



مكتبة قطر الوطنية QATAR NATIONAL LIBRARY

لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١٠/١٠ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:

http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000419.0x000130

المراجع	IOR/L/PS/10/409
العنوان	ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	١٩١٢-١٩١٨ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية و الفرنسية في اللاتينية
الحجم والشكل	مجلد واحد (١٨٦ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندي
حق النشر	<u>غير معروف</u>


حول هذا السجل

يحتوي هذا المُجلد على الجزأين ٢ و ٣ وهما معنيان بموضوع "الخليج العربي: امتيازات معين التجار". الجزء ٢ (IOR/L/PS/10/409/1) يتعلّق باستنجاز الجزر في الخليج العربي، والجزء ٣ يتعلّق بالاحتلال البريطاني للجزر في الخليج العربي في حال وقوع حرب مع (IOR/L/PS/10/409/2) بلاد فارس. يشمل نطاق التاريخ جميع تواريخ الوثائق الموجودة في المجلد؛ المحضر والأوراق المرجعية للإدارة السياسية والسرية بمكتب الهند في لندن، المرفقة بهذه الوثائق، مؤرّخة من ١٩١٤ إلى ١٩١٨.

يشتمل كل جزء على فاصل يوضّح الموضوع وأرقام الأجزاء، والسنة التي فُتح فيها الملف المعني، وعنوان الموضوع، وقائمة مراجع المراسلات الواردة في ذلك الجزء مُرتبة حسب السنة. ويوجد هذا الفاصل في نهاية المراسلات.



ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[أمامي] (٣٨٢/١)






ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[خلفي] (٣٨٢/٢)





ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[صلب] (٣٨٢/٣)





ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[حافة] (٣٨٢/٤)





ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[رأس] (٣٨٢/٥)






ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[ذيل] (٣٨٢/٦)






ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[أمامي-داخلي] (٣٨٢/٧)






ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[٢و] (٣٨٢/٨)





ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[ظ٢] (٣٨٢/٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٣] [٢٨/١]

Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
3615
1913.

3

Subject:

Persian Gulf Islands
As to occupation in case of war with Persia.

This File contains the following papers :—

YEAR.
1915. P. 3940 4070
191 . P.
191 . P.
191 . P.

Memoranda.


If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.


10488. I. 1251. 250.—10/1915.

2



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [ظ٣] (٢٨/٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٩١٣] (٢٨/٣)

(4)

Register No. **4070** Put away with **3615/13**

Secret Department.

Telegram letter from *Viceroy* Dated *7/8* November 1915.
Letter from *F.O.* Rec. *8/11*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary.....	<i>9 Nov.</i>	<i>AK</i>	<i>Persian Gulf.</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>10</i>	<i>J. W. H.</i>	<i>Question of occupying the islands in the event of war.</i>
Committee.....			<i>Views of the F. O. I.</i>
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Send letter to the F. O. but not the telegram to F. O. I.

I cannot urge the F. O. I. to further discussion of its views
cey
11/11

Copy to *India (See within)*

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

dft. letter to F. O. regretting immediate impossibility
dft. telegram to F. O. I. instructing as to eventual occupation

12 Nov. 1915. Letter to F. O.


Previous Papers:—
39140

17626.—1. I. 1865. 1000.—9/1914.

2




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٤ظ] (٢٨/٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٥/٢٨]



Sir A. Heitzel

Is "in" a slip for "off" in the
draft telegram?

Khaim, Bering & Kasak are,
I suppose, "off" the Gulf. Do
you advocate occupying also the
islands in the Gulf?


9/11/15 P. Witt

I did not contemplate any distinction
between "in" + "off" - indeed I am
not sure what "off" means. Strategically
the islands in the Strait of Hormuz are
the ^{most} important ones, & are the only ones

2




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٥ظ] (٢٨/٦)



Let need garrisons i.e. Kish, Hormuz, Hormuz,
Larak, & these are all described in the
Register as in the Persian Gulf. Kish,
off Bushire, also has a certain strategical
importance, but it belongs to a friend of
ours, & we need not touch it at present,
probably. There are other islands wh., though
of no strategical importance, are very important
for navigation e.g. Sheikh Shuaib, where we
were prevented from putting up a lighthouse
by the preposterous conditions made by the
Persian Govt. On Larak we have erected a
lighthouse. Both these certainly ought to be occupied,
when opportunity offers.

J.A. 10/1/15



MINUTE.

The mention of Abu Musa in our letter was a slip into which I was ~~not~~ betrayed by Sir C. Plater's letter. The island is not Persian, but belongs to the Sheikh of Shargah on the Arabian side. It wd. not be at all advisable to hoist the British flag there at present.

On the general question of policy - though of course it is obvious that the islands will always be there to be seized, there are 3 arguments for seizing them at once

1) possession is 9 points of the law, & it will be easier to take possession at once, when Persia's offence will be fresh, than later when she will be suing for peace in forma pauperis.

2) when that time comes, we cannot be certain that the I.O. will not be in a yielding frame of mind which may take the form of leaving Persia in possession of the islands. It will be much less easy to do this if the British flag has once been hoisted on them

3) if, however, for reasons of high policy it wd. then be necessary to restore them, we shall be in a stronger position for improving our own conditions (such as that they must be leased to us, or never leased to any foreign power), if the islands are actually in our possession at the time.

It may be added that in view of the probability



That our hold over Mesopotamia is now seems likely to
be much weaker than we had hoped, the eventual
control of the islands at the mouth of the Gulf
becomes more important to us than ever.

If therefore it were not for the difficulty of
finding troops I sd. not hesitate to urge immediate
occupation.

To Sec^y, Military Dep^t
for my remarks

M. H. H. H. H.
9/11/15

I agree with the above minutes
but unfortunately we are faced
with the fact that we cannot
find the necessary galleons.
We are carrying on a Boudiquarian
campaign with the forces of
Lilliput.

E. J. H. H.
9/11/15

Since the above was written the attached letter
from the S.O. has been received. Do you concur in
dft. let^{ter} to G. of I.?

M. H. H. H.
9/11/15

I agree with the terms of the draft
letter but I have suggested a slight
amendment to the paragraph.

E. J. H. H.
9/11/15

M
38774
1915



①

Book

U. S. of S.
F.O.

12 Nov. 1915.

Copy to India
19 November 1915

App. d. also

d/-7 Nov. 1915

I am directed by the S. of S. for I. to acknowledge the receipt of your letter n: 161740 of the 8th inst. suggesting the desirability of occupying the Persian islands in the Gulf in the event of war with Persia.

In reply I am to enclose copy of ~~the let^r~~ from the S. of S. on the subject, & to say that Mr. Chamberlain, while agreeing with Sir E. Grey that the course proposed is politically desirable, reports that the necessary troops cannot be procured from India in the immediate future. [A copy of a telegram which he has addressed to the S. of S. is enclosed for Sir E. Grey's information.]


(sd) T. W. Holderness.

agrees with the Govt. of India that there is no urgency for action as regards the islands in the event of a rupture of relations, and that as there are no troops available at present for the purpose of occupying them, the occupation should be deferred until it can be made effective without impeding more important operations.

2



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٧ظ] (٢٨/١٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٨و] (٢٨/١١)

8

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Rotamilla)

Despatched _____ 191 _____

*Foreign secret: your tel. m. 7. Nov.
Persian Gulf Islands. ^{fully} appreciate
objection to looking up troops but
H. M. G. are of opinion that in event
of war with Persia occupation is
on political grounds at your discretion
desirable & it sh. be effected as
soon as troops can be spared*

not send


not app. acy

2

17624. I. 1353. 1000.—9/1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٨ظ] (٢٨/١٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٩٠] (٢٨/١٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [٩ظ] (٢٨/١٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٠] [٢٨/١٥]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٠ ظ] (٢٨/١٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١١ و] (٢٨/١٧)

(11)

Register No.
3940
1915

Put away with 3615
B

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O. Dated } 28 Oct. 1915.
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary.....	28 Oct.	W.H.	Persecution Gulf
Secretary of State.....	28	P. W. H.	Request signature of islands in event of Persia declaring war.
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to
F.O. 8. 11. 15
Adm. 8. 11. 15

Mr. S. Hammas

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. Telegrams to G. of S. asking for their views.

30 October - telegram to Vicary

2

Send telegram
to
30/10


Sent +
W.H.
30. 10. 15


Previous Papers :-

18694 L 479 2000.-4/1915 [1865/14.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١١ ظ] (٢٨/١٨)








ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٢ ظ] (٢٨/٢٠)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٣ و] (٢٨/٢١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٣ ظ] (٢٨/٢٢)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٤ ظ] (٢٨/٢٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٥] (٢٨/٢٥)

(15)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Batamilla)

Despatched + log. 191
30. X. 15

[P]


*Foreign secret. Please telegraph your
views as to desirability if Persia declares
war of hoisting British flag on Abu
Musa + other islands in high seas.
Would ~~possible~~ garrisons that wd. be
necessary to hold Hormuz, Kishm + such
be made available?*

2

17624. I. 1353. 1000.-9/1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٥ ظ] (٢٨/٢٦)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٦] [٢٨/٢٧]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٣، "احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب
مع بلاد فارس" [١٦ ظ] (٢٨/٢٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧] (٣٤٤/١)

Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P:
3615
1913.

Subject: Persian Gulf
Lease of Islands.
(v Mun ul Tuffah's Concession)

See also
F. 357
1919

This File contains the following papers :-


YEAR.	P.	298, 502, 1356, 1563, 1755, 2017, 2250-1, 2251, 2304,
1914	P.	2462, 2530, 2521, 2538, 2666, 2816, 2858, 3119, 3224,
191	P.	3289, 3396, 3416, 3467, 3894, 4078, 508
1918	P.	1524, 1463, 2070
191	P.	

Memoranda.


If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.


14017. I. 497. 500.-4/1913.

2




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨] [٣/٤٤٤]



Put away with 3615
in Montagu
for information. 13
J. W. H. (15)


P207/18 21/5

W Shuckburgh


Did the S. of I. at one time
offer to fund the money?

Even if they did, the decision
to administer Mesopotamia apart
from India might alter the
position & relieve India of
responsibility - regarding the
strategic & naval positions in
the Persian Gulf. J. W. H.


15/5
Sir T. Alderson The S. of I. offered to fund




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٤)



part of the money: see
(2521/14)
Viceroy's letter of 28 June 1914, which
I have flagged on the file below ("we
"shall be prepared to consider Indian contribu-
"tion to such price as H. M.'s Govt. may eventually
"decide to be worth paying"). We endorsed this
Offer in our letter to the F.O. of 4th July 1914
(If Sir E. Grey sees no objection on grounds of
"general policy to acquiring territorial rights in
"the Persian Gulf, & the Z.C. of the Treasury will
"consent, if necessary, the amount to be offered
"by H. M. Govt. as annual rent to the Persian Govt.
"to £ 50,000, or even to £ 75,000, Z.C. Crewe will
"advise his Council to sanction a contribution
"from Indian revenues of a moiety of the sum




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٩] (٣٤٤/٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٦)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٠] [٣٤٤/٧]

BY TO	SECRET. (20) POLITICAL DEPARTMENT. P. 2070	
	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.....	14 May	J.S.
Secretary of State ...		
Committee	put by	
FOR INFORMATION.		
Persian Gulf: question of acquisition of islands by H.M.'s Sub		
The question is not a practical one for the moment. J.S. 14/5/18		



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٢١ و] (٣٤٤/٩)

M. 016954/17.

Index

CONFIDENTIAL

3615
13
1463
1024

Admiralty, S.W.,

2070
1918

10th May 1918.

3615

Form A.

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, and for general distribution, copy of a letter of even date to the Secretary H.M. Treasury, with copies of Treasury letter No. 8096/18 of the 1st April 1918 to the Foreign Office, and Admiralty letter M.0621/14 of the 5th May 1914 to the Foreign Office, respecting the proposed lease of certain Islands in the Persian Gulf.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,


The Under Secretary of State,
INDIA OFFICE.

Copy to India
30 May


O. Murray


1000/2/16-[4940] 34183/P2035 5000 10/16v G & S 110

RECEIVED IN
11 MAY 1918
ADMIRALTY




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢١ظ] (٣٤٤/١٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٢ و] (٣٤٤/١١)



M. 016954/17.

CONFIDENTIAL

10th May 1914

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 1st April No. 8096/18 respecting the proposed lease of certain Islands in the Persian Gulf, etc., I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will represent to the Lords Commissioners of H. M. Treasury that this matter has two aspects, one commercial and the other strategic. As regards the commercial aspect (which, although important, is the one to which the Admiralty attach less significance), the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury appear to be chiefly struck by the contrast between the lease of some of the Islands to Muin-at-Tajjar in 1904 for £6,000 p.a., and the figure now proposed of £75,000 p.a.. On this it must be observed that the former figure is scarcely a criterion. Even with primitive means of development Muin was able to secure large profits, those which he made out of Hormuz alone being estimated at over £16,000 a year. In Kishm oil has since been struck in what was believed to be paying quantities. Moreover, the rent paid by Muin would be a nominal amount; the actual charges falling on him would be increased by the constant bribes he would have to pay to numerous officials. It appears by no means clear that the figure of £75,000 cannot be justified as a commercial proposition, though the data are admittedly somewhat conjectural. What is certain is that if the offer of H. M. G. is to be limited to some sum commensurate with £6,000 there is no chance whatever of the Persian Government entertaining it. In 1914 H. M. Minister at Teheran expressed the opinion that nothing under £100,000 would tempt them.


3.- The strategic value of the Islands was scarcely touched

The Secretary,
H. M. TREASURY.

on




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٢٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٣ و] (٣٤٤/١٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٣ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٤ و] (٣٤٤/١٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٥ و] (٣٤٤/١٧)



COPY

0631/14.

5th May 1914.

SECRET.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 16885, relative to the proposed acquisition by His Majesty's Government on a long lease of the Islands of Larak, Henjan, and the whole of Kishm, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that in their opinion the control of the islands would undoubtedly be eminently desirable from the standpoint of naval and national interests.

2.- In view of Sir E. Grey's opinion expressed in your letter My Lords do not comment on the commercial aspects of the question further than to call attention to the additional security which would be thus given to the investment which H.M. Government is now making, and to the fact that the probable income from Kishm (on the assumption that oil royalties would in future be payable to H.M. Government) would in all probability amply pay for the administration and for the rent to be paid to Persia.

3.- The importance of these Islands from a strategic point of view cannot be too strongly insisted upon. They command the only deep water sheltered anchorages in the southern end of the Gulf, and they provide a possible base from which the whole trade of the Gulf can be controlled, if necessary, in time of war. They give absolute command over the terminus of the projected Trans-Persian Railway and the proposed line of route of the extension between Bander Abbas and Karachi.

4.- The establishment of British administration in these Islands would very greatly increase British influence in these regions, and would enable effective control to be maintained over the activities of the Beharloo and Bashkard tribes in case they showed signs of wishing to interfere with British interests in Southern Persia.

5.- It would also much strengthen the British position on the Trucial coast as there is constant intercourse between the Arab tribes on the Persian littoral and in the Islands, and the tribes on the Arabian Coast.

6.- It would give H.M. Government a more direct interest in the conservation of the pearl fisheries, and would greatly facilitate the working of the patrols that are now maintained for the preservation of peace in these waters. It would also provide a greatly improved base from which to maintain a watch over the Arms Traffic so as to prevent any recrudescence of that trade.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the India Office.


I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

(Sd)



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٢٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨)



Minute

To Under Sec
Part Under
Secretary
Committee
Under Sec
Part Under
Secretary

Previous



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٦ و] (٣٤٤/١٩)

(26)

Register No. 1463 Put away with 3615/13

Minute Paper. SECRET. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Vo. tel. Dated 10 Apr 1918. Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	10 Apr	JLS	Persian Gulf
Parl. Under Sec.	11	J. W. H.	Question of acquisition of Persian
Secretary of State.			islands by H. M.'s Govt
Committee.....	12/4	J	
Under Secretary..			
Parl. Under Sec.			
Secretary of State.			

Copy to India 11 Apr

FOR INFORMATION.

This question is necessarily in abeyance for the present.

J.S. 10/4/18


SECRET FOR GOVT
APR 1918

Previous Papers:—
1024

22603 1 920 2000 7/17




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٦ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٧ و] (٣٤٤/٢١)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٨ و] (٣٤٤/٢٣)

Minute Paper.

Register No. 1024

Put away with 3615
SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated 13 Mch 1918.
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Under Secretary..	13 Mch	JLS	Prussian Gulf
Parl. Under Sec	14	2.W.H	
Secretary of State			Question of acquisition of Prussian islands by H. M.'s Govt.
Committee.....	14/3	✓	
Under Secretary..			
Parl. Under Sec			
Secretary of State			

Copy to India 14/28 Mch

FOR INFORMATION.

Sir W. Townley's despatch No. 270
of 12th Nov. 1914, which Sir C. Marling
cites, is flagged in the volume below.
The present moment is obviously in-
opportune for raising these questions
with the Prussian Govt.

JLS. 13/3/18

14/3
CWS
Rd
Eg


SECR POL. DEPT.,
MAR 1918

Previous Papers:—
5068/14

22603 1 920 2000 7/17




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٩ و] (٣٤٤/٢٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٠] (٣٤٤/٢٧)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣١ و] (٣٤٤/٢٩)

(31)

Register No.
5068

Put away with 3615/13

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 28 } Decr 1914.
Rec. 29 }

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	7 Jan ¹	AK	Persian Gulf. The proposed sale of islands. Attitude of Persian Gov ^t
Secretary of State.....	10	T.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to
Indi
See within

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. letter to F.O. making suggestion.


12 Jan: letter to FO.

Previous Papers:—
(4078)

17226.—1. I. 1855. 1000.—9/1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣١ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٢ و] (٣٤٤/٣١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٣ و] (٣٤٤/٣٣)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٣ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٤] [٣٥/٣٤]

Putaway with 3615/13 S/S. 5068/14
I am generally and have omitted the par. for the reasons given C. H. I. 15

34

I would omit the last para. of the draft as I doubt whether we should force the meaning of the expression "sacrifice", as employed by Sir W. Townley in his French memo. of 12 Oct. If a person or a gov. hopes to get something for nothing, a business-like quid pro quo is to him a sacrifice. That this was Sir W. Townley's meaning is pretty clear when his memo. is read in the light of the telegrams exchanged between him & Sir E. Grey in the preceding month, on the subject of Persia's financial embarrassments. Sir W. Townley in his telegram No 275 of 19 Sept. described the situation as having reached the 'critical stage', and reported that the Prime Minister had spoken to him about it at great length and had "implored the assistance of H.M.'s gov.". Sir E. Grey in reply* telegraphed "We cannot advance money under present circumstances & Persian gov. must face financial situation by such methods as are open to them. Sale of Crown jewels is one such method. Another resource wd be to lease or sell to us the Island off Bender Abbas as we proposed a few

* No 231 of 22 Sept.



months ago and as Norman suggested to the Persian Govt."

Sir W. Tomley in the passage in which "sacrifice" appears gave the gist of Sir S. Grey's instructions. What he meant was that the Persian Govt. must face the situation ^{confrontation} & part with territory. He had already described the ^{favorable} nature of the bargain offered.

