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### "ملخص ثورة الحجاز"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/MIL/17/16/13

١٩١٨ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

١٦ ورقة

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل


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
### حول هذا السجل

أعدّ هذا التقرير هيئة الأركان العامة، مكتب الحرب البريطاني، ٣١ أغسطس ١٩١٨. وهو عبارة عن ملخص لثورة الحجاز منذ اندلاعها في يونيو ١٩١٦ إلى ديسمبر ١٩١٨. التقرير يتناول هجوم القوات العربية وت. م. لورينس على سكة حديد الحجاز.

ملاحق عن الملك حسين؛ ابن سعود؛ ابن رشيد؛ عائلة جمال باشا؛ تقرير موريس؛ النشاط السياسي للعدو؛ الحركة الصهيونية؛ الوساطة التركية بين القوات البريطانية والعربية الرئيسية؛ حصار الكويت؛ موقف قبائل شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية تجاه ثورة الحجاز؛ فخري باشا في المدينة المنورة؛ خسائر العدو والقوات التركية.



"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [أمامي-داخلي] (٣٢/٢)



"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [١] (٣٢/٣)

SECRET.

SUMMARY OF THE HEJAZ REVOLT.

Period from outbreak to end of 1917.

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1. Although the Sherif\* did not issue his Proclamation to the world until some days later, the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz may be said to have begun on the 5th June, 1916, when a cordon of Arabs under the command of two of the Sherif's sons, Feisal and Ali, was drawn up round Medina.

The Hejaz railway line was at once attacked at several points, but the Arabs, inexpert in demolition work, were unable to effect serious damage before being driven off by parties of Turks with machine guns. Traffic was, therefore, not seriously interrupted and the Turkish line of communication to Damascus remained intact. Nor could the Arabs, who were short of arms and supplies and who had but few guns, do more than invest Medina from a distance. They, however, attacked Jeddah on the 9th June, and the garrison, cut off from Mecca by the loss of the blockhouses on the road, and exposed to naval guns and aeroplanes, yielded to the demands of the civil population and surrendered about a week later. About three weeks later the weak garrison remaining in Mecca, after the summer move of the Governor-General to Taif, also surrendered. This latter place held out until the 23rd September after having been blockaded about three and a half months by Sherif Abdulla, the Sherif of Mecca's second son, with a mixed force of Bedouins and Meccan townfolk. Though regularly bombarded it had never really been assaulted.

Smaller places such as Lith and Yambo had surrendered as soon as they were seriously attacked, and by the end of September, 1916, the greater part of the Hejaz was clear of troops, though the railway still remained intact.

2. Meanwhile Turkish reinforcements had been rapidly sent from the north, and the situation at Medina was radically changed.† The Turkish forces, which had been strengthened, re-armed, re-victualled and re-assured by successful sorties during these past four months, were able in September to march out and, driving the Arabs before them, to make Medina secure by establishing a cordon of fortified posts at a distance of about 30 miles from the town along the roads leading to Mecca. They even at one time (the end of October) threatened to occupy Rabegh and Yambo, but, with a ration strength of about 14,000, they appear not to have felt capable of holding such distant posts together with their long lines of communication; and considerable Arab forces having moved up from the south and south-west they withdrew again towards the end of 1916 to behind the line of fortified outposts and to the town itself.

\* See Appendix A.

† See Appendix O.

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3. In addition to this force at Medina, known as the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, a Composite Force under Jemal III.\* of which the strength in January, 1917, was some 5,000 rations, was established with headquarters at Tebuk, and another force† (consisting in June, 1917, of four battalions) had its headquarters at Maan. To these forces were apportioned fixed sections of the line, each having small garrisons posted at the various stations in its area.

4. The Arab forces, though numerically strong, lacked guns and supplies. They were deficient in small arms, equipment and organization. Sherif Feisal, who at the outbreak of the revolt commanded the Sherifial forces in the Medina area, had three camps of some 10,000 men each, but no single camp had as many as 2,000 rifles; contingents of men joined or left at will, and his troops were quite inexperienced in the art of modern warfare. Steps were taken to organize, arm and equip the Arabs, and towards the end of 1916 they were formed into three independent groups, one under Sherif Ali, about 8,000 strong, facing Medina on the south, another under Sherif Abdulla, numbering some 4,000 men, encircling Medina on the east and north-east, while Sherif Feisal, with some 8,000 to 9,000 men, the pick of the force, was based on Yambo and operated against the railway. Such supreme command as was exercised appears to have been vested in Sherif Hussein personally with Aziz Bey el Masri as Minister of War.

5. By this time it had become clear that little was to be hoped from an Arab siege of Medina, and even less from any assaults the Arabs might be induced to make on its works. The operations which suggested themselves as likely to produce the most fruitful results were systematic raids on the Hejaz railway, which, from Medina to Damascus, consists of some 800 miles of single track. But, to enable these to be carried out and also to extend the revolt to the north towards Syria, it was necessary to have more northerly bases. With this object in view Sherif Feisal with his northern army installed himself at Wejh, already occupied by landing parties, in January, 1917, and proceeded to extend his hold further to the north towards Dhaba and Moweilah on the Red Sea coast. His brother Sherif Abdulla had meanwhile moved with his force to Wadi Ais, north-west of Medina; while his other brother, Sherif Ali, remained in his old place south and south-west of that town. The raiding carried out during the following six months, with British and French assistance, lowered the strength and spirit of the Turkish forces at Medina, and attracted many fresh Arab elements, but it did not isolate that town. The railway line proved harder to wreck permanently, and the enemy better prepared to effect repairs, than had been expected. Demolition work without hope of loot and any dogged occupation of points on the broken track did not appeal to the Bedouins, and it was not till the autumn of 1917 that a different policy, that of mining trains, with the attraction of consequent plunder, was acted upon. This immediately produced more satisfactory results, but the Arabs could not be induced to complete the destruction of a train or of the permanent way before starting to search for plunder.

6. Meanwhile, Akaba had been captured on the 6th July by a Sherifial force, accompanied by Lawrence,§ and Sherif Feisal moved there in July, 1917, thus enabling operations and propandea to be extended much farther to the north. The railway

\* See Appendix D.

† See Appendix O.

‡ Baghdad fell on the 11th March. This event does not seem to have reacted on the Hejaz situation to the extent that might have been expected, possibly owing to the lack of cohesion which was still apparent in August, 1918, between different factions in Arabia.

§ Captain Lawrence left Wejh on the 9th May, 1917, with a few men and Sherif Nasir, with the intention of visiting some of the Northern Hejaz tribes, and, if possible, to open Akaba for use as a supply base for the Arab forces.

His route lay to Jauf to see Nuri Shaalan, but on hearing he was north Lawrence proceeded to Nebk, near Qaf, where he met Anda Abu Tayi, of the Howeitat. Sherif Nasir remained in Qaf to enrol Rualla, Sherarat and Howeitat for the Akaba Expedition, while Lawrence proceeded north to near Tadmur and thence west to Baalbek, where he blew up a small railway bridge, and thence south to within 3 miles of Damascus; thence to Salkhad in the Druse country and from there to Azrak, where he saw Nuri Shaalan and his son, Nawwat. About the end of June, Lawrence rejoined Nasir, and on the 30th they moved to El Jefer, east of Maan, thence to Km. 479, where the railway was destroyed on a large scale. They then marched to Fuweilah on the Maan—Akaba road, where the gendarme post had been destroyed by an advance column, but had been reoccupied by the 4/178th Regiment from Maan. They secured the practical annihilation of this battalion at Aba Lissan on the 2nd July, taking prisoner the Officer Commanding, 160 men, with a mountain gun. They then captured the posts at Meriga and Gueira, capturing 5 officers and 100 men, then marched on El Kethira, wiping out a post of 3 officers and 140 men, thence to El Khadra, north of Wadi Ithm. The party entered Akaba on the 6th July, 1917, with 600 prisoners, about 20 officers and a German non-commissioned officer, having killed some 700 Turks.

Lawrence's journey was all the more remarkable for the fact that during the whole time his head was worth to any enterprising Arab the sum of £T.5,000.



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north of Tebuk, which had previously been unmolested, was now attacked not only as far as Maan, but even north of the latter place. Despite the British set-back at Gaza in March, 1917, Maan itself was threatened by the Arab forces, as was also the forest district of Hishe to the north-west, whence the Turks were drawing their fuel supply for the railway.\* The effect on Medina was soon evident, and had the Turks been able to evacuate the whole or part of the garrison and the force immediately to its north by means of the railway it is probable that they would have done so. A programme was drawn up in November, 1917, in anticipation of the fall of Jerusalem for the evacuation of part of the Medina garrison, after which the Tebuk force was to be evacuated.

The British victory at Bir Saba and Gaza occurred in September, 1917, and with the development of the British threat on Jerusalem, the situation of the Turkish forces on the railway was recognized by their leaders to be serious. The staff officer left in charge at Maan during the temporary absence of Jemal III.† reported to him on the 7th November his view on the situation. He appositely compared the attitude of the Arabs to a gangrene which had begun in the finger (Medina), which, if not cut off would spread to the hand (Maan) and finally to the arm (Syria). Fakhri Pasha at Medina replied to Jemal I. on the 12th November, regarding the proposed evacuation of Medina, that the movement might prove the dawn of the "Fourth Age." No authoritative explanation of the expression is forthcoming, but it is believed that according to Mahomedan tradition when the "Third Age" comes to an end the Turkish Empire will cease to hold the predominant position in Islam.

The evacuation of Medina was to be completed within 75 days, but the Turks were, and have remained, unable to carry it out owing to lack of rolling stock, want of fuel, the impossibility of accumulating sufficient supplies, and constant interruptions of the railway.

7. By the end of 1917 Feisal had secured the adhesion or neutrality of all the Arabs as far up as Maan and had come to an agreement with others in the north,‡ and could thus contemplate an advance further north into the Trans-Jordan country. He had collected more partly trained troops and Bedouins. He was also much better equipped with guns, small arms and auxiliary services than hitherto. The Turks in Maan and in the Hishe Forest area made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra region in October and November, 1917, but they were too weak to press home any advantage they gained. On the other hand, the cold experienced in this mountainous region militated against a strong offensive by the Arabs.

8. The situation therefore at the end of 1917 was, briefly, as follows :—

The Turks had been completely driven from the Hejaz except from the actual railway; the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Medina, now reduced to some 11,000 rations, was reduced in efficiency and suffering considerable privation and sickness; the Composite Force at Tebuk, reduced to some 1,500 rations was in a similar state, and traffic between these places was being constantly interrupted owing to the efforts of Sherif Ali in the area south-west of Medina, and Abdulla in the area between Medina and El Ula. Further north Sherif Feisal was operating against the railway in the Maan area and had seriously interfered with the fuel supply in the Hishe forest. The Turks found it necessary to establish a post at Tadmur to prevent the Arab movement spreading to the Euphrates, and to establish line of communication posts on the Yermuk Valley and Deraa—Maan railways.

During the period under review the Arabs had engaged the Turks on some 54 occasions, inflicting casualties§ (according to Arab reports) amounting to 3,400 killed, 757 wounded, while the captures amounted to 6,766 prisoners, 44 guns, 11 machine guns and 2,417 rifles.||

Arab reports also recorded 42 attacks on the railway, during which 7 engines, 3 wagons, 7,770 rails, 34 bridges and 16 culverts had been destroyed.¶

\* A light railway ran from Aneiza (second station north of Maan) into the Hishe Forest, and was used to transport wood fuel for the use of the engines on the Hejaz Railway. This line was pulled up at the beginning of 1918.

† See Appendix D.

‡ See Appendix L.

§ See Appendix N.

|| This information cannot be taken as strictly reliable, but Sir R. Wingate reported that in 1916, 3,345 prisoners were sent to Egypt and 1,354 in 1917 (see Appendix D).

¶ In December the train containing Suleiman Ibn Rifada, paramount chief of the Billi tribe and hostile to King Hussein, was destroyed. Five Turkish officers, Suleiman Ibn Rifada and several of his staff were killed.

The Arabs succeeded in capturing from this train £24,000 in gold and five horses and destroyed a considerable amount of foodstuffs.

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9. Before closing the summary of this period mention should be made of the Turkish ally, Ibn Rashid,\* Emir of Hail, who, after a profitless journey to the Lower Euphrates district in June, 1916, had returned to Hail.† In April, 1917, he was defeated near Hanakiyah‡ (see note to paragraph 24) by a Sherifial force, and, losing the greater part of his strength, fled to the Turks at Medain Saleh, where he arrived with about 1,000 men on the 17th August, while Teima, his most westerly possession, fell to Sherifial forces. His presence at Medain Saleh at once became a source of annoyance to the Turkish commander at Medina, owing to Ibn Rashid's exorbitant demands for supplies, which Fakhri was, by this time, in no position to afford, it being with the utmost difficulty that he was able to support his own forces. In spite of frequent remonstrances to headquarters, Fakhri Pasha at Medina was instructed that Ibn Rashid was to be looked on as a trusted Ally and should be treated in all respects as an honoured guest, and at the end of 1917 he was still in his camp east of the railway, near Medain Saleh.

Though they were unable to make any real headway against the Arab movement the Turks at German instigation were not altogether idle in their efforts to deal with the situation politically during the above period.

The ex-Khedive returned from Switzerland to Turkey in October, 1917, and proceeded to Syria. About the same time Maurice§ visited Berlin and Syria before emerging at Akaba. He gave information indicating that the Germans were endeavouring to reconcile the Turks with the Arabs (see Appendices E and F). The Germans also formed an "Arab Bureau" under *Yelderem* at Damascus and there were signs that their efforts were not entirely devoid of success (see Appendix A).

*Period 1st January, 1918, to date.*

10. January.—As above stated, the cold weather in December, 1917, had interfered with active operations in the northern area, but in January, 1918, Feisal's Arabs based on Akaba were able to begin an advance towards the country south-east of the Dead Sea. On the 1st January, 1918, armoured cars raided Tel Shahn station (6 stations south of Maan) damaging buildings and destroying several trucks. On the 3rd, Feisal's troops occupied the Turkish position of Aba Lissan (15 miles south-west of Maan), and, about the same date, Sherif Nasir, with Abu Tayyij|| and Beni Sakhr,¶ tribesmen, occupied Shobek in the Hishe area, while Arabs also occupied railway bridges south of Maan near Ghadir el Haj. Between the 3rd and the 7th, Sherif Nasir's force occupied Juruf ed Derwish station (3 stations north of Maan), remaining in occupation for 3 days during which rolling stock and a bridge were damaged. Some 80 Turks were killed, while 200 with a gun and machine gun were captured. A separate attack between Juruf ed Derwish and El Hasa (4 stations north of Maan) resulted in 25 Turks being killed and many wounded, and a further 50 prisoners were taken in a raid on Kalaat Aneiza (2 stations north of Maan). On the 14th, the Arabs occupied Tafilah (20 miles north of Shobek), capturing 150 prisoners, including the Kaimakam, Negib Bey. On the 15th January, 14 Turks were killed near Kalaat es Zerka, and on the 22nd an Arab force, in conjunction with 3 British aeroplanes and a motor 10-pr. gun section attacked the line south of Maan near Mudowere (8 stations south of Maan) capturing or killing 20 Turks. On the 26th January an attempt by the Turks to recapture Tafilah failed, their force, numbering some 800 men, 27 machine-guns and 2 guns, being severely defeated in the Seil el Hesa.\*\*

\* See Appendix C.

