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'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain'

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	IOR/R/15/2/669
Date(s)	19 Oct 1940-7 Jan 1941 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	1 file (44 folios)
Copyright for document	<u>Unknown</u>



About this record


The file comprises copies of correspondence and other papers relating to an air raid carried out by Italian bombers over the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) refinery in Bahrain and the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) refinery at Dhahran [al-Zahrān] in Saudi Arabia, on the night of 19 October 1940. The principal correspondents in the file are: the Political Agent in Bahrain (Major Reginald George Evelin William Alban); the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Geoffrey Prior); the British Minister in Jeddah (Hugh Stonehewer-Bird).


The file includes:

- initial reports of the raid (ff 2-3);
- an order from the Government of Bahrain (f 4, copy at f 30) dated 19 October 1940, announcing the raid and the British Government's intentions to take all measures in the defence of Bahrain. The order also calls for calm amongst the islands' inhabitants;
- a draft letter written by the Political Agent to the Political Resident, dated 20 October 1940 (ff 10-12, copy at ff 27-29) giving details of: the number of planes taking part in the raid and their altitude; the number of bombs dropped; damage (of lack of damage) caused; and precautions being taken against further raids: placement of light machine gun posts, blackout measures, the preparation of air raid shelters, increased refinery patrols);

- correspondence from the British Minister at Jedda (ff 13-14, ff 15-16, f 32), giving an account of the Italian minister to Saudi Arabia's initial denial of the raid over Dhahran, his response to the official announcement from the Italian Government of the raid over Bahrain, and his subsequent apology to the Amir Faisal [Fayṣal]. The British Minister at Jedda also reports on the official apology to Saudi Arabia from the Italian Government, and speculation that the refinery at Dhahran was mistaken for the BAPCO refinery at Bahrain by the Italian bombers;
- correspondence between Air Ministry and India Office officials in London (ff 41-42) discussing if such a raid could be repeated in future, and whether further air raid protection measures should be taken at Bahrain.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [front] (1/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [2r] (3/92)


Telegram G.T.C.

From Political, Bahrain.
To Residency Agent, Sharjah.
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire
Political, Muscat (*Please inform Defence
Officer*).
No. 383
Dated 19th October 1940

Important.

Enemy aircraft visited Bahrain this morning.
Please ask Station Superintendent to render landing
of aircraft at Sharjah impossible by placing movable
obstacles on the aerodrome. Also ensure that guards
are on the alert.

- Political -



Telegram "S"

From Political, Bahrain.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 382
Dated 19th October 1940

IMPORTANT


Bahrain Refinery bombed approximately 3.45 a.m. this morning by two or possibly three enemy machines of unidentified type flying at approximately 3000 feet. No damage or casualties sustained. Some 50 bombs of small calibre were dropped and all fell well clear of the target.

2. Single plane also bombed C.A.S.O.C premises at Dharan causing slight damage to water and oil pipe line between Dharan and Al Khobar.

3. Senior Naval Officer has informed Aden and Royal Air Force, Air Headquarters, Iraq.

4. Full black-out imposed in Oil Field from tonight.

- Political -



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [4r] (7/92)

3 4
Translation of notice No. 25/1359 dated 17th Ramadhan 1359
(19th October 1940) issued by the Government of Bahrain.

1.11.1323
20/10/1940


62

G O V E R N M E N T O F B A H R A I N .

N O T I C E .

We announce to all our subjects that on the night of Saturday the 17th of Ramadhan 1359 some enemy planes flew over our state and attempted to raid the oil refinery but despite the fact that they met with no opposition they did not come down below a height of 2000 Dir'as (arms' lengths). They dropped about 40 bombs all of which fell more than half a mile away from the enclosure. They did not cause any damage and, by the grace of God, did not injure anybody.

2. The High British Government are taking all the necessary measures for our defence and it is the duty of everyone of our subjects to remain calm and to obey immediately all orders issued or notified. We depend on God who protects the believers.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [5r] (9/92)

1.R. 752
20/10/40


4 (5)

(63)


Telegram Inter.
From British Minister, Jedda.
To Foreign Office, London (No.242)
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire (No.25)
Political Agent, Bahrain (No.10) &
Middle East Intelligence Centre (No.18).
Dated and received the 19th October 1940


Saudi Arabian Government inform me that on night of
October 18th - October 19th three unidentified aircraft
dropped approximately 23 twenty-five to fifty pound bombs
on California Arabian Standard Oil Company Camp, Dhahran,
causing slight damage to pipelines and made off southwards.
One bomb did not explode.

British Minister.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [6r] (11/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [7r] (13/92)

I.R. 756
20/10/40
I.A.C.B.