It is worth while taking note of dates in this matter. Sir W. Tomley's despatch reporting failure of the offer to buy the islands is dated 12 Nov. On 18th Nov. he sent his telegram (No 343) reporting that the Persian Govt. had addressed an intimate note to him & to the Prussian Minister asking that service of loans & advances secured on customs revenues might be postponed for one year & that advance of £500,000 might be made to Persia by the two countries.


It was on this telegram that the F.O. asked us to agree to a joint advance of £400,000. (F.O. letter of 22 Nov.). At the time it was not clear to us whether any attempt had been made by Sir W. Tomley to get the Persian Govt. to sell the islands as a solution of their troubles. We now see from his despatch of 12th Nov. that he had pressed the offer and had ascertained that there was no prospect of it being accepted.

The proposal to advance £400,000 conjointly with Russia has been dropped by the F.O. for the present, and until the situation in Persia becomes

more clear defined" (F.O. letter of 17 Dec.). But it does not follow that an advance for any be necessary & that debt or loan of the islands will hang to the other.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٥] (٣٤٤/٣٧)




Copy to India
15 JAN 1915

(sd) T. W. Holderness

with reference to the third para.
of H.E.'s memo. of 12 Oct. ~~is~~ enclosed
in his despatch n° 270 of Nov. 12, 1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٨)



Crewe doubts the expediency of
representing the sale or lease in the
light of a sacrifice. It had seem
more natural to explain to the persons
Govt ~~that~~, as a simple matter of
business, that if they require money,
they must expect to give some consid-
eration for it, and that H.M.G., who
are obliged to ^{themselves} incur ^{enormous} sums
of expenditure in defence of their existence,
have none to spare for unsecured
advances of a philanthropic nature.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٦ و] (٣٤٤/٣٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٦ظ] (٣٤٤/٤٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٧ و] (٣٤٤/٤١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٤٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٨ و] (٣٤٤/٤٣)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٤٤)



2

present. I was consequently by no means surprised to receive a thoroughly unsatisfactory memorandum, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation, couched in vague language that carefully avoids the question at issue.

It is of small real value to report that Ala-es-Sultaneh, in communicating this memorandum, told me verbally that I must be patient and that I should eventually get what is wanted.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Memorandum communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 14, 1914. **

A PLUSIEURS reprises ces temps derniers, leurs Altesses le Président du Conseil et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ont saisi le Ministre d'Angleterre de la situation pénible dans laquelle se trouve le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse à cause de la pénurie d'argent et des grands frais encourus pour le maintien de la gendarmerie gouvernementale et de l'administration financière—deux services qui sont tout à fait essentiels, afin de garantir le bon ordre dans le pays et une gestion satisfaisante des ressources financières. L'attention du Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne a été en même temps attirée sur le fait que la guerre qui sévit si malheureusement en Europe est venu ajouter aux difficultés budgétaires de la Perse en ce que, au moins momentanément, les revenus des douanes ont sensiblement diminué. Il a été en plus démontré par des tableaux dressés par M. Mornard, l'ex-Trésorier général, que les revenus du pays ne suffisent pas actuellement aux dépenses qui doivent être encourues.

Sir Walter Townley n'a pas manqué d'attirer l'attention de son Gouvernement sur ce déplorable état de choses, en ajoutant que les susdits Ministres du Gouvernement Impérial l'avaient prié de demander à Sir E. Grey si le Gouvernement britannique ne serait pas disposé de venir encore une fois en aide à la Perse par le moyen d'une nouvelle avance. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a répondu à cet appel en faisant une nouvelle avance de 50,000L destinée à l'entretien de la gendarmerie gouvernementale dans les provinces de Fars et Kerman, où les intérêts britanniques sont les plus importants.

Il paraîtrait, toutefois, que ce secours n'a pas suffi à améliorer la situation, et l'attention de Sir Walter Townley a été de nouveau attirée sur l'état vraiment désespéré des finances persanes. Saisi encore une fois des difficultés de la Perse, Sir E. Grey a répondu que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne saurait faire une autre avance. Il suggère pourtant que, si la Perse a vraiment besoin d'argent, elle devrait se décider à faire un sacrifice de son côté pour s'en procurer. Il y a quelque temps Sir E. Grey avait proposé au Gouvernement persan de vendre les bijoux de la Couronne. Il reconnaît que le moment actuel n'est pas favorable pour une telle vente et il propose maintenant au Gouvernement Impérial de vendre à la Grande-Bretagne certaines îles qui se trouvent dans le Golfe Persique à proximité de Bender Abbas, à savoir, Hormuz, Kishm, Larak, Henjam et Sheikh Shuaib.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est prêt à donner à la Perse 300,000L (soit environ 1,890,000 tomans au cours actuel) argent comptant pour les îles susnommées et de rayer la dette de la Perse à la Grande-Bretagne, qui remonte aujourd'hui à 790,000L (soit environ 4,977,000 tomans), qui coûtent à la Perse plus de 50,000L (soit 300,000 tomans) par an, frais d'intérêts et d'amortissement.

C'est-à-dire que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se déclare prêt à donner à la Perse pour les îles une somme d'argent qui équivaldrait, si l'on considère l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à payer sur les 300,000L, à plus de 70,000L (420,000 tomans) par an, et la Perse n'aura plus à rembourser l'argent qu'elle doit à la Grande-Bretagne. Il serait peut-être à propos de rappeler à son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que, d'après les engagements pris, la Perse est tenue à rembourser à la Grande-Bretagne les dernières avances faites, dont le montant est de 490,000L, à raison de 100,000L (600,000 tomans) par an, dans deux moitiés égales, et que le premier versement doit se faire le 1^{er} juillet de l'année prochaine. Vu qu'il y a déjà un déficit de 11,000L sur le service des emprunts garantis sur les douanes du sud pour les deux derniers mois, il est probable que le Gouvernement persan se trouvera gêné de faire le remboursement des avances dans les conditions actuelles.

Téhéran, le 12 octobre, 1914.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٩ و] (٣٤٤/٤٥)

3

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Memorandum communicated to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

IN reply to the unsigned memorandum of his Excellency the British Minister addressed to the Persian Foreign Office on the 12th October [? 14th October], the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honour to refer his Excellency to the various verbal communications recently made respecting the present financial difficulties of the Persian Government.

As pointed out by the Foreign Office in its note of the 27th October, the Persian Government expected the British Minister, who is well aware of their present financial difficulties, to draw the attention of the British Government to the unsatisfactory condition of the Persian Government and give personal support to the views of the latter.

The British Minister is well aware that the present financial straits of the Persian Government are due, firstly, to the recent years of trouble in the country, the natural result of the change of the old system, and to the expenses incurred in the restoration of order for the good of foreign and internal trade. For this object the Persian Government were obliged to undertake heavy expenses in despatching forces to different parts of the country. His Excellency is also well acquainted with the other difficulties which the Persian Government had to meet. When the Persian Government were free of these difficulties, they tried to put the security of money on a firm basis. The gendarmerie was created and a large sum of money was spent for that purpose. The good result of the gendarmerie cannot be denied.

Secondly, the grave commercial crisis in Persia is due to the present war unfortunately raging in Europe. This has greatly affected the Customs revenues, one of the important resources of the country, and it is feared that the Government may not be able to meet its liabilities out of the Customs revenues, which are the security for the recent loans and advances. In view of these facts, the attention of the British Minister was drawn, in the note above mentioned, to the financial crisis. His Excellency no doubt concurs with me that the contents of his memorandum must have surprised and grieved the Persian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs feels sure that the British Government, who have on more difficult occasions given their sincere support to Persia, would not take advantage of the Persian financial difficulties and make such proposals which the Persian Government would be unable to accept, and, if accepted, would bring her face to face with a more serious crisis.


It is true that after the opening of the Medjliss the Government is obliged, with the approval of the Chamber, to find new resources to meet the budget deficiencies as well as the necessary expenses, but for the immediate and necessary expenses it looks to His Britannic Majesty's Government for substantial support.

The Ala-es-Sultaneh feels confident that after careful consideration of the difficulties of the Persian Government the British Minister will bring the facts to the notice of his Government, and will not fail to take energetic measures with a view to obtaining the sincere support of the British Government in removing the present crisis in this country.

Foreign Office, Tehran, November 1, 1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٩ظ] (٤٦/٤٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٠ و] (٣٤٤/٤٧)



Copy.

No.270.
(82297)

TEHRAN,
November 12th, 1914.

Sir:-

*Printed
copy above*

I much regret to have to report that the recent progress of the negotiations for the purchase of the islands in the Persian Gulf off Bander Abbas have been most unsatisfactory in their results, which is especially disheartening seeing that the proposal when first submitted to the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, to the present Prime Minister, Mustofi el-Mamalek, and to the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ala es Saltaneh, appeared to meet with a much more favourable reception than I had anticipated would be the case.


Upon receipt of your telegram No.252 of the 7th ultimo, I presented a memorandum in French to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, setting forth the very favourable conditions upon which His Majesty's Government was prepared to negotiate for the purchase of the said Islands.

Nothing in the manner in which Ala es Saltaneh
received

Sir E. Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.
&c., &c., &c.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٤٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤١ و] (٣٤٤/٤٩)




41
received the memorandum led me to suppose that there was any change in His Highness' attitude towards the proposal, and I was promised an early answer, for which I pressed in consequence of the urgent nature of certain financial arrangements which the Persian Government found itself called upon to make in order to avoid a disaster.

No answer having been returned to the Memorandum, I sought an interview with the Prime Minister, at which I requested the presence also of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance, for the purpose of examining the financial situation, with a view to seeing whether or not the Gendarmerie could be maintained; in order to discuss the proposal made by the Persian Government respecting the revenues of the Southern Customs and a new advance from the British and Russian Governments which forms the subject of an accompanying despatch; and to ascertain definitely the views of the Cabinet respecting the sale of the Islands.

I pointed out that you, Sir, could not fail to be disappointed, if not seriously annoyed, at the attitude adopted by the Government in ignoring our proposal to provide money in return for something tangible in the place




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤٤١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٥٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٤] و (٣٤٤/٥١)




place of the usual shadowy promises that have been
accepted in the past, and in making instead a most un-
reasonable proposal without on this occasion even
attempting to hint at any security for the suggested
advance. As it was evident that the Minister of Finance
was at the back of the group in the Cabinet that is
hostile to the purchase proposal, I turned my attention
more especially to that notoriously corrupt official, and
told him in very plain language that as long as a
Minister of his calibre remained at the head of the
financial Administration Persia need not expect that any
money would be forthcoming from either Great Britain or
Russia. I let Montesham es Saltaneh know clearly that I
am fully conversant with the intrigues of himself and
his Secretary General, by means of which they hope to
sow discord among their Belgian employees and so to get
a larger control of the finances of the country into
their own hands, the road from which to their pockets is
a short one.

I then turned to the Prime Minister and told His
Highness that I could not submit this fresh unreasonable
proposal for financial assistance to you, Sir, unless I
could



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٤٤ ظ] (٢٤٤/٥٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٤٤/٥٣]

43

could add at the same time that the Cabinet was considering in a favourable spirit the proposal I had submitted for the purchase of the Islands. Mustofi el Mamalek after some hesitation, which was not unnatural seeing that the proposal had previously been well entertained by him, said that the scheme was one that was of such vital importance to Persia, since it concerned the sale of a portion of her territory, that the Government could not deal with it without the presence of the Medjliss which would meet in a very short time.


I then pressed the Prime Minister to give me an assurance that the measure would be laid before the Medjliss as soon as it assembled, and would receive the strong support of the Cabinet. Mostofi el Mamalek would not commit himself to this, and said that he must consult his colleagues, two of the most important of whom were present. I was consequently by no means surprised to receive a thoroughly unsatisfactory memorandum of which I have the honour to enclose a translation couched in vague language that carefully avoids the question at issue.

It is of small real value to report that Ala es

Saltaneh




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣ ظ٤٤] (٤/٥٤/٣٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٤ و] (٣٤٤/٥٥)




١٤٦
Saltaneh, in communicating this memorandum told me
verbally that I must be patient, and that I should
eventually get what is wanted.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) Walter Townley.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٤٤] (٦٤/٥٦) (٣٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٤٥] (٣٤٤/٥٧)




Memorandum handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
October 14th, 1914.

Gulahek,
ce 12 octobre, 1914.

A plusieurs reprises ces temps derniers Leurs
Altesses le Président du Conseil et le Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères ont saisi le Ministre d'Angleterre de
la situation pénible dans laquelle se trouve le Gouverne-
ment Impérial de Perse à cause de la penurie d'argent et
des grans frais encouris pour le maintien de la
Gendarmerie Gouvernementale et de l'Administration
financière, deux services qui sont tout-à-fait essentiels,
afin de garantir le bon ordre dans le pays et une gestion
satisfaisante des ressources financières. L'attention
du Ministre de la Grande Bretagne a été en même temps
attirée sur le fait que la guerre qui sevit si mal-
heureusement en Europe, est venu ajouter aux difficultes
budgetaires de la Perse en ce que, au moins momentaire-
ment, les revenus des Douanes ont sensiblement diminué.
Il a été en plus démontré par des tableaux dressés par
Monsieur Mornard, l'ex-trésorier général, que les revenus
du pays ne suffisent pas actuellement aux dépenses qui
doivent




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٤٥ ظ] (٨٠٤٤/٥٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٦ و] (٣٤٤/٥٩)



doivent être encourues.

Sir Walter Townley n'a pas manqué d'attirer l'attention de son Gouvernement sur ce déplorable état de choses, en ajoutant que les susdits Ministres du Gouvernement Impérial l'avaient prié de demander à Sir E. Grey si le Gouvernement Britannique ne serait pas disposé de venir encore une fois en aide à la Perse par le moyen d'une nouvelle avance. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a répondu à cet appel en faisant une nouvelle avance de £50,000 destinée à l'entretien de la Gendarmerie Gouvernementale dans les provinces de Fars et Kerman, où les intérêts Britanniques sont les plus importants.

Il paraîtrait toutefois que ce secours n'a pas suffi à améliorer la situation et l'attention de Sir Walter Townley a été de nouveau attirée sur l'état vraiment désespéré des finances persanes. Saisi encore une fois des difficultés de la Perse Sir E. Grey a répondu que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne saurait faire une autre avance. Il suggère pourtant que, si la Perse a vraiment besoin d'argent, elle devrait se décider à faire un sacrifice de son côté pour s'en procurer. Il y a quelque temps que Sir E. Grey avait proposé au Gouvernement


ment

ni reproduces
Sir E. Grey's
Eupham N°231
22 SS/1914
3756/4

X




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٤٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٦٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٧ و] (٣٤٤/٦١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٤٧ ظ] (٢٦٤/٣٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٨ و] (٣٤٤/٦٣)




148

rembourser l'argent qu'elle doit à la Grande Bretagne.
Il serait peut être à propos de rappeler à Son Altesse le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que, d'après les engage-
ments pris, la Perse est tenue à rembourser à la Grande
Bretagne les dernières avances faites, dont le montant
est de £490,000, à raison de £100,000 (tomans 600,000)
par an, dans deux moitiés égales et que le premier verse-
ment doit se faire le 1er juillet de l'année prochaine.
Vu qu'il y a déjà un deficit de £11,000 sur le service
des emprunts garantis sur les douanes du sud pour les
deux derniers mois, il est probable que le Gouvernement
Persan se trouvera gêné de faire le remboursement des
avances dans les conditions actuelles.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٦٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٩ و] (٣٤٤/٦٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٦٦٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٠] (٣٤٤/٦٧)




For this object the Persian Government were obliged to undertake heavy expenses in despatching forces to different parts of the country. His Excellency is also well acquainted with the other difficulties which the Persian Government had to meet. When the Persian Government were free of these difficulties, they tried to put the security of the country on a firm basis. The Gendarmerie was created and a large sum of money was spent for that purpose. The good result of the Gendarmerie cannot be denied.

Secondly, the grave commercial crisis in Persia is due to the present war unfortunately raging in Europe. This has greatly affected the Customs revenues, one of the important resources of the country, and it is feared that the Government may not be able to meet its liabilities out of the Customs revenues which are the security for the recent loans and advances. In view of these facts the attention of the British Minister was drawn, in the note above mentioned, to the financial crisis. His Excellency no doubt concurs with me that the contents of his memorandum must have surprised and grieved the Persian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs feels sure that




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٦٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥١ و] (٣٤٤/٦٩)



51
that the British Government, who have on more difficult occasions given their sincere support to Persia, would not take advantage of the Persian financial difficulties and make such proposals which the Persian Government would be unable to accept and if accepted would bring her face to face with a more serious crisis.

It is true that after the opening of the Mejliss the Government is obliged, with the approval of the Chamber, to find new resources to meet the budget deficiencies as well as the necessary expenses, but for the immediate and necessary expenses it looks to His Britannic Majesty's Government for substantial support.


The Ala-es-Sultaneh feels confident that after careful consideration of the difficulties of the Persian Government the British Minister will bring the facts to the notice of His Government and will not fail to take energetic measures with a view to obtaining the sincere support of the British Government in removing the present crisis in this country.

Foreign Office,
Teheran.

November 1st, 1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٥١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٧٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٢ و] (٣٤٤/٧١)



INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.

8th December 1914.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 72670 of the 22nd November on the subject of a proposed advance of 2400,000 jointly by His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government to the Persian Government.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the Persian Government are unable to provide the service of their existing loans, and would have publicly defaulted but for the assistance recently rendered to them by His Majesty's Government. The proposed advance and moratorium will not suffice for administrative needs until such time as, with a revival of trade after the war, the customs receipts may revive, or until such reforms may be introduced as may enable fresh sources of revenue to be developed. It may therefore be anticipated that the present situation will recur in six months at latest.

It may also be observed that the proposed advance (presumably carrying interest) and moratorium will not be as advantageous to the Persian Government as would be the sale or lease of the islands; while an unconditional advance will make them less willing to contemplate a transaction to the completion of which His Lordship in common with the Government of India and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, attaches very great importance.


He

The Under Secretary of State,

FOREIGN OFFICE.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٢٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٧٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٣ و] (٣٤٤/٧٣)



53

He could not therefore support the proposal as part of the normal policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia. But he recognises that in a state of war special considerations must prevail, and, as an item of war expenditure, he is prepared to advance £100,000 from Indian revenues on learning that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury and the Russian Government are providing the remainder. He is, however, of the opinion that it is essential that the Russian advance should also be unconditional, since a fanatical people are not likely to draw nice distinctions, and the odium of imposing harsh terms will recoil upon Russia's ally, thus defeating the very purpose for which His Majesty's Government are foregoing an important advantage.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(sd) T. W. Holderness.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٥٣ ظ] (٣٤٤/٧٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٥٤ و] (٣٤٤/٧٥)



CONFIDENTIAL

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31, 1.25 A.M.)

Tehran, October 30, 1914.
(October 30, 12.30 P.M.)

(No. 315.)

YOUR telegram No. 265 of 27th October: Swedish gendarmerie.

After conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on Wednesday I requested to see Ain-ed-Dowleh and the President of the Council together yesterday. We had conversation of over two hours, at which Minister of Finance was present. I represented that, unless money was at once forthcoming and reliable assurances given for the future regular payment of gendarmerie, Swedish officers had decided at once to present their resignations. I made a communication in the sense of your above-mentioned telegram, and pointed out that, instead of answering my memorandum embodying the proposals of His Majesty's Government for the purchase of certain islands in Persian Gulf, Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed me officially, asking that all payments on southern customs should be suspended for one year and a joint advance of 3,000,000 tomans (about 500,000L.) should be made to Persia by Great Britain and Russia. A pious hope that things may mend is the only security offered for the future repayment of advance and for resumption of payments due from the southern customs.

