



## مكتبة قطر الوطنية Qatar National Library

من المصادر الإلكترونية في مكتبة قطر الرقمية ٢٠٢١/١٢/١١ تم إنشاء هذا الملف بصيغة PDF بتاريخ  
النسخة الإلكترونية من هذا السجل متاحة للاطلاع على الإنترنت عبر الرابط التالي:

[http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc\\_100000000239.0x0001e5](http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000239.0x0001e5)

تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبيرها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

### "الحرب الروسية-التركية. ١٨٧٧"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/MIL/17/16/20

١٨٧٧ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد، (مادتان، ٥٧ ورقة)

الملكية العامة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



### حول هذا السجل

يوجد تقريران سريان وخريطتان يصفون العمليات العسكرية التي تحدث في أوروبا (بلغاريا ورومانيا)  
وآسيا (تركيا) خلال الحرب الروسية-التركية للفترة ١٨٧٧-١٨٧٨.

"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [١] [٦٦/١]

CONFIDENTIAL.

IOR:L/MIL/17/16/2011

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.  
1877.

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Narrative .. .. .	1	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. ..	10
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army ..	2	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. .. ..	11
III. Russian Army Details .. .. .	4	VII. The Turkish Army .. .. .	11
IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. .. .. .	9	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, &c. ..	12
		IX. Miscellaneous .. .. .	12

PRELIMINARY.

As a preliminary to this paper, it may be well to glance briefly at the state of affairs on the south-west frontier of Russia at the beginning of the year, and at the situation generally.

There was an armistice, to terminate with the month of February, between Turkey and Servia, and a conference of the Great Powers was sitting at Constantinople in the hope of preventing a recurrence of hostilities, and averting an impending war between Russia and Turkey.

A portion of the Russian Army had been mobilized at the end of the preceding year. Of this some details are given under the heading of Mobilization, and others under the heading Russian Army Details.

The subject matter in this preliminary paper is grouped under the following headings:—

- I. Narrative.
- II. Mobilization of the Russian Army.
- III. Russian Army Details.
- IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c.
- V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c.
- VI. Roumania, Servia, &c.
- VII. The Turkish Army.
- VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, Guns, &c.
- IX. Miscellaneous.

In the account for 1877, the above headings will be as far as possible adhered to, with such additional ones as may be required.

I.

NARRATIVE.

The probable course of Russia in the event of her occupying the Principalities in the spring, entering Bulgaria and marching on Constantinople, having been carefully investigated in papers prepared in this office, it may not be out of place to condense here briefly the form assumed by the various

[0654]

210-1wo



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [ظ] (٦٦/٢)

2

reports on the same subject, which reached this country at the close of last year, when the anticipated time of action was approaching.

The belief in Turkey was that the Russian advance would be by Roumania and Servia, and also on the Asiatic side.

Her plan of operations was said to be to force the Danube in as many places as possible. A strong corps would then take up a concentrated position near Bolgrad.

The corps crossing the Pruth would concentrate towards Fockhani and Galatz, the Commander-in-Chief's head-quarters being established at the former place.

One advance would be by the Dobrudscha. The natural starting point of this line of advance is the position Braila—Galatz. Little resistance was to be anticipated from the weak Turkish fort at Matschin; and the Danube once passed there or at Hirsova, the Delta is turned.

Russian movements at the end of the year pointed to the passage of the Pruth at three points, by rail at Sculiani and by two roads from Kischenev.

It is imperative on the Russians to send a force into the Dobrudscha, as if the Turks held that part of it which makes the right bank of the Danube between Braila and Galatz, they could seriously endanger the Russian communications; as the railway between those two points skirts the left bank of the river.

The Russian force for the Dobrudscha would probably consist largely of cavalry, and would seek, as soon as possible, to occupy Rasgrad, on the railway line between Rustchuk and Varna.

It was reported from Kischenev in December that the bulk of the cavalry was moving towards Orgeiev, north of Kischenev.

Generally, the situation at the close of the year included the following items:—

250,000 men, it was expected, would be on the Pruth by the second half of December. 84 field hospitals were being formed, providing accommodation for 52,000 men. The chief hospitals were at Odessa and Kremenchug.

Roumania was full of Russian officers studying the roads and the capacities of the country as regards provisions and accommodation for troops.

It was estimated that the active army of the Danube would have 448 guns. The possibility of the main Russian force being thrown into Turkey *vid* Servia was being discussed.

General Rostislav Fadéeff calculates, "in order to settle the fate of European Turkey, in spite of the maritime powers, it will be sufficient for 150,000 troops to reach the Bosphorus—i.e., 250,000 men, on the broadest calculation, should reach the Danube."

When the mobilization was announced of the military circles of Kharkov, Kiev, Wilna, Odessa, and the Caucasus, it was calculated that the measures adopted would give at the utmost 250,000 men for warfare against Turkey.

Probable allies of Russia were estimated as follows:—Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Albania, 30,000; Bosnia, 4,000; Servia, 80,000 to 90,000; Roumania, 52,000.

The Commander-in-Chief of the active army, the Grand Duke Nicholas, was seriously ill.

II.

MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

The reserve at present consists of those soldiers who have served under the ancient law of recruiting, and who are on temporary or permanent furlough. The reservists are called to active service when it becomes necessary to complete the effective of the army; this calling-out can only take place by an imperial ukase to the governing Senate.





"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢] [٦٦/٣]

3

Exempt from calling out are those who are employed in the service of the State, or in towns and public offices, as per authorised list, besides those who are ill and those under trial.

The callings-out are (a) *general* when all, or a considerable number of reservists are wanted, and (b) *partial* when only part are required.

Mobilization of 1876.

An Imperial Order of the 13th November, published in the "Invalid Russe" of the 14th, prescribed the formation of six Corps d'Armée, numbered 7 to 12, composed of troops stationed in the military circles of Odessa, Kieff, and Kharkoff.

A second order of the same date promulgated by the Minister of War decreed further the immediate formation of the staff, placed the Military Circle of Odessa under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and the 7th and 10th Corps under those of the commandant *ad interim* of the troops of the Military circle of Odessa.

Neither the battalions of rifles, sappers, nor the pontoniers or telegraphists have been classed with the field army, as the organization of the Russian Corps d'Armée is not theoretically known. The three military circles of Odessa, Kieff and Kharkoff, whose troops compose the six Corps d'Armée mobilized, have, under ordinary circumstances, the 3rd and 4th Brigades of Rifles and the 3rd Brigade of Sappers, stationed (in September) at Miejbouje (Kieff circle), Odessa and Kieff.

The mobilization of the Russian army has been gradual. Confined at first to a mobilization in the Kharkoff, Kieff, and Odessa circles, with a partial mobilization in those of Moscow, Vilna, and the Caucasus, it has been since extended to all the military circles of European Russia except Finland.

Of the Army-Corps above mentioned, the 8th, 9th, 11th and 12th were to form the field army, or "Army of the Danube," and the 7th and 10th to form the "Coast Army."

Orders were at the same time sent to the Civil Governors of the Districts concerned from the Minister of the Interior, notifying that the troops have been ordered to be mobilized in the Kharkoff, Kieff, and Odessa Circles; and partially so in the Moscow, Vilna, and Caucasus Circles.

As all the preparatory measures for this mobilization had been taken some time before, all the reservist and furlough men having had previous notice to hold themselves in readiness and not to leave their present abodes, the mobilization was expected to go on rapidly.

On receipt of the Imperial decree at the various circles, orders for calling out the reservists were at once issued, and according to official statements in the "Russki Invalid" with the following results:—

The Imperial order was communicated to the 52 governments and districts on the 13th November, the following day being named for the mobilization to commence.

On the 13th November all the preparatory arrangements for calling in the reserves and for the collection of horses\* were completed.

By 2 a.m. on the 14th, the reserves at Nijni Novgorod were already assembled and handed over to the military authorities. On the same day the assembly of the reserves was completed in seven towns.

On the second day of the calling out, the assembly of reserves was finished in one government; on the third day in five governments; on the fourth in 12; on the fifth in seven governments; between the sixth and tenth days in 17; on the eleventh day in two; on the thirteenth day in three; and on the seventeenth day in two governments.

\* The Government has the power to take the horses of the country for the army in time of war against an indemnity from the Crown.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢٢] (٦٦/٤)

4

The reservists, according to the same official statement, came quickly and cheerfully; the people also gave up their horses with willingness. The movements of the reservists were much retarded by the unfavourable weather and bad state of the roads.

By an order of the 6th December the new Militia or Landsturm Law is to be put in force in the three southern districts, and the militia is to be called out to reinforce the troops destined for the coast defence of the Black Sea.

The Militia is composed of men between 20 and 40 years of age inclusive. The men of the Militia (ratniks) are divided into two bans. The first is intended to fill vacancies when the number of reservists is insufficient, and can also be called out to form field corps of Militia. The second ban is destined to form corps of Militia.

When the first ban is destined to fill up field troops, they must be called out by Imperial Ukase to Senate.

Besides the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th Mobile Artillery Parks, the 7th and 8th Horse Artillery Parks, and the 3rd and 4th Telegraph Parks, are to be formed.

III.

RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

The following details have reference to the six Army Corps, numbered 7 to 12 inclusive, formed from the military circles of Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov. Of these the 7th and 10th Corps constituted the Coast Army, and the remaining four the Field Army.

FIELD ARMY.

Commander-in-Chief .. .. .	The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch (age 45).
Chief of the Staff .. .. .	Lieutenant-General Nepokoitschitzky (1832).*
Aide to ditto .. .. .	Major-General Levitzky (1853).
Chancellor of the Head-quarters' Staff	Councillor of State Stéfan.
Commander of Artillery .. .. .	Lieutenant-General Prince Massalsky (age 42).
Aide to ditto .. .. .	Major-General Adamovich (1851).
Commandant of Artillery Parks .. .. .	Major-General Kanatic.
Commandant of Engineers .. .. .	Major-General Depp (1854); Assistant, Colonel Engel.
Ataman of Field Cossacks .. .. .	Lieutenant-General Fomine (1836).
Commandant at Head-quarters .. .. .	Major-General Vociéoff (1851).
Chief of Military Communications .. .. .	Lieutenant-General Katalai (1838).
Etappen Section .. .. .	Major-General Stolzenwald.
Posts and Telegraphs .. .. .	Major-General Stohl.
Military Topography .. .. .	Colonel Obtomievsy.
Chancery .. .. .	Major-General Zaitsoff.
Inspector of Hospitals .. .. .	Major-General Kossinsky (1849).
Aide to ditto .. .. .	Colonel Widischaff.
Intendant of the Army .. .. .	Councillor of State Arens.
Aide to ditto .. .. .	Councillor of State Léokovitsch.
Advocate-General .. .. .	Councillor Aschamuroff.
Post .. .. .	M. Romanus.
Paymaster-General .. .. .	M. Kidoshenkoff.
Civil Administration, Chief of, in } enemy's country .. .. . }	Prince Tcherkasky.

8TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Kischinev).†

Commander .. .. .	Lieutenant-General Radetzky (1839).
Chief of the Staff .. .. .	Colonel Dmitrofsky (1852).
Commander of Artillery .. .. .	Major-General Evreinoff.

\* Where not otherwise specified the figures in brackets (*e.g.*, 1832) denote the year in which the individual became an officer.

† The names of localities in this and subsequent similar tables embody the last information available prior to the passage of the various Russian corps across the Armenian frontier.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٣] [٦٦/٥]

5

9th Infantry Division:—  
(Head-Quarters, Tiraspol).  
Lieut.-Gen. Prince Mirsky II. (1883)  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Ellers ..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 33rd and 34th Regiments.  
2nd " " 35th " 36th "  
9th " " 48 Guns, Major-General Anosoff, at Ploskoya.  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
Cossack Regiment.\*

14th Infantry Division:—  
(Head-Quarters, Kischinev).  
Major-General Dragomiroff (1849) ..  
Chief of the Staff, Col. Takonboffski..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 53rd and 54th Regiments.  
2nd " " 55th and 56th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
14th Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Colonel Zinovieff, at Kischinev.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

8th Cavalry Division:—  
(at Bieltsi).  
Lieutenant-General Prince Manveloff  
(1843) .. ..  
Chief of the Staff, Col. Baron Kaulbars

{ 1st Cavalry Brigade, 8th Dragoons, 8th Lancers.  
2nd " " 8th Hussars, 8th Don Cossacks.  
15th Regular and 1st Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, 12 guns, at Korneshiti.  
14th Flying Artillery Park, and 14th Mobile Park; attached to 9th Infantry Division, at Dreslitsheim.

15th Flying Artillery Park and 15th Mobile Park, attached to 9th Infantry Division at Malveshti.  
Second half of 5th Horse Artillery Park, attached to 8th Cavalry Division, at Bieltsi.

Total.—26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

9TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Balta).

Commander .. .. . Lieut.-General Baron Kridener (1828).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Major-General Schuitnikoff (1846).  
Commander of Artillery .. .. . Major-General Kalatcheff.

5th Infantry Division:—  
(Head-Quarters, Vinitza).  
Lieut.-General Schildner-Schouldner  
(1837) .. .. .  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Popoff ..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 17th and 18th Regiments.  
2nd " " 19th and 20th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
5th Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Major-General Pochitokoff, at Rachni-Lessovaia.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

31st Infantry Division:—  
(Head-Quarters, Balta).  
Lieut.-General Veliainoff I. (1841)..  
Chief of the Staff, Col. Muromzeff ..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 121st and 122nd Regiments.  
2nd " " 123rd and 124th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
31st Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Major-General Gilchen, at Gvozdalk.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

9th Cavalry Division:—  
(at Tiraspol).  
Major-General Loschkareff (1847) ..  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Koztenko..

{ 1st Cavalry Brigade, 9th Dragoons, 9th Lancers.  
2nd " " 9th Hussars, 9th Don Cossacks.  
16th Regular and 2nd Cossack Horse Artillery Batteries, 12 guns, Lieut.-Colonel Lozin, at Bokovo—Melanka.

15th Flying Artillery Park and 15th Mobile Park attached to 5th Infantry Division, at Tiraspol.  
16th Flying Artillery Park, and 16th Mobile Park, attached to 31st Infantry Division at Hohna.  
First half of Horse Artillery Park; attached to 9th Cavalry Division at Tiraspol.

Total.—26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

11TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Konshani).

Commander .. .. . Lieut.-General Prince Schahoffskoi I. (1842).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Colonel Biskupsky (1852).  
Assistants .. .. . Captain Prjeviotsky.  
Commander of Artillery .. .. . Major-General Philimonoff.

11th Infantry Division:—  
(Head-Quarters, Tarutinskaia).  
Lieut.-General Khrapovitzky (1837)..  
Chief of the Staff, Col. Tugenhold ..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 41st and 42nd Regiments.  
2nd " " 43rd and 44th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
11th Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Colonel Preis, at Novo-Kushani  
Cossack Regiment.\*

\* It is not established with certainty that the Rifle Brigades have been broken up and the battalions attached to Divisions, although this arrangement was proposed. This item, therefore, may be incorrect. The same remark applies to the Cossack regiment shown as Divisional Cavalry.

C



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٣] (٦٦/٦)

6

32nd Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Kuporan).  
Major-General Aller (1843) .. ..  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Prinz .. ..

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 125th and 126th Regiments.  
2nd " 127th and 128th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
32nd Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Major-General  
Muchin, at Batsh Kalala.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

11th Cavalry Division :—  
(at Dubossori).  
Major-General Tatistcheff (1845) .. ..  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Bayoff .. ..

{ 1st Cavalry Brigade, 11th Dragoons, 11th Lancers.  
2nd " 11th Hussars, 11th Don Cossacks.  
18th Regular and 4th Cossacks, Horse Artillery Batterie,  
12 guns, at Dubossori and Grigoriopol.

11th Flying Artillery Park and 11th Mobile Park, attached to 11th Infantry Division at Borodinskaia.  
10th Flying Artillery Park and 10th Mobile Park, attached to 32nd Infantry Division at Talmazi.  
First half of 4th Horse Artillery Park attached to 11th Division of Cavalry, at Sveto—Troitski—  
Volhonsky.

Total : 26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

12TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Orgeef).

Commander .. .. . Lieutenant-General Vannofsky (1840).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Major-General Dukmasoff (1856).  
Commander of Artillery .. .. . " Neieloff.

12th Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Kalarash).  
Lieutenant-General Baron v. Firsk (1836) .. .. .  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Kiriloff .. .. .

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 45th and 46th Regiments.  
2nd " 47th and 48th "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
12th Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Major-General  
Kohnuroff, at Tuzorai.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

33rd Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Orgeef).  
Major-General Timofeieff (1847) .. .. .  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Troitsky .. .. .

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 129th and 130th Regiments.  
2nd " 131st and 132nd "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
33rd Field Artillery Brigade, 48 guns, Colonel Viskovatof,  
at Lendjerky.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

12th Cavalry Division :—  
(At Soroki).  
Major-General Baron Driezen (1843) .. .. .  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Strick .. .. .

{ 1st Cavalry Brigade, 12th Dragoons, 12th Lancers  
2nd " 12th Hussars, 12th Don Cossacks.  
19th Regular and 5th Cossack, Horse Artillery Batteries,  
12 guns, at Dzigofka.

12th Flying Artillery Park and 12th Mobile Park, attached to 12th Infantry Division at Kalarash.  
17th Flying Artillery Park and 17th Mobile Park, attached to 33rd Infantry Division at  
Peresetsheim.

Second half of 4th Horse Artillery Park, attached to 12th Cavalry Division at Biolaia.

Total : 26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

COAST ARMY (Head-Quarters, Odessa).

Commander-in-Chief .. .. . Lieutenant-General Semeka (1834).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Major-General Krjivoblotzki.

7TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Odessa).

Commander .. .. . Lieut.-General Prince Barelay de Tolly-Weiman (1843).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Major-General Yanovsky (1850).  
Commander of Artillery .. .. . " Polonboyarinoff.


15th Infantry Division :—  
(At Odessa, Otchakov, and Nikolaef).  
Major-General Goremykin .. .. .  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Sarantscheff .. .. .

{ 1st Infantry Brigade, 57th and 58th Regiments.  
2nd " 59th and 60th "  
15th Field Artillery Brigade, Major-General Shestakoff, at  
Odessa.  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
Cossack Regiment.\*

\* It is not established with certainty that the Rifle Brigades have been broken up and the battalions attached to Divisions, although this arrangement was proposed. This item, therefore, may be incorrect. The same remark applies to the Cossack regiment shown as Divisional Cavalry.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٤و] (٦٦/٧)



36th Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Akerman).  
Lieutenant-General Verevkin (1838) { 1st Infantry Brigade, 141st and 142nd Regiments.  
2nd " 143rd and 144th " "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
36th Field Artillery Brigade, Major-General Jordan, at Akerman.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

7th Cavalry Division :—  
(At Odessa, and Gora Tchelgir).  
Lieutenant-General Manzei (1839) .. { 1st Cavalry Brigade—7th Dragoons, 7th Lancers.  
2nd " " 7th Hussars, 7th Don Cossacks.  
Chief of the Staff, Col. Baron Taube .. { 13th and 14th Regular H. A. batteries, at Mali-Buvlik and Gora-Tchelgir.

25th Mobile Artillery Park, attached to 15th Infantry Division, in course of formation at Kremenchuk, for Nicholaef.  
26th Mobile Artillery Park attached to 36th Infantry Division, in course of formation at Kremenchuk, for Akerman.  
First half of 7th Horse Artillery Park attached to 7th Cavalry Division, at Odessa.

Total.—26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

10TH ARMY-CORPS (Head-Quarters, Simferopol).

Commander .. .. . Adjutant-General Prince Woronzoff (1847).  
Chief of the Staff .. .. . Major-General Baron Vrefsky (1852).  
Commander of Artillery .. .. . Major-General Dobryschin.

13th Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Sebastopol).  
Lieutenant-General Richter (1848) .. { 1st Infantry Brigade—49th and 50th Regiments.  
2nd " " 51st " 52nd " "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Shavroff .. { 13th Field Artillery Brigade, Major-General Suhomlin, at Sebastopol.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

34th Infantry Division :—  
(Head-Quarters, Kherson).  
Major-General Baron Korf (1849) .. { 1st Infantry Brigade—133rd and 134th Regiments.  
2nd " " 135th " 136th " "  
Rifle Battalion.\*  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Karzanoff .. { 34th Field Artillery Brigade, Major General Lischin, at Kherson.  
Cossack Regiment.\*

10th Cavalry Division :—  
(At Eupatoria and Kalantschak).  
Major-General Dedioulin (1838) .. { 1st Cavalry Brigade—10th Dragoons, 10th Lancers.  
2nd " " 10th Hussars, 10th Don Cossacks.  
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Schultz .. { 17th Regular and 3rd Cossack H. A. batteries.

27th Mobile Artillery Park, attached to 13th Infantry Division, in course of formation at Kremenchuk for Simferopol.  
28th Mobile Artillery Park, attached to 34th Infantry Division, in course of formation at Kremenchuk, for Perekop.  
Second half of 7th Horse Artillery Park, attached to 10th Cavalry Division at Perekop.

Total—26 battalions, 12 squadrons, 6 sotnias of Cossacks, and 108 guns.

As a general rule an Infantry Division consists of 4 regiments of 3 battalions (each of 5 companies).  
With each Division there is a *brigade of field artillery* of 3—9-prs. and 3—4-prs. batteries (each of 8 guns), an artillery park, and a field hospital.  
The Division, with the artillery brigade and train, consists on the war establishment of 16,000 men, 2,540 horses, and 48 guns.  
A Cavalry Division consists of 3 regular regiments (each of 4 squadrons), and 1 irregular (6 sotnias). Besides these, 7 of the Cavalry Divisions have 2 regular H. A. batteries, and the remainder 1 regular and 1 Don Cossack battery.  
Inclusive of the batteries, a Cavalry Division numbers 4,076 men, 3,139 horses, and 12 guns.  
A corps of 2 Infantry and 1 Cavalry Divisions consists therefore of 36,000 men, 8,200 horses, and 108 guns.  
Compare the following Table :—

\* It is not established with certainty that the Rifle Brigades have been broken up and the battalions attached to Divisions, although this arrangement was proposed. This item, therefore, may be incorrect. The same remark applies to the Cossack regiment shown as Divisional Cavalry.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٤٤] (٦٦/٨)

8

	Officers.	Non-Com- missioned Officers and Men.	Non- combatants.	Wagons.	Horses.	Guns.	
Corps Staff .. .. .	14	..	48	4	34	..	
Infantry Division.	Divisional Staff .. .. .	5	..	22	3	27	..
	Two Brigade Staffs.. .. .	4	..	10	..	..	..
	Four Regiments .. .. .	304	12,264	636	164	696	..
	Artillery Brigade Staff .. .. .	3	..	21	2	10	..
	Six Batteries .. .. .	36	1,500	225	219	1,156	48
	Field Artillery Park .. .. .	5	228	40	56	252	..
	Rifle Battalion .. .. .	26	829	96	14	61	..
	Cossack Regiment .. .. .	21	790	42	2	877	..
Total of Division .. .. .	404	15,611	1,092	460	3,079	48	
Total of Two Divisions .. .. .	808	31,222	2,184	920	6,158	96	
Cavalry Division.	Divisional Staff .. .. .	5	..	21	..	26	..
	Two Brigade Staffs.. .. .	4	..	10	..	..	..
	Four Regiments .. .. .	124	2,929	472	41	2,336	..
	Horse Artillery Brigade Staff .. .. .	3	..	26	..	10	..
	Two Batteries Horse Artillery .. .. .	12	438	65	40	502	12
	Horse Artillery Park .. .. .	5	284	40	86	290	..
Total Cavalry Division .. .. .	149	3,651	624	167	3,664	12	
TOTAL, ARMY CORPS .. .. .	971	34,873	2,856	1,091	9,856	108	

Of the above six corps, the four forming the field army were at first, according to December information, ordered (head-quarters) to Kischenev in Bessarabia, forming about there a force estimated at 200,000 men. The Coast Army was then intended for the coast defence of the Crimea, and the parts about Odessa.

The total number of conscripts drawn for the year 1876 is officially given at 196,000.

Further, December information announced the probable mobilization of the military district of St. Petersburg; the actual mobilization at St. Petersburg, of four half-battalions of pontoniers for the Southern Army, and the formation for the same force of two new mountain batteries, and of a siege park of 400 guns, varying in calibre from nine to eighty-four pounders and six-inch mortars.

As regards the Southern Army, it would appear that all the regular troops are armed with the Berdan rifle.

A park of siege artillery of 92 guns was in process of formation at Chotin on the north-west frontier of Bessarabia. Whether these are included in, or are exclusive of, the above 400 guns, does not appear.

It was reported at the end of the year that there were at Kischenev and its neighbourhood 100,000 men—40,000 between Balta and Biltsy. There were also with the active army 40,000 non-combatants, *e.g.*, ambulance attendants, telegraphists, postal employées, &c.

The total of the Southern Army at the close of last year was said to be 214,000 men, and that it was the Commander-in-Chief's desire to have in Bessarabia a reserve corps of 70,000 or 80,000 men. This would necessitate the extension of mobilization to the second half of the Moscow District and to St. Petersburg.

The field Gendarmerie had commenced its functions, and 160 men were attached to head-quarters.

Much snow had fallen in Bessarabia.

A division of the Russian Army was at Ungheni, and a large force distributed on the Lower Pruth and Danube, where provisional barracks were being erected.



By the last intelligence the head-quarters of the army of the south were to be fixed at Chotin in the north-west of Bessarabia during the passage of the Pruth, and were subsequently to be transferred to Fockhani.

The advanced guard of the whole force, when the troops moved forward, was to be composed of the second division of the 7th and the first division of the 9th Corps, *i.e.*, the 36th and 5th Divisions.

The following details respecting some of the more important Russian Generals may not be out of place here :--

*Nepokoitschitzky*, Aide-de-Camp General, 65 years of age. Known as a good theorist. Late Director of Military Academy at St. Petersburg. Served in Hungary, the Caucasus and Crimea. Was named Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Field Army, the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievitch, in November 1876.

*Fomine*, Lieutenant-General. Long time Chief of the Staff of the Cossacks of the Don, afterwards Ataman of the Don Cossacks in the Warsaw Circle. Appointed Ataman of the irregular troops not forming parts of the Divisions of the Field Army in November 1876.

*Prince Barclay-de-Tolly-Weimarn*, Lieutenant-General and Aide-de-Camp General. Nephew of his namesake the well-known Field-Marshal of the Napoleonic wars. Named Commander of the 7th Army Corps in November 1876.

*Radetzki*, Lieutenant-General. No relation of his Austrian namesake. Appointed Commander of the 8th Army Corps in November 1876.

*Krudener, Baron*, Lieutenant-General. Governor of the Baltic Provinces (Riga). Appointed to command the 9th Corps in November 1876.

*Woronzoff, Prince*, Aide-de-Camp General and Lieutenant-General. Son of the Field-Marshal, well known in the wars with Schamyl. Commanded a Reserve Brigade of the Guard in the Crimea. Appointed to command the 10th Army Corps in November 1876.

*Schakhovskoi, Prince*, Lieutenant-General (?), late Governor of Tambov. Appointed to command the 11th Corps in November 1876.

#### IV.

##### MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

On this subject the information received is not very full. What has come to hand, including that extracted from newspapers and referring to the period at the close of 1876, may be condensed as follows :--

22 large guns (1,600 lbs. cast) had been despatched to Sebastopol and Nikolaieff, and a large quantity of torpedoes to the former place.

In Bessarabia large pontoon trains were being formed and sent towards the Pruth.

Four large 12-inch guns had been removed from the ironclad "Peter the Great," and sent to Odessa. Of these two were said to be destined for that place, and two for Ochakov.

All available steam launches and boats, numbering about 26, from Kronstadt and from Nikolaieff with detachments of sailors in charge, were made over to the Army of the South, and prepared for having guns mounted on them.

News about the 24th December described the Russians as in force at Ungheni, the Russo-Roumanian frontier station.

Vast barrack were in course of construction there and at Faleshti, on the road between Sculiani and Biltsy, and commissariat depôts were being organised at Bender and Tiraspol, between Kischenev and Odessa.

Artillery material for the defence of Odessa and the Coast of the Black



Sea had mostly to come from the north of Russia, and their despatch, and that of stores for the Army of the South, had necessitated the stoppage of the ordinary goods traffic on all the lines running southward from the Polish frontier since the 14th November.

In the middle of November the stoppage of goods traffic was announced on the following lines:—Warsaw—Terespol, Kiev—Brest, Moscow—Brest, Tambov—Saratov, Kharkov—Nikolaieff, Graen—Zaritzin, Moscow—Kisloff; and soon after the Russo-Moldavian Railway was completely handed over to the Russian Generals.

The Russian Government was pushing forward several contracts for war materials, among others the following:—

One for the supply of 300 field gun carriages, and another for that of fourteen eleven inch gun carriages.

One for the supply of 6,000 tons of steel projectiles for eleven and twelve inch guns.

A large contract for cartridges, and another for powder, both with American firms.

Eleven, thirty-eight ton gun were ordered from Krupp of Essen.

Rifles were being turned out as fast as possible in the small-arms factories.

V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

It would appear, from the most reliable information received in December 1876 that the railway organization proved defective in the mobilization of the Russian Army from want of sufficient rolling-stock.

There is a break of gauge at Jassy in Roumania, and the railways in the latter province are 4 foot 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches, but the rolling-stock of the Kingdom of Poland are of the Roumanian gauge, and might be made available for a campaign, reaching Roumania through Galicia.

The amount of rolling-stock, capable of adaptation to different gauges, available in Russia prior to the mobilization appears to have been small, perhaps 200 wagons. The following details refer to the rolling-stock in Roumania itself:—

110 locomotives, 356 second and third class carriages, 1,240 covered goods vans suitable for troops and horses, 600 trucks suitable for warlike stores. Of this, the bulk is kept at Bucharest.

*Bridges.*—The iron railway bridge over the Sereth at Barbosi, called the Barbosi Bridge, between Galatz and Braila, is 254 metres long, and, if destroyed, would be very difficult to repair. Its destruction would seriously cripple the Roumanian railways, if not render them useless for the Russians. It is on stone piers with three openings.

The railway on the bridge over the Pruth, and as far as Jassy in Moldavia, is of the Russian gauge, 5 foot.

The railway bridge over the Sereth, between Galatz and Braila, is a point of great importance, as its destruction would seriously disorganize the Russian advance.

In the original mobilization of the army, Baron Stiernwall, Chief of the Imperial Railway Department, was appointed to direct the transport of troops. The regulation regarding the suspension of ordinary railway traffic laid down that passenger and goods traffic was to be suspended when the number of military trains required upon the line exceeded 18 in 24 hours.

When the mobilization began there were despatched from Kiev and several intermediate stations trains of about 20 carriages every half-hour, each carriage holding 50 men. In this way, 20,000 men were carried on the first day 18,000 on the second, and 12,000, including 4,000 cavalry and 2,000 artillery guns, upon the third.

To work the railway lines for military purposes certain officers were



appointed to the charge of stations. A list was compiled showing the commandants of stations on the following lines of railway :—

Odessa.	Tamboff—Saratoff.
Kursk—Kharkoff—Azoff.	Morshansk—Syzran.
Kursk—Kieff.	Riajsk—Morshansk.
Kharkoff—Nicolaieff.	Kozloff—Voronej—Rostoff.
Kieff—Brest.	Kozloff—Tamboff.
Rostoff—Vladikavkaz.	Moscow—Kursk.
Lozovo—Sebastopol.	Landvarovo—Romny.
Griazo—Tsaritzin.	Fastoff.
Orel—Griazio.	

In the list are given the names of 65 officers appointed commandants, and assistants at 59 stations. Besides these, orders were given for the appointment at 49 stations of officers from the local or field troops of the respective circles. These latter officers were at the disposal of the staffs of circles.

The railway line between Korneschi and Ungheni, a part of the Kischenev—Sculiani line, was reported in extremely bad order at the close of 1876.

#### VI.

#### ROUMANIA, SERVICIA, &c.

Since the conclusion of the armistice, public attention has been concentrated on Constantinople, and there has been little intelligence from Servia and Roumania up to the end of the year.

It was stated that the Militia would be called out on the 2nd December, and that 90,000 men could be placed at the disposal of Russia.

The following account of preparations in the latter province appears in the Russian press :—

“Galatz has nearly lost its character of a commercial town, and has the appearance of a vast barrack. In it at the present time are 6,000 soldiers, while in the neighbourhood of Ibraila is concentrated an army of 10,000 men. On the 10th November orders were received for preparing quarters for 5,000 additional men. Notification has been officially made to the reservists that they will be with the colours throughout the winter. It is said that the Minister of War intends to raise the field army to 85,000 men. This intention is explained by the dread that the Turkish Army will assume the offensive and cross the Danube. For this reason the Minister of War has appointed special commissioners of engineer officers to inspect the banks and determine the points at which batteries should be constructed. At Kalafat will be erected a series of batteries. The Prince, Commanding-in-Chief, is expected in Galatz on the 20th November (2nd December).

All the Roumanian garrisons on the Bessarabian frontier are to be considerably curtailed. A considerable part of the troops will be sent from the Pruth into Little Wallachia, presumably to Kraevo, where will be the Prince's head-quarters.

The Russian “volunteers” had been withdrawn from Servia, and the Russian stores there sold or given to the Servian Government.

#### VII.

#### THE TURKISH ARMY.

The most trustworthy information available at the beginning of the year respecting the strength and distribution of the Turkish Army in Europe is somewhat fragmentary. The Turks were said to have at the close of last year 15,000 men at each of the following places: Widdin, Rutchuk, Silistria, and



Tultscha, or a total of 60,000 men. It was estimated that 10,000 at Rustchuk and 8,000 at each of the other places, or a total of 34,000, was more correct.

In addition to these, 150,000 were said to be distributed between Pravadi, Schumla, and Varna. According to previous intelligence, as regards their plans, they were said to intend having their main body 120,000 strong at Schumla, the numbers to be made up by drafting men from the forces stationed on the borders of Servia and Montenegro. At Rustchuk quarters were being prepared for 20,000 men.

It was intended to hold the fortresses of Silistria, Schumla, Rustchuk and Varna, with 75,000 Redifs (2nd Reserve) of 1st and 2nd Class of the five Army Corps of the Asiatic Division of the Army.

At the close of 1876 the Turkish troops at the Mostar, in the Herzegovina, and Serajevo in Bosnia, were called into Constantinople, and the Turkish Army in Albania was broken up; a portion of it being ordered to Bulgaria and the Danube, and 15 battalions proceeding by sea to Constantinople. Twenty-five battalions from Podgoritza and Scutari, on the frontier of Montenegro, were ordered to Constantinople, and a large force of fresh troops—90 battalions of Redifs (2nd Reserve) of the 1st and 2nd Class—were expected from Anatolia.

According to an official report, towards the close of the year, Turkey about the time of the beginning of the armistice had 480 battalions under arms, 315 in Servia, Montenegro, and Bosnia; 18 in Epirus and Thessaly; 16 at Constantinople; 12 distributed in European Turkey; 15 in Crete; 4 in Tripoli; 12 in Syria; 20 in Yemen; 20 about Bagdad; and 48 in Anatolia.

It was then in contemplation to form 150 new battalions by calling out that part of the Redif not yet called out.

#### VIII.

##### TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, GUNS, &c.

According to intelligence received at the close of the year 1876, all the Danube fortresses, except Widdin, had been looked to.

In Widdin there were 60 large Krupp guns and 85 others mounted.

A military train of 1,200 wagons was being prepared.

Two gunboats were added to the Danube flotilla.

The flotilla on the river included 10 monitors, carrying 15 heavy guns.

#### IX.

##### MISCELLANEOUS.

The following details about Bessarabia, its military resources, &c., are taken from the "Neue Freie Presse" of the 11th December 1876:—

"The country around Kischenev offers no great resources for an army of 190,000 men; it lacks the necessary conditions for the establishment of good winter quarters. These conditions are only found in well-populated provinces, dotted with towns and villages, well-cultivated, and intersected with a network of roads and railways. Nothing of the sort exists in this region.

"Among the districts comprised in the zone of the cantonments, that of Kischenev contains 3,190 inhabitants per square mile; that of Bender, 1,260; that of Tiraspol, 870; that of Akermann, 10,070; that of Bieltsy, 1,200; that of Odessa (without the city), 630. The districts of Kischenev, Bender, Akermann, and Bieltsy belong to the Government of Bessarabia; those of Tiraspol and Odessa to the Government of Odessa.

"In Bessarabia we find, according to the form of the ground, two regions differing completely the one from the other. North of the line Gouragalbinskaya—Kaouchany, the country is accidented, covered with hills of considerable height, intersected with deep valleys with scarp and



rocky slopes. The soil is clay and marl, covered with 2 feet of black earth of very great fertility where there is plenty of water. There are also forests which preserve to the soil its humidity and prevent the rivers from drying up during the year.

"The Akermann district, situated south of the above line, and the districts of Odessa and Tiraspol to the east of the Dniester belong to the "Steppe." The Steppe is a gently undulating plain, the watercourses running at the bottom of shallow valleys. It is perfectly open, treeless, dries up in consequence very quickly, which renders it poor in water. The rivers which flow into the Black Sea are for the most part entirely dry in summer, or rather they are dammed up into reservoirs or ponds for the cattle. The only rivers of importance are the Dniester, 180 to 300 paces broad, and the Pruth 30 to 100 paces broad.

"As regards railways there is only one line, Odessa—Kischenev—Jassy. Roads, as we understand the word, there are none.

"The villages are mostly built at the bottom of the valleys, as there is no water elsewhere. The localities inhabited by the Roumanians consist of low clay huts of one room. The few German and Bulgarian villages are better. The number of towns is limited. Kischenev has 96,000, Bender 22,000, Akermann 33,000, Tiraspol 9,500 inhabitants. Most of the houses are of wood. Thus, of the 1,464 houses in Bender, only 148 are of stone.

The winter is the most variable season. It is often mild, with the thermometer above zero; sometimes it is very cold with changes of 10, and even 30 degrees in a few days.

Deficiency of barracks for troops; and impossible to make them in the south owing to want of wood.

Provisions: Cattle in plenty; corn also. In the south, fuel very scarce.

Additional supplies can be brought by the rail or by the Dniester, which is navigable, or by the Black Sea, until the outbreak of hostilities, for the troops at Akermann.

No good places for hospitals.

Routes: Routes II.\* (Bucharest), excellent, practicable for carriages at all times, and accompanied by a railway as far as Tecuci. Routes I. and III.\* Excellent to Tecuci, thence country road. Routes to Galatz on both banks of the Pruth; country roads, practicable for carriages only in fine weather; impracticable after rain. Pruth navigable from Ermanesti, and can serve as line of supply.

Postal road: Bender—Kaouchany. Beyond is a country Steppe road, passing by Monzir-Kliastikaya to Bolgrad, a road exposed to all the rigours of the winter of the Steppe; from this latter place a postal road to Reni.

Akermann—Ismail postal road.\*

Three of these lines meet at Galatz, which is inconvenient, since the prolongation south is only by country road.

The only good route is Route No. II.,\* practicable in all weathers.

\* The reference in these numbers is to a paper prepared in this Department: "The steps which Russia would take should she determine to occupy the Principalities in the spring."



JANUARY TO MARCH INCLUSIVE.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Narrative . . . . .	14	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. . . . .	26
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army . . . . .	16	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. . . . .	27
III. Russian Army Details . . . . .	19	VIII. The Turkish Army . . . . .	27
IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. . . . .	24	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, &c. . . . .	29
		IX. Miscellaneous . . . . .	30

I.

NARRATIVE.

Jan. 1877. Trustworthy intelligence in January described the line of the Pruth as held in observation by two regiments of Cossacks, distributed in guard-houses along the river in parties of 15 men, each with an officer. There were then no regular troops.

The Head-Quarters of the Field Army were about to be moved to Chotin (on the Dniester), on the north-western frontier of Bessarabia, near the point where the frontiers of Russia, Roumania, and Austria meet.

The Grand Duke Nikolas, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the South, who had been much better, had had a relapse, and was still very ill; so much so that there was talk of nominating a successor to him.

It was stated in January, but the news has not yet been confirmed or contradicted, that Austria was preparing for the mobilization of three Army-Corps, each of 30,000 men, one for service in Dalmatia, one for Transylvania, and the third for concentration on the Save.

In the meantime, the Southern Army was hastening its preparations for crossing the Pruth. Two battalions of sappers, and two of pontoniers, provided with bridging material, were cantoned on the banks of the river, and an experimental bridge had been thrown over the river at Leovo with complete success.

Towards the close of the month, the question of superseding the Grand Duke Nikolas was again mooted, and it appears probable that the state of his health will make it imperative to supersede him, but at the end of January he was still in command.

Early in January, several superior officers of the Russian Army arrived at Jassy, and made an inspection of the neighbourhood, to ascertain its resources for the provisioning of troops.

Arrangements were made for fixing special tariffs for the purchase of victuals, and large stores of provisions were being massed at the principal stations on the Jassy—Galatz line.