7

6


Telegram Inter
From Minister, Jeddah.
To Political Agent, Bahrain (NO.11)
Repeated Government of India, Simla. (No.245)
Political Resident, Bushire (No.26)
Middle East Intelligence Centre (No.19)

Dated and received the 20th October 1940

67

Immediate

Saudi Arabian Government ask me to obtain from you very urgently any details showing identity of bombs which they state were dropped on Bahrain as well as on Dhahran on night of October 18th - October 19th.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [8r] (15/92)

7
7
SECRET

IMMEDIATE

No. C/806-1.a/43

Political Agency,
Bahrain, the 31st October 1940

To


The Air Liaison Officer,
BAHRAIN

Memorandum

The Saudi Arabian Government are urgently enquiring whether any details can be furnished to establish the identity of the bombs dropped on Bahrain as well as on Dharan.

2. I understand that the R.A.F. armaments expert who came here yesterday has already left and I should be grateful if you would let me know therefore with the least possible delay whether he was able to establish for certain the identity of the bombs and if so by what method.

h
for Political Agent, Bahrain.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [9r] (17/92)

8 ①


Telegram	Inter.
From	Political Agent, Bahrain.
To	Minister, Jeddah.
Repeated	Government of India, Simla. Political Resident, Bushire. Middle East Intelligence Centre.
No.	388
Dated	21st October 1940.

Your telegram No.11 dated the 20th October.

2. Impossible to identify definitely bombs dropped on Bahrain but portion of parachute flares of Italian manufacture and with instructions in Italian on it has been recovered.

- Political -

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [9v] (18/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [10r] (19/92)

Defence file.

9⁽¹⁰⁾


lu
22. 10. 92

P. R.

I give below a more detailed account of the air raid on the Oil Refinery at Bahrain and subsequent events.

2. At about 3.15 a.m. on the 19th October one of the Refinery guards saw aircraft approaching from a southerly direction with their navigation lights burning. The consensus of opinion is that there were three enemy planes and this appears likely as the bombs were dropped in salvos of three. The machines flew over the Refinery at a height between two and three thousand feet and dropped some 40 bombs a number of which failed to explode. As soon as he had sighted the aircraft the Refinery guard informed the Defence Officer and I am told that the lights of the Refinery were put out very soon after the first salvo of bombs had been dropped. The flares however could not be extinguished rapidly and it appears that the bombs were aimed at a point midway between the two flares on the east side of the Refinery. The position of one of these flares had been changed only a few days previously and had it remained in its former position it seems probable that the bombs would have fallen within the Refinery area. Actually they fell about 300 yards to the east of the Refinery perimeter. The bombs were obviously of small calibre as the craters were not more than 8 to 10 feet across and 4 feet deep. There were no casualties and no damage whatsoever was done. I personally visited the scene with the Senior Naval Officer at dawn. Guards were at once placed on the area where the bombs fell and to-day a Royal Air Force expert arrived by Blenheim to inspect the duds. While I was still at the Camp a message was received to the effect that a single aircraft had dropped some seven bombs close to Dharan but it now seems that the number of aircraft which took part in this raid was three and that the number of bombs dropped was between 20 and 30. As already reported there was no serious damage and there were no casualties.

2/-



- 2 -

2. The following precautions have been taken for the future by the Defence Officer:

(1) Four light machine guns posts have been placed at selected sites close to the Refinery.

(2) Listening posts have been established at Awali, Refinery and Sitra.

(3) A total black-out has been enforced at the Refinery Oil Field, Awali and the Cooly Camp.

(4) Car lamps have been dimmed.

(5) A guard consisting of a detachment of the Defence Force armed with a light machine gun has been sent to Muharraq to look after the landing ground.


(6) Patrols round the Refinery perimeter have been increased.

(7) Trenches to act as air raid shelters are being constructed at selected parts in the Refinery, Awali Camp and Cooly Camp areas for the protection of personnel working or living there.

3. As the Company have sufficient oil in storage tanks to meet immediate orders the Refinery has been closed for a few days in order to enable a system of lighting to be evolved which will not be visible from the air but which will be sufficient for operational purposes. The Refinery would in any case have been closed on the 26th October as by then storage tanks would have been full to capacity. The position has been further aggravated by the news that the tanker "Ketty Brovig" which was due here on the 31st October was damaged after a collision at Singapore.

4. Every effort has been made to introduce a black-out in Manama and Muharraq and it was surprisingly successful and was apparently not objected to. To impose a complete black-out in Bahrain is almost impossible particularly during the month of Ramadhan and efforts have been

concentrated /-



11 (12)
- 3 -


concentrated on extinguishing all lights which might be of use to aircraft in identifying the Islands.


