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| | |
|-------------------|---|
| المراجع | IOR/L/PS/10/132 |
| العنوان | ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية للشيخ." |
| التاريخ/ التواريخ | ١٩٠٤-١٩١٠ (ميلادي) |
| لغة الكتابة | الإنجليزية في اللاتينية |
| الحجم والشكل | مجلد واحد (٢٠٣ ورقة) |
| المؤسسة المالكة | المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند |
| حق النشر | <u>رخصة حكومة مفتوحة</u> |

حول هذا السجل

تُناقش المراسلات الوضع فيما يتعلق بالتطمينات البريطانية المقدمة لشيخ المحمرة. يتضمن المجلد وصفًا لملاحظة الشيخ أنه على الرغم من حسن تصرفه تجاه البريطانيين إلا أنه لم يُمنح نفس القدر من الدعم الممنوح لغيره من شيوخ العرب في الخليج مثل شيخ الكويت أو شيخ البحرين. تتضمن الرسائل تقريرًا عن التوضيح المُقدم لشيخ المحمرة بأن بريطانيا اعترفت باستقلال البحرين والكويت بحكم القانون وبحكم الأمر الواقعيًا؛ وعلى النقيض من ذلك اعترف البريطانيون بسيادة الشاه على المحمرة.

تتناول المراسلات الجوانب العملية للاتفاقيات الجمركية بين الشاه وشيخ المحمرة توسطها البريطانيون. تتناول الرسائل الظروف التي بموجبها يمكن لبريطانيا التدخل عسكريًا لحماية مصالحها في وادي كارون في حالة اندلاع اضطرابات عقب تدخل الشاه.

تُناقش المراسلات نطاق وصيغة كلمات التطمينات التي يتعين تقديمها إلى شيخ المحمرة وأحفاده من


الذكور وذلك في حالة اندلاع اضطرابات عقب تغيير النظام الفارسي، إما أن يصبح ذو طبيعة ملكية أو قومية أو دستورية وكذلك عقب النزاعات مع خانات بختياري.

تتضمن أطراف المراسلات كلاً من: الشيخ خزعل خان، السردار أرفع، شيخ المحمرة؛ الوكيل السري لشيخ المحمرة؛ الرائد بيرسي زكريا كوكس، قنصل بريطانيا في بوشهر؛ السير إدوارد جراي، وزير الدولة للشؤون الخارجية؛ القائم بأعمال القنصل في المحمرة.

يشتمل كل جزء على فاصل يوضح الموضوع وأرقام الأجزاء والسنة التي فُتح فيها ملف الموضوع وعنوان الموضوع وقائمة مراجع المراسلات الواردة في ذلك الجزء مرتبة حسب السنة. هذا الفاصل في نهاية المراسلات.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [أمامي] (٤١٦/١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ: " [خلفي] (٤١٦/٢)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ: " [صلب] (٤١٦/٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [حافة] (٤١٦/٤)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [رأس] (٤١٦/٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [نيل] (٤١٦/٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [أمامي-داخلي] (٤١٦/٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢و] (٤١٦/٨)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢ظ] (٤١٦/٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣] [١٠/١٦٤]

Previous File
P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.
345
1908

Subject :

Mohammerah :- Situation.
British assurances to Sheikh.

This file contains the following papers :--

| YEAR. | |
|--------|--|
| 1904 . | P. 2354 2454 2624 |
| 1908 . | P. 345 2914 3225 3628 1241 1336 3828 |
| 1909 . | P. 450 460 3115 3165 3176 3231 571 3252 1050 3985 1654 4322 |
| 1910 . | P. 2921 3071 3161-2 3226 3243 3266 3267 |

Memoranda.


continued in 345 ②
OP

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ: " [٣ظ] (٤١٦/١١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤و] (١٦/١٢)

2

Register No.
3266
(3267)

Minute Paper.

Letter from FO. Dated } 13, 18, 19 April 1910.
Rec.

Secret Department.

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | 22 Apr. | East | Persia Relations of Sheikh of Mohammed. -at with Bakhtiari, + Sardar Assad. Agreement between the Sheikh and Soviet of pacific nature. |
| Secretary of State..... | 23 | M. | |
| Committee | 27. | M. | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to India.
See within

FOR INFORMATION.


Exam Pol Com ca.
3 MAY 1910

Previous Papers :—
3243

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ: " [٤٤] [١٣/٤١٦]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥] [١٤/١٦٤]







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provided that they are able to maintain their own independent position and are left to manage their tribal affairs like the Arab sheikhs of the opposite coast.

He was very frank in giving me his views on the present state of affairs in Southern Persia, and they are worth note. He was much interested in the rising of Shahbancara containing allusions to the trouble into which the events at Ardebil had thrown the Government; both chiefs evidently had a poor opinion of the prospects of the Medjliss. Haidar Khan said that the Medjliss had no "shalude" in Iran, which was composed of many distinct elements, and that as regards Bushire, at any rate, it was only to please the local governor that the so-called elections had been held. The tribesmen cared little for what the Bushire Anjuman said. Ismail Khan wrote in a similar strain.

Tribal Distrust of Present Minister of Interior.—But the point on which he laid most stress was the mistrust by the southern tribes of the Sardar Assad as Minister of the Interior, and their irreconciliation to anything which seemed to threaten a Bakhtiari predominance over them.

According to Haidar Khan, the Lur and Kashgai tribes with which he is connected thought that Sardar Assad wished to institute a Bakhtiari sovereignty. They saw Nejed Kuli Khan, Minister of the Interior. The Samsam-es-Sultaneh at Isfahan, Ilyas Khan appointed to Behbahan (which is Kuhgelu country, and for long under the Fars Government), one Bakhtiari sent to Yezd and another nominally as head of the military forces of Fakhr-ul-Mulk, governor of Arabistan, though really to institute a Bakhtiari surveillance over the Sardar Arfa.

He understood that two important personages had fathomed the "designs" of the Sardar Assad, viz., Soulet-ed-Dowleh, Ilkhani of the Kashgais, and Sardar Arfa, sheikh of Mohammerah.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh has about 2,000,000 men under his command, and is treated like a king in his tribe; he is really a greater chieftain than the Bakhtiari Khans, and did not relish one of them over him as Minister of the Interior. That was the position generally taken up by the Kashgai and Lur tribes, of which the Hayat Daoudis are an offshoot. The Lurs of Fars were continually making raids on the Bakhtiaris, and, as regards the government of a Bakhtiari Khan in Behbahan over the overlordship of the Sardar Assad as Minister of the Interior, they would not submit (tamkin nemikunand). Haidar Khan also stated that Soulet-ed-Dowleh had written to himself and to other khans, e.g., of Shahbancara representing his objections to the present régime.

There is considerable confirmation from other sources of the views thus assigned to the Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Sardar Arfa.

Mr. Wilson is constantly referring to Sheikh Khazal's misgivings as to the intentions of the Sardar Assad and Bakhtiari interference in Arabistan, evidently foreseeing future attacks on his own position.


As to the Soulet-ed-Dowleh, it seems quite possible that the bottom of all the present raiding in Fars, and disagreement between the Governor-General and the Ilkhani may be the latter's dislike of the Sardar Assad occupying the position of Minister of the Interior. A Shirazi well connected with the Kashgai tribe has told us that the Soulet-ed-Dowleh in his correspondence will not give the usual titles of the Minister of the Interior to Sardar Assad. Mr. Christmas and his party on their way from Shiraz were stopped by a large force of Kashgais at Dashtarjin, and one of the chiefs asked Mr. Christmas much to his surprise whether he remembered the story of Charles II. "We are going to bring back Mohammed Ali Shah, just as they did Charles II." Mr. Bill, writing on the 1st December, thinks that the Soulet-ed-Dowleh is evidently determined to show his hostility to the present régime by all the means in his power.

Lawless state of Kuhgelu country.—Haidar Khan also gave me in the course of conversation details which show the wild and independent nature of the tribes north-west of Shiraz.

The Boir-Ahmedi tribe, which was alleged to have assaulted M. Passek has, for the last few years been most unruly. It numbers 7,000 riflemen at least, and they are cunning fighters (the Kughelu of whom they form a clan number more than 100,000, it was estimated). The former have killed all their own prominent chiefs, this year Wali Khan and Shahin Khan, his son; last year Kerim Khan, Bahadur-ed-Dowleh with twenty-five men of the tribe who were escorting Zeigham-ed-Dowleh, ex-Ilkhani of the Kashgais on his way to Behbahan as governor. Zeigham was only released from imprisonment after great difficulty by Soulet-ed-Dowleh his brother. They live in small fortresses in the mountains east of Behbahan where they have supplies of provisions and water.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧] (١٨/١٦٤)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧ظ] (٤١٦/١٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨و] (٤١٦/٢٠)



3266 6
DECRYPER SIR. G. BARCLAY TEL. AN. D. 3.5 p. m. April 19.

D. 3.0 p. m.

(no: 176).

My telegram no: 167.

His Majesty's Acting Consul at Mohammerah reports an agreement, which he and ^{Co.} consider innocuous, was signed on April 15th between Sheikh and Solet and said Sheikh in doing so "yielded to our representations and has avoided anything which might raise trouble with Sirdar Assad but he now looks to us for protection from aggression open or concealed on the part of Sirdar Assad or any Bakhtiari Khans"

No telegram is to be sent to Mejliss.


I consider this so far satisfactory in that it should at any rate defer crisis.

Repeated to Bushire.

Copy to Sirdar
22 April 1910
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


ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢١)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩] [١٦/٢٢]






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للشيخ." [٩ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠] [٤١٦/٢٤]



CONFIDENTIAL.



Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17, 1 P.M.)

(No. 167.)

Tehran, April 17, 1910, 2:15 P.M.

MY telegram No. 166.

Following sent to consular officer at Mohammerah:—

“ My telegram No. 26.

“ Sardar Assad declares reports of Bakhtiari aggressions to be quite untrue. There are no Bakhtiaris now in Arabistan. They are engaged in operations against Kuhgelui robbers.

“ He says that his sentiments towards sheikh are of the most friendly kind.”


Above telegram to Mohammerah is No. 27

*Copy to Saudi
22 April 1910
Serial No.*

[378-45]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠ظ] (٤١٦/٢٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١ و] (٤١٦/٢٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوض. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢] [٤١٦/٢٨]

Register No. 3243
~~3246~~

Secret Department.

Letter from FO. Dated 18 April 1910.
Rec. 19 April 1910.

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary..... | 19 Apr. | last | Mohammurah. Wnt |
| Secretary of State..... | 19 | PK | Proposal of the Council General at Basrah |
| Committee..... | 20 | M. | to extend the assurances already authorised to be |
| Under Secretary..... | 26 | last | given to the Sheikh of Mohammurah. |
| Secretary of State..... | | | FO. propose to assent to Sir G. Barclay's |
| | | | suggestion that such extension is entirely |
| | | | unnecessary. |

Copy to India (see within)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Sft. letter to F.O. concerning.

26 April 1910. Sft. approved P.C. Council

28 April - Letter to Foreign Office


(Telegram to Mr. Marling, No. 118, May 2, added May 4)

Previous Papers:—
3226

6540. I. 1686. 500.—9/1909. [I. 725.]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٣ظ] (٤١٦/٣١)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٤] [٤١٦/٣٢]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤١٦/٣٣]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥] [٤١٦/٣٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٣٥)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٦] (٤١٦/٣٦)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧] [٤١٦/٣٨]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧ظ] (٤١٦/٣٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨ و] (٤١٦/٤٠)



CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14, 1910 P.M.)

(No. 156.)

Tehran, April 14, 1910, 2:10 P.M.

FOLLOWING are the observations of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire on my telegram No. 152 [of 11th April]:—

"Your telegram No. 152 to the Foreign Office.

"Assurance contained in sentence indicated will be welcome to sheikh on general grounds, but as long as Sardar Assad remains Minister of Interior it will not dispose of present difficulty unless words 'or Bakhtiari tribe' could be interpolated after words 'Persian Government.' In this connection, please see paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of Trevor's telegram No. 170.

"I quite realise, however, that in matter of retirement of Sardar Assad the interests of north and south conflict, and some compromise is necessary. A change of portfolio might improve situation, though it would not fully appease.

"It would of course be very difficult, as well as inconsistent with the principles of our policy, for us to guarantee Arabistan against aggression of Bakhtiari tribe or guarantee Bakhtiari against Kashgai, but, presuming that we cannot intervene in inter-tribal politics, can we reasonably persevere in forcing advice on the sheikh against the consequences of which we are unable to protect him?

"He is quite alive to necessity for maintaining strictly constitutional and loyal attitude to central Government, and also to the need of avoiding action calculated to complicate situation in Northern Persia.

"Wilson understands from Haji Rais that first result of any arrangement come to between three parties under reference would be diplomatic telegram to Medjliss expressing complete individual and collective loyalty to constitution and ability and intention to maintain order and protect trade in their respective spheres, but at the same time urging the imprudence of placing the control of national affairs in the hands of tribal heads, who cannot be expected to refrain from using their position to pursue tribal aims.


"(Addressed to Tehran; repeated to India.)"

I am instructing His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah to give sheikh message indicated in my telegram No. 152, and I do not see why we need go further in our assurances. From resident's telegrams it would seem that if Sardar Assad were to leave Government he would have no further terrors for sheikh. The assurance we are now giving latter surely applies to Sardar Assad so soon as he is in the Government.


I have no desire to force on sheikh advice against the consequences of which we should be unable to protect him, but I see no harm in emphasising the fact that assurances depend on his loyalty to central Government.


(Repeated to Bushire.)

[379—75]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨ ظ] (٤١٦/٤١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية للشيخ." [١٩] [٤١٦/٤٢]

17

Register No.
3226

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letters from **70.** Dated 11, 12, 14, 15 } **Apr.** 1910.
Rec. 11, 12, 14, 15, 18

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | 18 Apr. | ZAH | <u>Persia.</u> Question of assurances to Sheikh of Mohammerah. Difficulty of guaranteeing Arabistan against Bakhtiari aggression, & Presence of Sardar Assad in Persian Cabinet. Autocommunication to Russian Min ^r at Tehran regarding assurances. |
| Secretary of State..... | 18 | KK | |
| Committee..... | | | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

70. 80/8
with 3243

Seen Pol Home
26 April 1910
(with 3243)


Copy to **INDIA**
15 April 1910 (see within)
SECRETARY'S NO. 15

FOR INFORMATION.

The Telegrams deal with the plans of the Sheikh of Mo. -hammerah for joining with Soviet & the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh to resist the Bakhtiari influence at Isfahan of Sardar Assad, the Minister of the Interior. So reassured the Sheikh it was decided to give him at once the assurance indicated in the first sentence of Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 207, 9 Nov. last, Encl. 2, viz: "that no matter what change may take place in the form of the Govt. of Persia, and whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, the British Govt. will be

Previous Papers:—
3161-2

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.




" prepared to afford you the support
" necessary for obtaining a satisfactory
" solution in the event of any encroach-
" ments by the Persian Govt. on your
" jurisdiction & recognized rights or on
" your property in Persia."

Col. Lee was doubtful as to
the sufficiency of this assurance to
meet the special point in view, viz.
the Sheikh's fear of Sardar Assad.
The difficulty may, however, now
be removed, since Sir J. Buxton's
telegram of the 15th April reports the
resignation of the Prime Minister & the
likely reconstruction of the Cabinet. A
Reuters message of yesterday said also
that Sardar Assad himself had
resigned.

18th April. A later telegram from Sir J.
Buxton, dated 16th Ap., states that
Sardar Assad had declared he was
about to resign.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٠] (٤١٦/٤٤)



16
18
DECYPHER SIR G BARCLAY TEHRAN D. 1.35 p.m. APRIL 16.

D. 11.50 a.m.

(NO 164)




My telegram no 152.

I have advised Sardar Assad in sense proposed. He still affects to make light of attitude of southern chiefs but he told me he had sent reassuring messages to both Soulet and Sheikh of Mohammerah conditional on their loyalty.


Confidential. He told me he was about to resign and later to proceed to Europe for medical treatment. He assured me that Bakhtiari force would remain in Tehran under proper command.

Sent to H.M. Representative at Bushire no 81.

Copy to India
22 April 1910
Secy's 16





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠ ظ] (٤١٦/٤٥)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢١ و] (٤١٦/٤٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢١ظ] (٤١٦/٤٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٢ و] (٤١٦/٤٨)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٣ و] (٤١٦/٥٠)



CONFIDENTIAL

Already
circulated 21

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay (Tehran).

(No. 98.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1910, 4:30 P.M.

[RUSSIAN concession in the Karun district.]

Can you ascertain whether Tariverdieff has a valid concession from the Persian Government?


The Sheikh of Mohammerah apparently claims the district as within his jurisdiction, and it will be extremely awkward if Germans secure any rights there, in view of new assurance which we propose to give to the sheikh.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, No. 176.)

[379-80]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٣ظ] (٤١٦/٥١)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٤ و] (٤١٦/٥٢)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٤ظ] (٤١٦/٥٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٥ و] (٤١٦/٥٤)

23

I am instructing H.M. Consul at Mohammerah to give Sheikh message indicated in my telegram no 152 and I do not see why we need go further in our assurances. From Resident's telegram it would seem that if Sardar Assad were to leave Government he would have no further terrors for Sheikh. The assurance we are now giving latter surely applies to Sardar Assad so soon as he is in the Government.

I have no desire to force on Sheikh advice against the consequences of which we should be unable to protect him but I see no harm in emphasising the fact that assurances depend on his loyalty to central Government.

Repeated to Bushire.

**RESIGNATION OF THE PERSIAN
PREMIER.**


ST. PETERSBURG, APRIL 14.

The following telegram has been received from Teheran :

"As the result of the victory of the Extreme Nationalists in the Mejliss, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have tendered their resignations. It is stated that Mustaf el Mamalek, now Minister of Finance, will be the Prime Minister in the new Government."—
Easter.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٥٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٦ و] (٤١٦/٥٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٦ظ] (٤١٦/٥٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٧ و] (٤١٦/٥٨)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٧ظ] (٤١٦/٥٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٨ ظ] (٤١٦/٦١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٩ و] (٤١٦/٦٢)



3226
DECRYPTED SIR G BARCLAY TEHRAN D. 2. P.M. APRIL 9
2. 2.15 P.M.

27

(NO 148)

Following from Cox at Fao.




" In view of urgent letters awaiting me on arrival from
Sheikhs in question I have just visited Koweit and Mohammerah.

I found latter Sheikh in nervous and agitated state.
Agents of Soulet and Pusht-i-Kuh are now with him. He represents that
unless we can see our way to give him specific written guarantee
of protection against further Bakhtiari aggression he cannot cut
himself adrift from, and thereby make enemies of, Pusht-i-Kuh and
Soulet and that if he cannot receive such guarantee in reasonable
time, say a week, he will have no alternative than to enter into
some compact with them for self-preservation. He promises however
that any agreement he may make with them shall be colourless and
absolutely constitutional and shall commit him to no aggressive
action. These chiefs regard Sardar Assad as fast acquiring position
of a Dictator over whom a discordant Medjliss has practically no
control and consider Persian Government has become synonymous
for Bakhtiari domination.

It is my belief that if dignified retirement of Sardar
Assad from the Cabinet could be brought about it would at once quiet
the activity of Soulet and allay existing tension in Arabistan
and Pars. On the other hand his continuance in his present post
and




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٩ظ] (٤١٦/٦٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٠] (٤١٦/٦٤)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٠ظ] (٤١٦/٦٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣١ و] (٤١٦/٦٦)

29

Register No.
3161-2

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O., Dated 23, - 31 March 1910.
Rec. 23, - March, 1910.

Formally acknowledged _____

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------|---|
| | | <u>KB</u> | <u>Persia.</u> |
| Under Secretary..... | <u>1 Apr.</u> | <u>zab</u> | <u>Question of assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Objections to form words such as made use of in agreement with Emir of Afghanistan: suggestion that form originally proposed in F.O. should be used accompanied by verbal explanations to the Sheikh by Major Col.</u> |
| Secretary of State..... | <u>2</u> | <u>KU</u> | |
| Committee..... | <u>6</u> | <u>M</u> | |
| Under Secretary..... | <u>12</u> | <u>zab</u> | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to India (Sec. W. B. I.)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. letter to F.O. agreeing

12 April 1910. Off. approved Pbl. Comm.


Letter to F.O., 13 April.


Previous Papers:—
2921 G.

6540, I, 1636, 500.—0/1900. [I. 725.]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣١ظ] (٤١٦/٦٧)





30


MINUTE.


The form of assurance proposed by the F.O. to
"H.M.S. will safeguard you to the best of their ability
"against an unprovoked attack by a foreign power or
"against any encroachment by such a power on your
"said jurisdiction & recognised rights or upon your
"property in Persia." This office suggested a
modification which Sir E. Grey is convinced will not
only not satisfy the Sheikh, but will actually frighten
him. It would be difficult therefore to press it;
& the original F.O. proposal, if accompanied by the
oral communication (to be subsequently reduced to
writing) which they now propose, seems to be quite
safe.

5610. I. 724. 1000-4/1909.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٢ظ] (٤١٦/٦٩)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٣ظ] (٤١٦/٧١)



which is intended for the Sheikh's personal
satisfaction as well as in that which is
to be shown to the Librarian.

(S) R. NITCHE.

by L. W.

H. M.


S. B.

W. J.

T. R.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٤] و [٤١٦/٧٢]






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للشيخ." [٣٤ظ] (٤١٦/٧٣)






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للشيخ. " [٣٥] [١٦/٧٤] (٤)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٥ظ] (٤١٦/٧٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٦ و] (٤١٦/٧٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٦ظ] (٤١٦/٧٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٧و] (٤١٦/٧٨)



(5618/10)


apprehensions, and that, rather than offer it to him, it would be preferable to endeavour to avoid the question till it is again pressed by him.

In view of the above considerations, in the cogency of which Major Cox entirely concurs, I am to express the hope that Lord Morley may see his way to withdraw the objections which he has raised to the adoption of the formula proposed in my letter above referred to.

In order, however, to remove all possibility of misunderstanding on the Sheikh's part of the nature and scope of the assurances, Sir E. Grey would suggest that Major Cox should receive instructions, when communicating to His Excellency the assurances in writing, to convey to him at the same time a verbal intimation that, while His Majesty's Government are perfectly sincere in their intentions towards him and have therefore given him these assurances, yet circumstances might arise in which it would be impossible for them to intervene by force on his behalf. In such a case he would, of course, receive the strongest diplomatic support. Major Cox would record in writing the substance of the conversation




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٧ظ] (٤١٦/٧٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٨ و] (٤١٦/٨٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٨ظ] (٤١٦/٨١)






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للشيخ." [٣٩و] (٤١٦/٨٢)






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للشيخ." [٣٩ظ] (٤١٦/٨٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٠] [٤١٦/٨٤]




DECYPHER. 31.61 38
SIR G. BARCLAY, TEHRAN, D. 3.35 p. m. March 23rd.
R. 3.15 p. m.
(No: 127).
My telegram no: 108 (Mar. 16)
Following from Acting Consul-General at Bushire.
" My telegrams nos 48 and 49 of February 23rd.
Sheikh very anxious to know if we will guarantee him
from internal aggression, vide paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement
in my telegram no: 48.
If not he says he must consult his own interests which
presumably means arrangements with all chiefs and Khans of South
and South-West who are hostile to the Bakhtiari.
I have instructed H. M. Consul at Mohammerah to tell
Sheikh Said that I am watching the situation closely and that I
think he exaggerates the dangers to himself from the Bakhtiari
influence. His best course is to remain loyal to the Persian Govt.
and if he still finds reason to complain of encroachments he should
submit his grievances to the central Government. Should satisfaction
be then refused him he could rely on my support.

25 March 1910
12




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٠ ظ] (٤١٦/٨٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١ و٤] (٤١٦/٨٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤١ ظ] (٤١٦/٨٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٤ و] (٤١٦/٨٨)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٢٤٢ ظ] (٤١٦/٨٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٣٤] و (٤١٦/٩٠)



of Tehran I shall be cutting my own throat.


3. But if British Government will guarantee me against internal aggression of Bakhtiari or central Government I will refrain from doing anything at all, if not I must consult my own interests and those of my tribes.' "

I defer comments until I see result of pressure which is being used on Sirdar Assad to effect compromise with Soulet .