The health of the troops in Bessarabia and Podolia was officially reported in January as very good.

Feb. 1877. As no serious movement of the Russian Army took place during the month of February, intelligence from Bessarabia was much occupied with rumours of the Russian plans. They (the Russians) were credited with the intention of keeping the army mobilized in Bessarabia, or even crossing the Pruth, with the alternative objects of exhausting Turkey, who was less able to bear the strain upon her resources caused by a prolonged state of preparation for war; or of provoking an attack on her part which would give them the advantage of the defensive. Meanwhile, the defences of the fortresses of Southern Russia were being carefully looked to, and the army was continually being reinforced.

Negotiations, consequent upon the breaking up of the Conference at Constantinople, were believed to be in progress between the Great Powers, but at Constantinople itself those powers were unrepresented, save by subordinate members of the Legations. The Russian Legation was withdrawn altogether, and affairs generally at the Turkish capital seemed to be in a state of chaotic confusion. The Sultan had abruptly dismissed his Grand Vizier,



Midhat Pasha, from whose influence in favour of peace much was expected, Feb. 1877. and who was the author of a new constitution given to his people by the monarch, as a concession to the demands of the Conference.

Peace negotiations were understood to be in progress between Servia and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, to avoid a renewal of hostilities on the expiration of the armistice which was to end with the month of February.

Early in February the presence of drift ice was reported on the Lower Danube, interrupting the river communication for the Turks, and compelling them to disembark their heavy stores and war material, destined for the various fortified places along the banks, at Varna, for conveyance by rail to Rustchuk, or over bad roads to the other points on the Danube. Simultaneously with this intelligence came that of the commencement of the collection of the war tax in Bulgaria.

On the 11th February, a military movement was begun which was stated to be purely experimental, to test the marching powers of the horses. At that time, thaw had set in, and the state of the roads was very bad. The movement was called a military promenade from Kischinev to Odessa and back, a distance altogether of upwards of 200 miles, and there took part in it the General (Chief of the Staff) and Staff, and a force of Cavalry and Horse Artillery. The test was pronounced most satisfactory.

At the same time, the troops about Kischinev were regularly exercised in parade and other instruction manœuvres, notwithstanding the daily increasing badness of the roads in Bessarabia. A forward movement towards the Pruth near Jassy, of 60,000 men from Balta was reported in the middle of February, but the report was not confirmed. From Bucharest, towards the end of February, spring weather was reported, and the departure of the snow; and from Vienna it was stated that a Turkish flotilla on the Danube had made a trial trip from the Sulina mouth of the river to Rustchuk and back. Other news denied the presence of any Turkish flotilla on the river.

Towards the end of February, the Grand Duke Nikolas was again reported ill, and confined to his room.

Austrian intelligence also relates that the presence of the large force in the south of Russia had caused great destitution and distress in the country, resulting in much crime.

Constant rumours of a Russian advance were rife towards the end of the month. Nine bridges were said to be ready to throw over the Pruth, and the troops were constantly exercised at their construction; but the bridges were not carried quite across to the Moldavian side.

The proposed Russian plan of action was said to be to enter Bulgaria at several points at once, so as to compel the Turkish commander to divide his army; and to enter with imposing forces, so as to invest the fortresses without weakening the advance. It was not proposed to attach very great importance to the Turkish quadrilateral formed by the fortresses Varna, Silistria, Rustchuk, and Schumla.

Putting the advance at eight Army-Corps, six regiments of heavy, and 16 of light Cavalry, and 435 guns, it was calculated that the quadrilateral could easily be blockaded without weakening too much the force intended to operate in the open field, which, moreover, would have a powerful reserve in Southern Russia.

The Grand Duke Nikolas had taken up his abode at Odessa.

So far as the weather and state of the country would allow, the troops forming the Southern Army were being constantly exercised in drill and parade movements, and combined movements in the field on a large scale were being arranged for, especially about Chotin, Bender, and Akerman, although the severity of the climate had proved a great hindrance.

Other accounts said the army was composed mainly of recruits, and was unfit to practice combined field manœuvres on a large scale, and that the parades, of which so much was said, were merely recruit drills.

During the month of March negotiations were in progress between the Great Powers, having for their object to avert the impending war between Russia and Turkey, and, as a preliminary, to bring about the demobilization of the Russian Army. March 1877

It was assumed that the Czar was anxious in the same direction, and only



March 1877. desirous of getting a plausible pretext—"a golden bridge"—to enable him to withdraw from a difficult and untenable position.

Warlike preparations, however, were not interrupted. Lists were prepared at Kischinev of the numbers of troops, quantity of munitions of war, provisions, guns, stores, &c., for which transport to Jassy would be required, and forwarded to the Roumanian railway board.

II.

MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Jan. 1877. In addition to the Russian armies of occupation and observation on the Turkish European frontier, described under the heading "Russian Army Details," the following troops had been mobilized in January, but were not then as yet formed into corps, nor had they received a united tactical formation:—

*1st Infantry Division.*—Major-General Prochoroff; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Leslyr; Head-Quarters, Lutsk.

*1st Brigade of Field Batteries.*—Major-General Simanoff, at Ostrog.

*17th Infantry Division.*—Major-General Hann; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Dennett; Head-Quarters, Kamenetz-Podolsk.

*17th Brigade of Field Batteries.*—Major-General Friede, at Litina.

*18th Infantry Division.*—Major-General Nabut; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Micheef; Head-Quarters, Tcherkask.

*18th Brigade of Field Batteries.*—Major-General Bogdanoff, at Jitomir.

*35th Infantry Division.*—Major-General Rall; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Agon Dovanofsky; Head-Quarters, Zastava; and

*35th Brigade of Field Batteries.*—Colonel Feodorenko.

It would appear that there was much confusion in carrying out the actual mobilization of a portion of the Russian Army at the close of 1876; that there was an insufficiency of stores and of transport, and that the actual strength of the troops was much under the estimated numbers.

Great efforts were being made to remedy defects, and, before the end of the month, these were producing a visible result; but, by the most authentic January intelligence, dated about the 15th, there were only 118,000 men on the Turkish frontier, instead of 175,000, the official number. This force was then supplied with only two weeks' provisions in the event of its taking the field against Turkey, and its means of transport were limited. According to a scale laid down by the Russian War Minister, the capital city was to provide horses, in the event of a declaration of war, to the Guard and troops of the St. Petersburg Circle, as follows:—

Saddle horses, 637; Artillery, 2,492; for the No. 1 Train, 1,522; and for the No. 2 Train, 349; total, 5,000.

Feb. 1877. It was reported, about the middle of February, that three more Army-Corps were about to be mobilized.

Further details of the original mobilization transpired gradually during this month. According to these, the confusion said to have prevailed was much exaggerated, and was due to the novelty of the experiment, and the inexperience of the railway officials, and would be unlikely to occur again; and, as regards rumours that had been in circulation of defective stores, useless ammunition, empty cartridges, &c., the only thing substantiated was, that while there was probably some foundation for such reports, the time that had since elapsed had been well utilised in making good deficiencies.

In Bessarabia, the soldier's rations were three-quarters of a pound of meat, three pounds of bread, sugar, tea, and vegetables. Many of the soldiers came from Bessarabia, and were at home there, living in comfort, and the health of the troops was good. As a rule, they were distributed through the villages, from one to five in a house, and well sheltered.



Among the mobilization and other details published in February were the Feb. 1877. following (many of which are dated January):—

The Staff and batteries of the 4th Brigade of Horse Artillery of the Reserve was formed at the end of last year.

The mobilization of the troops forming the Southern Army, under the Grand Duke Nikolas has, for some time, been complete. Such measures of reinforcement as are now being taken are for the augmentation of the strength of the existing battalions. Corps of Volunteers were about to be formed, including six "Droujinas nobles," two of Infantry and four of Cavalry, each having an effective strength of 1,000 men. These would be composed of members of the upper classes (la noblesse), following an example already set in the Caucasus, where there had also been organised "droujinas," composed of "hommes du peuple." This latter example was also to be followed in the south-west of Russia.

The organization of the irregular forces of the empire was being rapidly pushed forward. Major-General Dandeville, long resident in Serbia, was appointed to the General Staff of the irregular forces, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Staff of the Army of the South, and passed through Kischinev, on his way to St. Petersburg, to take up his duties.

In February, there were rumours of the approaching mobilization of 12 regiments of the Guard, to reinforce the Southern Army. This would mean an increase to the latter of 54,000 men.

It was as yet, however, a mere rumour. Another report was of the approaching mobilization of three fresh Army-Corps, to be despatched to Bessarabia, in addition to those already mentioned as said to be destined for the Upper Danube. There was, however, no authentic intelligence on either of these points.

It was also said, in the middle of February, that six regiments from the Warsaw military circle were on their way to reinforce the Southern Army, and that all the local troops of the Governments of Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson, computed altogether at 30,000 men, had received orders of readiness to march.

Details of the original mobilization came to light from time to time during the month.

It seems that, prior to the mobilization at the close of last year, it had been the practice of the recruits to undergo a training of six to eight months with the reserves, before joining the active army. According to recent orders, however, they were sent direct to the active army, and made up a good two-thirds of what was given out as the effective strength of the force in Bessarabia. Hence the marching and manœuvres in which the forces about Bender, Tiraspol, and Odessa were said by the newspapers to be engaged, were, in all probability, mere ordinary recruits drill, which had not yet been mastered by the bulk of the army.

It was stated that a cause of weakness in the Russian Army, and of confusion and shortcoming generally in the recent mobilization, was the absence of a complete knowledge, on the part of the War Office, as to the advantages likely to result from changes in organisation accomplished or contemplated. Among the Cossacks, for instance, the plan to secure a uniformity of organisation between the isolated contingents of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Ural had hardly taken shape.

An order had been issued, prescribing certain details of organisation for the Cossacks of the Don, which were to have come into effect in 1875, but, after a short temporary trial, had remained a dead letter up to quite recently, when an attempt was made to renew them. According to this, the men were divided into three classes, regulated by age, passing from the first, the preparatory class (18 to 21 years of age), to the active class (from 21 to 33), and thence to the "Ersatz" (from 33 to 38).

The first class received their training at home, which training was very perfective, from a lack of good officers. The second class were to receive theirs in the garrisons where the men were serving their regular time. Suddenly came the order of last year for mobilization, when the various Cossack headquarters received from the Atamans notifications of the numerical strength of the contingents required to take the field. Great delay then took place, owing to an organisation not too perfect in theory, and as yet only partially carried out in practice. When the two first regiments of Don Cossacks

F



Feb. 1877. reached Kischinev, the remainder, including detachments from some 60 regiments composing the Cavalry of the Don, were expected to arrive from day to day, but in vain.

The two regiments which arrived first were, as it happened, according to the arrangements of their localization in time of peace, quartered close at hand; and, at the period of their entry into Kischinev, the mere order for mobilization had not yet reached all or nearly all the Cossack head-quarters in the wide-spreading Don territory. As a rule, on the receipt of that order, from three to four weeks is required for the formation of the sotnias in the various isolated places of assembly. At least as long a time is necessary to collect the sotnias at the regimental stations, when the long distances are taken into account. Then comes the march across the breadth of southern Russia to the theatre of war, not to be accomplished in a day, so that, under any circumstances, a delay was to be expected. On this particular mobilization of the Don Cossacks, however, other eventualities befel. Many of the men, anxious to prevent their goods and chattels going to ruin—as had formerly happened—during their absence, looked about for relations or friends to be put in charge of their households while they were away, and having taken this economical precaution, they then set out for their different rendezvous.

From this cause the formation of the sotnias took at least six weeks.

Another cause of apparent shortcoming, and consequent delay in placing this force upon a war footing, was the perceptibly increasing poverty of the Don Cossack population. Government was compelled to arm many of the middle classes; in many cases to dispense with men bringing horses, and to overlook other deficiencies. From all this, it resulted that the expectations engendered at Kischinev by the appearance of the two first regiments of Don Cossacks were not realised, as regards rapidity of concentration.

March 1877. The following information from the "Invalide Russe" reached this country about the end of March:—

"The order of February 19th last, directing the formation of eight Army Corps, allotting to them divisions of Infantry and Cavalry, and appointing their commanders, is merely a working out of the plan for the organization of our Army, which was decided on in 1873, when the necessity was perceived of organising and strengthening our forces and means of defence, to place them on a level with the requirements of modern warfare and the armaments of other first-class European Powers. In the year 1875 the Guard Corps was formed, and last autumn six corps (7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12,) were organised to form the Southern Army. The formation of the Grenadier and eight other Army-Corps has now been decided on. The following is the composition of the different corps:—Grenadier Corps, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, Grenadier Divisions, 14th Cavalry Division; 1st Army-Corps, 22nd, 24th and 37th Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division; 2nd Army-Corps, 25th, 26th, and 27th Infantry Divisions, 2nd Cavalry Division; 3rd Army-Corps, 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions, 3rd Cavalry Division; 4th Army-Corps, 16th and 30th Infantry Divisions, 4th Cavalry Division; 5th Army-Corps, 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions, 5th Cavalry Division; 6th Army-Corps, 4th, 6th, and 10th Infantry Divisions, 6th Cavalry Division; 7th Army-Corps, 15th and 36th Infantry Divisions, 7th Cavalry Division; 8th Army-Corps, 9th and 14th Infantry Divisions, 8th Cavalry Division; 9th Army-Corps, 5th and 31st Infantry Divisions, 9th Cavalry Divisions; 10th Army-Corps, 13th and 34th Infantry Divisions, 10th Cavalry Division; 11th Army-Corps, 11th and 32nd Infantry Divisions, 11th Cavalry Division; 12th Army-Corps, 12th and 33rd Infantry Divisions, 12th Cavalry Division; 13th Army-Corps, 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions, 13th Cavalry Division; 14th Army-Corps, 17th and 18th Infantry Divisions, Don Cassack Cavalry Division." Including the Guard Corps, which has three Infantry and two Cavalry Divisions, there are in the Russian Army sixteen Army-Corps. The Grenadier Corps and three Army Corps (1st, 2nd, and 6th) have three divisions each, the remaining corps two divisions. In all, there are 37 Infantry Divisions, 16 Cavalry Divisions, and one division of Don Cossacks Cavalry organised into Army-Corps. Eleven divisions of Infantry (eight of which belong to the army of the Caucasus) and the Caucasus Cavalry Division are not included in any Army-Corps.



III.

RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

Information, received in January, gave the following details respecting Jan. 1877. the Russian army.

There were four corps on the line of the Pruth with head-quarters at Kischinev.

The advanced guard was thrown forward to the frontier, and had with it two pontoon trains, each with a verst of bridging.

The siege train reserve and ammunition columns were at Bender, the Engineer head-quarters at Kischinev.

A fifth Corps was mobilized at Odessa, and a sixth in the Crimea.

There were at Moscow and Kiev reserves to take the places of the four corps of the field army when they move forward.

The information respecting the condition of the army in Bessarabia and its strength, received in the month of January, was very conflicting, the general tendency being to exaggerate numbers.

The most trustworthy information respecting the distribution of the forces is that given in an official statement, which represents what was known on the 15th January of the disposition of the Russian troops, composing the armies of operation and observation on the European frontier of Turkey, under the command of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief, whose head-quarters were then at Kischinev, and of Lieutenant-General Semeka, whose head-quarters were at Odessa, which agrees with the statement already given.

In addition to what have already been detailed were the following troops, not forming part of the Army-Corps, but under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

*Escort of the Commander-in-Chief.*—Two squadrons of Kuban and two of Terek Cossacks; one squadron of each pair being of the Guard, and the other of the Line; at Kischinev.

Two companies of Kuban Rifles.

4th Brigade of Rifles, Major-General Zvietzinski, at Varzareshiti.

3rd Brigade of Sappers at Kojnshna.

*1st Brigade of Sappers (the Guard).*—A detachment of 100 men: 50 Sappers at Kischinev, and 50 men of the Galvanic company at Odessa.

*2nd Brigade of Sappers.*—Its 3rd and 4th half-battalions of pontoniers, at Kischinev.

*Special Battalion.*—For construction of military roads, &c., in course of formation at Moscow.

*Sailors of the Guard.*—Two companies, at Kischinev.

*Sailors from the Black Sea.*—A detachment of 200 men, at Kischinev.

*Terek Cavalry Militia.*—Four sotnias, at Kischinev.

*Artillery.*—Two newly formed mountain batteries at Kischinev, a siege park of 400 guns in course of formation at Bender, and a Horse Artillery Park attached to the Cossacks, not forming part of the Cavalry Divisions, at Kischinev.

*Division of Cossacks of the Don.*—Major-General Shumsheff; chief of the Staff, Colonel Ivanoff; usual head-quarters, Riazan; present head-quarters, Dubno; composed of the following details:—

21st regiment of Don Cossacks, at Papeluha; 23rd regiment of Don Cossacks, at Koduma; 26th, at Gorodishtchi; 29th, at Comrat; 30th, at Taraklia; 31st, at Enikinbei (Kubei); 34th, at Labutna; 35th, at Jabokritshi; 37th, at Serbi; and 40th at Gaidar; besides the following—8th battery of Don Cossacks, at Tomdi; 9th battery of Don Cossacks, at Pestchanka; 10th,



Jan. 1877. at Kipintna; 11th, at Mejibuje; 13th, at Pestchanka; 16th, at Roono; and 17th, at Mejibuje.

*Gendarmes.*—Third squadron, at Kischinev.

*Transport of Mobile Commissariat.*—Divided into 14 sections, of 350 country carts each, in course of formation at Kischinev, Bender, and Akerman.

*Artillery Reserve.*—For the first line, destined for repairs only, at Kischinev.

*Artillery Dépôt.*—For projectiles and powder, at Kischinev.

*Mobile Workshops.*—At Kischinev.

*Mobile Laboratory.*—At Kischinev.

*Hospitals.*—Within the districts of the armies of operation and observation are 30 Field Hospitals; 22 with horses, 8 without. The first 22 are as follows:—

48th Hospital, at Bieltsy.  
49th Hospital, at Tiraspol.  
50th to 57th Hospitals (8), at Kiev (provisionally).  
61st to 72nd Hospitals (12), at Kremenchuk (provisionally).

The last 8 are thus distributed:—

43rd Hospital, at Vinitza.  
44th Hospital, at Balta.  
45th to 47th Hospitals (3), at Kiev (provisionally).  
58th to 60th Hospitals (3), at Kischinev.

The official statement from which the above is taken does not give the numerical strength of the force described. For information under this head we have to depend on various and conflicting estimates. Probably more reliable data may reach this country by degrees.

It is estimated that the six Army-Corps just mentioned number 216,000 men, with 49,200 horses, and 648 guns; and that if four Army-Corps move forward in offensive operations, this active force will number 144,000 men, with 32,800 horses, and 432 guns.

Reinforcements said in January to be in process of organization for the army of the south were estimated at 110,000 men, the intention being to raise the entire strength to upwards of 300,000 men.

About the middle of January news came of the reinforcement of the Regular Cavalry of the Southern Army by seven regiments.

Towards the close of the month, the Grand Duke Nicolas was said to have at his disposal a force of 200,000 men with which to commence hostilities, and measures were being taken for organising a strong reserve; this reserve, it was stated, would consist of five Infantry Divisions, 8,000 Cavalry, and 150 guns, and be provisionally stationed in Podolia and the Ukraine.

Among the reinforcements reported to have reached Kischinev, and to have been sent forward towards the Pruth, were 16 Companies of Marines from Kronstadt and four of seamen.

The anticipated movement of the head-quarters of the Southern Army from Kischinev to Chotin was reported as having taken place, but the report was not confirmed. Its outposts were stationed on the Pruth, the line of which appears to have been occupied from a point south of Chotin down to Leovo.

The line of the river from the latter place up to Ungheni, near Sculiani, was held by troops thrown forward from Bender.

In January, orders were issued for the formation of the dépôt battalions of the following Infantry regiments: 51st, 52nd, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 141st, and 144th; of these the 69th, 70th, 71st, and 72nd Regiments belong to the Infantry Division, ordinarily stationed at Riazan and Tambov, in the Moscow circle, and not forming part of the six Corps first mobilized. The dépôt battalions of the following Infantry regiments were described as complete in their formation: the 53rd, 54th, 121st, 122nd, 129th, 130th, 131st, 132nd, and 164th.

Intelligence from Bessarabia in February announced little change from the state of things in January. Eye-witnesses reported favourably of the physique



and general condition of the Russian troops, whose numbers were given Feb. 1877. variously from 140,000 to 180,000 men. Judging, however, from the scale in which the storage of supplies were being carried on, and the quantity of Artillery it was computed that the Russian commanders made an army of 300,000 men the basis of their calculations.

Various rumours were rife as to the sanitary condition of the troops in Bessarabia, generally to the effect that it was unsatisfactory. This was contradicted by an official statement from the Commander-in-Chief, from which the following details are extracted:—

The hospitals included in the statement were 34 in number, providing 19,922 beds, made up of—

Two permanent hospitals at Bender and Tiraspol, providing respectively 415 and 207 beds; the hospital at Kischinev and a sanitary station for ophthalmia of 200 beds each; and 30 provisional military hospitals, each of 630 beds.

At the date of the return (January 1876), 13 of these hospitals were in readiness and provided with beds as follows:—

The two permanent hospitals, 620 beds; the Kischinev hospital and ophthalmia station, 400 beds between them. Of the provisional hospitals:—

- No. 43, in Vinitza and the village of Strijevka, 307.
- No. 44, in Balta, 200.
- No. 48, in Bieltsy and the Grebovitsky Convent, 420.
- No. 49, in the hamlet of Kliastitsy, 100.
- No. 50, in the town of Orgeieff, 170.
- No. 58, in the town of Kremenchug, 630 beds.
- No. 59, in the town of Tiraspol, 350 beds.
- No. 60, in the town of Kischinev, 420 beds.
- No. 61, in the town of Elizabethgrad, 420 beds; or a total of about 4,000 beds.

Of these hospitals, on the date of the return, 8th January, the occupation by the sick were as follows:—

	Sick.
Permanent hospitals—Tiraspol .. .. .	297
" " Bender .. .. .	189
" " Kischinev.. .. .	166
Ophthalmia sanitary station .. .. .	163
Military provisional hospital, No. 43 .. .. .	42
" " " " 48 .. .. .	29
" " " " 50 .. .. .	12
" " " " 58 .. .. .	402
" " " " 59 .. .. .	207
" " " " 60 .. .. .	318
" " " " 61 .. .. .	57

or a total of about 1,882 sick. This is not a large proportion if the strength of the army be taken at 180,000 men. Cases of Typhoid in no instance exceeded the proportion of 6 per hospital, and there were no contagious diseases. In the above return there appears to be a slight increase in the proportion of sick since the last official statement, which gave the number on the 31st December of the preceding year as 1,624, or about three-quarters per cent. of the whole force. Later details in February estimate the Russian force in Bessarabia actually ready to move forward at four Army-Corps, mustering 120,000 men, 8,000 cavalry, and 430 guns; and calculate that its reinforcement by the two corps of the coast army would raise the total force available to open the campaign against Turkey on the European side, to 180,000 men, 12,000 cavalry, and 720 guns.

From Vienna, in the middle of February, the Russian total strength towards the side of European Turkey is given at 100,000 men and 28 field batteries, distributed on the coast of the Black Sea from Kertch to Akerman; besides the force in Bessarabia, immediately under the Archduke Nikolas, distributed between the frontier of Moldavia and Odessa, and computed at 200,000 men, with 60 field batteries, and 300 siege guns.

In addition to the above the reserves are given at 75,000 men and 10,000 Cossacks.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [١١ ظ] (٦٦/٢٢)

22

Feb. 1877. In all these miscellaneous computations from the newspapers of different countries there is a complete absence of details and generally of such data as might be useful in testing the accuracy of the numbers quoted.

A statement from Bucharest of a date near the last agrees with it in estimating the Russian strength on that side at 300,000 men, and speaks with special praise of the artillery and of the excellence of the sanitary arrangements connected with the army.

Subsequent information from Vienna, which is said to have been collected from various sources, and to be reliable, does enter into some little detail.

According to this the whole Russian force on foot was 600,000 men, of which half was pushed forward to the frontier and ready to advance.

The mobilized army, at the date quoted (February 19) consisted of 20 Infantry Divisions out of 48; 3 Rifle Brigades out of 8; 9 Cavalry Divisions out of 20; 150 batteries of field, horse, and mountain Artillery; and a siege train of upwards of 500 heavy guns, or a total of about two-fifths of the whole army. This force includes that intended for operations in Asia, with which this paper is not concerned.

The troops mentioned in the former Vienna report as lining the coast of the Black Sea from Kertch to Akerman are given in a detail which agrees in the main with the statement already put forward in this chapter of the army of observation, and are as follows:—4 Divisions of Infantry; 2 of Cavalry; and 28 field Artillery batteries, besides the garrisons of Kertch, Ochakoff, Bender, Akerman, and smaller places on the coast, or a total of 100,000 men, of whom 80,000 are combatants. Details are also given of the force in Bessarabia, which do not differ materially from the statement put forward in this chapter of the army of observation. The ground occupied is that portion of Bessarabia which intervenes between the Moldavian frontier line and the Razdelnaya junction of the Odessa railway, and the strength is 8 divisions of Infantry, 4 of Cavalry, 1 Rifle Brigade, 12 regiments of Cossacks, exclusive of those attached to Divisions, 60 batteries of Field Artillery, and a siege train of 300 guns. In addition to all this an ample pontoon equipment and a contingent of sailors and marines are mentioned. The total effective of this force, including commissariat and hospital services is given again at 200,000 men.

The reserve of 75,000 men alluded to in the former Vienna statement is said to be fit to take the field and enter the first line at any moment. It numbers 60,000 combatants, and is quartered in the country between Kameinetz, Podolsk, Kiev, and Vladimir Volynsk, and is made up of 4 divisions of Infantry, 1 of Cavalry, and 1 Rifle Brigade. The already mentioned Cossack reserve of 10,000, numbers 8,000 combatants, includes some batteries of Artillery, and is made up of ten mobilized regiments of the second category. In addition to all the preceding, are 100,000 men, kept ready in depôts to supply losses in the mobilized forces.

It will be unnecessary, as far as the month of February is concerned, to recapitulate further newspaper rumours of the strength of the Southern Army. These have a tendency to exaggerate, but still they point to a continued flow of men to the Southern Army, and its consequent augmentation as regards the actual number present with the colours, without any increase in the number of corps, divisions, &c.

The Russians were said to be busy in February in augmenting the scale of their hospital arrangements. Large hospital establishments were about to be formed in the Crimea, and in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav, and twelve minor ambulances in Bessarabia. There are, however, no data to show if these last were in addition to the hospitals already enumerated in this chapter.

Eye-witnesses, writing from Kischinev, speak highly of the efficiency of the troops. The Cavalry of the Cossacks of the Don are described as regular Cavalry, the same as other regiments, and are armed with a lance, sabre, and Berdan carbine. Like those of Vladikavkas, in the Caucasus, they are also trained to act on foot. Their appearance is wilder than that of regular regiments owing to their having to provide their own clothes, horses and equipment, except the carbine, which is found for them by Government.

A description of a review at Kischinev mentions the following regiments as taking part in it:—53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th, all armed with a kind of Remington breech-loader, "*fusil à tabatière*."



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢ و١] (٦٦/٢٣)

23

A February letter from Odessa details the garrison of that place and its suburbs, Perésip and Moldavanka, at one Infantry Division ; 6 Cavalry regiments, and 126 guns.

As marking the rate at which the ranks of the Southern Army were being filled up, a state may be mentioned, dated Kischinev, 6th February, which put the total strength of the force at 251,270 men and 482 guns, exclusive of sappers and miners, sailors, marine-infantry, hospital service men, pioneers and railway employes which latter number together some 8,000 to 10,000 men extra.

It was stated in March that four batteries of field Artillery and two mountain batteries were to be added to the Army of the South, and that the Artillery of the Reserve was also to be reinforced ; also that the Cavalry force was to be strengthened, but no details of this last reinforcement were given.

The reserves in Podolia and the Ukraine were to be moved nearer to the frontier, and the third ban of the Don Cossacks and the second of the Ural Cossacks were to be set in motion before the middle of the month. In March, the health of the troops was reported good, but there appears to be a slight increase in the percentage on the two preceding months, judging from accompanying details extracted from an official statement bearing date the 17th of February (1st March).

According to this return the permanent and temporary military hospitals were occupied by sick as follows:—

PERMANENT HOSPITALS.		Sick.
Bender	.. .. .	198
Tiraspol	.. .. .	264
Kischinev ( <i>Lazaret de la Compagnie sédentaire</i> )	.. .. .	175
TEMPORARY HOSPITALS.		Sick.
No. 43	.. .. .	231
" 45	.. .. .	150
" 48	.. .. .	252
" 49	.. .. .	74
" 50	.. .. .	160
" 58	.. .. .	470
" 59	.. .. .	302
" 60	.. .. .	325
" 61	.. .. .	364
Total	.. .. .	2,965

This number must be reduced by 449 men, included in this return, but sent by other Corps not belonging to the Army of the South. This brings the number down to 2,516, or a percentage, with reference to the effective strength, of 1.25.

To these 2,516, however, must be added other sick in the ambulances with the troops as follows:—

	Sick.
8th Corps	135
9th "	119
11th "	177
12th "	170
4th Brigade of Chasseurs	30
Total	631

or an additional 0.24 per cent. of the effective strength of the army, making the total percentage of the effective strength represented by the sick in hospital and with the Corps ambulances 1.49.

It may be mentioned in conjunction with the subject of the Russian hospitals, that an important innovation had been established in the introduction by the military inspector of health, Dr. Prisselkow, of Kirghiz felt tents, such as in the Khiva and Samarkand campaigns of Central Asia, had been used to replace the ordinary ambulance tents. These Kirghiz or Kalmuk kibitkas



March 1877. were then found an admirable shelter both in hot and cold weather, and besides being in many respects more convenient than the ordinary canvas tents, were much cheaper.

Each of these tents was capable of sheltering twenty men or ten sick, and five of them were ordered for each of the thirty temporary military hospitals.

They were manufactured at Orenburg at a cost of 140 roubles each, to which sum 45 roubles must be added for the carriage of each tent by rail to Kischinev, making the total cost of the whole 150 tents when delivered at the latter place, 27,750 roubles.

There were also sent from Orenburg to Kischinev—with the tents a proportion of non-commissioned officers and men accustomed to pitch and strike them.

Two of these tents could be easily carried on one of the ordinary train wagons.

Intelligence received in March described a force newly organized and confided to the charge of Lieutenant-General Skobeleff, called the mixed Cossack Division. \*It was really a Division of scouts,† and formed no part either from a tactical or administrative point of view, of the Army-Corps. It was an entirely independent force, intended to collect information and keep a good look-out both in front and on the flanks of the advancing army, to harass the enemy and disarrange his plans, and generally, to keep him on the "qui vive" by rapid evolutions and sudden attacks. Its composition was three regiments of Cossacks, each of six sotnias, a six-gun battery and a regiment of Terek mountaineers. This Terek regiment was composed exclusively of volunteers, all inhabitants of the Terek district and included in its ranks 170 Christians, the remainder being Mussulmen. When this regiment was mobilized it was ready to march in ten days, every horseman turning out fully equipped at his own expense. Subsequently they were given pay by the government, each man receiving 10 roubles a month besides his food and forage for his horse; and they were moreover armed with breech-loading carbines instead of their own flint muskets. In one of the two sections into which this regiment was divided were 60 "aldars" or nobles, some of whom are described as very rich. Some of the officers could neither write nor read, but on the other hand they were thoroughly up to their work, were most of them decorated with the Cross of St. George and carried besides in the scars on their faces, marks of the many combats in which they had borne part. The officers were all good shots and anxious to be armed with carbines as well as the men. There were 25 of them, among whom only three, the Colonel, Adjutant, and Paymaster were Russians.

#### IV.

##### MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

In January it was reported that large stores of barley and oats were being collected; and of hay and barley at Reni. The Imperial Iron Foundry at Tula was commissioned to construct 40,000 iron huts for the accommodation of troops.

An order was sent to Herr Krupp for 14—11-in. guns, complete with carriages, for the forts at Kronstadt, to replace others sent to Odessa. Twelve Russian gunboats were selected for service on the Danube.

At the beginning of the year the lines leading to Kischinev from the north were re-opened for ordinary goods traffic, and this was taken advantage of by the dealers in army supplies. All the shops at Kischinev were rapidly filled with merchandize and stores likely to be in demand, and many private houses were converted into shops.

\* Often alluded to as the "Flying Division"

† "Eclaireurs."



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [١٣] (٦٦/٢٥)

25

Large depôts of stores were being formed at Kischinev; and the other Jan. 1877. depôts of the empire continued uninterruptedly, the despatch of stores towards the Pruth.

Intelligence in February related that preparations were being made in Feb. 1877. Roumania for the reception of large bodies of troops, at Galatz, Buzeo, and Kalarasch.

Also, that a fleet of small steamers, to be used in the passage of rivers, had been collected in the South of Russia. There were said to be 16 of them of horse power varying between 6 and 20. The defences of Nikolaev had been strengthened, and the banks of the river Bug lined with batteries.

Of the three circular ironclads possessed by Russia, two were in the Black Sea; one at Nikolaev and the other at Sebastopol. The third was at Kronstadt.

Telegraphic communication was established between the Imperial Palace at Odessa, where the Grand Duke Nikolas, still very ill but still in command of the Field Army, was temporarily staying, and all the coast batteries about Odessa; and the bay of Odessa was so unsafe for merchant shipping owing to the torpedoes and mines laid down for the defence of the harbour, that it was necessary to station pilot vessels at the entrance to guide foreign vessels through these hindrances, and similar measures had to be adopted at the mouth of the Dnieper and the straits of Yenikale, near Kertch.

The storage of supplies, ammunition, and warlike material, &c., reported from Kischinev in February was on a grand scale. An eye-witness, relating what fell under his own observation, speaks of a bridge; of 13 steam launches large enough for ocean service; two large barges; five torpedo boats to operate against the Turkish gunboats, and a large accumulation of rolling-stock at all the railway stations. A thousand horses had also been recently purchased for the train. From Frankfort it was announced that the Russian Government had concluded a contract at Mayence for 150,000 pairs of shoes.

It appears that the Russian Government was drawing largely on America for warlike stores, chiefly gunpowder. A letter from Philadelphia mentions the arrival at New York in February of 150 tons of gunpowder for immediate shipment.

News from Kischinev towards the end of February was to the effect that the Russians had entered into fresh contracts for provisions and forage to be ready by the 20th of May, in Roumania.

In February a quantity of shrapnel was directed to be sent to the western fortresses.

A service of carrier pigeons had been established to connect the various fortresses and points of strategical importance. For this purpose 400 pigeons were imported from Berlin in January.

A letter from Kischinev, published in February, speaks of the train equipment as having been for weeks massed at the railway station ready to move, and as having with it 24 small pontoons in pieces, and others of a larger scale, and a quantity of naval stores.

February intelligence alludes to the extreme efficiency as regards armament, &c., of the fortress on the Dniester. Among them Bender is specially mentioned for impregnability, so much so that the Emperor had decorated General Salkov, to whose superintendence its state of strength was due.

News of about the same date mentions the distribution of the siege Artillery in numerous parks at Bieltsy and Chotin, and the augmentation of field Artillery by eight batteries of mountain guns; also so continual an increase to the transport material of the train, so as to make it necessary to consider the possibility of its becoming an incumbrance.\* Within a period of three weeks an accretion to the train is mentioned of 200 wagons and 7,400 horses.

Vice-Admiral Aikas, commanding the Black Sea fleet, and superintendent of the coast ports, was attached to the Head-quarter Staff, in view, it was believed, of his assuming charge of a flotilla of Russian gunboats, already on the Pruth in a complete state of equipment, which it was in contemplation to collect on the Danube at Ismail and Galatz.

\* This is in direct antagonism with other equally trustworthy accounts, which speak of a deficiency of transport.

H



- Feb. 1877. A February letter from Odessa gives the armament of that place for coast defence at 88 guns of position, and relates that there had been recently added to the defences of Otchakow some floating batteries, mounting among them 28 guns; and gives the Otchakow garrison at 8,000 men, including marines.
- March 1877. At Kischinev and Odessa, contracts were invited in March, and merchants and others requested to submit terms for the delivery of large quantities of provisions during the month of April, at Jassy and Giurgevo, and various Roumanian towns between the two points.

V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

- Jan. 1877. Besides the bridges over the Pruth, mentioned in Captain Clarke's (Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General) paper on "The steps which Russia would take should she determine to occupy the principalities in the spring," there is a floating bridge described as follows:—

It is somewhat above Husch, a place about 35 miles south-east of Jassy. It will bear a cart, or anything of that kind, but nothing more, being ill-constructed.

The other bridges over the Pruth alluded to above appear to be three besides the railway bridge at Sculiani. A road bridge at Sculiani, one at Falshi, a few miles below Leovo, and one at Woduly Isakchi, a few miles north of Reni. Below Husch, the Pruth valley is a series of lakes and marshes only traversed by country paths and not easily to be temporarily bridged for military purposes.

In Captain Clarke's paper above referred to occurs the following passage:— "Should the Russians desire to throw across an additional bridge they would probably select to do so at the point near Hus (or Huseh), where the country road down the left bank meets that down the right." This appears to describe with sufficient accuracy the actual site of the above-mentioned floating bridge.

Generally speaking, the Kischinev—Jassy line is badly constructed. A landslip of the bank, near the Korneshti station, such as might easily be brought about by an enemy, would suffice to stop all traffic for a long time.

An addition was ordered in January to the Russian railway rolling-stock, of 150 carriages suitable for the transport of sick and wounded soldiers.

Intelligence dated the middle of January, was to the effect that the state of the Kischinev—Jassy line, near Korneshti, had been looked to; and that works had recently been undertaken to strengthen the crumbling embankments and guard against landslips, and it was stated that that part of the line was in good order, though closed to public traffic.

On the 17th January confidential instructions were despatched to the managing offices of 54 Russian lines of railway, directing the necessary steps to be taken for being prepared, if required, to suspend all ordinary goods traffic after the 27th January, with a view to the possibility of the lines being then required exclusively for the transport of troops.

- Feb. 1877. An extensive order was issued in February by the Russian Government to the railways to add ambulance carriages to their rolling-stock.

It was stated to be the intention of the Russians, when moving forward, to advance as much as possible by road and leave the railway lines for the conveyance of the ambulances and "matériel."

It was reported in February, from Pesth, that 8,000 men ("military engineers") were employed on the lines in Roumania in assimilating the gauge to that of Russia, by putting down an extra line of rails, and that the work would be completed in three weeks. The Russian gauge is 5 feet, and that of Roumania, 4 ft. 8½ in. It was also said that the lines which were for the most part single were about to be doubled. The Russians also had collected at Kischinev a store of 200 tons of axles so constructed as to enable them to utilize some of their own rolling-stock on the existing Roumanian lines.



In February, all the railway officials in South Russia were put under the orders of the military authorities. The ordinary goods traffic, however, on the southern railway lines was not interrupted. Intelligence early in the month announced that during the month further transport on the southern lines would be required for 45,000 men. Feb. 1877.

Towards the end of January and beginning of February, a large increase was made to the rolling-stock of the southern lines. The Kiev line alone had received an additional 380 carriages. Some had been purchased and the rest borrowed from other railways.

#### VI.

#### ROUMANIA, SERVIA, &c.

The Servian forces in January were estimated at two Army-Corps, each of 32,000 men, with 96 guns; but the whole Servian army was in such confusion that it was doubtful how far these numbers represented an actually disposable force. At the same time it was announced that the Servian Government was making great preparations. The first-class of reserves were called out and were to be stationed at Gladova and Negotin, both of which were fortified, and the works at Deligrad were being increased and strengthened. A line of entrenchments had been thrown up between Deligrad and Kruschewatz and forts constructed at Parakjin and Kjudrija in the Morava valley. Servia had obtained 100,000 Remington rifles by the aid of Russia. Jan. 1877.

The Russian Volunteers in Servia were broken up. The Russian General Nikitin, who was charged to settle certain questions at issue between them and the Servian Government, decided against the former, and the majority of them left the country to return to Russia, a minority proceeding to form a separate Corps in Roumania. Later intelligence announced that these volunteers received instructions from their own Government to await further orders at Turn-Severin.

In the event of a Russian Legion being formed for Servia, General Nowossoloff, was named as its probable commander.

Important negotiations—no details of which, however, have transpired—were in progress during the month of February, between the Russian and Roumanian Governments respecting the possible passage of the troops of the former through the territory of the latter. Feb. 1877.

It was reported from Galatz at the end of February that the Roumanian troops were about to occupy Barbosi, on the railway near Galatz, to anticipate its possible seizure by the Turks.

Earlier in the month (the order is dated 7th) all reserves under arms were directed to be sent home.

A project had been discussed for establishing a neutral zone in Roumania, in the event of war breaking out. To discuss this and other questions the Roumanian Government was represented at Kischinev by several superior officers. The Russian Chief of the Staff recognised the impracticability of the neutral zone idea and it was abandoned.