† In June, 1916, when Turkish prestige in Mesopotamia was high after the capture of the British garrison at Kut, Ibn Rashid was near Zubair with a small following. His Wazir, Saleh Ibn Subhan had already deserted him and joined the British camp in Mesopotamia. Ibn Rashid openly stated he was friendly to the Turks and if they advanced towards Zubair would join them, but if they did not advance he was prepared to remain neutral. Owing to his unfriendly attitude the British cavalry at Shaiba were reinforced by a column of all arms, with orders to attack him unless he moved forthwith from that neighbourhood. On the 25th June Ibn Rashid came to within 8 miles of Khamsieh, on the Euphrates, and there attacked Ibn Towala, of the Aslam Shammar, who was thereupon reinforced by a detachment of the 12th Indian Cavalry. Ibn Rashid was defeated and returned to Hail.

‡ 80 miles north-east of Medina.

§ See Appendix E.

|| Abu Tayyi, a branch of the Huweitat tribe.

¶ Beni Sakhr inhabit from Jebel Druze—(near) Maan.

\*\* On the 26th January a large force of Turks from Kerak attacked the Arabs at Seil el Hesa, where severe fighting took place. This resulted in a brilliant victory for the Arabs, who killed 500 of the enemy and captured 250, including Hamid Bey, Officer Commanding 48th Division. Only about 50 Turks escaped in the direction of Kerak, and all officers were killed or captured. The booty consisted of 2 powerful Austrian mountain guns, 9 automatic rifles, 27 machine-guns (including 15 German Maxims) and 800 rifles. About 200 mules and horses were also taken and distributed among the Bedouin.

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11. In the southern area Sherif Ali raided Hafra (2 stations north of Medina) on the 13th January, killing 7 Turks and destroying 1 kilometre of railway and a bridge, and on the 18th his forces attacked a large Turkish convoy about 8 miles east of Medina, capturing prisoners and much booty, including 17,000*l.* in specie. On the 20th Sherif Abdullah, in an attack on the line near Hedieh (9 stations north of Medina), destroyed some 1,500 rails, 19 culverts and 6 kilometres of telegraph line, the Turks having about 60 casualties; and on the 23rd he took 17 prisoners in an attack on a Turkish post between Wadi Ethil and Dar el Haj (just south of Tebuk).

12. During the month of February the Arabs brought down an enemy aeroplane east of Aneiza station in the northern area, while to the south Sherif Abdulla attacked the railway south of Hedieh, killing 20 Turks, capturing 30, and claiming to have destroyed 3,000 rails and 7 culverts. In another attack between Bir Jedid and Toweira (10 stations north of Medina) he destroyed 7 miles of railway and 12 culverts, while south of Wadi Ethil an engine and 2 trucks were derailed, 3 men being killed and 20 captured. Sherif Ali, in an operation south-west of Medina, killed 15 Turks, captured 12, some animals and many rifles.

Thus, during the first two months of the year 1918, Sherif Feisal's forces had occupied Shobek, in the Hishe fuel area, and Tafilah, some 20 miles to the north, and had successfully resisted a strong attempt by the Turks to recapture the latter place, inflicting severe casualties on them. In the Southern Hejaz, Sherifs Ali and Abdulla had carried out operations with considerable success.

About this month King Hussein wrote two friendly but very depressed letters to Sir R. Wingate, in which he hinted at suicide. He was evidently much upset by the Allies pro-Zionist (see Appendix G) declarations regarding Syria, and feared political bankruptcy in the event of his inability to vindicate his revolt before the Moslem world. A reassuring message was communicated to him by His Majesty's Government. (See bottom of paragraph 13.)

13. By the beginning of March a marked change became noticeable in the handling of the situation east of the Jordan by the enemy. This was probably due to German direction and realisation of the intimacy between the Arab operations and British operations in Palestine. Further reorganization had taken place and German troops had been sent to the scene of action, while Niedermayer\* the German tribal agent, appeared at Amman. This resulted in the concentration at Juruf ed Derwish and Kutrani of a striking force of sufficient strength to push back Feisal's Arabs, while the nucleus of a reserve was maintained at Amman, presumably to ensure the holding of the Jericho road while the Arabs were being dealt with. On the 2nd March the Turks from Juruf ed Derwish and Kutrani advanced in two converging columns in an endeavour to reoccupy Tafilah. On the 7th Sherif Zeid evacuated the town and fell back towards Shobek. During the Turkish concentration their camps were heavily bombed by British aircraft. By the 8th the Arabs were occupying a line running roughly east and west through Shobek, Tafilah being occupied by the Turks on the 12th.

In March King Hussein was again showing sign of anxiety. The enemy were known to be now spending large sums of money and increasing their propaganda\* among the tribesmen. This, coupled with the difficult situation of Sherif Abdulla, who was in considerable difficulties over his payments to his own forces, increased the King's anxiety.

14. However, General Allenby's advance towards Amman,† which was in progress on the 21st March, caused the withdrawal of this Turkish mobile column towards Amman and Es Salt, and on the 18th March the Arabs reoccupied Tafilah and pushed on towards the Seil el Hesa, there being every indication that the Turks, having for the time being attained their object of interposing a sufficient force between the British and the Arabs, did not intend to leave any troops south of a line from the Seil el Hesa to Kutrani, though a detachment was left by them at this latter place to defend the railway line to Amman. As a result of the redistribution of their forces‡ the Maan garrison numbered at this time about 2,300 rifles.

15. Meanwhile, though subjected to frequent attacks, the railway south of Maan to Medina had not been permanently damaged, although traffic had been very seriously interfered with. On an average there was one through train from Damascus to Medina

\* See Appendix F. It must be remembered that this was on the eve of the great German offensive and there can be little doubt that the Turks fostered, with some success, the idea that the Arab revolt would find its end in Paris.

† See Appendix H.

‡ See Appendix O.



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per week each way. The line was divided into five sections, one day being required to traverse each section or a total of five days for the whole distance as against a pre-war timing of 11 hours. Although the programme for the evacuation of Medina had been so interfered with that it had been impossible to carry it through (see paragraph 6), the early evacuation of the Hejaz from Medina to Maan was again under consideration, and arrangements were made for the rapid removal northwards of documents, money and telegraph instruments, &c., from Medina, Medain Saleh, El Ula and Tebuk.

16. In April, Sherif Feisal's army, divided into three columns, was operating in the Maan area as follows:—His southern column captured and blew up Ghadir el Haj station on the 11th, destroying 1,000 rails and 40 bridges and culverts, but the Turks recaptured the remains of the station on the 12th. Bir es Shedia station was also attacked, and the line south of Maan received damage which the enemy estimated would take at least a month to repair.\* In these operations the Turkish casualties amounted to five officers and 220 other ranks. Feisal's northern column destroyed 200 rails just north of Maan, and on the 13th captured and burnt Jerdun station, taking 200 prisoners and two machine guns, while the bridge over Wadi Jerdun and 159 rails were destroyed.

On the 13th the central column stormed the Semna position, 5,000 yards south-west of Maan, and captured a machine gun and 30 prisoners. The attack was continued on the 14th and 15th; on the 16th Maan was surrounded, while on the 17th the station was temporarily occupied by the Arabs who, however, subsequently withdrew and occupied the outer defences. Two more machine guns and 70 prisoners were captured during these operations.

About the 20th April, the stations of Batn el Ghul, Wadi Rethem, Tel es Shahn and Ramleh, south of Maan, were captured and burnt by a detachment of the Egyptian Camel Corps and British armoured cars, and important bridges and telegraph lines were destroyed. Tel es Shahn station surrendered with 52 prisoners, 450 boxes of bombs, and 280,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition; a quantity of food-stuffs was also captured. Minor attacks by tribesmen resulted in the capture of 28 prisoners and a machine gun near Mudowere.

In the southern Hejaz, 700 rails and two culverts were destroyed between Tebuk and El Ula, another 100 rails and three culverts between Matali and Abu Taka, 8 Turks being killed and 1 captured about the same period. South of El Ula an Arab demolition party destroyed 560 rails, killing 7 Turks, while a force of Sherif Ali's attacked the line just north of Medina, and destroyed a bridge and 200 rails.

17. In spite of all Turkish attacks, Sherif Feisal's central column continued to hold the Semna position, and had thus succeeded in completely isolating Maan from the south, and practically so from the north. About 1,000 casualties were inflicted on the Turkish forces in this area during April and May.

18. Owing to General Allenby's operations east of Jordan the Turks had been unable to send a strong force to the assistance of their Hejaz garrisons, but a small force sent from Kutrani managed to recapture the station at Jerdun, though it failed to get through to Maan. On the 12th May extensive demolitions were carried out by the Arabs at Batn el Ghul (south of Maan), 1,500 rails were destroyed as well as a large cutting. The enemy estimated this damage would take 500 men a month to repair, but as this demolition was carried out over very sharp winding curves, in what was originally the most difficult section to build on the whole Hejaz Railway, it was probably irreparable owing to lack of material.\* Meantime, the Arabs had continued operations further north capturing Ferifre and Hasa stations (45 and 35 miles respectively north of Maan), where extensive demolitions were carried out between the 25th and 28th May, which the enemy estimated would take 500 men 15 days to repair. These stations were again occupied by the Arabs on the 30th.

19. The Maan garrison was thus in difficulties, being cut off from the north with no prospect of supplies reaching them and with but 11 day's rations in hand. Medina now appeared to be really running short of supplies, for, on the 18th April Fakhri Pasha had reported that but 1½ month's rations remained, and the extensive demolitions of the line south of Maan, which had rendered some 60 miles of

\* No attempt had yet been made to mend the break in the line south of Maan by the end of August. In fact, on the 14th July, Yelderem ordered the sector south of Maan to Ghadir el Haj to be pulled up to mend the break north of Maan.

it useless, rendered him practically dependent on convoys\* from other parts of Arabia and on the local harvest.

In Southern Hejaz considerable demolitions were carried out by Sherifs Abdulla and Ali. On the 1st May at Bowat and Hafira, on the 10th at Abu Naim, where the bridges over the Wadi Hamdh were attacked, on the 14th at Bir Jedid and Toweira, where 800 rails were destroyed. At Mudurij on the same day 1,500 rails were destroyed. On the 19th the Bowat bridges were bombarded for four hours and a French demolition party destroyed 5 kilometres of railway, and in the same sector on the 22nd, French and Bedouin demolition parties destroyed 6 kilometres of railway and five culverts.

20. Ibn Rashid (see paragraph 9), who had remained in his camp near Medain Saleh, except for one minor raid from Jedaha during February, was suspected by the Turks of intrigue and had been kept practically a prisoner, while many of his followers had deserted him. About the end of April or early in May he left his camp for Hail, but was intercepted by Sherif Abdulla's Bedouins near Teima, and in the engagement which ensued his entire transport was captured, 30 of his men killed and 31 taken prisoner, he himself escaping to Hail.

21. In June the railway was still cut throughout the Maan to Mudowere sector and traffic south of Maan had been at a standstill since the 11th April. North of Maan the railway was still cut as far as Juruf ed Derwish, but on the 12th June a small Turkish concentration commenced at Kutrani with the object of reopening it. On the 16th a column with supplies left Kutrani, reoccupied Ferifre, and on the 18th entered Juruf ed Derwish, after having found El Hassa unoccupied. On the 19th the column, which had met with considerable Arab resistance, returned to Ferifre. Meanwhile, Maan remained invested, and between the 15th and 23rd was bombed three times by the Royal Air Force, in addition to which raids on a large scale were carried out on Kutrani. Three Turkish aeroplanes were seriously damaged.

22. On the 22nd June, Sherif Nasir was attacked near Hasa by two battalions of Turks with machine guns and a battery of field artillery, who were driven back by the Arabs to Ferifre after severe fighting in which they lost 20 killed and 15 prisoners. On the 24th the station and camp at Amman were bombed. On the 27th, Feisal's southern column destroyed a bridge south of Maan, and on the day following attacked and captured the station at Kalaat el Ahmar, the garrison surrend-ring. Following the capture of this station, Mudowere (next station to the north) was evacuated by its garrison who attempted to reach Maan, but were practically all captured by the Arabs.

In Southern Hejaz, on the 21st June, Sherif Abdulla destroyed 200 rails, a bridge and 2 kilometres of telegraph line between Seil Matara and Meshed, while another 500 rails and three bridges were destroyed between Istabl Antar and Abu Naam. On the 29th June a further 210 rails and two bridges were destroyed in this neighbourhood.

Dysentery was now reported to be rife in the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and the food conditions were extremely bad, while scurvy had broken out at Tebuk and Mudowere.

23. About the middle of June King Hussein's attitude again became difficult. He wired to his agent in Cairo expressing his disgust at the Anglo-French intentions regarding Syria, as alleged by Jemal Pasha in his farewell speech made at Beirut prior to his departure from Syria. King Hussein stated that this speech (made in November and widely quoted) had only just been brought to his notice. Though it was not known at the time, the Sherif's attitude was almost certainly influenced by uneasiness regarding a situation which had arisen at Khurma, about 80 miles east of Taif. This town, though undoubtedly in the Sherifal sphere of administration, had become contaminated by the spread of Wahabite influence through the Akhwan Society†

\* In this connection, ample evidence had been forthcoming to show that considerable convoys of supplies from Koweit were reaching enemy destinations, both in the Hejaz and in Palestine. A proposal to establish a blockade cordon with the assistance of troops was found to be impracticable, and other measures were adopted. The Sheikh of Koweit, whose actions in the matter had not been above suspicion, was cautioned, and gave assurances that he would make suitable arrangements and hold himself responsible that no such traffic should be carried on, and that all export of goods from Koweit to the interior should be carefully supervised and regulated. During March, April and May, 1918, five convoys aggregating 1,500 camels were captured east of Medina by detachments of Sherif Ali's Army. See Appendix K.

† The Akhwan organization is centred in Riyadh. It is a Bedouin society which exists to promote the spread of pure religion in the Wahabi sense among the different tribes of Arabia. The abolition of all inter-tribal warfare is one of its cardinal doctrines. Three hundred and more of these Akhwan are being educated in Riyadh to be the religious teachers of the different tribes. The society, entry into which appears to be easy, numbers many thousands in many different tribes, and enthusiastically supports the present ruling house in Riyadh.

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which is centred in Riyadh, with the result that the Governor of Khurma had defected to the Wahabis. Hussein, at the instigation of Abdulla, despatched a punitive force to Khurma which was ignominiously defeated. Though it is not clearly established that Ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd, was directly responsible for the situation at Khurma, Hussein's instinctive fear of his rival was sufficient to suggest Wahabi designs against Mecca, Hussein feeling particularly vulnerable on account of the commitment of the most efficient part of his forces to the north under Feisal. There is no doubt that at this period the mind of King Hussein was in a thoroughly unsettled state, and that the long, simmering trouble between him and Ibn Saud was on the point of boiling over.

24. Letters from Ibn Rashid, intercepted by bedouins, showed that, although he had reached Hail (see paragraph 20), he was unable, owing to British precautions, to obtain supplies from Koweit. He complained bitterly of his treatment by the Turkish officers, particularly by Fakhri Pasha. In reply to a letter sent to him by Sherif Abdulla offering him good treatment if he threw over the Turks, he expressed his willingness to join the Sherifians, but asked for delay, probably with a view to consulting the Turkish political agent, Abdul Hamid, who was *en route* to join him, and to whom reference is made later, and in expectation of the arrival of his own agent, Rashid Ibn Leilah, \* from Damascus, with two guns and two machine guns, † presents from the Turks. (His agent was still in Damascus, July, 1918.) In the light of the above-mentioned situation at Khurma the motive underlying Abdulla's overtures seems apparent.