As a temporary measure Captain Howes has taken charge of the black-out arrangements for Manama and Muharraq and has Mr. Furber, the Assistant State Engineer, and Shaikh Khalifah to assist him.

5. Ships entering Bahrain have been warned to black-out and C.A.S.O.C. have been asked to assist by imposing as far as possible a black-out over their Camp and Oil Field area.

6. Captain Howes with Mr. de Grenier visited the Shaikh on the morning of the 19th October and informed him of what had happened. On their advice the Shaikh issued an 'Alan, a copy of which is attached.

h
20th October 1940.





P. A. Bahrain

I.R. 173
23/10/40
1. alu3

12 (13)

73

Telegram Inter.
From His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah.
To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.246.
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire. No.27.
Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo. No.116.
Dated 20th October 1940.

(Relayed under Bushire telegram No.742
dated and received the 22nd October 1940).

IMPORTANT.

My immediately preceding telegram.


(1) Amir Faisal asked me to call this morning to talk of DHAHRAN bombing. He told me that Bahrain had also been bombed on October 18th/19th. He thought that probable explanation was that aircraft had thought they were over Bahrain when they had reached Dhahran as he could not see what advantage there could be for anyone in bombing Saudi Arabian wells. He was at a loss to know where raiders could have come from as nearest Italian territory was roughly one thousand miles distant and wondered whether there could be German or Italian raiders in neighbouring waters. I said I thought first thing was to try and establish identity of bombs and that I would immediately ask authorities at Bahrain to telegraph all possible information.


(2) Amir took incident much more easily than I had expected and agreed that it was best to take no action until further information was available. He is seeing Italian Minister this evening and I had feared that as he strongly dislikes him personally he might be moved to protest to him before knowing for certain who was responsible and thus create situation which as I gather from your telegram No.153 it would not be in our interests to create at this juncture.

- MINISTER.


W.L.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [13v] (26/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [14v] (28/92)



41

47

Handwritten Arabic text

Telegram later.
From His Majesty's Minister, Tegda.
To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, No. 247.
Referred to His Majesty's Intelligence Centre, Cairo, No. 21.
Political Resident, Tegda, No. 28.
Dated 21st October 1940.

(Relayed under British telegram No. 743 dated
and received 22nd October 1940.)

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 246.
Amir Yafai has just sent me message saying that
Italian planes had been heard over LAILA just before dawn
October 19th and over ABMA some hours later. This information
seems to indicate that Italian planes took most direct route from
Bahrain to ABMA thus violating Saudi Arabian territory through-
out return flight.
(2) I have learnt from an entirely sound (omission omitted)
that to Amir's protest yesterday against bombing of Dhahran
Italian Minister replied it was work of "our enemies". Yafai
asked Minister how then he explained bombing of Bahrain by same
formation. Signor PERROU answers that Bahrain had been
bombed was dumbo and said that Dhahran bombing must have
been accidental, he was aware of his Government's policy and a
similar mistake would not occur. Amir Yafai was not satisfied
and demanded official apology and guarantee from Italian Govern-
ment. He requested Italian Minister to draft telegram in Arabic
ly and hand it to him for transmission to Rome. This was done.
(3) I hope to obtain confirmation of above re interview
with Amir Yafai tomorrow and also learn reaction to violation
of territory which had not been reported to him when he was
Italian Minister.

- MINISTER.

W.L.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [15r] (29/92)

76
14 (15)
Telegram to Ohliger from Jedda.


October 21st 1940.

Acting on orders from King Prince Feisal arrived Jedda night of 19th and yesterday summoned the British Minister and afterwards the Italian Minister to the Palace.

This morning Nejb gave me following version of meeting between Feisal and Italian Minister. When confronted with news of bombing of Dharan Italian Minister expressed complete ignorance and stated that it was undoubtedly act of British done with purpose of arousing Arab animosity against Italians. Feisal replied that Bahrain also had been bombed and that he could not conceive of British bombing their own oil fields and installations and that he was convinced that both Bahrain and Dharan were bombed by Italian planes. At that point message was handed to Feisal stating Rome Radio had officially announced Italian bombing of Bahrain. Italian Minister expressed deepest sorrow stating that bombing of Dharan was clearly done by mistake and added that because he knew policy of his Government he could give Feisal firmest assurances that such a mistake would never be made in future. Feisal answered that these personal assurances were insufficient and that official assurances of the Italian Government were required. This the Italian Minister ^{promised} /to obtain and the meeting ended. Thereafter the Italian Minister coded a lengthy wire to Rome which was handed to Feisal for despatching. The wire was sent last evening.