I said that I refused to submit such a proposal unless I received some satisfactory assurance that sale of islands would be carried through. President of the Council put in a sentimental pleading on the grounds that Great Britain has always helped Persia, who has nobody but her to rely on. I refused to listen to such arguments.

President of Council then said that question of sale of the islands could not be treated until the Medjliss assembled in a few days, and after much discussion agreed that he would to-morrow lay the question before the Cabinet and let me know if the Ministers would undertake to press its conclusion upon the Medjliss as soon as it meets. I answered that until I received his reply I would not submit quite unacceptable request for a further advance to your consideration.


Representative of the Swedes called on me this morning.

On my telling him that I saw no prospect of money being forthcoming, he said that he and his comrades would send in their resignations, and that orders would be issued for the withdrawal of the men on the roads to their centres in order that their arms may be collected.

[1002—1329]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٧٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٥] (٣٤٤/٧٧)



CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28, 1-35 P.M.)

*Telran, October 28, 1914.
(October 28, 10 A.M.)*

(No. 313. Confidential.)


YOUR telegram No. 266 of 27th October.

I much regret that in confusion of move to town I forgot to report that Minister of Finance had offered to renew Strick's contract. When agent informed me I replied that I could not without instructions, and I also let him know confidentially outlines of our negotiations respecting the purchase of islands. Those negotiations are no longer secret since I broached the question officially with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[1002-1202]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٧٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٦ و] (٣٤٤/٧٩)



CONFIDENTIAL

CM

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24, 3.15 P.M.)

Tehran, October 24, 1914.

(No. 311.)

(October 24, 10 A.M.)


YOUR telegrams No. 261 of 18th October and No. 263 of 22nd October: Persian loan of 1911.

Matter is under consideration and I am pressing it hard, but the present Cabinet is very invertebrate.

[1002-1055]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٨٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٧] (٣٤٤/٨١)

(57)

Register No. **4078**

Put away with **3615**
13

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

F. O. Telegrams. Dated } 1914.
Rec. 15 + 19 Oct }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	20 Oct.	MA	Persia. The proposed purchase of the islands The possible default of Persian Govt in respect of the 1911 loan
Secretary of State.....	21	J. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Put by **21. X. 14**

Copy to India - see Within


FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:— 3874 etc.

17268. I. 1006. 2000.—7/1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٨٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٨ و] (٣٤٤/٨٣)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٨٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٩ و] (٣٤٤/٨٥)





A l'heure actuelle la Trésorerie se trouve en face d'un arriéré considérable et d'avances à rembourser à brève échéance, pour l'apurement desquels deux korours ne sont pas suffisants.

Les principaux paiements à effectuer sont :

	Tomans.
1. Deux mensualités de la gendarmerie	260,000
2. Les arriérés des Cosaques	103,000
3. Deux mensualités de la Cour	60,000
4. Les dépenses du couronnement	60,000
5. Certains services de l'armée et les services ministériels à Téhéran	100,000
6. Autres dépenses, telles que pensions, créances diverses	100,000
7. Remboursement aux deux banques à la date du 14 juillet	400,000
	1,083,000
A ajouter les avances réclamées par les provinces et celles que les banques leur ont déjà faites (par Kerman, Chiraz, Boroujerd, Kermanschah)	100,000
Total	1,183,000

Les chiffres que j'indique sont fixés de mémoire globalement, mais ils ne représentent qu'un minimum des paiements urgents qui incombent à la Trésorerie.

Il y a environ deux mois, j'avais insisté vivement au Conseil des Ministres afin que des mesures soient prises sans délai pour éviter la crise actuelle. Laissant de côté la rentrée des impôts, qui n'a lieu que plus tard, j'indiquais à l'honorable Conseil qu'il fallait présentement avoir recours à des ressources extraordinaires pour tirer d'embarras la Trésorerie; je rappelais que l'année dernière, à pareille époque, le Gouvernement avait trouvé 500,000. dans un emprunt à court terme et que néanmoins un déficit de 750,000 tomans avait été constaté à la fin de l'exercice Oud-II.

J'ajoutais que, vu l'accroissement progressif des revenus gouvernementaux, joint à la possibilité de créer de nouveaux impôts, la Trésorerie parviendrait à atteindre peut-être la fin de l'année Bars-II, si elle pouvait disposer d'une ressource extraordinaire de 1,500,000 tomans, que je proposais de rechercher :

- (1.) Dans la concession des mines de Kerman ;
- (2.) Dans la vente d'une partie des bijoux de la couronne ;
- (3.) Dans un petit emprunt (avances à courte échéance) ; ou,
- (4.) Dans un grand emprunt important à l'étranger.

L'honorable Conseil me fit entendre qu'il n'était pas possible de réaliser les bijoux de la couronne, mais que la concession des mines de Kerman susceptible de rapporter au Gouvernement, sous forme d'avance, une somme de 100,000. serait sérieusement examinée.

Quant aux emprunts, le Conseil s'abstint de donner une réponse catégorique.

Aujourd'hui j'apprends qu'il n'est pas possible que la concession des mines de Kerman soit accordée de sitôt. Les bijoux restent en suspens et, en ce qui concerne les emprunts, nulle démarche n'a été jusqu'ici entamée en vue de connaître les chances qu'aurait le Gouvernement d'emprunter avantageusement.

Il est à peine besoin de dire que, dans ces conditions, la crise actuelle ne tardera pas à devenir aiguë et à provoquer des troubles dans tous les rouages de la machine gouvernementale.

Selon moi, il est plus que temps de trouver de l'argent, car les hommes qui ont la responsabilité du pouvoir encourent la responsabilité des conséquences du manque de fonds et des retards prolongés dans le paiement des diverses dépenses.


Si les mines de Kerman ne sont pas à concéder pour le moment et si les bijoux de la couronne ne peuvent être ni vendus ni déposés en gage dans une banque, c'est à l'emprunt qu'il faut recourir, à moins que le Gouvernement, désireux d'échapper aux difficultés insurmontables qu'il rencontre dans le gouvernement de certaines régions, ne consente à céder aux Puissances voisines, moyennant équitable indemnité, certaines parties de son territoire situées à l'ouest de l'Azerbaïdjan, au nord du Gourgane et dans les îles du Golfe Persique.

On sait que la partie de la Turcomanie située au nord de la rivière Gourgane s'est depuis longtemps dérobée à la souveraineté du Schah, qui n'y perçoit aucun impôt et n'est représenté par aucun agent officiel. La terre y est riche et féconde et commence à être occupée par des propriétaires russes, qui s'y trouvent comme en pays conquis.

Dans la partie ouest de l'Azerbaïdjan, les convoitises du pays voisin sont telles que le Gouvernement persan ne fait plus d'opposition sérieuse aux empiètements successifs



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٠] (٣٤٤/٨٧)



des agents politiques étrangers sur les pouvoirs administratifs comme sur les propriétés elles-mêmes.

Quant à certaines îles du Golfe Persique, voisines de Bender Abbas, le Gouvernement persan a cessé depuis longtemps de s'y intéresser administrativement, tandis qu'elles seraient d'une grande utilité à l'Angleterre pour ses dépôts de charbon et pour le facile exercice de sa police dans les eaux du Golfe Persique.

Peut-être l'honorable Conseil trouvera-t-il ma proposition étrange et de prime abord inadmissible. Mais je convie votre Excellence d'y prêter une attention particulière en considérant les bienfaits qui résulteraient pour le Souverain et pour le peuple si, en échange d'une bande de territoire depuis longtemps improductive, la Perse recouvrait son indépendance et trouvait en même temps, pour prix de la terre cédée, une somme de 50,000,000 à 60,000,000 de tomans, qui suffirait à rétablir l'ordre partout, à créer des voies de communications et outiller le pays pour le développement de son industrie.

Au moment où l'existence de la Perse paraît être sérieusement en jeu, j'estime que le Gouvernement accomplirait un grand acte d'humanité en sauvant la presque totalité du territoire persan au prix d'une faible partie de ce territoire.

Quant à l'emprunt, je ne crois pas trop m'avancer en disant que les ressources du pays permettent d'escompter un accroissement progressif des impôts et autres revenus gouvernementaux, pour autant que ceux-ci continuent à être gérés par l'administration qui vient d'être organisée avec tant de succès sur des bases modernes. Or, un pays qui prospère est toujours capable d'emprunter, surtout s'il est à même de placer les fonds d'un emprunt dans des entreprises productives. Je proposerai donc éventuellement de contracter un emprunt de 20,000,000 à 30,000,000 de tomans, soit en Belgique exclusivement, soit chez un consortium de banquiers qui consentiraient à placer l'emprunt dans des conditions favorables au point de vue de l'indépendance du pays.


Je me permets d'insister vivement afin que votre Excellence puisse convaincre l'honorable Conseil des Ministres que le moment est grave et qu'il y a urgence d'entamer les démarches en vue de réaliser l'un des deux grands projets que j'ai l'honneur de lui soumettre pour le salut du pays.

Je prie, &c.

MORNARD, Trésorier général.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٠ظ] (٣٤٤/٨٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦١ و] (٣٤٤/٨٩)



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

[September 8.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 9.

[47400]

No. 1.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 224. Very Confidential.)

Tehran, August 3, 1914.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 212 of the 25th ultimo, I had the honour to submit to you a copy of a financial statement laid before the Cabinet by the Treasurer-General, in which a suggestion was made that a solution of the present financial embarrassments might be found in the sale of certain territories to Great Britain and Russia respectively.


I was surprised, in the course of a long conversation which I had on the 26th ultimo with the Prime Minister, to see that the suggestion put forward by M. Mornard has had a favourable reception in Ministerial circles. Ala-us-Sultaneh explained that people are in despair, and are so heartily sick of the situation that has been created by Russia's steady encroachments upon Persia's prerogatives that they are prepared to jump at any solution, however heroic, that might offer a chance of reaching a clear understanding. His Highness said that the manner in which Russia has laid hands upon the collection of revenue in the north from her subjects and protected persons, who are becoming countless, and is insidiously taking possession of the administration of the country through her consuls, has become so intolerable that he believes that a Medjliss would welcome even such a drastic solution as a sale of territory, provided that such conditions were attached to such a sale as would safeguard Persia from a continuance of Russian intervention in her internal affairs, and would guarantee her liberty of action in her own house.

I would respectfully venture to submit that the scheme appears to me to offer a possible solution of the Persian question, which, without some such radical step which will clearly define the true position and intentions of all parties, seems to me destined, sooner or later, to lead to serious differences between the British and Russian Governments. It may in justice be said that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in so far as it concerned Persia, has done a great work. It has undoubtedly preserved Persia from total disruption, but it has done its work, and if persevered in, will eventually prove a failure. If it be granted that both Governments were genuinely imbued with a desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia at the time of the signature of the convention, it cannot, I think, be gainsaid that circumstances have caused Russia to in a measure, at least, overlook the underlying principle of the convention, and that the recent action of the Russian legation and consuls has been of a nature to endanger the continued existence of Persia as a sovereign independent kingdom.

As co-signatory of the convention of 1907, Great Britain would appear bound to use her best endeavours to remind Russia of her undertaking under the said convention; but constant reminders of this nature are likely to produce friction, and it may, perhaps, be rightly held that the protection of Persia's rights under the joint guarantee of the two Governments is not of sufficient importance to risk jeopardising the good relations which it is of the first importance to maintain. There is, however, another side to the picture which cannot be lost sight of: the steady encroachment of Russia by means of the leasing of properties, and the intervention of Russian consuls which that entails, is rapidly spreading southwards from Ispahan into the neutral zone, in which, under the letter of the convention, Russia has equal rights with ourselves. It would appear to me inevitable that some day—and that day is not far distant at the present rate of progress—Russian interests will clash with old-established British rights in South Persia, and a quarrel may ensue. Already, I understand, at Ispahan the British and Russian residents pass each other as strangers.

Under such conditions, would it not, I venture to suggest, be well to take under careful consideration the question whether or no the scheme of zones of influence has been proved sufficiently successful to justify its continued maintenance? It appears to me to threaten to-day dangerous complications. Russia's aspirations in the north have been so far satisfied that either she or zealous consuls who are seeking their own self-advancement are looking for fresh fields in which to make her influence felt. It is hard

[2251 h—9]



to see how this tendency can be checked, unless the zones are delimited afresh in such a manner as to give almost the entire neutral zone to Great Britain. It is improbable that Russian public opinion would accept such an arrangement.

Were the Persian Government to propose to the two Powers a sale of certain territories as sketched in M. Mornard's memorandum a condition would doubtless be attached that the system of zones should be abolished, in order that Persia might have complete liberty of action in what remained to her, all due assurances being of course given for the proper protection of the British and Russian interests already established. I am of opinion that such an arrangement would be greatly to our advantage as things stand to-day. We could easily make our own terms to protect our various interests and we should no longer feel that the steady Russian pressure from the north is jeopardising our rights which under the convention are very vulnerable. Our position in the Gulf would be rendered unassailable by our possession of the islands, quite apart from the possible future value they may have as oil-producing units or for purposes of storage.

I presume that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that British interests are best served by a Persia sufficiently strong to act as a buffer between Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East. Such a Persia can never, it has been clearly demonstrated, be created under the 1907 convention. Half the country is directly under Russian influence, a portion is undecided, and the insignificant remainder from the point of view of Tehran politics, owns British allegiance. Meanwhile, the Central Government has no authority and never can have any authority so long as its hands are tied by the necessity of considering the wishes of one or other Power, or of both. A frank protectorate would afford the country a better chance of making progress than the present most unsatisfactory system.


If Russian aspirations in Azerbaijan or elsewhere could be satisfied by a sale of territory, Persia could be rendered free to look after her own affairs; she would have money with which to pay her most pressing creditors, and she would still have money over with which to carry out public works and maintain a sufficient force to guarantee law and order. Given a chance to manage their own affairs themselves, there are plenty of men in Persia to-day capable of doing so, and I feel convinced that, if she were given a fair start, Persia could not only rise again, but she could become a much more enlightened and useful State than she has ever been before. The position at Ispahan could be settled with a stroke of the pen. If the arrangement made between the Zil-es-Sultan and the manager of the Russian Bank were cancelled, the situation would become normal again as far as the interference of the Russian consul-general in the administration of the province is concerned.

This question of Ispahan is one that is likely to be fruitful of much trouble for our interests if the Russians are to be allowed to maintain the paramount position they have acquired there. The Bakhtiari are closely identified with Ispahan. For the last four or five years the Governor-General has been a Bakhtiari. Should a Russian nominee, other than a Bakhtiari, be appointed, it is more than probable that the chiefs of this fickle and money-loving tribe would make up their minds to come to terms with the Russians much in the same way as the Zil-es-Sultan has done. All Persians are prone to side with the stronger, more especially if pecuniary advantage is likely to result therefrom. We have seen from recent reports from Ispahan that there is good reason to believe that the present Russian consul-general, inspired doubtless by the manager of the bank, who knows the local conditions thoroughly, has made overtures to the Bakhtiari through the representative at Ispahan of the Haji ilkhani family, whose fidelity to British interests is perhaps less well assured than that of the ilkhani family. At the same time certain of the khans residing at Tehran have warned me that, if it is seen that the British Government means to abandon Ispahan to the Russians, we shall lose their allegiance. This would mean that the important Ahwaz-Ispahan trade route would pass under a foreign influence inimical to the penetration of British commerce into Central Persia, and that a hostile wedge would be driven down into Arabistan. We should, moreover, lose an invaluable link in the chain of that rampart of protection by local levies which seems to me essential for the protection of the British oil interests now established along the Gulf littoral.

Ever since I have been at Tehran I have been at great pains to maintain the cordial relations I found existing between this legation and the Bakhtiari khans. I think that I have had some measure of personal success, but I feel that the position is ephemeral and that for that reason it is most desirable that some means should be found of forging a stronger and more durable chain binding together our own and Bakhtiari interests. Much might be done by the presence of British officers as



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٢ و] (٣٤٤/٩١)



advisers among the Bakhtiars, but it is probable that such a step would arouse resentment at St. Petersburg, more especially if, as would appear to be the case from the policy of the Russian consul-general, reported from Ispahan, it is intended to endeavour to alienate the khans from their tacit allegiance to us.

Again, the situation that must be created in Luristan, if the British railway enterprise, to which His Majesty's Government and that of India appear to attach great importance, is to be carried through successfully, may well be productive of friction between Great Britain and Russia in the future. In order to succeed, not only in the execution of that undertaking but in its subsequent smooth working, it will be essential to create a pro-British atmosphere. A start has already been made in that direction by enlisting the sympathies of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, but there is small doubt that the Russians are watching developments, and are likely to favour any move that may be calculated to render the railway scheme abortive. This was clearly evident when Nizam-us-Sultaneh was in Tehran.

For the above reasons, and for others of a more remote nature that will only mature if our aims in Luristan and Bakhtiariestan are frustrated, it would appear to me highly desirable that a limit should be set to Russian penetration into the neutral zone. A total abolition of the same could, in my opinion, only be effected at a sacrifice of interests of great value to us, and would also entail the eventual partition of the Kingdom. Under the purchase scheme, if Russia could be induced to buy under certain essential conditions what she has already acquired, Russian penetration south might be effectively checked. It is possible that the best means of inducing Russia to adopt the idea of purchase would be for His Majesty's Government to carry through the purchase of the islands in the Gulf first. Russia would then probably demand a *quid pro quo* in the north, and the desired result would have been achieved.

It may possibly seem that the procedure suggested has a "tricky" appearance among friends, but I would venture to point out that despite reiterated assurances, Russia's policy in Persia, more especially in the matter of the Ispahan arrangement and Kermanshah, has not been marked with whole-hearted sincerity towards a friend who has loyally carried out the terms of the bargain made in 1907.


It is of course by no means certain that any Persian statesman would be found sufficiently courageous to take a step which would involve the alienation of a portion of the national territory, but the brusqueness of recent Russian action has awakened the semi-somnolent Persian to a realisation of the fact that certain parts of what is still called Persia have already passed into Russian hands never to be returned, and that, if a halt is not called to the present insidious policy of grab on Russia's part, Great Britain, whom the majority of Persians still look upon as a friend, whose good intentions towards Persia are inspired by the greatest of incentives, self-interest, will find herself forced in sheer self-defence to adopt a similar policy, in order to preserve her interests and position. Nothing can stop the development of what is in full swing to-day but the adoption of a scheme which would not only enable Persia to treat for freedom in the management of her own affairs, but would also put her in possession of funds with which to put her house in order and make a start upon a programme of public works which will immensely improve the economic situation of the country.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/٩٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٣ و] (٣٤٤/٩٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٣ ظ] (٣٤٤/٩٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٤ و] (٣٤٤/٩٥)



close with the offer.

If Sir E. Grey approves this course, I am to suggest that Sir W. Townley should be instructed to proceed with the least possible delay.