I am telling Bushire to keep India informed.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٣٤٥] (٤١٦/٩١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٤ و] (٤١٦/٩٢)



Note & Packet
20/1/0 3161-2
42

India Office,
Whitehall. S.W.

Mr Hertz

I will prepare our formula -

The difference is the meaning

of the 70 formula, as they

interpret it and as they


intend the number 5

interpret it, makes it

very dangerous - No Doubt,




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للشيخ. " [٤٤ظ] (٤١٦/٩٣)



in an emergency, the nature
of the land ^{issue} ~~is~~ to be explained
away: but this ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~to~~ ^{to} be
done without ^{clear} ~~clear~~ ^{instructions} ~~instructions~~ on our
part ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~maintain~~ ^{maintain} the balance of
our policy & the role of action
in the future sense of the land.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٥] (٤١٦/٩٤)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٥ظ] (٤١٦/٩٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٦ و] (٤١٦/٩٦)





Sir R. Ritchie.

Please see Mr. Mallet's letter
below. His final note is, I presume,
with the F.O. : we were asked for
observations, & made them. The F.O.
formula is "H.M.G. will safeguard you
to the best of their ability against an
unprovoked attack"; our formula is :
"H.M.G. will be prepared to aid you to
such extent & in such manner as may
appear




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٦ ظ] (٤١٦/٩٧)








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للشيخ. " [٤٧ظ] (٤١٦/٩٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٨و] (٤١٦/١٠٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٨ظ] (٤١٦/١٠١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٤٩و] (٤١٦/١٠٢)



MEMORANDUM BY MAJOR COX. FEBRUARY 18, 1910.


It is only on the question of protection against aggression by land that any further comment from me seems needed. As regards the other points I am in agreement with the views expressed above.

In the matter of aggression by land, what is wanted, if possible, is for us to give the Sheikh some form of assurance which will really let him feel that we frankly do intend to do our best to safeguard him, as far as ^{possibly} we can, having regard to conditions existing in local and general politics, when, if ever, the emergency arises. The form "safeguard him to the best of our ability" seemed to Mr Mallet and myself to meet the case without committing us too much. In the formula used in the assurances given to the Amir there is nothing, I fear, which would satisfy the Sheikh of the bona fides of our intention to do the best we could do for him; and I strongly recommend that the India Office be pressed to accept the other form. I can think of nothing at present which would meet the case better.

It




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٩ظ] (٤١٦/١٠٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٠] (٤١٦/١٠٤)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٠ظ] (٤١٦/١٠٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥١] [١٠٦/٤١٦]

49

Register No.
3071

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from **FO,** Dated **28 Feb., 11th Mch. 1910.**
Rec. **28 Feb., 11th Mch. 1910.**

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|------------------------|--------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | 14 Mch | W.M. | Persia. Sheikh of Mohammerah and Bahktiaris. Bahktiaris ascending deeply resented in the south. Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh desirous of an agreement with Sheikh of Mohammerah against the Bahktiaris. |
| Secretary of State.... | 14 | W.M. | |
| Committee..... | 15. | M. | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State.... | | | |

Copy to
India. { 4 Mch Secy 9
11 " " 10
18 " " 11

FOR INFORMATION.
(An account of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh will be found in the annexed 'Report on Pusht-i-Kuh' by Capt. Loring, pp. 20-24: of his relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, pp. 42-44. He & the Sheikh are drawn closer together by the uncertainty of the outlook in Persian government.)

Scanned by: **Scanned Pol. Comm., 21 MAR. 2010**


Previous Papers:—

74 3012

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1900.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥١ظ] (٤١٦/١٠٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٥٢و] (٤١٦/١٠٨)



DECRYPTER SIR G BARCLAY TEHRAN D. 12.35 p.m. MARCH 14.
R. 11.15 p.m.

(NO 108)

My telegram no 101 and previous correspondence. Situation in the south. I find that Minister of Interior is aware of the negotiations proceeding between Sowlet and other chiefs but he affects to make light of them. He has given Kasggai deputy in Tehran assurances that Sowlet will be maintained as chief of tribe so long as he is loyal to Persian Government.


I hesitate to say anything to Minister of Interior about the Sheikh of Mohammerah's grievances unless the latter complains again but I shall warn Sheikh through H.M. Consul at Mohammerah not to intrigue with Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

If Minister of Interior can succeed in convincing Sowlet that he is not seeking to ruin him it should go far to allviate situation and tranquillise Sheikh.

Repeated to H.M. Consul General at Bushire and India.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٥٢ظ] (٤١٦/١٠٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٥٣و] (٤١٦/١١٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٥٣ظ] (٤١٦/١١١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٤و] [١١٢/٤١٦]



DECYPHER SIR G BARCLAY TEHRAN D. 2.p.m. MARCH 11.
R. 12.10 p.m.

(NO 101)

My telegram no 81.


An emissary of Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh confidentially informed
H.M. Consul at Ahwaz on Feb 26 that ~~his German colleague~~ ^{he} was pro-
ceeding to Mohammerah to try ^{to} effect an agreement with Sheikh
against the Bakhtiari.

Emissary left for Mohammerah Feb 27.






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٤ظ] (٤١٦/١١٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٥] [٤١٦/١١٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٥٥ظ] (٤١٦/١١٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٥٦و] (٤١٦/١١٦)

54

Register No.
2921

mm

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O., Dated 31 Jan. 1910.
Rec. 2 Feby. 1910.

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|--------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary..... | 8 Feb. | ist | Persia. |
| Secretary of State..... | 10 | ku | Further assurances from H.M.'s Govt. |
| Committee..... | 11. | W. | desired by Sheikh of Mohammerah. |
| Under Secretary..... | 15. | ist | Proposals as a result of the recent |
| Secretary of State..... | | | discussion on the subject between Sir J. Barday and Major Cox. |

Copy to India 18 Feb '10
Secy. 7.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Sp. & F.O. approving generally & making some suggestions.

Feb. 15th. The Political Committee approve the draft letter.


Letter to F.O., 16 Feb.


Previous Papers :—
4322.

6540. I. 1636. 500.—9-1900. [I. 725.]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٦ظ] (٤١٦/١١٧)









ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٥٧ظ] [٤١٦/١١٩]







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٥٨ظ] [٤١٦/١٢١]



at present
limit to an assurance that is of indefinite duration.
The Sheikh evidently regards it as having rather the
opposite effect. No one can foresee what will
happen in even one generation, to say nothing of three,
and it is submitted that it is very inconvenient to
bind ourselves too tightly, and that this assurance
should not be given.

We may agree to the preparation of a document
for the satisfaction of the tribesmen, and to the
version (a) of Sir G. Barclay's para. 1. proposed by
the Foreign Office, which does not go beyond the
assurances previously given.


The proposal (b) as to para. 2. requires consider-
ation. The distinction between attack by sea and
attack by land is - except from the point of view of
practical convenience - purely arbitrary. The safe-
guards proposed are (1) that we are to help him only
"to the best of our ability", (2) that he "shall
"have continued to be guided by our advice, and main-
"tain an attitude satisfactory to us". (1) does
not seem quite strong enough, and it would perhaps
be preferable to adopt the language of our agreement
with the Amir, and say "H. M. Govt. will be prepared
"to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may
appear to them desirable, in the event of an unpro-
"voked attack, etc." and omit "against any" before
"encroachment". The para. would then read:- "In like
"manner H. M. Govt. will be prepared to aid you, to
"such extent and in such manner as may appear to them
"desirable, in the event of an unprovoked attack by a
"foreign Power or encroachment on your said juris-
"diction and recognised rights or on your property
"in Persia."

There seems to be no objection to giving him a
K.O.I.E. at a suitable moment, and the other proposals

may



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٩و] (٤١٦/١٢٢)





may be agreed to.

There is no doubt of the great importance of Mohammera to British and Indian interests in the Gulf. When the Bagdad Railway is completed to the Gulf, ~~and~~ by whomsoever it is completed; when the revivification of Mesopotamia takes place; and especially when Mohammera is the terminus of a railway connecting with the European system via Julfa - all of which are eventualities that have to be contemplated within the next generation - the importance to us of having a secured terre in this quasi-independent piece of territory will be even greater, and it is submitted that no reasonable opportunity should be lost of confirming the good will of its at present friendly, but suspicious ruler.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٥٩ظ] (٤١٦/١٢٣)





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16 Feb. 1910.

U. S. of S.
J.O.


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39

Approved Pol. Com'ce.,
15 FEB 1910

I am directed by the U. S. of S. for J. to say that he has given his careful attention to your letter No. 1006 of 31st Jan^y on the subject of the further assurances which the Sheikh of Mohammara desires to receive from H. M. G., & I am to offer the following remarks upon the proposals made by Sec^y Sir C. Grey.

(1) As regards the extension of the present ^{assurances} ~~pledge~~ to the Sheikh's male descendants, I am to say that ~~which Viscount Blandford~~ the proviso that they are only to hold good so long as his male descendants are not only fulfil their obligations to H. M. G. & the Provisional Gov^y, but also are acceptable to the Government, removes the objection which Viscount Blandford would have felt to giving an unqualified dynastic pledge, & he approves the proposal accordingly.


(2) On the point of the time limit, he



is inclined to doubt the wisdom of
departing from the present indefinite
assurance in view of the uncertainty
of the future in the Persian Gulf; &
he is confirmed in his doubt by the
consideration urged in para. 15 of your letter and
~~para. 16 of your letter and para. 17 of your letter~~
with para. 2 of Major Low's memorandum, which explains
~~the origin of the Sheikh's desire.~~
He would accordingly suggest
that this concession should be kept in
reserve for the present.

(3) Lord Cromley is willing to submit
the Sheikh's name to the King for the
grant of an honorary K.C.I.E. on a suitable
occasion, as to Sir E. Grey will doubtless advise him.

(4) ~~regarding the~~ On
the question of protecting the Sheikh
against foreign aggression, H.L. observes
that though the extension of the assurance
from naval defence to defence by land
introduces no new principle, it is wor-
doubtedly open to serious practical objections;
& he shares Sir E. Grey's desire that H.M.G.
should not bind themselves to forcible
intervention. He would suggest that the
language of our agreement with the Amir
might conveniently be followed, & that
the assurance should run: - "H.M.G.
will be prepared to aid you to such
extent & in such manner as may appear



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to them desirable in the event of an
improvised attack by a foreign power,
or encroachment" etc. In the longer
form of assurance intended for the
Sheikh's personal satisfaction, as well as
in that to be shown to the fishermen, it
should be made very plain that this
guarantee is conditional upon the his
being guided by our advice & maintaining
an attitude satisfactory to us.

(5) The other proposals seem to Lord
Kerley to be suitable, but he would be
glad if he might be allowed to see
the draft assurances in their final form
before instructions are sent to Sir George
Beadley.

(S^r) R. RITCHIE.

W. S. W.

[Signature]


[Signature]

W.

R.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. "[٦١ظ] (٤١٦/١٢٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٢و] (٤١٦/١٢٨)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٦٢ظ] (٤١٦/١٢٩)





(1006/10)



descendants.

3. The reasons for this wish, which are to be found in the Memorandum by Major Cox enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch, appear to Sir E. Grey to be sufficiently strong adequately to explain the Sheikh's anxiety on the point.

4. Sir E. Grey sees no objection, in the circumstances, to compliance with the Sheikh's desire, so long as it is made quite clear to him that the assurances given are only to hold good on condition that he and his male descendants continue to fulfil their obligations to His Majesty's and the Persian Governments and to be acceptable to their tribesmen.


5. Sir E. Grey attaches some importance to the inclusion of the latter condition since it would be undesirable that His Majesty's Government should find themselves in the position of being bound to support a Sheikh of Mohammera with whom the tribesmen were dissatisfied and whom they wished to remove.

6. The Sheikh further wishes the assurances to be made to hold good for one hundred years.

AS



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٣ظ] (٤١٦/١٣١)





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(1006/10)



7. As regards this point Sir E. Grey has no objection in principle to making the assurances valid for a stated time since it appears preferable that His Majesty's Government should be bound for a fixed period only than that they should remain under this obligation in perpetuity. He would suggest however that the period should be somewhat reduced and that the assurances should be given for three generations only.


8. The Sheikh also asks for an assurance of protection for his private property in Persia and, so far as possible encroachment by the Persian Government is concerned, Sir E. Grey concurs in the view of Sir G. Barclay and Major Cox that there is no objection to promising him that in such an event His Majesty's Government will afford him assistance to obtain a satisfactory solution of the difficulty.


9. Sir E. Grey further sees no harm in the proposal of Major Cox that, in order to give His Majesty's Government a pretext for intervention in a case of this kind, the Sheikh should be made a K.C.I.E.

The




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٤ظ] (٤١٦/١٣٣)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٥ظ] (٤١٦/١٣٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٦و] (٤١٦/١٣٦)

(1006/10)

intention of His Majesty's Government to afford him all the help in their power in the contingency contemplated, should yet not bind them to forcible intervention on his behalf.


/3. Sir E. Grey would suggest that the form "they (His Majesty's Government) will safeguard you to the best of their ability against an unprovoked attack by a foreign Power or against any encroachment by such a Power on your said jurisdiction and recognized rights or upon your property in Persia" might meet the case,

/4. Sheikh Khazal also regards as possible the contingency that His Majesty's Government might be driven to assume control of the customs of the Southern ports, including those of Mohammera and Ahwaz, and hopes that, if this happens, he will be left in immediate control of these two ports as at present.

/5. On this point Sir E. Grey agrees with Sir G. Barclay in thinking that it would be undesirable to give such an undertaking as, in the unlikely contingency contemplated, circumstances might arise in which it would be difficult or inconvenient to comply with
the



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٦ظ] (٤١٦/١٣٧)





65

(1006/10)



the Sheikh's wish.

16. He would therefore prefer that, should the Sheikh revert to the question, he should be answered, as suggested by Sir G. Barclay, with friendly assurances of a general character.

17. The Sheikh is also apprehensive of a general catastrophe in Persia which might compel His Majesty's Government to intervene in the South of that country, and wishes to be assured that in such a case he and his tribesmen will be maintained in their present position or, if this is impossible, that he may retain his personal revenue and be granted an asylum in India or elsewhere.


18. As regards this point it appears to Sir E. Grey that, as His Majesty's Government have recently signed the Anglo-Russian Agreement whereby they have bound themselves to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, it would be inconsistent to discuss the break-up of that country as a possible event.

19. He would accordingly propose to inform the

Sheikh



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٧ظ] (٤١٦/١٣٩)





66

(1006/10)


Sheikh that the contingency is one which His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate and to refer him to the instrument itself and to the communication made to him on December 1st 1908 in which this question is expressly dealt with.

20. Finally the Sheikh expresses the wish that the assurances given him should be couched in a form which he can show to his tribesmen to strengthen both their support of himself and their faith in the friendly policy of His Majesty's Government.

21. Sir E. Grey considers this request to be a reasonable one and is disposed to sanction the adoption for the purpose indicated of the form proposed by Sir G. Barclay and Major Cox with the modification suggested above in the passage relating to protection against molestation, &c., by a foreign Power. All reference to the fact that the assurances are given on condition that the Sheikh and his male descendants continue to be acceptable to the tribesmen should, Sir E. Grey thinks, be omitted from this document,
which




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٦٨ظ] (٤١٦/١٤١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٦٩و] (٤١٦/١٤٢)



(1006/10)

which should be handed to him at the same time as the longer form containing the text of the assurances in full, which is intended for his own information only.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with Viscount Morley's observations on this subject in general and on the above proposals in particular.

I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble servant,

Lewis Mallett



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٦٩ظ] (٤١٦/١٤٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧٠] [٤١٦/١٤٤]

68

Register No.
4322

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *JD,* Dated } *8 Decr.* 1909.
Rec. } *19*

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | <i>13 Dec</i> | <i>East</i> | <i>Persia.</i> Desire of the Sheikh of Mohammereh for an extension of the assurances he has received from the British Govt. Proposal to confer an Indian decoration on the Sheikh. |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |
| Committee..... | <i>14</i> | <i>NK</i> | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to COPY TO INDIA
10 Decemb 1909
SECRETARY'S N^o 50

FOR INFORMATION.

It is not clear that the extended assurance in the name in which the Sheikh during these times, do not in practice further commit us to any serious extent than we are at present committed, as Major Gore thinks. Our assurances are against external aggression, but the Sheikh wishes to provide against the contingency of his nephew assassinating himself or his son & usurping the Sheikdom. When the assurances were last extended the J.O. said (letter of 14th Apr. 04) "Should the Sheikh's immediate offspring fail to govern successfully & be expelled, H.M.G. wd. be no more bound to uphold them than they are now bound to uphold his successors." What the Sheikh has always wanted *subsequently* is in fact a dynastic guarantee.

11


Secr. Pol. Com'ce.,
4 JAN 1910

Previous Papers:—
*3985-41
1654*

8172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٠ظ] (٤١٦/١٤٥)



It may or may not be right to give it - he is not asked for
an opinion at present - but to give it certainly seems a
considerable extension of responsibility. The verbal assurance
proposed by Major Gore does not in fact appear to give it, &
it is not therefore quite clear why the Sheikh should be
"greatly pleased" by it, unless he understands it in a
sense which the words do not bear. The verbal assurance
further does not contain the limiting words "to the third
generation" after "include descendants", which Major Gore
proposes in his note.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧١و] (٤١٦/١٤٦)



4322 69
INDIA OFFICE
WHITEHALL S.W.


Committee
22.12.07

Sir R. Ritchie

With reference to the minute
on 4322 Major Cox explains orally that
the "revised version of assurance" at the
end of his note is only for the benefit
of the tribesmen, & not intended to give
effect to the policy described in para. 1
of his memo. As regards this, he
thinks that we are already so morally




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧١ظ] (٤١٦/١٤٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٢و] (٤١٦/١٤٨)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٢ظ] (٤١٦/١٤٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧٣و] (٤١٦/١٥٠)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٣ظ] (٤١٦/١٥١)



2

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Major Cox on Assurances desired by the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

BEFORE I left the Gulf for England Sheikh Khazal begged me to lay his circumstances and aspirations before His Majesty's Minister and Government, and after my arrival in England he sent me a telegram which was intended to remind me on the subject.

We have, of course, given the sheikh a generous amount of sympathetic support of late, and have considerably strengthened the assurances previously given to him. He is still, however, nervous for the future on certain points, and anxious for further signs, and I am inclined to think that when the nature of his apprehensions, and the facts at the back of them are examined, His Majesty's Government may find it possible to satisfy him without any practical increase in the weight of the obligations which they have already accepted in regard to him.

In spite of what we have hitherto given him in the way of assurances—

1. He is always in fear that his nephew Hanzal, a man of about 40, whose loyalty is doubtful, and who was recently suspected and accused of being implicated in a plot against his (Sheikh Khazal's) life, may seize some favourable opportunity to affect his own or his son's assassination and usurp the sheikhdom.

It is to provide against this or a similar contingency, and in order that Hanzal may know that it is useless his aspiring to the succession that the sheikh asks that the words "heirs and successors" be amended to "male descendents," &c. (*vide* my letter of the 16th May 1909.) Sheikh Khazal quite realises that we could only support a descendent so long as the said descendent continued to act up to his obligations to us generally, and was acceptable to his tribesmen; and, as regards the latter, he says he would be prepared, if we wish it, to obtain the signification of the assent of the elders to the succession of his children.

If the assurances were worded somewhat as follows: "Male descendents provided that they continued to satisfy their obligations to His Majesty's Government and are acceptable to their tribesmen;" it would please Sheikh Khazal greatly, and I do not see that by doing so we should in practice be further committed to any serious extent than we are now.

It is obvious, and this the sheikh well understands, that if he or one of his descendents proved an unsatisfactory ruler, or failed to act up to his obligations to us, he would be considered to have forfeited the right to our support.

2. Sheikh Khazal still fears that some day, either as a complement to Russian action in the north or as a result of the existence of continued chaos in the country, we may be obliged to intervene in Southern Persia and perhaps find it convenient to take over Mohammerah.

From this apprehension results his desire that our assurances should be recorded as holding good for a specific period.

Here again it seems to me that it would be possible to find a form of words which would satisfy him without inconveniently committing us, *e.g.*, would "male descendents to the third generation, provided that," &c., be out of the question? It is always our policy with these Arab rulers, *e.g.*, Bahrein, Koweit, crucial chiefs, to guide them and control their external relations but leave them independent in regard to their internal politics.

3. Apart from his position as Sheikh of Mohammerah and district and the property which he enjoys as such, Sheikh Khazal is apprehensive for the future safety of his person and of the property and income which he possesses and enjoys as a private individual.

In this position he may be compared to the Zil-es-Sultan, to whom on certain conditions and in view of certain facts we have given a great deal of help in the direction of safeguarding his person and private property.


One of the grounds on which we do so (or did so) is because the Zil enjoys a British decoration, and I think that the bestowal of a British decoration would be a convenient way of showing support to the Sheikh of Mohammerah. It would certainly please the Sheikh. The Sultan of Muscat has a G.C.I.E. May I suggest a K.C.I.E. for Mohammerah?

4. Sheikh Khazal thinks it possible that we may be driven to assume control of the customs of the south, including his.

In that contingency, however, he hopes that we will leave him in immediate



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٤و] (٤١٦/١٥٢)



3

control of the Mohammerah and Ahwas customs, as at present, by farming them to him at a figure based on the average receipts for a past term of years, subject to periodical revision. Can we meet his wishes in this direction?

5. Having regard to the possibility which he apprehends of the break up of Persia and of our intervention in the south, he would be relieved by an assurance that we would maintain him and his tribesmen in the enjoyment of their present rights and territory and internal autonomy as we do now in the case of Bahrein, Koweit, &c., and that in case it should be found possible to preserve that state of things, we would undertake to give him the personal revenue he now enjoys and give him an asylum in India or elsewhere.

6. Quite apart from the desired assurances set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the sheikh explains that the résumé of the various assurances given him from time to time up to now, which I recorded at his request in my letter to him dated the 16th May, 1909, is in that form suitable for his own information; but that owing to the references made in it to previous documents and previous occasions and the length of this letter, it is not a document which he could conveniently show to, or would be comprehended by, his tribal elders.

On the other hand, he considers it of urgent importance that he should, in order to quiet any apprehensions on the part of his tribesmen, and also to strengthen their support of himself and their faith in the friendly policy of the British Government, have some brief form of written assurance in general terms which he can show to them.

Asked to state offhand what sort of form and terms such an assurance as he had in mind should, in his opinion, take, he dictated the words of which I attach a literal translation.

It seems to me that, with slight modifications, it could be put into a form which His Majesty's Government might be able to approve and which would suffice for the sheikh's purpose.

P. Z. C.

Translation of Brief Form of Assurances of the nature desired by Sheikh Khazal, and in the terms dictated by him to Major Cox.

(For communication to tribal elders.)

I am authorized to inform you that whatsoever change may take place in the state of the government of Persia, and whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, the British Government will be prepared to afford you support and protection for preventing any sort of encroachment on your property, jurisdiction, and rights; and will likewise protect you against foreign Powers, and not allow any encroachment to be made on your property, jurisdiction, and rights. These assurances have been given for yourself and afterwards for your male descendants by the British Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Revised Version of Assurance to Sheikh of Mohammerah.


I AM authorised to inform you that, no matter what change may take place in the form of the government of Persia, and, whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, the British Government will be prepared to afford you the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution in the event of any encroachment by the Persian Government on your jurisdiction and recognised rights or on your property in Persia.

In like manner they will afford you protection against molestation from foreign Powers, and will not permit any encroachment to be made by them on your said jurisdiction and recognised rights or upon your property in Persia.

These assurances are given for yourself by the British Government, and are intended to extend to your male descendants so long as you or they shall not have failed to observe your obligations to the Central Government and shall have continued to be guided by our advice and maintain an attitude satisfactory to us.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧٤ظ] (٤١٦/١٥٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٥و] (٤١٦/١٥٤)

73

Register No. 16524

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from India, ho. 46 M, Dated 11 Nov. 1909. Rec. 27

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary..... | 29 Nov. | zax | Persia. |
| Secretary of State..... | 30 | Ku | Desire of the Sheikh of Mohammerah for a treat, with Great Britain. Communication made to the Pol. Agent by the Sheikh of Kuwait. |
| Committee..... | 1.12. | Ku | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to 30, 27 Nov 09.

FOR INFORMATION.

(For text of the assurances given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, see Major Genl's communication to him of 16 May '09, enclosed in Sir J. B. Morley's despatch of 27 July '09).

