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تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبيرها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

"زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين P ملف 28/1"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/R/15/2/669

١٩ أكتوبر ١٩٤٠-٠٧ يناير ١٩٤١ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد (٤٤ ورقة)

غير معروف

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل

يتكوّن الملف من نسخ لمراسلات وأوراق أخرى تتعلق بغارة جوية نفذتها قاذفات قتال إيطالية على مصفاة التكرير التابعة لشركة نفط البحرين (بابكو) في البحرين ومصفاة التكرير التابعة لشركة كاليفورنيا العربية للزيت القياسي (كاسوك) في الظهران في المملكة العربية السعودية، في ليلة ١٩ أكتوبر ١٩٤٠. تشمل الأطراف الرئيسية للمراسلات الواردة في الملف على الوكيل السياسي في البحرين (الرائد ريجينالد جورج إيفلين ويليام ألبان)؛ المقيم السياسي في الخليج العربي (المقدم تشارلز جيفري برايمور)؛ الوزير البريطاني في جدة (هيو ستونهيور-بيرد).

يتضمن الملف ما يلي:

- تقارير مبدئية عن الغارة (صص. ٢-٣)؛

• أمر من حكومة البحرين (ص. ٤، نسخة في ص. ٣٠) بتاريخ ١٩ أكتوبر ١٩٤٠، بالإعلان عن الغارة ونوايا الحكومة البريطانية اتخاذ كافة الإجراءات اللازمة للدفاع عن البحرين. كما يُطالب الأمر أيضاً سكان الجزيرة بالتحلي بالهدوء؛

• مسوِّدة رسالة كتبها الوكيل السياسي إلى المقيم السياسي، بتاريخ ٢٠ أكتوبر ١٩٤٠ (صص. ١٠-١٢، نسخة في صص. ٢٧-٢٩) تحتوي على تفاصيل: عدد الطائرات المشاركة في الغارة وارتفاعاتها؛ عدد القنابل التي تم إسقاطها؛ الأضرار الناتجة (أو عدم وجود أضرار)؛ الاحتياطات المتخذة للحيلولة دون التعرُّض لغارات أخرى: وضع مواقع رشاشات خفيفة، إجراءات تعتيم الإضاءة، إعداد ملاجئ للحماية من الغارات الجوية وزيادة الدوريات الأمنية في محيط مصفاة التكرير)؛

• مراسلات من الوزير البريطاني في جدة (صص. ١٣-١٤، صص. ١٥-١٦، ص. ٣٢)، تذكر إنكار الوزير الإيطالي للمملكة العربية السعودية بصورة مبدئية شن طائرات بلاده غارات على الظهران، ردّه على الإعلان الرسمي من الحكومة الإيطالية بالإغارة الجوية على البحرين، واعتذاره اللاحق للأمير فيصل. كما كتب الوزير البريطاني في جدة تقريراً عن الاعتذار الرسمي الذي قدّمته الحكومة الإيطالية للمملكة العربية السعودية، والاعتقاد بأن قاذفات القنابل الإيطالية قد التبس عليها الأمر وقصفت مصفاة التكرير في الظهران بدلاً من مصفاة تكرير بابكو في البحرين؛

• مراسلات بين وزارة الطيران ومسؤولي مكتب الهند في لندن (صص. ٤١-٤٢) تُناقش إمكانية وقوع مثل هذه الغارات في المستقبل، وإمكانية اتخاذ إجراءات حماية للحيلولة دون تنفيذ غارات جوية أخرى في البحرين.

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [أمامي] (٩٢/١)

File No. 28/1-P
19 .

Collection No.

IOR:R/15/2/669

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PROS. Nos.
Serial

SECRET (P)

VISIT OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT
TO BAHRAIN.

Previous References. Later References.


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
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MGIPC-S4-1742(S&P)MFP-(M-1204)-20.12.88-70,000.

28/1-8

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [أمامي-داخلي] (٩٢/٢)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٢] (٩٢/٣)



Telegram G.T.C.


From Political, Bahrain.
To Residency Agent, Sharjah.
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire
Political, Muscat (Please inform Defence HQ).
No. 383
Dated 19th October 1940

Important.

Enemy aircraft visited Bahrain this morning.
Please ask Station Superintendent to render landing
of aircraft at Sharjah impossible by placing movable
obstacles on the aerodrome. Also ensure that guards
are on the alert.

