 17<sup>th</sup> inst., the danger from  
that source is hardly to be taken seriously,  
& does not appear to call for <sup>the supply of</sup> 100,000  
rifles & 200 guns.

What H.M.G. require is that the  
Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> shd. take immediate & effective




steps to remove from Persia all the German & Austro-Hungarian parties that are now infesting the country; & to <sup>disband</sup> the gendarmerie & remove <sup>from Persia</sup> the Swedish officers, <sup>as suggested in Sir Grey's ltr. n° 471</sup> ~~to Chamberlain~~ <sup>to release H.M. Consul, Shiraz, & other British prisoners; & eventually to raise the critical siege of Bushire.</sup>

~~Willing to consider any reasonable proposal bearing that end in view, but on all issues against Turkey, does not appear to him to suffice. [Until they are strong enough to do so, their hostility, & even their friendship, <sup>see</sup> actually presents some disadvantages; since while the Germans are creating a de facto state of war in the South H.M.G. are precluded from taking the measures of self-defence contemplated in the event of a rupture with the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup>.]~~

~~If Sir Baring & Mr. de Otter are satisfied that the Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> <sup>are</sup> will be able & willing, with the assistance of 100,000 rifles & 200 guns, to undertake effectively the action suggested above, Mr. Chamberlain has no objection in principle <sup>to the offer of alliance against both Germany & Austro-Hungary; to the supply of <sup>such</sup> armaments <sup>as may be available</sup> ~~for as they are available; and~~ to be wd. be prepared to consider further</sup>~~

9. *Grant. The war part of the Persia. Sufficiently <sup>to</sup> our discretion. N.W.H.*

*If not in becoming*





151  
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financial concessions within reason. But,  
on the grounds stated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> of 1's let<sup>r</sup>  
of 23<sup>rd</sup> Sept., & in view of the fact that  
the future status of Bagdad is still un-  
settled, he ~~does not~~ think, it <sup>impossible</sup> to  
offer Persia any rights, however theoretical,  
over the Shik shiraz in that region.

Let. C. would add  
that the <sup>improvement in</sup> attitude of the Persian  
Gov<sup>t</sup> appears to date from  
& to be entirely due to the  
near approach of Russian  
troops to Teheran & he  
is inclined to think that  
it may be expected to  
last just so long as the  
Persian Gov<sup>t</sup> is convinced that the  
strength of the allies exceeds  
that of their enemies in Persia.  
He trusts therefore that unless  
& until the German bands  
have been dispersed, the  
Caval at Shiraz & other  
British prisoners have been  
released & security taken  
against the active participation  
of the Gendarmes, or even  
their arrivance in such  
straps in future, the  
pressure supplied by the  
presence of Russian troops  
near the capital will not  
be relaxed & no promises  
restricting our freedom of  
action will be made.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.







(175326/15)

4303/s-

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Copy to India 26 Nov.

Immediate, and Confidential.


*At Warling  
telegram No 467  
November 20*


The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India, and is directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to him, herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, relative to the possible desire of the Persian Government to conclude an alliance with Great Britain and Russia against Turkey.

Sir Edward Grey would be glad to receive an early expression of Mr. Chamberlain's views on this proposal in so far as the general principle is concerned.

Foreign Office,  
November 22nd, 1915.

RECEIVED  
22 NOV 1915





PERSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran) November 20th.

D. 2 p.m.,

November 20th 1915.

R. 10.55 p.m.,

No. 467. (K).

Persian Government has intimated to Russian Minister and me that they are ready to enter into an alliance with us against Turkey. I have no accurate details yet but I understand they will require amongst other things promise to defend Persia from possible Turkish attack by which may be understood a promise of 100,000 rifles and 200 guns, the latter to be under orders of British and Russian officers.

Six points mentioned in my telegram No. 442 will also be brought without loss of time forward for later discussion and possibly they may ask some formal share in possession of holy places in Mesopotamia, administration being left entirely in our hands.

I am assured by a friend in whom I can place implicit reliance that no outrageous demand will be made.

Germans are making most lavish promises of arms, officers to form an army and three million pounds in cash.


Russian Minister and I have intimated our readiness to enter into conversations so as to be able to submit definite proposals to our Governments.

In view of immense importance from Indian point of view of keeping Persia on our side I earnestly hope that Persian Government's proposals may be favourably considered.

An early decision is urgently necessary.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India, Petrograd, and Sir P. Cox.







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PERSIA

4303/15

POLITICAL

Decypher of telegram from Mr. Marling (Teheran).

November 22nd 1915.

(d. 2.55 p.m. r. 5.40 p.m. November 22nd).

No.475. (K). Urgent.

-----  
My telegram No.474.

Gendarmerie is in open revolt under Swedes. They hold Kum in German interests, have cut Indo-European Telegraph Department(sic) wire to Seistan(?), seized and robbed Lynch's road toll-houses and offices and robbed Russian subjects.


Government is very indignant but hesitates to act and dismiss the Swedes until they are sure of our attitude, that is whether we will offer them alliance or not. If we do not do so at once they will pretend that their hand has been forced by the Gendarmerie and go over to the Germans.


I earnestly solicit instructions to open negotiations for an alliance at once.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India.


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












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PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
November 17th. 1915.

D. 9.50.p.m. November 17th. 1915.


R. 1.25.p.m. November 20th. 1915.


No. 465. (K).

-----  
Situation to-day is shaping a little better. Shah received Russian Minister to-day and was much less insistent on withdrawal of troops from Kerej. It would be nevertheless most (?expedient) in order to appease public opinion (?and the) Shah that a commencement of withdrawal should be made; but a moderate detachment should remain, as if troops were withdrawn completely before Farman Farma has situation in hand Germans, Mujahidin, Austrians etc. would return and we should revert to situation that prevailed before their arrival there.

Addressed to Foreign Office and Petrograd.







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4303/15

PERSIA

Decypher of telegram from Mr. Marling (Teheran).

November 17th 1915.

(d. 9.50 a.m. r. 3.45 p.m. November 20th).

No. 464A. (K).


-----  
Your telegram No. 393.

Suggested alliance with Persia.

I venture to suggest any difficulty of giving arms and men is insignificant as compared with prospect of seeing (? Gol)tz or others raising a force in Persia against us to attack our communications with Bagdad. I have no knowledge of military situation in Turkey but I cannot help suggesting that if Turks cannot adequately defend Bagdad it is unlikely even with assistance of Persian tribes they could make any very serious attack on Persia which Russian troops that Grand Duke is ready to send could not deal with, assisted by presence of our own forces at Bagdad.

Addressed to Foreign Office and Petrograd.







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4303/15

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) November 20th.

D. 11.25 p.m., November 20th 1915.

R. 10 a.m., November 21st 1915.

No. 1735. (K).

Secret.

Your telegram No. 2731 most secret.


Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Grand Duke says(?group omitted) decided that as soon as new Division had been concentrated at Kasvin a detachment should be sent to Hamadan.

His Imperial Highness had also given orders for gradual withdrawal of troops from Kerej to Yengi Dman now that the Ministry had been constituted.

Situation at Teheran had His Excellency informed me greatly improved and Shah had sent Emperor telegram conveying his friendly and respectful salutations and expressing hope that he might be allowed when war was over to present his homages to His Imperial Majesty in person at Petrograd.

Sent to Teheran.







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161  
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4303/15

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)  
November 18th. 1915.