25. On the 1st and 3rd July, Maan was bombed. On the 4th the Arabs attacked Jerdun and the railway, damaging the latter, and took 13 prisoners, exclusive of a Turkish picquet. On the 5th, reports from Maan showed that there was no money to purchase supplies, the garrison had lived on indifferent rations for two months, desertions, even among officers, had been frequent and animals were dying daily from starvation. On the 6th, the town was again bombed, and Jerdun was bombed on the 8th. On the 12th July it was reported that the railway from the north had apparently been repaired as far as Hasa, and on the 14th orders were issued that repairs to the north of Maan were to be effected by removing rails from the line south of that place (see note to paragraph 18), but it was not anticipated that it would be completed through to Maan before the end of July.

26. On the 17th July a Turkish force, composed of two columns, concentrated at Kutrani and Samra respectively, with the object of operating against an Arab detachment north-west of Kutrani. The Turks claimed to have encountered this force and to have driven it southwards in disorder, but this was not confirmed. On this date the food question at Maan was again reported to be critical; rations and forage consumed daily amounted to three tons, while the weekly convoys from Juruf rarely carried more than nine tons. The population had created disturbances and demanded to be allowed to proceed to Damascus if food was unobtainable at Maan; the Sheikhs had held a meeting and passed a resolution deciding to co-operate with Feisal in the event of his attacking the town. On the 21st the Arabs attacked the line between Jerdun and Maan and held the line and its water supply up to the evening of the 23rd. The enemy's loss was considerable. Their relief column advancing towards Jerdun was engaged by the Arabs and forced to retire, though the Turks claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Arabs (our official reports say 70), and themselves admitted to 11 killed and 20 wounded. The Maan transport animals which were at Jerdun at the time carrying water and supplies, were all killed by shell fire, Maan thus being deprived of transport. On the 20th and 23rd Maan was again bombed.

27. In the southern Hejaz the Arabs destroyed 250 rails, some bridges and

\* First heard of about November, 1916, when, as Ibn Rashid's agent, he visited Ajajmi es Saadun, escorted by some 30 Turkish soldiers, and in December, 1916, purchased certain stores in Nejd, for which he was unable to arrange a safe passage back to Hail through the tribes which lay on his road. He was made a Pasha by the Turks in order to secure his interest in their propaganda. He was all powerful at Hail and the Emir was under his thumb. He was present at the fight between the Rashidite and Sherifal forces near Hanakiyah (see paragraph 9), although it is not certain if the Emir himself was present. He arrived at Medain Saleh with the Emir in August, 1917, and shortly afterwards left for Constantinople and returned to Damascus on the 12th February, 1918, where he still was at the beginning of August.

† Nuri Shaalan, paramount Sheikh of the Rualla (Anazah), is now believed to have definitely come into the open on the side of the Sherif against the Turks. He has until recently been sitting on the fence and making a good thing out of the contraband caravan traffic (see note to paragraph 19). He was recently reported to have stated that he would pass Rashid Ibn Leilah through his capital, Jauf, on the road to Hail, but would hold up any guns or munitions of war accompanying him. (See Appendix L.)

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telegraph line near Dar el Hamra on the 3rd July, and another important sector of line and two five-arched bridges near this place were destroyed on the 5th. On the 10th the Arabs surprised a detachment of 50 Turkish cavalry and infantry under Abdel Hamid Bey el Masri (late 4th Army representative with Ibn Rashid) who were *en route* from Medina to Hail to join Ibn Rashid (see paragraph 24). The whole party were killed or captured, Abdel Hamid el Masri being among the former. On the 17th, Fakhri Pasha represented the situation of his forces as serious and critical; he complained bitterly of the way in which they had been neglected. He thought that *Medina might be able to hold out till the beginning of September*, when the new date harvest, which promised well (2,000,000 kilos), was due, *but doubted if the 2nd Composite force at Tebuk would be able to hold out so long*. On the 31st, Sherif Ali made a successful raid against one of his posts south-west of Medina, killing about 50 Turks.

28. On the 1st August it was reported that Arab activity against the railway north of Maan continued and arrangements were being made for an extension northwards of operations in the autumn. With this object in view, two companies of Imperial Camel Corps were *en route* to Akaba. On the 5th August the enemy's concentration at Kutrani was still proceeding. A small Turkish column with machine guns and a convoy of 50 animals had succeeded in reaching Maan towards the end of July. Repairs to the damaged line between Juruf ed Derwish and Jerdun continued. A proposal by the Commander at Jerdun to make an attack from that place against Tafilah with the object of collecting the considerable quantities of grain in this area and ejecting the Arabs was discountenanced by the Officer Commanding IInd Army Corps, who condemned any offensive at present far from the railway as premature, and considered it more important to clear the Arabs away from the line in the section Maan to Aneiza. No attempt had as yet been made to repair the railway south of Maan (see note to paragraph 16). An aerodrome had been established by the Turks at Tebuk with the object of sending drugs and money to the Hejaz Expeditionary Force by air. The supply situation at Maan had been temporarily improved by the arrival of a convoy from Jerdun, and, on the 29th July, six days' supplies were said to be available. The successful defence of Jerdun by the Turks had had a restraining influence on the Maan sheikhs, but a plot in which Armenians and Arab officers were involved had been discovered by the Turks, who made several arrests.

On the 8th August the Imperial Camel Corps detachment captured Mudowere station (see also paragraph 22) and killed 35 Turks and captured 120 with 2 guns and 3 machine guns.

Following on the capture of Mudowere, Haret el Amara, the next station to the south, was evacuated on the 9th. On the same day the IInd Army Corps decided to assume the offensive in the Maan area and gave orders for 15 days' food and forage for 3,000 men and 500 animals to be collected at Hasa and Juruf ed Derwish. The attack column was to consist of the 2/73rd, 3/73rd, 1/75th, 2/75th, and a mule volunteer regiment, while another battalion, the 1/12th, reinforced the Maan garrison.

On the 10th Fakhri Pasha\* despatched a message of farewell as, in view of the fall of Mudowere, he considered Medina doomed, and on the 11th the purchasing officer of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Damascus received orders to close his accounts and make no further purchases.

On the 12th August Sherif Abdulla severely damaged the railway between Toweira and Bir Jedid and destroyed 2,000 rails, and captured 17 prisoners.

On the same date Fakhri Pasha sent a further despondent message. He considered that Yelderem were mainly responsible for his predicament, and stated he preferred to surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Arabs at Medina. Enver Pasha expressed his appreciation of Fakhri's difficulties and considered that the onus of opening the railway developed not on the H.E.F. but on Yelderem.

The enemy were reported to be showing considerable interest in the Akhwant movement centred at Ritawia, 5 days east of Aneize, in Qasim. The Nejd men, in the service of Hussein, were said to be regarded as infidels by the Akhwan, who attributed to Hussein the delay over the 1918 Haj.

29. The situation on the Hejaz railway about the end of August can be summed up as follows:—

North of Maan railway communication with the north was temporarily cut. The enemy were endeavouring to restore this communication with the troops and material locally available, and it was probable that in course of time would effect this object.

\* See Appendix M.

† See paragraph 23 and note.

They had been able to improve their situation by running transport convoys across the break in the railway from Juruf ed Derwish to Maan.

South of Maan railway communication was probably definitely severed\* with the north for a very considerable period, if not permanently. This, however, did not necessarily justify anticipation of the actual fall of Medina, whose garrison† had by now usurped the functions of the local inhabitants who had practically all been evicted from the district, and could probably support itself on local production of grain and dates for an indefinite period. The Arabs would not attack Medina itself, but it was possible that all outlying Turkish posts and garrisons would fall into Arab hands.

As regards the political situation, the tension produced by the Khurma affair had been aggravated by news from Philly who was with Ibn Saud, dated 25th June, that a large raiding party of Akhwan under Turki, Ibn Saud's son, had left Nejd for Jebel Shammar at the end of Ramadan. The dispute between the Quraish‡ and Wahabite factions is historical, and Hussein naturally regarded Saud as the chief opponent to his personal ascendancy and to his scheme of unification of Arabia. His Majesty's Government saw the necessity for intervention, and a strong message was sent to both chiefs urging forbearance and conveying His Majesty's Government's policy of friendship to both parties. This message appears to have succeeded in temporarily allaying the King's fears, and he gave assurances that his policy in the Khurma area would be restricted to the restoration of order locally, and that no hostile action against Ibn Saud was contemplated, but at the end of July, 1918, he suddenly asked to be allowed to abdicate and retire with his family from the sphere of Arabian politics. A reassuring message was sent him by His Majesty's Government and he withdrew his application to abdicate. He promised to write to Ibn Saud in favourable terms, and as evidence of his good faith offered to pay him a visit and personally discuss the points at variance.

On the 22nd August it was reported that letters, dated 13th July, had been written by Sherif Abdullah to two Ateibah chiefs. These letters were unfriendly to Ibn Saud and proposed a concentration of Ateiba and other tribesmen at Shudhub wells a day's journey east of Khurma. These letters were written without reference to King Hussein, who has been urgently requested to instruct Sherif Shakir to commit no act of aggression east of Khurma, and Abdulla to confine his energy to fighting Turks.

A report, dated the 8th August, from Mr. Philby, political officer with Ibn Saud, stated that the intervention of His Majesty's Government had had an excellent effect on Ibn Saud, who, in a written reply, which covered much recent history, expressed cordial agreement with the sentiment of His Majesty's Government. He left the settlement of all disputed questions to the discretion of the British Government whether now or hereafter, pending which neither side was to provoke the other by any hostile act.

\* See paragraph 18 and note.

† Despite the difficulty of their position the Turks appear to have maintained their moral and discipline to some extent. This is chiefly owing to the energy and capability of their commander in Medina, Fakhri Pasha, a Turk of the old school. In March 1918 when Atif Bey, commander of the 2nd Composite Force at Tebuk left his post for the north under somewhat peculiar circumstances, Fakhri did his best to get him tried by court martial for cowardice. On the occasion of the Mudowere garrison deserting their post (see paragraph 22) Fakhri had them tried by court martial and heavy sentences were promulgated on the officers concerned. In August 1918 a plot was discovered at Maan in which several officers were implicated in an endeavour to communicate with Sherif Feisal's forces and the ringleaders have been arrested and sent for trial to Damascus. Nor do the Turks appear to have abandoned the idea of re-establishing communication with Asir where the 21st Division is isolated. In March 1918 orders appear to have been issued that this division which consists of some 6 battalions with 20 guns should be formed into the XXIII Army Corps. There has been a good deal of evidence to show that messengers have from time to time been despatched from Medina to Asir. One of the most important of these messengers, Ashraf Bey, was captured by Sherif Abdulla in January 1917, with £T20,000 while en route to the South via Hail.

‡ See note to Appendix A.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

KING HUSSEIN.

Sherif Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the first Abadilah Emir (died in 1858) and of the Quraish\* tribe, was nominated to the Emirate of Mecca by the Turkish Anglophil Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, in 1908 after a long residence in Constantinople. Hussein was appointed as a man of pacific character, likely both to serve the Porte's purposes and also to keep on good terms with ourselves. In 1910 he took up arms for the Turks against the Asiri revolt under Idrisi, and succeeded in relieving Ebha and seriously reduced Idrisi's power. In the same year he sent an expedition to Qasim to assert the rights of the Ateibah; and though, through the defection of Ibn Rashid, he had to retire content with an arrangement with Ibn Saud under which the Ateibah were to remain free of the latter's taxes, and the Meccan Treasury merely asserted its right to a considerable contribution from Qasim, his influence had been extended to Central Arabia.

Hussein, however, under the stimulus of his second son† and reputed successor-designate, Abdullah, had cherished from the first the design of emancipating the Meccan Emirate from its dependence on the Porte; though he himself does not seem to have desired the Khalifat, Abdullah has been accredited with that ambition. His early pro-Ottoman expeditions had afforded the opportunity of organizing a bedouin force which he could use at need. From 1913 Sherif Hussein began to follow an anti-Ottoman policy, opposing the extension of the Hejaz Railway, and supporting the Harb tribesmen in their resistance to this and other Turkish projects. From the outbreak of the present war he steadily refused to help the Turks to recruit in the Hejaz, but had to give way so far as to allow his son Ali to raise an irregular regiment of bedouins at Medina for service in Sinai; he continued to organize such of the Hejaz tribes as acknowledged his authority, with a view to insurrection at the proper moment, and reconciled himself with Idrisi† trying to unite him and the Imam Yahya of Yemen in a common anti-Ottoman aim. His third son, Feisal, was despatched to Constantinople early in 1915, and on his return to Syria got into communication with the Pan-Arabists. Though Feisal's policy and actions at that time are not clear it seems that he secretly furthered his father's designs by promoting disaffection, and though obliged to accompany Enver Pasha to Medina in February 1916 he returned to Syria to continue the same work. In 1915 Abdullah, the second son, was sent to Central Arabia to make peace with the Emirs of Hail and Riadh and to enforce the claims of the Meccan treasury on Qasim and Sedeir. This peace, however, was not observed on either side for long. (See Appendix B.)

By the Spring of 1916 Hussein had become the *de facto* power in Hejaz, with wide influence outside, extending in Asir to Wadi Bishah and northward to the Southern Anazah tribes. Both in Mecca and Medina (in which last city he kept his eldest son, Ali, as his representative) he had reduced Turkish authority to a low ebb, and even in Jeddah his agents wielded most influence. But the Porte maintained its garrisons in spite of temporary interruptions of railway communication, and under their protection the Ottoman officials held on to their posts. In May 1916 a strict naval patrol of the Hejaz coasts was enforced by the British authorities in order to support the Emir by demonstrating to the Arabs the inevitable results of further submission to Ottoman occupation, and early in June an insurrection of tribes from the Juhelma in the north to the borders of Asir in the south, including both Harb and Ateibah, broke out under the leadership of the Emir and his sons.

On the 2nd Muharrem (29th October, 1916) Colonel Wilson, Chief Pilgrimage Officer, received at Jeddah a telegram, sent by Sherif Abdullah, as Foreign Secretary, notifying His Majesty's Government that Sherif Hussein Ibn Ali had on that day been recognized by the Assembly of the Ulema at Mecca and "according to the wish of the public" as *King of the Arab nation*, and religious Chief "until the Moslems are of one opinion concerning the Islamic Khalifat." Colonel Bremond, head of the French Mission in Jeddah received an identical telegram. Both he and our representative (Colonel Wilson) contented themselves with acknowledging receipt, and proceeded forthwith to ask instructions from their respective Governments. It was learnt later that the French Moslem Mission at Mecca had been summoned to the Assembly at which the acclamation had taken place, but without being forewarned of the object of that assembly.

Though in conversation with Mr. Storrs in October Sherif Abdullah had broached tentatively the question of his father assuming some higher title than Emir, the above definite announcement somewhat startled those immediately concerned with Hejaz affairs, and Colonel Wilson was asked to sound Sherif Abdullah regarding the motives for this step. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were informed that the Allied Governments and some neutrals had been directly notified of the above proceeding by telegram (in which only the title of *King* was mentioned, and no allusion was made to religious chiefship) and were informed that the "coronation" would take place on the 4th or 5th November, 1916.

The reasons given by Abdullah and the Emir were, briefly, these, that:—

1. Recognition of the new title by His Majesty's Government would clear us, in the minds of the Arabs, from any suspicion of designs on the Holy Places, and thus free our hands to send troops to the King's assistance.