- Political -

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ ٢/٤] (٩٢/٤)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣] (٩٢/٥)

Telegram "S"

From Political, Bahrain.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 382
Dated 19th October 1940

IMPORTANT

Bahrain Refinery bombed approximately 3.45 a.m. this morning by two or possibly three enemy machines of unidentified type flying at approximately 3000 feet. No damage or casualties sustained. Some 50 bombs of small calibre were dropped and all fell well clear of the target.


2. Single plane also bombed C.A.S.O.C premises at Dharan causing slight damage to water and oil pipe line between Dharan and Al Khobar.

3. Senior Naval Officer has informed Aden and Royal Air Force, Air Headquarters, Iraq.


4. Full black-out imposed in Oil Field from tonight.

- Political -


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ3] (٩٢/٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٤] (٩٢/٧)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤ظ] (٩٢/٨)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٥] (٩٢/٩)




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
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
"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ٦] (٩٢/١٢)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٧] (٩٢/١٣)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ٧] (٩٢/١٤)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٨] (٩٢/١٥)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ ٨] (٩٢/١٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٩] (٩٢/١٧)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٩٦ظ] (٩٢/١٨)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٠] (٩٢/١٩)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٠ ظ] (٩٢/٢٠)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١١و] (٩٢/٢١)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١١ ظ] (٩٢/٢٢)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٢و] (٩٢/٢٣)



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- 3 -

concentrated on extinguishing all lights which might be of use to aircraft in identifying the Islands.

As a temporary measure Captain Howes has taken charge of the black-out arrangements for Manama and Muharraq and has Mr. Furber, the Assistant State Engineer, and Shaikh Khalifah to assist him.


5. Ships entering Bahrain have been warned to black-out and C.A.S.O.C. have been asked to assist by imposing as far as possible a black-out over their Camp and Oil Field area.

6. Captain Howes with Mr. de Grenier visited the Shaikh on the morning of the 19th October and informed him of what had happened. On their advice the Shaikh issued an 'Alan, a copy of which is attached.


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20th October 1940.


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
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
"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٣ ظ] (٩٢/٢٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤/١] (٩٢/٢٧)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤ اظ] (٩٢/٢٨)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٥] (٩٢/٢٩)



Telegram to Ohliger from Jedda.

October 21st 1940.


Acting on orders from King Prince Feisal arrived Jeddah night of 19th and yesterday summoned the British Minister and afterwards the Italian Minister to the Palace.

This morning Nejb gave me following version of meeting between Feisal and Italian Minister. When confronted with news of bombing of Dharan Italian Minister expressed complete ignorance and stated that it was undoubtedly act of British done with purpose of arousing Arab animosity against Italians. Feisal replied that Bahrain also had been bombed and that he could not conceive of British bombing their own oil fields and installations and that he was convinced that both Bahrain and Dharan were bombed by Italian planes. At that point message was handed to Feisal stating Rome Radio had officially announced Italian bombing of Bahrain. Italian Minister expressed deepest sorrow stating that bombing of Dharan was clearly done by mistake and added that because he knew policy of his Government he could give Feisal firmest assurances that such a mistake would never be made in future. Feisal answered that these personal assurances were insufficient and that official assurances of the Italian Government were required. This the Italian Minister ^{promised} to obtain and the meeting ended. Thereafter the Italian Minister coded a lengthy wire to Rome which was handed to Feisal for despatching. The wire was sent last evening.

Nejb then added that Feisal is personally convinced that Dharan was bombed by mistake and that no such mistake would be made in future. Because of this conviction Feisal feels according to Nejb that the Company acted too hurriedly in suspending ~~its~~ work. Also according to Nejb Feisal plans to call me to Palace after receiving official assurances of Italian Government and to inform me that since these

assurances /-

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٥ ظ] (٩٢/٣٠)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٦] (٩٢/٣١)

15-16

- 2 -

assurances are acceptable to the Saudi Arabian Government they should also be acceptable to Company and consequently the Company should resume its work. From other sources I was given identical report of Feisal's convictions and plans.