D. 3.10.p.m.  
R. 8.40.p.m.  
November 18th. 1915.

No. 1717.

Urgent. (K).  
-----

Your telegram No. 2703.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said Grand Duke had categorically refused leaving disposition of troops to two representatives. His Imperial Highness strongly objected to troops being moved forward one day and brought back next and had given orders they were to remain at Kerej until Government had been definitely constituted and until our Minister and Consul were able to perform their duties without molestation.


Minister for Foreign Affairs added he entirely shared above view.


As regards question of Alliance he agreed with you as to difficulty of giving support in men and arms, and said it was impossible for Russia to furnish any. He had however no objection in principle to such an Alliance if you were in favour of it though it would not be of much practical advantage to us.

Sent to Tehran.









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4303/15.

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL

Decypher Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) Nov. 17th

D. 3. pm November 17th.

R. 10. 5 am November 19th.

No. 1706 (K).


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
My telegram No. 1703.


Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs to whom  
your telegram 2694 was communicated today stated Russian  
Government had decided not to withdraw Russian troops  
from Keredj in any case until a Persian Government  
affording satisfactory guarantees for the future is  
actually formed.


Repeated to Teheran.











copy.

162

164

L-303/15

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
To Sir A. Nicolson.

D. 1.55.p.m.  
R. 7.0.p.m.  
November 17th. 1915.


Unnumbered. (K).


Private.

-----  
My telegrams Nos. 432 and 462.

By accepting (?post of) Minister of Interior and by his present vigorous action Farman Farma has now thrown in his lot with us and is risking life and property in our cause. He has asked me in these circumstances to obtain an assurance from His Majesty's Government that in case things go wrong and he has to leave the country they will allot him a reasonable pension until he is able to return to Persia and re-establish his fortunes. If situation is saved here it will be thanks to him and I trust I may be allowed to give him assurance.

RECEIVED IN  
22 NOV 1915  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA





(173393). FILES ONLY.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Teheran).  
Foreign Office, November 19th 1915, 11 p.m.  
No. 403.


Secret.  
Your private telegram to Sir A. Nicolson.  
Pray inform me what would be considered as a  
reasonable pension.  
Repeated to Sir G. Buchanan No. 2743.


Cypher telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).  
Foreign Office, November 19th 1915, 11 p.m.  
No. 2744.

Teheran private telegram and my telegram No.  
403 to Teheran are for confidential information of  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.









From Telegrams, 23rd September 1915.


(Reprinted to *Basim*, No. 983/3.)

[P 3470]

Foreign Secret. Persia. Your telegram of 16th September. We agree generally with Cox's conclusions in his telegram No. 2069 of 19th September. As the Persian Government have apparently not yet themselves broached subject of Nejeff and Kerbela, and as at present there is no question of our advance to Baghdad, proposal of the Russian Government seems to us entirely premature. We think that the question of Nejeff and Kerbela should as far as possible be avoided, but, if raised by Persian Government, most that we should say is that, in the event of our advancing to Baghdad, it is the intention of British Government that Holy Places of Mesopotamia shall be removed from Turkish domination and form an enclave that shall remain intact and inviolable, and that their future administration shall be that of an autonomous Shiah state. We doubt whether any promise short of cession of Nejeff and Kerbela to Persia—which is out of the question—would greatly affect Persian Government or Persian public opinion, while any vague promise of admitting Persia to direct relations with Holy Places might be greatly resented by clergy of Nejeff and Kerbela themselves, and involve us in trouble in that quarter.

164

166





165  
(167)

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RUSSIA

POLITICAL

Cypher telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd).

Foreign Office. November 12th 1915. 7.30 p.m.

No. 2655. (K). Urgent.

Mr. Marling's telegrams Nos. 441, 442, 443 (of 9th  
November. Situation).

While situation at Teheran is so uncertain and variable that definite action is difficult to decide at this distance, you should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned I propose, if His Excellency concurs, to send following instructions to Mr. Marling with regard to points raised by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I see no objection to points 1 and 2 being discussed by our two Representatives with Persian Government. As regards point 3 it would be desirable to enquire of Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs what safeguards he could give to ensure that any arms supplied would not be used against us. (This appears imperative as the Germans might well promise to give the Persians support against us provided the Persians themselves were in a position to put up some force against us).

The two Ministers might state that in the present international situation it would be premature to discuss point 4 which as Mr. Marling pointed out can scarcely be of vital interest to the people of Persia.

On point 5 the Russian Minister has already stated himself to be ready to discuss matters.


The two Ministers might also hear what the Persian Government desire to say regarding point 6, without in any way definitely committing their two Governments on the subject.


I would propose, in addition, to inform Mr. Marling, if as I hope Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will send similar instructions to Russian Minister at Teheran, that it seems very probable that the Germans may make great effort to hold out to Persian Government financial inducements of more attractive nature than those of moratorium which we have granted.

If therefore Mr. Marling and his Russian colleague consider such a step desirable and believe that Persia has not yet decided to break with us and may still be held back ~~he might hold out hopes of further financial aid being forthcoming.~~

My reason for proposing this offer in case of need is that Germans would find it very difficult to give any tangible proof of immediate financial help, whereas an increase in our moratorium or a partial remission of Persia's debts could be granted by us at any moment.

Repeated to Mr. Marling No. 372.





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166

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C.M.

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran)  
November 9th. 1915.

D. 11.a.m. November 9th. 1915.  
R. 5.30.p.m.

No. 442.

Urgent. (K). -----

Continuation of my immediately preceding telegram:

I then pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell us the terms on which Persian Government were willing to adopt benevolent neutrality. His Excellency after dilating on the necessity for conciliating public opinion produced them.

(1) Settlement of purely Russian questions, that is, collection of revenue by the Russian Consuls, and strict observance of Treaty of Turkman Shai.

(2) Revision of tariff.


(3) Request for arms etc. to form Persian Army.

(4) Persia to be represented at the Peace Conference if other neutral countries are allowed to send Delegates.

(5) Undertaking to withdraw Russian troops from all parts of Persia will be discussed in a friendly spirit at a later date.

(6) Recognition by Persia of 1907 Convention to be cancelled as well as other undertakings obtained by 1911 Ultimatum.

I





167


169

I said that consideration of public opinion could hardly have inspired the insertion of points (2) and (4). In 6 months here neither had been even mentioned in the Press or by the Minister, and as for (4) it looked as if it was made in Germany. I feared the list would not make a favourable impression in London. Russian Minister concurred and said that as regards (1) that Persian Government 4 months ago had not cared to discuss the questions involved, although he had repeatedly expressed his readiness to do so, and he was equally prepared to do so still. As to (5) conversations had taken place between the Persian Government and his predecessor, and could be renewed.

We agreed to inform our Governments of the Persian Government's proposals and recommend sympathetic consideration.

Addressed to F.O. sent to India and Petrograd.







(170) 168  
3516  
14

Register No.  
4244-5

Put away with  
**Secret Department.**

Letter from 70, Dated } 18 Nov. 1915  
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	18 Nov.	W.H.	<u>Persia</u> Measures to be taken in event of war Views of S.O. & instructions to Mr. Mearns
Secretary of State.....	14	P. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Law  
Ac  
18/11

Copy to  
S.O. (24 Nov)  
India 26 November 1915


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Spt. telegram to S. of I. accepting their views &  
reporting S.O. instructions.