3985
309


Seen Pol Com'ce.,
7 DEC. 1909

Previous Papers:—
TH 3252

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧٥ظ] (٤١٦/١٥٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضعية. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٦و] (٤١٦/١٥٦)



Copy to C.O. 27-November 1909.

1654

RECEIVED IN
27 NOV 1909
POLITICAL DEPT.

74
M. 3252/0.

Confidential.

No. 2591, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 25th) October 1909.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, I.A., First Assistant Resident, in charge of Residency, Bushire,

To—S. H. BUTLER, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted letter concerning a conversation which the Sheikh of Kuwait held with the Political Agent.

2. Sheikh Mubarek appears to be in a very friendly mood at present, as instanced by his spontaneous offer of the Agency rent free, and by this conversation, but I think there must be some ulterior motive in all this affability.

No. 562, dated Kuwait, 11th October 1909.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The First Assistant Resident, in charge of the Residency, Bushire.

I have the honour to report the substance of a conversation which the Sheikh of Mubarak held with me a few days ago on the affairs of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in case it may prove of interest to Government.


2. It appears that shortly after Major Cox's last visit to Mohammerah Sheikh Khazal called together the headmen of his tribes and discussed with them the advantages of definitely binding himself to the British Government by a document, which evidently from Sheikh Mubarak's description was intended to be a regular treaty on more or less equal terms. The headmen of the tribes were very averse to any such proposal pointing out that, though they might make a treaty and so avoid Persian and Turkish interference in their affairs, they would be subjected to endless interference from the British who would, little by little, reduce them and their Sheikh (Khazal) to the condition of Bahrein, where now nothing was possible without the 'order' of the Political Agent; they could see no compensating advantage in such an arrangement especially as at present they found that a combination of all the near Arab tribes could make things so unpleasant for either Persian or Turks that Mohammerah generally succeeded in securing its own way very satisfactorily. Sheikh Khazal was, however, insistent and pointed out that, though such had been the case of Bahrein, it had been brought about from within by the Khalifa family's own foolish method of working and contrasted our treatment of Bahrein with that of Kuwait, where a Political Agent had proved of considerable help to Sheikh Mubarak. Finally, it appears that, by argument, specious promises and lavish hospitality Sheikh Khazal prevailed on his Cha'ab headmen to agree that, if he put his signature to any document of the kind contemplated, they would follow his lead and also append their signatures. In reply to my query as to why Sheikh Khazal should be so anxious to secure the signature of the headmen to such a document as well as his own, Sheikh Mubarak pointed out that that was the only certain way by which Sheikh Khazal could bind all the various subtribes to their promise, fearing as he did, if anything subsequently occurred to which one of the tribes objected, that he might be unable to prevent all of them siding with the disappointed one and leaving him without the necessary support either to force compliance or induce it pacifically.

3. The above was conveyed to me by Sheikh Mubarak quite spontaneously and, at the moment, struck me as being specially produced for British consumption or as a ballon d'essai. Then, on his own account, Sheikh Mubarak urged the advantages to the British Government in some such tie, pointing out that between them he and Sheikh Khazal owned practically the whole of the cultivated land on the Shatt-el-Arab up to Mohammerah and beyond.

4. I have no doubt, from the careful way in which the Sheikh expressed himself, that this communication and probably the form of it were carefully arranged between himself and Sheikh Khazal at one of their frequent meetings at Faliya solely with an eye to their own advantage; each desires to rid himself



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٦ظ] (٤١٦/١٥٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضغ. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٧و] (٤١٦/١٥٨)

75

Register No.
1050
(3985)

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from India, no. 27 M. Dated 1 July 1909
Rec. 19 July 1909

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------------------------|-------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary..... | 23.7 | Mu | Peria. Assurances to the Sheikh of Mohammerah: Major Cox's letter giving effect to the instructions of the F.O. |
| Secretary of State..... | 24 | ag | |
| Committee..... | 27. | M. | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to F.O. 23 July 1909.

FOR INFORMATION.

The pledge of support against encroachment given to the Sheikh in 1902 has now been extended to his heirs "successors". But, presumably with a view to strengthen the Argentine character of the guarantee, he wants the lands ceded to his "own successors" "male descendants". The Sheikh has agreed to the matter being referred till Major Cox has had an opportunity of seeing his fiancée.


Seen Pol. Comtee,
4 AUG. 1909

Previous Papers:—
3252

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٧ظ] (٤١٦/١٥٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٧٨و] [٤١٦/١٦٠]



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PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

[32487]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 147.)
Sir,

Gulahek, July 27, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reporting the assurances given by him to the sheikh of Mohammerah in the form authorised by you in your telegram No. 164 of the 17th April last.

It will be noticed that the sheikh is not yet entirely satisfied. He asks that our assurances may be extended to his own successive male descendants, and that it should be stated that these assurances should hold good for 100, or better, 150 years. The sheikh apparently does not expect an answer to his request until Major Cox has talked the matter over with me. I had expected Major Cox to visit Tehran on his way home to England, but he has been unexpectedly delayed at his post. I gather that he has to be in England by a certain date, and he therefore now wishes to proceed home direct. In these circumstances he will not visit Tehran until October. Even if he had not been delayed, this would probably have been the better course, as the state of the southern roads may have improved by then.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 55.)
Sir,

Bushire, June 12, 1909.

IN continuation of the correspondence on the subject of the assurances to be given to the sheikh of Mohammerah, ending with your telegram No. 99 dated the 19th April, 1909, I have the honour to report that at my last visit to the sheikh on the 15th and 16th May, I discussed the question with him at length in the presence of Mr. McDouall, and finding him, as the latter anticipated, still not fully satisfied with the deduction that his successors would presumably be his offspring, I gave him the slightly extended guarantee to cover his "heirs and successors," as authorised by His Majesty's Government. In the endeavour to persuade him that he had now got all he could reasonably want, I went through the record with him once more, reading him the various assurances that had been hitherto given him, and at his desire addressed him a communication epitomising the recent fragmentary negotiations and bringing the subject up to date in a convenient form for his information. Of this letter I enclose a copy.

The penultimate paragraph was included in order to satisfy him that his final representation was taken note of, but before parting with him it was agreed between us that as I hoped very shortly to have the privilege of meeting your Excellency, it would be better that I should discuss his affairs with you personally, and he consequently does not expect an immediate reply to his last request.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and
His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Consul McDouall to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 54.)
Sir,

April 24, 1909.

YOURS of the 20th about assurances to the sheikh. I have told Haji Rais to tell the sheikh the first part of the Foreign Office message, which is certainly an advance.

[2377 gg—12]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٨ظ] (٤١٦/١٦١)

2

As to the question of successors, in my opinion it will not satisfy the sheikh, the pointing out that successors will be presumably heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and Haji Rais is of the same opinion. The sheikh is particularly anxious to have his offspring ("aolad") mentioned. So in my opinion it will be advisable to give him the extension to "heirs and successors."

W. McDOUALL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Consul-General Cox to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

(= 1057/17)
(After the usual compliments.)

Mohammerah, May 16, 1909.

ON the 1st December, 1908, I had the honour, by the direction of His Majesty's Government, to repeat to your Excellency the assurances given you on behalf of Government by his Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, in his letter of the 7th December, 1902, to your address, and to inform you that the British Government were now prepared to extend those assurances to your successors.

I was further directed to explain to you that the British Government had engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and that that undertaking in itself involved the maintenance of the *status quo* in Persia, and thus included the continuance of the same state of autonomy which your Excellency at present enjoys.

I was then to point out that it followed from the above that any external aggression upon your Excellency would constitute an act of infringement of that Persian integrity which has received recognition in the Anglo-Russian Convention.

While expressing your thanks for these amplified assurances, you represented that they seemed to you only to safeguard you so long as Persia continued to exist as a sovereign State and you pressed for a further assurance which would cover the contingency of Persia ceasing to exist as a sovereign State and the intervention or occupation by foreign Powers.

You also expressed doubt as to whether the present assurance only provided immunity against unwarrantable encroachment on your rights by the absolute government of His Majesty the Shah, or whether it also covered prevention of similar action on the part of parliamentary government. In reply to those representations, your Excellency was informed that Great Britain and Russia being pledged to respect the integrity of Persia, the British Government were not, properly speaking, able to admit even the possibility of Persia ceasing to be a sovereign State or coming under the occupation of a foreign Power, but that in the unlikely event of such a contingency the assurances already given to your Excellency would become even more binding than before.

I was further permitted to inform you that whatever change might take place in the form of government in Persia the British Government were prepared to give you the same support against any encroachment on your rights as was promised to you in 1902, and I was authorised to add that they were now prepared to extend the application of those assurances to your "heirs and successors."

Mr. McDouall and I have informed you that in our opinion the assurances as now extended and expressed, appear to satisfy all your requirements; but you have further requested that the words "heirs and successors" may be changed and the words "own successive male descendants" may be written instead; and you have gone on to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will be pleased to dispel the last shadow of doubt from your mind regarding their own intentions in the future, by adding after the words "male descendants" as above, the words "up to a period of 100 years" (or if it be possible 150 years).


I cannot give your Excellency any reply on this point without reference to Government, but I will lose no time in communicating to them your representations.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٧٩و] (٤١٦/١٦٢)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٧٩ظ] (٤١٦/١٦٣)






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للشيخ. " [٨٠] (٤١٦/١٦٤)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٠ظ] (٤١٦/١٦٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٨١و] (٤١٦/١٦٦)



79

The penultimate paragraph was included in order to satisfy him that his final representation was taken note of, but before parting with him it was agreed between us that as I hoped very shortly to have the privilege of meeting Your Excellency, it would be better that I should discuss his affairs with you personally, and he consequently does not expect an immediate reply to his last request.

I have, etc.,

Sd./- P. Z. Cox, Major,

British Resident in the Persian Gulf
and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General
for Fars, etc.

His Excellency Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,


His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, T E H R A N .

P. Z. Cox



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٨٢و] (٤١٦/١٦٨)



80

To

His Excellency Sheikh Khazal Khan, Sardar-i-Arfa,
Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Dated Mohammerah, May 16th, 1909.

After the usual compliments,

On the 1st December 1908 I have the honour by the direction of His Majesty's Government to repeat to Your Excellency the assurances given you on behalf of Government by His Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, in his letter of 7th December 1902 to your address, and to inform you that the British Government were now prepared to extend those assurances to your successors.


I was further directed to explain to you that the British Government had engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia and that that undertaking in itself involved the maintenance of the status quo in Persia, and thus included the continuance of the same state of autonomy which Your Excellency at present enjoys.


I was then to point out that it followed from the above that any external aggression upon Your Excellency would constitute an act of infringement of that Persian integrity which has received recognition in the Anglo-Russian Convention.

While expressing your thanks for these amplified
assurances




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٢ظ] (٤١٦/١٦٩)






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للشيخ." [٨٣و] (٤١٦/١٧٠)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٣ظ] (٤١٦/١٧١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٨٤و] (٤١٦/١٧٢)

82

in 1902 and I was authorised to add that they were now prepared to extend the application of those assurances to your "heirs and successors".

Mr. McDouall and I have inform^{ed} you that in our opinion the assurances as now extended and expressed, appeared to satisfy all your requirements; but you have further requested that the words "heirs and successors" may be changed and the words "own successive male descendants" may be written instead; and you have gone on to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will be pleased to dispel the last shadow of doubt from your mind regarding their own intentions in the future, by adding after the words "male descendants" as above, the words "up to a period of 100 years" (or if it be possible 150 years).

I cannot give Your Excellency any reply on this point without reference to Government, but I will lose no time in communicating to them your representations.


I am Your Excellency's sincere friend,

Sd./- P. Z. Cox, Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٤ظ] (٤١٦/١٧٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٥و] (٤١٦/١٧٤)



83

Consul McDouall to Resident.

No. 54, dated April 24th 1909.

Yours of 20th about assurances to the Sheikh. I have told Hajji Rais to tell the Sheikh the first part of the Foreign Office message which is certainly an advance.


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x x x x x x

Sd./- W. McDouall.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٥ظ] (٤١٦/١٧٥)






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للشيخ. " [٨٦و] (٤١٦/١٧٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٨٦ظ] (٤١٦/١٧٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٨٧] [٤١٦/١٧٨]

85

Register No.
3252-1A

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *F.O.* Dated *14* April 1909.
Rec. *15* *19* April

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|----------------|------------|--|
| | | <i>503</i> | <i>War</i> |
| Under Secretary | <i>16 Apr.</i> | <i>MS</i> | <p><i>Persia: Mohammedah.</i></p> <p><i>British assurances of protection to Sheikh: as to scope in event of violation of his rights by a possible constitutional gov. in Persia, and as to extension of guarantees to his immediate offspring.</i></p> <p><i>Proposal to obtain concession for British subject to company for irrigation of Hamrah: certain provisions to be included (interposed by concessionaires).</i></p> |
| Secretary of State | <i>16</i> | <i>AF</i> | |
| Committee | <i>16.</i> | <i>M.</i> | |
| Under Secretary | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to
India (see within)

Sp. to F.O., enclosing in this proposals.

Letter to F.O., 16 April.

(F.O. telegram to Sir G. Barclay, 17 April, added 20 Apr.)


Mr S. G. S. wishes this letter signed
MS
16/4/09


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3489. I. 1135. 2000.—6/1908. [1779/07.]




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للشيخ." [٨٧ظ] (٤١٦/١٧٩)









ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٨٨ظ] (٤١٦/١٨١)








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للشيخ. " [٨٩و] (٤١٦/١٨٢)







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للشيخ." [٨٩ظ] (٤١٦/١٨٣)








ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٠ظ] (٤١٦/١٨٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩١و] (٤١٦/١٨٦)






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للشيخ. " [٩١ظ] (٤١٦/١٨٧)







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للشيخ. " [٩٢و] [٤١٦/١٨٨]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٢ظ] (٤١٦/١٨٩)





(13250/09)


observations on the first of these two points.

With regard to this first question, Sir E. Grey would suggest that the Sheikh should be informed that His Majesty's Government are prepared to give him the same support against any encroachment on his rights as already promised in 1902 whatever changes there may be in the Government of Persia.

With regard to the question of the extension to the Sheikh's immediate offspring of the guarantees already given, the Sheikh might be reminded that these assurances have already been extended to his successors and that as these will presumably be his offspring, our assurances do in fact already apply to the latter. If this declaration fails to satisfy the Sheikh, Sir E. Grey sees no objection to a formal extension to "his heirs and successors" of the guarantees already given, since, should the Sheikh's immediate offspring fail to govern successfully and be expelled, His Majesty's Government would be no more bound to uphold them than they now are to uphold his successors.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٣ظ] (٤١٦/١٩١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩٤و] (٤١٦/١٩٢)



(13250/09)

successors. Sir E. Grey is moreover of opinion that an assurance of this nature would be likely so far to strengthen the Sheik's position that his successors would be likely, if it were given, to be his lineal heirs.

I am to state that, if Viscount Morley concurs in the views above expressed, Sir E. Grey will address a telegram in that sense to Sir G. Barclay for the guidance of Major Cox.

I am to invite a reply to this letter at the earliest possible convenience of Viscount Morley.

I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,

L. M. Mallet




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩٤ظ] (٤١٦/١٩٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٥و] (٤١٦/١٩٤)



CONFIDENTIAL

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7, 4 P.M.)

(No. 237.)

Tehran, April 7, 1909, 2 P.M.

BUSHIRE telegram No. 299.


It might be pointed out to the Sheikh that the time when a constitutional régime will be strong enough, even should it so desire, to encroach on his rights is probably remote, but His Majesty's Consul-General might tell him that, should the case arise, assurances given by Sir A. Hardinge in his letter of 7th December, 1902, would hold good.

As regards the question of the extension of the guarantee to his immediate offspring, I have no observations to offer.

[453—55]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٥ظ] (٤١٦/١٩٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٩٦و] (٤١٦/١٩٦)



CONFIDENTIAL

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7, 2:20 P.M.)

(No. 232.)

Tehran, April 7, 1909, 1:45 P.M.

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, No. 299 :—

"Mohammerah affairs: Extension of assurances.


"I hope that the reply of His Majesty's Government, which you repeated to me in your telegram No. 69 dated 28th March, will enable me to satisfy Sheikh as far as concerns the contingency of the break [?] up of Persia or intervention of foreign Powers.

"With reference however to part 2 of my telegram No. 251, Sheikh will require from me some definite reply first as to whether guarantee already given includes protection against [?] trenching on his rights by possible constitutional régime, and secondly in regard to extension of existing guarantee to his immediate offspring."

[453-50]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٦ظ] (٤١٦/١٩٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩٧و] [٤١٦/١٩٨]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٩٧ظ] (٤١٦/١٩٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [٩٨] [٤١٦/٢٠٠]

96

Register No.
[3231]
571

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letters from F.O. Dated } 5, 6, 8 April 1909.
Telegram from Viceroy of India, rec. 10 April 1909. Rec. }
Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|----------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary | 10 April | WJ | Mohammedal. As to assurances to Sheikh regard- ing his position with a con- stitutional regime, and pro- -vision to his immediate off- spring. Question of financial assistance. Custody of customs receipts. |
| Secretary of State | 13 | WJ | |
| Committee | 15 | WJ | |
| Under Secretary | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Copy to COPY TO INDIA
see within
SECRETARY GENL

*Sign. M.
[Munich] 15/4/09.*

*Mr. Hertzl.
ought we not to
send a telegram to
S. of S.?
at hand
Please see above
15/4*

*Dept. L. to F.O., addressing to
previous decision as to loan
from H. M.'s Govt.*

*Letter to F.O. 15 April.
Del. to Viceroy, 16 April.*


Previous Papers :—
3176.


3489. I. 1135. 2000.—6/1908. [1779/07.]

Stamp: **Swan Pool, Commrs., 20 APR 1909**




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢٠١)








ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٩٩ظ] (٤١٦/٢٠٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٠] [٤١٦/٢٠٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٠ظ] (٤١٦/٢٠٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠١] [٤١٦/٢٠٦]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٠٧)





100
15 April 1909

F. O.

To V. 29 April '09
From - 9 April '09.

Book
158

Copy to India
23 April 1909
Secy 17.

With ref. to the
L. of this Office of
the 25th March last
as to the question of
the grant of a loan
by H. M.'s Govt. to
the Shikh of Moham-
-mahal I am dis-
-satisfied by Viscount Morley
to enclose for the
information of Sec. Sir
S. Grey copy of
further telegraphic
correspondence with
the Govt. of India in
the matter.

Lord Morley is
still of the opinion
expressed in the
letter referred to
regarding the impropriety
of a loan to the
Shikh by H. M.'s
Government.

But he feels no objection to some
such


That no charge
should be on this account be
laid upon the revenues of India.
He does not therefore think it
necessary to express an opinion on
the proposals in the first part of
Sir S. Morley's telegram 236 of
April 7. But he sees no
objection in principle to the suggestion
made in the second part.

(SD) A. GODLEY.

submitted to your Excellency




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٢ظ] (٤١٦/٢٠٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٣] [٤١٦/٢١٠]



255.—From Viceroy, 26th November 1902.


P.—Without venturing an opinion upon the exact terms of the assurance which Sir A. Hardinge proposes we should give to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, I desire strongly to support Hardinge's general position. See his telegram to Foreign Office, dated 23rd (? 20th) November. If there is a chief whose claims entitle him to our support it is the Sheikh of Mohammerah, while, if there is any part of Southern Persia where a special demand exists for the protection of British interests against foreign competition or intrigue, it is the mouth of the Karun River. A main cause of our weakness in Persia is our failure to support those chiefs and officials who are disposed to side with us.

101

CSM 630
19/1/07




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٣ظ] (٤١٦/٢١١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٤] [١٦/٢١٢] (٤١٦/٢١٢)



Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM
DATED 9/4/09
RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 39 pm.




Foreign secret. Please see your telegram of 29th March,
loan to Sheikh of Mohammrah, and Cox's telegram
Nos 299 and 300, dated 5th April to Minister at
Tehran. We fully recognize difficulty of position in
which H.M. Govt. is placed, but are so firmly convinced
of the vital importance to Indian interests of
maintaining our influence with the Mohammrah
Sheikh that we venture again to support Cox strongly
in the action which he proposes in regard to loan,
vide concluding portion of his telegram No 300. We
cannot overrate importance which in certain
circumstances the attitude of Sheikh may
assume, and I desire to associate myself
mutatis mutandis with the views expressed
in my predecessor's telegram of 26 Nov: 1902.

Copy to [unclear] 15 Apr
10 26
and P 30 -

x Copy communicated
to J.O. P Dec. '02.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٤ظ] (٤١٦/٢١٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٥] [٤١٦/٢١٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٥] [ظ ٤١٦/٢١٥]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٦] [٤١٦/٢١٦]



3231 104
Decypher Sir G. Barclay, Tehran. D.1.45 pm. April 7th 1909.
P. 3.10 pm.

No 233.

Following received April 5th from Bushire No 300:

"Mohammerah affairs.

Question of loan to Sheikh. I cannot but think that the seemingly unsympathetic tone of the reply of W.M.G. on this point as conveyed in your Tel. No 69 of March 28th must be due to maladroit representations on my part. Sheikh became vehement under pressure of great anxiety but he does not consider or suggest that we are under "obligation to grant him a loan." He simply counted in this connection on our friendly desire to promote his interests. I believe ~~that~~ his representation re loan to be prompted by following consideration of self-preservation which are but reasonable. Recent events connected with reported Dutch concession have given urgent point to his belief that the best way of safeguarding himself and preventing a corrupt Tehran Govt from springing non-British concessions on him is for him to start utilitarian projects himself with least possible delay. His difficulty in so doing is his inability to lay his hands at any moment on requisite amount of cash. What he confidently hopes for is the certain assurances that we will do our best to assist him to find money for such purposes when the need arises either by means of Govt loan or introduction to British financiers.

In the matter of a small loan it would obviously be exceedingly difficult for me to make Sheikh understand why the Govt of India were unwilling to give him temporary accomodation as they have done his friend Sheikh Mubarak.


In view of vital importance of our maintaining paramount influence with him in immediate future could I not be permitted to give him a reply somewhat on the following lines? Firstly that in case of a small loan Govt of India would do their best to arrange to accomodate him on learning the amount and object in view.

Secondly that in case of large sum being required for utilitarian scheme

C. P. M. S.
5 April




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ". [١٠٦ظ] (٤١٦/٢١٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٧] [٤١٦/٢١٨]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٧ظ] (٤١٦/٢١٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٨] [و] (٤١٦/٢٢٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢٢١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٠٩] [٤١٦/٢٢٢]



107

3031



DECYPHER. SIR G. BARCLAY. TEHRAN. D. 1 45 p.m. April 7th, 1909.
R. 2 20 p.m.

(No. 232)

Foll wing received from Bushire, no. 299:-

"REX Mohammerah affairs,
Extension of assurances,


I hope that the reply of H.M.G. which you repeated to
me in your telegram no. 69 dated March 28 will enable me to
satisfy Sheikh as far as concerns the contingency of the break
(?)up of Persia or intervention of foreign Powers.

With reference however to part 2 of my telegram no. 251
Sheikh will require from me some definite reply first as to whether
guarantee already given includes protection against (?)trenching
on his rights by possible constitutional régime and secondly in
regard to extension of existing guarantee to his immediate
offspring

Amir Khamis
9 Apr




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٠٩ظ] (٤١٦/٢٢٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١٠] [٤١٦/٢٢٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١٠ظ] (٤١٦/٢٢٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١١] [٤١٦/٢٢٦]



3231 RECEIVED IN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT - 5 APR 1909 109
DECYPHER. SIR G. BARCLAY. TEHRAN. D. 2 15 p.m. April 3rd. 1909.
R. 2 10 p.m.

(No. 223)

+ (3176/09)
My telegram no. 199.

Consul at Mohammerah reports that the Sheikh has called on the Director of Customs to retain receipts in Customs House safe for the present and to keep Customs steamer "Mozafferi" at Mohammerah in order to prevent possible disturbances.

H.M.Consul-General at Bushire has instructed Consul to repeat to the Sheikh the advice of H.M.G. not to involve himself in party politics and to urge him very strongly not to touch Customs receipts himself.