Also this morning British Minister called with Legation's telegram of Bahrain and Dharan bombings which he read. Thereafter he explained that during his meeting with Feisal he had expressed opinion that Italians had at first mistaken Dharan for Bahrain and had dropped their bombs before realising the mistake. He added however that he was personally of the opinion that no mistake had been made and that he had given the above explanation to Feisal because he felt that the Saudi Arabian Government preferred to believe that Dharan bombing was a mistake and because he felt it was better at this time that they did believe it was a mistake. However he later expressed the conviction that the bombing was done as a propaganda measure which is rather inconsistent with the expression of the belief that Dharan bombing was intentional. This might be explained by desire that we regard the bombing as intentional.


- Lenahan -

Copy given to P.R.


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27.10.20.


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
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
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
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
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
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
"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٩] [٩٢/٣٨]




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٠] [٩٢/٣٩]




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٠ ظ ٩٢/٤٠]




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢١ و] (٩٢/٤١)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢١ ظ] (٩٢/٤٢)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٢ و] (٩٢/٤٣)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٢ ظ] (٩٢/٤٤)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٢٣] (٩٢/٤٥)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٣ ظ] (٩٢/٤٦)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٤ و] (٩٢/٤٧)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٤ ظ] (٩٢/٤٨)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٥] [٩٢/٤٩]

(25)
24

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C/382 of 1940.

1. 10/43
1.8.1352
26.10.40

Telegram

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to
Government of India, New Delhi

1. The Secretary to the Government of India,
External Affairs Department,
New Delhi.
2. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,
London,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s)

Your telegram No. 4660 dated October 21st 1940.
Bahrain points referred to in your last
sentence were adequately covered in Press reports published
British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 24th October 1940.

Camp, Bahrain.


Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date	Subject.
Telegram to Ohliger from Lenahan, Jedda, dated October 21st 1940.	Bombing of Dhahran.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Bahrain, for information. ✓


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٥ ظ] (٩٢/٥٠)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٦ و] (٩٢/٥١)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٦ ظ] (٩٢/٥٢)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٧ و] (٩٢/٥٣)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٧ ظ] (٩٢/٥٤)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٨ و] (٩٢/٥٥)

- 2 -

2. The following precautions have been taken for the future by the Defence Officer:

(1) Four light machine gun posts have been placed at selected sites close to the Refinery.

(2) Listening posts have been established at Awali, Refinery and Sitra.

(3) A total black-out has been enforced at the Refinery Oil Field, Awali and the Cooly Camp.

(4) Car lamps have been dimmed.

(5) A guard consisting of a detachment of the Defence Force armed with a light machine gun has been sent to Muharraq to look after the landing ground.


(6) Patrols round the Refinery perimeter have been increased.

(7) Trenches to act as air raid shelters were being constructed at selected parts in the Refinery, Awali Camp and Cooly Camp areas for the protection of personnel working or living there.


3. As the Company have sufficient oil in storage tanks to meet immediate orders the Refinery has been closed for a few days in order to enable a system of lighting to be evolved which will not be visible from the air but which will be sufficient for operational purposes. The Refinery would in any case have been closed on the 26th October as by then storage tanks would have been full to capacity. The position has been further aggravated by the news that the tanker "Ketty Brovig" which was due here on the 31st October was damaged after a collision at Singapore.

4. Every effort has been made to introduce a black-out in Manama and Muharraq and it was surprisingly successful and was apparently not objected to. To impose a complete black-out in Bahrain is almost impossible particularly during the month of Ramadhan and efforts have been concentrated /-


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٨ ظ] (٩٢/٥٦)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٩ و] (٩٢/٥٧)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٩ ظ] (٩٢/٥٨)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٠] (٩٢/٥٩)

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30
Translation of notice No. 25/1359 dated 17th Ramadhan 1359
(19th October 1940) issued by the Government of Bahrain.


GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN.

NOTICE.

We announce to all our subjects that on the night of Saturday the 17th of Ramadhan 1359 some enemy planes flew over our state and attempted to raid the oil refinery but despite the fact that they met with no opposition they did not come down below a height of 2000 Dir'as (arms' lengths). They dropped about 40 bombs all of which fell more than half a mile away from the enclosure. They did not cause any damage and, by the grace of God, did not injure anybody.

2. The High British Government are taking all the necessary measures for our defence and it is the duty of everyone of our subjects to remain calm and to obey immediately all orders issued or notified. We depend on God who protects the believers.

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ ٣٠] (٩٢/٦٠)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣١ و] (٩٢/٦١)

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31

Telegram S
From Political Resident, at Bahrain.
To Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi.
Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.
Copy to Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.
Political Agent, Bahrain.
No. T/516
Dated 1st November 1940.