19 November - Telegram to Viceroy


Previous Papers :-  
4057  
4150


17628.-1. 1. 1855. 1000.-0/1914.













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171

(173)

(171134)

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Marling (Teheran)

Foreign Office November 17th. 10. 15 pm

No. 395.

.....

You will doubtless instruct His Majesty's Consul at Kerman that in the event of outbreak of war with Persia he should act in sense advocated by Government of India [in their telegram of 5th November repeated by them to you.]

If telegraphic communication with Shiraz be restored, you will of course concert with His Majesty's Consul there such measures for safety of him and British colony as may be possible.

As regards Pusht-i-Kuh you should authorize Sir. P. Cox to negotiate in sense of his telegram of 12th May No. 1085 B with Vali if, in light of such information as you and he possess, such course appears desirable. [See also Vicerey's telegram of 10th November. In any case Russian Government should not be mentioned unless Vali himself raises question of their attitude.]

Sir P. Cox's proposals regarding Mohamerah as mentioned in his telegram No. 273 of 1st November and telegram No. 368 of 14th November appear quite suitable but it would be desirable that Sheikh should give assurance to frame in due course regulations satisfactory to His Majesty's Government regarding Kerman navigation. India Office and Government of India fear that negotiations with Sheikh at this juncture might conceivably precipitate conflict with Persia if premature disclosure were made.


In view however of rapidly changing situation I authorize you to use your discretion on this point and you may communicate direct with Sir P. Cox when you think that moment has arrived for him to begin negotiations.


I share Sir P. Cox's view in his telegram 368 paragraph 2 that no special publicity should be given to recognition of Sheikh's declaration. Proposed action appears adequate.


You will understand that the above measures are contemplated only in the event of war with Persia.













*From Sir P. Cox, 1st November 1915.*  
*(Addressed to Teheran, repeated to Foreign, Secretary of State, Bushire and*  
*Mohammerah.)*

[P 3990] 273 R. My telegram of the 29th October last, 252 R.  
As soon as war with Persia is known to be inevitable, I am of opinion  
that we should at once take the following political steps in regard to  
Mohammerah, in order to reassure Sheikh, and to enable him to secure  
adherence of his tribesmen.

We should first give him secret assurance before reaffirming guarantee  
which we have already given him and his heirs and successors, but cancelling the condition requiring him to observe loyal attitude towards Persian Government, and informing him instead that in future, assuming a favourable termination to the war, while preserving his local autonomy as in case of Koweit, we will withdraw him from suzerainty of Persian Government and protect him from aggression from that Government also, to the utmost of our power. In return he must give us full assurance re control of his foreign relations.

We should also prepare an announcement in consultation with him to be made to his tribes to secure their adherence to him and to us. We should bribe them with same object, as already authorised.


Immediately on declaration of war, provided that he has agreed to act entirely in accordance with our instructions, he should be allowed to haul down Persian flag and hoist red Arab flag as a declaration of independence: the word "Mohammerah" written across the flag if he likes, on the analogy of Sheikh Mobarak's action at Koweit. I regard this as highly important, as I feel sure that it will appeal to him and tribesmen and all Arab elements, while our allies will be unable to take exception to it.

As regards customs of Mohammerah and Ahwaz, Sheikh should be informed that he will be allowed to resume them and receive net income on condition that we have entire control of them during the course of war; and that on the conclusion of war he accepts loan of British officials to manage them for him and accept such a tariff as we may think necessary with reference to tariff prescribed for Basra. For the present he must agree to allow Belgian staff to continue functions under our supervision and to accept British officials in case Belgians are unwilling to act. If he needs money as I believe he does, having regard to heavy expenses of last few months, compact should be sealed with a loan of 10,000*l.* to meet coming needs.

The old Karun regulations will obviously lapse with the declaration of war, but Government will perhaps consider whether any assurance will be required from the Sheikh in this connection at present stage.

Above suggestions are made from political point of view in my capacity of Political Resident in the Persian Gulf without regard to military considerations. Once Government have made up their minds in regard to above or alternate line of action the sooner we take Sheikh into our confidence the better.

I am asking Army Commander to comment on these proposals in so far as they may affect present or possible military operations.





*From Viceroy, 10th November 1915.*



*(Repeated to Basra and Tehran.)*


176

[P 4150] Foreign Secret. Mohammerah and Pusht-i-Kuh. Reference your telegram of 4th November. So long as the attitude of the Persian Government leaves room for hope that rupture may be avoided, we consider that it would be a mistake to enter into any anticipatory negotiations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah or other Chiefs, since such negotiations coming to the knowledge of the Persian Government would only tend to exasperate the situation and possibly to precipitate crisis; while if guarantee offered by us appealed strongly to the persons concerned, it might prompt them to expedite rupture which we desire to avoid.

Should, however, the prospect of rupture with the Persian Government appear absolutely inevitable, our views are:—

- (1) In regard to Pusht-i-Kuh, that though as stated in our telegram No. 500 of 19th May we still consider him unreliable, we realise that there are advantages in having him on our side if possible. If, therefore, Cox is satisfied that negotiations with him on the lines proposed can be satisfactorily effected, and Minister agrees, we think Cox should be authorised to act accordingly.
- (2) As regards Mohammerah, we think Cox should be given a free hand to treat on the lines he suggests.





*From Sir P. Cox, Aziziyah, 14th November 1915.*

*(Addressed to Minister at Teheran, repeated to Foreign, Secretary of State for India, Bushire and Mohammerah.)*

177

[P 4169]



R. 368. Reference to Government of India's telegram of 11th November. I submit that advantages of declaration of independence by Shaikh are that we thereby regulate Shaikh's position, and put him out of suspense at once, in a manner to which Allies cannot reasonably take exception and which while sufficiently securing our interests in future will avoid inconvenience of including Arabistan among the items to be discussed and distributed among Allies after war.



If proposal is approved subject to contingency arising, it is important for us to know what amount of publicity, if any, should be given to Shaikh's declaration and our recognition of it. I think we should make it clear to Shaikh's headmen we support his action, but that beyond that no special function or other specific step calculated to draw public attention to matter should be taken. Public might be drawing their own conclusions from hoisting Arab flag.



As between ourselves and Shaikh if he will agree to do so perhaps it will better for him to take initiative and write us a letter expressing his intention of declaring himself independent of Persia, and stating his readiness to maintain existing obligations towards us and place in our hands control of his foreign relations, and the management of posts and telegraphs and customs if possible, and asking us to recognise agent. In reply we should confirm previous guarantee and accord provisional recognition on above conditions, subject to conclusion of detailed agreement securing interests of each party *vis-a-vis* other.

Army Commander has been consulted and authorised me to say that he generally concurs, and if contingency should arise before reply is received above action will be taken on above lines.











(179) 175

Put away with 3516  
14

Register No.  
**4051**

Telegram  
Letter from Viceroy

Dated } 5 November 1915.  
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 Nov.	AK	<u>Persia</u> Measures to be taken in southern Persia on outbreak of war. Views of G. G. J.
Secretary of State.....	8	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Wip*  
~~AK~~  
8/11

Copy to  
Adm to 11.11.15.  
India 12 November 1915



FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.



*Lt. letter to F.O. preparing to approve.*

*9 Nov. 1915. Letter to F.O.*

Previous Papers:—

17626.—1. I. 1355. 1000.—9/1914.