Nejb then added that Feisal is personally convinced that Dharan was bombed by mistake and that no such mistake would be made in future. Because of this conviction Feisal feels according to Nejb that the Company acted too hurriedly in suspending ~~its~~ work. Also according to Nejb Feisal plans to call me to Palace after receiving official assurances of Italian Government and to inform me that since these

assurances /-



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [16r] (31/92)

15-16

- 2 -

assurances are acceptable to the Saudi Arabian Government they should also be acceptable to Company and consequently the Company should resume its work. From other sources I was given identical report of Feisal's convictions and plans.


Also this morning British Minister called with Legation's telegram of Bahrain and Dharan bombings which he read. Thereafter he explained that during his meeting with Feisal he had expressed opinion that Italians had at first mistaken Dharan for Bahrain and had dropped their bombs before realising the mistake. He added however that he was personally of the opinion that no mistake had been made and that he had given the above explanation to Feisal because he felt that the Saudi Arabian Government preferred to believe that Dharan bombing was a mistake and because he felt it was better at this time that they did believe it was a mistake. However he later expressed the conviction that the bombing was done as a propaganda measure which is rather inconsistent with the expression of the belief that Dharan bombing was intentional. This might be explained by desire that we regard the bombing as intentional.

- Lenahan -


Copy given to PR.

h


27.10.20.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [17r] (33/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [17v] (34/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [18r] (35/92)

17 (18)

Telegram Inter.
From His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah.
To Political Resident, at Bahrain (No.30)
Repeated Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London (No.251)
Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo
(NO.24)


Dated the 23rd received the 24th October 1940

79

p.151
My immediately preceding telegram.

Amir Faisal asks whether it would be possible for arrangements to be made between the Royal Air Force and either the Manager of California Arabian Standard Oil Company or local Saudi Arabian authorities there for advance information of intended Royal Air Force patrols over the Dahran - Bahrain area to be given, as population cannot distinguish between Royal Air Force and Italian planes.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [18v] (36/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [19r] (37/92)

1.R 772
26/10/40
1. a/43.

18 (19)

P.A. Bahra in ✓

Telegram S.
From Government of India, New Delhi.
To Secretary of State for India, London.
Repeated Political Resident, at Bahrain.
Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

No.4050.

Dated 21st received 22nd October 1940.


IMMEDIATE.

Reference Bushire telegram No.732 October 19th.

Press today reports that Italian High Command communiqué as stating that repeated hits were scored on British Petroleum centre in Bahrain and fire started. It is proposed to give any publicity to facts that bombing caused no damage or casualties and that oil fields are American concern.

-FOREIGN.

W.L.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [20r] (39/92)

P.A. Bahrain ✓

19 (20)

Telegram Q.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Resident, at Bahrain.
No.C/477.
Dated and received 23rd October 1940.

Your telegram 731 October 19th.


There is no doubt planes were heard over Kuwait night of raid on Bahrain and I am endeavouring to co-ordinate conflicting reports.


As a precautionary measure Shaikh has ordered all outside lights to be extinguished by 10 p.m. This includes navigation lights on DASMAN and Agency. Presume there is no objection as Ras al Ardh light is already out if so request Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf may be informed. Kuwait Oil Company is taking similar precautions.

- Political.


W.L.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [20v] (40/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [21v] (42/92)



✓
P.A.Bahrain.

(22)

21

Telegram Inter.
From Political Resident at Bahrain.
To Minister, Jeddah.
Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.
Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.
Air Officer Commanding, Habbaniya.

No.T/481.


Dated the 24th October 1940.


Your telegram No.251 of 23rd October
to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

So far as I know R.A.F. always avoid
Saudi territory. I doubt if they would agree to
give previous information regarding patrols to
Bahrain but will consult Air Officer Commanding.


RESIDENT.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [22v] (44/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [23v] (46/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [24r] (47/92)

I.R. 777
26/10/40
1. a. f. u. 3.

P.A. Bahrain.

24
23


Telegram S
From Political Resident, at Bahrain.
To Government of India, External Affairs
Department, New Delhi.
Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.
Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.
No. T/483.
Dated the 24th October 1940.

Your 4095 of 23rd October.

Americans here appear unnecessarily
alarmed but I hope to soothe them. Matter is
complicated by fact that their Legation at
Baghdad recently circulated routine notice
advising all American subjects to remove
themselves from Near East.

RESIDENT

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [24v] (48/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [25r] (49/92)

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C/382 of 1940.

25

24

1. a/lk3
1.R. 1352
26.10.40

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

Government of India, New Delhi

1. The Secretary to the Government of India,
External Affairs Department,
New Delhi.

2. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,
London,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).

Your telegram No. 4080 dated October 21st 1940
Bahrain points referred to in your telegram
sentences were adequately covered in Press reports published

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 24th October 1940.