My telegram No.T/488 of 26th October.

Air Officer Commanding arrived 31st October inspected arrangements and discussed Defence problems with Senior Naval Officer Political Agent and myself. He returned Basra in the afternoon but hopes pay further visit in a weeks time.


2. He will endeavour supply gun crews and has undertaken to provide search lights. He has no listening apparatus available but will arrange system of sibhals to give warning of raids coming via Iraq. Question of Levy N.C.Os for patrolling is in hand also motor transport.

3. A.O.C. expresses view that flight is more isolated act of bravado than first of probable series of raids but I impressed on him effect on American and local population if adequate defence measures were not taken. Two planes are being sent here on demonstration flight on Id day and one will stay and report on black-out arrangements.

RESIDENT.

(Above telegram received under P.R's P.L. No.C/422 dated 2nd November 1940).

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣١ ظ] (٩٢/٦٢)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٢] (٩٢/٦٣)

I.R. 790
57/1/40
31

Telegram Inter.
From His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah.
To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.259.
Repeated Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo. No.26.
Political Resident, Bushire. No.31.
Dated the 2nd November 1940.

(Relayed under Bushire telegram No.765
dated and received the 4th November 1940.)

My telegram No.250.

Amir Faisal told me yesterday that he had received official reply to Saudi Arabian Government's protest. Italian Government had apologised for incident asserted that neither Government nor Squadron Leader had had any intention of bombing Saudi Arabian territories and had given solemn assurance that incident would not be repeated.

2. Faisal asked my opinion about publication of this reply. I thought there could be no objection on the contrary publication of statement that pilots had mistaken their target would show up Italians even more clearly as consummate liars and incredibly incompetent navigators.


3. Faisal informed me that he had told Italian Minister that even if raid had resulted in doing any harm to Great Britain it would have been as nothing compared with serious damage Italy had succeeded in doing to her own prestige in Moslem world.

- Prodomo.


W.L.

Copy given to Political Agent,
Bahrain. ✓

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٢ ظ] (٩٢/٦٤)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٣٣] (٩٢/٦٥)



Confidential.

No.C/591-8/8.

British Agency,
Sharjah,
28th October 1940.

To,


The Political Agent,
Bahrain.

Memorandum


In connection with the recent Italian's Air raid on Bahrain, the Shaikh of Sharjah wrote the enclosed letter to His Highness the Shaikh of Bahrain condemning the action of the Italians. He requested me to send this letter with my mails to Bahrain. If you see no objection, I should be grateful if the letter is passed on to His Highness the Shaikh.

[Signature]
Residency Agent, Sharjah.


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٣ظ] (٩٢/٦٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٤ و] (٩٢/٦٧)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٤ظ] (٩٢/٦٨)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٥] [٩٢/٦٩]




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٥ ظ] (٩٢/٧٠)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٦ و] (٩٢/٧١)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٦ ظ] (٩٢/٧٢)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٧و] (٩٢/٧٣)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٧ظ] (٩٢/٧٤)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٣٨] (٩٢/٧٥)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [ظ ٣٨] (٩٢/٧٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٩ و] (٩٢/٧٧)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٩ظ] (٩٢/٧٨)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤٠] [٩٢/٧٩]



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤٠ ظ] (٩٢/٨٠)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤١ و] (٩٢/٨١)

P.Z.5982/40

AIR MINISTRY
KING CHARLES STREET,
S.W.1.

SECRET

29th October, 1940.

D.O.C./D.O.

Dear Peel,

With reference to your P.Z.5716/40 of the 24th October, 1940. The development by the Italians of the Cant Z.1007B long range aircraft has now made possible a light intermittent scale of air attack on Bahrein.

The recent attack, which entailed a flight of 2,500 miles, requires an effort by the Italians altogether out of proportion to the results obtained and may have been undertaken partly for propaganda purposes and partly as an endeavour to draw off our A.A. defences from elsewhere.

These aircraft carrying a heavier load of bombs could have been much more effectively employed on nearer objectives. It is therefore unlikely that these flights will be repeated frequently.