\* The Arabian tribe from which Mahommed was descended. The Sherif of Mecca is always of the Quraish tribe, but ever since the extinction of the Abbaside Khalifats, the Sultans of Turkey have held the office of Khalifat, who are not of this tribe.

† The sons of King Hussein in order of birth are Ali, Abdullah, Feisal and Zeid.

‡ Idrisi.—After much pressure and assistance in munitions and money, Idrisi began operations against the Turks early in 1918 and in February had succeeded in capturing Loheiya and Atn. In April the Turks, having collected men from all directions, advanced on his position east of the above towns and defeated his forces, but were, at the time, unable to follow up their success. On the 7th June, they however again attacked, and on the 8th captured various outlying villages. On the 10th they occupied Atn, an important village containing the main water supply for Loheiya, which Idrisi's forces evacuated without firing a shot. As a result of the loss of his water supply, Idrisi was compelled to evacuate Loheiya a few days later, and this he accomplished with the loss of a few guns, some of which were rendered unserviceable by British Naval landing party. Idrisi, when last heard of, had retired to Habi, 30 miles north of Loheiya, and it was considered unlikely that he would be able to undertake any further offensive operations for some time.

2. All Hejaz wished it as a proof of independence, and as such it would help the Arab cause in general.  
3. It was desirable to distinguish the new régime at Mecca from the old state of dependence on the Turks, and emphasize the return to the prior state of Sherifal independence. The Emir did not mean his new title to imply any lordship over, or interference with, other Arabian Princes, and he loyally held to all agreements with Great Britain. If the latter had any doubts of his good faith, he would demonstrate it by not pressing his request.

There were obvious objections to His Majesty's Government recognizing a "King of the Arab nation," while that nation was still *in posse* only, and the prince who claimed such recognition, was very far from being in a position to substantiate his pretension. Not only were our actual treaties and agreements with other Arab princes a bar, but we could hardly have been expected to give what amounted to a blank cheque on the political organization of Arabia in the future. Feeling that this title was a matter about which consultation with our Allies (and especially the French Government) had to take place, before any formal recognition in explicit terms could be given, and also that our relations to other Moslem princes and peoples had to be considered carefully, His Majesty's Government instructed Colonel Wilson merely to send a congratulatory telegram to Sherif Hussein. Finally the title recognized by His Majesty's Government after discussion with their Allies was *King of Hejaz*, and Hussein was not to be addressed as "His Majesty" but as "His Lordship."

In January, 1918, King Hussein again raised the question of his title and sought the recognition of His Majesty's Government to the title of *King of the Arabs*, stating such recognition would benefit his cause and help to refute enemy propaganda about the annexationist aims of the Entente Powers in Arab countries. Early in February, His Majesty's Government replied to this request by stating they were much touched at the readiness and frankness with which King Hussein had caused to be forwarded to the High Commissioners in Egypt a message from Jemal Pasha I. to Sherif Feisal and Gaafar Pasha (see Appendix D.), and that the policy of His Majesty's Government and their Allies was to stand for the cause of the liberation of the oppressed nations and that they were determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the reconstruction of an Arab world in which law should once again replace Ottoman violence. But the actual question at issue was waived.

With reference to the letters of Jemal I. to King Hussein there appears to be no doubt that practically since the outbreak of the Arab revolt the Turks had been despatching messages to Hussein and his sons. Whether all these messages duly arrived at their destination or not is unknown, but the first information received by British authorities of such correspondence was in January, 1918, when Hussein forwarded to the High Commissioner in Cairo the letters from Jemal Pasha I. above mentioned. Hussein left the answer to the High Commissioner, but informed his son Feisal that the official answer to the Turks should be that the sword must be the sole arbiter between the Arabs and the Turks.

In June, 1918, Hussein informed the High Commissioner that an emissary bearing a letter from Jemal II. had arrived at Feisal's headquarters stating that the writer was instructed by his Government to communicate with the Arabs and accept just demands from them. King Hussein had telegraphed to Feisal instructing him to reply in the same sense as on the occasion of the previous peace overtures, i.e., that the "sword must decide." There is, however, irrefutable evidence that Sherif Feisal replied at once to this letter and was prepared to enter into "conversation" with Jemal II. This may merely have indicated a desire to temporise.

In June, 1916, the Porte issued a proclamation deposing Sherif Hussein from the Emirate of Mecca and on the 1st July, 1916, appointed in his place Sherif Ali Haidar (of the family of Abul Mutallib, Emir, 1851-56, and 1881-82, and of the Dhuwji Zeid clan, hostile to Hussein's clan of the Abaddah. Ali Haidar proceeded to Damascus where he interested himself chiefly in propaganda work, he then proceeded to Medina where he arrived on the 26th July, 1916, and on the 9th August issued a long diatribe against Hussein for having thrown off the Turkish yoke, and on the 13th August wrote to Ibn Saud inciting him to take measures against the Sherif Hussein.

In November, 1916, a literary deputation from Constantinople visited Medina.

Early in March, 1917, Ali Haidar left Medina with his three sons and made good his return to Damascus.

About April, 1918, information was received that a special mission to King Hussein was contemplated by the Turks, its leader to be either the late or the present Sheikh el Islam. It was to go down to Medina and thence try and get into touch with Mecca and make certain propositions to Hussein in the name of Islam. Not much importance was attached to this mission by British authorities as it was realized that owing to the state of the railway it had practically no chance of getting through, and no member is believed to have proceeded beyond Deraa. The Sheikh el Islam returned home. The Grand Mufti of Damascus who was a member of the mission and who probably knew better than his colleagues the state of the railway opportunely fell ill and made no attempt to start for the south.

## APPENDIX B.

### IBN SAUD, EMIR OF NEJD.

The Principality of Nejd was founded about 1745 by Mohammed ibn Saud, said to be of the Hasanah tribe of the Anazah, and of honourable lineage. He was the earliest important convert made by Mohammed ibn Abd el Wahhab, the ascetic revivalist of Hareimulah (Ayaina), and it was with his sword that Wahabism was propagated throughout the Nejdean cases.

His son, Abd el Aziz, and his grandson, Saud, pushed religious conquest afield. Between 1784 and 1804 under Ibn Saud's ancestor Abdul Aziz, the Wahabis pillaged Iraq and Kerbela, exacted tribute from Bahrein, threatened Oman, captured and purged Mecca, and pillaged Medina driving out the Turkish representative. The sacking of Hodeida in the south was the furthest extension of the Wahabi power, but in 1810 a Wahabi army ravaged the Hauran and all but reached Damascus, whilst Saud's son, Abdul, raided almost to Baghdad.

When Saud died in 1814 he was acknowledged by almost all Arabia except Yemen and the districts south of the Great Desert.

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The Turks then turned to the Khedivial family for assistance, and the Wahabi conquests were checked by a series of expeditions from Egypt led either by Mohammed Ali himself or his sons Tahsin and Ibrahim Pasha. However, in 1817 Ibrahim overran Qasim, and in 1818 the Wahabi Emir, Abdullah bin Saud, was sent a prisoner to Constantinople, where he was beheaded. Wahabi authority was established at Riadh in 1843, but in 1871 Turkish troops reoccupied Hasa, and Abdullah bin Feisal Ibn Saud accepted the title of Kaimakam of Nejd.

The basis of the Nejdean Emir's power is both religious and secular. He is the recognized champion of Wahabism and he commands the population of the most thickly inhabited settled districts in Central Arabia.

For the past century the history of the interior of the Arabian Peninsula has centred round the rivalry between the Emirs of Northern and Southern Nejd, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. When Abdul Aziz, the present representative of the house of Saud was a boy of 15, the power of the Rashid touched its zenith; the great Emir, Mohammed (see Appendix C), drove the Saud into exile and occupied their capital, Riadh. For 11 years Ibn Saud wandered in exile, seeking refuge for a time in the Syrian desert, in the tents of the great Anazah tribe, with whom he claimed kinship, but in 1902 the Sheikh of Kuwait gave the young Emir his chance of recovering his capital. With a force of some 80 camel riders supplied by Kuwait, Ibn Saud surprised the Rashid garrison of Riadh and proclaimed his own accession from the recaptured city. In a contest renewed year after year Ibn Saud recovered the territories of his fathers, and in 1913 seized the Turkish province of Hasa, formerly an appanage of Riadh, ejected the Ottoman garrisons and established himself on the seaboard of the Persian Gulf, but in May, 1914, accepted the title of Vali of Nejd. He was already on terms of personal friendship with Captain Shakespear, British Political Agent at Kuwait. In the winter of 1914-15 Captain Shakespear made his way for the second time into Nejd and joined Ibn Saud, who was marching north to repel the attack of Ibn Rashid engineered and backed by the Turks. The two forces met towards the end of January in an indecisive engagement in which Captain Shakespear, though he was present as a non-combatant, was killed.

On the 26th December, 1915, Ibn Saud entered into a treaty with the Indian Government, which was ratified on the 18th July, 1916.

At the outbreak of the Sherif's revolt in the summer of 1916, Ibn Saud wrote that he considered Ibn Rashid should be obliterated and his name effaced. In September, 1916, Ibn Saud was either unable or perhaps unwilling to attack Hail without assistance, and possibly was mindful of his treaty with the Turks of May, 1914. On the 11th November, 1916, Sir P. Cox met Ibn Saud at Uqair. Saud pointed out the impossibility of co-operating with the Sherif on a large scale, but was prepared to send one of his sons with a few men as a token of his identification with the Sherif's cause; with certain assistance he would demonstrate against Ibn Rashid. Ibn Saud accompanied Sir P. Cox to Bahrein and Kuwait, where he was decorated with the K.C.I.E. on the 20th December and made an animated pro-British and anti-Turk speech, eulogising the action of the Sherif. He then accompanied Sir P. Cox to Basra, where he detailed the assistance necessary to commence operations against Ibn Rashid, viz., 3,000 rifles and some machine guns and the necessary ammunition; the question of subsidy was also raised. After his return to Riadh, he forwarded to Sir P. Cox about the end of the year a letter addressed to his father on the 13th November, 1916, by the Sherif, who signed as *King of Arabian Countries*. Ibn Saud considered this a clear justification of suspicions regarding the Sherif which he had previously expressed. On the 24th January Ibn Saud left Riadh for Qasim and commenced operations against Ibn Rashid and claimed to have killed 40 men and captured 200 horses about the end of February or the beginning of March. On the 12th May he reported to Sir P. Cox that Ibn Rashid had asked for peace, but stated he had replied he could not comply without ascertaining our wishes. About June, 1917, Mr. R. Storrs was about to start from Kuwait on his way to the Hejaz and to report on the situation in Central Arabia. Unfortunately, Mr. Storrs got sunstroke and could not continue his mission.

On the 14th June, 1917, Sherif Abdulla reported that Ibn Saud had written him a friendly letter stating he was anti-Turk, pro-Arab and pro-Sherif, at the same time sending him a valuable mare. On the 18th June it was reliably reported that Fakhri Pasha, at Medina, was endeavouring to communicate with Ibn Saud without result, and had stated that Saud had some time previously communicated direct with Constantinople to request money and arms. On the 12th June General Clayton forwarded a statement of the Sherif that he had received information that Ibn Saud was preparing to take action against him, had been making pro-Turk speeches, and was distributing the arms received from His Majesty's Government among the Wahabis whom he was stirring up against the Sherif, and also that Ibn Saud had connived at the passage through his country of £T40,000-50,000 for the Turkish troops in Asir and Yemen.

On the 28th September Sir P. Cox reported at length on Ibn Saud. The main points were that, if Turkish gold had passed through his territory to the Yemen, it was owing to the slackness of Ibn Saud's people, and not by connivance of the Emir himself; that Dr. Harrison, who had just returned from Riadh, reported that the continued strain of the war on the people of Nejd, and the severe restrictions placed upon their trade, caused public opinion to be hostile to us, although, owing to the loyal attitude of the Emir himself, there was no overt talk against us; that the money lavished on the Hejaz tribes had spoilt the market for Ibn Saud, and that, finally, his military value had never been over-estimated, and although he had been given two guns and three machine guns, their value was doubtful, owing to lack of trained personnel. At the Haj of 1917 Abd er Rahman, Ibn Saud's father, attempted the journey across Arabia, but had to give up owing to infirmity, leaving the Haj to be performed on his behalf by his son, the Emir Mohammed, who was entertained by the Sherif of Mecca.

On the 30th October, 1917, Sir P. Cox reported that he had detailed Mr. H. St. J. Philby, I.C.S., and Lieut.-Colonel Cunliffe Owen as a special mission to Ibn Saud, accompanied by Colonel Hamilton to represent the views and interests of the Sheikh of Kuwait. This mission appears to have accepted an exaggerated estimate of the Rashid power and importance from Ibn Saud. It was hoped that a British officer and a representative of the Sherif would come to Boreidah and the whole question of the internal politics of Arabia would be discussed. Mr. Storrs was suggested to King Hussein as the officer who would represent his interests at the proposed conference. After considerable difficulty the consent of the Sherif was obtained to Mr. Storrs' proposed journey, but the Sherif finally revoked his approval and nothing would make him change his mind. In the meanwhile the mission from Mesopotamia had reached Riadh and Philby reported on the 2nd December that Ibn Saud displayed consuming jealousy of the Sherif's assumption of the title King of the Arab Countries, and suspected that the Sherif's attitude in this connection was based on some secret understanding with us. Owing to the Sherif's refusal to allow Mr. Storrs to make the journey, Mr. Philby crossed Arabia and to the undisguised annoyance of Hussein arrived at Jeddah via Taif at the beginning of January, 1918. Commander Hogarth was sent to Jeddah from Cairo, where several conferences with Philby and King Hussein took place.



The King refused to be reassured about Ibn Saud's attitude. He both feared him as a centre of a religious (Wahabi) movement dangerous to the Hejaz, and hated him as irreconcilable to his own pretension to be King of the Arabs. The conferences were successful in other ways, but failed to solve the Ibn Saud question.

King Hussein finally refused to allow Mr. Philby to return by land to Ibn Saud and he went back by sea.

At the end of December, 1917, Major Cornwallis, who was in Sherif Abdulla's camp in the Wadi Ais, was informed by the Sherif that he had written to Ibn Saud in March, 1917, guaranteeing his future independence and that of his descendants. Ibn Saud is reported to have read this letter to his council at Riadh and to have sent a suitable acknowledgment. Later, when Ibn Rashid came to Medain Saleh, Abdullah wrote another letter to Ibn Saud proposing co-operation against Hail; Ibn Saud briefly acknowledged receipt of this letter but made no allusion to its contents.

At the beginning of April, 1918, reliable information was received that Ibn Saud was in communication with Fakhri Pasha at Medina to the effect that if Germany would guarantee his claims to certain districts he was prepared to assist Turkey, but nothing came of this. However, on the accession of the new Sultan of Turkey in July, 1918, Fakhri was ordered to inform Ibn Saud of his accession.

The next move was the Khurma affair (see paragraph 23), but whether this was instigated by Ibn Saud or not has never been clearly proved. The immediate outcome, however, was a message from His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud on the same lines as the message to Hussein (see paragraph 29).

King Hussein offered in August, 1918, to visit Ibn Saud with a view to settling their differences once and for all (see paragraph 29).