Camp, Bahrain.

Reference to previous correspondence:


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date	Subject.
Telegram to Ohliger from Lenahan, Jeddah, dated October 21st 1940.	Bombing of Dhahran.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Bahrain, for information. ✓



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [25v] (50/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [26r] (51/92)

I.R. 778
26/10/40
12/143

26
25

Telegram S
From Secretary of State for India, London
To Government of India, New Delhi
Repeated Political Resident, at Bahrain.
No. 6521


Dated and received the 24th October 1940

Your telegram No. 4050 dated October 21st.
Bahrain points referred to in your last
sentence were adequately covered in Press reports published
here.

Retaxandum

(Copy given to Political Agent, Bahrain),

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [26v] (52/92)



26⁽²⁷⁾


P. R.

I give below a more detailed account of the air raid on the Oil Refinery at Bahrain and subsequent events.

2. At about 3.15 a.m. on the 19th October one of the Refinery guards saw aircraft approaching from a southerly direction with their navigation lights burning. The consensus of opinion is that there were three enemy planes and this appears likely as the bombs were dropped in salvos of three. The machines flew over the Refinery at a height between two and three thousand feet and dropped some 40 bombs a number of which failed to explode. As soon as he had sighted the aircraft the Refinery guard informed the Defence Officer and I am told that the lights of the Refinery were put out very soon after the first salvo of bombs had been dropped. The flares however could not be extinguished rapidly and it appears that the bombs were aimed at a point midway between the two flares on the east side of the Refinery. The position of one of these flares had been changed only a few days previously and had it remained in its former position it seems probable that the bombs would have fallen within the Refinery area. Actually they fell about 300 yards to the east of the Refinery perimeter. The bombs were obviously of small calibre as the craters were not more than 8 to 10 feet across and 4 feet deep. There were no casualties and no damage whatsoever was done. I personally visited the scene with the Senior Naval Officer at dawn. Guards were at once placed on the area where the bombs fell and to-day a Royal Air Force expert arrived by a Blenheim to inspect the duds. While I was still at the Camp a message was received to the effect that a single aircraft had dropped some seven bombs close to Dharan but it now seems that the number of aircraft which took part in this raid was three and that the number of bombs dropped was between 20 and 30. As already reported there was no serious damage and there were no casualties.

2/-

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [27v] (54/92)



- 2 -

2. The following precautions have been taken for the future by the Defence Officer:

(1) Four light machine guns posts have been placed at selected sites close to the Refinery.

(2) Listening posts have been established at Awali, Refinery and Sitra.

(3) A total black-out has been enforced at the Refinery Oil Field, Awali and the Cooly Camp.

(4) Car lamps have been dimmed.

(5) A guard consisting of a detachment of the Defence Force armed with a light machine gun has been sent to Muharraq to look after the landing ground.

(6) Patrols round the Refinery perimeter have been increased.


(7) Trenches to act as air raid shelters were being constructed at selected parts in the Refinery, Awali Camp and Cooly Camp areas for the protection of personnel working or living there.

3. As the Company have sufficient oil in storage tanks to meet immediate orders the Refinery has been closed for a few days in order to enable a system of lighting to be evolved which will not be visible from the air but which will be sufficient for operational purposes. The Refinery would in any case have been closed on the 26th October as by then storage tanks would have been full to capacity. The position has been further aggravated by the news that the tanker "Ketty Brovig" which was due here on the 31st October was damaged after a collision at Singapore.

4. Every effort has been made to introduce a black-out in Manama and Muharraq and it was surprisingly successful and was apparently not objected to. To impose a complete black-out in Bahrain is almost impossible particularly during the month of Ramadhan and efforts have been

concentrated /-

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [28v] (56/92)



28
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- 3 -

concentrated on extinguishing all lights which might be of use to aircraft in identifying the Islands.


As a temporary measure Captain Howes has taken charge of the black-out arrangements for Manama and Muharraq and has Mr. Furber, the Assistant State Engineer, and Shaikh Khalifah to assist him.

5. Ships entering Bahrain have been warned to black-out and C.A.S.O.C. have been asked to assist by imposing as far as possible a black-out over their Camp and Oil Field area.

6. Captain Howes with Mr. de Grenier visited the Shaikh on the morning of the 19th October and informed him of what had happened. On their advice the Shaikh issued an 'Alan, a copy of which is attached.

L
20th October 1940.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [29v] (58/92)




29
30
Translation of notice No. 25/1359 dated 17th Ramadhan 1359
(19th October 1940) issued by the Government of Bahrain.

GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN.

NOTICE.