176

(180)

MINUTE.

To Secretary, Military Dep:

for my remarks

Atk  
5/11/15



I concur in the proposed letter  
The situation has developed with  
such swiftness that the proposals  
of the inter departmental committee  
are no longer applicable. We  
had <sup>rather</sup> ~~not~~ the leisure nor the  
means to undertake the deliberate  
measures contemplated by the committee  
under present circumstances.


(No copy on  
old copy file)

I would suggest a telegram to  
G. of I pointing out stated conditions.

E. J. D. [unclear]  
8/21/15

On receipt of G.O.'s reply we shall presumably  
telegraph approval to the G. of I., & can then add  
any further remarks.





U. S. of S.  
S.O.

(191-2)

To India, 27 Oct.  
7. " 5 Nov.

177

181


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
9 Nov. 1915


With reference to this office letter of 10 June last I am directed by the S. of S. for I. to forward, for the information of the S. of S. for I.A., copy of all <sup>ms</sup> exchanged with the S. of S. regarding measures to be taken in southern Persia in the event of war with that country.



Since Mr Chamberlain's telegram of 27 Oct. has despatched Sir P. Gore has submitted to H.M. Amir, Tehran, separate proposals regarding the treatment of Arabians, on which the views of the S. of S., as well as of Mr Marking, are awaited. While, therefore, awaiting that part of the question for further consideration, Mr Chamberlain's <sup>ord.</sup> propose to approve the policy recommended by the S. of S., & <sup>ord.</sup> suggest that Mr Marking & Anthony H.M. Grouble at Shiraz & Remmon to make their own arrangements when the time comes. (Sd.) T.W. Holderness.











TELEGRAM.

From Commodore, Persian Gulf.  
To Admiralty.


Sent 30.10.15.

Recd. 31. 10.15.

41. Your message No.15 of 29th October. After consultation with Military and Political Authorities I have arranged that ships will take up following stations as soon as possible. JUNO Bushire "Pyramus" Jask, BRAMBLE Chahbar BRITOMART Linge DALHOUSIE Bander Abbas LAWRENCE Henjam if required. As there are not sufficient troops for the occupation of Linge and Bander Abbas, British representatives and subjects will be removed if necessary by H.M.Ships at the port to Karachi. Cable would be disconnected and steamers would cease to call. Community will remain as long as possible at Chahbar on account of telegraph line. After evacuating Linge and Bander Abbas DALHOUSIE will go to Bombay for refit as previously arranged. BRITOMART will go to Henjam from which place a system of relief ships requiring coal will be arranged, LAWRENCE will then return to Bushire for disposal. Defence of Bushire will be undertaken by JUNO and troops following lines that have been recently in force at that place. C.O. of troops is asking for 400 additional troops to be sent. This reinforcement is considered very necessary owing to length of perimeter to defend, 6 miles in length. If it is desired to seize Persian Sea-borne trade propose to form Depot for captured dhows at "(?)rag" Island with a second depot Henjam. It is considered ports on the Arabian Coast need not be considered. Repeated to C-in-C East Indies.

1st Lord (a.b) 1st Sea Lord. Sir A.K.Wilson Sir D.Gamble  
D.O.D. Head of M.

Reference M 08353.





(184) 180

Register No.  
3867<sup>b</sup>

Put away with 3516  
Secret Department. 14

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Letter from \_\_\_\_\_ Dated \_\_\_\_\_ 1915.  
 Rec. \_\_\_\_\_

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	28 Oct.	W.H.	<u>Persian Gulf</u> Naval measures to be taken in the event of war.
Secretary of State.....	28	J. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to

F.O. } 30. 10. 15.  
H.O. }  
India 29/10


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Off. letter to Admiralty (consulting).  
  
 29 October - Letter to Admiralty.  
  
 NB Admiralty action (and later papers)  
 are in the Military Dept.

Previous Papers:—

3867<sup>b</sup>


18694 I. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1865/14.]






15616. I. 1178. 2000.-9/1913.







Secretary  
Admiralty

3001

187

186


29 October 1915


In view of the possibility of that  
a state of war may arise with Persia  
at an early date, I am directed  
by the S. of S. for S. to advert to the  
last para. of my letter of the 10<sup>th</sup> June  
last, & to ask that, with the  
approval of the L.C. of the Adm<sup>ty</sup>,  
the C. in C. East Indies Station may  
be requested to ~~consult~~ <sup>advise, after consultation</sup> with the  
military & political authorities in the  
Persian Gulf, ~~what~~ <sup>what</sup> measures for the  
protection of British interests ~~and~~  
be ~~available~~ <sup>are</sup> practicable. I am to  
add that it sh. be assumed that  
~~no further~~ <sup>additional</sup> troops will be forthcoming  
for operations in Persia or for ~~rein-~~  
forcing the garrisons of the ports.

Sd/TW. Holbornell.

Copy to India  
29 OCT 1915

appreciably





(187) 183

To speak to Sir P. Bann  
at conference tomorrow  
morning with reference to  
oil fields.

22/10




P3867/15

Sir J. Holderness.


Sir E. Bann has gone, so  
I cannot get his concurrence. But I  
think the dft. tel<sup>m</sup> says all that is  
necessary at the moment.


I agree  
G.W.H. 22/10

Mr Chamberlain 22/10  
This is the substance  
of which was repeated the privately  
this morning (see attached) have modified



The opening sentence  
of the draft,  
as Sir E. Grey's  
minute said, the  
Council should not  
be directed.







Register No.  
3867<sup>a</sup>

Put away with 3516  
Secret Department.

189 185  
14

Letter from J.O. Dated } 22 Oct 1915  
 Rec. }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	22 Oct.	W.H.	<u>Persia</u> Alleged intention to join Germanic alliance
Secretary of State.....	22	J.W.H.	
Committed.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to J.O. 2 11. 15.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. telegram to G. of S. informing & enquiring as to measures necessary.


27 October - Telegram to Viceroy


Previous Papers:—


W

18694 I. 479 2000.—4/1915 [1865/14.]











In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 154808 /1915

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State  
Foreign Office,  
London.



Secret

187  
191  
3867  
1915

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper, for any observations which Mr. Secretary Chamberlain may wish to offer.

Foreign Office,  
October 22<sup>d</sup>, 1915.


Reference to previous correspondence:


Letter to from Foreign Office:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir C. Spring - Rice, Washington. Dixie 2d. Oct. 20 <sup>d</sup>	Persia & German Alliance

(Similar letter sent to \_\_\_\_\_)





188  
192


Decypher Sir C. Spring-Rice (Washington) Oct. 20th  
R. 12 noon October 21st.

(K)

.....

Private. From Secret source.

German Government have informed United States  
Embassy at Berlin that Persia is going to join Germanic  
alliance.





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Despatched 27 October 1915

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within knowledge  
of the F.O.

*Foreign Office*  
Foreign secret: ~~(H.M. Secy Washington)~~  
~~claims that~~ German Govt have  
~~stated that~~ *stated*  
~~informed U.S. Embassy Berlin~~ that

Persia is going to join Germanic  
alliance.