#### APPENDIX C.

##### IBN RASHID, EMIR OF HAIL.

Ibn Rashid, Saud ibn Abd el Aziz, has been Emir of Hail and Jebel Shammar since 1908. This principality was founded by an Abdah Shammar Sheikh, Abdullah ibn Rashid, who in 1835 was made Governor of Hail by the Emir Feisal of Riadh. Since the last years of the 18th century, all Jebel Shammar was under Nejd, and most recently under Egyptian overlordship. Abdullah did not, however, throw off his dependence at once, but greatly increased his power during Feisal's detention for five years in Cairo, and, dying in 1847, left his successor, Telal, virtually free of Nejd. The latter's successor, Mohammed, the strongest native ruler seen in Arabia in the 19th century, consolidated his principality, and not only maintained complete independence, but formed the greatest confederacy of tribes ever collected, and in 1892 conquered all the dominions of Nejd and ruled as sole Emir of Central Arabia till his death in 1897. (See Appendix B.)

Since that time, Jauf el Amr has been lost to Nuri Shaalan, and despite active Turkish support in 1904-05 no territory has been permanently added to the Shammar domains. The Emirate, therefore, was at the outbreak of war in 1914, confined to Jebel Shammar.

The Ibn Rashids always maintained closer relations with the Ottoman Government than any other independent Arabian princes, and until the Hejaz revolt in 1916 were consistently friendly with the Sherifate of Mecca.

The Rashid house is accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders. Another noble Shammar family, the Subhans, is very intimately connected with it and shares its notoriety. The present Emir is a son of Abd el Aziz, who reigned from 1897-1906, when he was killed in battle against Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd. Abd el Aziz was succeeded by his son, Mitah, who, before he had reigned a year, was murdered by a cousin, Sultan Ibn Hamud er Rashid. Sultan was then killed by his brother, Saud ibn Hamud, but the latter in his turn was murdered in 1908 at the instigation of Hamud ibn Subhan, who brought back his nephew, Saud Ibn Abd el Aziz, from Mecca, where he had been sent for safety, and set him up as Emir. He is said to be an irresponsible boy of boorish manners and violent and ungovernable passions, verging on madness. He has a reputation for cruelty, and even in Arabia is accounted shifty and faithless.

His friendship with the Ottoman Sultan was rewarded with large presents of arms and by a considerable sum of money sent up with Ashraf Bey early in 1915, and with the title of Pasha.

There are estimates, varying from 20,000 to 800 of the numbers of fighting men he can put into the field, and a reasonable estimate is something under 10,000 and over 5,000.

See also paragraphs 9 (and note), 20, and 27.

#### APPENDIX D.

##### THE JEMAL PASHAS.

There have been three Jemal Pashas connected with Syria and Arabia—

1. Ahmed Jemal (Biyuk), the Greater or Jemal I.
2. Mohammed Jemal (Kuchuk), the Less or Jemal II.
3. Mehmed Jemal or Jemal III.

In 1916, Jemal I. was General Officer Commanding, IVth Turkish Army, and Minister of Marine. In March, before the outbreak of the Sherif's revolt, he had Sherif Feisal in Damascus with him, but it seems probable that he was deliberately, though perhaps to some extent sub-consciously, courting an Arab revolt in the intention of making it the excuse to crush the Arabs.

In 1916, after the discovery of compromising correspondence in the French Consulate at Beirut, he was responsible for the murder of a considerable number of Syrian notables in an endeavour to stamp out any signs of revolt, and cleverly managed to throw the blame for these atrocities on Enver Pasha.

Consistently anti-German in his policy, he quarrelled with all the Germans who were sent to Syria, where it was obviously his ambition to maintain a vice regal independence.

The failure of the Stotzingen Mission to Arabia in 1916 was attributed to him, and he displayed remarkable selfishness in his refusal to assist Khalil Pasha in Mesopotamia during the British threat on Bagdad, 1916/17. Jemal's hostility and failure to co-operate with Falkenhayn, whom he held morally and materially responsible for the loss of Jerusalem, resulted in his recall to Constantinople, whence he visited Berlin about August, 1917. In September, he returned to Syria with the title of General Officer Commanding, Syria and Western Arabia. In November, before his final recall from Palestine, he was responsible for a somewhat striking speech in Beirut, in which he explained his Syrian policy and emphasized the necessity for Turkey keeping a watchful eye on her hereditary enemy Bulgaria. He also went into some detail regarding his attempts to recall the Sherif to his Turkish allegiance. He had written to both Sherif Feisal and Gaafar Pasha\* (commanding the Sherif's regular troops) inviting them to a conference. To Feisal he pointed out the result to Islam of the ultimate fate of the Arab countries, Palestine and Syria, as disclosed by the revelations in the Russian Press; to Gaafar he reminded him of his heroic past when he was aiding Islam to conquer Egypt.

Jemal's position on his recall to Turkey in November was a curious illustration of how greatly a man may fail without suffering the common lot of failures. He had displayed no military capacity and his Egyptian scheme had led to a whole series of disasters. He provoked and had been powerless to check the Arab revolt and made no practical response to the appeals of Fakhri cut off by his agency at Medina; he had embittered Syria against the Turks; he had embittered the Turks against their all-powerful Allies. Yet he was still Minister of Marine, and the most conspicuous Turk in Syria. He had quarrelled with the most powerful ministers and generals and had again been summoned from his Syrian stronghold to give account at Constantinople, where, not so long ago, the bowstring or the Bosphorus would infallibly have awaited him. He obeyed, even went to Berlin, and had been everywhere more courted than castigated, and had returned in power to Syria.

On the other hand, his achievements consisted of compelling us to spend millions on the defence of Egypt, and to divert our armies sorely needed elsewhere. He had combed out Syria until it had not a head and hardly a hand to make rebellion. His strength lay in his championship of Islam, sincere enough as he made this his line in public life, and he was false to everything else but his own interest. Among prominent Turkish ministers he was the only one who stood for that, and greatly as the Turanians would have liked to have had him and all other pro-Islamic Turks out of the way, they dared not put him out. Therefore Jemal I. remained in power in spite of German opposition and Enver Pasha's scheming.

On his return to Constantinople in December, 1917, he took up his old post of Minister of Marine. Later he was reported at Batum on the Black Sea, and in August, 1918, at Vienna.

In 1917, Kuchuk Jemal II. commanded the VIIIth Army Corps. On the 11th November, 1917, he was travelling in a train which was mined by the Arabs near Khirbet-es-Sumra north of Amman and narrowly escaped being killed. His aide-de-camp and some 20 others lost their lives. About the beginning of 1918 he was given command of the IVth Army, and on the 25th January, 1918, was appointed Governor-General of Syria.

On the formation of the Composite Force at Tebuk at the beginning of 1917, Jemal III. was given command. On reorganization of areas he took over command at Maan in September, 1917, until he went sick in December, 1917, and returned to Damascus, thence to Constantinople.

#### APPENDIX E.

##### MAURICE'S REPORT.

About the beginning of January, 1918, Maurice, who was at one time employed as a British Agent in Egypt and Switzerland, arrived at Akaba and was sent to Cairo where he was interrogated. He left Switzerland on the 22nd September, 1917, arrived Berlin the 23rd and travelled *via* Sofia to Constantinople, where he arrived on the 5th October. In Berlin he was questioned closely at the War Office as to what he knew of British intentions in Syria and Mesopotamia, and asked if he considered it possible to buy over Ibn Saud, as well as various other questions concerning the Arab revolt. Maurice stated that the Germans had expressed to him their disappointment at the failure of the Turkish alliance to bring the whole Moslem world on to the side of the Central Powers. He was also interviewed by Von Kuhlmann in the presence of Hakkı Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, and claimed to have impressed the former with his reasons for the dislike to Turkish rule of the Arab Ottoman subjects; his reasons chiefly being the atrocities committed by Jemal Pasha I. and Khalil Pasha in Syria and Mesopotamia respectively.

On his arrival at Constantinople, Maurice stated he was at once interviewed by Talaat Pasha regarding the Arab question. Talaat stated that both the Sultan himself and Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, had written to the Sherif proposing peace, but the replies they had had were very vague regarding conditions. He stated he was also taken to see Enver, with whom the Sherif's revolt was discussed. Maurice stated he was informed that £200,000 in gold had already been despatched to Damascus for propaganda purposes among the Arabs.

Later Talaat told him that there had been an offer of peace from the Sherif in the spring of 1917, but it had not been entertained, as one of the conditions was for the Sherif to become Khalif. Talaat, according to Maurice, threw all the blame for the continuance of the Arab revolt on Sherif Abdullah, and said that Turkey might consent to the independence of the Sherif, and might possibly arrange matters in Syria for him, but would never permit him to become Khalif. Before leaving Constantinople Maurice stated he had had a further interview with Enver, who asked Maurice to explain to the great Bedouin families and the Druses, when he arrived in Damascus, Enver's attachment to them and consideration of their interests.

Enver stated that Taksin Bey, formerly Vali of Erzerum, had been entrusted with the handling of the Arab propaganda at Damascus.

About the beginning of 1917, Maurice reached Damascus and again saw Jemal Pasha I., who showed him two large envelopes which were to be sent to the Sherif *via* Kerak, and stated he had repeatedly written

\* A Baghdadi Arab, with a considerable European experience of modern warfare. Commanded the Turkish forces operating with the Senussi in Tripoli, 1915-1916. He was captured in 1916 and interned in the Citadel, Cairo. After an abortive attempt to escape, in the course of which he broke a leg, volunteered to fight for the Sherif and was appointed to his present post in May, 1917.

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to both the Sherif and Feisal, but had not received a reply. The Sherif is known to have received these letters. Maurice then saw the Vali of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, who stated he had been authorized to spend up to £T500,000 in gold, of which £T200,000 had already arrived, on propaganda.

Tahsin showed Maurice a letter to Nuri Shaalan (see Appendix L), who had left the Turks and gone to Qaf with his tribe, as his son Nawwaf had been arrested at Damascus in July and confined at Zahle. The letter stated that Nuri must return to Damascus with 500 camel men, when he would be given £T10,000, food for his bedouins and rifles, as well as the title of Emir of Qaf, and a first-class Osmanieh. Maurice stated he at once wrote to Nuri warning him that the above was a trap and the fact remains that Nuri Shaalan did not return to Damascus. During all this time Maurice's pose was that of a Turkish agent working to induce the Arabs to return to their Turkish allegiance. He stated that Jemal Pasha I, refused to allow him to go among the bedouin, but informed him he was to work with the Vali and the sum of £T400,000 (?) would be put at his disposal to raise a bedouin army of some 15,000 men. The Valis of Damascus, Adana, Aleppo and Beirut, with the Governor of the Lebanon appear to have formed a committee for this purpose. While at Damascus two Sheikhs of the Metawalli tribe asked Maurice why the support which he had promised them on his previous visit to Syria in 1916 had not been forthcoming. Maurice stated that he had told the authorities concerned (British? Arab?), but nothing had been done, but it would be different this time. Maurice had no authority for thus pledging the British authorities.

About the 7th December Maurice left Damascus in disguise and went to the Hammad, among the bedouins, whom he invited to revolt against the Turkish Government. Towards the end of December he stated he accompanied a bedouin party with the object of raiding Tadmur, but apparently the raiding party thought better of it when some 6 hours journey from that place.

At out this time Maurice stated he received a letter from Nuri Shaalan the gist of which was that he was on the Sherif's side but could not join him as he was too far off and had many enemies, Ibn Rashid, the Sherarat and the Anazah (?), but if the Sherif's forces came nearer (i.e. further north) he would join him at once as long as he was given sufficient arms and ammunition and with the whole of the Beni Muslim (300,000—400,000? men) would attack Homs, Hama, or anywhere else. (See Appendix L. The Rualla, Nuri Shaalan's tribe have now, August, 1918, definitely declared for the Sherif).

He also stated he had received a similar message from the Druse Sheikhs through Selim el Atrash, that, when the Sherif's forces came nearer, they would join him and attack Deraa. Maurice arrived at Akaba about the beginning of January, 1918. He is said not to have been received favourably by Feisal.

APPENDIX F.

CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE OF ENEMY POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN ARABIA.

The Turks, probably inspired by the Germans, first showed signs of adopting a more conciliatory policy towards the Arabs about the end of 1916.

*Telegram from Enver to Khalil.*—Almost the beginning of this change is seen in end of 1916 a message from Enver at Constantinople to Khalil Pasha in Mesopotamia dated the 27th December, 1916, in which Enver, in suggesting collaboration with Ibn Rashid, concluded with a summary of Turkish policy, of which the object was to keep matters going until the end of the universal war, to maintain alliances, and to prevent new trouble.

*Jemal I.*—The arrival of Falkenhayn to command in Palestine in place of Jemal Pasha No. 1 during 1917 marked a further step in this change of policy. Jemal has always been looked on as an enemy to the Arabs, but even he, before his departure, was reported as "making love to the Druses," and in a speech which he delivered at Beirut about the end of November, spoke in most kindly terms of Syrians and Arabs generally. While his name appears as signatory to an offer of free pardon, dated 14th November, 1917, to all Arabs who had taken up arms for the King of the Hejaz forces, who would give themselves up within a month. The pardon was also to be extended to the applicants family.

*Maurice's report.*—Maurice's report gives a credible indication of the German awakening to the necessity of bringing influence to bear on Turkey in this respect, and leaves the impression that the Germans had hitherto been thoroughly deceived by the Turks. At the foot of page 6, the Germans were reported to have said "All we wanted was that you Arabs should return to your allegiance to the Turks, because that was the only way we could do anything for you, and we give you our word that the Arabs shall afterwards see the fulfilment of all their aspirations both in regard to Syria and Irak."

*See page 10, last paragraph.*—Maurice's interview with Kuhlmann and Hakki Pasha when after an awkward discussion referring to the massacre in Syria, Hakki Pasha said, "let's leave off talking about these things, let bygones be bygones, let's put off old things and put on new."

*Page 11, last paragraph.*—"Our Government (German Government) now intends to assist yours (Arab) very thoroughly."

*Page 13, paragraph 2.*—Hakki Pasha's advice to Maurice to speak to Enver and Talaat about military goings on, and that the methods of Khalil and Jemal Pasha had done great harm.

*Page 17 (centre).*—Talaat on letters to Hussein, and later "yes, but we want to gain the friendship of the Arabs, we have made a mistake before and we want to remedy it now and settle Arab affairs."

*Page 20, last paragraph.*—Said Bey. "We have already sent 200,000*l.* in gold to Damascus, and we shall send some more."

*Page 22 (centre).*—Jemal—Maurice. "As for the Druses . . . I am quite certain they are against us and I am forced to treat them as if I believe in them."

*Page 24, end of first paragraph.*—Talaat to Maurice on the question of the Khalifat "since then we have frequently exchanged messages and letters between the Sultan and the Sherif."

*Paragraph 2.*—However, if the Sherif wanted to be independent we might consent to it and we might arrange things in Syria for him . . . His brother Nasir is now in Constantinople, he is very well treated, and the Sheikh of Islam visits him often. We have negotiated enough with the Sherif. Also the Neo-Turanian movement . . . Hope you will work hard and show the Arab people the error of their ways and try to bring them back to their allegiance to us."

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Page 25.—Talaat on the ex-Khedive. We know he received 300,000*l.* to 400,000*l.* from the Germans, and we sent him 20,000*l.* once.

Page 27.—Midhat Bey: "It was necessary to get the Arabs to understand that the aim of the British was to divide Islam, and he was prepared to join me in Syria in a propaganda campaign to this end."

Page 28.—Mohammed Ali Pasha, on the troubles in Syria and Arabia: "A great misfortune . . . asked if Jemal would ever regain the confidence of the Arabs . . . or if they could be reconciled if Rashid or Izzet Pashas were sent there instead of Jemal."