Lord Crewe is disposed to think that it would be well to warn the Imperial Bank confidentially of the proposal to cancel the Persian debts to H.M. Government and the Government of India, as it may considerably affect their arrangements. Moreover it will be necessary for them to cancel their agreement of the 26th May 1910 with the Persian Government.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/٩٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٥] (٣٤٤/٩٧)

Put away with 3615 (65)
3894 / 14 + 13

Despatched 14 October 1914.
[P] Jm

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

*Foreign secret: Your telegram 19 Aug.
Persian Gulf islands. Following proposal
communicated to H. M. ~~Amir~~ Amir John
7: mit. H. M. J. to pay down lump
sum of £300,000 + cancel Persia's
debts to them + G. of I. equal £190,000.*


*Copy to F.O.
sent 17 Oct.*

*sent
att
14/10/14*

13969. I. 1485. 1000.—10/1912. [2429/11.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٩٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٦ و] (٣٤٤/٩٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٦ظ] (٣٤٤/١٠٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٧ و] (١٠١/٣٤٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٧ظ] (٣٤٤/١٠٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٨ و] (٣٤٤/١٠٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٨ظ] (٣٤٤/١٠٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٩٦٩] (٣٤٤/١٠٥)



Copy.

(52169)

No.48457/14.

BALTIC HOUSE,

LEADENHALL STREET,

LONDON.

September 22nd, 1914.

P
3894
1914

Sir:-

ORMUZ RED OXIDE.

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, and thank you for forwarding to us the message from our Teheran Agent, Mr. H. W. Maclean.

We are quite prepared to negotiate for a new contract, provided same can be arranged on reasonable terms.

In regard to the latter paragraph of your letter, referring to Messrs. Ellinger and Company's claims, we beg to state that the cables exchanged between us and Mr. Maclean between 29th May and 16th June, 1914, copies of which we had the honour to send you on 9th and 17th of the latter month, express our views as to the suggested methods of arriving at a settlement.


We have, &c.,

For Frank C. Strick and Company, Limited.
(Signed) Frank C. Strick.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٩ظ] (١٠٦/٣٤٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٠] [٣٤٤/١٠٧]






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٠ظ] (١٠٨/١٤٤) (٣٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧١و] (٣٤٤/١٠٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧١ظ] (٣٤٤/١١٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٢و] (٣٤٤/١١١)



CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

3787/14

3615/13

Put away with

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25, 12-25 A.M.)

Tehran, September 24, 1914.

(September 25, 9-30 P.M.)

(No. 281.)

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday the contents of your telegram No. 231 of 22nd September. His Highness, who, in spite of reiterated warnings, has always assured both the last and the present Cabinets that His Majesty's Government would never desert Persia in her hour of dire financial need, was prostrated. He said that the Cabinet must resign, and that no one would be found to take their places.

His Highness considered that sale of Crown jewels would be insufficient to-day, as they could not be sent abroad, and probably no purchaser would be forthcoming. He said that he would talk over the question of the islands with Cabinet, and seemed to think it a possible way of raising money if the British offers were made more attractive than that submitted to his predecessor, but said that it would have to be sanctioned by the Medjliss.

Prime Minister, to whom I spoke on the subject some days ago, replied in the same sense.

Road robberies on a larger scale are recommencing, and, if disorders ensue upon the disbandment of the gendarmerie, it is probable that Russian troops will have to be called in to preserve peace.


At the same time it is impossible to recommend upon economic grounds that more money should be lent, and I cannot conscientiously say that I feel sure that if lent it would not be wasted.

Conditions attached to loan of 300,000 tomans, to which allusion is made in Petrograd telegram No. 437 of 22nd September, entail Persian Government taking over a debt of 2,000,000 tomans due to Russian Bank. The soundness of the securities given for this debt is being examined.

[931—1379]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٢ظ] (٣٤٤/١١٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٣و] (٣٤٤/١١٣)



CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy

Put away with 3615/13

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28, 11 P.M.)

(No. 463.)

Petrograd, September 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram No. 780 of 22nd September.


Aide-mémoire received from Russian Government states that, apart from considerations previously suggested by them as to sale of Crown jewels, they think such sale now impracticable. They raise no objection to sale or lease of islands off Bunder Abbas.

In making this communication Minister for Foreign Affairs said again that, in turn, all he asked was that we should not interfere with him in the north.

[931—1607]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٣ظ] (٣٤٤/١١٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٤و] (٣٤٤/١١٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٤ظ] (١١٦/٣٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٥ و] [٣٤٤/١١٧]



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and
should be returned to the Foreign Office when done with unless
required for official use.]

(51a32/14).

Cypher Telegram to Sir W. Townley (Tehran)
Foreign Office, September 22nd. 1914. 10.50.p.m.
No. 231.

Your telegram No. 275 (of 19th. September).

We cannot advance money under present circumstances
and Persian Government must face the financial situation
by such methods as are open to them.

Sale of Crown Jewels is one such method. Another
resource would be to lease or sell to us the Islands off
Bunder Abbas as we proposed a few months ago and as
Mornard suggested to the Persian Government.

Repeated to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) No. 779.

Cypher Telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd)
Foreign Office. September 22nd. 1914. 11.0.p.m.
No. 780.


Sir W. Townley's No. 275 and my telegram No. 231
to him.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs very
confidentially and say that we can see no other way in
which the Persian Government can get financial assist-
ance. The Islands do not affect the mainland in any way;
the administrative connexion of these islands with
Persia scarcely exists and we do not regard them as giv-
ing us any more footing in Persia itself. British
subjects hold concessions in them.

Repeated to Sir W. Townley, No. 232.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٥ظ] (٣٤٤/١١٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٦ و] (٣٤٤/١١٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٦ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٧٧و] (٣٤٤/١٢١)

(٧)

Register No.
3396
[3416]

Put away with 3615
Secret Department 13

Minute Paper.

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
No 32 M, dated
6 AUG 1914

Dated
Rec. 31 Aug. 1914.

Letter from
F.O. 31 Aug

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary..... 2 Sept:	AM	Persian Gulf. Lease of islands Views of the Admiralty
+ Secretary of State..... 3	P.W.H	
Committee..... 4	E	
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State.....		

Copy to
India (3416) 4 Sept.
F.O (3396) 11 Sept.

FOR INFORMATION.

The tel^{ms} from the Pol. Reg^t are obsolete
& can be ignored.


Seen Pol. Comm.,
8 SEP 1914

Previous Papers :—
3289

17265. I. 1006. 2000.—7/1914




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٧ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٨ و] (٣٤٤/١٢٣)



Copy.

Telegram. P.

P
3396
1914

H/2017
3289
3416

From - The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire,

To --- The Secretary to the Government of India

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARIN the Foreign and Political Department,
No 32 M, dated Simla.
6 AUG 1914

(Addressed Government of India, repeated Naval Commander-
-in-Chief, Senior Naval Officer, Biscoe, Karachi,
Mohammerah, Foreign Office.)


No. 844, dated the 30th (recd. 31st) July 1914.

With reference to the letter from India Office to
the Foreign Office, No. 25231, dated 5th ultimo which
I have just received. I heard from Mr. Biscoe on the
17th instant that Mr. Langdale of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company having arrived at Kishm, had commenced drilling
operations for oil in the vicinity of Salagh. I asked
Trevor for particulars and ascertained that the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company had been rushing their Manager in
charge, Mr. Greenwood, of the Mohammerah branch, to
expedite operations which are described as more
ambitious than ordinary prospecting operations. I
have been informed that the Admiralty had instructed
Admiral Peirse to give all possible assistance towards
the safe landing of the stores at Henjam. It appears
of prime importance, in view of letter first quoted, to
stop

RECEIVED IN
31 AUG 1914
POLITICAL RESIDENT




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٨ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٩و] (٣٤٤/١٢٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٧٩ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٠ و] (٣٤٤/١٢٧)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٢٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨١ و] (٣٤٤/١٢٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨١ظ] (٣٤٤/١٣٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزء ٢ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار)". [٨٢و] (٣٤٤/١٣١)

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 32413
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

2666
3247
Add to file
in 7/1/14
3615
13
Copy to India

P
3416
1914 Put away with
13
Copy to India
4 SEP 1914

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India,
and, by direction of the Secretary
of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned
paper.

Foreign Office,
August 31, 1914.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Letter ~~to~~ Foreign Office: P 2666, July 13, 1914.

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Admiralty, July 16	Lease of islands in Persian Gulf.


RECEIVED IN
31 AUG 1914
FOREIGN OFFICE

(Similar letter sent to)

[12]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٢ظ] (٣٤٤/١٣٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٣و] (٣٤٤/١٣٣)



Copy.
M.01104.
(32413)
Confidential.

ADMIRALTY,
July 16th, 1914.

Sir:-

In reply to your communication of the 7th instant, No.30268, relative to the proposed lease of islands in the Persian Gulf, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that in their opinion it is most important, in view of the recent discussions concerning the agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, that the lease of these islands should be secured.

My Lords would not feel justified at the present time in committing themselves to a definite limit for the rent to be offered for such a lease. It may however be material to remark that the latest geological reports are very favourable, and that boring plant has been sent to Kishim for testing the various sites for oil.


I am to add that My Lords concur in the reply which

Sir

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٣ظ] (٣٤٤/١٣٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٤و] (٣٤٤/١٣٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٤ظ] (٣٤٤/١٣٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٥ و] (٣٤٤/١٣٧)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٥ظ] (٣٤٤/١٣٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار)". [٨٦و] [٣٤٤/١٣٩]





The annuity to be entered in (3) would depend on whether the purchase basis is 2,000,000*l.* gross or something less. If it were 2,000,000*l.* gross the net sum left after deduction of (1) and (2) would be 910,000*l.* This would represent an annuity for a term of 99 years of 37,150*l.*, on a 4 per cent. basis. If the gross sum were less—for instance, 1,836,390*l.*—the annuity, on the same interest basis, would be approximately 30,480*l.* If it were 1,500,000*l.* the annuity would be approximately 16,740*l.*

Scheme II.—Various forms of lease.


1. The Government of India are prepared to share in a lease for 99 years at an annual rental of 100,000*l.*, cost to be equally divided between India Office and Treasury. Three years' rent (300,000*l.*), would be advanced in equal shares by the Indian and Imperial Governments. The Government of India do not combine with this proposal any suggestion for the extinction of Persia's existing debts to the Indian and Imperial Governments. But a calculation has since been made that if Persia's existing debts were cancelled and an advance of 300,000*l.* made, a reduction of the rental from 100,000*l.* to about 55,450*l.* a year could be claimed in return for these concessions. Of this the Treasury would pay about 30,500*l.* and the India Office about 24,500*l.* But the Treasury might pay in some other way their share of India's separate loan (296,478*l.*), which figures in the debts to be extinguished.

2. If a rental of 100,000*l.* is thought excessive, the Persian Government might be prepared to accept 50,000*l.* a year for a 99 years' lease on condition of receiving an advance of six years' rent (300,000*l.*). It would hardly be practicable to combine this with any proposal for the extinction of Persia's debts, as the rental left to be paid after such concessions would be only about 5,475*l.* a year.

3. If this offer is thought too low, 75,000*l.* a year might be offered for a 99 years' lease, with advance of four years' rent (300,000*l.*). The offer in a modified form might include the extinction of existing debt and an advance of 300,000*l.* A calculation has been made that in that case a rental of about 34,470*l.* would remain payable. The Treasury might adjust their share of India's separate loan (296,478*l.*) either (a) by finding practically the whole of the advance of 300,000*l.*, i.e., half the advance = 150,000*l.* + half the separate loan = 148,239*l.*; or (b) by bearing a larger share than India of the remaining rental of 30,000*l.*



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٧ وأ] (٣٤٤/١٤١)



3289/14

(87A)

I hope to be able to talk this over
with Sir S. G. at once in spite of
S/S. the many distractions from other
quarters C 28.VIII.14


Please see your minute of 19th
as to discussion with Sir S. Grey
of the question of purchasing or
leasing the islands.

In sending on the G. of S. 's
telegram to the F. O. our letter
of 25th says that the question will
be personally discussed.

The typed note below sum-
-marises the G. of S. 's scheme
of purchase, and alternative
schemes for the lease of the islands.
It may be useful as a basis




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٧ظأ] (١٤٢/٣٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٧و] (٣٤٤/١٤٣)



(87)

52/2
25/8 1914

P. 3289

Book

U.S. of S.
S.O.

25 Aug 1914

To U.S. of S. 12 Aug
from --- 19

Copy to India
4 SEP 1914


In reply to your letter 2236882 of
9th inst. I am directed by the U.S. of S.
for I. to forward for the information
of the U.S. of S. for I. a copy of tele-
grams that have been exchanged with
the U.S. of S. regarding the suggested
purchase of the five islands at the
mouth of the Persian Gulf, together
with a statement showing the present
indebtedness of the Persian Gov^t to
H.M.S. of the U.S. of S.

The Marquis of Borne will take
an early opportunity of discussing the
question with Sir C. Grey.

(Sd) J.W. Alderness.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٧ظ] (٣٤٤/١٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٨٨و] [٣٤٤/١٤٥]

(88)

Political and Secret }
Department. }

Reference Paper. *Secret*

Letter No. 3289 Rec. 191 .

Referred to Leyl Adnan 21st day of Aug 1914 .

A proposal has been made that H.M.S. should acquire certain property in Senegal & as part of the consideration should cancel the outstanding debts of the Senegalese Gov^t. The debts in question are certain sums lent to the Senegalese Gov^t nominally by the Imperial Bank, really by H.M.S. *7.0. to Bank 7:4pm/03* *who actually paid the money to the Bank.* They fall into two categories 1) sums advanced in 1903-4 at 5% per annum 2) sums advanced ^{in and} ~~in~~ ¹⁹¹² ~~in~~ at 7% per annum. In each case the Imperial Bank in paying the interest to H.M.S. is authorised to retain 1% as Commission. In 1910 all the debts of the Senegalese ~~Gov^t~~ ^{Gov^t} to the Imp^l Bank were consolidated, & among them the Gov^t debt of 1903-04 referred to above. As regards this, it was provided in a formal agreement between the Senegalese Gov^t & the Bank that interest & capital should be paid off in 15 equal annual instalments beginning on 21st March 1913, & the agreement was intentionally drafted in such a way as to provide against the Senegalese Gov^t being able to pay off the loan except by instalments.* *? fut.*

The loans made in & since 1912 similarly fall into two categories (a) those made in 1912-13, which are repayable out of the first proceeds of a large loan which the Senegalese

18086.-2. 1.1638. 2000.-11/4913.

2405/03
1/3556/10



hoped to raise (but never did); or failing that, the whole of the
 surplus of the Southern Customs revenues, which are paid into
 the Imp^l Bank, to be assigned to the amortization-payments
 to begin on 21st March 1915 (b) loans made in 1913, interest monthly,
 & capital repayable in equal half-yearly instalments beginning
 on 1st July 1915, if no large loan were raised by 1st Jan^y 1915.

As regards 2) a & b there is no agreement between ^{either} the
 Persian Gov^t & the Bank, so far as I am aware, & the Bank
 is ^{entitled to} retain its ~~1%~~ 1% ^{commission} for services rendered.


The question is, if H.M.G. decide to cancel the loans
 at once, what will the position of the Bank be? As regards
 loans 1), an agreement between the Persian Gov^t & the Bank
 will presumably be necessary to cancel the 1910 agreement. But
 the Bank had a reasonable expectation of receiving 1% on £34,281
 (approximately) ^{of £30,000 approximately} every year, in the capital and interest
 for 15 years from 1910, & it will lose the remainder of it.

As regards 2 a + b it had a reasonable expectation of receiving
 1% for 2 or 3 years ^{only} if the Persian Gov^t failed to raise a
 large loan out of wh. the advances of H.M.G. had been
 repayable at once. Has the Bank any equitable claim to
 compensation ^{for} loss of these commissions?

A. H. H. H.

My opinion the Bank would have no claim
 to compensation, equitable or otherwise - should
 H.M.G. decide to cancel the debt due by the
 Persian Gov^t in the manner proposed. The Bank
 is entitled to interest ^{by way of compensation} on loans actually repaid by
 the Persian Gov^t. The agreement of 1910 restricts
 the debtor from paying off his debt in any manner
 other than that provided by the agreement of 1910. But
 this does not prevent the creditor from cancelling the debt
 at any time - & as regards the debt due to H.M.G. the Bank is merely
 the agent of H.M.G. The agreement of 1910

The Bank is entitled to the 1% commission on the loans made in 1913 & 1914. It is not entitled to the 1% commission on the loans made in 1910 & 1911.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار)". [٨٩و] (٣٤٤/١٤٧)

(89)

Register No. 3289 Put away with 3615/13

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Telegram Letter from Vice, or Dated } 19 August 1914.
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	21 Aug.	AB	Persian Gulf Question of purchase or lease of islands
Secretary of State.....	23	J.W.H.	
Committee.....		see separate sheet	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to

FOR INFORMATION,
with reference to Mr. Robinson's note + the Accountant-General's memorandum. The S. of S. having decided in favour of a lease, it is not necessary to go further into the questions raised. It is understood that H.L. will in due course speak to Sir C. Guy.


been Pol. Com'ce., with 3396.
8 SEP 1914

Previous Papers:—

15294. 1. 864. 2000.-6/1918. [1486/12.]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٨٩ظ] (٣٤٤/١٤٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٩٠٠] [٣٤٤/١٤٩]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٥٠)

may be thought preferable to out- & -out
purchase.

The necessities of the Persian govt are so
great that they might accept £50,000 a
year for 100 years' lease, if the offer were
coupled with an offer of, say, six years' annual
rent in advance, free of interest. £100,000
a year seems an absurdly large sum. - I have
little doubt that the govt of India would be willing
to advance the £300,000 in the first instance, if
the Treasury would undertake to refund their
share (£25,000) of the annual rent in the
course of the next six years.

These are my first impressions on the
telegram. I have not yet been able to discuss
it with Heitzel. But the matter has been in
my mind for some time.

19/8/14

J. W. H.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار)". [٩١] [٣٤٤/١٥١]

(91)

3289

Reference Paper. Political and Secret
Department.

Letter No. Rec. 191

Referred to *Secretary Indian Dep't* 10th day of Aug. 1914

4439
1914

A. Hutzil

Political Secretary

for favour of remarks on the relative merits of purchase & lease as financial propositions.

As between payment of a lump sum down and payment of a lease rental for 99 years, the financial advantages are clearly on the side of the latter. We simply cannot spare the lump sum at present.

I gather that we are not committed to offer more than £75,000 a year (see Political letter of 4th July last). This would be equivalent, at 4.75% to a lump sum payment of £1,836,390. At the same rate of interest, £100,000 a year for 99 years would be equivalent to a payment of £2,448,520 down.

There is a third alternative which I suggest for consideration, viz. that we offer to pay £300,000 down at once; that we cancel at once the debts due from Persia to the Imperial Govt. and ourselves (roughly, I understand, about £800,000) and then pay a reduced lease rent for 99 years, the first instalment beginning a year hence, and so on. If we can secure the islands on a

This figure would
quite to be checked
the Political Dep't.

10086.-2. I. 1638. 2000.-11/1913.
cash figures £764,769-10-11



a basis of £75,000 a year, the annuity required would be approximately £30,000. If we cannot obtain them for less than £100,000, the annuity, taking the same rate of interest, would be approximately £56,000.