If this st. prove true do  
you propose any modification  
in programme approved in my tel<sup>m</sup>  
23<sup>rd</sup> June? O'Connor will presumably  
endeavour to arrange with Rawson &  
Sulist for safe conduct of British Army  
& British see your tel<sup>m</sup> 15<sup>th</sup> May. Is  
any similar arrangement possible at  
Kerman & either towards Bandar Abbas  
or Kerman-Isfahan.


action towards Bandar Abbas  
or Sestane

As regards oilfields interdepart-  
mental conference here after considering  
Kison's report & enclosures concluded  
that one brigade with 2 ~~mountain~~  
~~batteries~~ *batteries* ~~guns~~ *guns* wd. suffice to hold oilfields &  
approaches ~~to the fields~~  
that two batt<sup>ns</sup> with  
? *portable guns & cavalry cd. hold*

17624. I. 1353. 1000.-9/1914.

against all probable enemies  
against all probable enemies







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
REPORT OF DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENCE OF THE  
PERSIAN OIL-FIELDS. &c.

1. An inter-departmental Committee representing the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office and India Office, met at the India Office on the 3rd October 1915 to consider the question of the defence, in various eventualities, of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oil-fields and pipe-line in South-Western Persia. The Committee was constituted as follows:-

General Sir E. Barrow, G.C.B. (India Office)  
Vice-Admiral Sir E. Slade, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O. (Admiralty)  
Col. the Hon. M.G. Talbot. (War Office)  
Mr. L. Cliphant. (Foreign Office)  
Mr. J.K. Shuckburgh (India Office).

2. The general position with regard to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession in Persia may be briefly stated. The Company was formed in 1909 to work a concession obtained from the Persian Government in 1901 by Mr. W.K. D'Arcy, which runs for 60 years from the 28th May 1901, and gives the exclusive right to drill for, produce, pipe, and carry away oil and petroleum products throughout the whole Persian Empire excluding the 5 Northern provinces (Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Mazanderan, Asterabad and Khorassan). The only oil-fields at present being worked by the Company under this concession are situated in the neighbourhood of Maidan-i-Naphtan in the Bakhtiari country, whence the oil is conveyed in a pipe-line to the Company's refinery on Abadan Island at the head of the Persian Gulf. After leaving the Bakhtiari hills the pipe-line runs through a tribal area subject to the influence

of






- 2 -

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(195)

of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Under agreement with the Company the Bakhtiari Khans have undertaken to police and protect the field works and upper section of the pipe-line, while the Sheikh of Mohammerah is under a similar obligation in regard to the refinery and the lower part of the line. The Bakhtiari Khans are entitled, by agreement, to 3 per cent. of the shares in any Company formed to work oil in Bakhtiari country, and thus have a substantial interest in the success of the venture. In May 1914 <sup>was concluded between the Company and the Administration</sup> an agreement, by which the latter acquired a sufficient number of shares to give them a controlling interest in the Company's operations.

3. Up to the end of 1914, the pipe-line was never interfered with; but in January and February of the present year considerable damage was done by the Bawi, an Arab tribe then in revolt against the Sheikh of Mohammerah, to the section lying between the Bakhtiari border and Ahwas. The damage has since been repaired, and the Bawi have made their submission to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and have formally accepted responsibility for the security of the pipe-line, telephone line and the Company's employees, in return for which a subsidy of £1000 has been granted to the tribe. The Bakhtiaris have so far fulfilled their engagements; but in May 1915, when a rupture with the Persian Government seemed imminent, it was thought desirable to execute a further agreement with the Khans, by which they undertook, in the event of hostilities between Great Britain and Persia, and of their finding themselves no longer in a position to afford the necessary protection, to give the head of the oil-fields community 20 days' notice in advance and to be responsible for the safety





- 3 -

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
safety of the Company's employees during those 20 days. The agreement was dated the 24th May 1915. It may be mentioned that the population at the oil-fields consists of some 1,000 souls, including 40 Europeans.

4. In the event of disturbances in Persia endangering the oil-fields, it is considered that half-measures would be useless, and that only two practicable courses are open to us, viz:-

- (1) To despatch a military force sufficiently strong to defend the fields and pipe-line against all comers; or
- (2) To shut down the fields and withdraw the personnel until such time as the Bakhtiaris are in a position to resume their engagements.

The political objections to abandoning so important an interest, or, in Sir P. Cox's words, "leaving a large and valuable settlement, representing some millions of money, to be wrecked", are sufficiently obvious; and there is the further consideration that the Admiralty attach great importance to the continued supply of oil from the Persian fields for naval purposes. It has been argued that the Bakhtiaris, being financially interested in the enterprise, are unlikely ~~to~~ in any circumstances "to kill the goose which lays the golden eggs". But, as against this view, it must be borne in mind that the tribe may be offered inducements by our enemies which will more than outweigh any losses incidental to the destruction of the oil-fields.

5. The Committee having considered the marginally-noted reports\*





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(197)

reports\* from the G. O. C., Indian Expeditionary Force "D",

Letter No. 304-4-0., dated 19th June 1915,  
with enclosures.  
Telegram No. 304-5-0, dated 27th June 1915.  
Letter No. 304-6-0., dated 27th June 1915,  
with enclosures.

and having heard  
the views of  
Vice-Admiral Sir  
Edmond Slade, who


is personally acquainted with local conditions in the  
districts concerned, resolved unanimously to submit the  
following conclusions for the consideration of His  
Majesty's Government:-

(1). That the estimates - varying from one to two  
Divisions - of the force requisite to defend our interests  
in the Anglo-Persian Oil fields, which have been submitted  
by the military authorities in Force "D", are excessive  
in almost every respect, as they do not take sufficient  
account of:-

- (a) the fact that the Chaab and Bawi tribes are  
unlikely to act against us after the recent lessons  
they have received, so long as we maintain adequate  
forces for their repression, and so long as we are in  
alliance with the Sheikh of Mohammerah;
- (b) the fact that the Bakhtiari are unable to  
concentrate against us in large numbers and have no  
guns, while the Persian Government have practically  
no armed force of any value;
- (c) the fact that if we hold the potable water  
supply at the Oil-fields no sustained attack on us  
can be made there.

(2). That for the above reasons, if Persia declared war  
and if 'jehad' were proclaimed, a Brigade with a few  
mountain guns would suffice to hold the Oil-fields and  
the water supply against any probable or possible attack,  
while a couple of battalions with a proportion of guns  
and







- 5 -

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~~and~~ Cavalry could hold the Karun line up to and including Halila.

(3). This being so, the Committee consider that provided that certain measures as proposed below are now taken, we can always rely on being able to detach a sufficient force for this duty so long as we maintain in the Basra-Ahwaz region a force of not less than 2 Brigades of Infantry, 2 regiments of Cavalry, and 2 batteries of Horse and Mountain Artillery.

6. On these premises the Committee make the following recommendations:-

Measures to be taken at once:-


- I. The Karun to be recognised as the line of communications up to Halila, and for the purpose 2 steamers and barges to be placed on the river above Ahwaz.
- II. The post now at Ahwaz to be transferred to Masiri on the left bank.
- III. A cart road to be made from Halila viâ Ab-Ganji to the foot of the Anjirak Kotal (8 miles).
- IV. A water pipe to be laid from the Karun at Halila to the foot of the Anjirak and a Burj with pumping power inside to be erected at or near this point.
- V. A good mule road to be made up the Anjirak and thence along the Oil pipe line to the Ab-i-Tombi. The distance is about 12 miles.

Of these measures, III, IV and V should be carried out by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I and II are essentially matters for military action and expenditure.