#### VII.

#### THE TURKISH ARMY.

There are no accurate data to hand of the strength and distribution of the Turkish Army in the month of January, or even such as would enable a tolerably reliable estimate to be formed from balancing the conflicting reports. Jan. 1877.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٤ اظ] (٦٦/٢٨)

28

Jan. 1877. Probably, by degrees, official information may come in, but in the mean time there seems no other course open than to put down the most apparently reasonable reports, rejecting what seems exaggerated or improbable. According to one of the former, the total strength of the Turkish forces was 644,512 men.

40,000 men were at Nisch on the frontier of Servia, to be ready for the termination of the armistice.

Large contingents had been drawn from Syria, about 60,000 men.

The latest January intelligence, sent from Rustchuk, estimated the Turkish forces in Bulgaria at 146,000 men, distributed in 184 battalions of Nizams, 76 of Redifs, and 21,000 Cavalry, with 292 guns. The effective strength of the battalions of Nizams and Redifs was given at about 500 men, all told, and this list is exclusive of irregular troops and reservists who were still arriving. It was calculated that the 1st February would see the Turkish Army concentrated and deployed along the line of the Danube from the Sulina mouth and Tultscha to Lom Palanka, and even beyond Widdin.

Feb. 1877. Some details are given of the Turkish Army as seen in February by an English officer, who described it as armed, the Infantry with Martini-Henrys, Sniders, and muzzle-loaders, and the Cavalry with flint pistols and Remington carbines.

In February, the Turks were described as quite unprepared for war, and remarkably blind as to their own deficiencies. A paper force of 370,000 men on the Danube, on which the War Office relied, is reported to mean a real force of barely 8,000 men north of the Balkans, including Saitschar and Widdin, and scarcely a man to the south of them.

Intelligence, subsequent to but less reliable than the above, alluded to much moving about and shifting of the troops on the line of the Danube. Schumla and Widdin had received considerable reinforcements, and the force at the latter place was detailed at 57 battalions of Infantry, two regiments of Cavalry and 82 guns, and at the former at 28 battalions, one regiment of Cavalry and eight batteries. The Turks were making great efforts to get their whole army into line by the middle of the month. There was a great scarcity of horses for transport service. The Mustahfiz, or last Militia levy, were also now for the first time being called out, but they were without arms or equipment. Measures, however, were being taken to supply this deficiency. It was also resolved to call out the "Tcherkesse"—but only at the last moment—and to employ them against the anticipated Russian advance by the Dobrudscha.

Information, dated the middle of February, from Vienna, estimates the Turkish Army at 100,000 men, and 60,000 in the field, but does not explain the distribution in the field, or say anything of the condition of the troops.

Intelligence from Tuldscha, of the last week in February, relates that the Turkish Commander-in-Chief was prepared to place 20,000 men at that point in 24 hours, on the first sign of a forward Russian movement.

Subsequently the following details of the Turkish Army appeared, furnished to the "Journal de St. Petersburg" by its Constantinople correspondent.

On the European side, the force was not in excess of 130,000 men, (not counting a small corps in garrison in the provinces of Epirus and Thessaly). This force included 150 battalions of about 600 men, or about 90,000 regular troops, and they are described as admirably armed, equipped, and disciplined, and animated by a true military spirit. (In other words, except as regards numbers the description is the reverse of what has come to hand from reliable sources). The account proceeds with some details of the distribution of this force.

The army of the Danube, under the command of Eyub Pacha, is in echelon to the north of the Balkan chain from the Black Sea to the line of the river Timok. It includes the garrisons of Saitschar and Schumla, and absorbs of the above force some 70,000 men, whose formation is complete. There are at Constantinople about 45 battalions, not yet fit to enter the first line, and behind all these the reserve, being assembled and drilled in various unspecified localities in the interior.

\* Circassians.



The same correspondent stated that orders had been issued to the direction of the Adrianople railway to prepare for the immediate transport to the interior of 24 battalions, to be followed in a week by seven others. Feb. 1877.

A Vienna authority, writing in February, declares that all the efforts of the Turks will not enable them to assemble more than 100,000 men in Bulgaria.

In March the Turkish strength at Widdin (exclusive of a force of 40,000 men it was proposed to concentrate in an entrenched camp there), was given at 71 battalions of Infantry of the line, 12 squadrons of Cavalry, and 12 batteries of Artillery, told off into two divisions. In addition to these there were five battalions distributed between Rustchuk, Palanka and Lom, to keep up the communications between the different fractions of the force lining the Danube. The total strength of this force was given at 60,000 men. March 1877.

### VIII.

#### TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, &c.

*Rustchuk.*—Opposite side of the Danube to Giurgevo. About 100 yards from the Giurgevo landing place, in the stream of the Danube, is an island about half-a-mile in width, and distant some 700 or 800 yards from the Turkish side of the river. On it are the remains of two batteries facing south, probably Russian ones of 1854. The island is a mile and a half below the town of Rustchuk, opposite the terminus of the Rustchuk—Varna railway. Feb. 1877.

The enceinte of the Rustchuk fortress is of very ancient date and weak in profile, the relief being about 25 ft. at most. It was out of repair, escarp and counter-scarp crumbling into the ditch in many places. The fortress and forts contained many powder magazines, badly protected and conspicuously placed, in which much powder was stored. The Rustchuk forts were 12 in number, none of them constructed to meet the requirements of rifled Artillery. Hence Rustchuk is described as practically without defence, though affording an unusually good position for an army of 30,000 to 40,000 men. The key of the position is a hill on which a permanent fort, likely to be ready in two or three months, was being constructed. This hill is commanded by another to the south-east, about 600 yards to the west of the Rustchuk—Schumla road, on which it is intended to build another fort. Of existing fortifications at Rustchuk, the most perfect were a redoubt on the banks of the river, about 300 yards from the enceinte, and 200 to the north of the Rustchuk—Silistria road. It was the intention of the Turks to arm the forts at Rustchuk with 240 guns, but in February no guns were mounted except a few smooth-bores in the enceinte. Of the 240 guns only a limited number were to be rifled (about 42).

The Turks had only 11 or 12 rifled guns of position north of Schumla. 54 had recently been landed at Varna, for which place 44 of them were destined, and further cargoes of guns were arriving before the end of the month.

There was no certain information as to the force at Rustchuk. It was stated at 9,000 Infantry, and there were contradictory reports about the presence of two field batteries of Artillery. It was allowed that the garrison was very unhealthy, but there were only 120 men in hospital.

*Turtukai.*—An important point on the Danube, between Rustchuk and Silistria, opposite Oltenitza; in itself a dirty little Turkish village, without defences, troops, or telegraph.

*Silistria.*—The nominal garrison in February was 12,000 men, but there were only 90 men in the hospital, so the paper force was probably in excess of the real one. There were two field batteries, with light breech-loading brass guns, probably of similar calibre to English nine-pounders, and no cavalry. The fortifications of Silistria were inspected in February by an English officer, from whom a report on the subject may be expected. Feb. 1877.



*Schumla.*—The Turks have recently built one new fort on a hill named Boush-Tepe (five hills), to the north-west of the town. It is well placed, of irregular shape, and is to mount 12 guns. Three lunettes are to be built in front of the fort. There are two other large forts in process of construction, one a star fort to the south-east and the other a German fort to the south.

In February, the garrison numbered less than 10,000 Infantry, composed of two brigades, each brigade consisting of two regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. There were also a regiment of Cavalry and some field batteries, the reported numbers varying between four and eight. Of these some had Armstrongs, and muzzle-loaders and breech-loaders were mingled together.

There are eight or nine old forts, dating from 1828 and 1829, or from the Crimean war, valuable against field artillery, but useless against heavy ordnance; all much out of repair, and with no guns mounted except a few old smooth-bores.

Schumla from its natural advantages is a very strong position, and is well protected from investment by high hills and impassable forests to the north-west. The new forts are upwards of a mile in advance of the old ones and crown an admirable defensive position for a large army.

News from America in February mentions that Turkey had been engaged since 1870, and was still, in procuring warlike stores, chiefly arms and cartridges. One company, the "Winchester," at Newhaven, was credited with having already sent a hundred million of cartridges and cartridge shells to Constantinople.

The strength of the Turkish Navy was officially stated in February at 116 ships, of a total burden of 101,102 tons, armed with 759 guns, and was according to Vienna intelligence manned by about 16,000 men.

Turkey was also credited (by report) with having 15 monitors on the Danube.

As regards what has been said above respecting the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, however incapable they may be of resisting a vigorous attack under modern conditions, it appears established by intelligence received towards the end of February that recently, important works had been in progress to render them efficient, and that therefore the defensive power of the river line is very different from what it was a year ago.

In confirmation of what has been said of the supply of arms, &c., obtained from America by the Turks, a consignment of 200,000 Martini-Henry rifles, and 30,000 revolvers was due in February.

March 1877. News from Turkey in March described the fortresses of Silistria, Schumla and Varna as in a perfect state of defence, both as regards garrison and armaments, and the Commander-in-Chief was in communication with the forts on the Danube, with a view to filling up as quickly as possible all gaps still existing in the ranks of the garrisons.

It was resolved to concentrate 40,000 men in an entrenched camp near Widdin, and at the other extremity of the line of the Danube works were being thrown up for the defence of the plain of the Dobrudscha.

The Krupp guns already mentioned as having arrived at Varna had been distributed among the Danube fortresses.

A star fort battery had been erected facing Kalafat.

#### IX.

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

Jan. 1877. Nothing is more remarkable than the conflicting nature of the rumours received about the beginning of the year from Bessarabia of the condition of the Russian Army. These varied between the extremes of inefficiency, confusion, and disorganization on the one hand, and their opposites on the other. As the month of January wore on opinion seemed to lean towards the latter view, and it was held that though undoubtedly the commencement of mobilization showed many weak points in the system, the energy subsequently put forth in every department had remedied defects; and it was said to be to the interest of Russia that her army should appear in the eyes of Europe less efficient than it really was. There is no doubt that foreigners at Kischinev,



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [١٦] (٦٦/٣١)

16

newspaper correspondents and others, found few facilities afforded them for Jan. 1877. obtaining information, but the reports of witnesses as to what they actually did see suggest the idea of a really efficient and formidable army.

The climate of Bessarabia is unhealthy, and subject to epidemics, and by intelligence dated the middle of January, the sanitary condition of the Russian Army in the provinces was unsatisfactory. About Kischinev, diphtheria had made great havoc.

Towards the end of the month there was severe frost about Bucharest, and the freezing over of the Danube was anticipated.

The Conference of the Great Powers sitting at Constantinople broke up in the latter days of January.

February intelligence mentions the arrival at Odessa of 140 Russian Feb. 1877. families that no longer regarded the Turkish capital as a safe residence. Besides these, numerous Russian residents in other parts of Turkey had returned home.

The armistice between Turkey and Servia expired with the month of February, but though no definite peace was signed, diplomatic negotiations were in progress, which for the time averted a renewal of hostilities.

It was reported in March that navigation at Odessa was suspended on March 1877. account of the severe frost.



APRIL 1877.

PAGE		PAGE	
I. Narrative .. .. .	.. .. .	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. . . . .	.. .. .
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army .. .. .	.. .. .	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. . . . .	.. .. .
III. Russian Army Details .. .. .	.. .. .	VII. The Turkish Army .. .. .	.. .. .
IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Materials, &c. . . . .	.. .. .	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, &c. . . . .	.. .. .
		IX. Miscellaneous .. .. .	.. .. .

I.

NARRATIVE.

April 1877. During the month of April there were continuous rumours of a forward movement of the Russian troops in Bessarabia towards the Roumanian frontier, but these reports were unaccompanied by the details necessary for identifying the various fractions of the army said to be in motion, nor was there any reliable news of real importance till towards the latter part of the month.

The armistice between Turkey and Montenegro expired at midnight of the 12th and 13th April, and was not renewed.

On the 23rd of April, official notice was given of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey.

Unofficial intelligence of about the same date mentioned the arrival of the Russian Emperor at Kischinev, and his having reviewed the troops. Also that the roads in Roumania were still impassable, and likely to remain so for some time.

This last intelligence is confirmed by trustworthy information from St. Petersburg, dated the 11th, according to which the roads will not be practicable for at least three weeks.

Intelligence from Bucharest announces that a Russian General of Engineers, with his staff, had gone to Kalafat to inspect and take charge of the works there.

It was stated in the newspapers that the Turks had made all their preparations to anticipate the Russians at the Barbosi railway bridge, over the Sereth, between Galatz and Braila, and to destroy the bridge. This was about the latest news before the outbreak of the war.

On the night of the 24th of April, Lord Derby announced to the House of Lords his having received intelligence, an hour or two previously, of the passage across the frontier of 1,700 Russian troops.

This news was followed rapidly by that of the formal declaration of war with Turkey by Russia (the declaration being dated 12th-24th April), and of the successful seizure of the Barbosi bridge by the Russian Flying Division, under Lieutenant-General Skobelev (the same who, in 1876, was appointed Governor of Ferghana, in Central Asia).

It appears, that for political reasons, the declaration of war by Russia, and the passage across the frontiers, were advanced at least a fortnight.

This may account for subsequent apparent delay in the military operations on the European side, as the preparations were not complete when the troops moved forward.

The points at which the Russian troops are stated to have crossed the Pruth are three, at Sculiani, Leovo, and opposite Bolgrad.

By the latest April news, two new corps appear upon the scene and take up positions vacated by the active army. These are the 13th and 14th Corps, which, at the end of the month, were heard of respectively at Jitomir and Kischinev.

By news of the same date, the number of Russian troops that had crossed the Roumanian frontier was given at from 28,000 to 30,000 men, and these were concentrating about Galatz and Barbosi.

Several pieces of artillery had been placed in position, to protect the railway bridge at the latter place.



The badness of the roads had apparently made it necessary to use the railway for the conveyance of troops—Infantry (as well as for that of stores and war materials), more than had been originally intended. April 1877.

The disembarkation from the railway of troops destined for such points up the Danube as Kalafat, Flamunda, Turnu Margureli, Giurgevo, and Kalarasch, appears to be taking place at Marazesti, whence the high road leads by Fockhani and Rimmik, and meets the railway again at Buzeo. Army head-quarters, it was said, would be successfully transferred from Sculiani to Buzeo, and from Buzeo to Ploiesti.

According to the latest April intelligence, the general situation seems to have been as follows:—

The Russians were advancing parallel to the Danube, up the river, in two columns.

Of this advance no details were to hand, except, that the advanced guard of its left (formed of troops pushed forward from those being concentrated about Galatz and Barbosi) had reached Braila, which point and Galatz, and the Barbosi bridge between them, were held by the 11th Corps of Lieutenant-General Prince Schahovskoi. Ismail and Kilia, on the Russian side of the Pruth, south of Bolgrad and north of the Kilia estuary of the Danube, were occupied by the 36th Division, belonging to the 7th Army-Corps. These operations and concentrations on the left were then said to be preparatory to a passage of the Danube at Galatz, and an entrance into the Dobrudscha, as soon as the occupation of other points up the river had been effected.

Trustworthy information from St. Petersburg, names Giurgevo as the point at which the main body of the Russian Army will most probably cross the Danube.

## II.

### MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Russia was stated to have organised and put on a war footing, during the month of April, nine fresh army-corps, exclusive of the Guard Corps, which latter includes three divisions of Infantry, two of Cavalry, "three brigades of Artillery, and one of Chasseurs."

It is stated that there is a great deficiency of officers in the active army engaged in the operations, and that a similar deficiency exists in the 13th and 14th Corps.

## III.

### RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

Official information from Vienna, received in April and dated 7th March, gives the details and distribution of the Southern Army, which it is needless to recapitulate, as it is the same as has already been given in the portions of this chapter for preceding months. The numerical strength, however, is not quite the same, and there are one or two remarks that conflict with former reports. For instance, it is said not to be decided whether the coast Army of Observation will reinforce the active Army of Operation directly, or whether this reinforcement will be done by a new mobilization of other corps. It was calculated that there would be amply sufficient time for any needful measures of reinforcement during the six weeks which the troops will require for their march to the Danube.

The numerical strength is thus given:—

*Army of Operation.*—Four Corps, numbering 144,000 men, 32,800 horses, and 432 guns.

*Army of Observation.*—72,000 men, 16,400 horses, and 216 guns.

*Total Field Army.*—216,000 men, 49,200 horses, 648 guns.

To supplement the above information, comes intelligence from St. Petersburg, from a trustworthy source.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [١٧ ظ] (٦٦/٣٤)

34

April 1877. It refers to statements by Prince Gortschakoff, Count Schouvaloff, and the Russian press, estimating the Russian forces ready to march against Turkey at half-a-million of men, to deny these assertions, as exaggerations. The information is based on a close examination of the latest Russian official returns.

The statement itself is dated March 16th, and the Russian return referred to, January 12th.

The information is as follows :—

Troops under immediate command of the Archduke Nicholas, all told	..	210,000
13th and 14th Corps d'Armée (new organisation), stationed at Kiev and Jitomir, all told	.. .. .	55,000
Total	.. .. .	265,000

Deducting non-combatants, there remain—

Troops under command of Grand Duke Nicholas	.. .. .	185,000
13th and 14th Corps d'Armée	.. .. .	50,000
Total	.. .. .	235,000

Deducting from above, Artillery and Engineers, and men of Artillery and Engineer parks, there remain—

Troops under Grand Duke Nicholas	.. .. .	150,000
13th and 14th Corps d'Armée	.. .. .	40,000
Total	.. .. .	190,000

The Army of the Caucasus (with which this paper is not concerned), with similar deductions made, is given at 40,000 men, raising the foregoing total to 230,000.

From this whole strength, 20,000 men are deducted for sick, leaving a force of 210,000 combatants to represent the armies in Europe and the Caucasus, with which Russia is prepared to attack Turkey.

The writer infers that the deficit in men has been partially reduced since the date of the despatch, but that, with regard to officers, the position must be much the same as it was.

Former information from the same quarter alluded to an immense deficit of officers in the Army of Bessarabia; and it only remains to add that, in the 13th and 14th Army-Corps, there are deficient 600 officers.

The following information is from the ordinary sources:—Intelligence from Galatz, dated the 20th April, refers to the question of the reinforcement of the four Corps of the Army of Operation (8, 9, 11, 12), alluded to in the foregoing despatches.

According to this authority, these Corps have been reinforced, both by the two Corps of the coast "Army of Observation" (7 and 10), and by the 13th and 14th Army-Corps, mentioned in the statement just given.

It is, however, very doubtful about the 7th and 10th Corps. That the former, stationed at Odessa, has pushed forward detachments to Ismail and Kilia appears to be established, but nothing more.

The 13th Corps was still at Jitomir, and the 14th had replaced the troops of the original Army of Operation at Kischinev.

Some of the returns from which the details in this chapter were compiled, omitted to state the number of battalions in Russian Infantry regiments, and of brigades in Divisions, which are as follows:—

Each of the 48 Divisions of the Russian Army consists of two brigades, and each brigade of two regiments.

In 10 of these Divisions (three of the Guard and seven of the Caucasus), the regiments have four battalions, and in the remaining 38 Divisions, three battalions.

There are, therefore, altogether, 616 battalions of Regular Infantry in the Russian Army, exclusive of the Rifle Brigades.

The composition of Lieutenant-General Skobeloff's Flying Division of "Eclaireurs" is detailed in unofficial intelligence as follows:—Lieutenant-Colonel Konkarenko's Regiment of six sotnias of Kuban Cossacks, the 30th



Regiment of Don Cossacks (six sotnias) under Colonel Orlov, Colonel Leviz- April 1877.  
ov-Menar's Regiment of four sotnias of Terek Cossacks, Colonel Pankratow's  
Irregular Militia Regiment of four sotnias of Terek Mountaineers, and a Don  
Cossack battery of Horse Artillery, with mountain guns.

IV.

MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

Towards the end of the month, it was reported that the Russians—having occupied Braila and Galatz—were actively employed in placing torpedoes in the Danube, opposite those points.

Of four Russian gunboats brought by rail to Galatz, two had been launched.

2,200 sacks of Russian grain were delivered at Galatz, from Odessa, on the 15th of April.

At the end of last month there were rumours, not authenticated, and given without detail, of the withdrawal of troops from Odessa to Poti, for operations on the Asiatic side.

At the close of the month the state of the Russian transport was said to be unsatisfactory. There was not enough of it, a state of things likely to be felt more as the troops moved on. (This information, from a trustworthy source, is at variance with unofficial news.)

V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

At the end of April heavy inundations near Ungheni were interfering seriously with the Russian transport.

Materials were being collected for a floating bridge over the Sereth, near Sherbesti, and 100 flat-bottomed barges had been ordered by the Russian Consul at Galatz. The official intelligence announcing this (dated 17th), added that the Consul required the barges in ten days, but that they would not be ready for thirty.

The carrying capability of the Roumanian railway, when the Russians began their advance, was given at about 18 trains a-day. As a preparation for that advance, 900 railway carriages had been collected at various points along the line between Kischinev and Jassy.

The telegraph lines between Ungheni and Jassy had been worked by Russian officials for some time previously, and, since the 20th, goods traffic by railway across the Russo-Roumanian frontier had been stopped.

On the 23rd, the 3rd Battalion of the Russian Railway Service Brigade reached Jassy.

VI.

ROUMANIA, SERVICIA, &c.

A special convention secures Bucharest from Russian occupation during the passage of the Czar's troops through other parts of the province of Roumania.



April 1877. It was the intention of the Government to concentrate troops in that neighbourhood for the protection of the capital against an anticipated attack by Turkish irregulars.

Besides this concentration, it is notified from Galatz, on the 16th April, that 6,000 Roumanian troops were expected there in a few days.

VII.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

Russian semi-official intelligence, dated April, gives the strength of the Turkish forces in Europe at the close of the war with Servia at 867 battalions, and 83 squadrons, or a total of 250,000 men and 468 guns. The same authority, allowing for subsequent levies, estimates generally the strength and distribution of the Turkish forces on the European side of the Black Sea at 40,000 for employment against Montenegro; 60,000 at Widdin; 20,000 between Rustchuk and Silistria; 8,000 at the extreme west of the Empire, on the Danube; 40,000 further south, attached to the army of the Danube; and 25,000 for the defence of the line between Varna and Schumla.

The last intelligence, in April, described the Turks as evacuating Widdin and moving hastily down the Danube, apparently with the object of meeting the Russians in the Dobrudscha. They had made no attempt to occupy Kalafat, Oltenitza, or Giurgevo, on the north bank of the Danube.

Intelligence, dated Bucharest, 17th of April, mentions the arrival of Abdul Kerim Pasha and Ahmed Eyub Pasha, at Rustchuk, on the 16th. They were to leave the following day for Silistria.

The Head-quarter Staff of the Turkish Army had arrived by sea at Varna, and was about to leave for Rustchuk and Toulcha.

VIII.

TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, &c.

News from Bucharest, of the 17th of April, mentions the arrival of 70 Krupp guns at Rustchuk (probably field-guns for the Turkish Army); and of two Turkish iron-clads off the mouths of the Danube.

IX.

MISCELLANEOUS.

In April, news was received that a Russian Commissariat employé, convicted of peculation on a large scale, had been shot at Kischinev.



MAY 1ST TO SATURDAY, MAY 5TH.

CONTENTS.

PAGE	PAGE
I. Narrative .. .. . 37	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. . . . . 41
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army .. 39	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. . . . . 41
III. Russian Army Details .. .. . 40	VII. The Turkish Army .. .. . 42
IV. Movement of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. . . . . 40	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, &c. . . . . 42
	IX. Miscellaneous .. .. . 42

I.

NARRATIVE.

Up to the 5th of May, as far as the general situation was known, there was little change since the end of last month.

The left wing of the Russian Army rested on, and was strengthening its positions on, the left bank of the Danube from Braila to Galatz and Reni; and this position was prolonged through Ismail and Kilia, as far as the mouth of the river, by a division from the Coast Army, the 36th, from the 7th Army-Corps of which the Head-Quarters were at Odessa.

Prince Schahovskoi's 11th Corps held the positions from Braila to Reni, inclusive of Galatz and Sherbesti and intermediate villages.

No further movement other than across the Danube was to be anticipated from this part of the force, which became a pivot round which the rest of the active army was believed to be wheeling to the left to take up, as quickly as difficulties of bad roads and other obstacles would allow, positions along the north bank of the river.

Army head-quarters were to be transferred successively from Jassy to Buzeo and Ploesti, but as yet were not advanced beyond Kischinev. It is difficult to arrive at a correct estimate of the number of Russian troops actually in Roumania, as the figures given vary from 40,000 to 250,000. It is probable that the strength was not less than 60,000 up to the 5th of May, including the troops in position on the Lower Danube and those moving up the river.

Hobart Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Navy, who was on the Danube when the war broke out, successfully ran a blockade down the river under the Russian guns, and having joined the fleet was credited (by newspaper report) with the intention of bombarding Odessa. No collision of much importance had as yet taken place on the Danube between the Turks and the Russians.

The above is a general summary of the state of things in Roumania according to such intelligence as was to hand up to the 5th of May.

The following details of this intelligence are, of course, liable to contradiction by later news.

The Russian position on the Lower Danube was being made one of great strength. The various villages were secured by field-works, heavy guns were placed in position in batteries on the banks of the river and torpedoes sunk in the bed of the stream. Between Galatz and Ismail a camp of 3,000 huts of wood had been erected by the troops, and six Russian gunboats were being concentrated near the mouth of the Sereth for the protection of the Barbosi Bridge. A portion of the Black Sea squadron also was expected at the mouth of the Danube.

A quantity of bridging material was being collected at Galatz and Sherbesti.

This was required to bridge the Sereth (over which two additional bridges had been thrown), to repair an already existing, rather "rotten" bridge over the Pruth, and to throw over the Danube a bridge which should strike the right bank at Isaktchi.

L



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٩ اظ] (٦٦/٣٨)

38

May 1877.

The Head-Quarters of the 11th Corps were at Galatz, and Prince Schahovskoi, its commander, had issued orders for all merchant shipping at that place and Braila to be clear of those ports by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, the 28th of April. As regards the other flank of the Russian advance, up to the 5th of May there was no authentic intelligence further than that the advanced guard had reached Buzeo (where the road that diverges from the railway at Marazesti rejoins the line), and that Russian troops proceeding by rail were passing round Bucharest bound for Giurgevo. Rumour added that positions were being taken up and strengthened along the north bank of the Danube, from Giurgevo to Oltenitza, and that, in addition to the troops bound for Giurgevo, others moving past Bucharest by rail had gone on by train on the other line towards Krajovo. No troops had entered the town of Giurgevo, nor are the rumours of Russian troops to the west of Bucharest confirmed. Roumanian troops were moving into position on the Danube on the Russian right, and had occupied Kalafat with 12,000 men and 24 guns.

This occupation was about simultaneous with the first exchange of shots between the Turks and Russians, in which some Turkish shells fell into the Roumanian town of Braila, and did some slight damage. This may have had some effect in disposing of the doubtful question of the neutrality of Roumania. In any case, it becomes apparent from this time forth that that province is to be considered as an ally of Russia and at war with Turkey.

A difficulty arose about the Roumanian troops. The Russian Commander-in-Chief is said to have offered Prince Charles of Roumania his choice between distributing his soldiers throughout the Russian Army, and disbanding them. The Prince declined to do either, and the matter was ultimately compromised. The Roumanian Army was to form a separate force complete in itself under its own Prince, but under the Chief Command of the Russian Grand Duke. It was to operate to the extreme west, that is to say, on the right flank of the Russian Army. As part of this arrangement a Division was sent to occupy Kalafat as above related.

The exchange of shots alluded to above between the Turks and Russians took place on the 3rd of May, between the Russian batteries near Braila and two Turkish monitors. The firing was renewed the following day, but there is no record of serious damage being done on either side. The withdrawal of the monitors the first day is said to have been due to the superiority of the Russian fire.

There is little to add to the foregoing, from such information as was available up to the 5th of May.

As regards the future, the best information named the central position of about Giurgevo as the probable point of passage for the main body of the Russian Army.

Unofficial intelligence interpreted the Russian concentration between Braila and the mouth of the Danube as denoting a probable passage of the main body about Isaktchi and Toulcha. These two latter points are considered on high authority the most favourable for crossing which exist along the whole course of the river,\* but the concentration does not necessarily imply the intention of using them, as it is to the Russians a matter of vital moment to strengthen their position about the mouth of the Sereth and on the Lower Danube by every possible means, wherever they may decide on crossing. The probable date of the passage of the Danube is placed in the fourth week in May.

Supplies were plentiful in Roumania, but the weather and the state of the roads had much delayed the Russian advance in the direction of Buzeo and Bucharest, and floods, damaging the railway bridges, had brought to a standstill some trains of troops moving forward from the rear towards Galatz.

The neutrality of Servia was reported, enabling the Turks to withdraw their forces from the Servian frontier.

The latter were credited with the intention of acting strictly on the defensive in Bulgaria and awaiting the passage of the Danube by the Russians, and were said to be evacuating the Dobrukscha. There were rumours, without confirmation or details, of Russian detachments opposite Hirsova; and at Banjasa, Ursicini, and Slobodzia. These two latter points are on the Jalonitza river,

\* General Chesney, quoted in Confidential Memorandum No. 0622 of this Office.



the former about midway between Buzeo and Bucharest, and the latter on the road to Kalarasch, opposite Silistria. It would appear probable that these reports may be all due to the active arrival of Russian troops at Ursicini; as from this latter point a road runs through Slobodzia to Gura Jalonitza, on the Danube opposite Hirsova, while another road diverges from it at Slobodzia and runs south to Kalarasch. May 1877.

The official notification of the blockade of the Russian coast of the Black Sea as far on the European side as the Kilia estuary, is dated Constantinople, May 3rd, the blockade to have effect from the 1st. The last news of any importance up to the 5th of May is of an engagement taking place on the 4th between a Turkish monitor and the Russian batteries below Reni, which were covering an attempt to throw a bridge across the Danube between that point and Isaktchi.

The Turks in evacuating the Dobrudscha and retiring behind a second line were said to be making arrangements to lay waste the country behind them, and to burn Toultscha.

In general terms, the Turkish movements, as reported this week, seemed to imply a withdrawal from both flanks, the Dobrudscha and Widdin, and a concentration towards the centre about Rustchuk. The Turks were still said to be 50,000 strong at Widdin, and still in force at Toultscha, but were under orders to evacuate the latter.

## II.

### MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

The mobilization is officially announced of the 21st and 38th Infantry Divisions, thus completing the mobilization of the entire regular army of the Caucasus.

Reliable intelligence from St. Petersburg, dated the 23rd of April, announces that before leaving Kischinev, the Czar had ordered the following details of mobilization:—

1. The 2nd and 3rd Divisions of Infantry with their Artillery.
2. The 4th Army-Corps; made up of the 16th and 30th Infantry Divisions with their Artillery, and the 4th Cavalry Division. These were to be ready in three weeks, and were intended to reinforce the European Army of operations.
3. The 7th Artillery Brigade of Parks; destined to supply the Guards, the 1st Army-Corps and the above 4th Army-Corps, and 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions.
4. 10 Reserve Battalions; formed of fortress troops, intended for duties on the line of communications; to be composed of two fortress battalions of Bender, two of Bobruisk, and six of Dunaburg.
5. Twelve batteries of complementary troops.

There still remained unmobilized in Russia, 21 Infantry Divisions at the date of this news.

All the Don Cossack regiments of the 1st and 2nd part were mobilized (40 regiments of Cavalry).

Additional field hospitals had been formed.

The siege train was in immense strength. Unofficial intelligence announces that the mobilization of the Guards Corps, and the 1st Army-Corps—both of which have their head-quarters at St. Petersburg—had already been decreed.

Of 16 newly formed Army-Corps, 11 have two Infantry Divisions and the remaining five have three. The latter five corps are the following:—

The Guards, and 1st at St. Petersburg; the 2nd at Wilna; the Grenadiers at Lublin; and the 6th at Warsaw.



III.

RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

May 1877. General Routchevsky has been appointed Second Aide to General Nepokojtschizky, Chief of the Staff.

Intelligence from Vienna, dated the 4th of May, gives some details of the Russian Army, of which the following bear upon the European operations:— The actual army engaged in European operations is now considered to include nine Army-Corps—the original four corps of the army of operation; the two corps of the army of observation (of which the 10th corps guards the Crimea and the northern shore of the Black Sea, while the 7th has pushed forward a Division into Roumania to feel the left of the advancing army); and three corps of reserve in Volhynia and Podolia, the 4th, 13th, and 14th. The 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th and 12th Corps are described as in Roumania, or on the march to it, and with their reserves, the 4th, 13th and 14th are said to muster an effective strength of 247,000 Infantry, 24,000 Cavalry and 864 guns, or a total of 352,000 men; and the 10th Corps is given at 30,000 Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry, and 108 guns, or a total of 43,000 men.

The 15th Infantry Division—that is, the 2nd Division of the 7th Army-Corps—is now mentioned as on the march to join the 36th Division in the positions south of Bolgrad, about Reni—Ismail—Kilia.

The Russian strength in the neighbourhood of Barbosi and Galatz is given at a Division of Infantry, 32—16-pr. guns, and 2,000 Cossacks. Another Division is encamped in detachments between Galatz and Ismail, and about 8,000 men between Ismail and Kilia.

There is as yet no information to enable the troops to be identified that constitute the right of the Russian advance.

Of the Russian troops in Roumania, the number that had actually passed through Jassy, between the declaration of war and the close of the month of April, is given at 30,000 men and 60 guns. A quantity of hospital accommodation has been rented for one year in Jassy by the Russian Commander-in-Chief.

A Bulgarian contingent was being formed to aid the Russians, and was being organised in Roumania by Russian officers. The materials for two battalions were already collected, and the arrival was anticipated of sufficient recruits to swell the strength ultimately to that of a Division of 10,000 men.

IV.

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

*Troops.*—Of the 17,000 Russians whose passage across the frontier on the 24th April was announced by Lord Derby that evening, 12,000 crossed near Bolgrad, and the remaining 5,000 were at Jassy.

*Stores.*—Intelligence (official), received in May, dated the middle of April, announced the completion by the Russian Government of large contracts for beams, logs of wood, barges, pontoons and bridging materials generally. It was not anticipated that these stores would be collected at Galatz under 30 days. The wood was being taken to Sherbesti, close to the railway, on the north bank of the Danube, below the point of junction of the Sereth.

Reliable intelligence from St. Petersburg, under date the 23rd of April, announces that the 13th and 14th Army-Corps were under orders to move southward from Jitomir and Kischinev.

The occupation of Braila and Galatz by the 11th Corps, and of Ismail and Kilia by the 7th Corps (36th Division) was complete on the 27th April.

The Russians are said to have several floating batteries, drawing but a few feet of water, ready at the mouth of the Dniester, near Akerman, which it is their intention to work round along the coast to the Kilia estuary.

The Russian torpedo depôt of the Lower Danube was at the mouth of the Pruth, where the detachment of Engineers and Sailors in charge mustered 600



men. The first torpedoes were laid in the river on the night of the 28th of May 1877. April, and the following week they were down along the whole line from Braila to Reni. It was also rumoured that torpedoes had been laid below Reni to the mouth of the river.

V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

Banjasa is mentioned in early May intelligence as occupied by Russian troops, and it was announced that a large force would be concentrated there.

This Banjasa is about three miles north-west of Bucharest, near the point where the two lines of railway converge, from Jassy, and Krajovo; but there is another town of the same name, also said to have been reached by the Russian troops, on the railway line between Bucharest and Giurgevo.

There is an absence of accurate information as to the bridging operations being carried on by the Russians. An immense quantity of bridging material is collected about the mouth of the Pruth, and two bridges are spoken of as in process of construction—one up the river between Turnu and Nikopolis, and one below Reni, to reach the southern shore at Isaktchi.

As regards the former, beyond a vague rumour of Russian troops being seen marching west of Giurgevo, there is no confirmatory intelligence of their presence at Turnu.

Large working parties of Russian troops were employed in repairing and improving the roads about the position on the Lower Danube.

The floods in Roumania, by damaging the railway bridges had brought several trains of troops (15 engines and 200 carriages) to a stand still. The passage of troops this week over the Barbosi bridge is given at five military trains per day.

VI.

ROUMANIA, SERVICIA, &c.

The earliest May intelligence announced that the passage of the Pruth by the Russian Army, about the 24th April (a fortnight earlier than was originally intended), took Prince Charles by surprise.

The news of the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops from Jassy was simultaneous with that of the arrival of the Russians there.

A proclamation by the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Roumanian people, announcing the passage through Roumanian territory of the Russian Army, is dated the 24th of April.

Immediately after the news of the evacuation of Jassy by the Roumanian troops came that of the similar evacuation by them of Kalafat and Galatz, and of the concentration of the troops of the principality about Bucharest.

Subsequently the Roumanian troops re-occupied Kalafat, and the Roumanian Army became the right wing of the Russian active force.

It is announced that orders have been given for the mobilization of the Roumanian Militia, and that the entire Militia force will be called out. Each district in the province was to contribute a battalion, and the city of Bucharest a battalion.

A Roumanian gunboat was stationed off the mouth of the Sereth.

Servia continues neutral.



VII.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

May 1877. There is no fresh detailed information this week of the strength, distribution or movements of the Turkish forces between the Danube and the Balkans.

VIII.

TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, &c.

Early May intelligence, alluding to the end of April, announced the presence of seven Turkish ironclads in the Sulina mouth of the Danube, preparing to ascend the river.

Intelligence from Bucharest of the 3rd of May describes the Turks as very busy in the construction of two large earthworks at Rustchuk.

The Turkish ironclad flotilla for service on the Danube is said to include five gunboats carrying in a turret either a smooth-bore 68-pr. or a rifled Armstrong 40-pr.; three low-decked monitors with two turrets; two smaller monitors with one turret and two Armstrong guns; and two other monitors with one gun each.

IX.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The earliest May intelligence reported the roads as in bad order in Roumania.

The water in the Pruth and Danube was very high.

The marsh lands continued flooded.



MAY 7TH TO MAY 12TH.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Narrative .. .. .	43	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. .. .	48
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army .. .	45	VI. Roumania, Serrin, &c. .. .	48
III. Russian Army Details .. .. .	45	VII. The Turkish Army .. .. .	49
IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. .. .. .	47	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, Guns, &c. .. .	49
		IX. Miscellaneous .. .. .	50

I.

NARRATIVE.

During the week ending on Saturday the 12th May, little has taken place May 1877. to throw fresh light on the Russian plans, and nothing to change the general opinion that the Danube would be passed by the bulk of the Russian force about Giurgevo, and also at many other points lower down, about the 4th week in May. To this it now begins to be added, that the Russians will not operate in force to the west of the line connecting Bucharest with Giurgevo, although Russian Cavalry is reported from Rustchuk to have been seen as far west as Rahovo.

Head-quarters were still at Kischinev, but were on the point of moving to Ploesti.

There had been a considerable exchange of fire on the Danube between the Russian batteries and the Turkish gunboats, and also between the batteries on both sides resulting in some trifling loss to the Russians, slight damage to some of the batteries, and the destruction of a Turkish ironclad corvette, the "Loufti Djelil." There had been a reciprocal bombardment taking place between Widdin and Kalafat, the latter occupied by Roumanian troops, who had considerably strengthened the defences of the place. None of these engagements—so far as there is as yet any record of them—were of great importance as regards the effect they are likely to have on the issue of the campaign.

The following account gives the proceedings, of which news was received during the week, in more detail:—

On the 6th, five Turkish monitors opened fire on the Russian batteries on the heights above Braila, from Potbashi (not marked on the maps, but described as opposite Braila). The Russian batteries did not reply.

The Grand Duke Nicholas made a tour of inspection of the Russian positions at Reni, Galatz, and Braila on the 6th, and left for Jassy on the evening of the 7th. The Turks, knowing that he was expected, tried to shell the train at Braila by the fire of the five monitors on the river, but did not succeed in doing any damage.

The mutual bombardment of Kalafat and Widdin began upon the 7th May, and was continued throughout the 8th and 9th. The injuries inflicted seem to have been slight. At Widdin the casualties are given at two killed and four wounded. There is no reliable information as to the result, but the Roumanian works are said to have sustained much damage, and in the town, the barracks and custom house were burned and the church injured, and some wooden houses at Widdin were destroyed.

On the 7th May, a Turkish monitor engaged a shore battery erected close to the Theraponte Monastery, near Satanovo, opposite Isaktchi, from two o'clock in the afternoon till night. The Russians had one man killed and two severely wounded (of the 13th Field Battery), lost three horses, and had a gun dismounted. The monastery was destroyed.

On the morning of the 8th a Russian siege battery at Braila compelled a Turkish corvette and two monitors to retire. An exchange of musketry fire took place by which the Russians had one soldier wounded. The ironclads were also supported by the fire of the batteries at Khiasett.