We announce to all our subjects that on the night of Saturday the 17th of Ramadhan 1359 some enemy planes flew over our state and attempted to raid the oil refinery but despite the fact that they met with no opposition they did not come down below a height of 2000 Dir'as (arms' lengths). They dropped about 40 bombs all of which fell more than half a mile away from the enclosure. They did not cause any damage and, by the grace of God, did not injure anybody.

2. The High British Government are taking all the necessary measures for our defence and it is the duty of everyone of our subjects to remain calm and to obey immediately all orders issued or notified. We depend on God who protects the believers.



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [31r] (61/92)

30
31

Telegram S
From Political Resident, at Bahrain.
To Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi.
Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.
Copy to Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.
Political Agent, Bahrain.
No. T/516
Dated 1st November 1940.

My telegram No.T/488 of 26th October.

Air Officer Commanding arrived 31st October inspected arrangements and discussed Defence problems with Senior Naval Officer Political Agent and myself. He returned Basra in the afternoon but hopes pay further visit in a weeks time.


2. He will endeavour supply gun crews and has undertaken to provide search lights. He has no listening apparatus available but will arrange system of sibhals to give warning of raids coming via Iraq. Question of Levy N.C.Os for patrolling is in hand also motor transport.

3. A.O.C. expresses view that flight is more isolated act of bravado than first of probable series of raids but I impressed on him effect on American and local population if adequate defence measures were not taken. Two planes are being sent here on demonstration flight on Id day and one will stay and report on black-out arrangements.

RESIDENT.

(Above telegram received under P.R's P.L. No.C/422 dated 2nd November 1940).

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [31v] (62/92)



Telegram Inter.

From His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.259.

Repeated Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo. No.26.
Political Resident, Bushire. No.31.

Dated the 2nd November 1940.

(Relayed under Bushire telegram No.765
dated and received the 4th November 1940.)

My telegram No.250.

Amir Faisal told me yesterday that he had received official reply to Saudi Arabian Government's protest. Italian Government had apologised for incident asserted that neither Government nor Squadron Leader had had any intention of bombing Saudi Arabian territories and had given solemn assurance that incident would not be repeated.

2. Faisal asked my opinion about publication of this reply. I thought there could be no objection on the contrary publication of statement that pilots had mistaken their target would show up Italians even more clearly as consummate liars and incredibly incompetent navigators.


3. Faisal informed me that he had told Italian Minister that even if raid had resulted in doing any harm to Great Britain it would have been as nothing compared with serious damage Italy had succeeded in doing to her own prestige in Moslem world.

- Prodomo.

W.L.

Copy given to Political Agent,
Bahrain. ✓

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [32v] (64/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [33r] (65/92)

Confidential.

No.C/591-8/8.

28/1-P.
I.R. 1389
31.10.40

L 20/11 32 (23)

British Agency,
Sharjah,
28th October 1940.

To,


The Political Agent,
Bahrain.

Memorandum

In connection with the recent Italian's Air raid on Bahrain, the Shaikh of Sharjah wrote the enclosed letter to His Highness the Shaikh of Bahrain condemning the action of the Italians. He requested me to send this letter with my mails to Bahrain. If you see no objection, I should be grateful if the letter is passed on to His Highness the Shaikh.

Alford

Residency Agent, Sharjah.




'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [34r] (67/92)


Translation of a letter dated 22nd Ramadhan 1359
(24.10.40) from the Ruler of Sharjah to the
Ruler of Bahrain. -----

After compliments,


Your Highness, I beg to state that the
ether has carried to us the news that the
Italians, the spreaders of injustice and tyranny,
have dropped bombs on your (providentially)
protected town. This has grieved us very much but
we thank God that it caused no damage and did no
harm; this is by the grace of God who turned
their bad intentions on their own heads, and they
have met ^{with} failure and evil results. Those whom
God protects are immune. I pray to the Almighty
to protect you, your people and your state from
the evil intentions of invaders and to prolong
Your Highness' life, He is the Almighty who can
answer prayers. Please convey my best compliments
and regards to your brothers and sons. U.E.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [34v] (68/92)





'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [35v] (70/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [36r] (71/92)

TELEGRAMS) 5 BLACKNESS.
TELEPHONE)

36

THE BINNS,
LINLITHGOW.

October 27th 1940

My dear Political Agent,

I must apologize for addressing you thus,
but I do not know who is holding the appointment now.


I should be most grateful if you would kindly have the
enclosed letters translated and sent with the translation
to His Highness and to the Shaikhah Ayesah.

I hope that the Italians did no material damage and
that no one was hurt.

If you see Shaikh 'Abdu'lāh of Qatar and the Trucial
Shaikhs, I hope that you will give them my warm remembrances.