Measures to be taken when war threatens:-

- VI. A force to be despatched without delay to the Oil fields. This force to comprise:-

A





- 6 -

195

199

A Brigade of Infantry.

1 or 2 sections of Mountain Artillery.

A Company of Sappers and Miners.

This force might have to detach a battalion to hold the water supply at Maidan-i-Naphtak. It would also have to furnish a detachment for Ab-Ganji and provide all escorts and Picquets from Ab-Ganji to the Oil-fields (13 miles).

VII. The cart road from Darra Khazina <sup>via</sup> Ab-Gah to Ab-i-Tembi to be abandoned as it runs through an indefensible defile.

VIII. Fortified towers or posts to be constructed at the Kotals for Guards and Picquets and a defensible post at Ab-Ganji for a double Company.


IX. Two battalions and a Cavalry Regiment to be detailed for guarding the line Ahwas-Halila. A post to be formed for a  $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion and 1 squadron at Halila and a similar post at Bandi Kir or Mulla Thaneh. The rest to be concentrated at Nasiri (vide II).

The attached map shows the places mentioned above.

7. The whole of these proposals are subject to the condition laid down in <sup>paragraph 5</sup> (3) that a certain force is always maintained in the Basra-Ahwaz region. This condition would not apply if we were in possession of Bagdad, as in that case the maintenance of normal order in the Bakhti-  
asi hills would appear to be assured.

8<sup>th</sup> October 1915

(Signed) E. G. Barron, General  
Edmond J. W. Slade  
M. G. Talbot  
Lancelot Oliphant  
J. E. Shuckburgh





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Put away with 3516 (200)  
14

Register No.  
**3607**

**Minute Paper.** **Secret Department.**

Scaps Letter from India, 40 M Dated 10 Sept 1915.  
Rec. 4 Oct

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	8 Oct.	W.H.	The War.
Secretary of State.....	9	J.W.H.	Persia. Overtures by Peace Community, & reply
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to  
20. 6. 10. 15.


FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers :—

18598. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1000/14.]

W





Copy.

P  
3607  
1915

20. 197  
201

From

The Hon'ble Lieut.-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.G.I.E., C.S.I.,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and  
Chief Political Officer, Basrah,

To

The Hon'ble Mr. A. H. Grant, C.I.E.,  
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,  
Foreign and Political Department,  
Simla.

Dated Basrah, August 22nd 1915.

Sir,

At the direction of the Army Commander, I have the honour  
to forward, for the information of the Government of India,  
copies of telegrams exchanged with the General Officer

- |   |                               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| (1) G.O.C. Nasiriyah to Major General, General Staff, No. 274-G dated 19th August 1915. | } Commanding<br>Nasiriyah, in |
| (2) Major General, General Staff, to G.O.C. Nasiriyah No. Ig. 1118 dated 20th August.   |                               |

connection with overtures made by certain of the leaders of  
the Nejed community.

Received on 4 SEP 1915 with  
INDIA FOREIGN SECRETARY'S  
Letter. No. 4 DM  
Dated 10 SEP 1915


I have, etc.,

Sd. P. Z. Cox,

Lieut.-Colonel,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and  
Chief Political Officer, Basrah.







General Headquarters,  
I.E.F.D.

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Basrah 20th August 1915.

Telegram.

From G.O.C. 12th Division, Nasiriyah.

To M.G.G.S. Basrah.


No. 274-G.

Dated 19th August 1915, desp. 3.30 p.m. recd. 7.0 p.m.

Following is extract of a letter received here yesterday from Shaikh Attieh and Ghelal of Nejef. Asks what our intentions regarding Nejef and district are and for assurance that no one will interfere between people of district and Amir-ul-Muminin<sup>x</sup> and Atab<sup>m</sup> section. He adds that if it is our intention to proceed in their direction immediately and without any conditions there will be a great disturbance and difficulties will arise for them. He asks that we should tell them confidentially of our intention so that they may inform principal tribesmen and be intermediaries. He also says if we do not agree, things will become difficult and the people of Nejef and all the tribes will be obliged to fight for their religion. He concludes by asking for reply quickly to prevent misunderstandings. Messenger is here. Please wire whether you wish him sent on with letter to you or whether you wish reply sent back by him which is what messenger requests. Messenger states that ~~XXXX~~ Saiyid Katham Yesdi is supporting Shaikh Attieh in this matter.

x "Amir-ul-Muminin" probably means here the Shrine of Ali.  
m Atab - Atabat. The Holy places generally.

Sd. P. Z. Cox.





199  
203  
General Headquarters,  
I.E.F. "D"  
Basrah, 20th August 1915.

Telegram.


From the M.G.C.S.I.E.F. "D" Basrah.


To the G.O.C. 12th Division, Nasiriyah.

No. Ig.1118.

Dated 20th August 1915 (Desp. 4.45 p.m.)

-----  
*August*  
Your telegram 274 G. of 19th ~~August~~. Please give  
written reply in following terms. Begins. After Compliments.  
The Shaikh Attieh is requested to remember Firstly that Great  
Britain became at war with Turkey much against our will. The  
war was brought about simply by the hostile acts of Turkey  
instigated by Germany for her own purposes. Secondly. On the  
outbreak of war Great Britain notified to the World that so  
long as the inhabitants of the Holy Places refrained from ill-  
treating British Indian pilgrims, the troops of Great Britain  
would under no circumstances molest the Holy Places. Thirdly.  
Immediately on arrival of British Forces in Shatt-al-Arab we  
proclaimed that British Government had no quarrel with the  
tribes of Iraq and no design against their religion; that the  
war was with the Turkish Government and troops, and that  
British Forces would not attack or molest the Arabs so long  
as they maintained a neutral attitude. Fourthly. The  
British Government in spite of the war have not stopped the  
payments from the Oudh Bequest. On the contrary shares are  
being paid for distribution whenever opportunity arises.  
Fifthly, Army Commander has consistently shown clemency and  
consideration to any of the clergy or their adherents who  
have fallen into our hands as prisoners and has had them  
released forthwith. All the above facts should be sufficient  
proof that the British authorities possess<sup>s</sup> the most friendly  
feelings






204 200

feelings towards the Clergy and inhabitants of the Holy Places and have lost no opportunity of demonstrating them. We shall continue to do so, and feel sure that Saiyid Muhammad Kathan Yezdi and Shaikh Attieh will preserve the same sentiments towards us. They may rest assured that we have no intention of interfering in any way with the religious affairs of the Attabat. Ends.

Please ascertain through messenger whether reports of distress being prevalent in Nejef are true and if so whether there is any practical means by which the British Government can assist in relieving it and wire me.





(205) 201  
Put away with 3516  
Secret Department.

Register No.  
3534

Minute Paper.

Letter from F.O. Dated } 27 Sept 1915.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	28 Sept	J.L.S.	Persia.
Secretary of State.....	28	J.W.H.	The Shiah Holy Places : question of future relations with Persian Govt.
Committee.....			Views of H.M.'s Minister, Tehran.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 1 Cols


FOR INFORMATION.

Mr. Marking's conclusions are in accord with those expressed in our letter to F.O. of 27 Sept.

Previous Papers :—  
3470

18698. I. 483. 2000—4/1915. [1000/14.]







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and should be returned to the Foreign Office when done with  
unless required for official use.]

202 3349  
11.3470  
12.