On the 9th, a heavy fire had been sustained for three hours between the Russian batteries at Braila and the Turkish batteries at Khiasett, and was



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢٢ ظ] (٤٤/٦٦)

44

May 1877. renewed on the 10th. The Turkish batteries were supported by two monitors on the river. The town of Braila sustained no injury, but several shells fell into the Russian camp.

Besides the artillery fire between Braila and Khiasett a constant exchange of fire was also being kept up between the Russian batteries at Braila and the Turkish gunboats on the river, and on the 11th a large Turkish ironclad corvette, the "Loufti Djelil," four guns, commanded by Hassan Bey, trying to emerge from behind the island separating the Old from the New Danube, opposite Braila into the main stream, became engaged with the Russian batteries. A shell from the latter penetrated the engine-room and its explosion ignited the magazine, resulting in the loss of the corvette with her complement, given officially at 219 men. This Old Danube channel, called also the Matschin Canal, afforded shelter to the Turkish monitors, and it was an object with the Russians to concentrate the fire from the Braila batteries on the mouth of the channel, so as to prevent the egress of the Turkish vessels. It is also said that the destruction of the "Loufti Djilil" was due to carelessness on the part of the Turks, and was not caused by the Russian fire.

From several rumours, giving no details, and not actually confirmed, but all pointing in the same direction, it was becoming apparent before the end of the week that Russian preparations on the left for passing a portion of their force across the Danube were in progress. On the morning of the 10th, 300 Cossacks were sent in boats from Khiasett to reconnoitre towards Matschin, and became engaged with a detachment of the Turks. The fight was proceeding at noon, and both sides had suffered some loss, but no further intelligence on the subject had transpired at the end of the week. (Khiasett would appear to be a Turkish village either on the island opposite Matschin at the junction with the Danube of the Matschin Canal, or more probably on the main land opposite).

On the 10th, an engagement which lasted five hours took place between a Roumanian battery near Oltenitza and a Turkish battery in front of Turtukai, supported by two monitors on the river. The town of Turtukai was set on fire by the shells, one monitor was much damaged and the Turkish fire was silenced. The Roumanian casualties are given at one man killed, an officer and three men wounded, but are probably considerable.

There is as yet no record of a passage of the Danube in any force either by the Turks or Russians, but a Cossack reconnoitring party crossed near Braila as already related, and parties of the former have crossed at different points into Roumania and inflicted some damage on the inhabitants, among other places at Kalarasch, opposite Silistria, where they burned some huts and fired on the peasants, and at Piketu, opposite Rahovo, where they burned the village and some ships flying the English flag. As there were no Russian troops or batteries at Oltenitza when it was fired upon by the monitors, and no soldier of any nationality at Piketu or opposite Kalarasch when the Turks landed there, these proceedings annoyed the Roumanians, had much to do with the complete abandonment of an attitude of neutrality by that province, and are said to have been the cause of the bombardment of Widdin from Kalafat. On the other hand, it is also said that the firing at Kalafat was begun by the Turks. In any case, however, up to the date of the commencement of the bombardment the position of Roumania as at war with Turkey was not strictly defined. That event, of course, put an end to all doubt.

As regards the advance of the Russian right the first advanced guard of Cossacks reached Chitilla, near Bucharest, on the railway line between Bucharest and Ploesti on the 6th.

The last news of the week is that the Turkish movement reported last week—namely, the weakening both flanks to strengthen the centre was being reversed as far as the Turkish left flank was concerned; and troops were being recalled to Widdin in anticipation of a passage of the Danube in force by the Russians between Kalafat and Turnu-Severin. On the other hand, except for the arrival of a few Russian officers at the latter place, and a few cavalry seen opposite Rahovo, even rumour does not as yet take the Russians further west than Turnu-Margureli at the mouth of the Aluta. On the 10th some rounds were fired into Giurgevo from the Turkish batteries at Rustchuk. The notification by the Turkish Government prohibiting the navigation of the Lower Danube bears date the 29th of April.



II.

MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

It was announced this week that the whole force of the Roumanian Militia <sup>May 1877.</sup> had been called out, and all three classes enrolled.

The three classes are the unmarried men of sufficient age for military service; the married men without families; and the married men with families.

III.

RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

The Roumanian Army, forming the right wing of the Russian Army, consists of four Divisions, organised in two Army-Corps of two Divisions each. One Corps has its head-quarters at Krajoivo, with a Division at Kalafat, and is commanded by Major-General Lupu; the other, under General Radovits, is stationed at Bucharest and Giurgevo. The decree announcing these and minor Divisional and Brigade Staff appointments, the assumption of the chief command by Prince Charles, and his selection of M. Slaniceanu to be his Chief of the Staff is dated Bucharest, May 10th.

Intelligence from Bucharest of the 8th May gives the strength of the Roumanian force at Kalafat as 20,000 men.

A Bulgarian Brigade, of which no details as to strength are given, was stationed at Ploesti, under the command of Colonel Stilletoff, with Russian officers. It was also stated that the Bulgarian residents of Jassy were organising a Corps to serve as the nucleus of a legion of 10 battalions to be raised in Bulgaria to assist the Russians.

The Roumanian Horse Artillery is armed with Krupp guns, and is described as well-horsed and perfectly equipped, and the men as of good physique.

The Roumanian troops at Bucharest were reviewed by Prince Charles on the 7th. Their numbers on the ground are given at 5,500 men, consisting of two squadrons of Cavalry, 8 four-gun (Krupp) batteries of field artillery, and five battalions of Infantry. They were about to march to Oltenitza.

The strength of the Roumanian Army is given in round numbers at about 60,000 men.

Of the three Russian Army-Corps, the 4th, 13th, and 14th, mentioned last week as now forming the reserve of the force actively engaged in Europe, the following details have since come to hand:—

4th Army-Corps.

Lieut.-General Zlotow; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Nowitzki; original head-quarters, Minsk; composed of the following details:—

16th Infantry Division.—Lieut.-General Pomerantseff; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Timaschew; head-quarters, Mohilev; consisting of:—

1st Brigade; head-quarters, Mohilev.

61st (Vladimir) Regiment.

62nd (Sonzdal) Regiment.

2nd Brigade; head-quarters, Vitebsk.

63rd (Ouglitch) Regiment.

64th (Kazan, Grand Duke Michael Nicolaevitch) Regiment.

Artillery Brigade; 16th of Field Batteries; General Boretti.

30th Infantry Division.—Lieut.-General Ponzanow; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Kubel; head-quarters, Minsk; consisting of:—

1st Brigade; head-quarters, Bobruisk.

117th (Yaroslav) Regiment.

118th (Chonia) Regiment.

N



May 1877.

2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Minsk.  
119th (Kolonna) Regiment.  
120th (Sierponkhow) Regiment.  
Artillery Brigade.—30th of Field Batteries ; Colonel Sivnozine.  
4th Cavalry Division.—Lieut.-General Krylow ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel de Launitz ; head-quarters, Bielostok ; consisting of :—  
1st Brigade ; head-quarters, Bielostok.  
4th (Ekaterinoslaw) Dragoons.  
4th (Grand Duchess Alexandra Petrevna's Kharkov) Lancers.  
2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Niesvijs.  
4th (Landgrave Frederick of Hesse's Marionopol) Hussars.  
4th Regiment of Don Cossacks.  
Horse Artillery ; 7th and 8th Batteries.

*13th Army-Corps.*

Lieut.-General Hahn ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Iljatchevitch ; original head-quarters, Jitomir ; composed of the following details :—  
1st Infantry Division.—Major-General R. Prokharow ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Lesly ; head-quarters, Loutzk ; consisting of :—  
1st Brigade ; head-quarters, Kovel.  
1st (King of the Greeks, Neva) Regiment.  
2nd (Sofia) Regiment.  
2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Kiev.  
71st (Bielevski) Regiment.  
72nd (Toula) Regiment.  
Artillery Brigade ; 1st of Field Batteries ; General Simanow.  
35th Infantry Division.—Major-General Baranow ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Ogon Doganowski ; head-quarters, Jitomir ; consisting of :—  
1st Brigade ; head-quarters, Berdytchew.  
137th (Grand Duke Alexander Vladimirovitch Niejine) Regiment.  
138th (Volkhow) Regiment.  
2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Jitomir.  
139th (Morchansk) Regiment.  
140th (Zaraisk) Regiment.  
Artillery Brigade ; 35th of Field Batteries ; Colonel Michel.  
13th Cavalry Division.—Major-General von Raden ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel de Gayer ; head-quarters, Zamost ; consisting of :—  
1st Brigade ; head-quarters, Zamost.  
13th ("Dragons de l'Ordre Militaire") Dragoons.  
13th (Grand Duke Michael Nicolaevitch, Vladimir) Lancers.  
2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Yanow.  
13th (Grand Duke Constantine Nicolaevitch, Narra) Hussars.  
13th Regiment of Don Cossacks.  
Horse Artillery ; 20th Battery, and 6th Don Cossack Battery.

*14th Army-Corps.*

Lieut.-General Zimmerman ; Chief of the Staff, Major-General Sanowski ; original head-quarters, Kiev ; composed of the following details :—  
17th Infantry Division.—Major-General Porokhovinkow ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Dennet ; head-quarters, Kamenetz-Podolski ; consisting of :—  
1st Brigade ; head-quarters, Pronskowrow.  
65th (Grand Duke Nicolas Alexandrovitch, Moscow) Regiment.  
66th (Boutyrki) Regiment.  
2nd Brigade ; head-quarters, Kamenetz-Podolski.  
67th (Grand Duke of Oldenburg's Tarantino) Regiment.  
68th (The Emperor's Borodino, "leib"\*) Regiment.  
Artillery Brigade ; 17th of Field Batteries ; General Fride.

\* Body guard.



18th Infantry Division.—Lieut.-General Narbutt; Chief of the Staff, May 1877.  
Colonel Mikhijew; head-quarters, Kiev; consisting of:—

1st Brigade; head-quarters, Kiev.

69th (Riazan) Regiment.

70th (Riajsk) Regiment.

2nd Brigade; head-quarters, Pultusk.

15th (Schlisselbourg) Regiment.

16th (Ladoga) Regiment.

Artillery Brigade; 18th of Field Batteries; General Bogdanow.

Don Cossack Cavalry Division.—Lieut.-General Schamchew; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Ivanow; head-quarters, Doubno; consisting of:—

1st Brigade; head-quarters, Doubno.

15th and 16th Regiments of Don Cossacks.

2nd Brigade; head-quarters, Kamenetz-Podolski.

17th and 18th Regiments of Don Cossacks.

Horse Artillery; 17 and 18th Batteries of Don Cossacks.

#### IV.

#### MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

The latest intelligence of the week announces that the Russians are establishing batteries at Giurgevo, but it is possible that this was being done by the Roumanian troops. In any case it was telegraphed from Rustchuk on the 10th that batteries were being constructed to command the forts and town of Rustchuk and the station of the Varna railway.

The march of Russian troops round the town of Bucharest in the direction of Giurgevo was proceeding steadily. The passage that day of a Cavalry Brigade of two regiments and a battery of Artillery is mentioned in news from Bucharest of the 11th. On the same day two Roumanian batteries left Bucharest, one going west and the other in "an opposite direction," probably towards Giurgevo.

It was stated before the end of the week that there were 10,000 Russians at Giurgevo, and that they were moving westward up the Danube towards Simitza, opposite Sistova, and Turnu-Margureli, opposite Nikopolis (at the confluence with the Danube of the Aluta river that forms the frontier of little Wallachia), and Russian Cavalry are again said to have been seen still further west opposite Rahovo.

Later intelligence seems to confirm this information. As, however, Giurgevo is the head-quarters of a Roumanian Division it is probable that up to the end of the week the force there was mainly Roumanian, and that the Russian force was concentrated at Banjassa, between Bucharest and Giurgevo. The Emperor of Russia has made a present to Prince Charles of Roumania of 2,000 horses and 36,000 rifles.

Russian officers are reported as having arrived at Turnu-Severin.

Intelligence from Bucharest, dated the 9th of May, mentions the encampment, at the time of writing, of a large Russian force in the neighbourhood, at Banjassa (not the same as the place above mentioned). Amid the conflicting intelligence respecting the strength of the Russian armies of operation, it is desirable to note such accurate information received from time to time, as may serve for a fresh point of departure in making the calculations necessary to estimate the correctness of the different reports. Trustworthy information from Odessa received this week, sent during the early part of last month, estimates the total strength at that time of the six Corps of the active and coast armies at not more than 270,000 men. Out of this number, 70,000 were absorbed by the two Corps then on the coast and in the Crimea.

Three Russian gunboats left the Pruth on the 10th for Braila.

With reference to this statement it is possible that these boats may be three out of some eight or more stated on reliable intelligence to have been seen at Kischinev in April, loaded on railway wagons, and described as about



May 1877. 30 feet long, of eight nominal horse-power, weighing  $3\frac{1}{4}$  tons, built, one of steel, the rest of iron, and supposed to be for torpedo service. The Russian Government had recently entered into a contract with a firm at St. Petersburg for torpedo boats for the Black Sea, of which two were expected to be ready about the middle of June. They had also purchased from the same firm a small steam launch and sent it to the Danube.

The arrival of Russian Artillery, conveyed in 100 railway wagons at Bucharest on the 10th May is announced.

Intelligence from Rustchuk of the middle of the week relates that quantities of Russian stores were being sent towards Kalafat; and from Widdin it is telegraphed that war material has been sent by rail to Turnu-Severin. A large Russian force was being concentrated at Banjassa, on the railway line between Bucharest and Giurgevo, and generally it appeared to be part of the Russian plan to keep these troops and all others on their left, withdrawn from the banks of the river.

On the 6th, eleven trains of Russian troops, with tents and stores arrived at Bucharest. The troops all passed on towards Banjassa, on the Giurgevo line, and on the 7th, it was computed that 12,000 troops had so passed Bucharest.

Two Russian Generals (Katalei and Stolzenwald) are named as having arrived in Bucharest on the 7th.

V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

Up to the end of the week there still continues the same absence of positive information as to the positions of the Russian bridges for passing the Danube, except as regards three—one at Isaktcha, one at Galatz, and one at Braila. There is a report of a pontoon bridge constructed near the mouth of the Sereth, and ready to be towed into the Danube by steamer, and placed at once wherever it may be required.

The Russians were elaborate in their arrangements for the protection of the railway in Roumania, Cossacks patrol it night and day, and there are pickets at every bridge.

The Roumanian railway was re-opened for goods traffic on the 9th of May.

The floods had injured the line in many places by causing landslips and damaging the bridges.

The traffic had been temporarily interrupted from this cause between Bucharest and Krajoivo, and on the line between Galatz and Jassy, at the bridge over the Sereth, near Tecuci, by the rising of the river.

VI.

ROUMANIA, SERVIA, &c.

Prince Charles of Roumania undertook a tour of inspection of the Roumanian troops and positions, and was at Giurgevo on the 10th. A clause in a convention between Roumania and Russia prescribes that the town of Bucharest is not to be occupied by Russian troops. Hence the latter, in their marches towards Giurgevo have to make a circuit round the town.

Accounts from Servia are conflicting, and the neutrality of the province is less assured than it was by the news of last week. Intelligence from Vienna of the 6th May announces warlike preparations. The Artillery had received orders to be ready to march to the frontier within a month; a general mobilization was taking place, and the Militia of the Posarevatz district was ordered to Negotin.



VII.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

The latest intelligence received this week gives the following information <sup>May 1877.</sup> of the strength and distribution of the Turkish Army in Europe. The Army of the Danube included 189 battalions (103 of nizams and 86 of redifs), 54 squadrons of Cavalry and 108 field-guns.

These were distributed as follows:—

At Widdin, 72 battalions, 18 squadrons and 102 guns; Lom, 2 battalions; Rahovo, 2 battalions; Nikopolis, 3 battalions; Sistova, 3 battalions; Turtukai, 3 battalions; Rustchuk, 16 battalions, 12 squadrons, 18 guns; Silistria, 22 battalions, 12 guns; Tultscha, 3 battalions; Isaktchi, 3 battalions; Matschin, 2 battalions; Medschidil, 2 battalions; Czernavoda, 2 battalions; Babadagh, 2 battalions; in the Dobrudscha, 4,000 Tcherkesses.

There were besides, at Kustendje, 1 battalion; Varna, 16 battalions and 54 guns; Schumla, 13 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 78 guns; Tirnova and Rasgrad, 3 battalions; Sophia, 14 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 6 guns. The redifs were stationed almost exclusively at Widdin and Sophia.

Besides the above there were also in other parts of Europe, as follows:— Herzegovina, 49 battalions and 27 guns; Bosnia, 41 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 42 guns; Albania, 38 battalions and 30 guns; Epirus and Thessaly, 15 battalions, 7 squadrons and 18 guns; and Crete, 14 battalions and 24 guns.

Exclusive of small detachments composed chiefly of Moustahfiz, employed in guarding the passes of the Balkans, and the batteries on the coast, and doing garrison duty at Constantinople, the total strength of the Turkish Army in Europe is given at 348 battalions, 67 squadrons, and 440 guns.

The Turkish head-quarters were at Schumla in the middle of the week.

Sickness and considerable mortality is reported in the Turkish force at Rustchuk, the deaths within a fortnight during the latter part of the preceding month are given at 853 men.

VIII.

TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, GUNS, &c.

Intelligence, dated the 11th, says that the works for the defence of Constantinople are to be constructed by the inhabitants of the city. This is the only allusion to these works contained in the news received during the week.

It is related of the Turkish stores that none of the shells that fell into the town of Braila during the firing of the 4th exploded.

Of those used at the bombardment of the Russian position at Reni two exploded.

Of those used at the bombardment of Kalafat during the first day's firing but one exploded, and, generally, the Turkish shells appear to be unreliable.

The following details are given of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube:—

The vessels are grouped in six categories—

1. Five iron-clad gunboats, carrying each two Armstrong guns, and a bronze gun of small calibre, with a complement of 37 men. These are the "Fethi-Islam," "Boujan-Delin," "Semendria," "Podgoritza," and "Schkoura." The last has been injured and is laid up at Rustchuk.

2. Four wooden schooners (screw steamers) carrying each one heavy gun on deck, and four of small calibre in broadside, and with a complement of 40 men.

These are the "Akhia," (she has but two guns in broadside, one forward, the other aft, the latter a steel muzzle-loading Armstrong); "Varna," "Schefket-Nomna," and "Sulina."

3. Two iron gunboats, carrying each a small gun in the bow, with a complement of seven men. These are the "Schemscheka" and "Jedyrim."

4. Six transports, carrying each two guns, and a complement of 15 men.



May 1877. 5. A despatch vessel carrying 4 guns, with a complement of 28 men—the "Arcadion."

6. Two iron-clad corvettes, the "Hifzil-Rahman," and "Loufti-Djelil," stationed at "Sulina." By this week's news the latter was destroyed in action at Braila.

At the date of the declaration of war, this flotilla was reinforced by two corvettes, the "Fethi-Bulend," and the "Assiri-Schefkei," and two gunboats under Vice-Admiral Moustaffa Pacha. This brings its strength up to 24 vessels. With the exception of the "Fethi-Bulend" (ironclad corvette, 5 guns, 180 men); and the "Assiri-Schefkei" (probably the "Assar-Shefket), iron-clad corvette, 5 guns, 170 men; the "Podgoritsa," "Varna," "Sulina," "Hifzil-Rahman" (probably the "Hifzil-Rahmin," iron-clad corvette, 4 guns, 219 men); and the "Loufti-Djelil" (iron-clad corvette, 4 guns, 219 men); all the above vessels appear to be in addition to the sea-going Turkish fleet in the Mediterranean.

Exclusive of the above-mentioned flotilla, but inclusive of the individual vessels last enumerated, the Turkish fleet in the Mediterranean is given at six iron-clad frigates, 9 iron-clad corvettes, 2 monitors, 1 iron-clad gunboat (the "Podgoritsa"), 3 unarmoured frigates, 8 unarmoured corvettes, 10 unarmoured gunboats, 2 paddle steamers, 3 transports, 1 despatch vessel, and 1 yacht.

IX.

MISCELLANEOUS.

In the middle of the week the rivers were still flooded, and much rain was falling, but towards the end of the week an improvement in the weather and in the state of the roads and a diminution of the floods was announced.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢٦ و] (٦٦/٥١)

26

51

MAY 13TH TO MAY 19TH.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Narrative .. .. .	51	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. . . . .	56
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army .. .	52	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. . . . .	56
III. Russian Army Details .. .	54	VII. The Turkish Army .. . . .	56
IV. Movement of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. . . . .	55	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, Guns, &c. . . . .	58
		IX. Miscellaneous .. . . .	59

I.

NARRATIVE.

Up to the end of the week the movements of the Russians on the Danube <sup>May 1877.</sup> were still unrevealed. Of the presence of a large force at Banjassa and other points between Bucharest and Giurgevo there was little doubt, and also that bodies of troops were being brought up on its left so as to connect it with the force at Braila, and that these portions of the army were not on the banks of the Danube, but thrown back from it and in a kind of echelon, the positions selected being the cross roads where the roads of the interior were intersected by others leading down to the river. On the other hand, to the west of Giurgevo, between that point and Turnu, at the mouth of the Aluta, and further west still, as far as Rahovo, it appeared to be part of the Russian plan to make a display of troops close to the river.

Later in the week it was becoming doubtful whether this was a feint or whether there was really the intention of concentrating any large Russian force to the right of Giurgevo, the news being rather in favour of the latter view, as besides the Cavalry near the Danube there were rumours of a strong column kept back from the river, and said to be destined for Turnu Marguréle and Simnitza. In the meantime, the Roumanian troops were interlaced with those of Russia, the former holding temporarily the positions from Oltenitza to Giurgevo with a strong force of Russian Cavalry and Horse Artillery on their right between Giurgevo and Turnu Marguréle and towards Rahovo, and the Roumanians coming in again on their right at Kalafat.

Towards the end of the week it was becoming clear that a Russian Corps was taking up its position on the right of that already concentrated about the Bucharest—Giurgevo line, and that the Roumanians were being withdrawn to the extreme right.

The head-quarters of the Army moved from Kischinev to Ploesti, and were about to move to Bucharest, but at the last moment this arrangement was postponed on account of the expected arrival of the Emperor of Russia at Army head-quarters, and the Grand Duke remained at Ploesti.

The rumours of a Russian movement towards the valley of the Timok were becoming more pronounced, but there is no detailed or authentic intelligence to hand on the subject.

At the beginning of the week there were rumours of a Russian Corps of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery being engaged in the Dobrudscha with the Turks. This intelligence was not confirmed up to the end of the week. The nucleus of fact at the bottom of it would appear to have some connection with the Cossack reconnaissance recorded last week from Galatz to Khiasett, which was supposed to denote an intention on the part of the Russians (and of which there is some further information this week) to make an attempt upon Matschin. Potbashi mentioned in the account of this reconnaissance turns out to be the name of an old channel of the Danube. Khiasett is a small fishing village on the banks of the river opposite Braila, in front of and a kind of outpost of Matschin. It is also called Potbashi by the Turks.

By the end of the week it appeared to be established that the village of Khiasett was in the hands of the Russians, who were entrenching it and were about to erect batteries there.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٢٦ ظ] (٦٦/٥٢)

52

May 1877.

The probable relative positions of the various invading corps are given in the chapter on the details of the Russian Army. In addition to what has been already said of the probability of the passage of the Danube being made by the main Russian body about Giurgevo, it now begins to be implied that two corps will march by the Dobrudscha. This statement appears to have reference to the 11th Corps—which has already established a footing in the Dobrudscha, and the 8th whose objective point on the river would appear to be Hirsova.\*

The firing on the Danube between the batteries on both sides and the gunboats continued this week. The Russians had mounted heavy guns in their works at Braila, and were said to be trying their range in the direction of Matschin.

The duel between Widdin and Kalafat was also continued, and that between Turtukai and Oltenitza was resumed, and a new one is heard of between Nikopolis and Islacs.

The events of the week are unimportant, and are given in detail as follows:—

Two men were picked up by Russian boats from the wreck of the Turkish corvette blown up off Braila on the 11th, both were severely injured, and one is since dead. The stern of the vessel, with the mizen mast and Turkish flag were still above water. The flag was sent to St. Petersburg by the Russians. The Turks themselves report that the explosion was caused by carelessness in loading shells in the magazine.

The Russians, on the other hand, are very circumstantial in their account of the occurrence, and the officer who pointed the gun for the shot they affirm was the cause of the catastrophe, has been decorated.†

On the 13th, the Grand Duke Nikolas and head-quarters left Kischinev for Ploesti, the rest of the Staff were to follow in about six days.

On the 13th a slight affair of musketry and artillery, without important results, took place between the Roumanian troops and batteries at Oltenitza and the Turkish batteries at Turkutai, supporting an ironclad on the river. There were some casualties at Oltenitza, how many is not stated.

The same day a Turkish gunboat was captured by a Roumanian battery below Kalafat. She was unarmed, being on her way to Rustchuk to take in her armament. She passed Kalafat safely under cover of the Turkish fire from Widdin, but was stopped by the fire of the second battery (the Commander of which had been warned about her by telegraph from Kalafat) and surrendered. The Turks at Widdin had two men killed and four wounded by the Kalafat guns in this affair of the gunboat. The second battery would appear to have been at or near Tschupertscheni.

On the 14th, Prince Charles of Roumania visited the Grand Duke Commanding the Russian Army at Ploesti, and on the 15th the Grand Duke arrived at Bucharest to return the visit, going back the same day to Ploesti. The regular transfer of the Russian head-quarters to Bucharest was to take place on the 19th, the Grand Duke taking up his abode at Cotroceni, a suburban residence of Prince Charles.‡ The same day the advanced guard of the Russian right reached Balsu, near the railway, where the road connecting Slatina with Krajovo is intersected by one leading down the valley of the Aluta to the Danube and striking the latter river at Celci, about half way between Turnu Margurèle and Rahovo.

On the 14th a Turkish gunboat shelled a Roumanian outpost in the Jalonitza district at Cetatina, between Silistria and Hirsova, and burnt part of the village. The Roumanians had one man killed.

On the 14th, the Russian advanced guard reached Oltenitza, relieving in that position the Roumanian troops, who withdrew towards the Aluta.

On the 14th, a Turkish force embarked in six vessels, tried to cross the Danube in the direction of the Island of Mocan, near Giurgevo. The Roumanian outposts, reinforced from Giurgevo succeeded, after an engagement of musketry, which lasted a considerable time, in driving back the Turks.§

On the 14th and 15th of May, a Russian detachment from the 11th Corps at Braila succeeded in crossing the arms of the Danube opposite that town

\* Since this was written, the 8th Corps is alluded to in official despatches from Bucharest as marching on Giurgevo.

† Sub-Lieutenant Romanofsky.

‡ This transfer of head-quarters was subsequently postponed.

§ Not confirmed by subsequent news.



under a fire from the Turkish monitors, and in securing such positions on the other side for batteries and entrenchments as would enable them to command with their fire the arm of the river that runs under the walls of Matschin. Their works apparently are intended to include a battery at Khiasett, on the right bank, and one at the fork of the river, on the island between the old and new Danube Channel.

No details are given of the engagements which resulted in this success. They seem to have lasted two days and to have given rise to the report, elsewhere noticed, of a Russian Corps having landed in the Dobrudscha.

A result of the movement appears to be that the Turkish gunboats in the Matschin arm of the Danube are shut up there.

On the 15th, the exchange of "artillery and musketry" fire between Oltenitza and Turtukai was resumed, was continued from seven to nine in the evening, and was renewed on the 16th.

On the 15th, an affair took place between the Roumanians and Turks at Karagatz, described as near Rustchuk, in which the former were put to flight with the loss of a quantity of arms and stores, and 20 men killed and wounded.\*

On the afternoon of the 15th, an exchange of artillery fire took place between Turkish ironclads on the river and the batteries at Braila that the Russians have most recently armed with heavy guns. When it had been going on for three hours, the Russians ceased firing, as no result was being produced either side.

On the 15th, the Russians threw up entrenchments on the Matschin arm of the Danube without loss, under a fire from the Turkish gunboats confined in that branch of the river.

On the 16th, the engagement between the Turks and Russians respectively at Turkutai and Oltenitza was resumed both with musketry and artillery, and continued on the 17th without any considerable damage being reported on either side. It was remarked, as a new feature in the Turkish firing, that their shells generally exploded.

On the 16th, a Turkish ironclad opened fire on the Russian boats lying near Khiasett without doing any damage. The Russians did not reply to this fire.

On the 17th, an exchange of fire commenced between the Turkish batteries at Nikopolis and the Roumanian batteries near Islacs.

The same night a Turkish detachment got across the Danube and killed four Roumanian soldiers on picket duty, returning to their own side of the river afterwards.

Towards the end of the week, the exchange of fire between Oltenitza and Turtukai seems to have slackened. The breadth of the river here is given at 800 yards. The firing had been carried on by the Turks with a seven-gun battery of old 12-pounders; and by the Roumanians with field batteries of 6-pounders; also by musketry on both sides.

The losses at Kalafat of the Roumanians—who appear anxious to conceal the extent of their casualties—is given up to the end of the week at 80 killed and wounded, another account says 110. Their losses at Oltenitza also are said to have been considerable, but are not detailed.

The Turks have been censured by military critics for not anticipating the Russians at the Barbosi Bridge at the commencement of the campaign; and also for not occupying Kalafat, which commands Widdin, and defending it so as to prevent its seizure by the Russians and to be able to use it themselves for a *tele de pont*.

It would seem, however, that political considerations were the cause of these omissions.

On the other hand, whatever chance they had of securing, by these omissions, the neutrality of Roumania was nullified by their attacks on defenceless and unoccupied Roumanian villages, which provoked the province to declare war.

\* Not confirmed by subsequent intelligence.



III.

RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

May 1877. Although up to the end of the week there was no reliable information giving accurately the situation of the Russian Corps, such intelligence as was received seemed to denote that the positions they had reached were approximately as follows:—

*The 9th Corps.*—On the extreme right about Slatina, having its objective point on the Danube about Turnu Margurele and overlapping the Aluta Valley to the right as far as Balsu, Karakal, and Celci, feeling with its Cavalry towards the left of the Roumanian force as far as and beyond Rahovo.

*The 12th Corps.*—At Banjasi, between Bucharest and Giurgevo, with its Divisions replacing the Roumanians in the positions from the latter place to Oltenitza; head-quarters probably at Ploesti. A force said to be moving on the road to Simnitza would probably be a detachment from this Corps.

*The 8th Corps.*—\*Thrown back in echelon to the left of the 12th Corps; forming a connecting link between the latter and the 11th, about Buseo; and probably giving the detachment heard of at Slobodiza and Hirsova; head-quarters, Galatz, according to intelligence dated from that town on the 14th, but more probably Buseo, in which case the statement must be a clerical error, and the second head-quarters alluded to as at Galatz would be that of the 7th Corps.

*11th Corps.*—Head-quarters, Galatz. Occupying the positions on the left bank of the Danube from Braila, by Barbosi and Galatz to Reni; with a footing on the right bank of the Danube, in the Dobrudscha, opposite Braila, threatening Matschin.

*7th Corps.*—Prolonging the line to Ismail and Kilia, forming the extreme left of the Russian first line, head-quarters probably Galatz.

*Second Line.*—The 4th, 13th, and 14th Corps are spoken of vaguely as on the Pruth. This is probably true of the two last, but there is no confirmation of the 4th Corps having reached that river. One of the others, either the 13th or 14th would appear to have passed the Pruth.

*10th and 15th Corps.*—Both these Corps are spoken of as having replaced the 7th at Odessa, while the 10th is stated to have moved from Odessa to the Crimea.

The probability is that the 15th Corps, recently mobilized, has taken the place of the 7th at Odessa, and that the 10th, which was originally in the Crimea, has never left it.

Exclusive of the 10th and 15th Corps, therefore, the active Russian Army now consists of eight Corps, five in the first line and three in the second.

It is probable that the Russian troops heard of as between Bucharest and Giurgevo all belong to the 12th Corps.

Besides Banjassa, the following points on or near the railway appear to be the sites of Russian encampments, Jilava, Vidra, and Fratesti.

This week's intelligence includes the following details respecting the Roumanian Army:—

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF.

Commander-in-Chief, Prince Charles of Roumania.

Chief of the Staff, Colonel Slaniceano.

Staff Officers: Colonel Dona; Major Constantin Bratiano; Major Capitaneano (Topographical Section); Lieut.-Colonel Poenaru; Major Lahovari; Captain Magheru (Section of Military Operations); Colonel Arion (Chief of the Artillery Section); Major Jamsin (Chief of the Section of Engineers); Intendant Coranescu (Chief of the Intendance); Inspector-General Davila; Chief Surgeon Dr. Theodori (Sanitary Section); Colonel Greciano (Quarter-Master-General); three officers of Ordnance, and six Aides-de-Camp of the Prince.

*1st Army-Corps.*—General Lupu; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Boteanu; Commandant of Artillery, Colonel Dunca; consisting of—

\* See note to Narrative.



1st Division.—Colonel Logadi; 1st Brigade, Colonel Holban; 2nd Brigade, Colonel Beadescu; 1st Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Tretzianu.  
2nd Division.—Colonel Tcherkess; 3rd Brigade, Colonel Papadopulo; 4th Brigade, Colonel Sachelarie; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Tschernovodeanu.  
2nd Army Corps.—General Radovitz; Chief of the Staff, Colonel Pencovitz; Commandant of Artillery, Colonel Herkt; consisting of—  
3rd Division.—Colonel Aughelscu; 1st Brigade, Colonel Gramont; 2nd Brigade, Colonel Ipatescu; 1st Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Formac.  
4th Division.—General George Mann (formerly Colonel on the Staff and Burgomaster of Bucharest, promoted to General on the 6th of May); 3rd Brigade, Colonel Cantili; 4th Brigade, Colonel Boranescu; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Rosnovanu.  
Militia.—1st Territorial Division.—General Haralambi (one of three Governors of the State, promoted from Colonel on appointment).

IV.

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, STORES, &c.

This week there is mention of Russian gunboats on the Danube, torpedo-boats, and floating batteries put together on the Pruth, carrying one gun, and manned by the marine detachments attached to the active army for river operations; but there is an absence of detailed information respecting these vessels.

It is stated that shells fired from 8-inch guns in position at Braila have reached the town of Matschin, the distance between the two points being given at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles. The fact probably is that the shells were fired from Russian batteries at Khiasett, on the right bank of the Danube, or from the island separating the Matschin Canal from the New Danube channel. It is said that the Russians have batteries at the latter point, and their seizure of Khiasett, and their construction of batteries there appear also to be established. Braila is more probably seven miles from Matschin.

Krupp guns have been mounted at Vaduel Budar, above Braila, to command the gunboats on the river.

The 4th, 13th and 14th Corps are now spoken of as forming the second line of the active army, but no detailed intelligence is to hand as to where they are, except as regards the 13th Corps, stated in intelligence from Jassy of the 13th of May, to be on the Pruth.

The works at Kalafat, being strengthened by the Roumanians, are situated on a hill about 2,700 yards from Widdin (with the Danube intervening), on higher ground than and commanding the Turkish fortress. The Roumanians were unceasingly engaged in strengthening their works, and had got 40 guns into position in the batteries bearing upon Widdin.

They have also constructed batteries at Tschetati, further up the river on the road leading from Kalafat towards Turnu-Severin.

Intelligence from Rustchuk of the 15th mentions the passage about that date from Giurgevo along the Simnitza road, of eight battalions of Russian Infantry, "with several batteries of Artillery and squadrons of Cavalry."

Intelligence from Vienna relates that 12 redoubts have been constructed at Giurgevo.

Intelligence from Turnu-Severin of the 14th May, announces the arrival there the preceding day of three battalions of Roumanian Infantry, and half a battery of Artillery. 200 Engineers were to follow next day to throw up entrenchments about the buildings of the Danube Navigation Company.

This news, which seems authentic, is supplemented by unconfirmed rumours of a Russian force moving towards the Timok Valley and Turnu-Severin.



V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

May 1877.

In Roumania, the Russians found themselves in difficulties about railway transport. The line being only single was a serious hindrance. This was being partially remedied on some parts of the line, and a third rail was also being laid down to remedy the break of gauge, but the work was proceeding very slowly from the constant interruptions by passing trains.

There was further a serious deficiency of rolling-stock. All the Russian rolling-stock was being utilised in Russia itself in the constant forwarding of troops and stores towards the two seats of war; and, even had it not been so, but a very limited portion of it was available for use on the lines in Roumania on account of the difference of gauge.

It is reported from Bucharest that on the 17th May, the railway bridge at Tecuci was so damaged by floods as to cause an interruption of railway communication for several days. The Russians had set 1,000 men to work in hopes of repairing the damage in two days.

The following roads are spoken of in this week's intelligence as in good order, and available for the use of troops:—Tschernetz to Kalafat; Krajovo to Slatina; Slatina by Karakal to Islacs; Piteschti by Tekutschi to Turnu-Margurele; Turnu-Margurele by Simnitza to Giurgevo; Rusche de Wede through Alexandria to join the last road; and from Bucharest to Oltenitza.

The two roads from Bucharest and Braila to Kalarasch are only available in dry weather.

VI.

ROUMANIA, SERVIA, &c.

There are still assurances of Servian neutrality, but war preparations continue.

Intelligence from Berlin estimates the Roumanian strength at a lower figure than 60,000, that given last week, and only allows them 30,000 men fit for active operations.

VII.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

The following detailed information respecting the Turkish Army in Europe is furnished by Captain Ardagh, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

LAND FORCES OF TURKEY.

Turkey is divided into seven Army-Corps, or districts, of which three belong to Europe—namely:—

1. Guard .. ..	Constantinople.
2. Danube .. ..	Schumla.
3. Roumelia .. ..	Monastir.

The reputed establishment of the (whole) Turkish Army is thus given.—

Active Army .. ..	206,477
Redif 1st Ban .. ..	317,984
" 2nd " .. ..	280,030
Mustahfiz .. ..	518,448
Total .. ..	1,325,312 men. with 3,639 guns.







May 1877. Two battalions between Widdin and Nicopoli and one battalion at each of the following places—viz., Widdin, Nicopoli, Sistova, Silistria, and Hirsova. Subsequently, on the 9th May, the Turkish force in and near Widdin is thus given:—

In Widdin (the fortress)	9,000
Camps to north and west of the town	37,000
Reinforcements arriving at, from Sofia, at the rate of about two battalions per diem	80,000
	76,000

The Turkish troops on the Danube are reported in excellent condition and very enthusiastic, more particularly since the news of the Russian defeat in front of Batoum has reached them. The ideas of the Turkish commanders as to the defence of the Danube are kept very secret, but they seem to be very confident in their plans, and expect to give the Russians some surprises when the decisive operations commence.

The foreign legions being raised in Constantinople, are said to be filling rapidly—one is to consist of Poles and the other of Hungarians; when they are complete they will at once be despatched to the front.

On the 17th May, the Turkish forces in the Dobrudscha are reported to amount to 17,000 men, with 54 guns, under the command of Fazli Pasha.

The Sultan has, it is stated, decided to admit Christians into his army, and that he has ordered a draught of 200,000 men to be levied in the country without distinction as to race or creed.

On the 3rd of May it had been reported that 10,000 men had been sent from Widdin for the defence of the quadrilateral.

On the 29th April the Turks had begun to raise a foreign legion at Constantinople. Circassian troops for the service of Turkey were being enrolled, and coming in rapidly. They were said to be well armed and mounted, and likely to be of much use for outpost duty and as *éclaireurs*.

The Turkish army is very weak in Cavalry.

Apparently, in addition to the troops already enumerated, there had embarked for Constantinople during the spring:—

*From Beyrout.*—Two batteries of regular Artillery; one regiment of Cavalry; two battalions of Redifs.

*From Acre.*—Seven squadrons of Cavalry.

In addition to the above information, intelligence from Adrianople, received this week, relates that all the gendarmerie of that vilayet, numbering about 2,000 men, had been suddenly sent off to the seat of war on the Danube; their duties being taken up by the "Mustahfiz" troops. Of the latter there were about 12,000 in the vilayet distributed between Adrianople, Eski-zaghra, Hasskioi, and Dennotica. They were armed with Winchester rifles. Circassian irregular Cavalry was about being enrolled in the vilayet and sent to the seat of war.

### VIII.

#### TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, GUNS, &c.

The intelligence under this heading comprises also what has come to hand respecting the Turkish defences generally, including the "*matériel*" and military stores of the army, and the flotilla on the Danube co-operating with the troops.

On these subjects, the following detailed information is furnished by Captain Ardagh, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General:—

A report, dated February 13th, 1877, on the small-arms in possession of the Turkish armies, includes these items:—

Henry-Martini Rifles.—600,000 ordered from United States. Of these, 280,000 arrived some time ago, and were issued; 40,000 arrived later, and 100,000 were expected shortly. Empty cartridges for 10,000,000 rounds had arrived.