Page 29.—Enver Pasha: "I am very fond of the Arabs although they are rather stupid, and if my colleague, Jemal Pasha, has been rather foolish it was against my principles and wishes."

"You will be going to Damascus in a few days, and I wish you to explain to the great families of the Beduin and Druse and all the Arabs that I am very well disposed to them. . . . We (Talaat and Enver) have entrusted Tahsin Bey to carry out this policy (fulfilment of Arab aspirations), and when you get to Damascus you must work hard with him."—Page 30.

Page 31, paragraph 3.—Selim, late Kaimakam, of the Hauran. While he was Kaimakam he was always receiving letters telling him to be more careful . . . and to avoid doing anything to disaffect the Druses.

Page 34.—Kuhlmann asked if it was possible to win over those Arabs who had not yet taken up arms . . . we have studied this question and the only thing the bedouins care for is money. Turning to Talaat—"you must look into this business."

Last paragraph.—What do the Arabs now want? . . . Supposing the Turkish Government were now to allow them a measure of liberty . . . and give them plenty of money, would this not satisfy them?

Page 35.—Supposing the Government were to look out the relic of these families, bring them back, and treat them well, and give plenty of money to the bedouin, would it not be possible to rope them all in on our side?

Enver.—"We are not a bit afraid of the bedouin, with a couple of divisions we can settle them very quickly. Kuhlmann? No, No! the bedouins are very dangerous. . . . They have been very badly handled in the past."

Page 36.—Said Bey.—"The Arabs would be very well satisfied, because the chief command in Syria and Mesopotamia had been given to Falkenhayn."

Page 44, paragraph 3.—Jemal Pasha—"I have repeatedly written to the Sherif Hussein and his son, Prince Feisal, proposing to make peace, but I have never received any reply." He showed Maurice two large envelopes with his seal, which he said he was going to send to Kerak, to be forwarded to the Sherif. The contents were many letters from good families of Damascus and the Bedouins, telling the Sherif that they did not want him to make war as it was fatal to Islam. Jemal proposed that Maurice should write to the Sherif suggesting he should make peace.

Page 45.—Tahsin Bey discusses how to stop the Arab movement and to make peace with the Sherif. *Re* the question of money, Tahsin said there would be no difficulty about that as the Porte had authorized any necessary expenditure and they had 500,000*l.* in gold to meet these expenses. He also said they had enough corn to supply the bedouins with.

Enver quarreling with Jemal—"You have taken unnecessary measures (with the Arabs) and you see what has happened as a result."

Page 47.—Payment in gold to the bedouin Sheikhs.

Page 48.—General amnesty to all military, political and common law prisoners throughout the whole of Syria, issued by Jemal.

Paragraph 2.—Jemal offers to place 400,000*l.* at Maurice's disposal to raise an Arab army.

Page 49.—Conference between the Valis of Adana, Aleppo, Beirut and the Governor of the Lebanon to do everything to form a volunteer army of Beduin and Druses, and to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the population in Syria.

Page 52.—Offer of a free pardon by Jemal to Shukri Pasha Ayoubi if he will promise to work to get the Arabs on the Turkish side.

Page 53, paragraph 5.—The Vali of Damascus said that when Emir Abdur Kadr el Jezairli was with the Sherif he had talked with Feisal and believed he was ready to make peace. He had written a letter for the Vali the day before to Feisal recommending him to make peace.

Paragraph 7.—There are tolerably regular communications between the Turks and the Sherif *via* Kerak.

Page 62.—Maurice's interview with Feisal, the former reproaches the latter with paying too much money to the tribes. Feisal retorting that he had to give it or be outbid by the Turks.

The *Ex-Khedive*—Returned from Switzerland to Turkey about October, 1917. All reports received show his return was brought about by German influence, and the object of his return was his employment to undermine British influence in Arabia and Egypt.

2,000,000 francs are reported to have been put at his disposal for this object. A report stated his mission was to act as intermediary between the Porte and the Sherif, and he has had a considerable staff placed at his disposal.

*German Arab Bureau*.—A German Arab bureau was formed probably in the latter half of 1917, and the Officer Commanding Arab Section, Yelderem group, was in January, 1918, Hauptmann Andrae.

Falkenhayn paid personal attention to the Euphrates Arabs in the autumn of 1917, when the German political officer Preusser was despatched down the Euphrates. Exaggerated importance was attached to the influence of Ajlami and the German Headquarters do not appear, generally speaking, to have been well informed on the Arab question.

*Niedermayer*.—The well-known German political officer, who was employed in Persia and Afghanistan in 1916, arrived in the neighbourhood of Amman early in 1918. He had been sent for from Mesopotamia by Falkenhayn in the autumn of 1917. He was at Juruf ed Derwish on the 25th February and later was put on the staff of the East Jordan Group.

His assistant, Haase, at Ala Kihissa about the end of March, 1918, according to report would be retained for permanent service in Palestine.

*Turkish propaganda in Hejaz*.—General Wingate's telegram No. 560 A. of the 25th March, 1918, reported that the Turks were spending large sums of money on propaganda among the Hejaz bedouin.

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APPENDIX G.

THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

No account of the Arab movement would be complete without mention of the Zionist movement. This first took concrete shape upon the British occupation of Jerusalem, when a Zionist Commission, under the presidency of Dr. Weizmann was formed and left for Palestine in March, 1918. Its avowed objects were:—

- (a.) To assist the Zionist colonies in Palestine in material and educational matters.
- (b.) To plan future developments.
- (c.) To create harmonious relations with the non-Jewish population of Palestine.

It was at first hoped that both Russian and American Zionists would be represented on the Commission, but this was found to be impracticable, though a French representative was included. On arrival in Palestine the commission took over the work of the previously established Zionist Relief Commission.

Though, not unnaturally, some anxiety was caused among the Syrian and Mohammedan population, by his tactful handling of the situation Dr. Weizmann went far to dispel the atmosphere of distrust due to fear that the Jews intended to expropriate or buy during the war large tracts of land owned by Moslems and others, and gradually to force them from the country. He explained it was his ambition to see Palestine governed by some stable Government like that of Great Britain, that a Jewish Government would be fatal to his plans, and that it was simply his wish to provide a home for the Jews in the Holy Land where they could live their own natural life, sharing equal rights with the other inhabitants. There is no doubt that this frank avowal of Zionist aims produced a considerable revulsion of feeling among the Palestinians, who for the first time came into contact with European Jews of good standing. They had the conviction forced upon them that Zionism had come to stay, that it was far more moderate in its aims than had been anticipated and that if met in a conciliatory spirit they would be more likely to reap substantial benefits in the future.

At the beginning of June Dr. Weizmann visited Sherif Feisal in his camp at Gueira (between Akaba and Maan), where Zionism, as it affected the Arabs, was discussed. Weizmann and Feisal established excellent personal relations, and Feisal expressed his opinion of the necessity for close co-operation between Jews and Arabs, especially at that moment, but stated he himself was unable to express definite opinions on political questions, as he was only his father's agent in such matters. The meeting ended with cordial expressions of mutual sympathy and an invitation from Feisal to renew the meeting after Weizmann's visit to America.

In addition to setting afloat financial schemes for the alleviation of the Jewish colonies the commission took over the administration of the pro-German Hilfsverein schools, laid the foundation stone of a Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, and made considerable progress in the difficult task of uniting the community of poor Jews in Jerusalem. Large schemes were also formulated for the reclamation of land, and irrigation, and a number of young Jews were enlisted for service against the Turks. The importance of this Zionist movement has not been lost sight of by the enemy Powers. No sooner had the British declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, been made, than pressure was put on the German Government to take some action in reply. On the 31st December Talaat Pasha indicated to the correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* that he was prepared to offer German Zionists some form of Chartered Company, local self-government of a very limited character and immigration to Palestine. Negotiations at Berlin by his representative Carasso followed in January, in which various Jewish organisations took part. A new combination of Jewish societies was also formed entitled the *Vereinigung Jüdischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte des Osten* (V.J.O.D.), with the object of defending Jewish interests in Eastern Europe and Palestine. This was originally intended to be an anti-Zionist corporation, but was eventually joined by German Zionists who regarded its programme as representing the minimum only. The large percentage of Jews in the territories in Eastern Europe penetrated by Germany made the German Government anxious to obtain some concessions from the Turks, with whom further negotiations were opened at Constantinople in July, 1918. Prominent Zionists were represented and concessions on the lines laid down by Talaat Pasha were subsequently announced. It is not, however, considered that these will satisfy either German Zionists or Zionists in neutral countries who since the Allied declarations have tended to show more and more sympathy with the Entente. But it cannot be expected that this Zionist movement from the other side of the line will pay the same deference to Arab aspirations and susceptibilities as will that inspired by Dr. Weizmann.

APPENDIX H.

TURKISH INTERPOSITION BETWEEN MAIN BRITISH FORCES AND ARABS.

*Amman Operations at the end of March.*—The enemy anticipated a British move on Amman, but when on the 26th March he received reliable information that British cavalry would enter the town that day, he appears to have been surprised, since orders, which had been issued on and after the 14th March for the concentration of reinforcements,\* had not had time to take effect; with the result that the four Staffs. Army, Group, Corps, and Divisional, at Amman were actually protected during the British attack by only 1,500 rifles, probably comprising the remnants of the 48th Division and the 703rd German Battalion.

\* 126th Regiment, Mule M.I. Regiment, 2nd Squadron 29th Cavalry Regiment, 607th and 608th Machine-gun Companies, 7th Battery 27th Mixed Artillery Regiment, with the Machine-gun Company of this regiment, 2 guns 8th Powerful Mountain Battery of 44th Artillery Regiment, 7th Q.F. Mountain Battery 8th Artillery Regiment. All the above were ordered from the south in addition to those mentioned below from the north and west.

Fuad, commanding the VIIIth Army Corps, when he heard of the British advance, decided to withdraw his troops\* northwards from Kerak, though he was anxious regarding the safety of Kutrani, which he regarded as the key of the Kerak supply area.

Amman was attacked on the 27th, on which date railway communication was cut. Jemal II., Commander of the 4th Army, who had now arrived at Amman and taken over the direction of operations from Ali Riza Pasha (appointed Commander East Jordan Group as lately as the 23rd March), was very anxious about the situation.† He issued orders for certain‡ troops, which had arrived at Kalat ez Zerka from the north, to take up the position behind the Wadi el Hamman and reconnoitre the British, who were west and south of Zerka. He decided to withdraw the Amman Group and to hold the line of the Wadi Zerka, for which purpose he considered at least two strong infantry and two cavalry divisions were necessary.§

On the 29th, the enemy had ascertained from prisoners that the whole Anzac Mounted Division had crossed the Jordan, and that there were in front of Amman at least two British cavalry brigades and probably one infantry brigade of the 60th Division, as well as camelry further to the south. Although Jemal II. reported that violent attacks by the whole Anzac Division, and at least one brigade of the 60th Division, had been repulsed with great loss during the last two days, he was sensible of artillery inferiority, and was certain that British reinforcements were arriving from the rear and that their attacks would be redoubled. He realized the importance of Amman both as regards the tribal situation as far north as Deraa, and as regards the safety of Damascus itself. He still considered an immediate concentration at Zerka was necessary to save "a terrible disaster."

Jemal's report appears to have created an impression in Constantinople, for on the 30th, Enver, who had on the 27th March expressed his anticipation that the end would be attained shortly on the other fronts, and that then the greatest assistance would be given to the Hejaz front, now informed Fakhri Pasha at Medina that the situation at Amman had become critical. He advised him to withdraw, if necessary, the largest possible number of men from his district into Medina, while those who could not reach Medina must resist to the last man. Railway material should also be brought into Medina.

On the 31st March, Fuad reported that the British had commenced to retire in a westerly direction on the night of March 30/31, and that the Turkish pursuit from Amman would commence on the morning of the 31st. Concentration of troops from the south of Jize was to continue as rapidly as possible. The latter order was endorsed by Enver at Constantinople, who considered that all troops that could possibly be spared from the Hejaz Expeditionary Force should be sent northwards, since, if the Turkish troops at Amman were reinforced as soon as possible, the defeat of the British troops there was very probable. On the 1st April, Jemal II. reported that 300 British dead had so far been buried at Amman and a few others still remained to be buried. The Circassians reported that the British had withdrawn in disorder towards Salt and towards Wadi Sir,|| while a convoy of wounded had moved from Wadi Sir to Salihie. Natives had taken a successful part in an advance guard action near Sir, in which 8 Circassians were killed and 30 wounded, while at Kerak about 600 loyal Bedouins had promised to serve with the Turks. On the 30th March, on hearing of the British repulse, Fakhri congratulated Fuad at Amman—"I have kissed the threshold of the Prophet's Tomb, and am praying on behalf of you and your gallant troops. I kiss your eyes."

The subsequent operations in the Es Salt area at the beginning of May gave further proof of the Turkish determination to prevent the British actually joining hands with the Arabs and establishing an united front from the Mediterranean to the Hejaz railway.

#### APPENDIX K.

##### KOWEIT BLOCKADE.

Owing to reports having been received that large quantities of supplies were reaching the enemy from Koweit, the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, in consultation with Sir Percy Cox, proposed in October, 1917, that this port should be blockaded.

In December, 1917, the Viceroy pointed out that the institution of a blockade might alienate the Sheikh and simply divert illicit dhow traffic, and considered it preferable to offer inducements to the sheikh to take adequate measures himself. This course was eventually adopted, and early in 1918 the Sheikh undertook to control the inland caravan traffic. Owing to the strong pressure put upon him by Koweit merchants considerable difficulty was experienced in getting the Sheikh to consent to our superintending his blockade, but after some straight talking he accepted our proposals, and from that moment met all suggestions of our blockade officer without demur. In consequence of his friendly attitude, it was decided that the Sheikh should be given the C.S.I., and that we should forego the repayment of one lakh and 87,000 rupees advanced to his father for the installation of a water plant.

In April, Egypt reported that about 5,000 camels had arrived at Damascus with goods from Koweit, and at the beginning of May, Baghdad reported that it was impossible to enforce a strict blockade locally (although two of His Majesty's ships had been sent), and considered that it should either be enforced by the Government or allowed to fall in a *eyance*.

\* 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3/152nd Regiment, 1/148th? (146th) Regiment, Camel Columns and Veterinary Hp., Q.F. Field Artillery Bn. and Wireless Station.

† Railway communication with Amman was cut off completely, from the south on the 27th and from the north on the 28th March. The Turkish force in Amman, consisting of 1,500 rifles, was heavily outnumbered by the British attacking troops, who were able to be reinforced. Turkish artillery was inferior to the British and ammunition was short. There was only a few days supply of food. It was impossible to retire by night to Zerka, as the line was swarming with Bedouin.

‡ 1 German Infantry Company, 1 Engineer Detachment, Circassian Volunteer Squadron, 1/23rd Regiment, 1/191st Regiment (*en route from Damascus*), 12 officers and 900 men (ready to leave Damascus).

§ 3rd Cavalry Division, Independent (2nd Caucasus) Cavalry Brigade, 48th Division, *plus* 191st Regiment, another Infantry Division.

|| A Wadi in the Belqa, south of Es Salt, which enters the Jordan as the Wadi Nimrin.

¶ The present Sheikh of Koweit, Salem Ibn Mubarak, succeeded Sultan Jabir, his brother, in February, 1917.

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The Government, however, were averse to the dispatch of troops to Koweit to enforce the blockade, and on Sir Percy Cox's arrival in England in the middle of April the question was discussed with him.