206

P  
3534  
1915

PERSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Mr. Marling (Teheran), September 24th.

D. September 24th 1915, 9.30 p.m.

R. September 25th 1915, 10.10 a.m.

No. 362.


India Office telegram to Sir P. Cox of September  
17th. Holy Places.

2.16th (3349)

I do not think that we shall reap any advantage  
by an announcement of our benevolent intentions  
towards the Shiaah faith in the event of our becoming  
masters of the Holy Places or by promising Persia a  
voice in local administration. Persians are too well  
aware of respect shown for religions in India and  
elsewhere to feel anything but satisfaction at the  
prospect of British rule being established there  
and would probably secretly prefer not to see any  
corrupt Persian element introduced. It is also  
quite likely that enemy would represent such an  
announcement as a proof that we are waging war on  
Islam and make a certain amount of capital out of it.

Repeated to Petrograd.

RECEIVED IN  
27 SEP 1915  
POLITICAL DEPT





P 3470/15
207 203 A

207A
Put away with 3516/14

Secret Department.

Tel. Letter from Viceroy

Dated 23 } Sept. 1915.  
Rec. 24 }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	24 Sept.	J.S.S.	<u>Persia</u> Question of holding out hopes to Persian Govt of closer relations with the Shiach Shrines of Mesopotamia (Najaf & Kerbela): Views of G. & I.
Secretary of State.....	25	J.W.S.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (of letter to G.O.)

16/10/15

Copy to India

1 OCT 1915

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Obj. to G.O. forwarding supporting

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Ltr. to G.O. 27 Sept. 1915

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Previous Papers:—

3396

17626.—1. 1. 1355. 1000.—0/1914.



(207) 203 A

Register No.  
**3470**

Put away with **3516**  
**14**

**Secret Department.**

Tel-  
Letter from *Viceroy*

Dated 23 } Sept. 1915.  
Rec. 24 }

Formally acknowledged \_\_\_\_\_

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	24 Sept.	J.S.J.	<u>Persia</u> Question of holding out hopes to Persian Govt of closer relations with the Shiach Shrines of Mesopotamia (Najaf & Kerbela). Views of G. & I.
Secretary of State.....	25	T.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

*Jipm*  
*AL*  
*26/9*

Copy to India (of letter to 70.)  
*hal (of tel) rec Sept.*

Copy to India  
1 OCT 1915

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*Off. to 70. forwarding supporting*


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
*Let to 40. 27 Sept. 1915*


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Previous Papers :-  
*3396*

17628.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.











204  
(209)

27 Sept. 1915

Book

Sjt. F.O. Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 14<sup>th</sup> Sept. 1915 transmitting copies of two telegrams\* from H. M.'s Ambassador at Petrograd regarding the situation in Persia, I am directed by the S. of S. for I. to enclose herewith, to be laid before the S. of S. for F.A., copy of telegraphic correspondence with the G. of I. & Sir P. Cox as to the suggestion of the Russian Govt. that some assurance should be given to Persia in respect of her future relations with the Shiach Holy places of Mesopotamia.

Mr. Secretary Chamberlain concurs generally with the views expressed by the G. of I., & is decidedly of opinion that it would not be

be

\* Nos 1338 & 1340 of 12 Sept. 1915

To Viceroy & Sir P. Cox,	16	Sept. 1915
From Sir P. Cox,	19	" "
" Viceroy	23	" "

Copy to India  
1 OCT 1915



be advisable to raise the question  
of the Holy places, unless and  
until it is first broached by  
the Persian Govt. themselves.

Mr. Chamberlain wd. prefer to  
reserve his opinion as to the  
reply which should, in that  
event, be returned to Persian  
Govt.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.

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Telegram from Viceroy  
Dated 23rd Sept. 1915  
Received 4. 16 p.m..  
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
X  
P  
3470  
1915

205  
m 24.9.15  
210  
H 3396

Foreign Secret. Persia. Your telegram of  
16th ~~16th~~ Sept. . We agree generally with Cox's  
conclusions in his telegram No. 2069 of Sept 19th. As  
the Persian Govt. have apparently not yet themselves broached  
subject of Nejed and Kerbela and as at present there is no  
question of our advance to Baghdad proposal of the Russian  
Govt. seems to us entirely premature. We think that the  
question of Nejed and Kerbela should as far as possible be  
avoided but if raised, Persian Govt. most that we should say  
is that in the event of our advancing to Baghdad it is the  
intention of British Govt. that Holy Places of Mesopotamia  
shall be removed from Turkish domination and form an  
enclave that shall remain intact and inviolable and that  
their future administration shall be that of an autonomous  
Shiah state. We doubt whether any promise short of  
cession of Nejed and Kerbela to Persia - which is out of the  
question - would greatly affect Persian Govt. or Persian  
public opinion while any vague promise of admitting Persia  
to direct relations with Holy Places might be greatly resent-  
ed by Clergy of Nejed and Kerbela themselves and involve us  
in trouble in that quarter.

Repeated to Basra, No. 983. S.

RECEIVED  
24 SEP 1915  
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT





206  
3516 (211)

Register No.  
**3396**

**Minute Paper.** Put away with **Secret Department.**

*Two Tel to Gen Sir P. Cox,* Dated 19 Sept. 1915.  
Rec. 20 Sept. 1915.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	21 Sept	J.E.S.	<u>Mesopotamia</u> Question of the Shiakh Holy Places (Kerbela and Nejef)
Secretary of State.....	21	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


*Copy to F.O. 20 Sept 1915  
hdy. Sept*


FOR INFORMATION.

The views of the G. of I. may be  
awaited copies of both Sir P.  
Cox's letters have gone to the F.O.

Previous Papers:—  
3399

18698. I. 483. 2000.—4/1915. [1006/14.]





P3396/15.

212 207  
20.9.15  
Cof. to 20.  
Hily. 20.9.15  
Hf 3349  
20.9.15

From Sir P. Cox, Basra, 19th September 1915.

(Addressed to India, and repeated to Secretary of State for India.)

20506. My immediately preceding telegrams. Blockading of river trade routes from South owing to warlike operations, combined with oppressive exactions of the Turk ~~(?)~~, cause serious distress at the Holy Places, which have lately been relieved by abandonment and retirements from Euphrates line, and by liberal policy adopted by military authorities in allowing ~~and~~ food-stuffs to pass ~~(?)~~ in either direction on Euphrates.

People had to sell their ~~(?)~~ property to provide themselves with necessaries of life. Finally, there was a famine of current coin which accentuated distress.


I have done my utmost to get money to Holy Places. It has been impossible to send specie, but I have lost no opportunity of getting drafts here and there for small amounts sent secretly, and have thus sent about 700L. I have had indirect acknowledgment of arrival of money in several cases, and appreciation of recipients. One messenger was arrested on his way back by Turks; nothing was found on him, but he is still in durance, and his arrest has of course made recipients wary of communicating.

United States Consul at Baghdad reports that Turks object to payment by him of Oudh beneficiaries and pensioners, but he hopes to have objection removed.


A month ago leading Arab Sheikh, Na ~~(?)~~ sent an emissary to Nasrie saying they were ready to acquiesce in our passage on ~~receiving~~ certain assurances, and I sent a copy of reply sent to Government of India and I have asked them to communicate it if not already done.