Copy to London
9 Apr.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١٢ و] (٤١٦/٢٢٨)

110

Register No. 3176
~~3165~~

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from 70, Dated } 29/31 March 1909.
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary | 1. 4 | Mc | <p>Persia.</p> <p>Pending questions with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Major Cox's report on recent visit to Sheikh: proposal to approve Sir Barclay's communication to Major Cox regarding the disposal of customs receipts, and to await a further communication from Sir Barclay.</p> |
| Secretary of State | 1 | Al | |
| Committee | | | |
| Under Secretary | | | |
| Secretary of State..... | | | |

Copy to COPY TO INDIA
see within 190
SECRETARY'S N^o.....

70 to 70, concerning the proposed approval of Sir Barclay's letter to telegraph
views in favour of more of
primary position of the question
letter to 70, 30/3. Telegram to Herby, 20/3.

Seen Pol. Comm. 5 APR 1909


Previous Papers :-
74 3115
2102

3489. I. 1E35. 2000.-6/1908. [1779.07.]

SUBMIT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١٢ظ] (٤١٦/٢٢٩)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٣ و] (٤١٦/٢٣٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٣١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣١)








ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١٤ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥١] [٤١٦/٢٣٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١٦ و] (٤١٦/٢٣٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١٦ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١١٧ و] (٤١٦/٢٣٨)



CONFIDENTIAL.



Copy to Sir
2 Apr 07
Secy. H.

(3165/07)

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27, 5 P.M.)

(No. 199.)

Tehran, March 27, 5:30 P.M.

BEFORE I received your telegram No. 109, Cox had already returned to Bushire as he found at Mohammerah that the Sheikh was leaving for Ahwaz, and he wished to avoid if possible being out of touch with the Gulf ports.

Following extracts from a telegram from him No. 251 26th March show result of his visit:—

Cox found Sheikh much worried. Strong pressure was being exerted on him from Nejed and elsewhere to embrace popular cause, and difficulty of his position was aggravated by the impossibility of telegraphing to Shah or Government without being censored at Ispahan.

"Part 1. Sheikh stated that situation at Mohammerah now rendered much more critical by news of recent events at Bunder Abbas and Bushire, and he anticipated that unruly Nationalist levies would now turn their attention to his out-lying ports of Dilam Hindean, &c."

He continued that unless I could give him assurances that British Government would give him effective support in resisting Nationalists and would protect him against subsequent consequences of his so doing he could not hold out much longer, and must take some course which would save his face with both parties.

I replied that I was not authorized to give any such guarantee. He went on to explain that if customs receipts continued to be forwarded to Tehran, Nationalist resentment would be unrestrainable; that he as head of Mohammerah would be made responsible for receipts and that, in absence of definite advice or intervention from us, he would be unable to avoid asking Belgian Director to retain receipts under adequate guard in Customs premises until atmosphere became clearer.

"Part 2. Text of assurances. What the Sheikh hopes for is, first to be assured that we will not permit any Persian régime, whether autocratic or constitutional, to disturb *status quo* in regard to himself or his successors; secondly, that we ourselves will not disturb it as long as he fulfils his obligations to us, and thirdly, that we will oppose any other Power attempting to do so. Realizing from my replies to his inquiries that dynastic guarantee could not be expected, he earnestly begged that assurances given him might at all events be extended to his immediate offspring, subject, of course, to their giving us satisfaction. He expressed readiness to satisfy us as to concurrence of tribal Sheikhs."

"Part 3. As regards irrigation question, his present apprehensions have been allayed. I also discussed scheme fully with Willcocks, who is recording his conclusions in a Memorandum for me. *Primâ facie*, he considers present project calculated to have a deleterious effect on shareholders of Sheikh's existing date gardens on Abadan and Shat-el-Arab."


"Part 4. As regards loan, Sheikh will be content for the present with the provisional assurance that we are ready to grant a loan on suitable terms, and that he need not look elsewhere. Character of security or *quid pro quo* to be given by him cannot be decided until he has found the old Firmans on which his tenure is based. For these he is now searching. It is suggested that in the event of irrigation or other utilitarian scheme being undertaken by him with our assistance, a lien on the works as they progressed would be a feasible form of security."

Cox tells me privately that Sheikh is reassured and for the moment reasonable. I am asking him whether he considers having regard to your telegram No. 109, which I am repeating to him, any further communication to Sheikh desirable. Sheikh's contemplated action in regard to Customs seems unobjectionable, and I am telling Cox so.

[153—823]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية للشيخ." [١٧١ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٣٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨١ و] (٤١٦/٢٤٠)



CONFIDENTIAL

3165

116

Already received (26/3)
circulated.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay (Tehran).

(No. 109.)

Foreign Office, March 25, 1909, 1.15 P.M.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 157 and 164 [of 17th and 18th March : Mohammerah].

I concur in your views as to replies to Sheikh, and in your instructions to Cox as to Syndicate's negotiations.

Great Britain and Russia having promised to respect integrity of Persia, we cannot admit possibility of Persia ceasing to be a Sovereign State or being occupied by foreign Powers. In eventuality contemplated by Sheikh, our assurances would be more binding than ever. Sheikh should not forget danger of his losing his present strong and unhampered position by engaging in political party connections.


We are under no obligations to Sheikh to provide loan, and you should hold out no hope of one. Sheikh must be left to make his own terms with the Syndicate for land at Abadan and other facilities they may require.

Cox may have difficult task, but he should endeavour to soothe the susceptibilities of the Sheikh, and leave him in a good frame of mind.


Sheikh should be dissuaded if he shows signs of following example of Nationalists at Bunder Abbas and seizing Persian Customs.]

Gykhwin
26 March 1909

[154-711]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢٤١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩١] و [٤١٦/٢٤٢]

Register No. 3165

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from 70 Dated 25 Rec. 26 } Sent 1909.

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary | 26-3 | mu | <u>Persia</u> Loan to Sheikh of Muhammara. Decision of H.M. Govt. not to grant - in spite of recommendation in favour of loan referred to Govt. of India |
| Secretary of State | 27 | gf | |
| Committee | | | |
| Under Secretary | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Copy to India (see within)

Mr. J. P. Viceroy
explaining the Govt. of India's views were
considered, before decision not to grant
loan was arrived at.

Telegram to Viceroy, 29 March.


Seen Pol. Com. Sec.,
30 MAR 1909

Previous Papers :- 450
3115/09

3489. I. 1135. 2000.-6/1908. [1779.07.]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١١٩ظ] (٤١٦/٢٤٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٠] [٤١٦/٢٤٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٠ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٤٥)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٢١ و] (٤١٦/٢٤٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٢١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٤٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٢] [٤١٦/٢٤٨]



In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 10357/09.
and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant on the subject of the request made by the Sheikh of Mohammerah for advice as to the attitude he should adopt towards the constitution.

No further action seems called for in the matter, as, since your letter was written, the telegram, copy of which is enclosed, has been sent to His Majesty's Minister containing instructions for the Resident in the Persian Gulf somewhat different from the draft telegram to which the Secretary of State for India gives his concurrence in the letter under reply.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,


humble Servant,

Lami Mallet

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٢ظ] (٤١٦/٢٤٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٣] [٤١٦/٢٥٠]

Register No. 3115 [450] Secret Department. 121

Minute Paper.

Letter from F.O. Dated } 10, 16, 17 March 1909.
2el n.s. from Niceria 27. 4 Rec. 16 March 1909.
Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary | 20.3 | Mc | Persia. |
| Secretary of State | 20 | ap | |
| Committee | 21. | Mc. | Questions pending with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. As to instructions for Major Cox for his guidance in his impending interview with the Sheikh |
| Under Secretary | 24 | Mc | |
| Secretary of State..... | 24 | ap | |

Copy to COPY TO INDIA
See within 100.
SECRETARY'S N^o.....

Off to F.O. concerning in their views, and
discussing with Gen. of India as to advisability
of a loan to the Sheikh.

23rd March. Approved by a majority
of Political Committee. Sir
Hugh Baines records minute
of dissent.


Letter to F.O., 25 March.


Previous Papers :-
31024

3480. L. 1135. 2000.—6/1908. [1779/07.]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٢٣ظ] (٤١٦/٢٥١)







"to explain that that undertaking involves
" the maintenance of the status quo in that
" country and includes the continuance of
" the state of autonomy which your Excellency
" at present enjoys .


" It follows from the above that any
" external aggression upon your Excellency
" would constitute an infringement of Persian
" integrity, which is recognised by the terms
" of the Anglo-Russian Convention." (see
Consul-General Cox to Sheikh of Mohammerah,
1 Dec. 1908 enclosed with Sir G. Barclay's
despatch to Jany. 1909, No. 2 [No. 3115].

The view expressed in the matter of the
Sheikh's ^{will} request to lease lands to a British Co.,
referred to in the draft to the 70, has that even
-regiment which gives to the British will to have
understand the situation, but the no steps would be
taken by the British Gov. to secure preference rights
over lands belonging to the Sheikh, "in anticipation of a
" possible demand hereafter for their use" [No. 3111]

It appears from Sir G. Barclay's tel No. 157
that one reason why Major Cox wishes for a loan to
the Sheikh, is that otherwise the Sheikh will make
exorbitant demands on the Oil Corporation. Our policy
is that the Corporation should pay the necessary price, without help from us.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٥] [٤١٦/٢٥٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٢٥ظ] (٤١٦/٢٥٥)


draft telegram to Sir G. Barclay,
of holding out to the Sheikh
no hope of a loan from H.M.
Govt., and leaving him to
make his own terms with
the Syndicate for any
concessions they may require.
In this connection I am to
refer to the views expressed
by Lord Morley in my letter
of the 24th March, as to the
line to be taken in respect of
the wish expressed to H.M.
Consul by the Sheikh to
lease lands on the Marun
and the Shat-el Arab.

In ^{the} ~~these~~ circumstances
no question of the incidence of
the cost of the loan contemplated
by the Govt. of India arises.
But I am to say that
Lord Morley is not prepared
to accept the view that
any charge should be
placed

[Draft now before
Committee. No 3111]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٦ و] (٤١٦/٢٥٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٢٦ظ] (٤١٦/٢٥٧)






125

INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

India has very strong interests in the Persian Gulf, & it find it difficult to assent to the final paragraph of this ^{draft} letter. It is so important to prevent the Sheikh from applying to the Germans that I should not object to our helping him with a small loan, as we are helping the Sheikh of Kuwait. A loan on similar terms to the Kuwait loan would cost us next to nothing & for repayment is certain, and it would give us a control over the Sheikh, which in these troublous times in Persia might be very useful. It seems to me short sighted to refuse to take advantage of opportunities like the one now offered, ~~which~~ ^{which} were especially when it will cost us little or nothing to repay it. To advance a lakh or two




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
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


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للشيخ." [١٢٨ و] (٤١٦/٢٦٠)






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للشيخ." [١٢٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢٦١)






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للشيخ. " [١٢٩و] (٤١٦/٢٦٢)






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


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للشيخ. " [١٣٠] [٤١٦/٢٦٤]






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للشيخ." [١٣٠ظ] (٤١٦/٢٦٥)






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للشيخ. " [١٣١ و] (٤١٦/٢٦٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣١ظ] (٤١٦/٢٦٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٢] و [٤١٦/٢٦٨]

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. 130

COPY OF TELEGRAM. 460 Circulated with 315

FROM Victoria
DATED Calcutta 19th March '09
RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 5.45 p.m.

(3115/09)

RECEIVED IN
20 MAR 1909
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Mr. [unclear], secret. Sheikh of Bahamanrah. Please see [unclear]
telegram of 16th March. We are so impressed with urgent necessity
of giving Sheikh support and advice that we should be ready to
meet in the hour for which he asks. He already hints at
getting men from elsewhere, doubtless for arms.


Addressed to S. of S. for J.
Referred to Buhairi + Sohran.

Copy to 20 { 25 Mch (3115)
22 Apr
22 Apr

149




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٢ظ] (٤١٦/٢٦٩)






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للشيخ. " [١٣٣] [٤١٦/٢٧٠]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٣ظ] (٤١٦/٢٧١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحررة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٤ و] (٤١٦/٢٧٢)



132

Telegram to Sir G. Barclay, dated March 1909.

(10311)

Your telegrams No. 157 and 164 (of March 17th. and 18th. Mohammerah).

I concur in your views as to replies to Sheikh and in your instructions to Cox as to Syndicate's negotiations.


Great Britain and Russia having promised to respect integrity of Persia, we cannot admit possibility of Persia ceasing to be a sovereign state or being occupied by foreign Powers. In eventuality contemplated by Sheikh our assurances would be more binding than ever. Sheikh should not forget danger of his losing his present strong and unhampered position by engaging in political party connexions.

We are under no obligation to Sheikh to provide loan and you should hold out no hope of one. Sheikh must be left to make his own terms with the Syndicate for land at Abadan and other facilities they may require.

Cox




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
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


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للشيخ." [١٣٥] (٤١٦/٢٧٤)






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للشيخ." [١٣٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٧٥)






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للشيخ." [١٣٦ و] (٤١٦/٢٧٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٦ظ] (٤١٦/٢٧٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٣٧ و] (٤١٦/٢٧٨)



CONFIDENTIAL

135



Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17, 7:30 P.M.)

(No. 157.)

Tehran, March 17, 1909, 1:20 P.M. + as to
satisfy
- by area
- result
- from
- within
- lower part

HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire's telegram No. 170, 15th March.

Point 1. I am repeating your telegram No. 93 to His Majesty's Consul-General, which should enable him to satisfy Sheikh.

Point 3. I presume we cannot advise Sheikh to rebel. If he insists on advice we might tell him he had better take no action for the present, as the situation is likely to come to a head before long.

Points 2 and 4. His Majesty's Consul-General suggests that, in the event of giving a loan or extended assurances desired by the Sheikh, His Majesty's Government or the Oil Syndicate should take opportunity of acquiring on easy terms ground required by Syndicate on Abadan Island, as otherwise Sheikh may ask exorbitant terms.

I do not see how we can go beyond general assurances given by Sir A. Hardinge and His Majesty's Consul-General, unless he specifies from what quarter he anticipates aggression. If it is Turkish aggression that he fears, His Majesty's Consul-General might acquaint him with substance of your despatch No. 75 of 25th February, 1908, to Constantinople (see Mr. Marling's despatch No. 166 of 11th July). x (2914/08)

Your telegram No. 21. x


I have authorized Consul-General to assist negotiations, provided that Syndicate deals direct with the Sheikh and not through some firm, which local Manager wished to do in the hope of better terms.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India and Bushire.)

x. presumably about the site for a refinery on Abadan Island




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٣٧ظ] (٤١٦/٢٧٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٣٨ و] (٤١٦/٢٨٠)



CONFIDENTIAL

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15, 9-15 P.M.)

(No. 170.)

Bushire, March 15, 1909, 4-10 P.M.

APPARENTLY, as result of Legation telegram to Foreign Office repeated to me on 6th March as No. 32, I am ordered to proceed to Mohammerah forthwith to reassure Sheikh.

"Lawrence" is away, but I had intended to proceed by mail steamer on 17th March. Meanwhile, following is purport of representations from the Sheikh received to-day through Consul at Mohammerah:—

1. Sheikh is impatient to make proposed protest to Persian Government regarding reported Karun Concession. Can he now do so?

2. Referring to text of assurances given him by me on 8th December on behalf of Government, he represents that wording of ante-penultimate and penultimate paragraphs only safeguards him so long as Persia is on her feet. He asks urgently for extension of guarantee to cover contingency of Persia ceasing to be a Sovereign State and occupation or intervention by foreign Powers. The assurance that he particularly wants is that he and his descendants and tribesmen should be maintained in the enjoyment of their possessions so long as they remain loyal to British interests and advice.

3. He is annoyed at our refusal or neglect to advise him as to whether he should side with Royalist or Nationalist party. He states that both are appealing to him in the name of Persia; that he must ultimately make a choice, and he fears that if in the absence of our advice he should choose the wrong horse we might seize the excuse to withdraw our guarantee.


4. He states that he is in immediate need of cash for improvements, and he reiterates his previous request for a loan, adding that if we are not prepared to make it we must not object to his getting it elsewhere.

He begs that I will come to Mohammerah as soon as possible and bring authoritative reply on above points.

(Addressed to Legation; repeated to India and Foreign Office.)




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للشيخ". [١٣٨ظ] (٤١٦/٢٨١)






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للشيخ. " [١٣٩ و] [٤١٦/٢٨٢]






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


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للشيخ." [١٤٠] (٤١٦/٢٨٤)






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


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للشيخ. " [١٤١ و] (٤١٦/٢٨٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤١٤١ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٨٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٤٢] [١٦/٢٨٨]

Register No. 3828

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from J.D., Dated } 9 Sept. 1908.
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged

| Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|-------|-----------|--|
| 14. 9 | vx | Persian full. Extract from the Cairo Arabic paper 'El Livwa' regarding British policy towards Koweit and Mohammerah. Note desire of Sheikh of Mohammerah for an agreement with England. |
| 14 | U | |
| 16. | M. | |
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
COPY TO INDIA
11 September 1908
SECRETARY'S OFFICE 37

For information.


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22 SEP. 1908

Previous Papers :-
(36734)

3486. I. 1135. 2000.-6/1908. [1779/07.]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٢ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٨٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٣ و١] (٤١٦/٢٩٠)



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[August 25.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[29572]

No. 1.

Mr. G. Mackenzie to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)

Tempsford Hall, Sandy, Beds,
August 23, 1908.

Dear Sir Charles,

I PASS on the inclosed, received by last mail, as it may interest you.
Mirza Hamza came by steamer via Bombay, and when in London came to see me several times. He is supposed to have come to Europe for medical advice, and is now in Germany. He told me he intended to do the Hadj and go to Mecca on his way back to Mohammerah.

Lyle is one of our partners in Bussorah, and a personal friend of the Sheikh of Koweit, whom he has frequently visited. He did come home via Bagdad and Constantinople, but in no way connected with business, nor did he call upon any one when there. In fact, we at home had no idea that he intended taking that route.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) GEORGE S. MACKENZIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Translation of an Article in the Arabic paper "El Luvva," published in Cairo, dated 26 Jemad-el-Evvel, 1324 (June 25, 1908).

POLITICS IN MESOPOTAMIA.

AT the end of last month Mirza Hamza, agent of Sheikh Khazal, the Ruler of Mohammerah, left for India *en route* to London. It is rumoured that he is travelling on a tour and for a change, but this is only a falsehood, and he has not left here for anything but a political business in hand of ruinous results for Mesopotamia.

Mirza Hamza left on behalf of his Sheikh, and Mr. Archibald Lyle, agent of Gray, Mackenzie steamers in Bussorah, on behalf of the Sheikh of Koweit, or the Sultan of Koweit, as some people pretend to call him.

The said agent travelled via Bagdad with the pretext that in doing this his intention is to go to Constantinople. Just a few days before his departure the owner of Koweit invited him for a consultation in closing an Agreement with England. When the Sheikh of Mohammerah saw his friend entering into an Agreement with England, he also, who had been preparing himself for this for some time, wished to join him in the shameful act.

Also Mr. Crow, British Consul in Bussorah, left for London on a six months' furlough, and it is known to everybody that he left for the purpose of fulfilling the Agreement between his Government and the two Rulers of Koweit and Mohammerah. Woe to them, if they only knew what England did with people, when they dared to do this disgraceful act. It is their want of sincerity to their respective Governments and lack of patriotism that prompted them to this act. They are left to their discretion to act as they wish, and there is nobody to prevent them. In this they are justified.


As for the Turkish Government, which is a praiseworthy one, it is a Government of honour for Islam. If it was the misconduct of some of the officials, who forget everything and wink their eyes at everything to such an extent of indifference that it resulted in the inclination of Koweit to England, we ask our Lord the Sultan—whom God may exalt!—to send to these countries officials true to their Government and nation, so that internal disorders may subside.

We do not know what the two Sheikhs expect in delivering themselves up to England. England has introduced herself in their affairs, and British underhand politics are already in activity in Mesopotamia, especially in Koweit and Mohammerah, causing ruin and destruction. England is introducing arms in Mesopotamia from the two places above mentioned to such an extent that you find even a boy not yet 14 years of age armed with a rifle.

[1900 bb—2]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [٤٣ اظ] (٤١٦/٢٩١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٤] [١٦/٢٩٢]

142

Register No.
1336
[1241] (3528)

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from India no. 23 M.,
Telegram from Viceroi,
(Letter from P.O. of 6/6/08) (3528)

Dated 4 June, 10 July } 1908.
Rec. 22 " 11 "

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|---------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary | 15 July | W | Persia. W |
| Secretary of State | 15 | af | Sheikh of Muhammerah and Bahktari |
| Committee | " | M. | Khans Agreement between Sardar Lyfa and |
| Under Secretary | 21 | W | Bahktari Khans affecting Dept. of Khway - |
| Secretary of State | | | Spahan road and its neighbourhood. |
| | | | Relations with Muhammerah and Bahktari |
| | | | Khans: question of British assurances. Views of |
| | | | Capt. Lorne, Major Cox and Fort of India. |

Copy to P.O. [Printed portion of 1241] 1.7.08.

dt. 6.7.0.

The only new paper on the file, besides the Viceroy's telegram, is Capt. Drow's letter of the 10th May '08, giving an account of the agreement between the Sheikh & the Khans, already reported in Mr. Waking's telegram of 21 May.


3225
208


Previous Papers :—
3225

3489. I. 1185. 2000.—G/1908. [1779.07.]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٤] (٤١٦/٢٩٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٤٥] [٤١٦/٢٩٤]




1336 143
All alterations
will be made
as suggested.
28 July '08.
July 25 1908.
Dear Sir Richmond,


Your letter of July 22
about the visit of the Sheikh
of Mohammera and the
Bakhtiar Khan for closer
relations with us, last of.

The word "successor" was
not put in the singular in
in our letter 15994 of May 20
purpose, - in fact, it was a
slip. May we alter the






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٥ظ] (٤١٦/٢٩٥)







ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٦/١] [٢٩٦/٤١٦]









ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٤٧ و] [٤١٦/٢٩٨]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٧ ظ] (٤١٦/٢٩٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٤٨ و] (٤١٦/٣٠٠)



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[B] PERSIA.

[June 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 23.

[19089]

No. 1.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 123. Confidential.)

Tehran, May 21, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 124 of to-day's date, copy of the despatch in which His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah reports the conclusion of a formal alliance in writing between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari Khans.

I must confess that I was quite unprepared to see the negotiations on which I reported in my despatch No. 97 of the 23rd April arrive at a result so speedily. I cannot entertain very sanguine hopes as to the durability of such an arrangement, but so long as it lasts it seems calculated to assist in promoting peace and preserving order in the regions governed by the respective Chieftains—regions where there are numerous and important British interests—and as such I venture to think that its conclusion may not be displeasing to His Majesty's Government. To my mind the arrangement seems to be a step in the right direction, and all the more satisfactory in that it was taken without foreign instigation or assistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul McDouall to Mr. Marling.

(No. 13. Confidential.)

Mohammerah, April 24, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sardar Arfa went to Waiss to meet the Bakhtiari Khans; owing to illness he was unable to remain, and Salar Arfa, Shehab-es-Saltaneh, and Sarim-el-Mulk returned to Mohammerah with him on the 14th April and left on the 21st. On that day they called on me with Haji Rais Tujar to represent the Sardar Arfa, who was unable to come ashore owing to the abscess he is suffering from. They informed me that they had now conferred with the Sardar Arfa and made friends with him, and made a formal written alliance with him; that in future they are to act together, and their respective tribesmen must obey the chief of the district, Arab or Bakhtiari, in which they happen to be. They are to act together in loyal service to the Government and people of Persia so long as there is no interference with the various concessions held by them respectively or increase in the taxes demanded; but if such interference or alteration in taxes is made they will act as one in resisting it. They hope that this will tend to render the country, and especially the Ispahan road, perpetually safe. Haji Rais Tujar confirmed this, and both parties called on me to witness that they had made this agreement, and in the event of any dispute occurring between them they asked that we should inquire and, on finding out with whom the fault lay, advise that party that he is in the wrong.


The Salar Arfa said that the Legation had on several occasions advised them to make friends with the Sardar Arfa, and now that they had done so they hoped that the Legation might be able to give them a certain increased amount of support in Tehran.