Yours sincerely,
H. Dalrymple Binns

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [36v] (72/92)



Cable Address:
"BAPCO"

28/1-P
I. R. 1544
27.11.40

36 (37)

THE BAHREIN PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED

Awali,

BAHREIN ISLAND, PERSIAN GULF.

25th November, 1940.

Major A.C. Alban, I.A.,
His Britannic Majesty's Political Agent,
The Agency,
Manama.

Dear Major Alban,


Mr. P. Knabenshue, the American Minister in Baghdad, has asked me for a report on the attempted bombing of Bahrein Refinery, in order that he may forward this to the Department of State.

He suggested, and I agree with him, that the best method of transmitting this data would be to ask you to forward it to the British Embassy in Baghdad for delivery to him. Will you please let me know if you are agreeable to handling this for us, in which case I will ask Dr. Kennedy to take the package to Manama for censorship and hand to you to transmit through official channels.


Yours sincerely,

M. N. Lior

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [37v] (74/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [38r] (75/92)



No. C/920-28/1.P

Dated the 27th November 1940.

Dear Chancery,

We forward herewith a package containing a report on the attempted bombing of Bahrain Refinery received from the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited for favour of handing to His Excellency the American Minister in Baghdad. We would be grateful if this could kindly be done.

Yours ever,


Agency.

British Embassy,
Baghdad.




de


'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [38v] (76/92)




'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [39r] (77/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [39v] (78/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [40r] (79/92)



Secret. *28/1.* *Sea*
By Air Mail.
P.Z. *5982/19 40*
5716
I.R.6
4.1.41
INDIA OFFICE,
LONDON,
WE 9 NOV 1940
4.11.1. *39* *(40)*


Forwarded with the compliments of the Secretary,
Political Department, India Office.

A copy has been sent to India 9
Bahrain
by *Air* Mail. *9/11/40*
Sea

The Foreign Secretary, Government of India.
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
The Political Agent Bahrain

(11807) Wt.27890/P.237 2,000 9/39 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.655

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [40v] (80/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [41r] (81/92)

P.Z.5982/40

AIR MINISTRY
KING CHARLES STREET,
S.W.1.

SECRET

29th October, 1940.

D.O.G./D.O.

Dear Peel,

With reference to your P.Z.5716/40 of the 24th October, 1940. The development by the Italians of the Cant Z.1007B long range aircraft has now made possible a light intermittent scale of air attack on Bahrein.

The recent attack, which entailed a flight of 2,500 miles, requires an effort by the Italians altogether out of proportion to the results obtained and may have been undertaken partly for propaganda purposes and partly as an endeavour to draw off our A.A. defences from elsewhere.

These aircraft carrying a heavier load of bombs could have been much more effectively employed on nearer objectives. It is therefore unlikely that these flights will be repeated frequently.

It is of course, desirable to establish A.A. defences at Bahrein to counter these attacks, but whilst we are still so short of Fighters, A.A. guns and searchlights for the defence of other important targets with a higher scale of attack, we can do little more at the present time than make the best use of the H.A. gun which has been installed by the Navy, and the machine guns already there to meet low flying attack. All possible passive defence measures should, of course, be undertaken including the institution of a warning system. We are asking the A.C.C.Iraq to inform us what local defence measures are being put in hand.


I am sending a copy of this letter to Spraggett, Admiralty, Mallaby, War Office, and Baxter, Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) W.A.Coryton.

R. Peel, Esq.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [41v] (82/92)



CONFIDENTIAL
No. 28/1 P - 41v

AIR MINISTRY
KING CHARLES STREET,
S.W.1.
29th October, 1940.

P. R. 2822/40
SECRET
D.O.O. D.O.

Dear Peel,

With reference to your P. R. 2818/40 of the 24th October, 1940. The development by the Italians of the Cant Z.1007B long range aircraft has now made possible a light interdictory scale of air attack on Bahrain.

The recent attack, which entailed a flight of 2,800 miles, requires an effort by the Italians altogether out of proportion to the results obtained and may have been undertaken partly for propaganda purposes and partly as an endeavour to draw off our A.A. defences from elsewhere.

These aircraft carrying a heavier load of bombs could have been more effectively employed on nearer objectives. It is therefore unlikely that these flights will be repeated frequently.

It is of course, desirable to establish A.A. defences at Bahrain to counter these attacks, but whilst we are still so short of fighters, A.A. guns and searchlights for the defence of other important targets with a higher scale of attack, we can do little more at the present time than make the best use of the H.A. gun which has been installed by the Navy, and the machine guns already there to meet low flying attack. All possible passive defence measures should, of course, be undertaken including the installation of a warning system. We are asking the A.C.I. to inform us what local defence measures are being put in hand.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Foregett, Admiralty, Malaya, War Office, and Baster, Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) W.A. Coryton.