Snider Rifles.—140,000 serviceable, 10,000,000 cartridges.  
Winchester Rifles.—50,000 then in possession.  
The troops and police are very well armed.  
22nd March a steamer arrived with a cargo of shot and shell at Constantinople.  
4th April a steamer arrived with 7,000 American revolvers, which carry the same cartridges as the Winchester rifle. These are supposed to have been made for the Russians, but, there being some difficulty about payment, the Turks got them at 60 francs each.  
On the 17th April 1877, it was reported on good authority that the Danube flotilla, consisting of 17 vessels, with 60 guns, had quitted Sulina to defend important points as follows:—

Two armour-plated corvettes . . . . . (6 guns and 1,771 tons each).	.. .. .	"Hifzil Rahman," and the "Lutfi Djehl."
Two armoured monitors . . . . . (6 guns each and 513 tons).	.. .. .	"Hizibre" and "Seif."
Five armoured monitors . . . . . (2 guns each and 408 tons).	.. .. .	"Feih el Islam," "Semendria," "Boujan Delin," "Podgoritza," and "Sartari."
Four small wooden gunboats . . . . . (4 guns each and 300 tons).	.. .. .	"Varna," "Sulina," "Akha," and "Ckefket-Nouma,"
Four transports (4 guns and 474 tons) (2 guns and 500 tons)	.. .. .	"Kilitz-Ali," "Khayreddin," "Islakat," "Nouzhetie."

Of these, the corvettes remain at Sulina, two big gunboats go to Matschin, the third and two smaller ones to Toultscha. The rest to cruise on the river, and anchor between Rustchuk, Silistria, and Turtukai.

The corvettes are merely cruisers, and cannot mount the river.  
The big gunboats do not go higher up the river than Braila, between which and the sea the channel might be guarded.

The transports are believed to be indifferent vessels, and the remaining gunboats are reported to be slow, and unable to steam against the current at more than two miles an hour.

The Turkish gunboats on the Danube seem to have been active, as the Turks claim to have already captured over 200 Russian vessels laden with 130,000 hectolitres of wheat (about 358,000 English bushels).

Early in May the fortifications about Silistria were nearly complete, with, however, about 5,000 men still engaged in the erection of new works.

In addition to the above the following comes to hand from other sources:—

Last week's report about the defences of Constantinople is confirmed on trustworthy information.

Lines of defence are to be constructed round Constantinople, between Derkos and Bojuk-Tcheckmedge, the inhabitants of the city being called upon to supply forced labour.

Intelligence from Vienna relates that the Turks are also fortifying the passes of the Balkans.

#### IX.

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

The weather reported is hot, and the roads are rapidly drying. The river still very high. The Danube is not likely to be in its normal condition for at least another fortnight.



MAY 20TH TO MAY 26TH.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Narrative .. .. .	60	V. Railways, Roads, Bridges, &c. . . . .	64
II. Mobilization of the Russian Army .. .	61	VI. Roumania, Servia, &c. . . . .	64
III. Russian Army Details .. .	61	VII. The Turkish Army .. .	64
IV. Movements of Troops, Stores, War Material, &c. . . . .	63	VIII. Turkish Fortresses, Stores, Guns, &c. . . . .	65
		IX. Miscellaneous .. .	65

I.

NARRATIVE.

May 1877.

The intelligence from the Danube this week is very meagre.

It was becoming apparent at the beginning of the week that the troops being directed on Sinitza belonged to the 12th Corps, and that the 8th was coming to occupy the positions about Giurgevo vacated by the Roumanians.

The high state of the rivers, difficulties of transport and other causes, and interruption of railway communication from floods and broken bridges, made it apparent also that the passage of the Danube by the Russians is unlikely to take place before the second week in June.

The artillery duels at various points on the Danube between the two banks of the river, and between the Russian batteries and the Turkish monitors, were being continued by this week's intelligence, but less is heard of them. They were of little consequence.

Rumours this week continue to point to the probability of a Russian movement on the extreme right by the Turkish side of the Timok Valley, to turn the left of the Balkan line, and menace Sophia and Philippopolis. There is, however, still a complete absence of detailed or authentic intelligence on the subject.

According to the latest intelligence of the week, the Russian front on the Danube does not as yet extend further west than the mouth of the Schyl, opposite Rahovo.

With one exception the incidents of which news was received during the week are unimportant.

They are as follows:—

In an exchange of fire between the batteries at Giurgevo and a Turkish monitor, of which the date is not given, the artillery serving the guns in the batteries lost 15 killed.

News was received this week of a railway accident on the 17th, in which the Russians had two men killed, and a General Officer and 11 men wounded. The loss to the rolling-stock is given at five wagons destroyed and seven repairable. It was a collision and occurred at Kostechti, about two stations from Bucharest on the line to Krajovo.

On the 20th, an accident occurred on the railway near Slatina between Bucharest and Krajovo (where the line crosses the river Aluta), from the breaking of the Kriva bridge. There were some casualties, besides the loss to the rolling-stock of 12 carriages foundered in the river.

On the 20th, the batteries at Islacs succeeded by their fire in preventing the construction of a redoubt by the Turks at Nikopolis, and the same day the Turks made an attempt from Nikopolis to gain a footing on the left bank of the Danube, near Islacs, to silence the batteries, but were repulsed by the Roumanians. A Turkish monitor co-operating with them and trying to pass the Russian batteries was compelled to retire and take refuge at Nikopolis.

The Turks are credited with frequent raids across the Danube about Kalarasch, and with carrying on a work of devastation among the Roumanian peasantry; and on the 22nd their batteries at Rahovo set fire to an Austrian steamer.



On the evening of the 23rd and morning of the 24th, two Turkish gun-<sup>May 1877.</sup>boats shelled the village of Jalonitza, on the left bank of the Danube nearly opposite and below Hirsova.

On the 24th, a party of Tartars and Circassians crossed the Danube at Tchernavoda, and having captured six prisoners and some cattle retreated across the river. The exchange of fire between the batteries at Oltenitza and new Turkish ones at Turtukai was in progress on the 24th. The same day an engagement took place in the Matschin canal between the Russian batteries and a small gunboat on one side, and a Turkish ironclad, sent to destroy the Russian works, on the other.

The ironclad succeeded in considerably damaging the Russian works and received but slight injury herself. The Russian casualties are not detailed.

On the 24th, some of the Staff of the 11th Corps with an escort of 100 men crossed the Danube in eight boats from Galatz to Khiasett and made a reconnaissance towards Matschin. The party came into collision with the Turks and had to retire with a loss of two men killed and two wounded.

The Turkish ironclad, already mentioned as at Nikopolis, succeeded (according to intelligence from the latter place) in damaging considerably by her fire on the 24th, the Russian works on the opposite side of the river; the Russian loss is given by the same news at 40 killed.

On the morning of the 26th, a Russian detachment commanded by Lieutenant Dubascheff, accompanied by the Commander of the Roumanian flotilla, Major Murgescu, conveyed in a number of small boats, succeeded in applying a torpedo to the Turkish ironclad in the Matschin Canal that had attacked the Russian works on the 24th. The detachment escaped without casualties, discharged the torpedo, and the monitor, the "Hitzil-Rahman," 4 guns, 219 men, sister ship to the "Lufti-Djelil," already blown up, was destroyed with all hands. This is the last and only important intelligence of the week.

## II.

### MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

There is no intelligence this week of any further Russian mobilization. Some details given elsewhere have come to hand respecting a Bulgarian legion.

The six Infantry battalions or "Druschinen" composing it were made up of five companies each. As yet its total strength does not exceed 5,000 foot and 600 horse.

All its officers are Russian.

## III.

### RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.

The positions of a part of the Russian force on the Bucharest—Giurgevo line on the 17th of May are thus described:—

A Division of Infantry and a Brigade of Cavalry close to Bucharest, on the heights skirting the little river Sabara, extending from Jilava, through Vidra to Dobreni; the left near Gradiste and Gastinara, on the River Argish, which joins the Danube at Oltenitza. The left was in contact with another division posted on the heights above Oltenitza, vacated by the Roumanians.

Another Russian Division was on the heights behind Giurgevo, about 20 kilometres from Frateschi.

It is unlikely that these forces of Infantry amounted to Divisions.

Of the places enumerated above the following are stations on the line of railway between Giurgevo and Bucharest, Fratesti, Gradiste, Vidra, and Jilava.

Since the date of the returns already given showing the Staff, &c., of the different Russian Army-Corps, certain errors in the returns, or subsequent

R



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٣١ ظ] (٦٦/٦٢)

62

May 1877. alterations on the Staff have come to light, necessitating the following corrections:—

The 7th Corps is commanded by Lieutenant-General Gaujazki II., not by Prince Prince Barclay de Tolly Weiman.

Major-General Goremykin is not chief of the Staff of the 7th Corps, but commands the 15th Infantry Division of that Corps, which is, therefore, not commanded by Lieutenant-General Schostak.

General Ernrot, and not Lieutenant-General Khrapovitzky, commands the 11th Infantry Division of the 11th Corps, Major-General Kissutsch, and not Major-General Dukmasoff, is Chief of the Staff to the 12th Corps.

An infirmary has been established at Kischinev for the Artillery horses of the active army.

It is stated that, in addition to the Cavalry Divisions, regiments of Cossack Cavalry had been attached to various Army-Corps for independent action.\* The 8th, 9th, and 12th Corps had been reinforced by one Cossack regiment each; and three regiments and two Cossack batteries had been attached to the 11th Corps. Two other Cossack regiments and a Cossack battery had been formed into a Special Don Cossack Brigade. Sotnias of Cossacks had been attached to the 4th Rifle Brigade and 3rd Sapper Brigade.

Apparently in addition to the Artillery already detailed with the Army-Corps, each Infantry Division had received two 9-pr. and two 4-pr. batteries.

The formation of a Corps Artillery is also announced, to act independently under the Corps' Commander. Towards its composition each Artillery Brigade in the Corps contributed two batteries—one 9-pr. and one 4-pr.

Some details come to hand this week of the organisation of the Bulgarian Legion decreed by the Russian Government in an order bearing date the 17th April. It was composed provisionally of six battalions of infantry and six sotnias of Cavalry, organised in three brigades, consisting each of two battalions and two sotnias, and was placed under the command of Major-General Stoletov, who had Lieutenant-Colonel Ryukevitch for his Chief of the Staff.

The 1st Brigade was commanded by Colonel Prince Viazemsky; the 2nd by Colonel Korsakow.

The Battalion Commanders were—1st, Lieutenant-Colonel Kessiakow; 2nd, Major Kouritianow; 3rd, Lieutenant-Colonel Kalitine; 4th, Major Redkine; 5th, Lieutenant-Colonel Nistcherko; and 6th, Major Beliaiew.

Intelligence from Bucharest, published at Berlin, on the 24th May, estimates the Russian force at that time in position on the Middle and Upper Danube at 58,000 Infantry, 6,300 Regular Cavalry, 6,250 Irregular Cavalry, 17 Batteries of Artillery, and 42 siege guns.

The garrison of Jalonitza, shelled by Turkish gunboats on the 24th and 25th, consists of a regiment of Infantry with small detachments of Artillery and Cavalry.

With reference to the statement in the narrative of the intended visit of the Emperor Alexander to the Army in Roumania, a trustworthy authority at St. Petersburg relates that it was arranged that he should be accompanied by two companies formed of men belonging to the different regiments of Infantry and Sappers of the Guard, under the command of a Colonel.

His personal Cavalry escort, composed of Mussulmen from the Caucasus, was to remain at St. Petersburg.

His actual Cavalry escort was to be formed of four squadrons of the mixed Regiment of Cossacks of the Guard, augmented to eight squadrons.

Another escort is stated on authority from Warsaw, to have been formed, and is apparently (as far as the Cavalry is concerned) in addition to the above.

It consists of a non-commissioned officer and 16 private soldiers from each regiment of Cavalry, and a corporal and six men from each regiment of Infantry of the Guard. To this escort the four Infantry Regiments of the Guard in Poland had furnished their quota of four non-commissioned officers, and 64 men, and the two Cavalry regiments theirs of two corporals and 12 men.

The total strength of this body-guard is given at 250 Infantry and a squadron of Cavalry, and it probably includes the Infantry mentioned in the above intelligence from St. Petersburg.

\* See note, p. 5.



Colonel Dochtouroff, of the Russian Staff, formerly Chief of the Staff to May 1877. General Tchernayef, in Servia, is attached to the Roumanian head-quarters.

There are rumours this week that the Circassian element in General Skobelev's force has proved untrustworthy. These are so far confirmed that bodies of Circassian troops have been sent back by train to Russia.

#### IV.

#### MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, STORES, WAR MATERIAL, &c.

The Russian force concentrated in the positions about Islacs and Turnu Margureli is given in this week's news at 60,000 men, probably belonging to the 9th Corps. The troops were actively engaged in erecting batteries and strengthening the works of Turnu.

A small Roumanian ironclad of four guns, manned by Russian sailors, was launched at Galatz on the 20th.

The departure from Kischinev for Ploesti is announced of two battalions of the Bulgarian Legion, respecting the organization of which some particulars are given in the Section on Army Details.

The Circassian element in the Russian Army does not appear to have turned out a success. The men were being sent back to Russia. Two trains full of them passed through Barbosi on the 24th, bound for Galatz.

A trustworthy authority, writing from Bucharest on the 24th, relates that the Russians have numbers of boats and pontoons at Braila, Galatz, and Reni, and can get others at Oltenitza and Turnu, though the Turks have taken many.

Quantities of timber (for bridging) are *en route* by rail from Galicia to the Danube.

A depot of stores was being formed at Jassy. The Roumanian Divisions relieved by the Russian troops in the positions about Oltenitza, reached Bucharest on the 22nd.

Intelligence from Warsaw announces the despatch of the 13th Cavalry Division from the Galician frontier to join the Army of the Danube. It consists of the full complement of four regiments of Cavalry—viz., one of Lancers, one of Hussars, one of Dragoons, and one of Cossacks, each numbering 600 sabres; altogether 2,400 men and horses.

As regards the probable localities of the various Russian Army-Corps given in last week's account, trustworthy intelligence from Bucharest, dated 20th May, alludes to the 8th Corps as on the march to Giurgevo.

The Russians are stated in this week's intelligence to have collected a quantity of bridging material, boats and small steamers on the part of the Danube between Rahovo and Nikopolis.

The arrival at Oltenitza on the 21st of a strong force of Russian Infantry, three batteries of Artillery and some Cavalry is reported from Turtukai.

The arrival of the 12th Infantry Division of the 12th Corps at Banjassa, north of and near Bucharest, is related in intelligence of the 21st from the latter place. Their direction of march was to the westward.

The arrival of 7,000 Infantry of the 33rd Division of the same corps at the same place is announced on the afternoon of the 23rd, moving in the same direction.

Intelligence from St. Petersburg of the 23rd May corrects an announcement of last week with reference to the torpedo boats ordered by the Russian Government from Mr. Baird.

Five have been ordered, one 115 feet long, two 80 feet, and two 60 feet. Two of the smaller ones would be ready in a week, and the remainder in two months.

It is established by this week's intelligence that the Russians have occupied and erected batteries and entrenchments on the island separating the Matschin Canal from the main Danube river.



V.

RAILWAYS, ROADS, BRIDGES, &c.

May 1877. The railway line according to this week's intelligence is partly submerged between Galatz and Braila, by the overflow of the Danube; and at other places besides Tecuci mentioned last week, bridges and culverts have been carried away by floods. Owing to these causes and the consequent accumulation of trains at certain points, the line is practically blocked and railway communication is temporarily suspended.

A military bridge over the Sereth has also been carried away by the floods, and the roads and communication generally are for the present in an unsatisfactory state.

VI.

SERVIA, ROUMANIA, &c.

It is stated in the news from Belgrade of the 22nd May, that the "Corps of Observation" on the Servian frontier had been reinforced. It is under the command of General Horvatovics.

Head-Quarters, Negotin.

All the national militia of the Belgrade District had been ordered to assemble in their different localities on the 29th.

Two battalions were ordered to be added to the Standing Army, and all soldiers on leave were recalled.

The Regular Army was to be reinforced by the incorporation with it of the whole of the Militia of the First Class.

A temporary camp of exercise was being formed in the vicinity of Belgrade, at which it was said there would be a force of 30,000 men.

Fresh defensive works were in course of construction at Alexinatz Pandirato, Gramada, and Veliki.

VII.

TURKISH ARMY.

There is little information this week respecting the Turkish Army.

Intelligence from Bucharest gives the following as an approximately correct estimate of the strength of the portion of it on service in the theatre of war on the Danube, from Widdin to Ismail, and from Varna to Sophia:—

About 160,000 men, inclusive of 3,000 Irregular Cavalry (Tcherkesses), and 53 battalions; and exclusive of 10,000 Bashi-Bazouks, or a total of 170,000 men, with 318 guns.

It is related, in intelligence from Varna of the 22nd May, that all officers of the Circassian Cavalry service there had been ordered to Constantinople to take part in the organisation of 25 Cavalry Regiments for service at Adrianople and Sophia.

A trustworthy authority at Salonica, writing in the middle of May, relates that the Governor-General of that vilayet had been instructed by the Porte to send to Abdul Kerim's head-quarters at Rustchuk all the "Souvaree" Zaptiehs on horse-back to be found in the Sandjaks of Seres, Drama, Monastir and Salonica. He had decided on sending only 65 men out of every 100, which would make a total force of 400 men.

The Staff of Halet Pacha, sent to Adrianople to superintend the fortification of the Balkan Passes, comprised Houloussie Bey and Rifat Bey; and for the construction of the works, Fuad Bey and Mehemet Ali Effendi.



65

VIII.

TURKISH FORTRESSES, STORES, GUNS, &c.

The Turks are stated to have armed the island Fort of Addah, near May 1877. Orsova, with eight guns and garrisoned it with 400 men.

The rumour already mentioned of the intention of the Turks to strengthen the passes of the Balkans is confirmed.

In the middle of May Halet Pasha arrived at Adrianople to superintend defensive works in the Passes of the Balkan. The Government had ordered the commencement in the Constantinople Vilayet of the fortification of the following Balkan Passes leading towards the Black Sea; Derviche-Yovan; Nadir-Derbendi; Cazan; Demir-Capon; Chipka; Orhanie; especially Cazan and Chipka, from their great importance.

The Division of the Army at Sophia was to work at the fortifying of the Orhanie Pass, and the troops under the command of Ferik-Nejib Pasha at those of Derviche-Yovan and Nadir-Derbendi. The works of Chipka and Cazan were to be undertaken by the vilayets of Adrianople and Turnow.

IX.

MISCELLANEOUS.


At the beginning of the week the weather was reported unfavourable. The news is of heavy floods, a great overflow of the Danube submerging the railway line, and seriously interfering with the Russian communications. There had been very heavy rain all over Southern Europe.

Section D, Intelligence Branch,  
Q.M.G. Department.

R. J. MAXWELL,  
Bt. Major, late 80th Regt.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [٣٣ ظ] (٦٦/٦٦)





CONFIDENTIAL.

IOR: L/MIL/17/16/20/2

34 116/2

## RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877.

### OPERATIONS IN ASIA.

#### 1ST SEPTEMBER TO THE FALL OF KARS (18TH NOVEMBER).

##### OPERATIONS NEAR KARS.

In the beginning of September, General Tchernaiëff, of Servian notoriety, arrived at Alexandropol, and was appointed to the Grand Duke's staff, though in what capacity does not seem very clear. The Russians now made some slight changes in the disposition of their camps, moving some of their forces that were encamped at Kerekdereh and Kadikler to the Karayal and Bairatkar, and continued to fortify their positions with field-works and trenches, pending the arrival of reinforcements from Tiflis.

On the 8th September, some irregular Russian cavalry made a raid towards the Turkish positions, and on the 7th there was a somewhat severe encounter near the Kizyl Tepeh between some Turkish irregular horse (under the son of Schamyl), supported by 3 battalions of infantry, and some Russian dragoons, supported by 2 battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery. The engagement was confined to an exchange of rifle shots, and the loss was about 60 killed and wounded on either side.

On the 10th September, Mihr Ali, a notorious robber-chief, made a dashing raid, with 180 horsemen, across the frontier, capturing 160 artillery horses, and destroying the telegraph for a considerable distance between Alexandropol and Tiflis, and on the 12th a party of Bashi-Bazouks crossed the Arpa-Chai, and succeeded in burning a solidly-constructed Russian frontier guard-house, without molestation from the Russian detachment at Kizyl-Kilisseh. The object of the latter expedition was both to retaliate for similar acts committed by the Russians, and at the same time deprive their outposts of comfortable cover during the approaching winter.

On the 13th the Russians made a demonstration towards the Turkish right wing, with a force of 3 battalions of infantry, 7 sotnias of Cossacks, and 12 guns, and at daybreak opened a distant artillery fire. In the engagement which ensued, the infantry on either side were scarcely engaged at all, and the artillery only at long ranges in covering the advance and retreat of the cavalry skirmishers. The losses of the Turks were 3 killed and 17 wounded, those of the Russians 1 killed and 23 wounded. The object of this demonstration is difficult to understand, and the only special incident of the day was the murder and mutilation by Cossacks (certified by a credible eye-witness) of an unarmed Mahomedan in the village of Jabla, from which a post of Turkish irregulars had been driven.

On the night of the 16th, 2 battalions of the 3rd (Pernau) Regiment of Grenadiers arrived at Kerekdereh from Alexandropol. This was the first echelon of the 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Division from Tiflis; it was closely followed by the remainder of the Division with its brigade of artillery (48 guns), the tail of the column reaching the Russian camp on the 24th.

Mukhtar Pasha, who appears to have been kept very imperfectly acquainted with the Russian movements, but who now learnt that the force in his front was beginning to receive strong reinforcements from Alexandropol, and was moreover informed by Ismail Pasha that 8 battalions had been detached from the force under General Tergukasoff to reinforce General Loris Melikoff,\* ordered 6 battalions to join him from his right wing on the 19th September.

\* Ascertained from captured despatches, see page 88.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٤٣ ظ] (٤٢/٢)

72

COINDEZLITIA

On the 23rd, however, the Russians moved a force of 7 battalions of the 39th Division, with 10 guns, from their camp at Kadikler across the Arpa-Chai to Kizyl-Kiliseh. The destination of this force was the vicinity of a ford on the left bank of the river, just above the village of Uzunkend, where it established and entrenched itself, thus menacing the rear of the Turkish positions; but Mukhtar Pasha, believing that this force was detached to reinforce General Tergukasoff, and receiving reports from Ismail Pasha that the forces in his front still consisted of 22 battalions (his own as before consisting of 36)—thus throwing considerable doubt as to whether the 8 battalions had been moved from Igdyr to Alexandropol, as previously reported—gave up the idea of weakening his right wing for the present, having some doubts in his mind as to whether the Russians were not meditating an offensive movement against Ismail Pasha.

The position of a Russian force near the ford at Uzunkend did not, however, escape the Turkish general's observation, and for the protection of so important a point of his position, he detached 3 battalions of infantry, with 3 mountain guns (afterwards reinforced by an additional battalion and 2 field guns), and caused them to be posted on the heights adjoining the villages of Tashnik and Kizylkuleh, opposite to and watching the Russian force near Uzunkend; the ground occupied was strong by nature and was further strengthened by field-works and entrenchments.

On the 28th a Russian column of 6 battalions of infantry, 1 field battery, and 2 regiments of cavalry, coming from Ardahan *via* Zarshat, crossed the Kars-Chai, and took up a position near the village of Aktché-Boyoom, pushing forward some advanced posts to Yeni-Keui, on the Kars-Chai. Mukhtar Pasha, on receipt of this intelligence, ordered a regiment of cavalry to attack and drive the latter back, and on the morning of the 29th, according to Turkish accounts, there appears to have been an engagement,\* after which the Russian force in question retired to Parget, where it encamped.

The month of September was now drawing to a close, and it may be well to take a general survey of the state of affairs on both sides before proceeding to the more important events in October:—

In the centre, before Kars, the Turkish forces had remained much in the same numbers and positions during the month of September, and little had taken place except occasional expeditions and raids of irregular cavalry on either side.

The Turkish auxiliaries, emulating the feat of Mihr Ali, had on several occasions penetrated the Russian line of outposts, and intercepted their communications. These acts were retaliated on the other side much in the same fashion—some Russian cavalry, towards the end of the month, penetrating to Nakir-Cheevan and there setting fire to the dwellings of some Koordish chiefs attached to the Turkish camp, being perhaps the only incident worth mentioning.

Mukhtar Pasha had, however, now to regret the withdrawal of his Circassian and Koordish auxiliaries in large numbers. Debarred from pillage, and receiving no pay from the Turkish Government, they had long since shown a spirit of dissatisfaction at the style of service they were engaged on, and now the approach of winter, together with the failure of grain and grass for their horses, furnished additional motives for their return home.

The Turkish position before Kars, at the end of the month, extended from that fortress on the left (with 7 battalions forming the garrison of the place, and 7 battalions holding the intermediate hills, called the Yahniler or Yahni-Tepes) to the village of Hadji-Veli, whence the 50 battalions remaining to complete the Turkish centre were aligned by Soubatan to Kizyl-Tepch on the north, and from Kizyl-Tepch by the Nakir-Chee-Tepch to the village of Kozlayeh on the east, the triangle thus formed having its base passing through the village of Kerkhaneh, where the Turkish head-quarters were established. This position was of course far too extended for the force at Mukhtar Pasha's

\* There appears to be considerable doubt as to this exploit of the Turkish cavalry, and from the part the latter played throughout the campaign it may reasonably be supposed that the Russians were not driven but retired from the position they had occupied for other reasons.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٣٥] [٤٢/٣]

73

disposal; the distance from Kars to Koslayeh, as the crow flies, is not less than 22 miles, that from the lesser Yahni-Tepeh (forming the left flank of Mukhtar Pasha's position) to Koslayeh, or the base of the triangle just described, is at least 15 miles, and the distance from Kerkhaneh, the centre of the position, to the salient at Kizyl-Tepeh, fully 5 miles.

To hold this position, Mukhtar Pasha had 57 battalions of infantry (exclusive of the garrison of Kars), 10 batteries of field artillery (60 guns), 12 mountain guns, about 1,800 regular cavalry (including some regiments recently arrived from Syria and Baghdad, and the Zaptieh contingent), and some 3,000 irregular horse. In addition to the above, 4 siege guns had been brought from Kars and mounted on the Kizyl-Tepeh, 6 battalions\* were on their way from the right wing under Ismail Pasha via Kagisman, and 2 battalions and 2 field batteries, ordered to join from Erzeroum, were now daily expected at Kars.† The above, exclusive of the 6 battalions from Kagisman, but including the garrison of Kars and the reinforcement from Erzeroum, would give Mukhtar Pasha 73 battalions of infantry, 12 batteries of field artillery (72 guns), 12 mountain guns, 5 siege ditto, and 1,800 regular, and some 3,000 irregular cavalry, to hold a position 15 miles in length, and cover Kars from a *coup de main*.

The weak point of this position was undoubtedly in the direction of Kars, and the Turkish communications ran parallel to their front in the direction of the town, involving risks which it is unnecessary to describe. The line of telegraph which had been established between Mukhtar Pasha's head-quarters and the town, facilitated, it is true, the transmission of orders along the extended front, but on the other hand, the many deep and rocky ravines and the general rugged character of the ground, were a great obstacle to lateral communications, isolating, in fact, to a great extent, the different strong points which together formed the Turkish position.

On the Russian side, very little change had taken place in the positions occupied by their forces during the month but towards its close, not only had strong reinforcements arrived at Karayal from Tiflis and other places on the frontier, but the gaps in the battalions and squadrons had been made good by fresh batches of men from the interior of Russia. General Goutchine had, moreover, now replaced General Doukhovskoi as Chief of the Staff at head-quarters, and many officers of distinction‡ had been sent from St. Petersburg and Moscow and joined the Grand Duke's Staff apparently as advisers, the recent failures having, it appears, been attributed to a certain extent to generals who had gained their reputation in Caucasian warfare. General Lazareff succeeded General Dewel in command of the 40th Division, and Generals Count Grabbe, Von der Schink, Komaroff, and Rydreowski were appointed to commands. General Philippoff, Chief of the Staff to General Tergukasoff, appears also to have been appointed to the Grand Duke's head-quarter Staff.

During the night of the 30th September, the Russian force at Uzunkend (seven battalions and eight guns), which had been reinforced on the preceding day by two regiments of Cavalry from the forces before Kars and at Kulpi, crossed the Arpa-Chai, and at daybreak attacked the Turkish force that had been posted on the opposite bank in the hope of surprising and overwhelming it before assistance could arrive. At the same time a force of four battalions, 3 regiments of Cavalry and 2 batteries of field Artillery were pushed forward to make a demonstration towards the Turkish right wing, and succeeded in causing considerable stir and alarm in the Turkish camps before dawn. As day broke, however, it became evident to the Turkish General, from the smallness of the Russian force in the field and the little vigour with which the attacks were pushed forward, that nothing more than a feint was being made in this quarter, the object of which was not discovered until the sound of distant firing and the arrival of messages from the isolated detachment covering the right rear of the Turkish position, apprised Mukhtar Pasha that

\* These battalions had been countermanded by Mukhtar Pasha, but they had left Ismail Pasha's force before the order arrived and reached Kagisman on the 30th September.

† They arrived on the 1st October.

‡ Among others, General Obrutcheff, President of the Scientific Committee at St. Petersburg. He was afterwards transferred to the army of the Danube, when the success of the Russian army in Asia was assured.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٣٥ ظ] (٤٢/٤)

74

the feint in his front, on his right wing, was evidently intended to cover something more serious in the direction of the Arpa-Chai. Two battalions of infantry and a body of cavalry under Ghazi Mohammed Pasha (Schamyl's son) were now dispatched to the scene of action, but before their arrival (the distance to be got over being not less than 15 miles), the 4 Turkish battalions (weak in rank and file and armed with the Snider rifle) under Ali Chefket Bey had not only successfully repulsed the repeated assaults of the Russians, but taking the offensive, had driven them over the Arpa-Chai with heavy loss, the want of cavalry, according to the Turkish Commander, only preventing the Turks from capturing the Russian guns whilst in the act of fording the river. According to Turkish accounts the Russians left 400 killed in front of the Turkish entrenchments.

BATTLE OF THE YAHNI-TEPEH.

Ever since the arrival of the 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Division (16 battalions and 48 field guns) and 2 regiments of cavalry from Tiflis, a grand attack had been contemplated on Mukhtar Pasha's position, and after considerable delays and postponements, owing, it is supposed, to the divided opinions of the Grand Duke's head-quarter staff, it was finally determined to attack on the 2nd. The object now to be attempted was, briefly, to sever the communications of the Turkish forces with Kars by seizing the Lesser Yahnitepeh, whilst they were threatened along their front, and at same time attacked in rear by a force which was to cross the Arpa-Chai somewhere near Uzunkend and seize the summit of the Aladja Dag. The arrangements finally made to carry out the above was somewhat as follows: on the right, General Roop, with a brigade of the Moscow Grenadiers and the Division from Ardahan (8 battalions, &c.) was to assault and carry the Lesser Yahnitepeh, whilst the Great Yahnitepeh was masked by the other brigade of same Grenadier Division; next to him, General Heymann with the Caucasus Grenadier Division was to close with and engage the enemy from Soubatan to Hadjiveli to prevent him reinforcing his left and to divert his attention from the real point of attack; and on the left the Kyzil Tepeh was to be heavily bombarded and threatened together with the Turkish extreme right by General Lazareff with the 40th Division, whilst General Schelkownikow, with 5 battalions, 1 regiment of cavalry and 4 mountain guns, was to seize the summit of the Aladja Dag, and descending from it attack the Turks in rear. Three regiments, forming the garrison of Alexandropol were also brought to the Kara-Yal to hold the camps and positions during the coming engagement, and act as a reserve to the 40th Division should this be necessary.

The total force thus brought to bear on Mukhtar Pasha was some 45 or 50 battalions of infantry, 5 or 6 regiments of cavalry, and from 15 to 16 batteries of field artillery, exclusive of General Schelkownikow's column and the troops left to guard the Russian positions on the Kara-Yal, &c.

As will be seen later on, these dispositions on the part of the Russians, though certainly in advance of the tactics hitherto practised by them, were still defective, inasmuch as the mass of their strength was by no means directed to the points where the resistance of the Turks was to be overcome; and their forces, though everywhere superior to those of the Turks, were neither able to crush the latter in the defence of the key of the position—the Lesser Yahnitepeh—nor direct a serious turning movement on the Aladja Dag.

Four day's rations were issued to all the Russian troops on the 1st instant, and during the night the tents in both their camps were struck and by daylight on the next day sent to the rear, together with all their heavy baggage, on the road to Alexandropol; so well indeed was all this carried out and their plan for the 2nd concealed, that it was not until daybreak on that day when their batteries were all in position ready to open fire that the Turks discovered the serious nature of the attack intended, and found how completely they had been surprised.

The Russian guns now opened fire simultaneously on the three salients of the Turkish positions—viz., the Kyzil-Tepeh and the two Yahnitepehs, their infantry and cavalry being drawn up in extended order between the batteries



ready to attack. The Russian guns had, however, scarcely commenced bombarding the Turkish positions before an attack was made on the village of Hadiveli, towards which the Russians had pushed forward 2 batteries of field artillery to shell the camp of Hussein Hami Pasha near that place.

Whilst this had been going on in front of the Turkish positions, the Russian force at Uzunkend (5 battalions of infantry with 4 mountain guns, and a regiment of cavalry) had during the night crossed the Arpa-Chai unperceived by the Turkish outposts at Tashnik, surprised the pickets on the adjoining hills, and by daylight was advancing over the reverse slopes of the Alaja Dagh threatening the rear of the Turkish position.

The Yahni-Tepehs were garrisoned, the greater by one weak battalion only (about 400 to 450 men), and the lesser by six battalions and a battery of field guns. The Aulia-Tepeh and the heights of Wezin-keui covering the road to Kars had been denuded of troops since the 25th August, when also the garrison of Kars had been reduced to 7 battalions. Thus the objective of the Russians, who were always perfectly informed as to the number and disposition of the Turkish troops, was now clearly to the Turkish General, if not the capture of Kars itself by a *coup de main*, at any rate the interception of the Turkish communications with that place and with Erzeroum, which latter object if attained, considering the defective state of the Turkish commissariat, would have involved an issue almost equally pregnant with disaster. With the fall of the Yahni-Tepehs its attainment would undoubtedly have been assured, but it must be admitted, and is reverently acknowledged by Mukhtar Pasha, that on this occasion the "*Kismet*" of the Turkish soldier was as transcendent as the generalship or "*Truppenführung*" of the Russian leaders was as obviously at fault. The conduct indeed of the Turkish General and the coolness and readiness of resource manifested by him under the emergency, in spite of his evident anxiety at the seriousness of the crisis, are described by a competent eye-witness as worthy of the highest admiration.

By 9 o'clock the Russians had succeeded in taking the greater Yahni-Tepeh\*, an acquisition in itself of little importance, and the only one they really gained during the day, the remainder of which they wasted in constructing well-finished batteries for the bombardment of the lesser Yahni, and in vain attempts to carry it by repeated assaults, in which they employed no less than 30 battalions, supported by the fire of a formidable array of artillery.

The stubborn defence of the lesser Yahni of which the credit is chiefly due to Liva Mohammed Pasha (the "Captain," Mohommed Bey of Ardahan) who commanded there, together with the delays practised by the Russians, now gave Mukhtar Pasha time and opportunity of remedying the weak points in his position, and checking the Russian advance. He lost no time in at once vigorously driving back the Russians troops advancing on Hadji-veli thereby clearing the direct way to the Aulia-Tepeh, and after the former place had been secured with 2 battalions and some field guns, proceeded under its cover to form a force under the command of Ferik Rashid Pasha to threaten the flank of the Russians operating against the latter place, and prepare the way for the reoccupation of the heights of Vezinkeui. The latter operation though unavoidably delayed until the following morning, was, fortunately for the Turks, effected before the Russians had recovered from the check they had sustained before the lesser Yahni.

The Turkish General further ordered to the front 4 of the 6<sup>t</sup> battalions posted at Tashnik, and despatched messengers to hasten the arrival of the six battalions coming from Ismail Pasha's force the arrival of which at Kagysman two days previously had been reported. Perceiving also the real object of the Russian attack, he instructed Reis Ahmet Pasha by telegraph† to make a sortie from Kars with four battalions‡ and a field battery, in order to create a diversion on that side in favour of the Turkish troops holding the Yahni-Tepeh, and learnt with no

\* The Russian brigade ordered to mask the Great Yahni-Tepeh, finding it weakly held, attacked instead of masking it only.

† Including the 2 battalions sent there in support on the 1st inst., but the order miscarried, and the distance being considerable these battalions did not arrive till the following day.

‡ Telegraphic communication was soon afterwards interrupted.

§ According to Russian accounts, they were attacked by 13 battalions from Kars.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٣٦ ظ] (٤٢/٦)

76

small satisfaction in reply that the two battalions and two batteries expected from Erzeroum had arrived just in time to take part in this movement. Finally the Mushir directed 8 battalions with 2 field guns under the command of Liva Shefket Pasha and Ibrahim Bey—son of Namyk Pasha (who had a horse shot under him on this occasion)—to repel the threatened attack of General Schelkownikow on the Turkish rear by at once occupying the summits of the Aladja-Dagh or by dislodging the enemy if he should anticipate them in taking possession. Unfortunately for the Turks, the latter was found to be case, and the Russians were already posted in the old Turkish entrenchments on the mountain, some 1,000 feet above where the Turkish General stood, before the Turks sent to attack them reached the upper slopes. It was at once clear that the position could not be retaken without a severe struggle and corresponding loss. Retaken it was however by dint of hard fighting in a comparatively short space of time, and before 2 p.m. the Russians had been fairly driven out of their trenches and thence pursued over the plateaux and down the ravines and reverse slopes of the mountain to the banks of the Arpa-Chai, where the want of cavalry on the Turkish side alone prevented their utter rout and discomforture with the probable loss of their mountain guns.

In the meanwhile, the bombardment of the Kizyl-Tepeh (held by Omer Pasha's Division) accompanied with severe fighting at its base and repeated attacks on the lesser Yahni-Tepeh continued during the day without intermission, and it was not until evening that the successful resistance of the 'Turks was finally confirmed at the latter point, the possession of which they fully felt was of such vital importance. For had the Russians succeeded here in good time, or had they masked the lesser Yahni and at once proceeded to occupy the Aulia-Tepeh and the heights of Vezin-keui (where they would have found ready to hand the vacant entrenchments formerly constructed by the Turks), establishing themselves at the same time on the banks of the Kars-Chai in the direction of the town, they must have effectually closed the road to that place—thus compelling the Turks to take the offensive against superior forces—and probably baffled every attempt on their part to re-open it. Nor is it to be argued that the Turks might have turned the tables upon the Russians by a counter-attack on their positions covering Alexandropol and their communications which they would then have exposed. The Russian camps had, it is true, been raised, but the hills on which they had been pitched—the Kara Yal and the Utch-Tepeh—had been so solidly fortified, as well as another strong position near Pir Ali (half way to the frontier), as to be practically unassailable, or if stormed by the Turks in a succession of desperate efforts, to have entailed on the latter such a sacrifice of life as to defeat the end they had in view, and which the military resources of the Porte could certainly not justify; moreover, by widening the distance of the Turkish forces from their base, the difficulties of provisioning them would have been much aggravated, in what, after all—with the regularly fortified town of Alexandropol in their front—must have eventually proved but a barren conquest.

The reverses suffered by the Russians in their attempts to take the lesser Yahni-Tepeh appear to have paralysed their energies for the time; for, although their forces bivouacked on the ground, they made no effort on the following day (3rd) to retrieve their defeat; but, instead of renewing the attack along the whole line, as was fully expected—with no little concern—by the Turks, confined themselves to a strictly defensive attitude during the process of removing their killed and wounded, and were content the while to exchange an artillery fire with the Turkish batteries or to repel the counter-attacks of the Turks from various points, wherever the opportunity was afforded the latter of striking a blow without advancing too far beyond the cover of their own field works. The most serious of these engagements appears to have taken place in the afternoon of this day between the 40th Russian Division, supported by the three battalions of the Alexandropol garrison, and a force of Turkish infantry making an offensive movement in the direction of the Kara Yal from Soubatan and the Kizil-Tepeh, both sides being supported by a numerous artillery. The 40th Division lost, it is said, some 700 killed and wounded in this affair, and the Turks not less than 400; though, had General Heymann taken the latter in flank, they would, in all probability, have suffered far more severely. Some recrimination, it is said, took place afterwards on



this affair between Generals Lazareff and Heymann. A Russian official bulletin, dated Kara Yal, 4th, gives the losses on their side on this day as 3 officers and 40 men killed, and 11 officers and 250 men wounded.