I said that I was very glad to hear that they had made friends, which should tend to increased security for trade in these districts; that I would report the matter to His Majesty's Legation and Consul-General, Bushire; and that I would always be glad to assist by advice in preventing any disagreement between them. It had appeared to me that there had been a difficulty in arranging matters before owing to the Khans them-

[1813 i—23]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٤٨ اظ] (٤١٦/٣٠١)






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للشيخ. " [١٤٩] [١٦/٣٠٢]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٤٩٩] [٤١٦/٣٠٣]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [١٥٠] [٤١٦/٣٠٤]



Enclosures in letter from
Foreign Secretary, No 23 M
87. 4 June

Confidential]

1241

Circulated with
1336



198

Received ahead
from 70
3225/08

Copy to 30
(Printed in 1908)
1 Dec 1908

No. 942, dated Bushire, the 22nd (received 30th) March 1908.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—S. H. BUTLER, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward for information and such consideration as may be possible, copies of the undermentioned papers—

- (i) A memorandum giving details of an interview between myself, accompanied by Mr. Consul McDouall, and Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah on 7th January last.
- (ii) A letter No. 44, dated 3rd February 1908, received from His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz, in which the latter reports the purport of a conversation which he recently had with the Bakhtyari Khans, Salar-i-Arfa and Shahab-es-Sultaneh.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah asked me to await receipt of the memorandum of State expenditure which he was preparing, before taking special action on his representations, and when the summary of the said document reached Bushire I was away on tour; meanwhile Captain Lorimer's report also reached me.

2. In connection with the abovementioned papers I beg to refer to, and to quote for facility of reference, a memorandum recorded by Sir Louis Dane at the time of the tour made by His Excellency Lord Curzon and Sir Arthur Hardinge to the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1903. The passage I refer to runs as follows; (*vide* enclosure to Foreign Department, No. 694-E.A., dated 1st March 1904):—

"The question of increasing our influence in the Lur and Bakhtyari country and of strengthening the tribes in South-Western Persia, so as to enable them to hold their own in the event of a collapse of the central power or trouble in South-Western Persia was discussed on several occasions by His Excellency with Sir Arthur Hardinge. It was recognised that our future action in South-Western Persia must largely depend on the extent to which we could strengthen and utilise both tribes and the tribes of Arabistan, who under the Sheikh of Mohammerah are in much the same position".

3. It will be seen from my present enclosures that practically simultaneously though independently, the Chiefs of the Bakhtyaris and of the Arab tribes of Arabistan respectively have become apprehensive as to their future and convinced that their interests lie in union among themselves, if possible under our aegis.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah, encouraged no doubt by the understanding at which his fidus Achates Sheikh Mubarek has arrived at with us, presses for an assurance that his lineal heirs will be maintained in the enjoyment of their present patrimony, and will be reasonably safeguarded against curtailment of their present semi-independent position and powers, by the Central Government. As arguments in support of his rights or strong claims to such treatment Sheikh Khazal adduces the facts that ever since his accession the Central Government have obliged him to meet from private funds very heavy expenditure which should properly have fallen on the Government Exchequer, and that now during the current Turco-Persian crisis the Central Government have left him, absolutely to take care of himself in the best way he can, in fact, have neither the means nor the power to do anything to help him in the event of his territory being invaded by Turkish troops. In this respect he is in a measure comforted by his confidence in Great Britain to prevent any attack upon him by sea but in the event of an invasion from the landside he feels that he would be placed in a very serious position, seeing that he possesses no artillery or large supply of ammunition.

In return for such assurances from us as his heart desires he expresses his readiness to bind himself to us in any way which may seem to us feasible.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. [١٥٠ ظ] (٤١٦/٣٠٥)

The Bakhtiaris intimate that, prompted by the common sentiments of self-preservation, they contemplate allying themselves with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and in the hope of thus maintaining a position of semi or practical independence they are anxious to enter into a secret understanding with the British Government.

I do not feel that I can safely or usefully offer much comment upon their respective representations, as in such a question my field of vision is too confined to allow me to see the matter in the right perspective. I can only say as a local officer that it seems to me that having by the terms of our convention with Russia left the region affected, in the neutral zone and exposed to German enterprise, it is of the utmost importance to our interests to counteract the advantages of that circumstance as far as possible and without delay, by strengthening our hold as much as we can upon the Chiefs of South Western Persia before the opportunity to do so passes out of our control.

As far as the Sheikh of Mohammerah is concerned, I believe him to be primarily quite sincere in his protestations that his interests and hopes are centred in us. Nevertheless he is mainly prompted by the dictates of self-preservation and should there be failure on our part to dispel his apprehensions, it is as well to remember that he is likely to be greatly influenced by his astute henchman and relative Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar, who is possessed by no feelings of tradition or sentiment or by any considerations other than those of personal aggrandisement and present profit, and would, I doubt not, as lief pursue his schemes through German auspices as ours, if the former were made sufficiently attractive to him and ours were too lukewarm.

Whether the aspirations of the Sheikh and the Khans can be entertained to any degree or not, I feel sure that the problem of which they are factors will have the early and interested consideration of Government.

A duplicate of this letter is being forwarded to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, under my office No. 44—943 of to-day's date.

Note regarding an interview which took place between the Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah and the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Dated 7th January 1908.

At my last visit to Mohammerah on the 16th December 1907, in connection with the delivery to the Sheikh of the Humaidi pirates, Sheikh Khazal who in the course of our discussion regarding the punishment of the outlaws, had incidentally shown that he had heard of our recent agreement with Sheikh Mubarek, informed me as I was leaving that he had urgent grounds for wishing to discuss his affairs generally with me and begged me to pay him a leisurely visit at an early date for the purpose. I did so on 7th January, and having gone there for this express purpose, I took such previous papers as were necessary with me. Mr. McDouall was present with me. Sheikh Khazal having in the first instance led me to think that he needed more definite support or assurances from us, I read him out the purport of Sir Arthur Hardinge's letters of December 7th, 1902 and December 24th, 1903 and then enquired what further he needed. Sheikh Khazal replied that the assurances just referred to were all right so far as they went and at the epoch at which they were given but that the outlook had much changed and developed since 1903 and that he could not but regard the near future with the greatest apprehension. It was the advent of the "Majlis" and the so-called constitutional government which had changed the aspect of the future so much. One of two things must soon happen, either the Shah or the Majlis must be eliminated. If the probability was that the Shah would be able to suppress the Majlis, as there was no doubt he would like to do, and if there was to be a return to absolute Government, then he would not feel so apprehensive, for he was fortified by the assurance which we had given him to afford him our good offices and support with the Central Government, and, as long as he remained faithful to the Shah and followed our advice, to protect him against attack by water under any pretext. But it now appeared to him and his



advisers, either that the Majlis would get the upper hand of the Shah and that the latter would become a mere puppet in their hands or else that the Majlis would break up and that a general upheaval would supervene, which would prompt or oblige Foreign Powers to interfere and that a scramble would result. In either eventuality he felt that he would be in great jeopardy. We repeated to him the purport of a recent telegram to the effect that Russia and England had specifically undertaken to respect the integrity of Persia and asked what he especially fears from the Majlis or from Constitutional Government. He replied that the Majlis and the now free Press had always been hostile to him. The papers had repeatedly been attacking him lately, for everything he did. Thus he had been attacked for the Beni Truf Expedition and for his friendship with Sheikh Mubarek. He knew that the Russians, who were all-powerful in Tehran in the way of pulling strings, were hostile to him and fostered these attacks, and he believed that the first thing that the Constitutional Government would do under the pretext of reform would be to attempt to clip his wings and to intrench further upon his hereditary and established rights. Something in that direction was bound to happen, and it was of vital importance to him to know in the event of (1) the break up of Persia or (2) the attempt of the Majlis to reduce him to nothing, what the policy of His Majesty's Government would be, and how far they could reassure him now. He begged that we would consider the question of giving him a writing, assuring him (1) that we would to the utmost of our power prevent his absorption by any other power and that he and his children would be maintained in the enjoyment of their patrimony; (2) that just as we had hitherto undertaken to protect Mohammerah from attack by a Foreign Power (whatever pretext for such action be alleged) and also that we would continue to give him our support and good offices so long as he remained faithful to the Shah and acted in accordance with our advice—similarly, we would now extend that undertaking and promise him immunity against the inroads of the Majlis upon his powers. He expressed the conviction that his salvation lay in forming connections with one of the great European Nations and that among those Nations his interests and ideas were identical with those of Great Britain and not with those of any other Power and that in return for such fresh assurances as those indicated he was prepared to take upon himself obligations to the British Government in any terms that they might think advisable.

The Sheikh then went on to speak of the Turco-Persian question complaining that although the Central Government sought to curtail his powers and independence, they left him, in an urgent matter like this, in the dark and in the lurch, and without special funds (*vide* Residency telegram, No. 16—54, dated 18th January 1908).

He enlarged on this fact and went on to speak of the enormous extra expenditure that he had been put to by the Persian Government in connection with measures of government which should properly fall on the Government Exchequer. He begged leave to have prepared and to place before me for the confidential information of Government a statement of such expenditure which he had incurred. He concluded with the promise to have this drawn up as soon as possible, but it was not received by me until the end of February.

P. Z. COX, Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Statement of the chief expenses of the Government of the Shatt-el-Arab and the Karun from the accession of Sheikh Khazal Khan 1315 to the end of 1325 Hijra (June 1897 to January 1908 inclusive) eleven years.

(1) Expenses on the Shatt-el-Arab including salaries of Sheiks, guard posts, patrols, bellams, cartridges and a few rifles.

Krans 2,410,860 = £46,363



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥١ظ] (٤١٦/٣٠٧)

4

| | |
|---|---------------------------|
| (2) Expenses on Karun. Salary of Naib-el-Hukuma at Ah-az, salaries of Bawi Sheikhs and other headmen, guard posts on Karun and at Felahieh, sowars, cartridges, also steamer expenses when Sheikh Khazal is on the Karun. | Krans 4,842,815 = £93,131 |
| (3) Expenses in connection with Hawija and Beni Truf including salaries of Sheikhs, two expeditions, compensation for horses killed, cartridges and some rifles. | " 4,786,242 = £92,043 |
| (4) Expenses sending Hanzal with 300 sowars for two months in 1904 to preserve order at Dizful and Shushter pending arrival of Azam-es-Sultaneh. | " 32,000 = £615 |
| (5) Expenses in 1907 sending Hanzal with 500 sowars to assist Sardar Mukarrem in his expedition against Derekwand Lurs. | " 35,000 = £673 |
| Telegrams for 11 years ... | " 80,000 = £1,538 |
| Total ... | " 12,186,917 = £234,363 |

Note by Mr. McDouall.—This does not include such expenses as entertaining Governor-General which comes to about 50,000 Krans a year, according to Haji Rais, or expenses of band or Haji Rais' two missions to Tehran. In Haji Jabur's time the Sheikhs received no salaries. Sheikh Mizal gave a few small sums, but Sheikh Khazal instituted the present system and called upon them to prevent robbery and piracy and keep the peace. Haji Rais now has the whole accounts made out in sections from the books kept by the Sheikh's clerk and himself, but says probably some items are omitted. This is a summary of the whole; any special items could be obtained if you wished for them but Haji Rais is leaving on a mission to the Bakhtyari at Ab-i-bid in a few days. Expenses in connection with Behbahan Government are not given.

MOHAMMERAH; } (Sd.) W. McDOUALL.
The 15th February 1908.

No. 44, dated Camp Wais, the 3rd February 1908.

From—CAPTAIN D. L. R. LORIMER, I. A., His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul for Arabistan,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to communicate a proposal propounded by the Salar Arba and Shahab-us-Sultanah in their brief interview with me at Maidan Munaf-tun on 23rd January.

2. On this occasion they made the startling announcement that, after due consideration, they found themselves so dissatisfied with the present state of the Persian Government that they were contemplating throwing off allegiance to it. They had entered into negotiations with Sheikh Khazal on the subject



and would have me understand that they had made some progress in them, and that the Sheikh had indicated that he shared their feelings and aspirations. It was proposed to have a personal meeting with him in order to bring matters to a practical issue in the form of a treaty or convention, and for this purpose they intended to shortly pay a visit to Nasiri. There they would exchange written undertakings with the Sheikh, which they would ask me to guarantee. Their ambition was to attain the position of *quasi*-independent protectorates, of which they cited Maskat and Koweit as examples, and with this end in view they were prepared to accept our sovereignty, paying their revenues to us, and putting their population at our disposal for military training. They recognised that their agreements among themselves lacked stability, and they would look to us to enforce on both sides the observance of their treaty with the Sheikh.

3. Previously, and in my absence, the Shahab had begged my Mirza to gain my adherence to their project, and professed the Khans' willingness to furnish us with all necessary signed agreements. My Mirza expressed himself doubtful of my attaching much weight to their signed undertakings, gently reminding the Shahab that the seal on the document which he had handed me at Kima last March was yet scarcely dry. This silenced the Shahab, who did not want the Salar's curiosity aroused regarding that episode in his past career.

4. In the course of the conversation the Salar remarked that they had some 40,000 subjects capable of bearing arms, but of these only some 10,000 were provided with fire-arms. This estimate, I may observe, is the most sane statement of the fighting strength of the Bakhtyari tribes which I have yet had made to me. The Salar also said that some British representative (Colonel Douglas in 1904?) had approached them on the subject of raising and training forces in their country. At that time they were not prepared to favour such a step, but that their feelings had undergone a change, and that now they were anxious for it. Let us now play up to our own proposals.

5. I answered very briefly that I was unable personally to make them any reply, but that I would lay their proposals before my Government. I also stated that their proposals appeared to me to involve issues of great magnitude, and of such a nature that our engagements with Persia and other powers would make it very difficult for us to accept any part in them.

6. The short time at my command and my unwillingness to display too great interest in the subversive projects of the Khans, prevented me from attempting to draw from them a more detailed statement of the precise course of action they have in view, and of the means and methods which they propose to employ.


I can therefore only communicate the above précis of what passed between us. This I do merely for the information of Government.

I do not propose to offer any comments on a subject which stands to be judged on general and not local grounds, but I may remark that I question the probability of Sheikh Khazal's committing himself in the way desired by the Khans, though he may, to gain fugitive objects, discuss the matter with them with apparent seriousness. I would also point out that, if rejected in their full scope, the avowed desires of the Khans might possibly still be taken advantage of in part, as a means of attaining the aims which Government held in 1904 as regards the raising of Militia under our control among the Bakhtyaris and the tribes of Western Luristan.

7. In the event of the Khans carrying out their projected visit to Nasiri and meeting with the Sheikh, their proposals are likely to be presented to me in a more concrete and urgent form by themselves, and possibly by the Sheikh, I should wish to be furnished with instructions regarding the attitude which I should observe, before such a contingency arises.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٢ظ] (٤١٦/٣٠٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٣] [٤١٦/٣١٠]



[Confidential.]

1741
No. 1391, dated Bushire, the 10th (received 18th) May 1908.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, First Assistant Resident, In charge current duties,
To—S. H. BUTLER, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the
Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of
India, a copy of the communication
marginally noted, addressed by His
Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,
No. 13, dated the 24th April 1908.
regarding the agreement arrived at between the Sardar Arfa and the Bakhtyari
Khans affecting the safety of the Ahwaz-Ispahan Road and its neighbourhood.

BRITISH CONSULATE ;

Mohammerah, April 24th, 1908.

No. 13.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Sardar Arfa went to Wais to meet the
Bakhtyari Khans; owing to illness he was unable to remain and Salar Arfa,
Shahab-es-Sultaneh and Sarim-ul-Mulk returned to Mohammerah with him on
the 14th April and left on the 21st. On that day they called on me with Haji
Rais Tujjar to represent the Sardar Arfa who was unable to come ashore owing
to the abscess he is suffering from. They informed me that they had now
conferred with the Sardar Arfa and made friends with him and made a formal
written alliance with him that in future they are to act together and their
respective tribesmen must obey the Chief of the district, Arab or Bakhtyari, in
which they happen to be. They are to act together in loyal service to the
Government and people of Persia as long as there is no interference with the
various concessions held by them respectively or increase in the taxes demanded ;
but if such interference or alteration in taxes is made they will act as one in
resisting it. They hope that this agreement will tend to render the country and
especially the Ispahan road perpetually safe. Haji Rais Tujjar confirmed this
and both parties called on me to witness that they had made this agreement
and in the event of any dispute occurring between them they asked that we
should enquire and on finding out with whom the fault lay advise that party
that he was in the wrong.

The Salar Arfa said that the Legation had on several occasions advised
them to make friends with the Sardar Arfa, and now that they had done so, they
hoped that the Legation might be able to give them a certain increased amount
of support in Tehran.

I said that I was very glad to hear that they had made friends which should
tend to increased security for trade in these districts, that I would report the
matter to His Majesty's Legation, and Consul-General Bushire, and that I would
be glad to assist by advice in preventing any disagreement between them. It
had appeared to me that there had been a difficulty in arranging matters before
owing to the Khans themselves not always acting together. Both the Salar
Arfa and the Shahab-es-Sultaneh assured me that there was no likelihood of
any differences between them in future and that the Sardar Arfa will use his
influence to prevent any differences between them.

Copy sent to His Majesty's Consul-General, Bushire, and His Majesty's
Vice-Consul, Ahwaz.

I have, etc.,

W. McDOUALL,


His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah.

C. M. Marling, Esq.,

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires,
Tehran.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية للشيخ." [١٥٣ظ] (٤١٦/٣١١)



Copy forwarded to His Britannic-Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, etc.

MOHAMMERAH;


April 24th, 1908.

W. McDOUALL,

His Britannic Majesty's Consul.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٤] [١٦/٣١٢]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٥٤ظ] (٣١٣/٤١٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٥] [٤١٦/٣١٤]



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[A]

ASIATIC TURKEY.

[March 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[9404]

No. 1.

Supplementary Memorandum respecting British Interests in the Persian Gulf

[See Confidential Paper No. 9161.]

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I.—The Arms Traffic.

(Communicated by the India Office.)

THE position in regard to the arms traffic on the various sections of the Persian Gulf littoral is briefly as follows:—

1. *Muscat*.—Muscat has for many years been an emporium for the arms traffic, and the trade has now attained to such dimensions that in 1906-7 the total value of the imports of arms and ammunition amounted to 112,338*l*. The situation is governed by the fact that the Sultan of Muscat has Commercial Treaties with France, Holland, and the United States, under the terms of which it would be impossible for him to impose special restrictions on the importation of arms and ammunition into his dominions without the consent of the Powers in question.

The result is that arms flow freely into Muscat, and are thence distributed throughout Persia, Arabia, and Afghanistan. From the last-named country a considerable proportion of the arms find their way to the tribesmen of the Indian North-West Frontier, with results which have been described by the Government of India as "constituting a grave menace to the peace of the border." To such an alarming extent has this process been going on that in February 1907 the Government of India estimated that out of the 270,000 men belonging to the frontier tribes no less than 94,000 possessed breech-loading rifled arms.

The view is pretty generally held that, until Muscat is closed to the importation of arms it will be impossible to place any effective check on the export trade by native *dhows* to other ports on the Gulf littoral.

The total number of rifles imported from Great Britain into Muscat reached 13,831 in the year 1900. During the two following years there was a marked decline, but in 1904-5 the total number of imported rifles was believed to be not less than 20,000. Recent figures point to a still more remarkable increase, and the custom-house returns show that, during the quarter ending the 30th September, 1907, some 10,000 rifles and 7,000,000 cartridges were shipped from the United Kingdom to Muscat. Besides the imports from this country there is known to be a considerable trade with the port of Marseilles. The Government of India calculated in February 1907 that, whereas in 1899-1900 only about one-seventh of the imports were from France, by 1905 the proportion of French arms had risen to two-fifths. M. Goguyer, a local French merchant, who has from time to time lent large sums of money to the Sultan, is known to be deeply involved in the arms traffic. Another French merchant, M. Caracalla, was reported in July 1906 to have arrived at Muscat, with the apparent intention of taking part in the trade. In the returns for 1906-7 Belgium appears

Government of India's letter of February 21, 1907.

India Office to Foreign Office, November 26, 1907.

[2878 s-1]

B



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٣١٥)

for the first time as an importer of arms into Muscat, though it is believed that rifles of Belgian manufacture have for many years past been imported in considerable numbers.

Government of India's letter of February 10, 1898.

In 1897 the Government of India determined to make an effort to check the arms traffic at Muscat, and, accordingly, in January 1898 joint representations were made to the Sultan by the British and Persian Governments, urging him to co-operate in the suppression of the traffic. His Highness fell in with the suggestion, and on the 13th January of that year issued (1) a Notification warning his subjects that the importation of arms and ammunition into India and Persia was illegal; and (2) a Proclamation authorizing British and Persian vessels of war to search, within Muscat territorial waters, vessels carrying the British, Persian, or Muscat flag, as well as Muscat vessels in Indian and Persian waters, and to confiscate arms and ammunition intended for Indian and Persian ports.

The right of search does not extend to the vessels of other nations, and, as has been stated above, the terms of his Commercial Treaties render it impossible for the Sultan, without the consent of the Treaty Powers, to impose any general restriction on the import of arms into Muscat.

In the same year, 1898, with a view to imposing a further check on the arms traffic in Oman, rules were issued requiring all British subjects possessing arms within the Sultan's territory to register the same at the British Consulate. It may be doubted, however, whether this measure has done more than throw the trade to an increasing extent into foreign hands. In the same way it seems not unlikely that the action recently taken by the British India Steam Navigation Company to check the smuggling of arms in small quantities by the Company's steamers in the Gulf may only result in diverting traffic of this kind to vessels which are not placed under such restrictions.*

India Office to Foreign Office, October 19, 1898.

It may be added that the import of arms at Gwadar, the Sultan of Muscat's dependency on the Mekran coast, was prohibited by a Proclamation issued by His Highness on the 3rd March, 1891.

Government of India's letter of March 31, 1904.

In March 1904, the Government of India proposed that the terms of the Muscat Proclamation of 1898 should be extended so as to cover the export of arms to Turkish ports, and to the territories of the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit, and of the Trucial Chiefs, as well as to "Indian and Persian" ports, which already fell within the scope of the Proclamation. This proposal was not carried into effect, it being at the time held undesirable, in view of the Sheikh's position in regard to the warfare in Central Arabia,^o to impose any fresh restrictions on the importation of arms at Koweit. The necessary arrangements with Turkey also presented some difficulty.

Mr. Brod- rick's telegram of June 24, 1908.

The Government of India have also from time to time recommended—

- (1.) That the French Government should be approached with a view to their being induced to agree to the total prohibition of the arms traffic at Muscat; and
- (2.) That the Porte should be asked to agree to our patrolling the Turkish littoral against arms smugglers, or at least to declare the illegality of the traffic.

Government of India's letter of February 21, 1907.

Neither of these suggestions has hitherto borne fruit. The question was passed in review by the Government of India as recently as February 1907, and the conclusion at which they arrived, after a careful and detailed examination of the case, was that the arms traffic would continue to flourish and increase until an Agreement with France was arrived at, and a complete prohibition was enforced against the importation of arms and ammunition into the territories of the Sultan of Muscat. The whole question will come up for discussion at the forthcoming International Conference at Brussels.


Under the Brussels Act of 1890 for regulating the traffic in arms, any one of the Signatory Powers that has occasion to authorize such traffic in territories of its own lying within the region affected by the provisions of the Act, is required to establish a "public warehouse," under the control of its local Administration, in which all imported arms must be deposited, and from which they may not be withdrawn without the previous authorization of the Administration.

There seems no hope of obtaining the consent of France, and the other Powers having Treaty relations with Muscat, to the Sultan's prohibiting, *proprio motu*, the import of arms into his dominions. The only remedy for the present evil would,

* See below, under Koweit.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
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ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٦ظ] [٤١٦/٣١٧]



Government of India's letter of July 5, 1900.

3. *Koweit*.—On the 24th May, 1900, the Sheikh of Koweit entered into an agreement with the British Government, by which he engaged "absolutely to prohibit the importation of arms into Koweit or exportation therefrom." To carry out this engagement he issued on the same day (1) a Notification declaring that "the importation of arms and ammunition into Koweit and the territory under my control, and the exportation of the same are absolutely prohibited," and that "all arms and ammunition imported into any parts of Koweit territory, or exported therefrom, in future will be seized and confiscated;" (2) a Proclamation conferring on British and Persian vessels of war the right to search, in Koweit territorial waters, vessels carrying the British, Persian, or Koweit flag, as well as Koweit vessels in Indian and Persian waters; and to confiscate any arms and ammunition destined for Indian, Persian or Koweit ports.