At the present moment there is no doubt inhabitants of Holy Places are praying for our advance in order that normal conditions may be restored, but as soon as that is done, and they are contented, they will doubtless revert to their natural condition of bigoted community whom we had better leave, as far as possible, to their own devices. This should not be impossible from the administrative point of view.









3396

213

208

F.O. 7, 20, 18  
M. 3349  
(3368)


From Sir P. Cox, 19th September 1915.


(Addressed to India, repeated to India Office, ~~the~~ Minister, Bushire.)


[P 3396] R. 2069 B With reference to Secretary of State for India's telegram of 17th September. Holy Places. If we advance beyond limits of Basra vilayet it surely goes without saying that holy places would be eliminated from Turkish domination and come under ourselves in some form, together with Baghdad.

It does not appear to me that we can advisedly do more than offer inducements suggested in Viceroy's telegram of 12th February and my telegram No. 894 of 19th April. We might guarantee absence of Christian officials, and, in view of special interests of Persia, we might agree to consult Persian Government informally when selecting individuals for governorships. It is even conceivable that we might on occasion ask Persian Government to lend us such individuals who would become British employes for time being.

We might allow clergy to keep a representative at Teheran, and Persian Government ~~to~~ to keep agents at each holy place who might be given diplomatic rank and special privileges, but to allow Persia any direct control or rights of interference seems to me out of the question. Moreover, though communities concerned are bigoted people and are no doubt averse from any interference from Christian officials, yet large numbers of them originally came to reside in holy places as a refuge from Persian ~~pusillanimous outrage~~ *insufficing and* (4) we leave them to manage their own affairs as far as possible, I am confident they would prefer to come under our aegis; and, in fact, would resent being rescued from oppression of one corrupt Government merely to be delivered into the hands of a worse.









215 210  
3516  
14

Register No.  
3349

Put away with

Secret Department.

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Letter from *Foreign Office* Dated *14* Sep. 1915.  
Rec. *15*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>15 Sept.</i>	<i>W.H.</i>	<i>Persia</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>15</i>	<i>J.W.H.</i>	<i>Russian proposal to plan Kerkala + Hajef in direct relations with Persia</i>
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to

*J.G. 20 Sept. 1915*  
*India 17 Sept.*

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*off. telegram to G. of I. + Sir P. Cox asking for  
their views.*

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
*16 Sept. Tel. to Viceroy (repeated to Cox)*

*and*  
Al.  
15/19

Previous Papers:—

*4403/14*  
*3524/14*

17626.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.






211


MINUTE.

(216)

It has always been contemplated that, if we remain in possession of Mesopotamia, Hefef & Kerbela will form a more or less independent enclave under Shie's control. That is comparatively simple. The difficulty is to bring Persia in without bringing Russia in too. It seems worth while to see if the G. & I. have anything further to say. <sup>[They are not likely to have changed</sup>  
~~the unfavorable view they expressed in Sept 1914]~~ T. W. H.  
If spheres were in the British sphere, some sort of arrangement between the Shenna here & the Shenna of Kerbela & Hefef for the control of the latter is imaginable.







DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Repeat Sir P. von Bock

[P<sub>2</sub>]

Despatched 16 Sept 1915.

212

217


WPR

Foreign secret. Persia. Russian Govt  
have revised proposal that in order to  
conciliate her we sd. let Persia ~~under~~  
stand that Kerkela & Najaf will be  
removed from Turkish dominions & in  
some way or other be placed in direct  
relations with Persia. Have you  
anything to add to your tel<sup>m</sup> of 10:  
Sept/16? & can you suggest any form  
which of such relations that wd. not be  
open to objections?

Addressed G. of S. repeated here

(3511/16)

Copy to G.O.  
20 Sept. 1915.





Immediate  
and  
Confidential.



(218)  
P. but the previous 213  
propose that should be  
All  
H. 4403/104  
(3344)

130820/15.

P.  
3349  
1915


The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State  
for India and is directed by the Secretary of State to  
transmit the accompanying copies of 2 telegrams, as marked  
in the margin, for such observations as it may  
be desired to offer.

on Ambr. at  
14th Sept  
no 1338 Sept 12  
no. 1340 " 12.

Foreign Office,

Sept. 14, 1915.







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(219)

P  
3349  
105

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)  
September 12th. 1915.

D. 2.0.p.m. September 12th. 1915.  
R. 5.5.p.m.

No. 1338.


-----  
Minister for Foreign Affairs with whom I had dis-  
cussed in recent conversations Persian situation has  
sent me an Aide Mémoire embodying his views on the sub-  
ject.

While recognizing imperious necessity for taking  
certain measures to counteract German and Turkish in-  
trigues, Monsieur Sazonof states that he could not  
entertain the idea suggested by Mr. Marling, of breaking  
off diplomatic relations with Persia and recalling the  
two Legations if the Persian Government refused within  
48 hours to declare itself solid with us.

His Excellency does not consider Legations are in  
any immediate danger while the fact that Russian detach-  
ment at Kasvin has been reinforced by 1,000 men, gives  
reason to hope that the situation at Teheran will not  
develop into one like that at Ispahan.

While Mr. Marling's suggestion might produce a  
certain impression on the Shah and his Ministers, who  
while apparently anxious to maintain Persian neutrality  
are powerless to cope with the situation, departure of  
the two Legations would be a triumph for the Democrats  
Nationalists and Fedais, who are the real promoters of  
disorder







215

220


disorder as well as for their German instigators, and would afford new proof of weakness on our part. Moreover departure of the two Ministers would leave the field open to our enemies who would at once organize a movement directed against Great Britain and Russia, which might eventually spread to Afghanistan.

As regards the proposal to make an advance to Persia Russian Government do not refuse to participate in principle, but consider that lack of money in Persia offers almost insuperable difficulties to actual payment of a loan to the Treasury, and that it would serve no good purpose to place the funds at the disposal of Persian Minister without first studying estimates of expenditure and establishing a certain control to prevent money being used to the detriment of the Allies.


Russian Government are therefore inclined to consider the best means of counteracting the intrigues of the Triple Alliance, and of securing the sympathy of the Persians is to hold up to the latter (?groups omitted) to let Persians understand these places will be removed from Turkish domination and in some way or other placed in direct relations with Persia. Russian Government believe this proposal would have the best effect, both on (?group omitted) possibility of obtaining certain advantages by joining the enemies of Turkey. Russian Government attach special importance to question of Kerbela and Medjef, and return to proposal made by them at the beginning of (?group omitted) Persia on all Arab Sheikhs.

Repeated to Teheran.

(Repetition of omitted groups asked for).







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P  
3349  
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RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)  
September 12th. 1915.

D. 3.25.p.m. September 13th. 1915.  
R. 5.5.p.m.

No. 1340.

-----  
Your telegram No. 2100.

Following is repetition of my telegram No. 1338,  
last paragraph:-

"Russian Government are therefore inclined to consider that the best means of counteracting intrigues of Triple Alliance and secure sympathy of Persians is to hold up to the latter possibility of obtaining certain advantages by joining enemies of Turkey. Russian Government attach special importance to question of Kerbela and Nedjef and return to proposal made by them at the beginning of the war to let Persians understand that these places will be removed from Turkish domination and in some way or other placed in direct relations with Persia. Russian Government believe this proposal would have the best effect both on public opinion in Persia and on all the Arab Shiahhs."

Sent to Teheran.

RECEIVED  
15 SEP 1915  
POLITICAL DEPT