The same inaction continued on the 4th, when at length, at 8 p.m., the Russians began to draw off their forces; but, being continually followed up and harassed in their retreat, they made a stand at Kabak-Tepeh, when the Turks also stopped, and both sides remained on the defensive, and exchanged a lively artillery fire till dark, without collision, Rachid Pasha then re-occupying the Great Yahni without opposition.\* The Russians were, however, obliged to bivouac on the ground in considerable force and did not finally retire to their old positions behind the Kara Yal until the forenoon of the 5th, leaving a brigade of the Moscow Grenadiers entrenched on the Kabak-Tepeh and to the south and east of it; here it bivouacked for the night, but again retired on the 5th, leaving outposts only, and occupying the ground at Kadikler with a regiment of cavalry, distributed in the villages. They at the same time withdrew from Uzunkend, but still held the Utch-Tepeh with outposts at Kizyl Kilisseh.

As an illustration of the caution with which their reverses in this part of the theatre of war had inspired the Russians, the battlefield is described by an eye-witness as literally ploughed up and seamed on every side with rifle-pits and shelter-trenches, dug by them in their first advance upon the Turkish positions or in the successive steps of their retreat, both to secure the left flank and rear of their main column advancing on the Yahni-Tepehs and Kars, as well as to repel the expected counter-attacks of the Turks.

The Turkish losses in the fighting from the 1st to the 4th October inclusive, amounted, according to their official returns, to 2,500 killed and wounded. Of these, 800 were killed and wounded (amongst the former 6 Bimbashis)† at the Lesser Yahni. Omer Pasha's Division lost 117 killed and 400 wounded in the defence of the Kizyl-Tepeh; and Moussa Pasha's Division, 56 killed and about 200 wounded, at Soubatan. The remaining losses were chiefly sustained at Tashnik and Kizyl-Kala, on the Aladja-Dagh, at Hadji-Veli, and in the counter-attack from Kars, but details are wanting on the numbers at each place. The Turks lost some 300 prisoners.‡

The Russian losses must have been undoubtedly very heavy, especially in their repeated attacks on the Lesser Yahni, and are estimated by a competent eye-witness at not less than 5,000 killed and wounded. Four prisoners were taken by the Turks. According to a Russian official despatch, dated Kara Yal, 4th October, their losses on the 1st amounted to 9 officers and 1,000 men killed, and 60 officers and 2,000 men wounded; and, on the 3rd, to 3 officers and 40 men killed, and 11 officers and 250 men wounded. A despatch of the Chief of the Staff of the Caucasus Military District afterwards gave the losses as 472 men killed, 2,540 wounded, and 70 missing in the two days' fighting. According to the "Invalide Russe," the Russian losses were 83 officers and 3,300 men killed and wounded; and according to the "Moscow Gazette," there were 2,679 men wounded alone. From the official returns of officers killed and wounded, the troops engaged appear to have belonged to the Caucasus Grenadiers, the 1st (Moscow) Grenadiers, the 19th, 20th, 38th, 39th and 40th Divisions, some battalions of Caucasus Chasseurs, together with their respective artillery brigades in whole or part.

Mukhtar Pasha's force had a narrow escape in this battle. Had the Lesser Yahni fallen and had the Russians made an attack by a *coup de main* on Kars, that fortress, in all probability, we are informed on excellent authority, would have been taken. In either case, the Turkish communications must have been severed. The defective state of the Turkish transport, commissariat and administrative services needs no description. They were conspicuous by their absence, and, with the army entirely dependent upon Kars and Erzeroum for its supplies and living from hand to mouth with only one day's provisions in camp, the critical position of the Turks on the Aladja Dagh—opposed as they

\* According to the Russians they were obliged to abandon the Great Yahni from want of water. † Battalion commanders.  
‡ 140 prisoners were taken by the Russians at the storming of the Great Yahni-Tepeh.



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٣٧ظ] (٤٢/٨)

78

were to a superior enemy ever ready to attack them and with their line of retreat passing along the rear of their positions—may easily be imagined.

Owing to the want of an efficient cavalry, the Turkish Army was completely surprised on the morning of the 2nd; nor was this arm on their side able or fit to cope with that of the Russians in the field or fair fight. The major portion of the Turkish horse were massed in the open between the Aulia-Tepeh and Vezin-keui during the fighting, and an eye-witness describes them as declining a combat with a single regiment of Russian cavalry which advanced unsupported to engage them to within range of a Turkish battery, from the fire of which it suffered some loss in consequence. Such, indeed, was their quality and the condition of their horses from insufficient nourishment, that little or no advantage could be expected from their further employment, at any rate during the present campaign. Their numbers, indeed, as was shown by a recent muster, had diminished, chiefly by the desertion of irregular horsemen, to an extent far greater than had been supposed, and the total number now available for the field did not exceed, according to the best authority, 3,000 sabres.

The Russians, it may be observed, brought a less numerous cavalry into the field on this than on former occasions. This may probably be accounted for by their having detached a considerable force of this arm, it is supposed, to their left wing at Igdyr, where the services of cavalry were more urgently required in the open country round Erivan, to check the incursions of the Turkish irregular horse.

During the period from the 5th to the 8th, the Russians slowly concentrated their forces at Kerek-Dereh and re-occupied the Kabak-Tepeh, still holding the Kara-Yal and the Uteh-Tepeh. By the 8th, they were in strong force behind and to the west of the Kara-Yal, and Mukhtar Pasha, coming to the conclusion that they intended to force his positions at Soubatan and Hadji-Veli, determined to abandon these two points together with the Kizyl-Tepeh; he at the same time ordered five battalions from Pennek to reinforce the garrison of Kars, and 10 battalions to join him from his right wing. These steps were determined on with a view of eventually retiring to winter quarters at Kars, where his forces would be safer than in their present exposed position. The want of transport, however, now began to be felt more than ever, and the Turkish General could only hope to move his force by steps and relays, carrying most of his baggage, stores, and reserve ammunition on casual pack animals and the backs of his soldiers.

On the 6th and 7th, the Russians received large reinforcements, of all arms, *via* Alexandropol, though the Divisions, &c., to which these troops belonged are not precisely known. In addition to the complete Division from Russia (the 1st (Moscow) Grenadiers) and the brigade from Ardahan, the Grand Duke had now been further reinforced by 10 battalions from his left wing and 6 battalions from Soukoum Kaleh, and the total force now at his disposal, as will be afterwards shown, consisted of not less than 61 battalions of infantry, 69 squadrons and sotnias of cavalry and Cossacks, and 246 guns.\* This formidable concentration now enabled the Russians to repeat, on a somewhat larger scale, the tactics that had failed in the recent fighting. It was therefore determined to send a larger force to cross the Arpa-Chai, in rear of the Turkish positions, and take Mukhtar Pasha in reverse whilst he was attacked in front by the main body; thus repeating, on a larger scale, what had hitherto been tried only by small bodies (*viz.*, on the 1st and 2nd instant). Lieut.-General Lazareff was accordingly detached from the main body on the night of the 9th, with a combined Division consisting of 17½ battalions, 22 squadrons and sotnias, and 70 guns; he was to march by Kegatch and Koschevan to Uzunkend, where he was to pick up the detachment posted there of two battalions and a regiment of Cossacks, and crossing the Arpa-Chai, advance by Digor, Bazardjik, and Orlok, and attack the Turkish positions at Vezin-keui. He was further to be joined, *en route*, by a detachment consisting of 4 battalions, 2 sotnias of Cossacks, and 8 guns, under Major-General Tsytovitch, coming from General Tergukasoff's force, *via* Hadji Bairam. The latter was also directed to push a strong cavalry force to reconnoitre towards Kagisman and intercept any

\* Exclusive of the detachment coming from Igdyr to Digor, and which joined General Lazareff on the 12th at the latter place.



reinforcements coming from Ismail to Mukhtar Pasha. The total force thus placed under General Lazareff, including the detachments that were to join him *en route*, amounted to 23½ battalions, 28 squadrons and sotnias, and 78 guns; and in order that his attack should be supported at the right time in front, he was to be connected with head-quarters by the field telegraph.

It had, however, now become clear to the Turkish General from the character of the Russian operations from the 1st to the 4th instant, the superior forces they had unmasked, and the subsequent offensive action implied by their recent manœuvres, that the position now occupied by his forces was far too extended for effective defence, whilst it hazarded, in exchange for a mere tactical advantage, in the possession of the Kizyl-Tepeh—threatening, as it did, the Russian camps—the much more important strategical objects of covering Kars and the communications of the Turkish forces in the field with that fortress and Erzeroum. The advantages, indeed, of holding the Kizyl-Tepeh had been more than counter-balanced by the reinforcements which the Muchir now knew the Grand Duke had received; and the former, it may be fairly argued, showed sound judgment in at once coming to the conclusion that it was better to abandon the forward positions he had occupied since the 25th August, and decision and promptitude in at once carrying out the retrograde step when determined on. But however desirable the step may have been from a strategical or tactical point of view, it undoubtedly had the most disastrous effect on the *morale* of the Turkish troops. They appear, as will afterwards be seen, to have lost all heart on being ordered to abandon the Kizyl-Tepeh—a position they had won in fair fight, and to hold which they seem to have made a point of honour in consequence.

Desertion, too, which had lately been greatly on the increase, now gained a fresh impetus, and we find Mukhtar Pasha stating in a telegram on the 12th or 13th, that upwards of 700 men deserted on the 9th or 10th.

On the night of the 8th, the Turkish forces were successfully withdrawn from Hadji-Veli, Soubatan, and the Kizyl-Tepeh to their former positions—4 miles to the rear, on the higher slopes of the Aladja-Dagh—which they had quitted on the 25th August; but at daylight the Russians, who, it appears, were always kept fully informed of every move that took place in the Turkish camps, advanced in force, and at 9 a.m. had deployed in formidable strength from behind the Kara-Yal, and opened fire on the Turks from some 60 pieces of artillery. Before, however, the attack was fully developed—the formidable preparations for which now showed how right Mukhtar Pasha had been in his view of the situation in ordering a timely retreat to a stronger position—the Turks had firmly established themselves in their old lines with all their baggage and camp equipment safely lodged in rear, save some 800 boxes of ammunition and a quantity of commissariat stores which had been left at Kerkhana, and which, owing to that place being under the fire of the Russian guns, could not be removed till the following night.

The attack, it appears, was planned for the same or following day, and, had it found the Turks in their old positions, or on the move—as the Russians probably expected—the results would, in all probability, have been different. As it was, the attack was not pushed home though the artillery fire continued till dark, the Turks in their entrenchments only sustaining a loss of some 150 killed and wounded. The Russians, owing to the nature of the engagement, must have suffered more severely; their losses, however, are not precisely known; they are estimated by the Turks at 1,200 killed and wounded—a figure undoubtedly very much exaggerated; on the other hand, according to their own accounts, the Russians only lost 10 officers, a chaplain, and 132 men wounded (no mention is made of the killed), which is evidently below the mark.

During the day, the Russians advanced to the line Hadji-Veli, Soubatan, and Kizyl-Tepeh, and at night bivouacked in force in the positions abandoned by the Turks; they next day mounted 2 siege guns on the Kizyl-Tepeh, from which they threw occasional shells against the Nakir-Chee-Tepeh, but beyond some slight movements within their own lines, nothing of importance occurred on this or the following day.

On the 12th, about noon, a large body of Cossacks made a reconnaissance towards the Great Yahni-Tepeh which was now unoccupied by the Turks, but shortly afterwards retired, on coming under the fire of the Turkish batteries on



the Aulia-Tepeh and at Vezinkeui. During the night, however, the Russians seized the Great Yahni, unobserved apparently by the Turks, and occupying it with 3 battalions and a battery of artillery opened fire on the Little Yahni and Vezinkeui at daylight the following day (13th).

The positions occupied by the Russian forces were on this day as follows:—

General Heimann with 24 battalions, 8 squadrons and sotnias, and 104 guns, occupied the Great Yahni with a brigade (Schaak), Hadji-Veli with a brigade (Avinon), and Soubatan with the remainder as a reserve under Soloviev; on his left General Kouzminsky, with 8 battalions, 24 sotnias, and 24 guns, was posted in front of the Kizyl-Tepeh—towards Kerkhana and Tainalykha—with his cavalry covering his left flank.

General Dehn, with 6½ battalions, 8 squadrons and sotnias, and 40 guns, was posted at Gulverein as a general reserve, and General Count Grabbe held Kapak-Tepeh with 3 battalions, 3 sotnias, and 8 guns to cover the right flank and act as a support to Count Wittgenstein's Cossack force of 20 sotnias, posted at Enghi-Keui, on the Kars-Chai.

The forces under Generals Kouzminsky, Count Grabbe, and Dehn were placed under the orders of General Roop.

In these positions the main forces of the Russians awaited the signal to attack from General Lazareff whose head-quarters were connected with the Kara-Yal by the field telegraph, protected by posts of Cossacks.

At daylight on the 13th, a diversion was made by the Turks, both from Aulia-Tepeh and the Lesser Yahni, against superior forces of the Russians near the Great Yahni-Tepeh; the Tepeh itself was held by 3 battalions and a field battery, and the Turks threatened it with 6 battalions, supported by some artillery from the Aulia-Tepeh and 7 battalions from the Lesser Yahni-Tepeh. According to the Russian accounts, the Turks were repulsed, losing some 400 men, but it does not appear as if the affair was intended to be more than a demonstration on the part of the Turks, and certainly no serious attempt was made by Mukhtar Pasha to recapture the post.

The Russians, in the course of this day, mounted 3 siege guns at Hadji-Veli and commenced a continual shell fire night and day on the Aulia-Tepeh and Turkish head-quarter camp.

The Turks now held the lesser Yahni with 10 battalions, Vezin-Keui with some 15 battalions, and the Aulia-Tepeh with 4 battalions; some 30 battalions held the Aladja-Dagh, including posts on the Liaret and Nahlend Tepehs.

Mukhtar Pasha was joined on the 13th by 6 battalions from the right wing. Of the 10 battalions that had been ordered to join him, Ismail Pasha would only consent to part with 6; these arrived at Vezin-Keui on this day, having encountered and beaten off *en route* 2 regiments of Russian cavalry from Digor. The 6 battalions previously ordered from the right wing had been recalled by Ismail Pasha!

In the meanwhile, General Lazareff had reached Digor with the head of his column on the 12th, with his advanced guard at Akriak, having picked up *en route* the detachment at Uzunkend and been joined at Digor by General Tsytovitch's force from Hadji Bairam. In consequence of the forced marches his troops had executed, a day's rest was now given them in these positions. On the morning of the 14th a reconnaissance was made towards Bazardjik and Hadji-Halil and a strong Turkish force was reported in a position near the former place. In the course of the morning a portion\* of the advanced guard were pushed forward under General Loris Melikoff† to seize some strong ground near the Turkish position. This was apparently done without opposition, the Turks being taken by surprise, but the Russian advance guard was now threatened by the 3 battalions near Bazardjik and 6 battalions from Hadji-Halil,‡ and some sharp fighting occurred, through the Russians, being

\* 4 battalions, 2 companies of sappers, 1 regiment of dragoons, 1 regiment of irregular cavalry, and 14 guns.

† Not the Commander-in-Chief.

‡ According to the "Golos" General Lazareff found himself confronted by a strong body of Turks, which had been sent from the Aladja Daghs, and occupied strong positions at Bazardjik—on the south-western extremity of the Orlok heights—and as this contingency was not foreseen, he telegraphed to head-quarters for instructions. General Loris Melikoff immediately sent an order to occupy the important positions on Shatiroglu, and on the two heights flanking that hill in front



rapidly reinforced, soon established themselves in force on the positions seized and pushed forward towards Vezin-Keui.\*

About noon, apparently, Mukhtar Pasha received intelligence that the enemy was advancing in force from Digor and was threatening his position in the direction of Vezin-Keui. He was soon afterwards informed that his troops holding the Tiaret Dagh, covering Vezin-Keui, were attacked in force, and that being taken somewhat by surprise, had been anticipated in the occupation of an important hill and had in consequence been obliged to yield a portion of the ground they had taken up to bar access to the valley of the Kars-Chai

The Turkish General, now it would seem for the first time realized the gravity of his situation and discovered that he was threatened in this dangerous quarter by a far more formidable force than he had been led to believe, for about this hour he appears to have sent Ferik Raschid Pasha with 12 battalions, 2 field and 1 mountain batteries, and some 2,000 irregulars to the point threatened.

This General, arriving as he did late on the field, at once attacked the foremost of the enemy, and at first, it appears, gained some success, the Russians were, however, now solidly established in force on the Orlok-Bazardjik heights, and night soon put an end to the conflict.

The sound of the firing was of course heard by the Russians in front, but a report on the situation does not appear to have reached the Russian head-quarters at the Kara-Yal until 2:30 a.m. on the 15th, and from the contents of the telegram—in which General Lazareff described his force as being in the presence of the enemy in strength—it was at once decided that the moment had come for a general attack with all the forces available, in accordance with the plan previously determined on, and at 5 a.m. the troops received the following dispositions for the day:—

General Schaak was to cover the Great Yahni-Tepoh against Turkish attacks from Kars or the Lesser Yahni-Tepoh and threaten any reinforcements the Turks might direct from Vezin-Keui to the Aulia-Tepoh.

General Heimann was to attack the Aulia-Tepoh.

General Kouzminsky was to attack the Aladja-Dagh, but was to threaten it only during the early part of the day.

The remainder of the troops under General Roop (the reserve and 2 battalions withdrawn from the Kabak-Tepoh during the night) were to connect the forces of Generals Heimann and Kouzminsky and advance from Soubatan on the Inak-Tepessi.

The cavalry was to act on either flank—that on the right in the direction of Vezin-Keui.

Finally, General Lazareff was instructed to regulate his action according to the dispositions and results of the attack in front.

Thus the error of again attacking the Lesser Yahni on which so many lives had been uselessly lost on the 2nd, was this time avoided. It was to be masked only.

The Russian troops were in motion at 6:30 a.m., and before daylight were formed up for attack with their batteries in action ready to open fire.

It is not precisely known how far Mukhtar Pasha was aware of the plan his adversaries had now adopted for dislodging him from the positions in which he had hitherto defied their attempts, nor at what moment he became conscious that the attack threatened in rear of his positions was something very different from the feeble attempts made to turn his right flank on the 1st and

of Bazardjik. This was at first done by cavalry alone, but the Turks leaving their entrenchments drove these back. 3 battalions under General Gurtchine now attacked the Turks in front whilst their flank was threatened by 4 more. The Turks after a hard fight retired to Orlok, when here again they came on a fresh body of Russians under General Shelkownikow, and then fled in some disorder towards Vezin Keui, and the Russians now established themselves on the Orlok heights. General Lazareff now sent a telegram to head-quarters describing his position, and adding, "If you attack Mukhtar Pasha to-morrow at daybreak from your side, his destruction is certain." This despatch was received at 2:30 a.m. on the 15th, and shortly after telegraphic communication was from some unknown cause interrupted.

\* These were the 6 battalions that were on their way to join Mukhtar Pasha from Ismail Pasha's force.



2nd inst., and which he had so signally defeated. No doubt he was now, owing to the disappearance of his Kurdish and Circassian scouts, kept very badly informed of all Russian movements; he knew, however, on the 13th that a strong Russian force had appeared at Digor, still it does not appear as if he made any preparations to retire on the 14th, and it was not apparently until the evening of that day that he seems to have fully realised the danger that threatened him, and ordered a retreat to Kars on the same night, as the result of the partial success gained by General Lazareff during the day.\*

The resolution on the part of Mukhtar Pasha to retire had, however, been too long deferred. During the night, the Russian force in his rear had firmly established itself on the ground it had won during the day, threatening Vezin-Keui, and the first instalment only of Turkish baggage had been safely conveyed to that point, the animals being on their return journey in the morning to remove a second instalment, when the general attack commenced which was to decide the fate of Mukhtar Pasha's force, and ultimately that of Kars.

#### BATTLE OF THE ALADJA-DAGH.

The point assailed in the first instance by the Russians was the Aulia-Tepeh, held by 4 battalions of Turkish infantry with 3 field and 4 mountain guns.

Between 8 and 9 a.m. General Heimann had brought forward 5 heavy field batteries † (40 9-pr. guns), and from these, supplemented by the fire of 3 batteries, ‡ established on the Great Yahni-Tepeh (9-prs.), and 3 siege guns at Hadjiveli (in all 67 guns), there rained, for not less than three hours, § such a storm of shell and shrapnel on the Aulia-Tepeh as threatened the utter annihilation of the gallant defenders before the assault took place. Such, however, was soon found not to be the case, for on the position being attacked about noon by 13 Russian battalions, || so stoutly did the brave fellows defending it cling to their posts, that during the musketry fight which ensued, they repulsed 3 successive attacks of the Russian infantry before a circumstance occurred which caused them to give way and on the fourth attack taking place, to abandon the hill. This they did so deliberately, walking leisurely away and allowing themselves to be fired on by their pursuers without returning a shot, as to convince their comrades on the adjoining Nahlend-Tepeh that their resistance had been prolonged to the last cartridge.

The circumstance above referred to was the extraordinary behaviour of 5 Turkish battalions with a field battery, which (in co-operation with other troops from the side of the Aladja-Dagh) had been ordered up from the Sivri-Tepeh to assist in the defence of the Aulia-Tepeh by taking the assailants in both flanks. The battalions in question were observed to be very tardy in

\* It is only fair to state, that on the 13th the Turkish General received a telegram from Constantinople, in which he was informed that a serious insurrection had broken out in Daghestan, and that the Russian force he was opposed to would detach 20 battalions to assist in suppressing it. He was, at the same time, informed that he might first expect a formidable attack. According to all accounts, this telegram was implicitly believed in at the Turkish headquarters. It had also been observed by the Turks that the baggage and camp equipage that had been sent to Alexandropol by the Russians on the night of the 1st-2nd instant had not returned, their troops having bivouacked in the open ever since; and Mukhtar Pasha may have been led to believe that this indicated the probable retirement of the Russian force in his front. Still no sign of a retreat had appeared, nor was it to be inferred that such a step was contemplated by the Russians from any of their movements or manoeuvres up to this date, and certainly not from their continual employment of siege artillery in the open.

† 5 batteries of the Caucasus Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade.

‡ The 2nd Battery 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Battery 21st Field Artillery Brigade, and the 3rd Battery 39th Field Artillery Brigade.

§ The Russian field batteries at first opened fire at their usual respectful range, but soon finding the Turkish artillery opposed to them very weak, limbered up and moved forward after about an hour's firing to within 1,800 or 2,000 yards of the Turks, and now used almost exclusively shrapnel with time fuzes. The precision of their fire seems to have been very remarkable on this occasion, and the summit of the Aulia-Tepeh is said by an eye-witness to have been completely enveloped in the smoke of their bursting projectiles. This was afterwards verified by the large number of Turks found killed and wounded in their trenches by artillery fire.

|| The 13th (Erivan) and 14th (Georgia) Grenadiers and the 151st (Piatigorsk) regiments, and the 1st Battalion Caucasus Chasseurs.



moving forward, notwithstanding the repeated orders sent to them to accelerate their advance, and no sooner had they come into conflict with the Russian supports than a panic seized them, and, though by no means hard pressed, they retired precipitately, leaving the garrison of Aulia-Tepeh to its fate. Still for awhile the catastrophe was suspended by a sortie which was bravely attempted by a mere detachment of the defenders in order to relieve the defection of their comrades, but the odds against them were tremendous and the effect was only momentary. A battalion armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, sent to reinforce the garrison, reached it with half its numbers, the other half joining the troops operating against the left flank of the Russian attack. These men, however, who had witnessed the withdrawal of the Sivri battalions, and who, it appears, shared their panic, were so far from proving an accession of strength to the garrison, that they were the first to set the example of quitting their posts. Three field guns were abandoned in the Aulia-Tepeh, and fell into the hands of the Russians.

This was the turning point of the day; by the capture of the Aulia-Tepeh the Turkish centre was laid open in front, and the whole of General Heimann's force masking the Lesser Yahni, could now be brought to bear on the Turkish left wing at Vezin-Keui.

Accordingly, after a short pause—during which his front line of 12 battalions, extending from the western slopes of the Great Yahni-Tepeh to Tehift-Tepessi, was reinforced by 4 additional battalions,\* and the whole of his artillery brought forward—General Heimann resumed his attack on the Turkish positions on the Orlok—Vezin-Keui heights, and scarcely had the advance commenced, when heavy firing announced that General Lazareff was co-operating in rear.

General Lazareff, it appears, had not taken any active measures early in the day, and it was not apparently until the Aulia-Tepeh fell that his advanced guard, moving in two columns† under Generals Tsytoivitch and Schelkownikow, attacked and made an impression on the Turks holding the heights of Vezin-Keui.

General Heimann's skirmishers and field batteries now gradually advanced, driving the Turks before them from position to position, and at 2 p.m. the troops of Heimann's left and Lazareff's right joined hands, thus effectually cutting the Turkish position fairly in two.

General Melikoff, it appears, now rode forward to the scene of action, and, having examined the situation, took the following steps to follow up the successes already gained. Seeing that the Turks were apparently inclined to make a stand at Vezin-Keui and that their positions on the Aladja-Dagh and the Lesser Yahni-Tepeh were still intact, he ordered General Heimann to attack Vezin-Keui with a portion of his force and occupy with the remainder the ground between the heights of Vezin-Keui and the Tehift-Tepessi. General Lazareff was to follow up the enemy in the direction of Kars with his cavalry and occupy the Tehift-Tepessi and the heights of Bazardjik, together with the roads and paths by which the Turkish forces holding the Aladja-Dagh, might try to escape by Digor or Aliama. General Heimann's cavalry was to mask the little Yahni until the arrival of infantry, and cut off the retreat of the defenders on Kars.

The taking of the Aulia-Tepeh was, at the same time, the signal for General Roop, who had been threatening the Turkish right wing on the Aladja-Dagh since the morning, to push forward and convert his demonstration into a real attack. Accordingly, the 8 battalions with 2 field batteries,‡ forming his first line, were at once pushed forward with this object towards Kerkhana and Schamschi. The Turks, after a sharp fight, now evacuated the Inakk-Tepessi, and retired to their defences higher up the Aladja-Dagh, against which the Russian attack could make no impression for some considerable time, and it was not until the attacking force had been reinforced to

\* The 4th (Nieshwiez) Grenadiers and a battalion of the 3rd (Pernau) Grenadiers.

† The 154th (Derbent) Regiment, 2 battalions of the 153rd (Baku) Regiment and 2 of the 75th (Sevastopol) Regiment.

‡ The 156th (Elizabethpol) and the 152nd (Vladikawkaz) Regiments with the 3rd Battery 38th Field Artillery Brigade, and the 1st Battery 1st Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade.



12 battalions and 36 guns, and the Turkish positions were turned on either flank,\* that their resistance was broken.

It is doubtful, however, whether such was the case in consequence of the Russian attack alone, for, on the Turkish centre being pierced by the combined attacks of Generals Heimann and Lazareff, the Turkish troops on the Aladja-Dagh were warned of their danger and ordered to retreat, abandoning their stores and camp equipage; the result was, of course, that the Russians pressed forward both on the front and flanks of the retreating Turks and the resistance of the latter was soon at an end. As the Russian infantry pressed forward, their artillery had to cease firing, not being able to follow the skirmishers up the broken and rugged slopes of the mountain; the former, however, took many prisoners, and whole battalions of Turks, seeing their retreat cut off, laid down their arms. In the meanwhile the Turks on the Tchift-Tepessi and the heights of Bazardjik were gradually surrounded by portions of Generals Heimann's and Lazareff's forces, as well as attacked by detachments of General Roop's forces from the Aladja, and finally surrendered. At nightfall, however, portions of 8 battalions, aggregating from 1,500 to 1,800 men, contrived to break through the Russian lines and make good their way to Kagisman; and a somewhat larger number, it was afterwards found, effected their escape in small bands in other directions, but the remainder—about 7,000 officers and men, including two Ferik and three Liva Pashas, with 40 field and mountain guns—fell into the hands of the victors, the whole of the Turkish right wing on the Aladja-Dagh being thus either killed, taken, or dispersed.

After a final stand at Vezin-Keui, the left wing retired in disorder to Kars, but the pursuit does not appear to have been kept up for any distance, nor was the retreat of the forces holding the Lesser Yahni apparently cut off, for, under cover of night, the Turkish forces posted there—10 battalions with 9 field and mountain guns, under "Capitan" Mehmet Pasha, which had been more or less surrounded during the day by the Russians—retired in safety, with its artillery, &c., unmolested to Kars.

It is difficult indeed to account for the small amount of courage, determination and endurance exhibited by the Turkish soldier on this day compared with his previous behaviour in this part of the theatre of war, for nothing like a real stand was made after the fall of the Aulia-Tepeh. The events and course that affairs took on the Turkish side after the loss of that important post, are perhaps best given in the words of a competent eye-witness who accompanied the Turkish General and actually saw how things occurred.

"My experience of the enthusiasm hitherto animating the Turkish soldier on the field of battle had not prepared me for the events which hereon (*i.e.* after the fall of the Aulia-Tepeh) ensued, nor were the Commander-in-Chief and his staff less taken by surprise at the apathetic indifference for which that enthusiasm seemed now to be exchanged. Whether appalled by the heavy losses they had sustained during the recent engagements and the miserable untended condition of their wounded comrades, or subdued by the exposure, suffering, and short rations to which they had been subjected and which had occasioned wholesale desertions, whether conscious that their communications were virtually intercepted, or more probably still, disheartened and demoralised by the first indication of a retreat,† the same men who had before borne themselves so courageously and held their ground so tenaciously in many a hard fight now seemed to be utterly prostrated. Nowhere after the fall of the Aulia-Tepeh did they once attempt to make a stand. As the Russian batteries advanced, they abandoned position after position without firing a shot, and neither persuasion nor threat could induce them to await the enemy's assault. For the rest of the day, while exposed to the heaviest cross-fire

\* On the right by the 152nd (Vladikawkaz) Regiment, and Prince Tchavtchavadze's irregular cavalry and 2 squadrons of the 17th (Siéversk) Dragoons, and on the left by the 1st (Catherianoslav) Grenadiers and 2 squadrons of the 17th (Siéversk) Dragoons, with 4 horse artillery guns.

† During the attempt on the part of the Turkish officers to check the panic and turn back the fugitives, the men denounced the retreat from Kizyl-Tepeh, and one of them, attacking an officer of high rank with his bayonet, asked why they had been required to shed their blood in vain in capturing that post if there were no intention of retaining it; and this sentiment has, it appears, been repeated in various quarters to justify or explain the conduct of the Turkish soldiers on this day.



of artillery (for General Lazareff's force and the main body from Hadjivefi were co-operating after the fall of the Aulia-Tepeh), Mukhtar Pasha personally visited the trenches of the several positions in succession and was himself among the last to quit them when the failure of his exhortations and remonstrances left him no other alternative. It is a remarkable fact that the Turkish troops in this movement to the rear, though losing their formation and retiring in great disorder, retained every man his rifle and never once quickened their pace beyond a walk though harrassed by the enemy's projectiles, until they reached Wezin-Keui. There, however, after a last vain attempt on the part of Mukhtar Pasha to make a stand, the contagion spread to the assembled rabble of soldiers of all arms, muleteers, and drivers, and the retreat took the form of a precipitate flight over a tract of eight miles which intervened up to the gates of Kars amid the explosion of ammunition boxes and other accidents incidental to a panic. In the case of a force composed for the very most part of raw levies, without other subaltern officers to mould the battalions than serjeants promoted from the Nizam regiments to the command of companies, and devoid also of any kind of organization, that a serious defeat should lead to a *débandade* is, of course, to be expected, but in this instance, the loss of the Aulia-Tepeh involving the discomforture of 4 battalions only, could hardly be termed a serious defeat. The Turks, it must be remembered, were everywhere fighting behind entrenchments—their strong point—on positions well chosen for mutual defence, and had they held them with equal tenacity, the retreat of the troops on the Aladja Dagh—some 30 battalions, including 5 battalions stationed on a hill to the south of the Nalhend-Tepeh—must not only have been fully secured, but their appearance on the field, covered by the guns of those positions, might have retrieved the day by concentrating a preponderant force against the Russian Division operating from Digor. Such an issue was only possible of course by dint of sheer hard fighting against the overwhelming numbers the Russians brought into the field on this day."

The total force engaged on the Russian side on this day was 65 battalions, 71 squadrons and sotnias, and 254 guns, whereas on the Turkish side there were 73 battalions,\* 84 field and mountain guns, some 1,500 regular and 2,500 irregular cavalry.

Owing to casualties and desertion, however, the average complement of the Turkish battalion, we are informed on the best authority, had actually fallen below 300 rank and file, whereas the Russian infantry recently recruited from the interior and reinforced by two whole Divisions (the 40th and 1st Grenadier Divisions) as well as by the concentration of all available troops from the right and left wings as Ardahan and Igdyr, not only surpassed the former in number in the field, but averaged in each battalion not less than 650 bayonets, thus giving the Grand Duke some 42,250 bayonets and 254 guns against Mukhtar Pasha's 21,900 infantry† and 84 guns.

The preponderance of artillery on the Russian side in this battle is remarkable as not only outnumbering the Turkish guns as 3 to 1, but being in addition mostly of a much heavier calibre.‡ It was, moreover, worked on this day with a precision and activity which had not distinguished it on former occasions, and, as was remarked by an independent eye-witness on the Russian side, instead of confining itself to a shell fire at impossible ranges—where neither accuracy nor effect could be expected and where its fire was soon masked by the advance of its own troops—moved forward this time in support of the infantry and materially co-operated towards the general result of the day. It is also worthy of remark that whereas the Turkish artillery fire was almost exclusively one of common shell with percussion fuzes, the Russian gunners recognised on this occasion the superiority of shrapnel fired with time fuzes, and used it in large quantities with great effect.§

The actual losses of the Turks in killed and wounded on this occasion were probably very slight in comparison with the scale of the engagement

\* Including the garrison of Kars—some 7 or 8 battalions.

† About 19,650 bayonets, deducting the garrison of Kars.

‡ The Russian 9-pr. fires a common shell weighing 24 lbs. 5 oz. (filled), and a shrapnel shell weighing 22 lbs. 9 oz. (filled).

§ Probably owing to their moving on this occasion to within effective shrapnel range.



owing to their feeble defence, but they are not and probably never will be known, as owing to the complete way in which the Turkish force on the Aladja Dagh was broken up, a large number of men took the opportunity of decamping and not rejoining the colours. The number of prisoners taken by the Russians is given in an official account, dated 24th October, as 7 Pashas,\* 250 officers, and 7,000 unwounded men.† The number of guns taken up to this date was 35, but some more were known to have been abandoned by the Turks in the rocky ravines of the Aladja Dagh. Several camps, with tents, baggage, and large quantities of stores and ammunition also fell into the hands of the victors.

The Russians give their own losses as 7 officers and 223 men killed, and 40 officers and 1,162 men wounded.

#### THE RETREAT FROM KARS TO KIEUPRI-KEUI.

Mukhtar Pasha reached Kars on the evening of the 15th with the *débris* of his left wing from Wezin-Keui, and was joined during the night by "Capitan" Mohammed Pasha with the 10 battalions, &c., that had held the Lesser Yahni-Tepeh during the battle.

No time was now lost in telegraphing orders to Ismail Pasha to retire at once on Kieupri-keui, and to Dervish Pasha, at Batoum, to send 10 battalions to Erzeroum, *vid* Trebizond; and Mukhtar Pasha, having collected a small force, at once prepared to quit Kars for the defence of Erzeroum before the former place was invested by the Russians.

Leaving 31 broken battalions numbering some 10,000 men of all arms and classes to form the garrison of the city under Ferik Hussein Pasha, Mukhtar Pasha left Kars on the morning of the 17th with 9 skeleton battalions and 6 mountain guns, and marched by a mountain path *vid* Bashkeui to Hunkiar Duzi, where he was joined by the remaining battalion from Pennek with 4 mountain guns on the 18th. He had however a narrow escape of being intercepted *en route*, for a Russian force, in strength of about a brigade with a numerous Cavalry, marched from Vezin-Keui on the 16th *vid* Tikma to Begli Ahmet, where it was only separated by a range of heights from Mukhtar Pasha's line of retreat. The weather however was so bad that, though greatly aggravating the sufferings of the retreating Turks, it probably saved them from being observed, or at any rate from being molested. Had indeed the Cossacks shown themselves on the range in question, we are informed on good authority that such was the dispirited state of the Turkish force, the men would undoubtedly have at once dispersed. The Turkish Cavalry under Edhem Pasha, in fact, which was covering Mukhtar Pasha's left flank in the plain, was obliged to retire to Kars, but eventually retreated thence to Erzeroum, *vid* Pennek, with 580 horsemen of sorts, and horses for two or three batteries. On the same day that a Russian force marched to Begli Ahmet to cut off the communications with Kars, another force, in the strength of about a brigade, was despatched to Kagisman, under General Lazareff. Its apparent object was to pursue and capture the fugitives belonging to the Turkish left wing who had escaped in this direction, and according to Russian accounts, the Khoper regiment of Cossacks overtook and captured a Pasha, a Bimbashi, and some 200 or 300 men between the Aladja Dagh and Kagisman on the 17th.

Mukhtar Pasha's retreat to Hunkiar Duzi was accompanied by much hardship and suffering, the weather being very cold, stormy, and wet. Eight Turkish soldiers actually died from exposure *en route*, and some 200 failed to answer their names at roll call at Hunkiar Duzi on the 18th.

On the 19th, Mukhtar Pasha again retired to Yeni-keui, where depots and stores had been established, and where he could hope to recruit the strength

\* Ferik Omar Pasha, Ferik Hussein Pasha, Mustapha Djavid Pasha, Achmet Radet Pasha, Shekret Pasha, Omar Faghir Pasha, Khamdi Bey, Bimbashis Tefik Bey, Sadyk Bey, Kefat Bey, and Ali Effendi, Ahmed Djeftet Effendi and Ismail Agha were among the prisoners taken.

† According to later accounts the number of prisoners was 6,500 of all ranks.



of his troops, collect stragglers, and endeavour to check the advance of the Russians, so as to cover the retreat of his right wing, under Ismail Pasha, now retriring *vid* Delibaba to Kieupri-keui. He accordingly again retired on the 23rd and took up a strong position at Ketchek Sood, a village about 3 miles in rear of his old entrenched position near Zewin. His force now consisted of 10 broken battalions (averaging 240 rank and file), 10 mountain guns and a few horsemen, amounting in all to not more than 2,800 men of all arms. At Erzeroum there were two indifferent battalions which had been recalled from Kieupri-keui on the first tidings of Mukhtar Pasha's defeat, and at the latter place some stragglers only. The Olti line was now completely denuded of Turkish troops.

At Ketchek Sood, distant some 28 miles from Kieupri-Keui, Mukhtar Pasha now halted to observe the advance of the Russians from Milliduz, and from the vantage of a hilly and difficult tract of country, was enabled, though at some risk on the 24th, to surprise a Russian reconnoitring party of 3 regiments of cavalry, with a rocket troop and half a battery of horse artillery that had ventured within his reach; in the skirmish which ensued the Russians were worsted, and retired on Milliduz. This success, though slight in itself, was of great advantage to the Turks, and their spirited manœuvre in all probability suggested to the Russians the presence of a large Turkish force near Zewin, menacing their right flank. Anyhow to Mukhtar Pasha's courage and energy must be attributed the safety of Ismail Pasha's retreat, as will be afterwards seen.

On the 26th, however, the Turkish General finding the Russians in strong force on the heights of Milliduz, destroyed all surplus stores collected at Alakilisseh, &c., and retired unmolested to Kieupri-keui, where he was joined on the following day by Ismail Pasha with 24 battalions, some 2,000 cavalry (regular and irregular), and 33 field and mountain guns, numbering some 14,000 men of all arms. He was now also joined by three Pashas, supposed to have been taken prisoners on the Aladja Dagh,—viz., the two Circassian commanders, Moussa Pasha and Mehemet Ghazi Pasha, and Hadji Rashid Pasha, who brought with them some 2,500 men who had succeeded in cutting their way through the Russians on the night of the 15th and reaching Kieupri-keui. These fugitives were now formed into four battalions and told off as a rear guard in the retreat to the Deveboyun.



OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH RIGHT AND RUSSIAN  
LEFT WINGS.

The demonstration on the 29th ult. was only an exchange of artillery fire at long ranges without any apparent object, and the regular troops on either side continued to remain in September in the camps they occupied in August, both sides being apparently either unwilling or unable to undertake anything decisive.

On the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd September, Ismail Pasha received some reinforcements in the shape of about 1,000 Arab-koords - Sulimanis, from the neighbourhood of Hamadan. Of the 10 battalions referred to in the narrative of events in August as expected from Erzeroum, 2 (Redif) arrived during the first week in September, 3 more with a battery of field guns were on the same date at Karakilisseh, and the remaining 5 at Zeikidan *en route*. Six batalions of Mustaphiz were in addition expected from the south.