In May the Secretary of State informed the Viceroy that the War Office, after consultation with Sir P. Cox, recommended that exports from India to Koweit should be stopped except under special permit. On the 3rd June Baghdad telegraphed that exports from India to other Gulf Ports should also be limited, otherwise the traffic to Koweit would simply be diverted to Bahrain or elsewhere.

On the 4th June Baghdad telegraphed that on the 3rd May the Sheikh had written to the political agent at Koweit asking the Government to overlook the past and promising his hearty co-operation in the future. He agreed to be personally responsible for everything that happened in his country, undertook to eject all enemies of the Government, and to prevent goods reaching the enemy, and asked for the blockade officer to remain. The Sheikh was informed that his offer was receiving the friendly consideration of the Government, and local tension was thus temporarily relaxed.

On the 24th June the political agent at Koweit telegraphed that occupation was the only real solution of the Koweit question, but if it was not feasible the Sheikh's offer of the 3rd May must be accepted at once. Discontent was rife in the town, rich merchants were seriously considering leaving, and the poor were complaining bitterly of the high prices. Consequently, on the 5th July a message from His Majesty's Government was delivered to the Sheikh to the effect that the Government had deeply regretted the events of the last two years, but they welcomed his offer of the 3rd May. If he would show the same friendly spirit towards the Government as his predecessor had shown, the same protection and assistance would be given him, and he, himself, and his heirs would be recognized as the rightful owners of Koweit and its territories. On the other hand, he would be held personally responsible for any hostile act committed by one of his subjects, and his prosperity depended on the preservation of true friendship with the Government. The blockade would not be renewed provided the Sheikh took the necessary measures to prevent supplies from reaching the enemy, but for the future no goods would be allowed to leave India for Koweit by dhow or by steamer without the production of a permit signed by the Political Agent at Koweit, or his duly authorised representative, and the former would also grant permits for goods which might be necessary for lawful trade with the subjects of Ibn Saud.

In an interview with the Political Agent, a few days after the delivery of the message, the Sheikh's attitude seemed entirely changed for the better, and for the first time he evidently desired to take some real action himself.

On the 5th August the Viceroy wired that the Sheikh's pecuniary loss in connection with the blockade was estimated at about 3½ lakhs, and recommended a gift to the Sheikh of 5 lakhs to compensate him for the loss of prestige and as a mark of appreciation. It was proposed to drop the question of the remission of the loan contracted by his father. It was considered that this gift would not only rehabilitate the Sheikh, but should secure his continued co-operation, thus ensuring against the alternative of military occupation.

In the meanwhile, on the 8th August, a report from Mr. Philby, dated from the Saud's camp on the 18th July, was received to the effect that a mixed gang of about 100 Ajman and Aslam Shammar had attacked some adherents of Ibn Saud's between Qatif and Hasa, having previously attacked successfully a caravan belonging to Ibn Saud. The raid originated in Koweit territory, and Mr. Philby considered the Sheikh was responsible for this occurrence which, in conjunction with other events, was causing widespread resentment in Nejd. The Political Agent at Koweit considered that strong action by ourselves was the only means of stopping such raids, and suggested the location of a mobile column and troops at Koweit. Baghdad recommended that half a battalion and a squadron of cavalry should be dispatched to Koweit forthwith. The General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia had no comment to make on the above suggestion, provided he was not called upon to provide the troops required.

On his return to Mesopotamia Sir Percy Cox took the matter in hand, and reported that there were two questions at issue affecting the Sheikh of Koweit—the Blockade and Ajman raids through Koweit territory. As regards the first, Mr. Philby's report of the 8th August was based on a misunderstanding, and since His Majesty's Government's message to the Sheikh of the 5th July, the blockade arrangements had been working satisfactorily. The only exports allowed from Koweit, according to the C.P.O., Mesopotamia, on the 21st August, were:—

- (1.) To Nejd, on permits signed by the blockade officer, on voucher and demand by Ibn Saud's agent.
- (2.) To Iraq tribes on production of permits from their political officer.
- (3.) To tribes of the Sheikh of Koweit, and vouched for by the British agent strictly on the basis of minimum requirements.

As the despatch of troops to Koweit appeared illogical in the face of His Majesty's Government's friendly communication to the Sheikh of the 5th July, and no case of illicit export or raiding having occurred since that date, it was decided to adopt the following measures:—

Occupation of the Safwan wells by a British post. Secondly, occupation of Jaharah (20 miles west of Koweit), and other Koweit watering holes in vicinity by the Sheikh of Koweit's levies. Thirdly, the occupation of the Hafar wells on the Koweit boundary by Ibn Saud.

As regards the Ajman raids. The raid referred to by Mr. Philby occurred before the 5th July. The leading Sheikh of each of the Ajman six sections were to be sent for and informed that as a condition of receiving further support they would be required to enter into fresh written undertakings to refrain from moving across the Anglo-Koweit boundary, and to give approved hostages for due observance of the undertaking.

As regards the Aslam and the other four sections of Shammar in our sphere, their superior Sheikhs would be summoned. While not debarred from entering or camping in Koweit limits, they would be required to give an undertaking to refrain from raiding to east of Baten, which is the western boundary of Koweit territory, and of a line from the head of the Baten to Zobair. Hostages would also be required as in the case of the Ajman. If any section of the above two tribes then in friendly relations with us, directly or through subsidized chiefs, refused to accept these terms, further supplies would be denied and the section would be treated as hostile by Ibn Saud and ourselves.

It was considered that the above conditions would naturally cause the Sheikhs to stipulate that similar conditions should be imposed by Ibn Saud on the tribes at feud with themselves.

APPENDIX L.

ATTITUDE OF THE NORTHERN HEJAZ TRIBES TOWARDS THE HEJAZ REVOLT.

In addition to the Emirates of Shammar and Nejd and the tribes of the Hejaz, there are certain other tribes which must not be omitted from any history of the Arabian Peninsula. The most important of these are the Amarat Anazah, the Rualla Anazah and the Druses.

1. The Amarat Anazah (or Dhana Wail) occupy the south-eastern part of the Anazah country, which ranges to the Euphrates, between Kerbela and Hit. Unlike the Rualla it maintains friendly relations with the great Shammar Group to southward, but there is no sort of alliance between the two. Their ruling house is that of Haddhal, whose present head, Fahd, is long past his prime, and moreover shares his authority with Mohammed Ibn Turki, head of the Mijlad family, who rules the Dahamish section of the tribe.

The revolt in the Hejaz in 1916 was too distant greatly to affect this branch of the Anazah, but Fahd Ibn Haddhal professed sympathy with King Hussein. At the end of 1916 it was reported that correspondence was going on between Ibn Haddhal and the Shaalan family. Nawwaf had urged Fahd to join him in helping the Sherif, but the latter had replied with characteristic caution that he was restrained from taking action, as the Turks might seize his lands, but it would be a different thing if the English offered him their equivalent in the occupied territories. There has always been friction, however, between Ibn Haddhal and Nuri Shaalan over their rival claims to be paramount chieftain over the whole Anazah. In May, 1917, Sherif Feisal had letters from Ibn Haddhal, who said he was only waiting for him to come his way to join forces, and in the same month Baghdad reported that Ibn Haddhal had given definite proof of his friendly sentiments towards the British, and later came into Baghdad and offered the whole-hearted support of himself and his tribes against the Turks.

About September, 1917, two of the greater constituents of the Northern Anazah, the Fedaan and the Siba, rallied towards Ibn Haddhal, but owing to the distance from his country to the Hejaz, Ibn Haddhal has been unable to render active assistance to King Hussein.

2. The Rualla Anazah (or Dhana Muslim) are allied with the Muhallaf and Wuld Ali under the general authority of Nuri Shaalan, paramount chief of the Rualla.

In 1915, Sherif Feisal was in communication with Nuri Shaalan, and at the beginning of the revolt there were many rumours of Nuri Shaalan's descending on the Damascus Vilayet with 15,000 Rualla at his back. As his markets, both east and west, were controlled by the Turks in 1916, it was impossible for Nuri Shaalan to co-operate with the Sherif, but there was complete understanding between them.

A meeting between Nuri, his son Nawwaf, and Fawaz Ibn Faiz, of the Beni Sakhr, took place at Jauf in December, 1916, at which it was decided to break off at once all relations with the Turkish Government, but active co-operation with the Sherif's forces was pronounced impossible until Feisal should have reached El Ula, and thereby opened up a means for getting supplies through to the Rualla.

Audah Abu Tayyi, of the Howeitai, about this time joined Nuri Shaalan, and subscribed to King Hussein's cause and in April, 1917, came with five members of the Shaalan family to see Feisal at Wejil, where arrangements were made for the future.

Audah Abu Tayyi was the leader of the force which captured Akaba in July, 1917, and had some of the Rualla tribe fighting under him, although unaccompanied by any of the Shaalan family.

In June, 1917, Captain Lawrence met Nuri and his son Nawwaf at Azrak, and was the bearer of a request from Nuri that half of the Rualla should be allowed to supply itself from the Mesopotamian market controlled by us.

In September, 1917, Nuri was near Jebel Druse and a strong letter was dispatched by Sherif Feisal to Nawwaf asking him to define clearly his attitude towards the Sherifian movement. Nawwaf had at this time either been or narrowly escaped being imprisoned by the Turks at Damascus, while his father was warned not to fall into a trap the Turks had laid for him under cover of an invitation to Damascus.

In October, 1917, one of Nuri's nephews, Trad, visited Sherif Abdullah in the Hejaz, and in November, 1917, Nuri sent his brother Mohammed and also his nephews Khalid Ibn Sattam and Ferhan Ibn Fahd to Mecca on a mission to King Hussein.

During the early part of 1918 the Shaalan family, although maintaining their friendly attitude towards the Arab movement, occupied themselves with furthering the contraband traffic from Koweit to Damascus. Nawwaf at Jauf levying toll on the caravans which passed through his capital, and taking his share of the petroleum carried by these caravans, while his adherents acted as escort from Jauf northwards.

In June (?) Nawwaf was, at Sherif Feisal's instance, dispatched to Ziza, where he placed himself with a small armed following at the disposal of the Turks, in order to deceive them regarding his intentions. In July, however, as the result of a rupture, the cause of which is at present unknown, Nawwaf left Ziza and rejoined his father at Hazim near Azrak, whilst Nuri apparently definitely renounced his allegiance to the Turks by an offer of active co-operation with Feisal. He came into Feisal's headquarters and from there dispatched a telegram to King Hussein at Mecca avowing his allegiance.

This declaration is considered premature as it had been Feisal's policy to postpone an open expression of their loyalty by the Rualla, in order to add surprise to the value of their co-operation when the time came to employ them for the extension of the Arab movement to the Hauran, and, secondly, to transfer from himself to the Turks the heavy burden of their maintenance in the meantime.

3. *The Druses.*—In 1916, the attitude of the Druses towards the Sherif's revolt was one of apathy. The Druses have always kept apart from their neighbours, and although their sympathies were probably with the Sherif, the prompt action of Jemal I. in taking child hostages, making many arrests and reinforcing Deraa, was sufficient to intimidate the Druses from taking any action. About June, 1917, Jemal I. seems to have made an effort to win them over. Their chiefs were entertained for two months at Damascus, being fêted and made much of. In August, 1917, the Druses were reported to have never been in such a flourishing state. They had sold their crops at high prices for hard cash, and even when they had been requisitioned by the Turkish Government, had managed to retain 60 per cent. As long as the good treatment lasted the Druses were not going to revolt but would only rise when they felt they could do so without fear of retaliation.

According to information from various sources the enemy continually feared a rising of the Druses in conjunction with the Arab movement, and in June, 1918, Colonel Lawrence received a letter, written in English, from one of the Atrash family, the fighting Druse Sheikis of Salkhad in the Hauran, containing expressions of friendship and loyalty, while on the 31st August the enemy anticipated an attack by the Rualla and Druses in the neighbourhood of Deraa.



APPENDIX M.

FAKHRI PASHA AT MEDINA.

The following summary of messages shows a consistent attitude of despondency on the part of Fakhri Pasha commanding at Medina since the autumn of 1917. It is probable that he has sometimes exaggerated his troubles, as the vitality of his garrison has proved, but it is obvious that he can have little hope of being relieved in the absence of some drastic change in the situation.

1. On the 4th October, 1917, Fakhri informed the General Officer Commanding Syria and Western Arabia that his wheat and food supplies were all but exhausted. Applications to the lines of communication had not been replied to and he stated he could not rely on the Hejaz railway. Owing to the approach of winter he considered his situation serious, and unless considerable quantities of stores were sent him forthwith would become dangerous.

In reply he was told he was responsible for the fuel in his area and in case of necessity authorised to demolish the buildings in Medina, with the exception of the Holy buildings. On the 26th October Fakhri reported he had only one month's food left in Medina, and that the date crop, on which his hopes for supplies were based, had been destroyed by a storm.

2. About the same time Fakhri despatched a message to the Line Commissaire General at Damascus pointing out how the arrangements for feeding Medina had broken down; and that the reserve of bread at Medina finished on the 29th October. He despaired of ever receiving enough supplies at Medina, and put the whole moral responsibility for the fall of Medina (if it did fall) on the lines of communication and the Line Commissaire General.

3. About the beginning of November Fakhri pointed out to the Turkish Higher Command the futility of sending him anything by rail and declared himself besieged.

4. On the 10th November Jemal I. informed Fakhri of the Turkish defeat on the Gaza—Bir Saba line and that in the event of the fall of Jerusalem it was intended to evacuate the Hejaz Expeditionary Force from Medina. On the 11th a further message was sent him asking how long he could hold out should the Medina force be abandoned. Fakhri replied somewhat acridly, asking whether the decision for evacuating Medina rested with him or the Khalif.

5. At this time there was a good deal of bitterness in the correspondence between Fakhri and Jemal I. About the end of October Fakhri informed Jemal that it was no good sending food to Medina unless the Arabs were kept off the line; Jemal later replied that Fakhri was responsible for this, to which Fakhri replied bitterly that if he had sufficient force left to keep the line clear he would not have sent his original message.

6. About the middle of November Fakhri was informed that the decision had been taken to evacuate the Hejaz Expeditionary Force with the exception of a small garrison in Medina, and shortly afterwards he was informed of the programme for carrying out the evacuation.

7. In a message dated the 25th November Fakhri protested his inability to comply with orders issued from Damascus for the withdrawal of his mounted troops. He prayed that Jemal I. "will not deprive him of his means of defence, as he has already deprived him of his power to take the offensive, and so let the Medina garrison be trampled under the feet of the enemy."

8. In the middle of December, 1917, the heavy troop movements from Damascus to Deraa dislocated the Hejaz programme. On the 20th December Colonel Pianesteil, director of railways, arrived at Medina. Fakhri was deeply impressed with the sympathetic hearing he received from his guest, who "unlike the Turks and Moslems, listened to my worries with great attention." Damascus resented this message, and replied that it was due to the "Turks and Moslems" that Pianesteil was sent to Medina "for the sole purpose of enquiring into the needs of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force in his capacity as highest authority in matters of railway transport."

9. In January, 1918, according to information obtained from the French Mission in the Hejaz, peace overtures were initiated by the General Officer Commanding 2nd Composite Force, and addressed to Sherif Feisal. The Turkish Commander (Atif Bey) was stated to have proposed a general evacuation of the whole of Arabia, provided the Arabs guaranteed entire freedom from molestation during evacuation. This report was received with all reserve. Atif Bey, the General Officer Commanding 2nd Composite Force, subsequently was replaced at his own request.