The financial advantages of the third alternative would be :-

- (1) that we should avoid a larger lump sum payment than £300,000 at a moment when the Govt. of India need all their resources;
- (2) that we should get rid of seven loans from us to Persia. As the loans have been so troublesome, this would, I think, be an undoubted advantage from a financial point of view.


If the third alternative be adopted you will no doubt consider its effect on the position of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

L.P. Phipps

20th Aug/14.

I understand that you would like my opinion on two further points :-

- (1) whether sanction of Parliament would be needed to the purchase of the islands by any or all of the above alternatives? The question is




(92)


is one course for the Treasury, but I assume such sanction would be necessary, whatever method of purchase might be adopted. I believe that the Treasury did not seek sanction for the loans to Persia in which they took part, but a loan to be repaid is a very different matter, financially and politically, from a payment in consideration of the handing over of territory, whether that payment takes the form of a lump sum down, or a lease rent for a long period, or a combination of lump ~~sum~~ ^{payment}, cancellation of debt, and lease rent for a long period, such as I have suggested.


(2) How the payments to Persia would be allocated between us and the Treasury seeing that the whole of the first loan was made by us, the Treasury simply guaranteeing us against loss. I had not noticed the point before. The answer is, I think, that the cancellation of the whole of Persia's debt ^(taken itself) would mean that £294,702.74 ^(more) of the purchase price of the islands would have been paid by us, ^(then by the Treasury) and that to equalise matters the Treasury ought to hand over to us half this amount, viz £147,351.3.8. This they could do either by paying £150,000 + £147,351.3.8, = £297,351.3.8, of the initial lump sum payment to Persia of £300,000, leaving only £2,648.16.4 to be paid by us,

or



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٢ظ] (٣٤٤/١٥٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٣ و] (٣٤٤/١٥٥)

(93)

Reference Paper. *Secret* Political and Secret }
Department. }

Letter No. 3289 Rec. 191 .

Referred to the Accountant-General 20th day of Aug. 1914 .

Will the Accountant-General be so good as to inform
me of the exact sum now due by the Pension Gov^t
on account of Anglo-Indian loans?
Supposing that these loans were cancelled at once,
presumably the Imp^l Bank wd. have no grievance
on account of the loss of their commissions?

W. H. H. H.

I attach a memorandum giving the
information required -

I suggest that the legal advice be
consulted as to any possible claims of
the Imperial Bank.


Walter B. B. B.

21 Aug/14

16086.-2. I. 1638. 2000.-11/1913.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٣ظ] (٣٤٤/١٥٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٩٤ و] [١٥٧/٣٤٤]

(94)

Liabilities of the Persian Government on account of Anglo-Indian loans

	Due to	
	Indian Govt.	Imperial Govt.
1. Consolidated Anglo-Indian loan of 1902-04		
Capital	292,020 : 15 : 7	
Amount of interest on 8 th March 1913	22,681 : 11 : 9	
	294,702 : 7 : 14	
2. Anglo-Russian advance of February 1912	50,000 : - : -	50,000 : - : -
3. Anglo-Indian advance of August 1912	12,500 : - : -	12,500 : - : -
4. Anglo-Indian advance of November 1912	7,500 : - : -	7,500 : - : -
5. Anglo-Russian advance of April 1913	100,000 : - : -	100,000 : - : -
6. Anglo-Indian advance of May 1913	50,000 : - : -	50,000 : - : -
7. Anglo-Indian advance of July 1914	25,000 : - : -	25,000 : - : -
Total on 8 th July 1914, the last date to which instalments of repayment or interest were received	539,702 : 7 : 14	245,000 : - : -
Add. Interest for 44 days to 21 st August on		
£ 294,702 : 7 : 14 @ 5%	1,776 : 5 : 9	
on £ 440,000 : - : - @ 7%	1,856 : 8 : 9	1,856 : 8 : 9
Total liability of the Persian Govt. on 21 st August	543,335 : 1 : 10	246,856 : 8 : 9
Deduct: Commission on amounts included above which will be repaid by the Imperial Bank:		
One fifth of £ 22,681 : 11 : 9 = £ 4,536 : 6 : 4		
£ 1,776 : 5 : 9	355 : 5 : 2	
One seventh of £ 1,856 : 8 : 9	265 : 4 : 1	5,156 : 15 : 7
Total sums due to the British and Indian Govts.	538,178 : 6 : 3	246,591 : 4 : 8


One half of any loss on loans No. 1. is guaranteed by the Imperial Government

No interest has been received on account of loan No. 7, but nothing is included above in respect of accrued interest to date, as the date of the actual advance to the Persian Government is not at present known.


6.13.

Copy to India
4 SEP 1914

21st August 1914




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٤ظ] (٣٤٤/١٥٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٩٥] (٣٤٤/١٥٩)



COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM

Viceroy

DATED

19 August 1914

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

3289

1914

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of 12 August. Purchase of Persian islands. If the five islands cannot be acquired for less we are prepared to share cost either on basis of purchase for £2,000,000 or lease for 99 years at rental of £100,000. In former alternative we should be prepared share £300,000 desired as an advance, on completion of bargain. That having been done however we must make it a condition that total amount of loans already due to us by Persia should be set off against purchase price, Home and Indian Governments each retaining the particular amounts of their respective contributions to said loans. We recommend balance of purchase price then remaining should be paid to Persian Govt. by convenient annual instalments.

If lease is decided on we consider three years rent might be advanced and agree to share it.


On the one hand acquisition by lease has the advantage of being financially more convenient and less open to misinterpretation politically. On the other hand in view of contingency of our having to settle Persian question with Russia after present war, it might be advantageous to secure complete possession of these islands.

We would leave decision to H.M. Government.






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٥ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٦ و] (٣٤٤/١٦١)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٩٧ و] (٣٤٤/١٦٣)

(97)

Register No. **3224** Put away with **3615/13**

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from **C.F.O.** Dated **14** } August, 1914.
Rec. **17** }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 Aug.	W.H.	<u>Persian Gulf</u>
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			Anglo-Persian Oil Co.'s operations on Kishm
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Put by **19/8 W.H.**

Sent copy to India.

FOR INFORMATION.

Mr. L. Townley told us long ago that the Persian Govt. ^{probably} knew all about the oil on Kishm (tel^m of June 19); moreover it was expressly mentioned in the debates in the H. of C. Mr. T.O. do not therefore propose to take any action on this tel^m.

Seen Pol. Comtee., with 7396
8 SEP 1914


Previous Papers:—

3119

17265. 1. 10. 6. 3000—7/1914.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٧ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٨ و] (٣٤٤/١٦٥)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٨ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار)". [٩٩و] (٣٤٤/١٦٧)

Register No.
3119

Put away with 3615
Secret Department.

Letter from Foreign Office

Dated 9 } August 1914.
 Rec. 11 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 Aug.	W.H.	<u>Persia</u> Trimaail embassment. Proposed purchase of Persian Gulf islands.
Secretary of State.....	11	J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to J.W.H. ✓ J.W.H. ✓ India

Copy to India
 14 AUG 1914

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. Telegram to G. of I. asking for their views.

12 August - telegram to Viceroy

It is not easy to imagine that the Treasury or the G. of I. would find £2,000,000 for these islands at the present time. But we may hear what the G. of I. has to say.

J.W.H.

11/8

I agree. But it is not possible to let questions of this sort rest, when the local needs are not affected by the European political situation.

E. 11. VIII '14


Previous Papers:—

2858

14988. I. 566. 1000.—6/1913.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٩٩ظ] (٣٤٤/١٦٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٠] [٣٤٤/١٦٩]

(100)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

Despatched 12 August 1916.
[١٠٠] mm


Foreign secret: Persian prison
embarrassment now extreme. Suggests ^{that islands are worth} purchase of ~~islands for say~~
£200,000 & an immediate advance
of £100,000 on this account. ~~ask~~ Please
telegraph as quickly as possible your views
as to purchase and price. Please ^{reply by} telegraph
as quickly as possible.

*is promised,
purchase should
be possible. Foreign
office ask*

13969. I. 1435. 1000.—10/1912. [2429/11.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٧٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠١] (٣٤٤/١٧١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠١ظ] (٣٤٤/١٧٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٢] (٣٤٤/١٧٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٧٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٣ و] (٣٤٤/١٧٥)



CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31, 11.30 A.M.)

Tehran, July 31, 1914.

(July 31, 9.55 A.M.)

(No. 216.) R.

STOCKHOLM telegram No. 15 of 28th July : Persian gendarmerie.


Chief Swedish instructor, having received no answer to telegram sent to Stockholm by French Minister, presented ultimatum to Prime Minister two days ago. Gist is that if about 120,000 tomans (12,000L.) are not forthcoming to-morrow, Swedes will refuse responsibility for discipline of the gendarmes and ask Swedish Government to recall them. As previously reported, I have relieved tension at Shiraz and Kerman, but the necessary money is most urgently [? omitted : required] elsewhere, as there is grave danger of the gendarmes revolting and taking to highway robbery. It is but natural that Swedes should seek to dissociate themselves from all blame should their men get out of hand.

I have been strongly pressed to alienate portion of 50,000L. advanced by His Majesty's Government to relieve immediate pressure, but I have refused on the ground that your instructions to me forbid me to take such a step. Moreover, assurances of early repayment are not good enough. Unless money can be found situation will become serious.

705 - 680]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٣ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٧٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٠٤] [٣٤٤/١٧٧]

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 34988
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

104
P
3119
1914
M 2538
2858

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned
paper.

Foreign Office,
August 7, 1914.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Letter to Foreign Office: July 4

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Treasury, July 30.	Islands in Persian Gulf— Proposed lease.

(Similar letter sent to Admiralty)

[12]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٧٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٥] [٣٤٤/١٧٩]



Copy.

TREASURY CHAMBERS.

30th July, 1914.

12594
14.

Confidential.
(34988).

Sir:-

I have laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir Eyre Crowe's letter of the 18th ultimo (25231/14), relative to the proposed lease by the Persian Government to His Majesty's Government of the island of Kishm and certain other islands in the Persian Gulf.

In reply I am to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that the proposal to ask Parliament to make provision for this service is not one which, upon the information at present before Them, My Lords would feel justified in entertaining.


I am, &c.,

(Signed) John Bradbury.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٠٦] [٣٤٤/١٨١]

106

Register No.
[2816]
2858

Put away with 3615
Secret Department. 13

Minute Paper.

Letter from 20. (2858) Dated } 17 July, 1914
India, Arabian Gulf 27 m, d/2 July, recd 20 July, 1914 (2816) Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	23 July	Atk	<u>Persian Gulf</u> the proposed lease of islands
† Secretary of State.....	24	J.W.H	
Committee.....	25	C.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (2858)
17 July

FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol. Com. 8 Sept. 1914 with 3396


Previous Papers:— 2666 etc.

15294. 1. 954. 2000.--6/1913. [1436/12.]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨٢)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٧] (٣٤٤/١٨٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٧ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٨ و] (٣٤٤/١٨٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٩] (٣٤٤/١٨٧)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٠٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٨٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٠] [٣٤٤/١٨٩]



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

[June 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[25231]

No. 1.

P
2858
1914

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 18, 1914.

Sir,

SECRETARY Sir Edward Grey has for some time been engaged in strong representations to the Persian Government that they should cancel an extensive mining concession on the mainland and islands in the vicinity of Bunder Abbas, at present irregularly held by the Moin-ut-Tujjar, an exceedingly wealthy Persian, who in the past has been a bitter opponent of British interests in the Persian Gulf.

It is unnecessary to explain the details of this long and complicated question, beyond observing that the Moin's wealth gives him great influence with the individual members of the Persian Government, while on the other hand Sir E. Grey would be reluctant to use active pressure to secure acceptance of the demands of His Majesty's Government, fully justified though he believes them to be.

A possible solution has, however, been mooted by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, namely, that certain of the islands should be leased by the Persian Government to His Majesty's Government for a term of years, and I am directed to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, paraphrases of telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and of letters from the India Office and Admiralty on the subject.*

The correspondence shows that there is a consensus of opinion in favour of renting the islands not only on commercial grounds, but more especially in view of the grave political and strategical considerations involved.

The Government of India have expressed the opinion—which the Marquess of Crewe shares—that the acquisition of the five islands on lease for 25,000*l.* per annum would be reasonable, and that it would be worth the payment of even 50,000*l.* if necessary; and the Secretary of State for India in Council is prepared to accept half the annual rent as a charge on Indian revenues.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, moreover, consider that the oil royalties and other revenues derivable from the islands would in all probability alone suffice to cover the whole outlay on rent.

In view of these facts, and having regard to the probability that if the Persian Government become aware of the potentiality of oil exploitation on Kishia island the price would at once be raised, Sir E. Grey has instructed Sir W. Townley in a telegram, of which a copy is enclosed herein,† to open discussions with the Persian Government on the subject.

I am in these circumstances to express the hope that, in view of the Imperial interests involved and the favourable opportunity offered, their Lordships will sanction as a charge on Imperial funds the expenditure required to meet a moiety of the rent which it may be necessary to pay for the lease of the islands up to a maximum of 50,000*l.* per annum.

In view of the urgency of the question, I am to request the favour of an early reply.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

* Sir W. Townley, No. 107, Telegraphic, April 17; ditto, No. 125, Telegraphic, May 9; India Office, June 5; Admiralty, May 5, 1914.

† To Sir W. Townley, No. 118, Telegraphic, June 10, 1914.


[2159 s-1]

Copy to India
17 JUL 1914

RECEIVED IN
17 JUL 1914
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٩٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١١١] (٣٤٤/١٩١)

Register No. 2666 Put away with 3615/13 Secret Department.

Letter from F.O. No. 29499/14 Dated 8 July 1914 Rec. 9 July 1914

Formally acknowledged

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
9 July	J.E.S.	Persian Gulf. Prepared application by Messrs. Strick for minerals concession on coast + islands of Persian Gulf. F.O. propose to inform firm confidentially of negotiations of H.H.'s Govt. in regard to islands.
10	P.W.H.	

Copy to India - 10 + 17 July 1914

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


8/11 to F.O. concurring

13 July. To F.O.


Seen Pol. Comtee., 8 SEP 1914 With 3396


Previous Papers:—
2462
2528

14988. I. 665. 1000-6/1913.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١١ظ] (٣٤٤/١٩٢)








ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٩٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٣] (٣٤٤/١٩٥)



~~Book~~

113

13 July '14

Messrs. F. C. Strick & Co., Ltd.

Sir,
In reply to your letter of the
8th July 1914, No. 29499, as to
the intended application of
Messrs. F. C. Strick & Co., Ltd., for
a concession on the islands
& littoral of the Persian Gulf,
I am directed by the S. of S. for
India to inform you that he
concur in the terms of the
reply which it is proposed to
address to the firm.


It will, it is assumed, be
made clear to Messrs. Strick that
the negotiations on which H. M.'s
Govt. are engaged have reference
to the islands only.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.

Copy to India
17 JUL 1914




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣ظ] (٣٤٤/١٩٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٤ و] (٣٤٤/١٩٧)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤١٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/١٩٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١١٥] (٣٤٤/١٩٩)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٠٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٦ و] (٣٤٤/٢٠١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١١٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٠٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧ و] (٣٤٤/٢٠٣)



Copy.
No. 1036/14.
(294)

FRANK C. STRICK AND COMPANY, LIMITED.
BAL TIC HOUSE,
LEADENHALL STREET,
LONDON.

June 29th, 1914.
2666
1914

Sir:-

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 25th. instant, and, in reply, beg to say that our intended concession would include the mining rights in all the islands in the Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman, belonging to Persia, especially Ormuz, Kishim, Larak, Henjam, Farur, and Nabiyu Farur, and in the whole of the littoral of Persia on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

We beg to enclose a blue print of the Persian Gulf which we had prepared some time ago, which may be of use to you for reference.

We have, &c.,


For Frank C. Strick and Company, Limited.

(Signed) J. W. Holmes.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٠٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١١٨ و] (٣٤٤/٢٠٥)

Register No
2538
2521
Put away with 3615/13
118

Secret Department.

Telegram Letter from India
Letter from 20. 29 June
Formally acknowledged

Dated 28 June, 1914
Rec. 29

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 June	Wt	<p><u>Persian Gulf</u> Proposed line of islands. As to terms to be offered. Views of H. M. Minister, Tehran, & S. G. I.</p>
+ Secretary of State.....	2 July 1914		
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to 20 (of tel. from Vic.) - 29 June 1914
India (letter to F.O.) 26 June + 10 July 1914
India - Hint 21 Aug.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. letter to 20. making further proposals

4 July 1914. Letter to F.O.

Sign
C. S. VII. 1A

Comm -


Recd. Secy. Com. Sec.,
8 SEP 1914
with 3396.


Previous Papers :-
2462

14088. I. 565. 1000.-5/1913.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٠٦)







MINUTE.


It is unfortunate that this question has now become complicated by the mention of a loan. It is not the policy of H.M.G. to facilitate the acquisition by Persia of money, without control or conditions. Stringent political conditions at the present moment not probably defeat their own purpose, & those suggested in the draft are therefore very mild. Repayment out of the first public loan is already a condition of the last advances of £300,000. This ^{might} have been an opportunity to secure satisfaction of British claims for compensation (amounting now to £119,000). But H.M.G. have hitherto taken the line of not preserving their own claims apart from those of other countries, which amount in all to over £800,000; & after discussions with the L.O. I do not think that it is very wise suggesting it.

The Treasury have requested that the ^{to leave the interests} proposal may be laid before the Cabinet.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٩١٩] (٣٤٤/٢٠٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٠ و] (٣٤٤/٢٠٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [٢٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢١٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٢١] (٣٤٤/٢١١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢١٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٢٢] [٣٤٤/٢١٣]






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٢٢ظ] (٣٤٤/٢١٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٣ و] (٣٤٤/٢١٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٣ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢١٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٢٤ و] (٣٤٤/٢١٧)



124

Book

U. S. of S.
S.O.

Sir ^{Immed^s} 4 July 1914

I am directed by the U. S. of S. for S. to acknowledge the receipt of your letter N^o 27928 of the 25th June regarding the proposed lease of islands in the Persian Gulf, & to forward, for the information of the U. S. of S. for S. A., copy of further telegrams that have been received from the U. S. of S. on the subject.

14th June 1914
28

(For para. 2 see annexed sheets)

2. The Managers of Home understand that the commercial considerations advanced by the U. S. of S. were not intended to form the basis of an offer to the Persian Gov^t, as H.M. Min^{is} appears to suppose, but merely to serve as data for the guidance of H.M. S. It is clear that the islands possess a political & military importance out of all proportion to their commercial value, & for this H.M. S. must be prepared, within reasonable limits, to pay. H.M. S. wd. be suggest that Sir S. Dorey, wd. have be instructed to open formal negotiations for


Copy to India
10 JUL 1914



the lease of all 5 islands at ^{annual} interest of £50,000. It appears from H.E.'s tel^m that the Persian Gov^t are ~~likely~~ likely to think more of the money than of the islands, & it is therefore improbable that they wd. accept a smaller sum for 3 islands only, or that, if they did, they wd. be willing to tie their hands in the manner suggested by the G. of I. in the last para. of their tel^m of 22nd May as regards Hormuz. It is accordingly probable that if £50,000 is not acceptable the sum must be increased, & I wd. have wd. be suggest that H.M.G. sh. be prepared ^{in that event} to advise his Council to accept half of this as a charge on Indian revenue. ~~to offer £75,000 of this sum, it will be~~ observed, will rather more than cover interest at 7% on a loan of £1,000,000, & it appears that the Persian Gov^t desire to raise, & H.M.G. might tender their good offices in obtaining such a loan, provided that H.M. Gov^t is informally associated with the Persian Gov^t in the expenditure of it, & that it is agreed that the maintenance of order in Persia & Hormuz & the ^{repayment of the outstanding} ~~settlement of the outstanding~~ ^{Anglo-Persian advances} ~~should be a~~ ^{condition to compensation on a}




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٥] (٣٤٤/٢١٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٢٦ و] (٣٤٤/٢٢١)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٦٦ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجارة). [١٢٧ و] (٣٤٤/٢٢٣)

CONFIDENTIAL

Already received
2062/14

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22, 12.25 P.M.)