On the evening of the 6th, 500 of the newly arrived Sulimanis left the Turkish camp at Zor on a marauding expedition against Russian convoys, having obtained leave to do so from the Turkish General after considerable difficulty and only on condition of their giving a solemn promise not to kill or plunder unarmed villagers. They crossed the Araxes, to the west of Igdyr, by swimming their horses, and returned to camp on the morning of the 8th with some captured horses whose owners they had accounted for, together with a Russian post bag between Kulpi and Igdyr as well as a mail from Erivan to the latter place, which they had intercepted. From the contents of despatches thus captured, the Muchir learnt that General Tergukasoff had resigned and had been replaced by General Devel, and that 8 battalions had been withdrawn from Kulpi to Alexandropol. In spite of this, however, Ismail Pasha showed no signs of undertaking any active operations against the weak force now in his front, much to the disgust of the troops under his command, who openly showed their dissatisfaction and discontent at his inactivity. The Russians now only numbered some 10 batalions, 5 of which were at Igdyr and the remainder at Kulpi, Gulidja, and neighbouring villages; they were still superior, however, to the Turks in cavalry and artillery.

Fearing the advance of a Russian force from Abbasgol, Ismail Pasha had, in the meanwhile, posted a force consisting of 8 or 9 battalions of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, and a large number of irregular horse, on the heights to the north of Mussin, in that village itself, and in the valley leading thence to the Bakyklygol. The cavalry outposts of this force extended, in the commencement of September, to at least 10 miles from head-quarters at Zor.

On the 12th, a brigade of 8 battalions of infantry, 2 field batteries, and 4 mountain guns took up a position on the plateau overlooking Khalifalu, about 3½ miles in advance of the Turkish position. Of these, 2 battalions and the 4 mountain guns were posted to the left of the ravine running from Zor, the remaining 8 battalions and 12 guns being aligned on the heights to the right of it. Khalifalu and the ground adjacent was occupied as an advanced post by the Russians, with a force of 1 battalion of infantry, 4 squadrons of cavalry, and 8 guns. The Turkish battalions now sent forward their skirmishers for some little distance, and about noon 5 battalions of Russian infantry issued from Igdyr and deployed on the plain, but, seeing that no offensive movement was attempted by the Turks, withdrew towards evening.

Ismail Pasha intended, it is supposed, to have followed his advanced brigade with his main body on the following day (13th) and have attacked Khalifalu, to co-operate with a contemplated diversion of the Turkish cavalry from Mukhtar Pasha's force, but on the same night (12th), the temperature suddenly fell some 40°, and a violent storm of snow and rain ensued, lasting for over 36 hours, and effectually putting a stop for the time to all idea of military movements in the mountains.

On the 14th, a Russian force, consisting of 4 or 5 battalions, 4 squadrons or sotnias, and 1 field battery, encamped near the village of Tcharekdjilis, and their advanced camp at Igdyr was strengthened at the same time by 4 battalions of infantry from their camp somewhat in rear of that place.



On the 16th, owing to the severity of the weather and the marshy state of the ground, the Turkish head-quarters and main body descended to the position occupied by their advanced guard, near Khalifalu. Owing to the presence of a Russian force at Tcharekdjilis, however, a change in the disposition and strength of the Turkish left was made, and the positions and forces of Ismail Pasha were now somewhat as follows:—

The right wing consisted of 12 battalions, 3 field batteries, and some 2,500 irregular cavalry; the left wing of 8 battalions, 1 regiment of regular cavalry, 2 field batteries, 4 mountain guns, and "some hundreds" of irregular horse; and to the rear near Ghimede were encamped some 1,000 irregular Arabs, horse and foot. The remainder of the regular battalions were echeloned along the mountains towards the pass of Mussin, and 9 battalions occupied the ground immediately to the west of Zor, with a battery of artillery in reserve on the road to Zor-Asma; there were also 3 battalions in the pass above Mussin (1 being in Mussin itself), 2 at Begéré on the road to Van, 1 at Bayazid, and 1 at Kara-Kilisseh.

The position now occupied by the Turkish advanced forces above Khalifalu was, from a purely defensive point of view, exceedingly strong, being almost inaccessible both in front and on the flanks, but, owing to the escarped and rugged nature of the ground in front, it had the great disadvantage of hampering the movements of artillery and impeding offensive action. The wings, moreover, were separated by a deep and difficult ravine, and the battalions thinly scattered along the front. As regards supplies, it was most inconveniently situated; there was great difficulty in obtaining water, in addition to which, with the exception of the few deserted villages in the neighbourhood where the logs of the roofs of the houses were taken for firewood, there was absolutely no fuel.

The Turks now busied themselves with making roads for the passage of guns down the slopes from this position, and in throwing up batteries at night along the front, gradually approaching Khalifalu.

To oppose Ismail Pasha, General Tergukasoff was still weak in infantry; 8 battalions were posted near Igdyr, and 5 at Tcharekjiler, the remainder being encamped or occupying the villages between Igdyr and Kulpi. Perfectly level ground extended all along the front of the positions occupied by the Russians, being at least 5,000 yards wide at its narrowest point. Their front, too, was protected by numerous cuts or water-courses, especially towards their left flank, which a slight increase of inundation would have rendered impracticable.

Ismail Pasha was now joined by the 6 battalions and field battery so long expected from Erzeroum; 2 of these were Mustaphiz. There had been a great many desertions *en route*, some of the battalions on arrival only mustering 400 bayonets. In one battalion alone, 150 men had deserted and about an equal number had fallen out and were left behind sick.

Ismail Pasha's force now consisted of 36 battalions of infantry, 6 batteries of field artillery, (36 guns), 13 mountain guns, 500 regular cavalry, and some 3,000 irregular horse.

To oppose these, General Tergukasoff had from 20 to 22 battalions of infantry, 8 or 9 regiments of Cossacks and cavalry, and 52 guns.

Continual skirmishing now took place on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, between the Turkish Bashi-Bazouks and the Russian outposts without result and with trifling loss to either side. On the 19th, however, a Russian heavy battery (8 guns) unlimbered to the west of Khalifalu and opened fire on an advanced Turkish half battery (3 guns) to the right of the track leading to the village, and a general cannonade soon ensued along the whole line. The range being between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, but little damage was naturally done. The Russian fire, however, is described by an eye-witness as accurate, and the *sang froid* of the Turkish gunners in the advanced half battery, where the Russian shells fell thickly, very remarkable.

According to a Russian official despatch, dated Kara-Yal, 21st September, the 153rd (Baku), 150th (Taman), and 74th (Stavropol) regiments were engaged in this affair. Their losses were insignificant. Colonel Ivanow, commanding the 153rd (Baku) regiment, was wounded.

On the afternoon of the 20th a party of some 300 Bashi-Bazouks were permitted to make a demonstration against the village of Khalifalu. They



descended a ravine on the right of the Turkish position, but were speedily observed by the Russians, who brought forward a couple of heavy field guns from their main camp—half way between Khalifalu and Igdyr—and from a point about 1,000 yards on their side of the former place, unlimbered and opened fire, pushing forward at the same time a battalion in extended order to the east of the village. This at once checked the advance of the Turkish irregulars, and both sides then continued firing at each other at long ranges, and with little effect till evening. The Turks at the same time opened an artillery fire from their advanced batteries on the Russian guns and skirmishers. The firing went on till dark, with little damage to either side. On the Turkish side the losses were 1 Bashi-Bazouk and 2 horses killed and 1 man wounded. Towards evening a Russian ammunition wagon was blown up by a Turkish shell.

In the meanwhile another and more serious fight was going on on the other flank. Late in the afternoon 4 Russian battalions, supported by 4 guns advanced from the village of Yokari-Cherik-Jileh, and made a more serious but unsuccessful attack on the Turkish extreme left. They were met by 3 Turkish battalions, occupying a position about 1,000 yards in front of their camp, afterwards supported by a portion of another battalion and 3 guns advanced for the purpose. These guns were, it is said, used with considerable effect on the Russian skirmishers, but were retired on the latter coming within rifle range. The Russians made three distinct advances on the Turkish position, which was temporarily strengthened by stone breastworks, but were repulsed each time with considerable loss. A regiment of Cossacks advanced during the engagement, and dismounting, supported their infantry as skirmishers, whilst on the Turkish side, some 600 Koords under Erak Bey came to the support of their infantry on their extreme left, and, dismounting, materially checked the Russian advance by their fire.

The Turkish loss in this action is given as 5 killed and 12 wounded (among the latter was Kaimakam Hafiz Bey commanding on the left of the Turkish position, mortally wounded).

Simultaneously with the real attack on the Turkish left, the Russians made a demonstration with one battalion from Khalifalu on the centre, but beyond a good deal of firing between skirmishers, nothing took place. The Turkish loss was nil.

The total Russian loss in the engagement is not known, but it was undoubtedly more severe than the Turkish, as they were much more exposed throughout the affair.

In consequence of this attack, the Turkish left was on the following day reinforced by 2 battalions, raising the force on the left of the Zor ravine to 9 battalions, 12 guns (4 pounders), 4 mountain guns, 1 regiment of cavalry, and some hundreds of Bashi-Bazouks.

There was no fighting or firing on either side on this or the following day, (21st, 22nd), but on the latter day Mohammed Mumri Pasha, lately in command of the reserve, was appointed commander of the 3rd brigade, comprising all the Turkish troops on the left of the Zor ravine, as given above.

At sunset on the 23rd, the Turks fired a salute and lit bonfires all over their positions to celebrate Osman's victory at Plevna, news of which arrived on the night of the 22nd.

Shortly after midnight on the 23rd, heavy firing took place in front of the Turkish position and on both sides of the Zor ravine. The Russians advanced 2 or more battalions, with what object it is difficult to say, and fired several volleys by sections into the camp of a Turkish battalion (Malacthia) located just above and on the left bank of the ravine, and soon succeeded in drawing a heavy indiscriminate file fire on themselves from all sides. No casualties were apparently caused on either side, and the Russians retired after a couple of hours' waste of ammunition by moonlight, having only succeeded in alarming the whole of the Turkish camp.

On the following night the Turks, anticipating a renewal of the previous night's diversion, reinforced their outposts with a large force of infantry and Bashi-Bazouks, but the Russians did not repeat the experiment.

From the tactics employed by the Turkish General, he would seem to have had an idea of pushing forward his batteries by degrees, working at night and 2 battalions were now encamped lower down on the slopes in the immediate



front of the main Turkish position, two more being employed day and night on the left front as opportunity occurred at road making.

On the evening of the 27th it was decided at the Turkish head-quarters that an advance should be made at midnight on the extreme left to a position overlooking the Mussin—Igdyr road, about one mile to the west of the position previously occupied, this movement thus enabling the Turks to connect their temporary roads for their artillery with the main road above mentioned. A battalion of Chasseurs, 4 companies of an infantry battalion, and 4—4-pounder guns accordingly took up a position on the front of a spur, on the left of which was the broad, deep, winding ravine along which the main road runs, and on the right another ravine, deep, but narrow. The Turks immediately threw up stone parapet walls along the face of the spur, but made their usual mistake in neglecting to look after their flanks while making their front nearly impregnable.

The Russians apparently received intelligence of this movement during the night, for they attacked the Turks early in the morning with 4 battalions and 4 heavy field guns. The Turkish guns which were posted somewhat in rear of their infantry were compelled after firing a few rounds to retire to a safer position, and strong bodies of Russian skirmishers pushing unperceived up the ravines on either side of the spur, took the Turks holding it in flank and reverse. The latter now beat a hasty and somewhat disorderly retreat, after which the Russian infantry occupied the stone entrenchments which they had constructed in the night. Their further advance, however, was checked by the arrival of 2 Turkish battalions, who at once occupied some entrenchments previously thrown up (the same which the Turks had successfully defended on the 20th), about 1,000 yards from the position held by the Russians.

Ferik Mustapha Pasha arrived on the scene at 11 a.m., and was met in succession by the retreating guns, a good many wounded stragglers, and finally by several companies of infantry, retiring in the greatest confusion, accompanied by a disorderly mob of Bashi-Bazouks. The Ferik at once assumed command, rallied the fugitives, and led them in person against the Russians.

He first despatched several hundred Bashi-Bazouks to the other side of the main ravine on the Turkish left—thus not only getting rid of this element of confusion, but threatening the Russian flank—and next succeeded in getting 2 guns into action, which on opening fire soon drew that of the Russian guns, now reinforced to six. The remaining 2 Turkish guns soon afterwards came into action, and a sharp musketry and artillery combat ensued. The Russian skirmishers now tried to push up a ravine on the Turkish right, but were checked by a heavy fire and did not get nearer than 600 yards. Skirmishing was now kept up between both sides for at least two hours, and 2 Turkish battalions (weak) arriving in support at 2 p.m., the Russians retired to the position they had taken in the morning, being threatened in flank by the Bashi-Bazouks, who, however, only approached to within about 1,500 yards and kept up an unceasing but useless fire for several hours. The Turks made no attempt to drive them from this position, but the skirmishers on both sides continued to keep up an unceasing rifle fire till dark at a range of about 1,000 yards, doing little or no damage on either side. Just before sunset a Russian ammunition wagon exploded. After nightfall the Russians abandoned the position they had taken and held during the day, but the Turks made no attempt to reoccupy it.

The Turkish loss in this affair is given as 30 men killed and some 100 men wounded.\*

In the meanwhile, on the Turkish right, the Russians brought 4 guns into action near Khoshkhabar, and 8 near Khalifalu, which village they occupied with 2 battalions, with 1 battalion and 4 squadrons or sotnias in rear of it, and covered their front with skirmishers. 3 battalions and 4 squadrons or sotnias were also brought out from Yokari Cherik-Jileh, as if to support an attack on the Turkish right. At 10 a.m. the Turks opened fire from 6 guns in their advanced batteries, and the Russians at once replied vigorously. The fire was now taken up by another Turkish battery, giving 12 guns on either side, and after

\* Among the killed was Ibrahim Agha, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment, and among the wounded Mehemet Agha, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment (previously wounded at Bayazid).



an hour's firing, the Russians withdrew their guns at Khalifalu but advanced those near Koshkhabar with the object of taking the Turkish guns *en écharpe*; their fire, however, is said to have been ineffective, as a very strong gale was blowing at the time. At about 12 noon the Russian skirmishers in front of Khalifalu moved slightly forward, but retired after exchanging a few shots with the Turkish outposts. The losses on the Turkish side on the right amounted to two men wounded.

The total loss of the Russians on this day is given in an official despatch dated Kara-Yal, 29th September, as 16 men killed and 148 wounded. General Dewel commanding the 39th Division, Colonel Kabenine commanding the 155th (Kuban) regiment, and 10 other officers were wounded. The Russian troops engaged appear to have belonged to the 154th (Derbent) and the 155th (Kuban) regiments of the 39th Division, the 73rd (Crimean) and the 74th (Stavropol) regiments of the 19th Division, and the 4th and 2nd batteries of the 19th and 28th Field Artillery Brigades respectively.\*

A great many horses on the Turkish side were killed or disabled by shell and shrapnel fire, but with the exception of Ibrahim Agha who was killed by a shrapnel bullet, nearly all the casualties were caused by rifle fire, in spite of the continual and heavy artillery fire kept up during the greater part of the day. Most of the losses on the Turkish side occurred early in the day.

In consequence of the affair on the 27th, the Turkish left wing was strengthened on the following day by two battalions from the reserve, and the right by 1 battalion. There were consequently now 11 battalions on the left of the Zor ravine, 12 on the right, and 11 in reserve in the neighbourhood of the Mussin and Zor passes. The Turks also retired their guns from their somewhat exposed position in the advanced batteries, where they were certainly dangerously near the battalions covering them in front, and liable to be taken or disabled by a sudden attack of the Russians in force.

Towards the end of September the Turkish force began to feel the effects of the weather, which was now stormy and cold, in this exposed situation; in addition to this the difficulty of supply increased daily, especially as regards forage.

The army looked forward, however, with some small satisfaction that Ismail Pasha would soon be obliged in consequence to move either forwards or backwards in spite of himself. Desertions among the Koords and Arabs now took place in large numbers, and scarcely a night passed without a batch of from 50 to 200 of these irregulars taking their departure. Their loss was not however so important as the dissatisfaction felt among the regular forces at Ismail Pasha's want of energy; this, added to bad rations and exposure, seriously affected the *morale* of the Turkish regular troops, and the sick list now began to assume alarming proportions.

The actual strength and position of General Tergukasoff's force at the end of this month are not precisely known, but are supposed to have been somewhat as follows:—

At Igdyr and Khalifalu, 9 or 10 battalions, 12 squadrons or sotnias, and 32 guns; and at Tcharekliger, Khoshkhabar, and Oba, 6 battalions, 4 squadrons or sotnias, and 8 guns; giving a total force of 15 or 16 battalions, 16 squadrons or sotnias, and 40 guns.

With the exception of a cavalry reconnaissance made by the Russians on the 6th towards the Turkish extreme right and along the Karabalak road, held by a regiment of Turkish cavalry (4th), and a continual exchange of rifle shots between the outposts almost every morning before sunrise, little or nothing occurred between the opposing forces in this part of the theatre of war in October until the 14th.

On the 8th instant, 6 battalions, and again on the 14th, 4 battalions were despatched, *vid* Mussin and Karakilisseh, to reinforce Mukhtar Pasha, in

\* According to the Russian account of this engagement, Ismail Pasha attacked the whole line occupied by the forces of General Tergukasoff at 10 a.m., and their right flank at Scharoukhtcha with 12 battalions, and after a severe struggle was driven 7 versts by detachments of the Kuban, Derbent, and Stavropol regiments with considerable loss. It is difficult to reconcile this version of the affair with that given by impartial and competent eye-witnesses, who, moreover, can have no possible object in describing a Turkish *offensive* movement as a *defensive* one, or *vice versa*.



accordance with that General's orders. These battalions were, it is said, among the best and most reliable under Ismail Pasha's orders, and their withdrawal, together with the disappearance of the greater part of his irregulars, now quite precluded any idea that General might have had of assuming the offensive, if indeed such had ever been his intention at any time.

On the other hand, on the 9th or 10th, a Russian force consisting of 4 battalions, 2 sotnias, and a field battery, was detached under General Tsytovitich, *via* Hadji Bairam, to Digor, there to join General Lazareff (*see* page 78). This movement was, it appears, noticed by Ismail Pasha's headquarters, and the Turks were fully satisfied that the Russian centre was being reinforced from the left wing.

On the 14th a demonstration was made along the whole front by the Turks, with the avowed intention of attracting the Russian troops from their camps and showing their strength. The following was the general disposition of the Russian outposts:—3 advanced pickets of from 10 to 12 men each with about 60 men in support, were posted in the ravines between the Turkish right wing and Khalifalu, the latter village being occupied by a reserve of 1 battalion and 1 squadron or sotnia, reinforced at night by an additional battalion and a field battery (8 guns). The disposition of the outposts in front of Tcharekliger was much the same, with the exception that the reserve—usually consisting of 1 battalion, 2 squadrons or sotnias, and 4 guns—was pushed forward along the Mussin road to the ravines on the extreme left of the Turkish position.

The Turks about noon on this day began by pushing forward a line of skirmishers towards Khalifalu from the 6 battalions occupying entrenched positions on the slopes in their front on the right of the Zor ravine, to oppose which the Russians sent forward a line of skirmishers from the village, with a squadron of cavalry on each flank. At the same time the Turks threw forward their left wing and occupied the ground which had been the scene of the conflict on the 27th; this wing consisted of 12 battalions of infantry, 1 regiment of regular cavalry, and 3 batteries of field and mountain guns, and had some desultory skirmishing with the Russians, but without inducing the latter to attack or make a corresponding advance on their right. In the course of the afternoon, the Russians moved 1 battalion, 2 squadrons and 4 guns from Tcharekliger towards the Turkish left. As soon as the supporting force of the Turkish right wing (10 battalions, with 2 field batteries, and 1 regiment of regular cavalry covering the flank) had pushed forward down the slopes some 1,000 yards or so, a Russian battalion with a field battery issued from Igdyr, and took up a position across the Igdyr—Khalifalu road, where they remained during the remainder of the day, being subsequently reinforced by another battalion and 4 squadrons.

In the meanwhile, at about 2:30 p.m., 3 Russian battalions and a field battery advanced from the Russian right at Igdyr; the battery pushed forward over the plain towards Khalifalu, preceded by a battalion with 2 companies extended in two lines of skirmishers (one in support of the other) and the remaining two covering the front of the battery. The latter was halted at about 800 yards from Khalifalu, the remaining 2 battalions were formed up in support, and the leading battalions entered the village in extended order. The latter now came under the fire of the Turkish artillery, and soon swarmed from the village to avoid the shells, and, forming an extended line some hundreds of yards in front of it, out of rifle range of the Turks, crept cautiously forward, taking every advantage of the rifle pits, stone screens, and natural cover formed by the rocky nature of the ground; they were soon indeed almost entirely out of sight, for, owing to the continual skirmishing that had taken place between the Turkish advanced positions and Khalifalu, the ground had been thickly studded with every kind of artificial cover, from which the skirmishers, both Turkish and Russian, were in the habit of firing at each other with a minimum amount of damage to either side. Both sides now kept up an incessant fire till night fall, in which the Turks decidedly carried off the palm for wasting ammunition—their batteries in fact firing some 100 rounds at the Russian supports without, it is said, doing any damage. Towards evening, the Russians moved 3 squadrons and 4 guns from Igdyr to Tcharek-



liger, and 1 battalion from Khoshkhabar to Oba. The Russian cavalry, with the exception of the squadrons mentioned, remained in camp.

The Turkish losses in the affair are given as 1 officer and 3 men wounded. Those of the Russians are not known, but were probably as insignificant.

The Russian troops engaged, according to their own accounts, were the 150th (Taman) and 75th (Sevastopol) regiments, 2 squadrons of Caucasus dragoons and 3 sotnias of Caucasus Cossacks.

As a demonstration to compel the Russians to show their strength, these proceedings on the part of Ismail Pasha were futile. There was an absence of reality about them which must soon have been as evident to the Russians as to the Turks themselves, and no more was seen by the Turks than was every day visible in camp, while beyond the appearance of the single battalion at Oba, there was no indication on the part of the Russians to what extent they occupied the villages.

On the 13th or 14th, a large force of Russian cavalry was detached and made a reconnaissance or demonstration in the direction of Kagisman and Nachdshevan, with a view to interrupting the Turkish reinforcements on their way to join Mukhtar Pasha.

#### RETREAT OF THE TURKISH RIGHT WING TO KIEUPRI-KEUL

On the morning of the 16th a general parade of all the Russian troops under General Tergukasoff took place, and a salute of 101 guns was fired in honour of the victory before Kars. On the same evening a telegram in cypher was received at the Turkish head-quarters from Mukhtar Pasha announcing his defeat, and ordering an immediate retreat to Kieupri-keul.

The contents of the telegram were kept secret, but a council of war was at once held in Ismail Pasha's tent, and at 8 p.m. orders were issued for a general retreat to the positions that were occupied before the 16th September.

The baggage was now hastily packed, and at 9 p.m. the tents were already being struck. At 7 p.m. the Turkish head-quarter camp was struck and sent up the mountain. The greater part of the artillery on the right wing was moved across the ravine near Ghinudi towards Zor, as soon as possible after the issue of orders—or about midnight. A half battery remained on the ground in front of head-quarters till 3 p.m., when it also retired to take up a position near Ghinudi, but all the infantry, except 6 battalions, continued to occupy the advanced posts in front of each wing till early morning, when they followed the baggage trains to the rear, the advanced posts being finally withdrawn shortly before sunrise.

The distance to be got over was short—two hours' march by daylight—but the night was dark, and the road bad, especially where the deep and precipitous Zor ravine had to be crossed, so that the day was well advanced before the troops were settled down in their old position near Zor, which they had occupied for six weeks immediately after crossing the frontier on the 6th August (some 1,650 feet above the position they had just quitted).

The night was fortunately fine, and the arrangements for the retreat appear to have been well considered. Everything was carried out in an orderly manner and without confusion, and the retreat was unmolested by the Russians.

On the 18th the Turkish force amounting to 24 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry, 36 field and 13 mountain guns, and a large body of irregulars remained in the Zor position. Of these, 10 battalions and 2 field batteries occupied the Mussin Pass, village, and surrounding heights, and the remainder the positions that were held some six weeks previously. Throughout this day all was quiet on both sides. In the afternoon the Russian outposts were pushed forward to the edge of the plateau on the right bank of the Zor ravine, and on to the ground occupied on the previous day by the Turkish head-quarters. After sunset the Turks fired a few shells at the Russian bivouac fires.

During the night the Russians struck their camps near the village of Chiraka, and before daylight on the 19th the whole of their force was advancing in two columns towards the Turkish position. On the right a column, consisting



of 7 or 8 battalions of infantry, 8 or 10 squadrons of sotnias, and 2 batteries of artillery advanced from Chiraka by the road leading from that place to Mussin (which lay on the left of the position occupied by the Turks), and in the centre a similar force of infantry with 3 or 4 batteries of artillery, but with less cavalry, advanced from Koshkhabar straight towards the Turkish centre, the whole of General Tergukasoff's force (some 15 or 16 battalions, 16 squadrons and sotnias, and 40 field and mountain guns) advancing to the attack, hoping no doubt to catch the Turks on the move.

The latter were, however, firmly established in strong positions on the mountains, and were anxious to meet the Russian attack.

At about 10 or 11 a.m., the Russian right column pushed forward a battery supported by 3 battalions of infantry and soon came into action with the Turkish guns at a long range. The infantry on either side were out of range, but the artillery fire lasted for upwards of an hour, doing little or no damage: it was stopped by a storm of rain and was not re-opened till dark, when the Russians retired.

At the same time that the artillery fire commenced on the Turkish left, the Russian skirmishers from the centre column were pushed forward from the position the Turks had occupied two days previously, to within some 3,000 yards of the Turkish centre, but, on coming under the fire of the Turkish artillery, were checked, and made no further advance during the day.

On the Turkish right, the Russians made an advance towards the hill on the north-east of the Zor ravine, occupied by the Turks with 2 battalions and 3 mountain guns; they pushed their skirmishers to the very base of the hill, but then suddenly retired for some unknown reason, without even exchanging shots, and at noon had re-occupied the positions held by their outposts on the previous night.

In the centre, however, where the firing had been stopped about noon by the rain, and both sides were hidden from view for upwards of two hours, the Russians, succeeded during the storm in moving forward a field battery (8 guns) to a hill where its fire took the Turkish batteries *en écharpe*, the latter being echeloned along the crests of the hills. The Turkish gunners were, however, equal to the occasion; quickly changing front, they gradually got the better of the Russians, though the latter were soon afterwards reinforced by 4 more guns, and after a severe artillery combat, silenced the Russian battery, exploding 4 ammunition wagons and driving the teams and gunners from the guns, which were not removed by the Russians till nightfall, when they retired along the whole front from the advanced positions they had taken up back to Igdyr and the adjacent villages.

Owing to the firing having been exclusively confined to artillery, and at a long range, the losses were not heavy, the Turkish being given as 3 gunners contused and a few men of the infantry killed and wounded. The Russians give their losses as 5 men killed, but do not mention the number wounded. They had at least one gun disabled.

On the Turkish side, another council of war was held in the evening, at which it was decided to continue the retreat.\*

This was well arranged and orderly, but being suddenly decided on for strategical reasons, unfortunately happened at a time when there were not sufficient animals in camp to carry away the whole of the spare ammunition and commissariat stores that had been accumulated. The latter, moreover, owing to the recent arrival of large quantities of rice purchased at Khoi in Persia, were in greater quantity than had ever been the case since Ismail Pasha's force had advanced from Bayazid, and after loading all the animals available, there remained some 500 boxes of ammunition (500,000 rounds), some tents, enormous piles of horse shoes, nails, &c., and large quantities of rice and biscuit. The latter were mashed up and destroyed by smouldering fire, the tents were torn to shreds, cases of rifles and bayonets were opened and their contents distributed among the soldiers to be carried away, and at about 2 p.m., when the last man was leaving the ground, the cartridges were fired.

Fortunately for the Turks it was a clear, fine, moonlight night—a striking

\* Only on account of the disaster before Kars, and not on account of General Tergukasoff's demonstration.



contrast to the bad weather experienced in their night march 48 hours previously, and to the much worse weather encountered on many a subsequent night in their retreat—and when day dawned the whole of the baggage and heavy guns and nearly all the troops had defiled through the pass, and were in safety on the south side of it. The retreat was accomplished by two roads—the main Mussin—Igdyr and the Zor—Mussin roads. The battalions and batteries of the left wing with their reserve ammunition and baggage retired by the former, and the main body by the latter—a track which the Turks during their stay on Russian territory had converted into a fair road for guns.

The ground to the north of the pass is open and undulating, but on the south side, the Zor—Mussin tracks all merge into a single road, and at one time during the night a block occurred, when camels laden with ammunition, baggage ponies, sheep, and soldiers of the escort got mingled together in dangerous confusion. The delay, however, was short, and by sunrise the baggage and a portion of the troops had arrived in Mussin, the rear guards (consisting each of 3 battalions with 3 mountain guns) holding the two passes on the hills overlooking the roads. It was an anxious moment for the Turks, for had their rear guard on the Zor road been hard pressed and forced to retire, it would in all probability have been annihilated, as the steep and winding tract on the south of the pass would have been exposed throughout to the fire of guns placed on the highest part of the road. Fortune, however, favoured the Turks, for the Russians who had been some 20 hours under arms by the time they retired to their camps on the night of the 19th, were hardly in a fit state to start on the morning of the 20th in immediate pursuit, when they learned—as they did at daylight—that not a man of the Turkish force remained on Russian territory.

The Turkish force reached Mussin (9 miles) in safety, but only to be hurried forward again to Ippek Gedik (13 miles)—a strong position where it had been determined to make a first halt.

The leading baggage animals reached Ippek Gedik early in the afternoon, from which time up to midnight baggage and troops continued to arrive at the camp wet, hungry, and miserable, for the weather was now cold and stormy, and the road bad, and many of the overworked and scantily fed baggage animals were left in a dying state by the way side; the march was followed by a bitterly cold night in camp at Ippek Gedik, where there was neither water nor firewood.

Mussin village lies in a level plain some 4 miles broad, enclosed on the north and south by ranges of mountains. Two miles south-east of the village there is a narrow defile, through which the line of retreat lay, and here on the hills covering the entrance to the defile were posted the 6 battalions and 6 mountain guns forming the Turkish rear guard.

On the morning of the 19th General Tergukasoff, finding that Ismail Pasha had retired over the mountains, at once moved forward in pursuit, and about noon the cavalry of the Russian advance guard crossed the frontier by the roads by which the Turks had retired, and descended at once into Mussin; this village had been vacated, but in such haste that some tents belonging to the Koordish auxiliaries fell into their hands, together with a small quantity of small-arm ammunition and commissariat stores, which the Turks had not found time to destroy. The Russian cavalry (2 squadrons of dragoons and 3 sotnias of Cossacks) now pushed on to the entrance of the defile, following up the Koordish irregulars who had been left in the Mussin plain to cover the Turkish retreat, but on coming within range of the guns of the Turkish rear guard late in the afternoon, were at once checked by the fire of the latter, and retired to Mussin.

The Turkish rear guard retired shortly after dark and joined the main body at Ippek Gedik about 2 a.m. on the morning of the 20th.

At about 9 a.m. on the same day orders were issued by Ismail Pasha to continue the retreat, and by 11 a.m. the camps were struck, and the baggage had started for Gerger. At noon on this day 4 battalions and 6 mountain guns started from Ipek for Bayazid, which it had been determined to occupy. This force, which was placed under Liva Achmet Mukhtar Pasha, marched *via* Djevna (a more southerly road than the direct one, which lay in full view of possible Cossacks on the range of hills south of Mussin), with orders to retire on Van should the Russians have advanced and seized Bayazid from Igdyr *via*



the Karabulak pass. It reached Bayazid in safety, however, on the same night, but subsequently retired, as will be afterwards seen, to Barghiri, on the road to Van. The day's march on the 20th was to Gerger—a small village on the left bank of the Euphrates, distant some 23 miles. The march was a long and trying one for troops in such a harassed condition and impeded with long trains of baggage, and the camp which was on a good defensible position on the right bank of the stream, was not reached till night. To raise the spirits of the troops, who appeared to think that the hurried retreat was due to fear of Russian pursuit, Ismail Pasha caused copies of a telegram to be circulated in the camp just before starting, to the effect that a Russian General had been taken prisoner in the Schipka Pass, together with his army-corps of 50,000 men! This rumour was generally believed in, and it did not ooze out until two or three days afterwards that the telegram had no foundation.

In the course of the day's march a detachment of Cossacks that had crossed the Russian frontier near the Balikly Gol, came down by a mountain track to the neighbourhood of Utch-Kilisseh, near which place they came into contact with some Turkish regular cavalry and a skirmish ensued in which the Kol-Aghani\* (wing officer) and 2 troopers on the Turkish side were either killed or taken prisoners. The Cossacks, however, retired, and did not molest the Turkish retreat. Some 150 stragglers were left behind on the line of march during this day's retreat, and great exhaustion was now everywhere apparent in the force. Gerger was reached in the night.

On this day, Ismail Pasha was joined at Utch-Kilisseh by the 4 battalions that had been sent from the camp at Zor on the 14th to join Mukhtar Pasha. Having heard of the disaster at Kars, they remained halted at Utch-Kilisseh awaiting the retreat of the right wing.

On this day the cavalry of General Tergukasoff's advance guard reached Utch-Kilisseh, and a body of Turkish cavalry numbering some 1,000 sabres (regulars and irregulars), were sent along the road to reconnoitre. They came upon and surprised a Russian cavalry picket at Tachlidgeh; following them up, they then came on the Russian cavalry in the strength of some 6 or 7 squadrons and sotnias at Utch-Kilisseh, with whom, however, they do not seem to have interfered. Orders were now sent to the Turkish cavalry to check any further advance of the Russian cavalry, but the latter appeared nevertheless at Karakilisseh on the afternoon of the following day (24th). The infantry of Tergukasoff's advance guard reached Mussin on the 23rd, their advance being much impeded by the bad state of the weather and road.

Having now considerably distanced the Russians, none of whom had been seen following in rear during the day, a halt was made till midnight on the 21st, when the force again retired some 15 miles to a strong position 3 miles west of Karakilisseh, where it halted for a clear day (23rd) to rest the troops and allow stragglers to come up. Some 350 or 400 sick and some stores were now despatched in advance on ponies to Erzeroum.

Early on the morning of the 24th Ismail Pasha again resumed his retreat, the baggage and ammunition train moving off at 1 a.m., followed at 3.30 by the infantry (24 battalions) and artillery (33 guns). 1 battalion and 3 field guns were now detached by a southerly and circuitous route to reinforce the detachment at Bayazid. The rear guard, consisting of 5 battalions and 2 squadrons, finally left the position at 4.30 a.m. The day was fine and there was a slight frost hardening the roads, and the head of the column reached Zeidikan (18 miles) at the foot of the Kosé Dagħ about 10.30 a.m. (between Karakilisseh and Zeidikan there is a gradual rise of some 500 feet). Great consternation prevailed among the inhabitants of the villages through which the Turkish army was now retiring, and all who could manage to transport themselves and their families accompanied the Turkish troops, dreading the Koords who followed in rear.

A council of war was now held, and reconnoitring parties of cavalry sent forward along the road to Delibaba, and towards evening the column which had halted near Zeidikan during the greater part of the day, was directed by the Djeli—Gedik road on Kurdali—some 6 miles distant—where the troops arrived

\* It was generally supposed by the Turks that this man, who was a Caucasian, deserted, and went over to the Russians during the skirmish.



and bivouacked at about 7 p.m. At the same time a flanking column of 5 battalions and some cavalry marched by the Chat or easternmost road across the mountains. The Djeli—Gedik road attains a height of 6,200 feet near Halias; it was by this road that General Tergukasoff retired in the previous June, and it had been greatly improved by the Russians, still, owing to the exceptionally steep gradients and muddy subsoil, it was a formidable obstacle to a retreating army encumbered with wheeled transport, especially in wet weather.

On the 25th, the column marching again at about 1 a.m., found the road all but impassable. With each gun, there were 500 infantry and extra relays of horses, yet it took 8 hours to drag them a distance of little more than half a mile near Kiurdali, and so difficult was the greater portion of this day's march that the artillery did not arrive at the camping ground near Halias, distant about 11 miles, till the following night.

Snow fell continually, and marching for the strongest was no easy matter under the circumstances; for the sick and exhausted it was in many cases impossible, and many a poor fellow was left to perish by the roadside, utterly unable to stagger on a yard further.

In the afternoon the troops prepared to bivouack near the memorable heights of Halias, where Tergukasoff's advance had been checked in the early summer; the baggage was some three miles ahead at the village of Henkilias, but on a report being received that Cossacks had been seen in the neighbourhood, it was ordered back to Halias and Henkilias occupied by a detachment of cavalry.

On this day the cavalry of General Heimann occupied Milliduz, its further advance having been checked on the previous day near Zewin by Mukhtar Pasha's timely attack, the news of which reached Ismail Pasha this afternoon; consequently it was reasonably concluded at the headquarters of the latter that the retreat of the right wing, or its junction with Mukhtar Pasha's force, was now secure, unless the Russians were in force at Milliduz, which fortunately for the Turks was not the case. Still up to the actual hour of marching on the 26th, it was understood that the column would avoid the Delibaba defile and reach Kieupri-keui by a circuitous road over the mountains.

By 5 a.m. on the 26th, the baggage train was moving towards the defile (6 miles from Henkilias, and 9 or 10 miles from Halias) followed at 7 a.m. by the infantry and artillery; this portion of the road was good, and by 1 p.m. the baggage and ammunition train had cleared the defile, and by 2 p.m. was parked in the plain beneath awaiting orders. It was shortly afterwards followed by the artillery and infantry. Thus the retreat had not been practically interfered with by General Tergukasoff's cavalry since the affair near Mussin on the 19th.

The cavalry of General Heimann's advanced guard on this day pushed forward from Milliduz to Zewin, and occupied the ford over the Araxes, near Maoudjikh, with a detachment, but the retreat of Ismail Pasha was in no way interfered with.

This was continued in the afternoon and by midnight the greater part of the baggage train had arrived at Kieupri-keui; it was followed next morning by the artillery and infantry, the whole force reaching Kieupri-keui by 3 p.m. on the 27th where it now joined the force under Mukhtar Pasha.

Had the Russian cavalry been more enterprising, they might have seriously interfered with the retreat of the baggage train near Delibaba on the 26th, or if not there, certainly during the subsequent march to Kieupri-keui. The flanking column on the Chat road might, it may be said, have prevented the approach of the Russian cavalry near Delibaba, but the column, some 10 miles in length, in subsequently moving over the plain, undoubtedly invited attack, and though the infantry soldiers who led a number of horses throughout the line, might have made a show of resistance, they were much too few and too exhausted to repel the assaults of cavalry at different points, and a few squadrons would have thrown the whole column into irretrievable confusion and disorder.

Whatever the shortcomings of Ismail Pasha may have hitherto been as a general, it must now only fairly be allowed that he had proved himself of



signal advantage to his army in this retreat, both by his natural determination and shrewdness, as well as by his thorough knowledge of the country.

The loss of the stores at Zor, Mussin, and elsewhere, were unavoidable contingencies, and considering the unexpected circumstances of the case, this rapid retreat, made over a long distance, in the face of many difficulties, and under bad conditions of weather and roads, reflects credit on the Turkish force.

To Mukhtar Pasha's courage and high military instinct must however be attributed the safe arrival of the right wing at Kieupri-keui, for it was by his timely offensive from his position at Ketchek Sood, that the Russian cavalry was checked in its advance on Khorassan on the 24th, and time given to the right wing to effect its retreat in safety.

The state of the latter on its arrival at Kieupri-Keui was, as may be supposed, anything but satisfactory. The battalions were deplorably weak, for though the pursuit of Tergukasoff's force had tended to prevent straggling, many had nevertheless been left on the road utterly unable to keep up from sheer exhaustion. There was moreover now a distinctly visible apathy tending to demoralisation among the men—the natural result of their continued inactivity and disappointment, arising from the senseless operations which had characterised the action of the right wing since its formation. The force on arrival at Kieupri-keui consisted of 24 battalions (averaging 400 rank an file), 33 field and mountain guns, and some 2,000 cavalry (regular and irregular), and amounted to some 14,000 men of all arms, of which it is said at least one-third were unfit for service.

The 4 battalions and 6 mountain guns that were detached from Ippek Gedik to Bayazid reached the latter place on the night of the 20th, where they were joined by a battalion that had been stationed there for some time past, and afterwards by the 1 battalion and 3 field guns from Karakilisseh, but Liva Achmet Mukhtar Pasha deeming the place untenable,\* retired shortly afterwards to Barghiri, in the direction of Van, where he was joined by 2 battalions of the Baghdad Army-Corps, the total force under his orders now numbering 8 battalions of infantry (averaging some 450 rank and file), 3 squadrons of cavalry and 9 guns.

\* According to some accounts it was occupied by the Russians.