R. Peel, D.O.

P.Z.5716/40

INDIA OFFICE,
S.W.1.
24th October, 1940.

41 (42)

Secret

Dear Coryton,

In view of the bombing of the Bahrein refinery on the 19th October (see the enclosed copy of the Political Resident's telegram No.732) we should be glad to learn whether the Air Ministry think the time has come to reconsider the views they held in 1938 as to the comparative immunity of Bahrein from air attack. You will recollect attending an informal discussion in this Office on Persian Gulf defence matters on the 14th April, 1938, (your letter of the 3rd May, 1938, No.S.40564, refers), when the view of the Air Ministry representatives was that the danger of air attack on Bahrein, except from bases in Persia, was negligible. This view was followed in the report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee dated 25th July, 1938 (Paper C.O.S.752 and C.I.D.1461-B) and underlay the preparation of the defence plans for Bahrein, which were designed only to meet the danger of tribal attack or sabotage.

What we should like to know is whether the Air Ministry consider that there is any serious danger of further attacks from the air on Bahrein, and if so what measures can be devised to deal with them. A later telegram from the Political Resident dated 21st October indicates that a high angle gun is being provided by the Naval Authorities (see copy of telegram enclosed).


I am sending a copy of this letter to Spraggett (Admiralty), Mallaby (War Office) and Baxter (Foreign Office).

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) R.Peel.

Air Commodore W.A.Coryton, M.V.O., D.F.C.,
Air Ministry.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [42v] (84/92)



'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [43r] (85/92)

1.R.12
7.1.41

28/1-P.

42
43

Telegram "S"


From Political Resident, Bushire.
To Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.
Repeated Political Agent, Bahrain.
Political Agent, Kuwait.
Government of India.
No. 26
Dated 7th January 1941.

SECRET

His Majesty's Government have information they regard as undeniably authentic that Italians are considering once more air attacks on Abadan and possibly also on most important oil fields.


Acting on instructions I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs and ~~local authorities~~ local authorities in Bahrain to take necessary steps to extend air raid precautions. Inform General Manager.

'File 28/1 P Visit of enemy aircraft to Bahrain' [43v] (86/92)



(44)

- 1 Issued tel. No. 383, 19.10.40 to R.A. Shaykh
- 2 Issued tel. No. 382, 19.10.40 to P.R.
- 3 Notice 19.10.40 issued by Bahrain Govt.
- 4 Tel. No. 10, 19.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah
- 5 Tel. No. 733, 20.10.40 from P.R.
- 6 Tel. No. 11, 20.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 7 Issued memo. No. 4806, 21.10.40 to A.L.O. Bham
- 8 Issued tel. No. 388, 21.10.40 to Minister, Jeddah
Rpl. G.Y.D., P.R. & Misc
- 9 Note, 20.10.40 by A.P.A.
- 12 Tel. No. 246, 20.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah
- 13 Tel. No. 247, 21.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 14 Tel. 21.10.40 to Mr. Drijer, from Jeddah.
- 16 Tel. No. 250, 23.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 17 Tel. No. 251, 23.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah
- 18 Tel. No. 4050, 21.10.40 from Govt. of India
- 19 Tel. No. 4477, 23.10.40 from P.A. Kuwait
- 20 Tel. No. 750, 24.10.40 from Secretary, Airshire
- 21 Tel. No. 7/481, 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 22 Tel. No. 7/482, 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 23 Tel. No. 7/483, 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 24 P.L. No. 4382, 24.10.40 from India office
- 25 Tel. No. 6521, 24.10.40 from India office
- 26 Note, 20.10.40 by A.P.A.
- 30 Tel. No. 7/516, 1.11.40 from P.R.
- 31 Tel. No. 259, 2.11.40 from Minister, Jeddah



(45)

32 Memo. No. 4591, D. 28.10.40 from
R.A. Sharjah.

A translation of the sketch
of Sharjah's letter to H.H. is attached.
May forward the letter, in original, to
H.H.?

KoR
3.11.40

Yes.

It will write to see.

h

3.11.40

See issue

3/11

Letter forwarded to H.H.

KoR
3/11/40

35 Letter D. 27.10.40 from G. Dalrymple
Brins.

36 Letter D. 25.11.40 from Mr. Liff Baper

37 Issued letter No. 4920 D. 27.11.40 to British
Embassy, Baghdad.

38 Issued letter No. 4921 D. 27.11.40 to Mr. Liff Baper

29 P.L. No. P.Z. 5982/40 D. 9.11.40.
5716