Tehran, June 21, 1914.
(June 22, 9 A.M.)

(No. 183.)

MY telegram No. 181

Although not authorised to do so, I deemed it advisable to warn Minister for Foreign Affairs last night of the fact that, unless the Persian Government could guarantee the regular payment of gendarmerie budget, there is a grave danger that the Swedish Mission will be recalled. I told his Excellency very confidentially of the step the Swedish Government appeared disposed to take in this direction.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was much disturbed, and said he had strongly urged the Cabinet to grant the Kerman mining concession in order to secure funds for the immediate requirements of the gendarmerie, but that certain Ministers hesitated, although Ala-es-Sultaneh and Arfa-ed-Dowleh supported him. I replied that His Majesty's Government was not disposed to furnish further funds, as it did not appear sufficiently well established that the Persian Government had really done their utmost to make proper provision for the financial needs of this most essential force.

In reply to a question from his Excellency as to whether, if the Kerman concession were granted, I could hold out any hopes of the long-anticipated large loan being forthcoming. I replied that this would only be possible in the event of Persia accepting a Commission of Control, which would supervise both the collection and the distribution of revenue. I did not know, I added, if the money would be forthcoming even under such conditions.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then asked whether I had had any reply about the question of leasing the islands in the Gulf. I replied in the affirmative, and said that the most His Majesty's Government could offer would be 25,000*l.* for Kishm, Henjam, Larak, Hormuz, and Sheeshuaib.

His Excellency's face fell, and he exclaimed that this would mean little more than the islands produce at present, and that he believed that an offer of 1,000,000*l.* to buy Hormuz alone from a British syndicate had already been refused. I replied that the syndicate would have lost money, since I understood that oxide mines only produced about 11,000*l.* a year, of which 75 per cent. goes to the Persian Government, and that the supply is probably not inexhaustible.

It is not clear from the telegram from Government of India what value is placed on the islands, but it appears to me evident that nothing under 100,000*l.* per annum would tempt the Persian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would submit the matter to his colleagues, but felt convinced that the proposal would not be listened to. He seemed to be [? very] disappointed.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)


COPY TO INDIA

26 June 14

|600 402|




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٧ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٨ و] (٣٤٤/٢٢٥)



CONFIDENTIAL

Already
received
sub 2/14

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19, 8 P.M.)

Tehran, June 19, 1914.
(June 19, 9 P.M.)

(No. 182. Confidential.)

YOUR telegram No. 118

I have not opened negotiations on the question of the islands because it is most improbable that the Persian Government would take any such proposals into consideration at the present moment. The Cabinet is much divided, all its members being leagued against Minister for Foreign Affairs, who threatens almost daily to resign. All are agreed that no new proposals shall be discussed before the coronation.

I do not think that a proposal based upon commercial considerations would meet with any approval. Such a scheme as the one suggested could only succeed if the Government could thereby see a way to raising a large sum of money, at least 1,000,000L., upon the security of the rent paid by His Majesty's Government.

Any attempt to add other conditions would certainly jeopardize the negotiations. Potentiality of oil on Kishm is probably already known to the Persian Government, as the arrangements with the oil syndicate, as laid before Parliament, have reached Tehran, where the matter has caused considerable comment in the press.


(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

COPY TO INDIA
26 June 1914

[600-358]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٢٩ و] (٣٤٤/٢٢٧)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٢٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٢٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٠] (٣٤٤/٢٢٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٣٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٣١ و] (٣٤٤/٢٣١)

(131)

Register No. **2530** Put away with **3615**
Secret Department. **73**

Minute Paper. **2530**

Letter from **270** Dated **26** June, 1914.
27836 Rec. **29**

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 June	alt	<u>Persian Gulf</u> Intention of Messrs. Smith & apply for monopoly of minerals on islands & littoral of Persian Gulf.
+ Secretary of State.....	1 July	J.W.H.	
Committee.....	2	<u>Σ</u>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 3 July. 1914.

FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol. Comtee.,
7 JUN 1914

Previous Papers :—

15294. 1. 864. 2000.-6/1913. [1498/12.]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٣٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٣٢] (٣٤٤/٢٣٣)

١٤

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 27834.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

India. 132

P
2530
1914

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned
papers

Foreign Office,
June 26, 1914.

Copy to India
3 JUL 1914

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:
from

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Messrs J. B. Strick Bohra. June 19, 1914.	Mineral Concession on islands in Persian
To do do June 25, 1914.	

(Similar letter sent to

[12]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٣٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٣] (٣٤٤/٢٣٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٣ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٣٦٦)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٤ و] (٣٤٤/٢٣٧)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٣٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٥] [٣٤٤/٢٣٩]

(135)

Register No. **2462** Put away with **3615/13**
Secret Department.

Minute Paper.

2 letters from *ad.* Dated } 26 June, 1914.
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	26 June	AKH	<u>Persian Gulf</u> Proposed lease of the islands. Attitude of Persian M. F. A.
Secretary of State.....	27	J.W.H.	
Committee.....	29	<u>E.</u>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to
Indic - 26 June 14

FOR INFORMATION.
We have contemplated paying up to
£50,000.

Seen by Council,
7 July 14
(with 2530)


Previous Papers:— 2307
2251
et

✓ H.Y.

15294. 1.864. 2000.-6/1913. [1486/12]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٦ و] (٣٤٤/٢٤١)



CONFIDENTIAL.

P
2462
1914

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22, 12.25 P.M.)

(No. 183.)

Tehran, June 21, 1914.
(June 22, 9 A.M.)

MY telegram No. 181

Although not authorised to do so, I deemed it advisable to warn Minister for Foreign Affairs last night of the fact that, unless the Persian Government could guarantee the regular payment of gendarmerie budget, there is a grave danger that the Swedish Mission will be recalled. I told his Excellency very confidentially of the step the Swedish Government appeared disposed to take in this direction.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was much disturbed, and said he had strongly urged the Cabinet to grant the Kerman mining concession in order to secure funds for the immediate requirements of the gendarmerie, but that certain Ministers hesitated, although Ala-es-Sultaneh and Arfa-ed-Dowleh supported him. I replied that His Majesty's Government was not disposed to furnish further funds, as it did not appear sufficiently well established that the Persian Government had really done their utmost to make proper provision for the financial needs of this most essential force.

In reply to a question from his Excellency as to whether, if the Kerman concession were granted, I could hold out any hopes of the long-anticipated large loan being forthcoming. I replied that this would only be possible in the event of Persia accepting a Commission of Control, which would supervise both the collection and the distribution of revenue. I did not know, I added, if the money would be forthcoming even under such conditions.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then asked whether I had had any reply about the question of leasing the islands in the Gulf. I replied in the affirmative, and said that the most His Majesty's Government could offer would be 25,000*l.* for Kishm, Henjam, Larak, Hormuz, and Sheeshuab.

His Excellency's face fell, and he exclaimed that this would mean little more than the islands produce at present, and that he believed that an offer of 1,000,000*l.* to buy Hormuz alone from a British syndicate had already been refused. I replied that the syndicate would have lost money, since I understood that oxide mines only produced about 11,000*l.* a year, of which 75 per cent. goes to the Persian Government, and that the supply is probably not inexhaustible.

It is not clear from the telegram from Government of India what value is placed on the islands, but it appears to me evident that nothing under 100,000*l.* per annum would tempt the Persian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would submit the matter to his colleagues, but felt convinced that the proposal would not be listened to. He seemed to be [? very] disappointed.


(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India.)

[600 402]






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٣٧ و] (٣٤٤/٢٤٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٧١ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٣٨ و] (٣٤٤/٢٤٥)



CONFIDENTIAL

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19, 2.5 P.M.)

(No. 181.)

*Tehran, June 19, 1914.
(June 19, 3 P.M.)*

YOUR telegram No. 4 to Stockholm of 18th June.

If the Swedish Government persist in their intention to recall the military mission lent to Persia for the purpose of organising a gendarmerie, we shall find ourselves here in a precarious and almost desperate situation at a moment when the young Shah is about to ascend the throne.

I had yesterday most satisfactory proofs that the Shah and some of the more enlightened of his entourage are fully conscious of the onerous duties which await His Majesty, and that he and his younger advisers, amongst the ablest of whom is a son of the late Mozaffereddin Shah, have been discussing seriously and intelligently the qualities of the various public men best suited to form a Cabinet after the Coronation.

I was not aware till yesterday that the Shah was taking such a serious interest in the future of his country. Persons who have been brought into contact with him lately, including my wife on her return from Europe, have been struck with the marked advance in him from a fat shy boy to a thinking youth. He also now speaks French fluently, and does not require the services of an interpreter.


I gathered that Shah does not mean to be swayed by the advice of men like Kamran Mirza and the old reactionary party. It would be hard if a boy sovereign who shows promise should be confronted by such a situation as would be created by the withdrawal of the Swedes. Who, and what, is to take their place, and how are the 7,000 gendarmes who would be left without officers to be controlled? British officers would certainly be as distasteful to Persia as Russians, and, I am convinced, that they could only be imposed on Persia by some drastic measure such as an ultimatum or a bribe in the shape of money to finance the administration. Treasurer-General has often told me that he would go if the Swedes do, as his administration could no more work with British officers than with Russians.

I would beg once more to place on record my firm conviction that the Swedes can yet succeed if a fair chance is given them, and if they are genuinely supported. They have faults but they have done good yeoman work. All impartial persons capable of judging the situation are unanimous in their praise of the result achieved when viewed as a whole. The only alternative, unless it is proposed to let Persia again make a trial of governing herself by her old methods, is British officers in the south and Russians in the north. Such an arrangement would lead to partition in some form which in addition to many other drawbacks would eventually prove much more costly to British taxpayer than a few hundred thousand pounds advanced to Persia at a remunerative rate of interest.

[600 356]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٣٩ و] (٣٤٤/٢٤٧)

(139)

Register No. **2304** Put away with **3615/13**
Secret Department.

Minute Paper. *Tel. from Vicroy* Dated 14 June, 1914.
Rec. 15

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 June	W.H.	<i>by 11/14</i> <u>Persian Gulf</u> Proposed lease of the islands Munir's projects on the trade industry
Secretary of State.....	16	P.W.H.	
Committee.....	17	E.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to P.O. to ref. to our letter of 5th inst.
17 June 1914

FOR INFORMATION.

The sum mentioned in P.O. L's tel. of 22 May was £16,000, & the proposed offer of £25,000 as a maximum ^{in the first instance} was based on this figure. He may therefore expect to have to pay more


Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
23 JUN 1914

Previous Papers:— 2251
2017
etc.

15294. 1. 864. 8000--6/1913. [1496/12.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٣٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٤٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٤٠] (٣٤٤/٢٤٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٠ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٥٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٤١ او] (٣٤٤/٢٥١)

(141)

Register No. **2250-1**
2251

Minute Paper.

Put away with **3615**
13
Secret Department.

Los. from 70.

Dated 9210 } June 1914
Rec. " }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 June	Wk	<u>Persian Gulf.</u> Proposed lease of the islands. Instructions to H.M. Minister, Tehran Hormuz Guide Position of Great Shik
+ Secretary of State.....	12	J.W.H.	
Committee.....	13	E.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to India - See within

FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
23 JUN 1914

Previous Papers:—
1563
2017

10294. 1. 804. 2000.- 0/1913. [1486/12.]





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤١٥ ظ] (٢٥٢/٤٤٤٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤٢و] (٣٤٤/٢٥٣)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٢ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٥٤)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٣ و] (٣٤٤/٢٥٥)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٣ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٥٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٤٤] [٣٤٤/٢٥٧]

Register No. 2017

Confidential
Put away with 3615
Political
Secret Department. 13

Telegram Letter from Viceroy. Dated 22 } May, 1914.
Rec. 23 }

Formally acknowledged

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary..... 4 June	Atb	<u>Persian Gulf</u> Proposal to obtain a lease of the islands of Kishm, Honjom, Lash, Hormuz, & Shikh Shuab.
Secretary of State..... 4	At	
Committee.....		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State..... Lammal		

Copy to G.O. 23 May, 1914.

Copy to India
12 JUN 1914


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Sp. letter to G.O. supporting.
5 June 1914. Letter to G.O.


Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
9 JUN. 1914


Previous Papers:—
156³ 21/1912 285/1913
135⁶

14988. I. 565. 1000.—5/1913.





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٤٤ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٥٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤٥] [٣٤٤/٢٥٩]







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٥ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦٠)

has valuable deposits of red oxide, at present worked for the Persian Government by the Muin-ut-Tujjar, under an agreement for 10 years from 22nd March 1910.

The group of islands taken together are, politically and strategically, the key to the Persian Gulf. They command Bunder Abbas which His Majesty's Government have laid down must be the point at which the Trans-Persian railway ~~touches~~ touches the sea; and between them they form the best -if not the only- anchorage for men-of-war near the mouth of the Gulf.

The tendency of recent events has been to increase the competition which British supremacy has to face in the Persian Gulf. Hitherto a British mare clausum it is tending to become an international thoroughfare. By the expenditure of large sums on lighting, buoys, and policing its waters; by an agreement with Turkey consolidating our position at Koweit and removing causes of friction on the Arab coast; and by the maintenance of most friendly relations with the Sheikh of Mohammera, His Majesty's Government are seeking to secure British supremacy. But the advent of the Bagdad Railway to Basra; the determined and successful efforts of the subsidized Hamburg-Amerika line to secure a footing for German trade; the renewal of its subsidy to a Russian line from Odessa; the revival of interest shown by a French line; and the appearance even of Italy on the scene - all these are indications that our supremacy will not be maintained without effort. The establishment of British administration on these islands ~~for a century~~ would at once put it beyond reach of probable attack and render the success of such attack a matter of much less importance. Moreover, if anything were to happen to the integrity of Persia, the possession of the islands would be a matter of almost vital concern to us.

In



In itself this might be held to be a sufficient return for the expenditure proposed. But there are other advantages. (1) As has been mentioned, the island of Kishm has very promising shows of oil. It is covered by the concession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in which His Majesty's Government are about to invest £2,200,000. It would add greatly to the value of their holding if important wells were in what would virtually be British territory. Moreover, Sir E. Slade is of opinion that the royalty which would be payable to His Majesty's Government under the concession (16% of the net annual profits) would more than cover the rent.

(2) Henjam, under British administration, would probably soon develop into the principal depot of our trade in that part of the Gulf - a circumstance which would doubtless tend to increase our trade, and strengthen our relations, with the Trucial coast.


(3) Established at the mouth of the Gulf we should be in a much better position to protect the pearl fisheries, and prevent the intrusion of foreign influences and methods.

(4) The presence of British administration on the islands would undoubtedly have a tranquillising effect on the Persian mainland opposite.


None of these considerations apply to Sheikh Shuaib. We want to build a lighthouse on this island for the convenience of commerce in the Gulf. It is an important link in the chain of lights, ^{already approved by H.M.G.} but the Persian Government have refused to allow it except on impossible terms.

Draft letter to F.O. is submitted.

What Mr Robinson says in his note on the reference paper is no doubt true, & I wish I cd. think that this is the best demand




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٦ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦٢)



of the kind that is likely to be made. Unfortunately omelette
cannot be made without sooner or later breaking eggs. Our position in
the Persian Gulf has hitherto ^{being one established,} but comparatively little because it has
not been seriously challenged. Henceforward, if we want to keep it we
shall have to pay for it.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤٧ و] (٣٤٤/٢٦٣)



Accepted by Heligoland Mail
in a Hitzel on 7 hours
N. 9
6. 11.

(١٤٧)

J.F.
8/6/14

Dear Resident Clerk.

You had better consult
Hitzel about this by phone.
It has just arrived.

yes
[initials]


2017 file
8.6.14

Telegram sent: 7.6.14.
S.H. & V. (Basra Dept)
P.S. Pl. refer to A.H. Minister at Tehran
your telegram of May 22 Persian Gulf Islands.

Copy to
[initials]
14




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٧ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٤٨ و] (٣٤٤/٢٦٥)



1 agree
C.A. VI. 14
U.S. of S.


and have
I think, with Sir A. Hertzog, that
there would be an advantage on the
whole in not putting the matter before
Council until the views of the F.O. &
Treasury have been obtained. If these views
+ from Sir John Lubbock agree with the views of the
U.S. of S. the political & strategic importance of the
measure, Council will, it may be
assumed, concur. 2. 11.
14/6/14

I suppose this must go to
mail at the present stage, but there is
nothing to be said for waiting until we
know how the negotiations go. If the latter
are adopted the words "will be prepared
advise his Council" sh. be substituted for
"sh. be prepared", towards the end of para. 3.

500
log M.
- H.T.
A.H.
4/4/14




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٨ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦٦)



of the kind that is likely to be made
cannot be made without sooner or later
the Persian Gulf has hitherto not
not been seriously challenged. Hence
shall have to pay for it.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٤٩] (٣٤٤/٢٦٧)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٤٩ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٦٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٠] (٣٤٤/٢٦٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٧٠)




reasons given by them, existing rights in the latter island being of course respected. He understands that it is proposed that H.M.G. should take the place of the Persian Govt. as the recipient of royalties in respect of both oil and oxide; and that being so, the terms suggested by the Govt. of India appear to him reasonable, and he would be prepared to admit half the annual rent as a charge on Indian revenues. He would suggest that Sir W. Townley should have a free hand in negotiating on that basis, within the limits of £12,000 and £~~25~~²⁵,000 in the first instance, *but he thinks that H.M.G. sh. be prepared to pay not less than £50,000, if necessary.* If it were possible also to secure any of the points enumerated in Sir P. Cox's telegram to Sir E. Grey No. 115 of 19th Jan. ¹⁹¹² to which the Govt of India refer in the last sentence of their telegram, it would be an advantage; but they are of subsidiary importance, and His Lordship would not desire that an appreciably higher sum should be paid, or the success of the negotiations in any way imperilled, for that purpose.

I am to suggest that, if Sir E. Grey approves these proposals, the question should be opened with the Persian Govt., and the transaction completed, with the least possible delay, since it is likely that if they become aware of the potentiality of oil exploitation on Kishm, they will raise their price.

It




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥١] (٣٤٤/٢٧١)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٧٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٢] (٣٤٤/٢٧٣)

(152)

Secret

Reference Paper. Political and Secret Department.

Letter No. 2017 Rec. 191

Referred to Secretary, Military Dep.ⁿ 28th day of May 1914.

M
7341
1914

for my remarks.