Viceroy's telegram of May 29, 1904.

In spite of the above Notification little serious attempt has been made to check the import of arms into Koweit. In April 1904, at a time when tribal warfare was in full progress in the interior of Arabia, the Government of India pointed out that no arrangements had as yet been made with the Porte for the combined suppression of the traffic, and that the importation of arms was proceeding briskly. In view of the support rendered by the Turks to Bin Rashid, Amir of Nejd, one of the warring Chiefs of the interior, the Government of India were anxious that no additional check should be imposed on the arms traffic at Koweit, which afforded the main source of supply to the rival Chieftain, Bin Saoud, Amir of the Wahabi. It was explained that this did not involve authorizing the Sheikh of Koweit to import arms, or even relaxing measures actually in force, but merely letting matters remain as they were. His Majesty's Government accepted this view, and the Government of India were informed on the 24th June, 1904, that fresh measures for the prevention of the importation of arms at Koweit would for the present be deferred.

Mr. Brodriek to Government of India, June 24, 1904.

The latest reports of the Political Agent at Koweit show that a large and increasing traffic in arms is being carried on at that port. Major Knox, in his Trade Report for 1906-7, drew attention to the large increase during the year in the value of the arms imported in country sailing-boats, and remarked that "the well-known dislike of the British authorities to this traffic, while it has had no effect in checking the import of arms and ammunition, has had the very unfortunate result of losing to a British Company (the British India Steam Navigation Company) the freight on 13 lakhs worth of goods."

Major Knox to Government of India, May 7, 1907.

Major Knox to Government of India, August 19, 1906.

Major Knox found it necessary in May 1906 to remind Sheikh Mubarak formally of his Arms Prohibition of 1900, and to request that it might be more strictly enforced. The Sheikh did not take the reminder in good part, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf gave his opinion that the question was one which might at any time endanger the good relations between the Sheikh and the Political Agent. Major Knox put the case still more strongly in a letter to the Resident. "The Proclamation," he wrote on the 3rd July, 1906, "is not worth the paper it is written on, and is only a cause of friction."


4. *Trucial Chiefs*.—At the close of 1902 the Trucial Chiefs entered into engagements respecting the arms traffic, similar to those of the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit.


5. *Turkey*.—The importation of arms and munitions of war of all kinds into Turkey was prohibited by an Imperial Decree which was notified to the British Embassy in February 1862. The orders issued under this Decree to the custom-house authorities were communicated to the British Embassy by the Ottoman Government on the 11th February, 1863. They forbade absolutely the import into any part of the Ottoman Empire of all arms and ammunition, except "les armes de chasse et de luxe, les armes blanches, tels que sabres, épées et couteaux, et la poudre de chasse en petite quantité, destinés à l'usage privé"; and stated that all contraband articles would be confiscated by the State.

On the 4th October, 1893, the Porte made a fresh communication to the Powers, inclosing the Regulations which had been accepted in the Turco-German Commercial Treaty just then concluded, and notifying them as those in force. The acceptance of these Regulations was not at the time considered opportune by Great Britain and the other Powers, but it would seem that, nevertheless, the Turkish Government continued to regard the Regulations as those in force in the Ottoman dominions.



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their despatch of the 21st February, 1907. "We regard it as certain," they wrote, "that effective action for the suppression of the arms trade cannot be taken by the Persian authorities. On the coast, the Belgian Customs officials are few in number, and although, perhaps, willing to give assistance for the suppression of the traffic, they have not the means at their disposal really to take efficient measures to deal with the evil. Inland, as is well known, the Persian authorities are powerless outside the towns, and large caravans can travel by unfrequented routes without the slightest risk of interference."

Government of India's letter of February 21, 1907.

II.—Quarantine.

(Communicated by the India Office.)

A.

"The sanitary defence of the Persian Gulf," wrote Dr. Theodore Thomson in his Report of the 12th July, 1906, "has in the past received, and still continues to receive, considerable attention, not only in the interests of countries adjacent thereto, but also because it is maintained by some authorities that cholera and plague are particularly likely to invade these regions by reason of their nearness to, and frequent communication with, India, and thence to extend over-land to Europe. This view was voiced by M. Barrère, one of the French Delegates at the International Sanitary Conference of 1897, when he classified the Persian Gulf, along with the Red Sea, as the '*routes naturelles des maladies pestilentielles*.' In relation with this aspect of the matter the question of what measures should be adopted with a view to guarding against the suggested danger to Europe was discussed at the International Sanitary Conferences of 1894, 1897, and 1903; and in each of the Conventions drawn up at these Conferences clauses were incorporated embodying measures intended to secure this end."

Stated briefly, the Regulations framed under the Paris Convention of 1894, which had special reference to cholera, have in the main been a dead letter. The Regulations contemplated the establishment of a number of sanitary stations, under the control of the Turkish authorities, in the Persian Gulf, and the enforcement of quarantine against arrivals. The British Government, in adhering to the Convention, refused to accept the Appendix containing the Persian Gulf Regulations, on the grounds (1) that the posts were unnecessary; (2) that Turkey and Persia were too far off to maintain effective control; and (3) that the great expense entailed in establishing the ports would fall chiefly on British shipping, which formed 98 per cent. of the shipping in the Gulf. The scheme was not carried out.


When plague appeared in India in 1896 the Constantinople Board of Health* discussed at great length and on repeated occasions the question of new ports and the régime to be applied in the Gulf ports. It was ultimately decided to establish a permanent port at Fao, and to repulse plague-infected ships from Bussorah. A Commission was sent to Fao to select a site, but nothing further was done, and Fao remained a sanitary office with no lazaret and no sanitary apparatus.

In the Venice Sanitary Convention of 1897 provision was made simply for a sanitary station near Bussorah and another at or in the neighbourhood of the Island of Ormuz or of Kishm, near the entrance of the Gulf, these stations to be under the control of the Constantinople Board of Health. The establishment of the Ormuz station was to be subject to an agreement between Turkey and Persia. The Indian authorities objected to the proposed station at Ormuz on political grounds, holding that it would give the maritime control of the Persian Gulf to Turkey, and might become a means of harassing British shipping. The proposals were, however, accepted by the British Government, and Persia also ratified the Convention, subject to the reservation that the station at the entrance of the Gulf should be under the

* This is a body of international composition, Great Britain being represented on it by Dr. F. G. Clemow, Physician to His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople. Dr. Dickson, Dr. Clemow's predecessor, Physician to the British Embassy, thus described the Board in January 1898: "Notwithstanding its nominal international character, the Board is in reality a Turkish Department, guided by the real or pretended will of the Sultan, and administered by its Turkish members;" and the British Government has always consistently maintained the view that the Board "is not independent of the Turkish Government, . . . and that the Porte is responsible for all measures adopted on its advice."




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٥٨ ظ] (٤١٦/٣٢١)



Sir F.
Bertie to
Sir E. Grey,
December
3, 1906.
Mr. Brod-
rick to
Government
of
India,
September
8, 1905.
Viceroy's
telegram of
November
6, 1905.



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The terms of the Persian "Declaration Additionnelle" to the 1903 Convention (viz. (1) that the station to be established at the entrance of the Gulf in accordance with the Venice Convention of 1897 should be under Persian, and not international, control; and (2) that it should be placed on the Island of Henjam, and not Ormuz) were communicated by the French Government to the British Ambassador at Paris in December 1905, with an intimation that the Persian proposals were favourably viewed by them. These proposals did not commend themselves to the British Government, partly on the ground that any such arrangement would defeat the object of the British reserves, viz., the postponement of the scheme for a station at the entrance of the Gulf, and partly because they doubted the ability of the Persian authorities to provide the necessary funds for the purpose.* In regard to this latter point, Mr. Grant Duff, writing from Tehran on the 15th November, 1905, said that he did not think "there is the slightest prospect of the provisions of the Convention, or any other sanitary measures, being carried out, except in those ports where the quarantine arrangements are under European control, so long as Persia remains under its present Government." The French Government, however, continued to press the point, and in support of the Persian proposals stated that Dr. Faivre (whose Report His Majesty's Government had not yet seen) had pronounced in favour of Henjam, the island chosen by the Persian Government, as being a suitable position for the station, while, at the same time, they pointed out that it would be difficult for them to explain to Persia that one of the reasons for which Great Britain had decided not to accept the Persian proposal was the incapacity of the Persian Treasury to bear the expenses. It was also urged that, if the Persian offer were declined, Persia might refuse to ratify the Paris Convention or make her ratification conditional on reserves, which would cause still further delay in bringing the Convention into operation.

At this stage of the discussion Dr. Thomson's Report reached the hands of His Majesty's Government in July 1906. Its general conclusions were opposed to the creation of a sanitary station at the entrance to the Gulf, (1) because it still remained to be proved that epidemics had been conveyed to Europe by that route; (2) because a sanitary station at that point would be ineffective, inasmuch as it would be evaded by native sailing craft, the most dangerous class of shipping; and (3) because no suitable position could be found for such a station, Henjam, though upon the whole the most suitable site in other respects, being open to serious objections on account of its climate, its inadequate water supply, and its lack of provisions.

Dr. Thomson's own recommendations were summarized as follows at the close of his Report:—

"In substance, therefore, the scheme best adapted, in the circumstances, to secure a reasonable degree of protection to Europe and the minimum of interference with commercial interests in the Gulf of Persia consists in the perfecting of the present sanitary stations at Mohammerah and Bushire,† the establishment of a sanitary station at Koweit, and the creation of a new station in place of that now existing at Bassorah. Sanitary defence of the Gulf based on these lines will afford a greater degree of protection to Europe against plague and cholera than would be secured by a 'sentinel station' near the entrance of the Gulf, combined with a terminal station at Bassorah, and will not impose on shipping the unnecessary and prejudicial restrictions that would result from the latter scheme.

"If this view should meet with acceptance, I would urge that steps should be taken to put the scheme I have suggested in operation with all possible speed. I view the alternative 'sentinel station' project with apprehension, as calculated to be ineffective, expensive, and gravely detrimental to commercial interests—and these are mainly British—in the Gulf. Abandonment of this 'sentinel station' project is much more likely to follow on knowledge that defensive measures, of the kind and at the places I have indicated, are in actual operation than on mere announcement that such measures are in contemplation."


Dr. Thomson's views as to the "sentinel station" were adopted by His Majesty's Government, and the French Government were informed that the Persian proposals were unacceptable, a decision which was in due course communicated to Persia and to the other parties to the Convention.

* In his despatch of the 27th April, 1906, to Sir F. Bertie, Sir E. Grey wrote: "The unsatisfactory state of Persian finances makes it hard to believe that that country would be ready to incur the necessary expenditure, and it would seem clearly indicated that she is relying on outside assistance, and that the scheme may be said to have originated rather in St. Petersburg than in Tehran."

† Dr. Thomson further considered that there would "be advantage to commerce in also fully equipping the sanitary station at Bunder Abbas."



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10

Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
January
1, 1907.

Sir C. Spring-Rice at the end of 1906 explained the position to Dr. Schneider, President of the Tehran Sanitary Council,* who promised to do his best to prevent the question being again raised. Dr. Schneider observed, however, that it would greatly facilitate his task, should the matter be brought before the Sanitary Council, if the Government of India would consent to improve the conditions under which quarantine measures were at present carried out in the Gulf, i.e., by increasing the European personnel and by supplying disinfection stoves and rat-destroying apparatus at each of the five ports (viz., Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, Bunder Abbas, and Jask), instead of at Bushire only. Dr. Schneider added that the Persian Government had not the necessary funds at their disposal, and that the expense would necessarily fall on the Indian Government.

B.

Major Cox
to Govern-
ment of
India,
September
5, 1904.

Persian
Gulf
Residency
Administra-
tion
Report,
1896-97.

Viceroy's
telegrams
of August
12 and 20,
1903.

Colonel
Kemball
to Govern-
ment of
India,
February
3, 1904.

Sir A.
Hardinge
to Lord
Lansdowne,
August 6,
1903.

Viceroy's
telegram of
August 12,
1903.

Viceroy's
telegram of
March 19,
1904.

It will be convenient at this stage to give a brief account of the quarantine system hitherto administered in the Persian Gulf by officers of the Indian Government. In September 1904 Major Cox, after examining the old records regarding the sanitary control in the Persian Gulf, reported that "since 1864, and probably before, it has been entirely in our hands; but our control seems to have come into existence automatically, and I can trace no original arrangements with the Persian Government." The appearance of plague at Bombay in the autumn of 1896 rendered it imperative to adopt quarantine precautions in the Gulf. The resources of the Persian Government were unequal to the inauguration of adequate measures, and the task was, with the consent and at the desire of the Persian Government, undertaken by the British Residency at Bushire. After some difficulty, quarantine was placed on satisfactory and efficient footing at Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Mohammerah, for which the services of assistant surgeons were lent by the Government of India, as well as at Bushire.

In August 1903 the Government of India reported that three assistant surgeons were employed exclusively on quarantine duties at Mohammerah, Bunder Abbas, and Lingah, while at Bushire and Jask the duty was done by the assistant surgeons attached to the Residency and the telegraph station respectively. The cost of the quarantine establishment at the first three ports, estimated at 1,450 rupees a-month (1,184. per annum) was borne by the Persian Government, while a charge of about 310 rupees a-month (272. per annum) fell upon Indian revenues in respect of the quarantine duties discharged by the doctors at Jask and Bushire. The assistant surgeons were placed under the immediate orders of the Residency Surgeon at Bushire, who was in the executive charge of the quarantine arrangements. Financially, control was vested in the Customs Administration, to whom all fees were made over by the quarantine officials.

Attempts have from time to time been made to undermine the position of the British Quarantine Administration. On the 6th August, 1903, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that the Russians were pressing the Persian Government to take the Gulf quarantine arrangements out of the hands of the British doctors and to place them under the Belgian Customs Department. Six days later the Government of India telegraphed that they had "positive proof" that the Persian Government intended to carry out this suggestion, and recommended that the "strongest protest should be made against a change so injurious to British interests," and that His Majesty's Government should resolutely resist the "principle that quarantine arrangements in the Gulf can be subverted, without our knowledge or consent, or that a body of foreigners can be put in expressly to hamper British trade, the tonnage of which is over 90 per cent. of the total." The Persian Government, on being approached by Sir A. Hardinge, disclaimed all intention of removing the British doctors; but the British Minister was informed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that certain complaints against the manner in which they administered the quarantine "had suggested to the Shah the idea that it might be advisable to establish some closer supervision over their work." The question was again raised in February 1904 by Colonel Kembell's complaints of interference by the Customs Department in the executive work of the quarantine. The Government of India recommended "that a vigorous protest should at once be made against the disturbance of existing sanitary

* This body was instituted by the Shah in 1904 as a result of the cholera panic. It comprises the European physicians of the Shah as well as several Legation physicians and Persian doctors. Its functions are purely advisory, and it has neither funds nor executive of any sort under its control.



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C.

Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
January 1,
1907.

In his despatch of the 1st January, 1907, reporting conversations with the President of the Tehran Sanitary Council, the British Minister at Tehran (Sir C. Spring-Rice) recommended that Dr. Schneider's suggestions for the increase of the European personnel and the improvement of the apparatus of the quarantine stations in the Gulf should be submitted to the Government of India for their consideration. These proposals, it may be noted, went somewhat beyond those made by Dr. Theodore Thomson in his Report of 12th July, 1906, inasmuch as Dr. Schneider contemplated improvements at all five of the Gulf ports, whereas Dr. Thomson's recommendations, so far as the coast of Persia was concerned,⁶ were limited to perfecting the existing sanitary stations at Mohammerah and Bushire, and possibly improving the station at Bunder Abbas.

Viceroy's
telegram of
February
6, 1907.

The Government of India, in a telegram dated the 6th February, 1907, expressed their agreement with Dr. Thomson's recommendations, and their willingness "to bear, for the present, the cost of necessary preliminary measures, including supply of disaffecting apparatus at Gulf ports, reserving right of subsequent recovery from the Persian Government in case of Persian ports, and subject, in the case of Koweit, to acquiescence of Sheikh in proposed arrangement." In April 1907 the British Minister at Tehran telegraphed that an attack might shortly be anticipated upon our control of the quarantine in Southern Persia, and that he trusted that steps would be taken to secure the maintenance of existing arrangements. He subsequently explained that his apprehensions were based upon (1) the impending retirement of the President of the Tehran Sanitary Council, who was friendly to British interests, and the possibility of his being replaced by some one hostile; and (2) the frank hostility shown towards our quarantine officers both by the Russian Consul at Bunder Abbas and by the Belgian Customs officials. Sir C. Spring-Rice recommended, in addition to the improvements of the sanitary service on the lines indicated in his despatch of the 1st January, that a communication should be made to the Russian Government to the effect that, in view (1) of the predominance of British trade and shipping; (2) of the impossibility of securing an efficient Persian service; and (3) of the necessity for good administration, His Majesty's Government expected that the Russian Government would offer no objection to the continuance of the present system.

Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
April 11
and 17,
1907.

His Majesty's Government decided to postpone making any representations to the Russian Government until the estimates of the cost of the proposed improvements had been received from the Government of India.

The outbreak of plague at Bahrein in April 1907 brought into notice the deficiency in the disinfecting equipment of the southern ports, and lent additional urgency to the question of improving the sanitary defence of the Gulf.

Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
May 19,
1907.

With a despatch dated the 19th May, 1907, Sir C. Spring-Rice transmitted a Memorandum by Dr. Schneider, President of the Tehran Sanitary Council, on the measures he recommended for the improvement of the quarantine service. These measures included the appointment of commissioned officers of the medical service to all five ports, and the provision of a stove and Clayton apparatus (for destroying rats, &c.), as well as a reserve stove, at Bushire. Sir C. Spring-Rice added, in a telegram dated the 30th May, that the Sanitary Council, while strongly approving the measures proposed, did not possess the necessary personnel, appliances, or funds to carry out the scheme, and would be very grateful for the assistance of the Government of India. Sir C. Spring-Rice expressed himself strongly in favour of the proposed improvements being undertaken by the British Government, and in this view the Foreign Office concurred, the following statement of policy being made in Mr. Mallet's letter of the 21st June, 1907:—

Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
May 30,
1907.


Foreign
Office to
India Office,
June 21,
1907.

"During the eleven years in which the control of quarantine arrangements in the Gulf has been in British hands, the Government of India have spent large sums on the service, which would be entirely lost if any change in the control were now to be made; and Sir E. Grey entirely agrees with His Majesty's Minister in considering it of great importance, both politically and commercially, to endeavour to maintain the *status quo* by improving the efficiency of the medical service."


Sir C.
Spring-Rice
to Sir E.
Grey,
July 12,
1907.

In July 1907 the Sanitary Council reported in favour of an extended scheme of improvement including sanitary stations at Bunder Abbas, Bushire, Mohammerah, Jask, and Lingah, with a mobile service under a European doctor. The Russian

* Dr. Thomson also proposed the establishment of a station at Koweit, on the Arabian side of the Gulf.



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representative on the Council proposed that the sanitary service should be in "strict collaboration with the Customs," who should use the five small steamers they had recently acquired; he also desired the appointment of the French doctor of the Russian Consulate at Bushire as Inspector-General. Representations were made to the Russian Government, on the 24th July, in which it was pointed out that His Majesty's Government considered "the present quarantine arrangements as one of their special interests in the Persian Gulf and a part of the *status quo*." On the 27th July the Russian Minister at Tehran assured Sir C. Spring-Rice that the proposal of the Russian doctor had been made without his knowledge, and that care would be taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar incident.

On the 7th November, 1907, the following measures were actually sanctioned by His Majesty's Government:—

Mr. Morley
to Government
of
India,
November
7, 1907.

1. The provision of four stoves at Jask, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Mohammerah, under the charge of the present assistant surgeons; and of one stove at Bahrein under a military assistant surgeon, to be appointed on a salary of 208*l.* per annum. The initial cost of the five stoves was estimated at 1,250*l.*, and the annual recurring expenditure on them at about 333*l.*

2. The provision of a Clayton apparatus at Bushire, at an initial cost of 1,000*l.*

3. The appointment of a mobile assistant, of the Indian Medical Service, at Bushire, at a cost of 560*l.* per annum.

The total estimated cost was: 2,250*l.* initial; 1,100*l.* recurring.

On the 4th January, 1908, the purchase of a portable stove for the mobile assistant was sanctioned, at a maximum cost of 40*l.*

The whole of this expenditure is to be shared equally between the Indian and Imperial Exchequers.

The sanctioned strength of the Quarantine Establishment in the Persian Gulf thus works out as follows:—

At Bushire.

Paid by the British Government—

- One Residency surgeon (in executive charge of the Quarantine Service).³
- One mobile assistant (of the Indian Medical Service).
- One assistant surgeon (in sub-charge of Residency dispensary, stove, &c.).

At other Ports.

Paid by the Persian Government—

- One assistant surgeon at Bunder Abbas.
- " " Lingah.
- " " Mohammerah.

Paid by the British Government—

- One assistant surgeon at Bahrein.
- " " Jask.⁵

At Koweit the assistant surgeon attached to the British Agency was empowered by the Sheikh in May 1907 to carry out the necessary measures for imposing quarantine on arrivals from Bahrein. Bahrein was declared free of plague in the following July.

III.—*Question of British Consular Representation in El Hasa and Katif.*


(Communicated by the India Office.)

The question of British Consular representation in El Hasa and Katif was raised by the Government of India in 1904. In a despatch dated the 31st March of that year, Lord Curzon's Government represented that the Indian merchants of Bahrein, trading with the mainland, were subjected to many vexatious restrictions by the Turkish Customs farmer, and that official regulations at the Katif custom-house had

Government
of
India's
letter of
March 31,
1904.

* At Jask the quarantine duties are discharged by the assistant surgeon attached to the Eastern Telegraph Department station. He receives a special local allowance for the purpose.

Indo Empire



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been so used as to destroy the British trade previously established at that place. It was pointed out, in illustration, that the Bania community of Katif had, in 1900, been reduced from one of 70 or 80 persons to a single trader, and, further, that those still desirous of carrying on trade at the port had, in the same year, expressed their willingness to pay, in advance, the cost of maintaining a British Agent to protect their interests on the spot. This request, it was added, was repeated during Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf in 1903,* when the British Indian merchants of Bahrein petitioned his Excellency for the appointment of a British Representative to protect their interests at Katif. The Government of India accordingly recommended (1) that the Political Agent at Bahrein should be appointed Vice-Consul for El Hasa, and (2) that a Native Consular Agent should be stationed at Katif.

Sir N. O'Connor to Lord Lansdowne, June 28, 1904.
Mr. Brodrick to Government of India, August 5, 1904.

Sir N. O'Connor, who was consulted, thought that these suggestions should not be pressed for the moment, and his view was accepted by His Majesty's Government. In communicating this decision to the Government of India, Mr. Brodrick wrote as follows, in a despatch dated the 5th August, 1904:—"It will be seen that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, . . . , having regard to the interpretation which the Turkish Government might place on the appointment of a Consular officer for El Hasa, and to the objection they would feel, at present, to recognizing such an officer, does not consider it advisable that effect should be given to the suggestion that the Political Officer at Bahrein should be invested with Vice-Consular jurisdiction over the Turkish district of El Hasa. For similar reasons, Sir N. O'Connor is of opinion that the present moment is unsuited for appointing a Native Consular Agent at Katif, and he suggests that the consideration of this proposal should be deferred till the result is seen of the representations which he has addressed to the Turkish Government, in regard to the grievances of the Indian traders, which formed the subject of the Government of India's letter of the 31st March, 1904. These views are approved by His Majesty's Government."

Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, November 22, 1904.
Mr. Brodrick to Government of India, December 20, 1904.

In September 1904 the British Consul at Bussorah reported that the necessary instructions had been sent to the Mutessarif of Hasa, regarding the abatement of the excess duties at Katif, of which British Indians had complained; and Mr. Brodrick informed the Government of India, on the 20th December, 1904, that he had intimated to the Foreign Office that, "if practical effect is given to these orders, it will be unnecessary to press for the appointment of a Consular Agent at Katif."

The question has not subsequently been raised.

IV.—Mohammerah.

Sheikh Khazal is the acknowledged Head of the Muhaisen tribe of the Chaab Arabs, living on both sides of the Karun, from near Shuster to its junction with the Shat-el-Arab near Mohammerah, and on the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab from Mohammerah to its mouth, and between the Tigris and the Shat-el-Arab to the west, and to the Jerrish River on the east.