#### THE RETREAT FROM KIEUPRI-KEUI TO ERZEROU.

The situation of Kieupri-Keui, as the point where the roads from Kars and Bayazid meet, make it at once a place of importance, both as a general depôt and a strategical point for the defence of Armenia. It is, moreover, a place which is described as technically possessing certain advantages for defence, with previous preparation. Little or nothing, however, had been done in the latter sense in anticipation of a crisis which had all along been regarded by the Turks as impossible, but which now was inevitable, as soon as the heads of the advancing Russian columns were strong enough to attack.

The Deve Boyun\*—a naturally strong position covering Erzeroum on the east—was also incomplete as regards defence and was now practically denuded of troops, and the city, 7 miles in rear, was still open to attack by an enemy strong enough to advance simultaneously on either flank, *vid* Olti, or by the roads leading over the highlands on the right bank of the Araxes. Considerable exertion had been made, it is true, since the news of the defeat before Kars had been received; on the morning of the 18th, every available man in the town was sent to the Deve Boyun, under Faizi Pasha (Kohlmann), to work at the defences, and the latter had succeeded, mainly by his own ability and energy, in throwing up and arming, by the 23rd, two batteries for field guns on commanding points in the position, and was now engaged in making such other defensive preparations as he was able with the few weak, disheartened men at his disposal, consisting, for the greater part, of arrested deserters, convalescents from hospital, and the dregs of the Mustaphiz. In addition to the other defences to the city, the plain north of it was flooded as far as possible.

Nor was the state of affairs at Kars more reassuring to the Turkish cause. The 31 broken battalions had been formed into 14 battalions, but amounted to no more than 10,000 men, including the few stragglers from the recent defeat that had since come in; the garrison however was so demoralized and dispirited by hardships, fatigue, and defeat, that the governor, in his last telegram to the Grand Vizier, stated that he could not hope to hold the fortress for any length of time, if even he could resist a first assault. Telegraphic communication between Kars and Erzeroum was cut on the evening of the 17th.

On the Russian side, little or nothing appears to have been done except detaching the two forces previously mentioned to Begli-Ahmed and Kagisman and collecting the prisoners and trophies of the victory, until the 18th or 19th, when all the Russian troops quitted Vezin Keui and the Aladja Dag in two columns, under Generals Heimann and Melikoff, to follow up Mukhtar Pasha and besiege Kars, respectively.

The former force consisted of the Caucasus Grenadier Division, a combined Division (4 regiments of the 21st, 38th, and 39th Divisions), 3 battalions of chasseurs, 16 or 17 batteries of artillery, and a large force of cavalry, amounting to some 35 battalions, 40 squadrons and sotnias, and 130 guns.

The latter consisted of the 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Division, the 40th Division, two battalions of Caucasus Sappers, and the siege artillery from Alexandropol, and amounted to some 30 battalions, 40 squadrons and sotnias, and 120 guns. The siege park was at once brought forward, and preparations made for attacking the fortress on the south and south-east sides.

On the 24th, the cavalry of General Heimann's advanced guard had crossed the Soghanli Dag, and was worsted in a fight near Zewin, and, by the 27th, the Russian columns were crossing the mountains *vid* Milliduz and marching on Khorassan in force.

No alternative consequently remained to the Turks, on the first appearance of General Heimann's troops in this direction, but to destroy all surplus stores and abandon Kieupri-Keui.

This was carried out unmolested by the Russians, and, on the 28th, the Turks, who were now under Ismail Pasha *pro tem* (Mukhtar Pasha having proceeded, on the evening of the 27th, to inspect the defences of the Deve Boyun), retired to Hassan Kaleh (9 miles), where they bivouacked for the night. So

\* Meaning in Turkish "The Camel's Back."



aggravated was now the disorganization of the Turkish troops—so confirmed is their habitual neglect of the commonest precautions against surprise—that, about 2 a.m. on the morning of the 29th, their rear guard was overtaken and surprised by a Russian force (2 regiments of dragoons,\* 2 sotnias of Cossacks, a rocket troop, and half a battery of horse artillery) without the slightest alarm being given of its approach. The village of Hassan Kaleh was traversed and occupied by the Russians, and many Turkish officers and men, who had sought shelter in the place, were killed or taken prisoners. The Turkish rear guard—consisting of the four Kieupri-Keui battalions, under Mohammed Ali Bey, which had bivouacked separately—was cut off, and had to fight its way through the Russians, and it was not until daylight that the main body of the Turkish force could recover from the alarm into which it had been thrown, and resume its march, without, however, attempting to rescue its rear guard. The night was dark and wet, and so complete was the surprise that the Turks in Hassan Kaleh were first alarmed by being fired on by the Russian guns. According to Russian accounts, some 100 Turks were shot or cut down, and 1 Pasha and 120 officers and men taken prisoners. The Russian infantry occupied Hassan Kaleh at about 5 p.m., and the cavalry pushed on somewhat further; but so great was the fatigue of the Russian troops that no pursuit was attempted, and the Turks continued their retreat after daylight unmolested. They reached the Deve Boyun about 11 a.m., with their diminished battalions, marching in tolerable order; these were now posted at the several points pre-determined by Mukhtar Pasha. Their rear guard had, however, to maintain a running fight with the Russians before it was able to extricate itself. One battalion broke up, and the men dispersed, it was believed, to their homes; the remaining three battalions eventually reached the Deve Boyun, but a large proportion of the men were missing. The fring between the Turkish rear guard and the Russians did not cease till near 11 a.m.

The Russian advance guard pushed forward in the course of the day to Kuruyuk, distant some 3 miles from the Turkish outposts, where it was joined on the following morning (30th) by the main body from Kieupri-Keui, with head-quarters at Hassan Kaleh.

The cavalry of Generals Heimann and Tergukasoff had effected a junction at Kieupri-Keui on the 28th (the same day that Ismail Pasha's force had quitted it), and the Russian columns now pushed forward to the Deve Boyun, but so severe was the fatigue of the troops, entailed by their recent forced marches, and so great the depth of their columns, that a halt was necessary before their forces could be sufficiently closed up to undertake active operations against the Turks now holding the head of their column in check.

Mukhtar Pasha was now again in command of the Turkish forces and lost no time in turning the respite allowed him by General Heimann to account in strengthening his position, which is described as strong and the line of defence well planned and armed, especially in the centre and on the right flank.

On the 31st, the Russians reconnoitred towards Mukhtar Pasha's position, feeling apparently for a road towards the left flank of the Turks, and the latter at once took the hint and strengthened the points menaced.

Both sides now continued to watch each other till the 4th; the Russians, on the one side, busily reconnoitring the Turkish positions, and the Turks, on the other, using every additional hour allowed them in strengthening their defences. The chances of the latter, indeed, looked better and better every moment. Their demoralization, it is true, was great, and their fighting qualities much shaken, but the Mushir was doing his best to revive their confidence, and, on the 31st, addressed each brigade separately, with apparently good effect.

By the 3rd November, some 3,000 Turkish fugitives and stragglers had rejoined the colours, and two battalions were expected on the following day (4th) from Trebizond.

The position occupied by the Turks on the Deve Boyun had the common fault of being too extended for the force holding it, being nearly 8 miles in its entire length. Communication between the different parts of the position, as well as between the position of the reserves in rear and the front line was moreover difficult, both by reason of the rocky and precipitous nature

\* The 16th (Novgorod) and 17th (Siéversk) Dragoons.



of the slopes and the isolated character of the various hills on which the Turkish troops were posted.

It may be briefly described as consisting in the centre of a large elevated plateau with precipitous sides, and difficult of access (held by 12 battalions, with 6 siege and 12 field guns); on the right of a range of hills of considerable elevation, of which the 4 isolated peaks or mamelons were entrenched or fortified; and on the left of a still more elevated mountainous block, situated between the two roads which, coming from the Passin valley, circle round its base on either side into the plain north of Erzeroum, by Wank and the village of Mudurgha respectively. The defences of the right and centre covered the only two other roads which lead from the Passin valley to Erzeroum, the one being the main caravan road from Hassan Kaleh passing the base of the plateau to the right, and the other a bye road from Kertren, skirting the hill which formed the extreme right of the position. From that point a wide gully runs down the position on each side, embracing beyond the plateau a low range of hills in front of, and only separated by a deep valley from the line of defences on the Turkish left.

The whole of these defences were held, on the evening of the 3rd, by Mukhtar Pasha, with a force of some 40 battalions with 8 siege, 63 field, and 17 mountain guns, amounting in all to some 20,000 men. The fieldworks and trenches were, however, far from completed by this date, and had the serious defect of being constructed of stone with a mere outward facing of earth.

The want of some good cavalry was now severely felt by the Mushir, both for scouting and harassing the enemy's communications, but the little that was left of this arm in the Turkish force appears to have been hardly of any use.

General Heimann had advanced from the Soghanli-Dagh with some 35 battalions and 100 guns, and General Tergukasoff from Igdyr with some 10 or 12 battalions and 40 guns (the latter had left a detachment at Bayazid, and had, moreover, to watch his communications, again threatened by the Koords). The combined Russian forces which had moved up to attack Mukhtar Pasha on the Deve-Boyun by the 3rd, consisted of some 40 battalions, with from 120 to 130 guns, and a general attack was fixed for the following day.

#### BATTLE OF THE DEVE-BOYUN.

During the night of the 3rd, large bodies of Russian infantry were pushed forward and concealed in the hollows at the foot of the Turkish positions, and by daylight the whole of General Heimann's and Tergukasoff's artillery had advanced in the plain and was ready to open fire. At about 7 a.m. a body of Russian cavalry moved towards the Turkish centre, and Mukhtar Pasha ordered some Turkish cavalry down the slopes to check its advance. The Russian cavalry at once retired, followed by the Turks, but the latter were now soon exposed to a withering fire from some concealed Russian infantry, and immediately broke and fled. By 8.30 there was a general artillery fire along the whole line. At about 11 a.m. the Russian infantry began to advance against the right of the Turkish position, where an artillery and infantry combat raged during the remainder of the day. By 3 p.m., however, the Turks, though offering a stubborn resistance, had been gradually pressed back for upwards of a mile, the infantry on both sides keeping at about 500 yards from each other and firing from under cover. During the early part of the day the Mushir was himself here in command and was slightly wounded, and in the course of the engagement the Turkish centre was considerably weakened to reinforce the right, where the Russians were visibly gaining ground.

On the Turkish left, the Russians apparently remained satisfied with keeping the Turks in check, and though a constant musketry as well as artillery fire was kept up all day, the Russian infantry did not push forward to nearer than 1,000 yards from the defences occupied by the Turks.

The battle, however, was decided in the centre. To the left of the road, at a short distance in front of Mukhtar Pasha's head-quarter camp, lay the large, flat-topped, elevated plateau, forming the centre of the position, and held in the morning by 12 battalions with 6 siege and 12 field guns; by 3 p.m. however this detachment had been considerably reduced to reinforce the right,



where, it appears, the Mushir was anxious for the safety of his position, and it is doubtful whether by this time it was held by more than 6 weak battalions. The plateau, nevertheless, had been unsuccessfully attacked by the Russian infantry no less than three distinct times, and was now subjected to a severe concentrated fire from a large number of Russian guns in the plain below as was also a mamelon on the right of the road, considerably in advance of the plateau referred to; the latter, however, was not attacked until the plateau was carried.

Seeing that the Russians were attacking the plateau in force, Mukhtar Pasha proceeded there in person about 3.30 p.m., and ordered forward 2 battalions held in reserve to reinforce the garrison, and some 50 horsemen to bring forward shells for the 12-centim. guns on the plateau, the ammunition for which was now running short. These reinforcements were ascending the reverse slopes of the plateau when a panic seized the garrison, and the spare ammunition train at once commenced a rapid retreat in the direction of Erzeroum; it was shortly afterwards followed by a stream of skirmishers, all walking rapidly to the rear down the slopes, and in a few minutes every unwounded man of the detachment holding the plateau had walked quietly off it and was making his way across the deep ravines in rear to get by the shortest road to the town. The last few men who descended from the plateau turned occasionally and fired, and they had not quitted the edge of the plateau two minutes before the Russian infantry appeared on the reverse edge and opened a heavy fire on the retreating Turks. The 2 battalions, advancing in support, soon became mingled with the fugitives; they rallied, however, on the neck of land separating the plateau from the road, and commenced firing, though somewhat wildly, at the Russians on the hill above. The latter showed, however, no inclination to press forward; had they done so, they would certainly have at once captured the 12 field guns in position in front of the Turkish head-quarter camp, and, at the same time, cut off the retreat of the Turks holding the mamelon. These, seeing the plateau in the left rear taken, at once retired towards the 12-gun battery and got safely away. The gunners in this battery appear to have been utterly demoralized by what they had seen, and instead of opening fire on the Russians—within easy range and crowded together on the plateau—limbered up and retired. These guns were saved, but the 6 siege and 12 field guns on the plateau, together with 6 field guns on the mamelon, and a siege gun near the head-quarter camp, fell into the hands of the Russians.

The capture of the plateau, forming the centre of the Turkish position, was the signal for a general retreat along the whole line.

The Russian skirmishers, who had remained inactive for half an hour or so after seizing the plateau, now descended slowly to the foot of the ravine slope, and a large body of Russian infantry (some 5 or 6 battalions), that had remained stationary at about a mile from the mamelon, advanced, after the Turks had abandoned the latter, and moved straight up the road towards the Turkish head-quarter camp. The two unbroken Turkish battalions remained, however, steady, and even made a forward movement towards the advancing Russians. Any attempt, however, to seriously attack such overwhelming odds was of course out of the question, and they slowly retreated after the other fugitives. A striking contrast to the general *débandade* was the conduct of 2 companies of Turkish infantry, held in reserve at head-quarters, with 2 heavy field guns. The former, led by a staff officer, moved down a slope of the ravine in rear of the plateau to check any forward movement of the Russians; it was a timely and judicious movement, steadily executed, and formed a pleasing contrast to the scene around; the guns also were well and coolly handled by a mounted artillery officer, retiring to fresh positions as the Russian skirmishers advanced, and doing all they could to check their progress. They were eventually saved.

The rout of the Turkish centre was complete. Some of the artillerymen detached the traces to abandon their guns, but on being quietly remonstrated with, hooked on again and made no further attempt to leave them. It was also a remarkable fact that in the general *débandade* no Turkish soldier was without his arms nor was there any running or riotous conduct.

About sunset the troops on the right of the Turkish left which was under the "Capitan" Mehemet Pasha, began to quit their posts and retire to



Erzeroum,\* and at about 6 p.m. the whole of the Turkish force had abandoned the Deve-Boyun and was making for the town. The attack on the Turkish right was not followed up, nor, fortunately for the Turks, was any attempt at pursuit made by the Russians, probably owing to the great fatigue of their troops and darkness setting in, but 36 siege and field guns, all the Turkish camps, with large quantities of stores and ammunition fell into their hands. According to General Heimann's report, the Russians took 8 officers and 300 men prisoners. Their own losses are given as 30 officers and 800 men killed and wounded.†

The firing ceased at 6.30 p.m., and the Russians bivouacked in the positions abandoned by the Turks.

Mukhtar Pasha had been borne away by the general rout of the Turkish centre, and was heard of no more until he reach Erzeroum during the night. Three out of four of his attendants were killed.

When the defeat became known at the latter place the southern gates and ramparts of the town were occupied by guards with fixed bayonets, and all ingress refused. The scene which then ensued is described by an eye-witness as terrible, thousands of men, horses, camels, oxen, &c., in one jammed and struggling crowd seeking to obtain admission, and pressing against the guards, who used their bayonets freely, killing several men. This continued till 10 p.m., when the guards were withdrawn and the fugitives allowed to enter.

The greatest terror now prevailed in the town, both on account of the expected bombardment and attack of the Russians and the anticipated violence of the fugitives in seeking food and shelter.‡ No excesses were, however, committed, and tranquility was soon restored with daylight.

#### OPERATIONS BEFORE ERZEROUM.

With a Russian army numbering some 30,000 men with over 150 guns on the Deve-Boyun, and flushed with victory, Mukhtar Pasha's chance of saving Erzeroum seemed indeed anything but hopeful. Disheartened, however, as he must have been at his succession of disasters, he did not give way to despair, but again showed himself to be a leader of energy, resolution, and courage, and at once set about doing his best to continue the resistance.

On the night of the 5th a Russian Major with a flag of truce was sent to Erzeroum to demand the surrender of the town within 8 hours, and a Yuzbashi was sent back with him to ask for terms. The Russian reply was that if the town were not surrendered by noon on the following day it would be bombarded, and when captured, handed over to pillage for 3 days. The panic in the town was soon at its highest pitch, and at a general council it was determined on the part of the townspeople to surrender, but Mukhtar Pasha who had in the meanwhile communicated with the Sultan, refused, and stated his determination to resist to the last.

The Turkish forces in Erzeroum now numbered 30,000 men in all, but of these there were only some 10,000 men who could be depended on to face the Russians. The remaining 20,000 were made up of worn-out Redifs, convalescents, newly raised Mustaphiz, and Mussulman citizens. This force Mukhtar Pasha divided into 5 brigades—4 to man the forts and *enceinte*, with one in reserve. To each brigade was attached some 180 horsemen under a Yuzbashi.

Fortunately for the Turks, the Russians again showed themselves slow in following up their success, and time, which was everything to the defeated Turks, was again allowed them to recover from their disasters.

On the 7th the Russians threw up a work on the summit of a hill some

\* The "Capitan" saved all his guns, 17 in number.

† The brunt of the fighting appears to have been borne by the Elizabethpol, Erivan, and Tiflis regiments.

‡ As an instance of the famished condition of the Turkish soldiers, they are described as having in one case entered a garden of cabbages and devoured the latter raw. That no violence under these circumstances should have been offered to the Armenian citizens, speaks volumes for the Turkish soldier.



3,500 yards from the southern works of the town, and on the 8th armed it with field guns. On this day Mukhtar Pasha, having decided on stringent measures to stop desertion, caused 14 men to be shot for this offence when on guard, and at the same time degraded several officers, including a Bimbashi, for cowardice in the battle of the 4th.

On the night of the 8th, the Russians advanced in force from the Deve-Boyun in 2 columns on the forts defending Erzeroum, hoping no doubt to affect a surprise. The southern column was intended apparently to make a feint only on the works on the south of the town, whereas the other column consisting of some 10 battalions of infantry with 2 batteries of artillery and a regiment of cavalry, was to push on and attack the works on the Top Dagh. The approach of this column was seen and reported by the Turkish outlying pickets in front of the Medjidieh lunette, but the officer commanding in the work (who is accused of being a traitor), only upbraided them for cowardice. 3 Russian battalions of the 153rd (Baku) regiment, it appears, had been thrown forward towards the work, preceded by a storming party, and the latter surprising the garrison of the lunette, penetrated by the salient and unprotected gorge, and captured the work together with a battalion of Mustaphiz—located in a block house or defensible barrack, situated to the right of it—with little or no resistance. A Koord escaping, however, conveyed intelligence to "Capitan" Mohammed Pasha in fort Azizieh, of how things stood, and the gallant Prussian immediately determined to retake the work at all costs. By some mistake on the part of the Russians the party that had succeeded in this brilliant but daring enterprise was left quite unsupported, and dawn was just breaking when it was attacked by 2 battalions of Turks, under the "Capitan," and nearly every man that belonged to the party either killed or taken prisoner. According to Russian accounts, their troops lost their way owing to the darkness and did not reach the points assigned them, but the fact remains the same, the storming party was destroyed for want of support. Had the latter been at hand, it is admitted on all sides that Erzeroum must have fallen. Of the Russian party that had captured the lunette, upwards of 300 were killed in and round it and 30 taken prisoners, of whom, however, only 14 were saved alive by the "Capitan's" exertions.\* The Russians tried, but too late, to follow up their early success and brought forward the remainder of the column against the lunette, but the Turks held their own though suffering great loss, and eventually the Russians retired, followed for some distance by the Turks.

The loss on the Turkish side was heavy. Of the battalion holding the lunette numbering some 820 men, only 230 could be found on the following day, the remainder having it is supposed either been killed or taken prisoners.† The total loss of the Turks is not, however, known. That of the Russians is given in an official report as 32 killed and 600 wounded, but, as they left 287 corpses in the Medjidieh lunette alone, this figure is evidently much below the mark.

The feigned attack on the south of the town was met by a heavy artillery and musketry fire from all the Turkish works near, which are described as being soon in a general blaze, firing on imaginary assaulting columns in the darkness, and at daylight the column which had advanced in this direction retired through the Abdul-Rahman-Ghazi defile to the mountains, followed shortly afterwards to the Deve-Boyun by the column that had failed to support the real attack. The Turks, elated by their success, now followed in pursuit for some distance and inflicted, it is said, considerable loss on the retiring Russians. The latter, however, made a stand near the pass, and the Turks retired to their works.

On the 10th a skirmish took place between the outposts near the Deve-Boyun, leading to no results except adding to the killed and wounded on either side, and again on the 11th another engagement of a similar nature took place, but on a larger scale. On the morning of the 10th the Russians sent a bag of

\* It is stated by the Turks that a Russian Engineer Officer who had formerly been employed as a dragoman to the Russian consulate in Erzeroum led the storming party. He was killed and plans of the works were found in his possession.

† This battalion was threatened with the severest penalties by the Muchir, for their carelessness; it was found, however that there were too few left to punish, and their offence was condoned.



letters from Turkish prisoners to Erzeroum, and in the course of the day 4 Turkish battalions arrived from Trebizond, 2 more with a field battery being due on the following day.

On the 11th General Heimann despatched some 500 wounded Turks in arabas from the Russian camps on the Deve-Boyun into Erzeroum. These had all been well cared for and kindly treated, a strong contrast to the conduct of the Turks, who invariably butchered their prisoners without mercy.

On the evening of the 12th, at about 7 p.m., a body of Russian cavalry made a reconnaissance in the direction of the eastern works, and drove in some Turkish horsemen, the latter losing 31 men, but on the former following in pursuit an indiscriminate fire was opened from nearly every Turkish fort or battery, so much so indeed that two of the western forts threw several shells into the Turkish cavalry that had issued by the southern gate, and inflicted severe loss on them.

The weather on the 13th became very cold, and snow began to fall heavily. On this day a body of Russian cavalry pushed forward to Mudirk to the north of Erzeroum, but the setting-in of winter now practically brought matters to a standstill.

On this day a Russian deserter entered the Turkish lines. He was a pure Russian, and gave a pitiful account of the state of the Russian camps. Coming as he did at such a moment, and giving an account of the state of affairs on the Russian side, which was contradicted by the villagers, it was generally supposed in Erzeroum that he was sent there by authority.

The supply of provisions, &c., in Erzeroum was now extremely scanty, partly on account of the inundations which cut off access from the villages on the north of the town, and partly on account of the roving bands of Bashi-Bazouks that infested the neighbourhood and effectually stopped all traffic.

On the 18th it was determined to bring back the Government archives, &c., and military chest, which had been sent to Baiburt after the defeat of the Deve-Boyun, and confidence in being able to resist the Russians now grew stronger every day.

#### OPERATIONS OF THE TURKISH LEFT AND RUSSIAN RIGHT WINGS (ARDAHAN).

Early in September the Turkish left wing at Pennek, which had recently been reinforced to 6 battalions of infantry with some irregular cavalry and 6 mountain guns, advanced to Tehermak, where it was joined by 2 battalions and some new levies from Ardanutsch, and threatened Ardahan, which was weakly garrisoned by the Russians; the latter, however, instead of evacuating the place as was expected by the Turks, reinforced the garrison with 3½ battalions from Akhalziek and General Oklobjio's force before Batoum.\* The Turks now made a feint or reconnaissance towards Ardahan, but finding it strongly occupied, again withdrew to Tehermak, and the detachment belonging to the Batoum command being withdrawn to Ardanutsch, the 6 battalions and 6 mountain guns again took up a strong position at Pennek; this force Mukhtar Pasha intended in the last days of September to reinforce from Kars with a field battery. Events, however, made him alter his decision, and he was obliged, in consequence of the severe fighting early in October before Kars, to order 5 battalions of the Pennek force to that fortress.

On the 13th the Russian force occupying Ardahan had been reinforced to 16 battalions of infantry with 4 batteries of field and 2 of mountain guns, under General Komaroff, and about the 25th, a force consisting of 6 battalions, 12 sotnias, and 8 guns were moved *via* Zarshat to Parget, to reinforce the Russian force before Kars.

Nothing now occurred on the Russian right or Turkish left wings till the 6th October, when 5 of the battalions with 2 mountain guns, stationed at Pennek, were ordered to Kars by Mukhtar Pasha; the remaining battalion with 4 mountain guns, joined the Mushir in his retreat from Kars at Hun-Kiar-Duz on the 19th.

The Olti line was now quite denuded of Turkish troops, and on the 16th

\* According to some accounts 16 battalions of the Rion Corps were also moved to Ardahan on the 15th September.



or 17th October, a Russian column, under General Komaroff, again advanced from Ardahan on Erzeroum. It pushed on unopposed as far as Olti, but was then recalled to Kars—for what reason it is not exactly known, but probably on account of the roads being found impassable—and reached General Melikoff's force before Kars on or about the 3rd of November. It numbered some 8 battalions, 10 or 12 squadrons or sotnias, and 36 guns.

#### BLACK SEA AND CAUCASUS.

Little or no change took place in the relative positions of the Russian and Turkish Forces near Batoum during the months of September, October, and November.

The Russian force watching Batoum still consisted of the greater part, if not all, of the 41st Division, under General Oklobjio, numbering some 16 battalions, 20 squadrons and sotnias, and 50 guns.

On the 2nd and 3rd September, engagements took place between the Russian troops near Fort St. Nicolas and Kutais, and on the latter day, and the 9th, artillery combats before Batoum.

On the 15th September, 16 battalions were moved from the coast to Ardahan; and, on the 22nd, the Russian force at Soukoum Kaleh was removed to Tiflis.

On the 21st, an artillery engagement took place before Batoum, and Fort St. Nicolas was bombarded by the Turkish fleet.

Nothing now appears to have taken place till the 31st October, when some engagements again took place between detachments of the Kabuleti column and insurgents, near Kakout.

About the 16th October, Dervisch Pasha detached 10 battalions from Batoum to Erzeroum, *via* Trebizond, by Mukhtar Pasha's order.

On the 7th and 8th November, the Russian artillery, which had been reinforced by several siege guns from Ardahan, kept up a heavy fire on the Turkish positions at Katsoubani, and, according to Russian accounts, it was then discovered that the Turks were still strong in artillery and infantry. The Russian losses in this engagement are given as 8 men killed, and 1 officer and 38 men wounded.

On the 11th November, cannonading again took place all day, without apparently doing much damage on either side.

Towards the end of August, a serious insurrection broke out in Daghestan, and severe engagements appear to have taken place between the Russian troops (the 20th Division and Militia) and the insurgents on the 23rd September at Lavatsch, on the 24th at Koubisch, on the 30th at Kaipent, and, on the 3rd October at Dschemi-kent; in all of which, according to Russian accounts, the insurgents were defeated and dispersed, with slight loss to the Russian troops.

By the 14th October, the insurrection appears to have been crushed in Southern Daghestan, but engagements took place in the central part—near Lawaschi—on the 15th and 16th, in which the Russians lost heavily, but the insurgent bands were dispersed.

By the middle of October, the Samur District was in open rebellion, and it was said that, at one time, Tiflis itself was threatened by the insurgents, who now numbered some 18,000 men; they were however severely defeated by the Russian troops at Kulische.

On the 28th, a Russian column was defeated by the insurgents at Zermalje.

Tranquility was restored, according to Russian accounts, about the middle of November.

#### SECOND SIEGE OF KARS.

The details of the second siege of Kars in this campaign are as yet meagre in the extreme, and but little has hitherto been allowed to transpire by the Russian authorities.



As has been previously mentioned, on the breaking up of the *ordre de bataille* of the Russian force on the Aladjia Dagh after Mukhtar Pasha's defeat on the 15th October, General Loris Melikoff with the 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Division, the 40th Division, two battalions of Sappers, some 40 squadrons and sotnias, and 15 or 16 batteries, together with the siege park and artillery from Alexandropol, was left to prosecute the siege of Kars, whilst General Heimann, with the remainder of the force, marched on Erzeroum.

The head-quarters of the Russian army were moved to Vezin Keui immediately after the battle, and, by the end of the month, some 70 siege guns had been brought from Alexandropol, and were heavily bombarding the town and forts on the south and south-east.

On the 25th October, the fortress was summoned to surrender, but refused.

On the 5th November, the Turks made a sortie on a small scale, according to Russian accounts, but were repulsed, and two battalions of the Kuban Regiment, following them up in pursuit, entered the Hafiz-Pasha Tabia, where 10 officers and 40 men were taken prisoners, and 8 guns spiked.\*

On the 13th November, the Russian head-quarters were moved to Veran Kaleh—on the Akbaba Dagh, about 7 miles south of Kars.

Early in the month, the besieging force was joined by a force in the strength of about a brigade, under General Komaroff, from Ardahan. This force had advanced from the latter place on Erzeroum,† but had been recalled, for some reason as yet unknown, to reinforce General Melikoff, and the force under the latter now amounted to 39 battalions, some 40 squadrons and sotnias, with 150 field, and 70 siege guns.

No preparation, it appears, was made for attempting a siege *en règle*. The Russian batteries were erected at their favourite long range, and did little more than annoy the besieged. The latter, it was well known at Russian head-quarters, were numerically, physically, and morally weak. The garrison necessary to hold the extensive works which surround the city has been computed, by good authority, at 30,000 men, whereas it scarcely amounted to 10,000, and these men who had been disheartened by hardship and defeat. Anyhow, it seems clear that, on the besieging force being reinforced from Ardahan, and the summons to surrender definitely rejected, it was decided by the Russian Staff to attempt to storm the fortress.

The assault, which was at first fixed for the 13th, but, according to Russian accounts, was postponed on account of the weather, finally took place on the night of the 18th.

No details have as yet been published by the Russians, but the following is, briefly, what occurred.

The attack commenced at 8.30 p.m.

On the south, Forts Suwarri, Khanli, and Hafiz Pasha were carried by storm in the night by columns of the 40th Division (General Lazareff, right wing), and the 1st Moscow Grenadiers and a regiment of the 39th Division (General Count Grabbe, left wing); and, at the same time, the eastern forts—Kara Dagh and Arab (Karapatlak)—were attacked and taken by forlorn hopes, the former being carried by the gorge, and the latter by a frontal attack.

The capture of the southern works was followed, in course of time, by an attack on the suburb Ortakapi, which fell after some sharp street fighting.

The western forts—Teckmas, Tih Tepeh, Laz, Ingliz, and Muekliz—were threatened apparently during the night by the Ardahan Brigade and the 2nd Moscow Grenadiers, under Generals Komaroff and Roop, respectively, but were only taken towards morning. It does not appear very clear whether these works were really defended by the Turks. At any rate, the fall of the western works was subsequent to that of the defences on the south and east, and was probably due to it.

The result was, however, a concentric attack from the south and west

\* According to Turkish accounts, a party of 18 men succeeded in entering the work and captured a horse only. Being unsupported, they were of course, unable to follow up their success, and had to retire.

† There is still some doubt about this.



(53)

109

on the old town of Kars and the citadel, and their ultimate capture in the early morning.\*

A portion of the garrison tried to cut its way through to the mountains, but was intercepted and captured, and few escaped except mounted men— among others, however, the Governor, Ferik Hussein Pasha.

The losses of the Russians were heavy, but cannot be said to outweigh the importance of their success. They are given in an official bulletin as 500 killed, including 1 General (Count Grabbe) and 50 officers, and 1,833 wounded, including 143 officers. The Turkish losses in killed and wounded are not known, but were probably as severe, and those that were not killed were taken prisoners. The number of guns found in the place is given by the Russians as 300, together with a vast quantity of military stores and matériel. The town, as may be supposed, was found in a wretched state of disease, neglect, and suffering, and some 4,500 sick and wounded were found in the hospitals. The Russian soldiers, it is said, committed no excesses,† and, on the morning of the 20th, the Grand Duke and Staff entered the city.

Judged by its results, the storming of Kars was undoubtedly a daring and brilliant achievement, but it is only right to add that there is good reason to believe that the Russians once more found ready money to be a most useful article of siege equipment in the attack of a Turkish fortress.

W. A. H. HARE,  
Lieutenant, Royal Engineers.

Position	Number of Guns	Remarks

Left Column—Lieut. General Reimann  
Right Column—Major General Soloview

Position	Number of Guns	Remarks

\* According to Turkish accounts a heavy bombardment had been kept up from the Russian batteries established on the south side of the town for 22 days prior to the assault, the greater portion of their projectiles being directed on the town.

On the night of the assault, a very heavy fire commenced about 2 hours before sunset, and was kept up for 3 hours. Fort Faizi (?) Pasha was the first attacked, and fell almost without resistance. Forts Khanli and Hafiz Pasha were next taken after a very slight resistance, several of the principal Officers of the garrison having quitted their posts. The Russians then advanced between Forts Hafiz Pasha and Khanli, and, taking possession of the south-eastern suburb of the town, pushed forward from it and attacked Fort Kara Dagh in rear. The garrison fled. Fort Karapatlak afterwards fell without a shot being fired to a forlorn hope of 18 men who were followed at some distance by a regiment.

Altogether the resistance offered was practically *nil*, with the honourable exception of Fort Chim, which, held by a battalion of Redif and a battalion of Nizam under a Bimbashi, made a most gallant and determined resistance, holding out till daylight, and inflicting heavy loss on the Russians.

A false attack was made on fort Techmas. The garrison is described as having been in a complete state of demoralization, and the officers to have been worse than the men. The Commanding Officer was sick and unfit for duty.

Owing to the want of firewood the garrison of Kars had been supplied with flour only for some time past, and dysentery of a violent type was raging, causing a mortality of 40 or 50 men per diem when the place was taken.

The city was given up to plunder for 3 days, the Armenian quarter excepted. All except Armenians were plundered, including the sick and wounded. 2,000,000 piastres were found in the Government Treasury of which, however, one half was in *caimé*.

† This appears to be still a disputed point.



ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF  
THE ALADJA DAGH.—15TH OCTOBER 1877.

Commander-in-Chief .. ..	The Grand Duke Michael.
2nd in Command .. ..	Lieut.-General Loris Melikoff.
Commanding the Artillery .. ..	Major-General Groubsky.
"    Engineers .. ..	.. .. ?
Chief of the Staff .. ..	General Gourtchine ?

	Battalions.	Squadrons or Sotnias.	Batteries.
--	-------------	--------------------------	------------

Right Column.—Lieut.-General Heimann.  
(Brigades Shaak, Alvinow, and Reserve Soloviev.)

The Caucasus Grenadier Division .. ..	16	..	..
The 2nd (Rostov) Regiment of Grenadiers .. ..	3	..	..
3 battalions, 151st (Piatigorsk) Regiment .. ..	3	..	..
1st Battalion, Caucasus Chasseurs .. ..	1	..	..
1st " " Sappers .. ..	1	..	..
The Caucasus Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade .. ..	..	..	6
2nd Battery, 1st Grenadier " " .. ..	..	..	1
2nd " " 21st Field Artillery Brigade .. ..	..	..	1
3rd and 4th Batteries, 39th Field Artillery Brigade .. ..	..	..	2
16 horsed field guns of the Siege Park .. ..	..	..	2
15th (Tver) Dragoons .. ..	..	4	..
4 sotnias, 6th Orenburg Cossacks .. ..	..	4	..
5th Kuban Horse Artillery Battery .. ..	..	..	1
Total .. ..	24	8	13

(\* Besides 3 siege guns mounted at Hadji Veli.)

(\* 104 guns.)

Column of Major-General Kouzminsky.

152nd (Vladikawkaz) Regiment .. ..	4	..	..
156th (Elizabethpol) " " .. ..	4	..	..
1st Battery, 1st Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade .. ..	..	..	1
Half-Battery, 6th Battery, 19th Field Artillery Brigade .. ..	..	..	$\frac{1}{2}$
3rd Battery, 38th " " .. ..	..	..	1
Half-Battery, 5th Battery, 38th " " .. ..	..	..	$\frac{1}{2}$
2 sotnias, 1st Gorsko Mozdok Cossacks .. ..	..	2	..
2nd Irregular Daghestan Cavalry Regiment .. ..	..	6	..
The Tchetchva Irregular " " .. ..	..	6	..
The Tiflis Regiment of Mounted Noblemen .. ..	..	6	..
4 sotnias, Mounted Militia .. ..	..	4	..
Total .. ..	8	24	3

(\* Besides 2 siege guns mounted on the Kizyl-Tepeh.)

(\* 24 guns.)



"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٤٥] [٤٢/٤١]

111

	Battalions.	Squadrons or Sotnias.	Batteries.
--	-------------	--------------------------	------------

Column of Major-General Count Grabbe.  
(Position.—Kabak-Tepch.)

3rd (Pernau) Grenadiers .. .. .	3	..	..
3rd Battery, 1st Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade .. .. .	..	..	1
3 sotnias, 7th Orenburg Cossacks .. .. .	..	3	..
Total .. .. .	3	3	1 (8 guns.)

Column of Major-General Dehn.  
(Reserve, Gulverein.)

1st (Ekatérinoslav) Grenadiers .. .. .	3	..	..
4th (Niesviége) .. .. .	3	..	..
2 companies, 3rd Caucasus Sapper Battalion .. .. .	1/2	..	..
2nd, 5th, and 6th Batteries, 1st Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade .. .. .	..	..	3
17th (Siéversk) Dragoons .. .. .	..	4	..
2nd Astrakhan Cossacks .. .. .	..	4	..
2nd Kuban Cossack Horse Artillery Battery .. .. .	..	..	1
14th Don Cossack Horse Artillery Battery .. .. .	..	..	1
Total .. .. .	6 1/2	8	5 (40 guns.)

Column of Lieut.-General Lazareff.  
(Chief of Staff, Colonel Malana.)

40th Infantry Division .. .. .	12	..	..
75th (Sevastopol) Regiment .. .. .	4	..	..
4th Battalion, Caucasus Chasseurs .. .. .	1	..	..
2 companies, 3rd Caucasus Sapper Battalion .. .. .	1/2	..	..
40th Field Artillery Brigade .. .. .	..	..	6
3 guns, 6th Battery, 19th Field Artillery Brigade .. .. .	..	..	3 3/8
3 " 6th " 39th " " (mountain guns) .. .. .	..	..	3 3/8
10th (Nijni-Novgorod) Dragoons .. .. .	..	4	..
1st and 2nd Volgsk Cossacks .. .. .	..	12	..
3rd Daghestan Irregular Cavalry Regiment .. .. .	..	3	..
The Alexandropol " " .. .. .	..	3	..
1st Forek Cossack Horse Artillery Battery .. .. .	..	..	1
13th Don " " " " .. .. .	..	..	1
Total .. .. .	17 1/2	22	8 3/4 (70 guns.)
Joined at Kambinsk by—			
2 battalions, 153rd (Baku) Regiment .. .. .	2	..	..
2nd Kislias Cossacks .. .. .	..	4	..
Joined at Digor by Column under General Tsytovitch—			
The 154th (Derbent) Regiment .. .. .	4	..	..
5th Battery, 39th Field Artillery Brigade .. .. .	..	..	1
2 sotnias, Ouman Cossacks .. .. .	..	2	..
GRAND TOTAL .. .. .	23 1/2	28	9 1/4 (78 guns.)

Cavalry Corps of Prince Wittgenstein.  
(Acting on the right of the army, in the Kars Chai Valley.)

2nd Vladikawkaz Cossacks .. .. .	..	4	..
4 sotnias, Eisk Cossacks .. .. .	..	4	..





"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في آسيا." [٤٥٤ ظ] (٤٢/٤٢)

112

	Battalions.	Squadrons or Sotnias.	Batteries.
--	-------------	--------------------------	------------


SUMMARY.

Column of General Heimann .. .. .	24	8	13
" " Kouzminsky .. .. .	8	24	3
" " Count Grabbe .. .. .	3	3	1
" " Dehn .. .. .	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	5
" " Lazareff .. .. .	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	28	9 $\frac{3}{4}$
TOTAL .. .. .	65	73	34 $\frac{3}{4}$ (254 guns.)

W. A. H. H.




"خريطة مبدئية لنهر الدانوب بين سيستوفا وزيميتزا. لتوضيح مسار القوات الروسية في ٢٧ يونيو ١٨٧٧." [٥٥و] (٤/١)






"خريطة مبدئية لنهر الدانوب بين سيستوفا وزيمنيترزا. لتوضيح مسار القوات الروسية في ٢٧ يونيو ١٨٧٧". [٥٥ظ] (٤/٢)






"خريطة مبدئية لنهر الدانوب بين سيسstofا وزيميتزا. لتوضيح مسار القوات الروسية في ٢٧ يونيو ١٨٧٧". [٥٦و] (٤/٣)






"خريطة مبدئية لنهر الدانوب بين سيستوفا وزيمنيترزا. لتوضيح مسار القوات الروسية في ٢٧ يونيو ١٨٧٧". [٥٦ظ] (٤/٤)





"ضواحي روسه" [٥٧] (٢/١)





"ضواحي روسه" [٥٧ظ] (٢/٢)