A. H. H. H.

It seems to me impossible to underestimate the importance of obtaining possession of these islands at this present moment, even though occupation may involve certain ^{extra} expenditure in this kind of budget. We may have to establish a native staff detachment at Hongkong, a place which has I believe no alternative climate.

E. Barron 29/5

Secretary, Political Dept.

Please see notes attached


E. Barron
4/6/14.

2852
1914

16086.-2. I. 1638. 2000.-11/1913.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٧٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٥٣] (٣٤٤/٢٧٥)

(153)

Reference Paper.	Financial Department.	
Register No. F.	Rec.	191
Referred to <i>Political Secy</i>	day of	191

The question is obviously one that must be decided on political and military considerations. If the advantages anticipated on these grounds are realised, it is not improbable that the outlay involved will ultimately result (apart from possibilities of revenue) in an even greater saving of expenditure in other directions, & I feel therefore that I cannot raise objection on financial grounds. At the same time it is well to realise that (apart from the annual naval outlay in the Gulf borne by India) this is the most costly recurring charge proposed for political purposes in connection with Persia - so far as I am aware - during the present century. Political expenditure in Persia in 1911-2, should be a substantial increase on the figure for

for

14768.-2. I. 947. 1000.-4/1918.



for 1910-11, the total expenditure by the F.O. & J.O.
taken together being 794930 in 1911-2 as against 786090
in 1910-11. And for subsequent years the totals will
be swollen by the outlay on the large schemes for lighting
& buoying, surveys & works that have been or are in the
process of being sanctioned. The estimates for these works are
roughly as follows: -

Lighting & buoying	£ 84000 initial	£ 7090 recurring
Works	41480 ..	6000 -
Surveys		4667 for eight years.

This expenditure will be shared with the F.O. & in addition I
would refer to the further charges that have been incurred by
the sending of troops to S. Persia owing to the general
insecurity of the country.

As regards the present proposal the only suggestion as
to detail I would offer is that Sir W. Tomley might be
given a narrower margin for bargaining in the
first



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٤] (٣٤٤/٢٧٧)

(154)

Reference Paper.	Financial Department.	
Register No. F.	Rec.	191 .
Referred to	day of	191 .


first instance than is proposed in the draft.
It will probably strengthen his hands in pushing
for a low figure if he knows that he cannot
raise his offer above, say, £25,000 without a
further advance to H.H.G. £25,000 represents an
increase of 100% above the £12,000 which the
G. & S. propose as the initial offer & seems to me
to give a sufficiently wide range for the early
stages of the negotiations. I recognize of course
that the figure may have to be raised later if
£25,000 does not represent attractive terms in the
eyes of the Persian Govt. (vide Tishman tel. 17 April 14),
though it is vastly in excess of anything they are likely
to get from any Persian loan or concessionaire.

W. Robinson
4/6/14.

14768.-2. I. 347. 1000.-4/1913.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٧٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٥٥] (٣٤٤/٢٧٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٥٦ و] (٣٤٤/٢٨١)



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA.

[December 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 14.

[50546]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 238.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 361 of the 20th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Bill conferring on Muin-ut-Tujjar certain rights in connection with the mining of Hormuz oxide.

No agreement in accordance with article 8 has as yet been executed between the Ministry of Public Works and the Muin-ut-Tujjar.

I understand that Mr. Shuster disputes the validity of the law, principally on account of the absence of his imprimatur to it, which he claims is necessary under the law, defining the attributes of the treasurer-general.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Bill passed by the Medjliss at the Sitting of November 2, 1911, in regard to the lease of Hormuz Ozide.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. The Government hands over to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar the mine of oxide of iron which is in the Isle of Hormuz, for ten solar years from the beginning of Hammal It II, 1328 (22nd March, 1910), on the condition that all undertakings which, in accordance with a separate contract, were arrived at on the 16th Zighede, 1328 (19th November, 1910), between the previous Cabinet and Mr. Strick should be fully carried out by Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar during its term, which is five solar years, and that should he act in a manner contrary to the articles of the said contract so as to cause a loss to the Government, he shall have to make good any losses occasioned to the Government.

Art. 2. The Government undertakes that from any quantity of soil which may be over and above the 13,000 tons of the oxide of iron now ready belonging to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar, which it bought and gave him an order of payment for the sum of 24,000l. to be realised by him as against the value of 11,294 tons of soil, up to the amount of 30,000 tons of soil which in accordance with the contract must be delivered to Mr. Strick, to pay Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar 15 per cent. for the expenses of excavation, on condition that should the soil now ready belonging to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar be less than 13,000 tons he should pay the Government for the deficit up to 13,000 tons at forty-two shillings and a half per ton, and that should the soil now ready be more than 13,000 tons Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar will not claim the price of the surplus.

Art. 3. Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar, after deducting the 13,000 tons, is bound to pay the Government the remaining cost of the soil purchased by Mr. Strick until the expiration of Mr. Strick's contract, and in case the appointed instalments should not be met, the Government will be able to revoke this contract.

Art. 4. If until the expiration of the Government's contract with Mr. Strick, which is for the first five years, Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar should, during this period, sell anything over and above the 30,000 tons to him or to any other body, he will pay 75 per cent. of the cost of the soil to the Government.


Art. 5. After the expiration of Mr. Strick's contract, any quantity of soil which may be excavated from the said isle, 75 per cent. of the cost of the same will be the Government's share, and 25 per cent. of it will belong to Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar for the expenses and his commission.

Art. 6. All transactions which Hajji Muin-ut-Tujjar may within the period of ten years do with anyone in regard to the red soil of oxide of iron must be with the Government's information.

[2286 s—14]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨٢)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٥٧] [٣٤٤/٢٨٣]



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

[March 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 12.

[10389]

No. 1.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 51.)

Tehran, February 18, 1914.

Sir,
WITH reference to my despatch No. 239 of the 29th October last, transmitting a translation of Muin-ut-Tujjar's "concession" of the 9th September, 1913, I now have the honour to transmit a French translation, supplied by the Treasurer-General to Mr. Maclean, of the agreement between Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Ministry of Public Works, dated the 21st December, 1911, containing twelve articles.

I would refer you in this connection to Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 238 of the 4th December, 1911, transmitting translation of a Bill passed by the Medjliss on the 2nd November, 1911. Article 8 of this Bill declared that an agreement will subsequently be drawn up between Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Ministry of Public Works, and the enclosed document is a translation of the agreement in question.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Agreement dated December 21, 1911.

(Traduction.)

ENTRE le Ministère des Travaux publics, d'une part, et Hadj Agha Mohammed Mouin-et-Todjar de Bouchir, de l'autre, conformément à l'arrangement concernant l'exploitation de l'oxyde de fer de l'île d'Ormuz, comprenant huit articles et approuvé par le Parlement, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

Article 1^{er}. Le Gouvernement cède à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar la mine d'oxyde de fer de l'île d'Ormuz pour une durée de dix ans, prenant cours depuis le 1^{er} hamal itt-il, 1328; sous condition que le prénommé observe scrupuleusement les engagements faits, en vertu d'un accord séparé, par l'ex-Cabinet des Ministres, au 16 zilghadeh, 1328, vis-à-vis de MM. Strick, jusqu'à l'expiration de cet accord, dont la durée est de cinq années solaires. Si le prénommé Hadj agit contrairement aux dispositions de l'accord précité et que son agissement occasionne certains préjudices au Gouvernement, le susdit Hadj sera tenu de répondre de tous ces préjudices.

Art. 2. Pour toute quantité excédant les 13,000 tonnes d'oxyde de fer appartenant à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar, dont le stock a été acheté par le Gouvernement et que mandat a été donné au prénommé Hadj de prendre 4,000^l. sur le prix de 11,294 tonnes de ce minéral, le Gouvernement s'engage à verser à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar les 15 pour cent du prix, à titre de frais d'exploitation de l'oxyde qui, selon l'accord, doit être délivrée à MM. Strick jusqu'à concurrence de 30,000 tonnes.

Il a été, toutefois, convenu que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar paiera au Gouvernement, à raison de 42¹/₂s. la tonne, le prix de toute quantité d'oxyde qui serait nécessaire pour compléter le chiffre de 13,000 tonnes; mais, qu'il ne touchera rien du chef du prix de la quantité qui dépasserait les 13,000 tonnes.

Art. 3. Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar s'engage à payer au Gouvernement jusqu'à l'échéance de la durée de l'accord de MM. Strick, le restant du prix de l'oxyde de fer acheté par MM. Strick, déduction faite de la quantité de 13,000 tonnes.

Dans le cas de non-paiement des termes de ce prix, le Gouvernement aura le droit de résilier cet arrangement.

Art. 4. Si, avant l'expiration de l'accord passé entre le Gouvernement et MM. Strick, soit pendant la durée des cinq premières années, Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar vend, après la livraison et à part des 30,000 tonnes vendues à MM. Strick, une quantité d'oxyde quelconque à MM. Strick, ou autre, il devra en payer les 75 pour cent du prix au Gouvernement.

Art. 5. Les 75 pour cent de l'oxyde qui sera exploité de l'île précitée après

[2063 i—12]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٥٧ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨٤)

2

l'expiration du délai de l'accord de MM. Strick, appartiendront au Gouvernement, et les 25 pour cent à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar du chef des frais et d'indemnité.

Art. 6. Toutes les opérations que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar fera vis-à-vis des particuliers au sujet de l'oxyde de fer devront être avec information du Gouvernement.

Art. 7. Toute quantité d'oxyde exploitée et emmagasinée par Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar, dans le cours des dix ans, en plus de la quantité vendue, appartiendra au Gouvernement.

Art. 8. Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar s'engage à payer au Ministère des Travaux publics, à la fin de chaque mois, une somme de 850L. du chef de l'oxyde de fer exporté, à partir du 1^{er} hamal itt-il jusqu'à fin houte bars-il 1332; le montant des sommes dues au Gouvernement sera calculé, à la fin de la période de douze mois, d'après les documents concernant les ventes successives faites par Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar pendant cette période. Si la somme de 10,200L. que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar versera au Gouvernement dans le courant des douze mois sera moindre que les 85 pour cent des produits de vente d'oxyde devant être fournis au Gouvernement, le restant de la somme due à ce dernier devra lui être payé à la fin du douzième mois; mais dans le cas que cette somme dépassera le montant de la somme due au Gouvernement, l'excédent sera porté aux comptes du chef des termes des paiements de l'année suivante.

Il a été également convenu que le restant du prix des 13,000 tonnes d'oxyde de Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar sera déduit du montant des paiements qui seront dus au Gouvernement à partir de la signature du présent arrangement. Le mode de paiement des termes dus par Mouin-et-Todjar dans la période des cinq dernières années sera conforme à ce qui précède; mais le montant du paiement mensuel que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar doit effectuer au Gouvernement sera déterminé au commencement de la seconde période de cinq ans.

Art. 9. Outre l'engagement que s'est fait Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar suivant l'esprit de l'article 6 ci-devant, le prénommé s'engage aussi à se procurer l'autorisation du Ministère des Travaux publics en ce qui concerne toutes les questions de transmission ou transfert du présent arrangement.

Art. 10. Toutes les fois que le Ministère des Travaux publics désirera charger provisoirement ou d'une manière permanente ses agents d'examiner et de contrôler l'exploitation et l'exportation de l'oxyde, Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar se chargera de donner les instructions nécessaires à ses agents et représentants pour accorder aide et assistance aux agents du susdit Ministère.

Art. 11. Tous les firmans et documents concernant l'oxyde de fer* que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar a entre ses mains sont considérés comme nuls et le Ministère des Travaux publics ne reconnaît valable que le présent arrangement, en ayant soin d'agir envers le prénommé Hadj conformément aux onze articles ci-devant.

Art. 12. La quantité d'oxyde de fer exportée de l'île d'Ormuz ainsi que la quantité d'oxyde de Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar mentionnée dans l'article 2 ci-haut; le montant de la somme versée au Gouvernement; le montant des termes de paiement de la somme de 24,000L. qui, selon l'ordonnance du Ministère des Finances, doit être versée à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar; les frais effectués par l'Administration des Douanes pour nouvelle exploitation de l'oxyde, à raison de 15 pour cent; et, enfin, tous ces comptes devant être exactement et minutieusement fixés et déterminés—il a été convenu que les clauses concernant le présent article seront préparées après la désignation de ce qui précède et annexées, à l'échéance, au présent arrangement.


L'arrangement fait entre le Ministère des Travaux publics et le sieur Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar de Bouchir comprenant douze articles, dont sept (de 1^{er} à 7) ont été approuvés par le Parlement et cinq autres ajoutés par le Ministère préappellé conformément aux dispositions des sept premiers articles, est complètement exact; il est fait en double expédition suivant l'approbation du Parlement, en date du 29 zilhadj, 1329 (21 décembre, 1911).

Le Ministère des Travaux publics,
MOCHIR-ED-DOWLEH (HASSAN).

* Dans l'île d'Ormuz.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجارة). [١٥٨] (٣٤٤/٢٨٥)



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA.

[January 19.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[2825]

No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 19, 1913.

RECENT Reuter telegrams emanating from Tehran and London seem to adumbrate that His Majesty's Government may be giving lively consideration to the pros and cons of the grant of a further respite to the Persian Government for restoring order on the Bushire-Ispahan road and in Fars generally, and, if this is the case, it can only be in conjunction with an extensive scheme for the financing of the Governor-General by Imperial Government.

Without touching on prospects of such a scheme, I venture to urge, in case anything of the sort is on the tapis, the importance of our securing from the Persian Government, in return for such forbearance, the preliminary settlement of various desiderata, regulation of which would assist towards the consolidation of our position and legitimate interests. Immediate loss both in trade and prestige which will be involved to us by further long-suffering is so considerable that it would appear gratuitously quixotic for us to refrain from requiring the Persian Government, as a condition of it, to recompense us as far as they can for the damage their impotence brings on us. Satisfaction of our requirements in these matters involves no difficulty or loss of authority or dignity for the Persian Government, and, moreover, it is not our position vis-à-vis of Persia which we seek to better thereby, but our position vis-à-vis of foreign Powers. To the strengthening of this latter position Persia should be interested little less than ourselves, for she must surely now see in Great Britain a friendly Power whose [? aim] it is to uphold her.

Desiderata which occurred to me are as follows:—

1. Documentary recognition of our prescriptive rights to control lighting, buoying, and policing of Gulf in the same way that our position has been recognised in respect of quarantine, in regard to which the position might with advantage be reaffirmed incidentally.
2. Documentary recognition as a permanency of the old prescriptive postal rights and privileges which we still enjoy, and an expression of readiness to see those extended to other Persian ports of the Persian Gulf as occasion may require.
3. Undertaking to refrain from giving any lease or concession, commercial or otherwise, in Southern and South-Western Persia (i.e., in the area comprising the British and neutral zones under the Anglo-Russian convention), or in Persian islands of the Gulf, to any foreign subjects or Government, without the knowledge and consent of His Majesty's Government. We have precedent for such a request in the undertaking given by the Shah to the Russian Minister referred to in Mr. Marling's telegram of 27th August, 1908, to the Foreign Office, repeated by me to India on the following day. This, perhaps, might be secured in the course of current negotiations for mining concessions.
4. Extension of rights of navigation to the Upper Karun.
5. Abandonment of empty claims to sovereignty over Bahrein and recognition of our protective rights over those islands and Trucial Coast and our title to protect their subjects in Persia.
6. Undertaking to grant option to British company when the time is ripe for formation of lighterage company in Gulf ports.
7. Acceptance of consular officer at Bampur when needed.

I make no suggestion here in connection with Kishm-Henjam position, as we appear to be effectively consolidating ourselves in an unobtrusive way, and further openings are likely to offer themselves.


I have expressed views on the strategical question in my telegram No. 10, dated 3rd January, to India and Tehran.

(Communicated direct to Foreign Office; repeated to India and Tehran.)

[2763 t-1]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٥٩] (٣٤٤/٢٨٧)

159 N 1563
1356
31/1912
285
1913

16454 L. 211. 10000-21114.

COPY OF TELEGRAM. †

FROM *Victory*

DATED *22nd May 1914*

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE *4.28 p. m.*

2017
1914

I

Copy to 30
23 May 1914

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of 27th April. Persian Gulf Islands.

We are of opinion that both from the strategical and political point of view, acquisition of Kishm, Henjam and Larak on a long lease, e.g. 99 years, is highly desirable and would greatly strengthen our position in the Gulf both now and prospectively. In saying this we assume that terms of lease would include surrender of all administrative control by Persian Govt. and hoisting of British flag.

We would strongly recommend however that Hormuz should be brought into the bargain and also Sheikh Shuail if possible.


As regards Hormuz, it may perhaps be (regard)ed that if we held three first named Islands, its strategic value would be considerably diminished, nevertheless its possession would effectively complete our control of the position at Bandar Abbas and the entrance of the Gulf and apart from that would enable us to regulate the valuable oxide industry. We recognize that its inclusion may make bargain somewhat more difficult to carry through but if we are right in holding that under the existing contract between him and Persian Govt. (vide Enclosure in Sir G. B. Selway's Despatch dated 14th Dec. 1911 and Townley's No. 51, 18th Feb. 1914, to Foreign Office) the Mo'in is not a concessionaire but merely the Contractor or Commission Agent employed by the Persian Govt. up to March 1920, we venture to think that it would be practicable to estimate lease value of this island with fair accuracy and that provision might be made in lease for maintenance of present contract for its full period.


Our reason for recommending inclusion of Sheikh Shuail Island is merely that its acquisition would enable us to complete our lighting scheme.

Question of price which we might offer or ultimately pay is somewhat difficult to deal with. We think that in negotiating with




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٥٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٨٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٦٠] (٣٤٤/٢٨٩)



COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM

II.

DATED

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

with Persian Govt. we should approach it first from the purely commercial standpoint; but in any case we must first decide what in the last resort bargain is worth to us from all standpoints collectively.

It will be seen from the terms of Main's concession of 1904 that he paid approximately £6000 for the farm of the first four Islands together with the fertile district of Minab and other odd localities on the mainland. Though we are not certain of being able to obtain confirmation of figures in time, we understand that it was currently believed in the Gulf that including proceeds of oxide industry, Main cleared £16,000 a year from his old farm. Thus substituting Sheikh Shuaib for Minab we should not be standing to lose if we paid £22,000 for the lease of the five islands. Persian Govt. however have presumably never realized more than £6000 paid by the Main.

Above estimate takes no account of promising prospects of oil on Kishm, vide Pascoe's recent geological report of potential value, which the Persian Govt. are probably not aware of.


Calculating on above basis and subject to your consideration of estimates of other Departments of State interested, we are of opinion that we might begin discussion with an offer of £12,000 a year for the five islands and should not do badly if we obtained lease for £25,000; and that acquisition of islands is so important that it would be worth our while to pay £50,000 or even more if necessary. In expressing this view we assume that if any portion of cost of scheme is thrown on Indian revenues, it will not be more than half.


Should the Persian Govt. refuse to deal regarding Hormuz we would suggest a clause in lease insuring that island will not be leased to the Govt. or subject of any other Power, and that no further oxide concession be given except with the consent of British Govt. Though point is not immediately relevant we venture to suggest incidentally that if negotiations take shape we should take opportunity to endeavour to secure some of desiderata mentioned in Bushire telegram No. 115 referred to in my telegram of Jan. 18th 1913.