Mr. Spring-Rice, No. 15, March 20, 1900.

As regards the Persian Government, the position of the Sheikh, who murdered his brother, Sheikh Mizal, in 1897, has always been that of a great feudal Prince, who in smaller matters has thought it well to humour the Central Government while remaining at the same time extremely jealous in matters touching his quasi-independence.


His attitude to British interests has been friendly, and in striking contrast to that of the Persian officials in South-west Persia.

Ever since 1898 the Sheikh has shown himself nervous about his position in the event of the break-up of the Persian Empire, and anxious to obtain guarantees regarding the independence of his territories in certain eventualities.


In November 1899, when Sir M. Durand visited the Karun, the Sheikh made a request for assurances. While declining to afford guarantees of the nature desired, Sir M. Durand intimated to him that "he might rely upon our help whenever we could give it without ill-faith to the Persian Government."

The intention formed by the Central Government in 1900 to include Mohammerah in the newly organized Customs system increased the anxiety of the Sheikh to obtain some kind of guarantee, the more so since rumours were prevalent that the

* It was again repeated to Major Cox in July 1904, the merchants offering to pay a fee equivalent to 2,000 rupees per annum towards the cost of the appointment.



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contemplated changes would be used as a pretext for putting an end to his power as that of the last of the great feudal Chiefs of Persia.

Fears were also entertained that if the Sheikh were forcibly to resist any such attempts the Persian Government would retaliate by their favourite method of intrigue, and endeavour to create dissension in the Chaab tribe by setting up the nephew of Sheikh Khazal, Sheikh Aboud, who resided at Ahwaz, and was not on the most cordial terms with his uncle.

In March 1900 a Memorandum was communicated to the Persian Government by Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

In this paper it was stated that the British Consul-General at Bushire had recently called Lord Salisbury's attention to the state of affairs at Mohammerah. In order to avoid difficulties in the future his Lordship thought it best that there should be a clear understanding of his views as to the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, and Bunder Abbas, and other ports of the Gulf.

The control of these ports by a foreign Power might lead to a state of things which Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of the Indian Empire, would be bound to resist. This had been recognized by the Persian Government, who, on the 23rd October, 1897, gave a written promise that the customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision. Her Majesty's Government must hold the Persian Government to the strict observance of this engagement.

As the Persian Government were aware, far the larger part of the trade of the above-mentioned ports was British. This trade imposed certain duties upon Her Majesty's Government, and they could not pass without notice any measure likely to effect its position and prospects. It was from this point of view that the Marquess of Salisbury desired to inform the Persian Government that, in view of British interests in the trade of Mohammerah and in the navigation of the Karun, Her Majesty's Government must insist upon their right to be consulted before any change were made in the administration of the customs or in the position of the Sheikh. In claiming such a right of consultation, the Persian Government could have no doubt as to the anxiety of the British Government for the preservation of order, the maintenance of the Persian sovereignty, and the improvement of Persian resources. In all these the interests of Her Majesty's Government were second only to those of Persia herself.

The reply of the Persian Government was verbal:—

"Not only in Mohammerah, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government, before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government, but Persia could not give a definite Agreement with regard to a special point of her territory, as such an Agreement might appear to others like a consent to partition."

On the 10th May, 1900, Lord Salisbury addressed a despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, in which he wrote as follows:—

"You should take any opportunity that may offer itself to explain that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to diminish, but rather seek to uphold and confirm, the authority of the Persian Government in the southern provinces, and that it is in the interest of Persia, as well as of Great Britain, that they endeavour to prevent the intrusion of other Powers."

The annexed extracts from a despatch, dated July 1901, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, show in some detail how the question of giving a British assurance to the Sheikh arose:—

"The Sheikh is evidently nervous about the designs of the Persian Government, and looks to us for assistance and protection.

"If a Russian Consul-General should come to Bushire the Sheikh may, should such support be withheld by us, be tempted to coquet with him, or at any rate to modify to some extent the friendly relations which he has hitherto cultivated with the British Resident at Bushire.

"It is undoubtedly important that he should continue to be our friend and to be guided by our advice, and I am therefore anxious to be able to give him such assurances of support as will prevent his looking for help elsewhere.

"I shall visit him in the course of the tour to the Persian Gulf ports which I hope to undertake next October, and I should be grateful if your Lordship would instruct me as to the language which I should hold to him in reply to the questions which he will almost certainly put to me in regard to possible difficulties between himself and the Persian Government.

"My idea is that we should endeavour to persuade him to come to a fair arrangement with

[2878 s—1]

F

Mr. Spring-
Rice,
No. 17,
March 27,
1900.

Mr. Spring-
Rice,
No. 27,
April 5,
1900.

Sir A.
Hardinge,
No. 118,
July 28,
1901.



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the Persian Customs, as it is impossible that M. Naus, in reorganizing that service, can allow so important a port as Mohammerah to remain beyond his control, but that we should, in view of possible Russian activity in Southern Persia, attach him to ourselves by a promise that we will not let his political authority over his tribesmen be destroyed or undermined by the Persian Government.

"I am fully aware of the difficulty of supporting local quasi-hereditary Chiefs who are subjects of the Shah against endeavours by the Persian Government to weaken their positions and extend the power of the Central Government at their expense. Seistan is a case in point.

"At the same time our neglect or reluctance to do this may be taken advantage of to the detriment of our interests by our rivals, and it is clear that Colonel Kemball thinks that some definite assurance of assistance in certain contingencies should be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

"I would propose to urge him to be loyal to the Persian Government, to come, with the help and, if necessary, mediation of His Majesty's Vice-Consul, to an arrangement with the Customs which would indemnify him for the loss of their administration by himself, and to trust to us to protect him against any attempt from Tehran—in my opinion, a very improbable one—to diminish or encroach upon his authority as Chief over his people. If we give him an assurance that we shall so protect him, we ought to be prepared, in the unlikely contingency of such an attempt as I have suggested, to send a gun-boat to Mohammerah and to let the Persians know that we shall not acquiesce without good reason to the deposition of the Sheikh, or in interference by the Governor-General of Arabistan in the internal affairs of his tribe.

"Your Lordship can, of course, judge better than I to what extent the grant of such an assurance is in accordance with the general policy of His Majesty's Government in Southern Persia, and how far it would be wise and safe to give it. It is clear that the Sheikh is, perhaps, unnecessarily anxious about his future, though no doubt he is more or less trying to bluff us into giving him pledges of support; but I would venture to submit that the time has come for us to decide how far we are prepared to back him up, should the Persian Government, perhaps at Russian instigation, determine to destroy him, so to speak, autonomous position, and what counsel Colonel Kemball and I should give him should he appeal to us, as he seems disposed to do, for our advice."

Sir A.
Hardinge,
No. 167,
December
3, 1902.

The upshot of this correspondence was that Sir A. Hardinge informed the Sheikh on the 7th December, 1902, under instructions from Lord Lansdowne, that "we shall protect Mohammerah against naval attack by a foreign Power, whatever pretext for such action may be alleged, and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, shall continue to give you our good offices and support."

This assurance was really necessitated by the urgency of arriving at a solution of the question, as Sir A. Hardinge reported in March 1902 that the Russians had been making offers for over a year to reduce the Sheikh of Mohammerah to subjection by force, and that they had been pressing the Persian Government to adopt towards him an uncompromising attitude. The assurance was actually given after an Arrangement about the Customs had been concluded, largely owing to the friendly intervention of His Majesty's Government; but it was probably only in consequence of this assurance that the Sheikh consented to avoid friction and to make the new Arrangement work smoothly.

On the 24th December, 1903, Sir A. Hardinge addressed a note to the Sheikh confirming the assurance of 1902, and adding that he might rest assured of the support of the British Government so long as he on his side observed the conditions of the Arrangement made with the Persian Government.

Sir A.
Hardinge,
No. 65,
April 7,
1904.
Consul
McDonall,
No. 1,
August 25,
1904.

In 1904 a Russian decoration was conferred on the Sheikh and a Commercial Mission was sent to Mohammerah.

One of the principal reasons for avoiding a conflict between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah has been the fear that such an event would raise the much larger question of the Turco-Persian frontier dispute. Mohammerah and the surrounding district have always been a bone of contention between the Turks and the Persians, and only recently the Sheikh expressed his apprehensions to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in regard to recent developments at more northerly points of the frontier. The views of his Majesty's Government are explained in the subjoined despatches.

"Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

"(No. 21.)

"Sir,


"I have received your despatch No. 17 of the 28th ultimo, in which you forward telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

"I concur in your opinion that a gun-boat need not be sent to the Shatt-el-Arab under existing conditions, and I consider that when an attack appears more imminent the precise action to be taken by His Majesty's Government can be determined.

"Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ " [١٦٣] و [٤١٦/٣٣٠]



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"It would, however, be advisable, in order to allay the Sheikh's apprehensions, to inform him that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the situation, but that they do not anticipate Turkish aggression in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah, and you should instruct Major Cox accordingly."

"Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

"(No. 75.)

"Sir,

"Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.

"I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tebran, relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

"As you are aware, His Majesty's Government have been content to allow the Russian Government, as being more closely concerned, to take the lead in regard to making any proposals for arresting the Turkish encroachments so long as they are confined to the northern portion of the frontier; but it is desirable that your Excellency should clearly understand that the position would be materially altered if there were to be an advance of Ottoman troops to the south, more especially in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah. In this district His Majesty's Government are not prepared to recognize any other frontier than that laid down by the mediating Commissioners in 1850, as indicated in red on the accompanying sketch map; and in this connection I may recall the admission made by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 18th November, 1893, to the effect that 'the Turkish Government laid no claim whatever to Mohammerah.'

"Any disturbance of the *status quo* at Mohammerah would affect British interests, and might not improbably lead to the active intervention of His Majesty's Government, who have given the Sheikh certain assurances in regard to his territory.

"Your Excellency should accordingly instruct His Majesty's Consuls at Bagdad and Bussorah to furnish by telegraph early information of any aggressive designs in the district in question."


In January 1908 the British Consul-General at Bushire reported that the Sheikh was anxious that His Majesty's Government should guarantee himself and his own family as heirs in the enjoyment of their present position. Sir E. Grey considered that it would be advisable to maintain an attitude of reserve on this subject.

India Office,
February
25, 1908.

March 18, 1908.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٣ظ] (٤١٦/٣٣١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٤] [٤١٦/٣٣٢]

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Register No.
3225

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from 20, Dated 20, 27 May 1908.
" " " " Rec. 21, 22

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary | 1. 6 | Mc | <p style="text-align: center;">Persia. <i>sent by</i></p> <p>(1) Wish of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and of the Bakhtiari Khans for closer relations with G. Britain. Views of Sir Elphinstone Request for views of L. Hoole and Sir Elphinstone (1) Agreement between the Sheikh of the Bakhtiari Khans and the British Government.</p> |
| Secretary of State | 2 | ap | |
| Committee | 3. | M. | |
| Under Secretary | 9 | RR | |
| Secretary of State..... | 10 | al | |

Copy to
COPY TO THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE (See within) (Approved and dated 1908) SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Off telegrams + Visions

The position at Mohammerah is discussed at page 14 of the attached 70 memorandum. The pledge given the Sheikh in 1902-3 renewed in 1904 was that "we shall protect Mohammerah against naval attack by a foreign power, whatever pretext for such action may be alleged, and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, shall continue to give you our good offices and support".

In the F. O., it will be seen, asks for the views of the Govt. of India, and all that seems necessary at present is to ask for their views. In reply, they will probably say that if we mean business with the Sheikh,

he

16 JUN 1908

Previous Papers:—
 2914
 3145
 Mean^{ing}
 (As. Res. P.
 Mar 11/08)

1637. I. 1770. 2000.—10/1907.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ". [١٦٤ظ] (٤١٦/٣٣٣)

the thing to do is to develop our concessions (irrigation,
railway etc.) in the district.

The argument in the F.O. letter that our pledge "to
respect the independence and integrity of Persia" involves the
"maintenance of the status quo" and the "continuance of the
Sheikh's present state of autonomy", does not seem
sound. The extension of the authority of the Central
Government over an outlying province could hardly
be resented by us on the ground of our pledges to maintain
the independence and integrity of Persia.

As regards the nature of the Sheikh's relations with
Tehran, reference is invited to the telegraphic corres-
pondence of Dec. 1903 (Nos. 3317, 3327, 3341 and 3361 of 1903,
see also 2454 and 2624 of 1904)
flagged in the file.


Reference is also invited to para. 4 of Captain
Lorimer's despatch of 3 February as to the tentative
advances made to the Bahktiani Khans by Major
Burton ^{and Col. Douglas} in 1903, with a view to organising their
tribesmen as military road-guards under British
officers. It does not seem necessary to put up
the papers, which are available if required. No. 2478

of 1904 (attached) reports certain assurances given by his Highness
to the Khans.

* 1443/05
2112/04




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٦٥] [٤١٦/٣٣٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٥ظ] (٤١٦/٣٣٥)




autonomous status what
are your views as to terms,
if any, in which our former
assurance could safely be
strengthened. As regards
Bakhtiari Khans in view
of their recent unsatisfactory
behaviour towards British
enterprises in their country
it is thought that any
engagement beyond assurance
of friendly sympathy would
be likely to be utilised by
them to create difficulties
between us and Persian
Govt. Please let me have
your views on whole subject.

W. St





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٦٦] (٤١٦/٣٣٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٦٦ظ] (٤١٦/٣٣٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٧ و] (٤١٦/٣٣٨)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٧ظ] (٤١٦/٣٣٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٨ و] (٤١٦/٣٤٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٦٨ظ] (٤١٦/٣٤١)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٩] [٤١٦/٣٤٢]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٦٩ظ] (٤١٦/٣٤٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٧٠] [٤١٦/٣٤٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧٠ظ] (٤١٦/٣٤٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٧١] [٤١٦/٣٤٦]

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to me more than probable that the task of governing these parts of Persia, nominally directly administered from Tehran, will so tax the energies of the Ministers that they will be only too glad not to ^{have to} ~~interfere~~ interfere wherever there is a local authority capable of maintaining a reasonable degree of order. In these circumstances I am inclined to think that the Sheikh of Mohammerah may consider his position as fairly well assured for a good many years to come without any special guarantees from us, and it is for the Bakhtiari to secure themselves in like manner by putting their house in order and giving no pretext for attempted interference in their affairs from Tehran.


In any case I presume that we can scarcely make any reply such as would encourage the Bakhtiari Khans and Sheikh Khazal to believe that we favour any agreement between them aimed at their eventual independence. Such a step would scarcely be in accordance with the spirit of our recent undertaking to respect the integrity of Persia.

(29/14/08)
As regards the second point, i.e. the apprehension of attack from the Turks, I understand from your Despatch No. 21 (5428) of February 25th last, that His Majesty's Government consider our interests in South Western Persia are of sufficient importance to warrant us in taking steps to prevent any serious disturbance of the status quo, and I venture to think that some general assurances of this nature would suffice to allay local apprehension. Such assurances could not be resented by the Persian Government, nor do I believe that Russia, to judge from her present attitude, would take any exception to them.

They would also, it seems to me, be sufficient to banish Sheikh Khazal's temptation to look towards the Germans rather than to ourselves; a contingency which Major Cox appears




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للشيخ." [١٧١ظ] (٤١٦/٣٤٧)






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للشيخ." [١٧٢و] (٤١٦/٣٤٨)






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للشيخ. " [١٧٢ظ] (٤١٦/٣٤٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٧٣و] (٤١٦/٣٥٠)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧٣ظ] (٤١٦/٣٥١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٧٤] [٤١٦/٣٥٢]



No. 942 of 1908.

Teheran 3. 172

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 22^{هـ} March 1908.

15994

MAY 11 1908

From,

Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

To

S.H. Butler, Esquire, C.I.E.,
Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department,
S I M L A.

Sir,


I have the honour to forward for information and such consideration as may be possible, copies of the undermentioned papers;

- (i). A memorandum giving details of an interview between myself accompanied by Mr. Consul McDouall, and Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah on 7th January last.
- (ii). A letter, No. 44 dated 3rd February 1908, received from H.B.M.'s Vice Consul, Ahwas, in which the latter reports the purport of a conversation which he recently had with the Bakhtyafi Khans Salar-i-Arfa and Shahab-es-Sultaneh.


The Sheikh of Mohammerah asked me to await receipt of the memorandum of State expenditure which he was preparing, before taking special action on his representations, and when the summary of the said document reached Bushire I was away on tour; meanwhile Captain Lorimer's report also reached me.


2. In connection with the abovementioned papers I beg to refer to, and to quote for facility of reference, a memorandum recorded by Sir Louis Dane at the time of the tour made by His Excellency Lord Curzon and Sir Arthur Hardinge to the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1903. The passage I refer to runs as follows: (vide

enclosure



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧٤ظ] (٣٠٣/٤١٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧٥] [٤١٦/٣٥٤]

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enclosure to Foreign Department No. 694-E.A., dated 1st March 1904):-

"The question of increasing our influence in the Lur and "Bakhtyari country * * and of strengthening the tribes in "South-western Persia, so as to enable them to hold their own "in the event of a collapse of the central power or trouble in "South-western Persia was discussed on several occasions by His "Excellency with Sir Arthur Hardinge. * * * * It was "recognised that our future action in South-western Persia must "largely depend on the extent to which we could strengthen and "utilise both tribes and the tribes of Arabistan, who under the "Sheikh of Mohammerah are in much the same position".


3. It will be seen from my present enclosures that practically simultaneously, though independently, the Chiefs of the Bakhtyaris and of the Arab tribes of Arabistan respectively have become apprehensive as to their future and convinced that their interests lie in union among themselves, if possible under our aegis.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah, encouraged no doubt by the understanding at which his fidus Aghates Sheikh Mubarek has arrived at with us, presses for an assurance that his lineal heirs will be maintained in the enjoyment of their present patrimony, and will be reasonably safeguarded against ^{the} curtailment of their present semi-independent position and powers by the Central Government.


As arguments in support of his rights or strong claims to such treatment Sheikh Khazal adduces the fact that ever since his accession the Central Government have obliged him to meet from private funds very heavy expenditure which should properly have fallen on the Government Exchequer, and that now during the current Turco-Persian crisis the Central Government have left him absolutely to take care of himself in the best way he can, in fact, have neither the means nor the power to do anything to help him in the event of his territory being invaded by Turkish troops. In this respect he is in a measure comforted by his confidence in Great Britain to prevent any attack upon him by sea but in the event of an invasion from the landside he feels that

he

submit to your Excellency





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٧٥ظ] (٤١٦/٣٥٥)







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للشيخ. " [١٧٦] [٤١٦/٣٥٦]







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للشيخ." [١٧٦ظ] (٤١٦/٣٥٧)







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


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للشيخ." [١٧٧ظ] (٤١٦/٣٥٩)







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للشيخ. " [١٧٨] [٤١٦/٣٦٠]







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



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


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للشيخ." [١٧٩ظ] (٤١٦/٣٦٣)






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للشيخ. " [١٨٠] [٤١٦/٣٦٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٠ظ] (٤١٦/٣٦٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨١] (٤١٦/٣٦٦)

179

Statement of the chief expenses of the government of the Shatt-el-Arab and the Karun from the accession of Sheikh Khazal Khan 1315 to the end of 1325 Hijra (June 1897 to January 1908 inclusive) eleven years.


| | |
|--|---|
| (1). Expenses on the Shatt-el-Arab including salaries of Sheikhs, guard posts, patrols, bellans, cartridges and a few rifles. | Krans 2410860 = £ 46,563/- |
| (2). Expenses on Karun. Salary of Naib-el-Nukuma at Ahwas, salaries of Dawi Sheikhs and other headmen, guard posts on Karun and at Felahieh, sowars, cartridges, also steamer expenses when Sheikh Khazal is on the Karun. | Krans 4642815 = £ 93,131/- |
| (3). Expenses in connection with Hawija and Beni Truf including salaries of Sheikhs, two expeditions, compensation for horses killed, cartridges and some rifles. | Krans 4786242 = £ 92043. |
| (4). Expenses sending Hanzal with 300 sowars for two months in 1904 to preserve order at Dizful and Shushtar pending arrival of Azam-es-Sultaneh. | Krans 32000 = £ 615/- |
| (5). Expenses in 1907 sending Hanzal with 500 sowars to assist Sardar Bukarrem in his expedition against Derekwand Lure. | Krans 35000 = £ 675/- |
| Telegrams for 11 years | Krans 80000 = £ 1538/- |
| | ----- |
| | Total Krans 12,186,917 = £ 234,563. ----- |

Note by Mr. McDouall.

This does not include such expenses as entertaining Governor General which comes to about 50000 Krans a year, according to Haji Rais, or expenses of band or Haji Rais' two missions to Teheran. In Haji Jabur's time the Sheikhs received no salaries. Sheikh Mizal gave a few small sums, but Sheikh Khazal instituted the present system and called upon them to prevent robbery and piracy and keep the peace. Haji Rais now has the whole accounts made out in sections from the books kept by the Sheikh's clerk
and




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية للشيخ." [١٨١ظ] (٤١٦/٣٦٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٢و] (٤١٦/٣٦٨)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٢ظ] (٤١٦/٣٦٩)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٣ و] (٤١٦/٣٧٠)



181

No. 44. of 1908.

H.B.M.'s Vice Consulate, Ahwaz.

To

H.B.M.'s Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Camp Wais, 3rd February 1908.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate a proposal propounded by the Salar Arfa' and Shahab-es-Sultaneh in their brief interview with me at Maidan Munaftun on 23rd January.


2. On this occasion they made the startling announcement that, after due consideration, they found themselves so dissatisfied with the present state of the Persian Government that they were contemplating throwing off allegiance to it. They had entered into negotiations with Sheikh Khazal on the subject and would have me understand that they had made some progress in them, and that the Sheikh had indicated that he shared their feelings and aspirations. It was proposed to have a personal meeting with him in order to bring matters to a practical issue in the form of a treaty or convention, and for this purpose they intended to shortly pay a visit to Nasiri. There they would exchange written undertakings with the Sheikh, which they would ask me to guarantee. Their ambition was to attain the position of quasi independent protectorates, of which they cited Muscat and Koweit as examples, and with this end in view they were prepared to accept our sovereignty, paying their revenues to us and putting their population at our disposal for military training. They recognised that their agreements among themselves lacked stability, and they would look to us to enforce on both sides the observance of their treaty with the Sheikh.

3. Previously, and in my absence, the Shahab had begged my Mirza to gain my adherence to their project, and professed the Khans'

willingness



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٣ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٤] [٤١٦/٣٧٢]

182

willingness to furnish us with all necessary signed agreements. My mirza expressed himself doubtful of my attaching much weight to their signed undertakings, gently reminding the Shahab that the seal on the document which he had handed me at Kima last March was yet scarcely dry. This silenced the Shahab, who did not want the Salar's curiosity aroused regarding that episode in his past career.

4. In the course of the conversation the Salar remarked that they had some 40,000 subjects capable of bearing arms, but of these only some 10000 were provided with fire-arms. This estimate ~~as like~~ I may observe is the most sane statement of the fighting strength of the Bakhtyari tribes which I have yet had made to me. The Salar also said that some British representative (Colonel Douglas in 1904?) had approached them on the subject of raising and training forces in their country. At that time they were not prepared to favour such a step, but that their feelings had undergone a change, and that now they were anxious for it. Let us ~~know~~ now play up to our own proposals.


5. I answered very briefly that I was unable personally to make them any reply, but that I would lay their proposals before my Government. I also stated that their proposals appeared to me to involve issues of great magnitude, and of such a nature that our engagements with Persia and other Powers would make it very difficult for us to accept any part in them.

6. The short time at my command and my unwillingness to display too great interest in the subversive projects of the Khans, prevented me from attempting to draw from them a more detailed statement of the precise course of action they have in view, and of the means and methods which they propose to employ. I can therefore only communicate the above precis of what passed between us. This I do merely for the information of Government.