It is of course, desirable to establish A.A. defences at Bahrein to counter these attacks, but whilst we are still so short of Fighters, A.A. guns and searchlights for the defence of other important targets with a higher scale of attack, we can do little more at the present time than make the best use of the H.A. gun which has been installed by the Navy, and the machine guns already there to meet low flying attack. All possible passive defence measures should, of course, be undertaken including the institution of a warning system. We are asking the A.O.C.Iraq to inform us what local defence measures are being put in hand.


I am sending a copy of this letter to Spraggett, Admiralty, Mallaby, War Office, and Baxter, Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) W.A.Coryton.

R. Peel, Esq.

"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [١٤ ظ ٩٢/٨٢]



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٤ و] (٩٢/٨٣)

P.Z.5716/40

INDIA OFFICE,
S.W.1.
24th October, 1940.

Secret

Dear Coryton,

In view of the bombing of the Bahrein refinery on the 19th October (see the enclosed copy of the Political Resident's telegram No.732) we should be glad to learn whether the Air Ministry think the time has come to reconsider the views they held in 1938 as to the comparative immunity of Bahrein from air attack. You will recollect attending an informal discussion in this Office on Persian Gulf defence matters on the 14th April, 1938, (your letter of the 3rd May, 1938, No.S.40564, refers), when the view of the Air Ministry representatives was that the danger of air attack on Bahrein, except from bases in Persia, was negligible. This view was followed in the report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee dated 25th July, 1938 (Paper C.O.S.752 and C.I.D.1461-B) and underlay the preparation of the defence plans for Bahrein, which were designed only to meet the danger of tribal attack or sabotage.

What we should like to know is whether the Air Ministry consider that there is any serious danger of further attacks from the air on Bahrein, and if so what measures can be devised to deal with them. A later telegram from the Political Resident dated 21st October indicates that a high angle gun is being provided by the Naval Authorities (see copy of telegram enclosed).


I am sending a copy of this letter to Spraggett (Admiralty), Mallaby (War Office) and Baxter (Foreign Office).

Yours sincerely,


(Sgd.) R.Peel.

Air Commodore W.A.Coryton, M.V.O.,D.F.C.,
Air Ministry.


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٢٤/٨٤] (٩٢/٨٤)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤٣و] (٩٢/٨٥)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٣٤ ظ] (٩٢/٨٦)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤٤ و] (٩٢/٨٧)




- 1 Issued tel. No. 383, dt. 19.10.40 to R.A. Shagik
- 2 Issued tel. No. 382, dt. 19.10.40 to P.R
- 3 Notice dt. 19.10.40 issued by Bahrain Govt.
- 4 Tel. No. 10, dt. 19.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah
- 5 Tel. No. 733, dt. 20.10.40 from P.R
- 6 Tel. No. 11, dt. 20.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 7 Issued memo. No. 9806, dt. 21.10.40 to A.L.O. Bhu
- 8 Issued tel. No. 388 dt. 21.10.40 to Minister, Jeddah
Rpl. G.Y.D., P.R. & Mice
- 9 Note, dt. 20.10.40 by A.P.A.
- 12 Tel. No. 246, dt. 20.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah
- 13 Tel. No. 247, dt. 21.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 14 Tel. dt. 21.10.40 to Mr. Dhlaja, from Jeddah.
- 16 Tel. No. 250, dt. 23.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 17 Tel. No. 251, dt. 23.10.40 from Minister, Jeddah.
- 18 Tel. No. 4050, dt. 21.10.40 from Govt. of India
- 19 Tel. No. 4477, dt. 23.10.40 from P.A. Kuwait
- 20 Tel. No. 750, dt. 24.10.40 from Secretary, Bushire.
- 21 Tel. No. T/481, dt. 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 22 Tel. No. T/482, dt. 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 23 Tel. No. T/483, dt. 24.10.40 from P.R.
- 24 P.L. No. 4382, dt. 24.10.40 from India office
- 25 Tel. No. 6521, dt. 24.10.40 from India office
- 26 Note, dt. 20.10.40 by A.P.A
- 30 Tel. No. T/516, dt. 1.11.40 from P.R.
- 31 Tel. No. 259, dt. 2.11.40 from Minister, Jeddah


"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٤٤ ظ] (٩٢/٨٨)




"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [و٤٥] (٩٢/٨٩)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [٥٤ ظ] (٩٢/٩٠)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [خلفي-داخلي] (٩٢/٩١)



"ملف P 28/1 زيارة طائرات معادية للبحرين" [خلفي] (٩٢/٩٢)