24th = 285/13



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٩٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجارة). [١٦١] (٣٤٤/٢٩١)

(161)

1755

3615
13

Register No. ~~1728~~
~~1613~~

Put away with 3615
13

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARIES		Letter from... Dated	1914.
No 15 M. dated		dated May 4:	
(1613) 9 APR 1914		Rec. May 5.	Rec. 27 April,
		(1728)	(1755)
Letter from Admiralty		SUBJECT.	
Date.	Initials.		
8 May	Att	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Persian Gulf</u></p> <p>Muni-ut. Tajiri's Commission.</p> <p>Voice of Admiralty as to acquisition of H.M.S. of long lease of the islands.</p>	
8	P.W.H		
10	C.		
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to C.O. 29 April, 1914 (1613)
u - India (1728) and (1755) - See with...

FOR INFORMATION.

(1563)


Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
12 MAY 1914

Previous Papers :-
1424
1563

15294. I. 804. 2000.-6/1913. [1486/12.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٩٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٦٢ و] (٣٤٤/٢٩٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٢ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٩٤)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٣] (٣٤٤/٢٩٥)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [٦٣ اظ] (٣٤٤/٢٩٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٤] (٣٤٤/٢٩٧)



absolute command over the terminus of the projected Trans-Persian railway and the proposed line of route of the extension between Bander Abbas and Karachi.

4.- The establishment of British administration in these Islands would very greatly increase British influence in these regions, and would enable effective control to be maintained over the activities of the Baharloo and Bashkard tribes in case they showed signs of wishing to interfere with British interests in Southern Persia.

5.- It would also much strengthen the British position on the Trucial coast as there is constant intercourse between the Arab tribes on the Persian littoral and in the Islands, and the tribes on the Arabian Coast.

6.- It would give H. M. Government a more direct interest in the conservation of the pearl fisheries, and would greatly facilitate the working of the patrols that are now maintained for the preservation of peace in those waters. It would also provide a greatly improved base from which to maintain a watch over the Arms Traffic so as to prevent any recrudescence of that trade.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the India Office.


I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sd.) W. GRAHAM GREENE.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/٢٩٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٥] (٣٤٤/٢٩٩)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٦ و] (٣٤٤/٣٠١)

(166)

1563
1/14 Put away with 3615
+ 13

Despatched 18 May 1914.
[P.] 200

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)


*Foreign secret. My telegram 27 Apr.
Persian Gulf islands. May I soon expect
reply?*

*send
Att
18/5/14*

13960. I. 1435. 1000.—10/1912. [2429/11.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٧] (٣٤٤/٣٠٣)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٨ و] (٣٤٤/٣٠٥)

168

1863/14

Despatched 8 May 1914. +

[P.] Sm

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

*Foreign secret. My telegram 27th Apr.
Persian Gulf islands. Please expedite
reply.*


*and
att
8/5*

*Copy sent to G.O.
13 May '14*

18969. I. 1435. 1000.—10/1912. [2429/11.]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٨ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٦٩] (٣٤٤/٣٠٧)

3615/13

Register No. 1563

Put away with 3615/13 (169)

Secret Department.

Letter from O. 16885^{1st}

Dated 21 April, 1914.
Rec. 22

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	23 Ap.	J.S.	<u>Persian Gulf</u>
Secretary of State.....	24	J.W.A.	The Muin-ut-Tajjar's concession
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			Suggested acquisition of Larak, Anjam +
Secretary of State.....			Kishan by J ^r Peritiem on long lease.

Copy to India - see within
R.O. of telegram - 30 April 1914

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Lt. telegram to G.O.I. requesting their views.


27 April - telegram to Viceroy

12 MAY 1914
(with 175)

Previous Papers:—
WV 1337
PP 298 etc
14988. 1. 565. 1000.—5/1913.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٦٩ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٠٨)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٠] (٣٤٤/٣٠٩)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٠ظ] (٣٤٤/٣١٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧١ و] (٣٤٤/٣١١)



DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE
TO
VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

Despatched 27 April 1914.


2011

Foreign Secret. Main-ut-Tujjar.
Please see Tansley's telegram
No 107 of 17th April, and
telegraph your views as ~~soon~~ ^{early}
as possible.

1396B. I. 1435. 1000.—10/1912. [2429/11.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧١ظ] (٣٤٤/٣١٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٧٢و] (٣٤٤/٣١٣)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٢ظ] (٣٤٤/٣١٤)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٣ و] (٣٤٤/٣١٥)



(16885/14).

the islands should be dealt with subsequently, after
a decision on the main question shall have been
taken.

A similar letter has been addressed to the
Admiralty.


I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,

Ralph Paget




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٣ظ] (٣٤٤/٣١٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٤ و] (٣٤٤/٣١٧)



CONFIDENTIAL

174

Persia Pt.
Apr 17 3

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17, 12:35 P.M.)

Tehran, April 17, 1914.

(No. 107. Secret.)

(April 17, 1:40 P.M.)

SOME weeks ago, when discussing question of cancellation of Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession with Minister for Foreign Affairs, I put forward suggestion, as coming merely from myself personally, that possibly, in view of financial difficulties in which Persian Government found themselves, some arrangement might be come to under which His Majesty's Government might purchase or acquire on long lease islands of Larak, Henjam, and the whole of Kishm. Idea seemed to commend itself to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that sale would be impossible, but that lease might be arranged if terms were made attractive. I said that a lease would of course imply total surrender, for period of its duration, of the islands upon which British flag would be hoisted for such purposes as His Majesty's Government might require.


Nothing more was said on the subject until two days ago, when, upon my again referring to question of Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession, Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether I could give him some idea how much His Majesty's Government would be prepared to pay as rent for islands. I answered that I had no idea, as suggestion had never been submitted to you, and I had no notion of how such a proposal would be received.

At his Excellency's request, I promised to lay matter before you by telegraph.


N.B. F.O. has been called
to minister Sir W.T.
to repeat this tel
to India.


RECEIVED IN
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
22 APR 1914

[440-254]



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٤ظ] (٣٤٤/٣١٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٧٥] (٣٤٤/٣١٩)

(175)

Register No. **1356** Put away with **3615** 13

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from to. Dated } 2 April 1914.
Rec. }

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....		<u>Persia</u> Mun-at-Tujjar's Concession
Secretary of State.....		
Committee.....		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State.....		

Copy to India. 3 April 14

FOR INFORMATION.

Keep out 7/4


Seen Pol. Com'ce.,
21 APR 1914
(with 132)


Previous Papers:—
1337
502 +c

12294. I. 804. 2000.—6/1913. [1486/12]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٥ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢٠)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٦ و] (٣٤٤/٣٢١)



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

P
1356
1914

[March 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 12.

[10389]

No. 1.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 51.)

Tehran, February 18, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 239 of the 29th October last, transmitting a translation of Muin-ut-Tujjar's "concession" of the 9th September, 1913, I now have the honour to transmit a French translation, supplied by the Treasurer-General to Mr. Maclean, of the agreement between Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Ministry of Public Works, dated the 21st December, 1911, containing twelve articles.

I would refer you in this connection to Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 238 of the 4th December, 1911, transmitting translation of a Bill passed by the Medjliss on the 2nd November, 1911. Article 8 of this Bill declared that an agreement will subsequently be drawn up between Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Ministry of Public Works, and the enclosed document is a translation of the agreement in question.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Agreement dated December 21, 1911.

(Translation.)

ENTRE le Ministère des Travaux publics, d'une part, et Hadj Agha Mohammed Mouin-et-Todjar de Bouchir, de l'autre, conformément à l'arrangement concernant l'exploitation de l'oxyde de fer de l'île d'Ormuz, comprenant huit articles et approuvé par le Parlement, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

Article 1^{er}. Le Gouvernement cède à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar la mine d'oxyde de fer de l'île d'Ormuz pour une durée de dix ans, prenant cours depuis le 1^{er} hamal itt-il, 1328; sous condition que le prénommé observe scrupuleusement les engagements faits, en vertu d'un accord séparé, par l'ex-Cabinet des Ministres, au 16 zilghadeh, 1328, vis-à-vis de MM. Strick, jusqu'à l'expiration de cet accord, dont la durée est de cinq années solaires. Si le prénommé Hadj agit contrairement aux dispositions de l'accord précité et que son agissement occasionne certains préjudices au Gouvernement, le susdit Hadj sera tenu de répondre de tous ces préjudices.

Art. 2. Pour toute quantité excédant les 13,000 tonnes d'oxyde de fer appartenant à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar, dont le stock a été acheté par le Gouvernement et que mandat a été donné au prénommé Hadj de prendre 4,000^l. sur le prix de 11,294 tonnes de ce minéral, le Gouvernement s'engage à verser à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar les 15 pour cent du prix, à titre de frais d'exploitation de l'oxyde qui, selon l'accord, doit être délivrée à MM. Strick jusqu'à concurrence de 30,000 tonnes.

Il a été, toutefois, convenu que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar paiera au Gouvernement, à raison de 42¹/₂ s. la tonne, le prix de toute quantité d'oxyde qui serait nécessaire pour compléter le chiffre de 13,000 tonnes; mais, qu'il ne touchera rien du chef du prix de la quantité qui dépasserait les 13,000 tonnes.

Art. 3. Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar s'engage à payer au Gouvernement jusqu'à l'échéance de la durée de l'accord de MM. Strick, le restant du prix de l'oxyde de fer acheté par MM. Strick, déduction faite de la quantité de 13,000 tonnes.

Dans le cas de non-paiement des termes de ce prix, le Gouvernement aura le droit de résilier cet arrangement.


Art. 4. Si, avant l'expiration de l'accord passé entre le Gouvernement et MM. Strick, soit pendant la durée des cinq premières années, Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar vend, après la livraison et à part des 30,000 tonnes vendues à MM. Strick, une quantité d'oxyde quelconque à MM. Strick, ou autre, il devra en payer les 75 pour cent du prix au Gouvernement.

Art. 5. Les 75 pour cent de l'oxyde qui sera exploité de l'île précitée après

[2063 i—12]

RECEIVED IN
2 APR 1914
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Copy to Jabra
3 APR 1914



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢٢)

2

l'expiration du délai de l'accord de MM. Strick, appartiendront au Gouvernement, et les 25 pour cent à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar du chef des frais et d'indemnité.

Art. 6. Toutes les opérations que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar fera vis-à-vis des particuliers au sujet de l'oxyde de fer devront être avec information du Gouvernement.

Art. 7. Toute quantité d'oxyde exploitée et emmagasinée par Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar, dans le cours des dix ans, en plus de la quantité vendue, appartiendra au Gouvernement.

Art. 8. Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar s'engage à payer au Ministère des Travaux publics, à la fin de chaque mois, une somme de 850L. du chef de l'oxyde de fer exporté, à partir du 1^{er} hamal itt-il jusqu'à fin houtte bars-il 1332; le montant des sommes dues au Gouvernement sera calculé, à la fin de la période de douze mois, d'après les documents concernant les ventes successives faites par Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar pendant cette période. Si la somme de 10,200L. que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar versera au Gouvernement dans le courant des douze mois sera moindre que les 85 pour cent des produits de vente d'oxyde devant être fournis au Gouvernement, le restant de la somme due à ce dernier devra lui être payé à la fin du douzième mois; mais dans le cas que cette somme dépassera le montant de la somme due au Gouvernement, l'excédent sera porté aux comptes du chef des termes des paiements de l'année suivante.

Il a été également convenu que le restant du prix des 13,000 tonnes d'oxyde de Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar sera déduit du montant des paiements qui seront dus au Gouvernement à partir de la signature du présent arrangement. La mode de paiement des termes dus par Mouin-et-Todjar dans la période des cinq dernières années sera conforme à ce qui précède; mais le montant du paiement mensuel que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar doit effectuer au Gouvernement sera déterminé au commencement de la seconde période de cinq ans.

Art. 9. Outre l'engagement que s'est fait Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar suivant l'esprit de l'article 6 ci-dessus, le prénommé s'engage aussi à se procurer l'autorisation du Ministère des Travaux publics en ce qui concerne toutes les questions de transmission ou transfert du présent arrangement.

Art. 10. Toutes les fois que le Ministère des Travaux publics désirera charger provisoirement ou d'une manière permanente ses agents d'examiner et de contrôler l'exploitation et l'exportation de l'oxyde, Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar se chargera de donner les instructions nécessaires à ses agents et représentants pour accorder aide et assistance aux agents du susdit Ministère.


Art. 11. Tous les firmans et documents concernant l'oxyde de fer* que Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar a entre ses mains sont considérés comme nuls et le Ministère des Travaux publics ne reconnaît valable que le présent arrangement, en ayant soin d'agir envers le prénommé Hadj conformément aux onze articles ci-dessus.

Art. 12. La quantité d'oxyde de fer exportée de l'île d'Ormuz ainsi que la quantité d'oxyde de Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar mentionnée dans l'article 2 ci-dessus; le montant de la somme versée au Gouvernement; le montant des termes de paiement de la somme de 24,000L. qui, selon l'ordonnance du Ministère des Finances, doit être versée à Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar; les frais effectués par l'Administration des Douanes pour nouvelle exploitation de l'oxyde, à raison de 15 pour cent; et, enfin, tous ces comptes devant être exactement et minutieusement fixés et déterminés—il a été convenu que les clauses concernant le présent article seront préparées après la désignation de ce qui précède et annexées, à l'échéance, au présent arrangement.

L'arrangement fait entre le Ministère des Travaux publics et le sieur Hadj Mouin-et-Todjar de Bouchir comprenant douze articles, dont sept (de 1^{er} à 7) ont été approuvés par le Parlement et cinq autres ajoutés par le Ministère préappellé conformément aux dispositions des sept premiers articles, est complètement exact; il est fait en double expédition suivant l'approbation du Parlement, en date du 29 zilhadj, 1329 (21 décembre, 1911).

Le Ministère des Travaux publics,
MOCHIR-ED-DOWLEH (HASSAN).

* Dans l'île d'Ormuz.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٧٧و] (٣٤٤/٣٢٣)

(177)

Register No. **502** Put away with **3615/13**

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from ... Dated } 10. Feb. 1913.
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	10 Feb.	J.S.	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Iranian Gulf</u></p> <p>Minut-t-Tujjar's concessions : instructions to Sir W. Tomley.</p>
Secretary of State.....	11	J.W.H.	
Committee.....	12	Σ	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - 13 Feb. 1914


FOR INFORMATION.

Sir E. Grey's telegram of 7 Feb., which is based on an official letter of 26 Jan. last, was sent after informal consultation with this Office: see Sir T. Alderson's minute of 6 Feb. below.


Seen Pol. Com'ce.,
17 FEB 1914

Previous Papers:—
399 etc

15294. 1, 864. 2000—6/1913. [1488/12.]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢٤)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٧٨ و] (٣٤٤/٣٢٥)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٨ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢٦)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٧٩] (٣٤٤/٣٢٧)

P502
14
As proposed. 9/-
is in accord with
the views expressed Jan 27
- our letter of 26 Jan 27
2. W. H. (174)

Sir T. Holderness, 6/2
Mun-ut-Tujjar's concession
The F.O. send these papers over
in order to obtain our concurrence in
the oft. telegram to Sir W. Tomley.
I have shown the oft. tel. to Sir P. Cox,
who saw Sir E. Grey personally on Wednesday
about this question; he considers the
terms suitable, but suggests the slight
addition suggested in pencil on
p. 3 of the oft. x


I submit that I be authorized
to inform the F.O. that we concur
in the oft. - which is mainly based
on

in accordance with file
J.S. 6/2/14

x Separating the
Anglo-Persian Oil Co's
rights.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٧٩ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٢٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز معين التجار). [١٨٠] (٣٤٤/٣٢٩)

Register No. P 298

Put away with 3615/13

Secret Department.

Letter from FO

Dated 21 } January 1913.
Rec. 22 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	23 Jan.	AA	Persian Gulf Munis-ul-Tujjar's Commission. Question of Cancellation. Further views of Sir L. Swire
Secretary of State.....	24	J. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 16, 23 & 30 Jan. 1914.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. letter to F.O. (after consultation with Sir P. Cox) making suggestions as to course now to be taken.

26 January 1914. Letter to F.O.


Seen Hol. Com'ee.,
14 FEB 1914

Previous Papers:—
286

14688. I. 505. 1000.—5/1913.



ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٠ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٣٠)





181

Memor. by Sir P. Cox

We clearly need something further than the mere cancellation of the concession; and I despatched my telegram of 23rd Oct in the view that that the flagrant breach of their assurances by the Persian Govt reported in Munster's Telegram of 27th Sep^r & the defiant attitude of the Moir gave us very good grounds for going further than the demand for cancellation and making certain demands on the Persian Govt.

~~It remains now a question of time~~
If we can take that line now it is undoubtedly the most satisfactory course. If we are not in a position to go through with it then I suggest -


(1) That we should arrange for a new concession to include the islands to be given to a British firm approved by us, with the Moir as partner if ^{being} ~~being~~ excluded.

or

(2) Agree to the concession being restored to Moir minus Karak, Keshur & Kenam, & require Persian Govt




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨١ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٣٢)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٢] (٣٤٤/٣٣٣)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٢ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٣٤)







ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٣ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٣٦)

only suggest either 1) that a new concession
sh. be arranged, including the islands, to
be given to a British firm approved by
H.M.G., with the Muiri ~~and~~ in partnership,
& foreign participation expressly excluded,
or 2) that H.M.G. sh. agree to the restoration
of the concession to the Muiri, Larak, Kishm
& Herjoom being excluded, & obtain from the
Persian Govt. a written assurance that no
concession on these islands will be given
except on terms, & to a British firm,
(approved by H.M.G.)


In either case it wd. appear desirable
that the whole of the island of Kishm &
not merely the "more important part" (as
proposed in Sir G. Jowley's let^r of 18th Dec.)
sh. be specified, & that any concession
on the islands to a British firm sh. be
permanent & not for short terms only as
suggested by the Report (see Sir G. Jowley's
let^r n^o 355 of Oct. 13).

These views have the concurrence of
Sir P. Cox.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٤] (٣٤٤/٣٣٧)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٤ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٣٨)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٥] (٣٤٤/٣٣٩)



CONFIDENTIAL

298

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 2 P.M.)

(No. 16.) R.

Tehran, January 15, 1914.

(January 15, 2:20 P.M.)

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 14th January: Muin-ut-Tujjar.

The answer to (1) must depend on the amount of pressure which it is proposed to exert. I had in mind possible threat of occupation of islands when I despatched my telegram No. 415. I have not forgotten that I once put such a suggestion forward, but it seemed to me my duty, perhaps unnecessarily, to call your attention to the possible effect of such a step.


(2.) All mining rights should be secured for British firm supported by His Majesty's Government.



[121-185]




ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٥ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٤٠)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٦ و] (٣٤٤/٣٤١)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٦ ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٤٢)






ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٧ و] (٣٤٤/٣٤٣)





ملف رقم ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥، الجزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي: استتجار الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). [١٨٧ظ] (٣٤٤/٣٤٤)





ملف ١٩١٣/٣٦١٥ ، الجزأين ٢-٣ ، "الخليج الفارسي: استنجاز الجزر (وامتياز
معين التجار). احتلال جزر الخليج الفارسي في حال وقوع حرب مع بلاد فارس"
[خلفي-داخلي] (٣٨٢/٣٨٢)