I do not propose to offer any comments on a subject which stands to be judged on general and not local grounds, but I may remark that I question the probability of Sheikh Khazal's committing himself in the way desired by the Khans, though he may, to gain
fugitive




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٤ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧٣)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٥] [٤١٦/٣٧٤]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٦] [٤١٦/٣٧٦]

184

Register No. **2914**

Minute Paper. **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Letter from **Z.O.** Dated **6 March 1908**
Rec. **6 March 1908**

Formally acknowledged **WHL**

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|----------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | 11 March | WHL | Persia. Apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammoud as to recent events on the Turco-Persian frontier. Sheikh to be reassured position of H.M.'s Govt. in event of Ottoman advance in the south. Early information of any aggression designs there to be reported. |
| Secretary of State | 12 | ap | |
| Committee | 14 | J.H. | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Copy to
Under Secy 6 March '08
Secy 10

For information


Seen Pol. Comtee.,
17 MAR. 1908

Previous Papers:—

Y 12568. 1000.—4/1907. L 575.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٦ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧٧)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٧و] [٤١٦/٣٧٨]



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[A]

PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[February 25.]

SECTION I.

[AMENDED COPY.]

No. 1.

[5428]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 75.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.

Sir,
I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran,* relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

As you are aware, His Majesty's Government have been content to allow the Russian Government, as being more closely concerned, to take the lead in regard to making any proposals for arresting the Turkish encroachments so long as they are confined to the northern portion of the frontier; but it is desirable that your Excellency should clearly understand that the position would be materially altered if there were to be an advance of Ottoman troops to the south, more especially in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah. In this district His Majesty's Government are not prepared to recognize any other frontier than that laid down by the mediating Commissioners in 1850, as indicated in red on the accompanying sketch map; and in this connection I may recall the admission made by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 18th November, 1893, to the effect that "the Turkish Government laid no claim whatever to Mohammerah."

Any disturbance of the *status quo* at Mohammerah would affect British interests, and might not improbably lead to the active intervention of His Majesty's Government, who have given the Sheikh certain assurances in regard to his territory.

Your Excellency should accordingly instruct His Majesty's Consuls at Bagdad and Bussorah to furnish by telegraph early information of any aggressive designs in the district in question.

A copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran is inclosed for your information.†


I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

* Mr. Marling, No. 17, January 28, 1908.

† To Mr. Marling, No. 21, February 25, 1908.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٧ظ] (٤١٦/٣٧٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٨٨] [٤١٦/٣٨٠]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٨ظ] (٤١٦/٣٨١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٩] [٤١٦/٣٨٢]



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PERSIA.

[February 25.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[5428]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 21.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 17 of the 28th ultimo, in which you forward telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I concur in your opinion that a gun-boat need not be sent to the Shatt-el-Arab under existing conditions, and I consider that when an attack appears more imminent the precise action to be taken by His Majesty's Government can be determined.

It would, however, be advisable, in order to allay the Sheikh's apprehensions, to inform him that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the situation, but that they do not anticipate Turkish aggression in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah, and you should instruct Major Cox accordingly.

A copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject is inclosed for your information.⁹⁹


I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

* To Sir N. O'Connor, No. 75, February 25, 1908.

[2836 bb-2]




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٨٩ظ] (٤١٦/٣٨٣)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٠] [٤١٦/٣٨٤]



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[February 17.]

SECTION 14.

[5428]

No. 1.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 28, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith paraphrases of telegraphic correspondence which has passed between this Legation and His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire respecting the situation brought about by the Turco-Persian frontier dispute and its bearing upon the position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul-General Cox to Mr. Marling.

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, January 18, 1908.

SHEIKH of Mohammerah, in a recent interview, complained strongly of the unsatisfactory situation in which he finds himself in connection with the Turco-Persian frontier question.

He has no instructions as to the course he should pursue if hostilities break out from the Persian Government, who leave him entirely in the dark as to what is going on. Although he has under his jurisdiction an extensive frontier, starting a short distance above Mohammerah from the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, he has been provided neither with guns nor munitions of war.

A useful argument in future in support of the Sheikh's tribal status and semi-independence would seem to be furnished to us by the fact that he is being left to take care of himself on this occasion. The protection of Mohammerah from naval attack has already been undertaken by us. Would it not now be possible to inform the Porte that we could not permit hostilities, either by river or land, between Bussorah and Mohammerah, our commercial interests in those two places and the Shatt-el-Arab being too great to admit of such an eventuality? The only recent information I have is from Reuter's telegrams. The situation, however, seems to be acute, and it would be prudent to retain a British gun-boat in the Shatt-el-Arab so long as it remains so.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Marling to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 18, 1908.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier question.

Please refer to your telegram No. 16 of to-day.

Present position is as follows:—


The Turks, seizing opportunity offered by weak condition of Persia and present disinclination of the two mediating Powers to exert forcible pressure, have occupied certain districts to the west of Lake Urumia, and are endeavouring to create disorder by stirring up the frontier tribes of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Firman Firma is now in difficulties, having proceeded to Soujboulak, which was threatened by the latter tribes, to restore order. At Urumia a joint Turco-Persian Commission is about to sit.

It seems improbable that the Turks will extend their activities as far as the

[2836 r—14]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٩٠] (٤١٦/٣٨٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩١] [٤١٦/٣٨٦]

Register No. 345 189

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from *Didi*, No. 4 M., Dated 23 Jan. } 1908.
Rec. 8 Feb. }

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary | 11 Feb | <i>RM</i> | <i>Persia.</i> Hope expressed by the Sheikh of Mohammerah to Major Cox that in return for some suitable agreement from himself, the British Govt. would give him an undertaking to maintain him and his children in the rights and status at present possessed by the Sheikh and the Arab tribes pertaining thereto. |
| Secretary of State | 12 | <i>as</i> | |
| Committee | 12. | <i>RM</i> | |
| Under Secretary | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Copy to *F. O. 25. 2.08*

For information.

For the pledge given to the Sheikh in 1902, see Sir A. Hardinge's letter of 7 Dec. '02 (2069/03)


Seen Pol. Commr., 18 FEB 1908

Previous Papers:— *2624/04*

1637. I. 1779. 2000.—10/1907.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩١] (٤١٦/٣٨٧)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضغ. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٢] و [٤١٦/٣٨٨]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٩٢] ظ [٤١٦/٣٨٩]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٣] [٤١٦/٣٩٠]



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interpreted as a request for a dynastic guarantee we were at pains to probe his meaning. We asked him did he suggest that the British Government should guarantee the continued existence of an Arab Sheikh of Mohammerah on the present lines; or, that they should guarantee the maintenance of him personally and his own family heirs in the enjoyment of their present position.

He answered without hesitation that the latter was his intended meaning, adding in explanation that his own paramountcy was unquestioned; that his son Sheikh Chasib was universally regarded by his dependents as his natural successor and that in case of Sheikh Chasib's demise he had other sons and blood relations who could succeed.

No reference was of course made by him or me to our recent agreement with Sheikh Mubarek, but, as the Government of India are aware, the two Sheikhs are fast friends and it may be taken for granted that Sheikh Mubarek had informed his comrade of his own agreement with us, and that the latter had it in mind when he expressed himself as above.

For this reason I report the incident as indirectly bearing upon the issue raised in the correspondence alluded to in the first paragraph of this communication.


I have, etc.,

Sd. P. Z. Cox, Major,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

S.K.R.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٩٣] (٤١٦/٣٩١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٤] [٤١٦/٣٩٢]



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

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323/104

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

[October 3.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 167. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Gulahek, September 6, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence between His Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf and myself respecting certain schemes in which the Sheikh of Mohammerah is interested and those bearing on our general relations with that Chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major Cox to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 108.)

Sir,

Bushire, July 21, 1904.

UNDER this office No. 94, dated the 2nd instant, I had the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, Lieutenant Lorimer's Report No. 17, dated the 21st June, in paragraph 9, of which His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Ahwaz dealt with the local aspect of the support which His Majesty's Government had expressed their readiness to afford to the principality of Mohammerah.

2. I now submit copies of two further letters since received from Vice-Consul Lorimer.

The earliest of these two communications deals with two irrigation schemes, and one proposal for the purchase of certain riparian property. The second letter is connected with a supposed endeavour on the part of the Sheikh of Mohammerah to get Messrs. Lynch to move your Excellency to advise the Central Government to reimburse for expenses incurred retrospectively and prospectively, in policing highways of trade in Arabistan.

Each of these subjects I commend to your Excellency for such consideration as you may feel able to give it on its merits. The irrigation projects mentioned in letter No. 25, would no doubt require to be subjected to expert examination before any measure of participation in them, direct or indirect, could be seriously considered by Government, and with the information at present available to me it is difficult to venture any opinion as to their soundness. What irrigation is doing for Egypt, and might do for the region with which we are now concerned is a matter of common knowledge.

3. The course suggested in the second of the inclosures seems *prima facie* to be worthy of your Excellency's good offices, but, in forwarding these papers what I would ask you especially to notice is the general trend of these and previous reports received from His Majesty's newly-appointed Vice-Consul at Ahwaz. They seem to make it clear that the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in spite of authoritative pronouncements and advice communicated to him by your Excellency, and notwithstanding his own repeated assurances to the contrary, is chafing at the difficulties and uncertainty of his relations and position in regard to the Shah's Government, and is at heart dissatisfied by the need of prospective support of which His Majesty's Government has hitherto felt in a position to assure him.

4. From the records on the subject available to me it appears exceedingly improbable that in the absence of any provocative cause, His Majesty's Government would see its way to amplify its promises in the direction of active support. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that the Government might come to the conclusion that our position and influence in Arabistan, and our hold over the present Ruler of Mohammerah might be strengthened without dereliction of our obligations to a friendly Power, and without laying

[2182 c-2]

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ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٤ظ] (٤١٦/٣٩٣)

2

ourselves open to the suspicion that we were encouraging the Sheikh to free himself from allegiance to the Persian Government, by our acquiring concrete vested interests in the prosperity and development of Arabistan, supposing always that the soundness of any agricultural scheme were adequately demonstrated.

It is this general aspect of the possibilities indicated by Lieutenant Lorimer's reports that I would respectfully invite your Excellency's attention, apart from the consideration on their merits of the several projects now ventilated, and which it would be undesirable to see handled by non-British agencies.

5. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the Foreign Department of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Lorimer to Major Cox.

(No. 25.)

(Confidential.)

July 2, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to recur to a question raised in my despatch, dated the 21st June, 1904, namely, the relations of the British Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah. The present form in which the subject invites attention is that of financial assistance.

I learned first that the Sheikh had been making obscure references through confidential employes of Messrs. Lynch to two or three schemes, for the furtherance of which he would be glad to receive aid from our Government.

These schemes are:—

1. The irrigation of part of Arabistan by five or six steam-pump barges placed on the Karun below Ahwaz.
2. The construction of irrigation works on the rapids at Ahwaz on the site of the old "Band."
3. The purchase of certain land from the Nizam-us-Sultaneh.

Shortly afterwards he called on me, and I was able to talk of the first scheme, which is public knowledge, and to approach the subject of the second.

The third I did not care to introduce.

The Sheikh is an impossible man to get any expression of opinion from when Haji Rais, his counsellor, is not present.

He ventured, however, to commit himself so far as to give me to understand that under certain circumstances he would not be averse to receiving financial help from the British Government in connection with the first and second schemes.

Later I had a private interview with Haji Rais-ut-Tujar on the same subject. He put the matter in this form that I should on my own account invite the opinion of Government on the matter as though the conception were entirely my own, and had not emanated from or been discussed with the Sheikh. If the answer were favourable, he (Haji Rais) would undertake to work the Sheikh into a favourable frame of mind.


I shall proceed to give some explanation of the schemes.

No. 1. The Sheikh has for some time, it appears, entertained this notion. How it was suggested to his mind I do not know. A certain Mr. Blunsum, of the Bussorah Trading Company, has been here prospecting for the last six weeks. On his first arrival at Mohammerah he conceived the same idea, and was very surprised to learn that he had been forestalled in it by the Sheikh. He came up across country and examined the land and river bank. He then interviewed the Sheikh, and has been authorized (I have it only from himself in confidence) to make inquiries in England and furnish estimates. Mr. Blunsum would, of course, like to secure the working of the scheme if feasible for his own Company, but I am sure the Sheikh would not part with its control. In this case Mr. Blunsum says that his firm would be prepared to give all necessary assistance, asking, in return, a preference in the purchase of the produce of the land irrigated.

The Sheikh is, I believe, prepared to spend 15,000*l.* or 20,000*l.* on this scheme. If the expense proved greater, I understand him to imply that he would accept our help. Personally, I believe that he would do so, if it were proposed, in any case.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٥] [٤١٦/٣٩٤]






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ." [١٩٦] [٤١٦/٣٩٦]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٦] [٤١٦/٣٩٧]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظلمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٧] [٤١٦/٣٩٨]

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Register No. 2624

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from J.D., Dated 3 May 1904 Rec. 5

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------|---|
| Under Secretary..... | 5/6/04 | PK | Persia. H.M.'s Govt. and the Sheikh of Mohammerah. The Sheikh's reply to Sir A. Hardinge's letter. |
| Secretary of State | 6 | ag | |
| Committee | 9 | S/10 | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Previous Papers:—
2454
Copy to India.
For information.

It will be remembered that Major
Benton recently expressed the opinion
that the Sheikh was able to protect
himself against the Persian Govt., if
the question was exclusively one between
him & them.

It seems to be taken for granted
that
"Good offices & support = support"
= "assistance"


Seen Pol. Comtee.,
13 MAY. 1904

COPY TO INDIA
6 May 1904
SECRETARY'S No. 19

Y 8964. 2000-7/1908. I. 1509.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تميمات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٧ظ] (٤١٦/٣٩٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٨] [٤١٦/٤٠٠]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٨ظ] (٤١٦/٤٠١)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٩١] [٤١٦/٤٠٢]

197

Register No. *2454*

Minute Paper. **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Letter from *F.O.* Dated *18* March 1904.
Rec. *19*

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------|---|
| <i>106</i> Under Secretary..... | <i>26 March</i> | <i>W.</i> | <i>Persia.</i> <i>His Govt. and the Sheikh of</i> <i>Mohammerah. Letter from Sir A. Hardinge</i> <i>to the Sheikh.</i> |
| Secretary of State | <i>26</i> | <i>ap</i> | |
| <i>106</i> Committee | <i>28</i> | <i>SJS</i> | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Previous Papers:—
2354

Copy to India.
For information.


Seen Pol. Comtee,
12 APR. 1904

COPY TO INDIA
25 March 1904
SECRETARY'S NO. *13*

Y 8964. 2000-7/1908. I. 1509.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [١٩٩] [٤١٦/٤٠٣]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٠] [٤٠٤/٤١٦]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٠ظ] (٤١٦/٤٠٥)

2

Inclosure in No. 2.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 12, 1904.

A COMMUNICATION, dated Farsha, the 10th February, has just been received from Colonel Wahab, in which he describes the previous day's skirmish. The opposing Arabs were not numerous, and were driven back with loss; the guns did considerable damage to the hamlet of Dar Ibrahim. The Turkish Commissioners were left him in the Kubati country without transport, and their movements are, therefore, somewhat uncertain. The British Commissioners, however, hope to get into touch with them again at Wadi Madin, [round ?] which place they propose to move after staying several days at Farsha.

The Commission appear to have met with some further opposition near Farsha, but reports from Dar-al-Kudaimi show that all is quiet in that neighbourhood, and the Political Officer with the column there has been visited by the Sheikhs.

(Repeated to Secretary of State for India, Political Department, Bombay; British Ambassador, Constantinople.)

No 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 15, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* suggesting that a British Agent should be sent to Kuchan, together with an extract from the Persian monthly summary of the 6th ultimo,† relative to the disturbed condition of that part of Persia.

Lord Lansdowne is inclined to doubt the expediency of sending a British Agent to Kushan, where our interests are comparatively small; but his Lordship would be glad to be favoured with the views of the Secretary of State for India as to the proposal contained in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 4.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 15, 1904.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Imperial Bank of Persia,‡ stating that they have instructed their Manager in Tehran to complete the purchase of 15,000 zars of land for the premises of the branch bank in Seistan and the residences of its officials. The Bank express their willingness to bear the cost of the land, but state that interest on the purchase money will be charged to the working expenses of the Seistan branch.

Lord Lansdowne will be glad to learn whether the Secretary of State for India agrees to this proposal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.


* Sir A. Hardinge, No. 18, Telegraphic, February 11, 1904.

† Extract, Monthly Summary, January 6, 1904.

‡ Imperial Bank, February 10, 1904.



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠١ و] (٤١٦/٤٠٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٢ و] (٤١٦/٤٠٨)

2500

Register No. 2354

Minute Paper. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from F.O. Dated 29 Feb. 1904
Rec. 3 Mch. 1904

Formally acknowledged

| | Date. | Initials. | SUBJECT. |
|--------------------------|---------|-----------|--|
| Under Secretary..... | 4 March | KK | Persia. H.M.'s fort. and the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Report of Sir A. Hardinge's visit to Mohammerah. |
| Secretary of State | 7 | as | |
| Committee | 8 | S.M. | |
| Under Secretary..... | | | |
| Secretary of State | | | |

Previous Papers:—
3261/03A

For information.


Secy Political Committee.
15 Mch/04

COPY TO INDIA
4 March 1904
SECRETARY'S No. 10

Y 8964. 3000—7/1903. I. 1509.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٢ ظ] (٤١٦/٤٠٩)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٣ و] (٤١٠/٤١٦)






ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٣ظ] (٤١١/٤١٦)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٤ و] [٤١٢/٤١٦]



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PERSIA AND ARABIA.

[January 19.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 19, 1904.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Ahwaz, December 11, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that I left Bushire on the evening of the 7th instant and reached Mohammerah the following afternoon, where I received on landing the official visit of Sheikh Khazal.

In the course of the return visit which I paid him next day, he spoke at great length on the subject of his political position, and complained that the Persian Government were systematically endeavouring to undermine it, and that, notwithstanding all the services he had rendered, and was still prepared to render to us, His Majesty's Government did not support him as it did other Arab Sheikhs on the Gulf such as those of Koweit and Bahrein.

I pointed out to him that these Sheikhs were maintained by us, to be independent *de jure* as well as *de facto* both of Persia and of Turkey, but that we had recognized the Shah's sovereignty over Mohammerah, though we had no wish to see it emphasized at the expense of the ancient rights long enjoyed under its aegis by the Arabs. I then asked him to explain his specific grievances at this particular juncture against the Persian Government, adding that I had hoped that the arrangement negotiated as regards the Customs last year was working smoothly.

Sheikh Khazal replied that that arrangement had already begun to be violated. It had been agreed in it that his duties should be free from export duties, and that goods brought by him for his personal use from abroad should be exempt from import duties.

The Persian Government were now attempting to make him pay both these classes of duties, and although they had, in consequence of his remonstrances, given in on the subject of the duties, they refused to do so in the matter of his personal imports. It had been stipulated at the same time that if he accepted a Belgian Customs official, and paid the entire customs revenue over to M. Naus, he should himself remain head of the Customs, and that the Belgian should be, so to speak, his technical assistant. He now found that his position as Chief of Customs was merely nominal; that new clerks were constantly being brought in from Isfahan and Tehran by M. Waffalaert; that the latter officer corresponded over his head with the Central Government; and that it was clear that the Persian Government were bent on gradually paring away his authority, and destroying the prestige on which it rested. He had been induced by the advice of His Majesty's Legation to acquiesce in the new customs arrangement, and he wished to know definitely whether we would now support him if the Persian Government repudiated the bargain they had made with him.

A long desultory discussion followed, and was continued at a subsequent visit which the Sheikh paid me the same evening, but the upshot of it was that he desired a pledge from us that if, in consequence of a breach of its engagements by the Persian Government, he declared himself no longer bound by the arrangement negotiated last year, at any rate, unless the Persians adhered to it also, and if as a result of this attitude on his part the Persian Government attempted to depose him or coerce him as a rebel, we would prohibit such action on their part. I explained to him that this meant that if the "Persepolis" came up to attack Mohammerah we might conceivably have to send a gun-boat of our own to enforce the prohibition; that we had already gone a long way in promising to protect Mohammerah against a foreign enemy; and that to interfere in such a manner between the Sovereign of Persia and a Chief whom we had recognized as his subject would be a strong measure which would be deemed very unfriendly by the Shah, and might react on our general relations with him. He would readily understand that before even expressing any opinion as to the view which His Majesty's Government would take of such a proposal, I must refer to your Lordship for instructions. Speaking personally, I should be glad if I were authorized to support him against any further encroachments or display of bad faith by the Persians, and I would, in writing to your Lordship, place his case fully and clearly before you; but he must remember that the

[1811 4-1]



ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تظمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٤ ظ] [٤١٣/٤١٦]

2

question of Mohammerah was only a part of a much wider problem. I added that I could not discuss with him our attitude in the event of certain hypothetical contingencies in relation to which he wanted me to define it, such as the overthrow of the Kajar Dynasty, the break-up of Persia, &c., pointing out that it must necessarily depend upon as yet unknown circumstances and conditions respecting which we could now predicate nothing.

He mentioned incidentally in the earlier part of our conversation that the Russians were quite ready to give promises of protection, and I think it not improbable that if we withhold our support from him, he may be persuaded to enter into some secret arrangement with them.

His Confidential Agent, Haji Reis-et-Tujar, showed me a letter from the Russian Consul-General at Bushire promising to visit Mohammerah, and announcing that he had obtained permission from the Shah to confer upon Sheikh Khazal a very high Russian decoration.

The letter did not state what the decoration was beyond that it was one usually given to "Ministers." It is for this reason that, reluctant as I am to recommend a measure which will certainly exasperate the Shah, I ventured in my telegram of the 9th instant to advise that, in the last resort at any rate, we should be prepared to support the Sheikh if need be by a forcible demonstration against the Persian Government, and should let him know that we are ready to do so. I would, however, urge upon him, and I have intimated that we should certainly require this, to exhaust all the resources of diplomacy and negotiation before taking action which could bring about a rupture.

If we decide to inform the Persian Government that we shall not allow the use of coercive measures against the Sheikh, we can, I think, very plausibly, and, indeed, reasonably, argue that our interests in Arabistan, and particularly on the Karun, would be so seriously imperilled by the outbreak of disorder that we cannot be indifferent to the adoption of measures calculated to provoke it.

The territory governed by Sheikh Khazal is one of the few portions of the great united Province of Arabistan and Luristan, nominally ruled by His Royal Highness the Salar-ed-Dowleh, in which our merchants can trade in security. The whole region to the north of Dizful is now closed to them owing to the revolt which the actions of the Persian Government have occasioned, and the compliance of our Road and Transport Company, with the terms of its Concession, has been made impossible by the existence of a state of anarchy, the end of which seems as distant as ever. We cannot be expected to acquiesce in the extension of this deplorable condition of things to the Karun Valley, and we must, therefore, insist that the provisions of the Shah's Firman to the Sheikh, and the promises given him by M. Naus, shall be scrupulously adhered to by the Customs Department, and that no further steps shall be attempted of a nature to arouse the suspicion and jealousy of the Arabs. But we may require, in addition to putting forward the above considerations, to intimate pretty plainly that if our advice is disregarded we may have to send a ship to Mohammerah to prevent any collision between Arabs and Persians.

We have already, in a formal note sent about a year ago (I have no means here of giving exact references) to the Persian Government, reserved in diplomatic but unmistakable language our right to do so should we judge it necessary.

It is, of course, very unlikely that we shall have to speak so strongly to the Persian Government. If the Sheikh is firm—and he will be firm as soon as he feels that he has either the British or the Russian Government at his back—the Persians will probably desist from their efforts to tamper with the arrangement made with him last year, more especially if a hint is conveyed to them that we are watching the progress of events at Mohammerah, and may possibly interfere in them.


We have a very strong position, in view of the fact that we urged the Sheikh two years ago to come to terms over the Customs question with the Persian Government, and that, though we were not formally parties to the Agreement, its acceptance by the Arabs was in the main the result of our advice. This circumstance is, I think, generally known, and at Koweit Sheikh Mubarek told me that he had advised the Sheikh of Mohammerah to resist the Persians rather than submit, but that Sheikh Khazal had replied that he had yielded owing to the representations of His Majesty's Legation. The reopening of the question seems to afford us a favourable opportunity for recovering the confidence in us on the Sheikh's part which has been shaken by the events of two years ago, and securing his friendship for and dependence upon us against all attempts of our rivals to tamper with it.

Our support would, of course, be conditional upon our advice being followed by him at each stage of his discussion with the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.




ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٥] [٤١٤/٤١٦]





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة": الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [٢٠٥ ظ] (٤١٦/٤١٥)





ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية
للشيخ. " [خلفي-داخلي] (٤١٦/٤١٦)

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