10. At the end of January, 1918, it was ascertained that it had been intended to combine offensive action by the Hejaz Expeditionary Force with a movement northward on Taif and Mecca of the 21st Asir Division, but this was indefinitely postponed.

11. In the middle of February, 1918, railhead was established at Juruf ed Derwish (north of Maan) and Fakhri appealed to his lines of communication officers to despatch goods consigned to Medina in spite of orders from the Higher Command to the contrary.

12. On the 15th March, Fakhri estimated that 3,660 tons of food would be necessary to maintain for one year the garrison which it was proposed to leave in Medina if and when the evacuation of the Hejaz took place.

13. On the 13th April, the Hejaz Expeditionary Force was ordered to take over the districts of the 1st and 2nd Composite Forces, who were ordered north, but Fakhri replied that such a move would be the equivalent of presenting the Hejaz Railway to the Arabs.

14. On the 3rd May, Fakhri appeared to fully realise the grave situation in which the 2nd Composite Force and the Hejaz Expeditionary Force had been placed owing to the cutting of the railway in the Maan area. He averred the position of Medina and Tebuk was desperate, and resented the way he had been treated by his superiors to whom he had again and again appealed for reinforcements.

15. On the 6th May, Fakhri was increasingly pessimistic concerning his situation. He reported that his reserve of wheat and barley, were almost exhausted, and that he had no troops to spare for the repair of the damaged line. He stated he had clearly explained the position and the responsibility for any future disaster must now lie with the IVth Army authorities.

16. On the 18th May, Fakhri was informed by Enver Pasha that the Hejaz Expeditionary Force was placed under Yelderem and ordered to hold Medina at all costs, while Yelderem were responsible for the repair and protection of the Hejaz Railway as well as the provisioning of Medina.

17. At the beginning of June, Fakhri reported that the supplies of the 2nd Composite Force and the Hejaz Expeditionary Force would be exhausted at the end of June and July respectively, while the Medina date crop (known to be about 2,000,000 kilos) would not be available until September.

18. At the beginning of July, when reporting the evacuation of Mudowere to Damascus, Fakhri explained that, in his opinion, the low morale of the troops, which could alone account for such infamous conduct, was due primarily to the non-arrival of reinforcements and to the failure of the Turkish Higher Command to reopen railway communication between the Hejaz Expeditionary Force and the north.

19. About the same date, Fakhri reported that it was his opinion that the Medina force might just hold out to the beginning of September (new date harvest), but he feared that the 2nd Composite Force would be unable to do so. He complained bitterly of the fact that no attempt had yet been made to reopen his communications with the north, and could only look forward to the future with the gravest anxiety.

20. At the middle of July, Fakhri was ordered to take over with his mounted troops the Maan—Mudowere section of the railway, but refused on the grounds that no further reduction could be made with safety in the Medina garrison where his mounted troops were his only mobile reserve; that until the railway was repaired mobile troops could not be maintained in the Maan—Mudowere area where, was neither water nor grazing, and, lastly, that the animals of these troops were earmarked as Medina's last reserve of food.

21. On the 17th July, Fakhri made a strong appeal to Liman von Sanders, General Officer Commanding, Yelderem, in the course of which he asked that the 11th Army Corps should be temporarily put under his command, and that the Damascus line of communication railway transport department and the Hejaz railway administration should be placed definitely and directly under his orders. He considered that only by the prompt adoption of these measures could the present very critical situation be saved, and was of the opinion that his force had been disgracefully neglected.

22. At the beginning of August, Fakhri reported that the Hejaz Expeditionary Force were so short of fuel that even if the railway was repaired it was doubtful if trains would get through to Medina.

23. On the 10th August, Fakhri despatched a message of farewell, as in view of the fall of Mudowere (captured by two companies Imperial Camel Corps on the 8th August), he considered Medina doomed.

24. On the 11th August, the purchasing officer of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force in Damascus received orders (from Fakhri ?) to close his accounts and make no further purchases.

On the same day, Fakhri was very despondent of the situation of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and considered disaster was pending. This he attributed to shortage of fuel, slowness in repairing the railway north of Maan, lack of decision regarding the Maan—Mudowere section, the fact that Yelderem had omitted to send reinforcements and had not placed the 11th Army Corps under his orders, lack of barley, wheat and money, and his inability to reinforce any of his garrisons to the north owing to shortage of troops in Medina.

He considered that in the next few months no improvement was likely. The only mobile troops at his disposal were a camel mounted regiment and machine-gun company (310 combatants and 292 camels) and a mule mounted regiment and machine-gun company (195 combatants, 29 mules, 78 camels). These could not be spared for duty north of Tebuk, as they were the only reserve left for the Medina area. He preferred to surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Arabs at Medina.

The above message was apparently despatched to Enver Pasha, who replied sharing Fakhri's views on the difficulty of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force undertaking active operations, and considered that the onus of responsibility of reopening the railway was on Yelderem, and not the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and owing to the comparative calm on the Palestine front this should not be impossible.

GENERAL STAFF,  
31st August, 1918.

#### APPENDIX N.

##### ENEMY CASUALTIES.

The following figures of enemy casualties since the outbreak of the revolt up to the end of August, 1918, are taken from various sources, but mainly based on Arab claims:—

Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.		Guns.	Machine guns.
		Officers.	Rank and file.		
4,697	871	230	8,919	50	59

With reference to the number of prisoners captured, General Wingate reported that since the outbreak of the revolt to the end of July, 1918, 5,827 prisoners of war had been sent from the Hejaz for internment in Egypt.

The Arabs claim the following destruction to the railway line up to the end of August:—

Engines.	Trucks.	Rails.	Bridges and culverts.
15	29 (?)	28,602	207

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APPENDIX O.  
TURKISH TROOPS.

	Date	Composition.	Strengths.	Remarks.
Maan force, later 1st Composite Force (now Maan Command).	2.4.17	2/161st Regt. ... ..	...	
	2.6.17	3/130th (as above)... ..	...	Formed at Maan from different details, nucleus came from Medina.
	26.6.17	2/161st Regt. ... .. 1, 2/129th Regt., from S. of Medina, 1 bn. formed into 2 bns. on arrival at Maan.	...	
	30.6.17	3/130th ... ..	...	Between Maan and Akaba, afterwards absorbed.
		Dets. of Nizamie ... ..	...	2 Bns. 2nd and 4th/178th Regt. arrived Maan. 4/178th destroyed at Akaba.
	19.7.17	As above ... ..	...	
		3/130th ... ..	...	Total, 5,000 men.
		2/161st ... ..	...	Although all had not arrived by this date, was the eventual concentration at Maan after the fall of Akaba.
		2, 4/178th ... ..	...	Under command of Jemal II. (who left for Amman on 2.9.17).
		1, 2, 3/146th Regt....	...	
		Mule M.I. Bn. ... ..	...	
	20.8.17	7th Cavalry Regt. ... ..	...	Called 1st Composite Force. Jemal III. to command (arrived 21.9.17) under IVth Army H.C. area from Maan—North.
		2/29th Cavalry Sqdn. ... ..	...	4/178th absorbed into 3/130th and 2/161st Regts.
	7.9.17	As above ... ..	...	Reinforced by about 8 guns Strength — Officers, 150 ; rank and file, 5,300 ; m.gs., 20 ; animals, 1,750.
	21.9.17	1, 2, 3/146th Regt....	...	Total—Rifles, 3,500 ; sabres, 100 ; guns, 16 ; m.gs., 20 (about).
2/161st Regt. ... ..		...	7th Cavalry Regt. arrived 25.9.17.	
1/130th Regt. ... ..		...		
3/178th Regt. ... ..		...		
Mule M.I. ... ..		...		
29.10.17	2/29th Cavalry Sqdn. ... ..	...		
	1, 2, 3/146th Regt....	...	Total—Rations, 7,561 ; rifles, 4,024 ; horses, 2,130 ; camels, 361 ; guns, 18 ; m.gs., 34.	
	2/161st Regt. ... ..	...		
	1/130th Regt. ... ..	...		
	3/178th Regt. ... ..	...		
	7th Cavalry Regt. ... ..	...		
8.1.18	Mule M.I. ... ..	...		
	2/29th Cavalry Sqdn. ... ..	...		
8.1.18	As above (less 7th Cavalry Regt. and 2/29th Cavalry Sqdn.) ... ..	Strength of 6 inty. bns. 3,396 men with 625 animals.	The 7th Cavalry Regt. and 2/29th Cavalry Sqdn. had gone north. Total—Rations, 7,819 ; rifles, 4,733 ; horses, 2,099 ; camels, 320 ; oxen, 178 ; guns, 13 ; m.gs., 34 ; aeroplanes, 2.	
1.3.18	As above ... ..	...	1st Composite force responsible up to Juruf ed Derwish. Mule M.I. left for Es Salt area about this time.	

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	Date.	Composition.	Strengths.	Remarks.
Maan force, later 1st Composite Force (now Maan Command)— <i>continued.</i>	25.3.18	As above ... ..	...	1/146th left Maan for Amman, but 4/146th appears to have been formed from details.
	26.3.18	2, 3, 4/146th Regt.... 2/161st Regt. ... .. 1/130th Regt. ... .. 3/178th Regt. ... ..	...	Total — Rations, 4,322; animals, 899.
	6.5.18	As above ... ..	...	Total—Rations, 3,458; rifles, 1,775.
	18.5.18	As above ... ..	...	Total—Officers, 194; rank and file, 4,086; animals, 427.
	30.5.18	As above ... ..	...	Total—Officers, 182; rank and file, 3,651; animals, 651.
	12.6.18	... ..	...	2/75th Regt. arrived Kutrani area, followed by 3/75th Regt., 2/73rd Regt., 3/73rd Regt. and 1 Bn. 150th Regt.
	2.7.18	As above, plus 2/75th Regt.	275 men ...	2/75th Regt. arrived Maan. The 2/161st, 1/130th and 3/178th Regts. appear to have been amalgamated into the 146th Regt. This force becomes Maan district command.
	10.8.18	As above, plus 1/12th Regt.	7 officers, 280 rank and file.	Arrived Maan area.
	10.8.18	As above ... ..	...	Preparations to receive further 3,000 men and 500 animals in Maan area. This force to consist of 1/75th, 2/75th (?), 2/73rd, 3/73rd and Vol. Mule Mtd. Regt.
	30.8.18	... ..	...	Total would appear to consist of 1/12th, 2/73rd, 3/73rd, 1/75th, 2/75th, 2, 3, 4/146th, or about 7,000 rations, 11 guns, 18 m.gs.
Composite or Connecting Force (later 2nd Composite Force).	? .1.17	... ..	5,000	Commanded by Jemal III. H.Q. at Medain Saleh. Area, Tebuk—Hadiyah.
	? .4.17	1 regt. cavalry ... .. 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. ... .. 4/31st Regt.* ... .. 2/129th Regt.* ... .. 3 aeroplanes ... .. 2-3 W/T sections ... ..	5,000 men 900 animals 10 guns	Probably Circassians.  * These regiments not definitely located but their presence probable.
	26.6.17	1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. ... .. 1 gendarmerie bn. ... .. 1 sqdn. Circassian Cavalry ... .. 1 sqdn. Kurdish Cavalry ... .. 1 coy. camel corps ... .. Garrison of Maan ... ..	...	See under Maan force.
	20.8.17	... ..	...	Basri Pasha to command 2nd Composite Force with H.Q. at Tebuk. Under IVth Army. Area, Maan—Muadhdam.

(6144-19)

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	Date.	Composition.	Strengths.	Remarks.
Composite or Connecting Force (later 2nd Composite Force)—continued.	30.9.17	2/178th ... .. Gendarmerie bn. ... ..	406 rifles 684 rifles (?)	Strength — Rations, 2,310 ; animals, 204; guns, 12 ; m.gs., 11.
	29.10.17	2/152nd ... ..	293 rations, 197 rifles.	Total — Rations, 2,574 ; horses, 98 ; camels, 27 ; rifles, 1,722 ; guns, 11 ; m.gs., 11.
		2/178th ... ..	630 rations, 496 rifles.	
		Gendarmerie bn. ... ..	603 rations, 491 rifles.	
	28.11.17	As above ... ..	...	Total — Rations, 2,592 ; rifles, 1,525 ; horses, 127.
	3.12.17	... ..	...	Basri Pasha relieved by Atif Bey, Governor of Damascus.
	25.1.18	As above ... ..	...	Total — Rations, 2,191 ; combs., 1,223 ; horses, 70 ; camels, 24 ; m.gs., 16 ; guns, 16.
	27.2.18	2/152nd ... ..	346 rations, 191 rifles.	Total — Rations, 2,265 ; animals, 130.
		2/178th ... ..	475 rations, 286 rifles.	
		Gendarmerie bn. ... ..	518 rations, 374 rifles.	
	20.3.18	As above ... ..	...	Total — Rations, 2,263 ; animals, 72.
	27.3.18	... ..	...	Atif Bey with the 2/152nd Regt. and 2 guns left Tebuk for the North.
	6.4.18	... ..	...	H.E.F. absorb 2nd Com- posite Force.
	13.4.18	2/178th Regt. ... ..	429 rations, 274 rifles.	Total — Rations, 1,599 ; combs., 982 (Infy.) ; m.gs., 12 ; guns, 13.
Gendarmerie bn. ... ..		520 rations, 365 rifles.		
4.5.18	... ..	...	Total — Rations, 1,681 ; animals, 26.	
23.5.18	... ..	...	Total would appear to consist of 2/178th and a gendarmerie bn. or about 1,600 rations (but should be included in H.E.F.).	
30.8.18	... ..	...		
Medina (H.E.F.) ...	9.6.16	128th Regt. ... ..	...	22nd Division. Later used to bring rein- forcing battalions up to strength and entirely broken up in the process.
		129th Regt. ... ..	...	
		130th Regt. ... ..	...	
		Yemen Mofraza ... ..	?	
		Mohafiz Alai ... ..	...	
	Train troops ... ..	...		
	?-7.16	Fortress gunners ... ..	...	
	1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. ... ..	?	Sent down on the arrival of the news of Sherif's revolt and destruction of 22nd Division. 58th Division formed.	
	1, 2, 3/55th Regt. ... ..	...		
	2 bns., 130th Regt. ... ..	...		

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	Date.	Composition.	Strengths.	Remarks.
Medina (H.E.F.)— Medina area ...	30.11.16	4/131st Regt. (?) ... 1/129th Regt. ... Regt., Camel Corps... 79th M.G. Coy. (4 guns) ... Fortress Artillery ... 3 coys., Engineers ...	600 (Turks) 700 (80 per cent. Turks). 500 (Turks) ... 300 (Turks)	Gendarmerie battalion from Aleppo. Nominal battalion of regi- mental details and drafts, afterwards used to bring 55th Regt. up to strength and one tabur went to Maan in May, 1917. Personnel probably Arab. From 47th, 48th, 49th Divisional Engineers.
Bir Derwish ...	...	1, 2, 3/55th Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. ... 3/130th Regt. ... 2 coys., Mule M.I. ... Regt., Camel Corps ... 1 batt ry, Camel Mtn. Arty. Field-Gun Batteries ... Aeroplane Section ...	2,400 (Turks) 2,400 (Turks) (Arabs) (Turks) ... ... ?	Camel Transport Bn. 22nd Artillery Regt. 3 machines—2 disabled, 1 serviceable.
Bir Raha ...	...	1, 2/130th Regt. ... Camel Corps ... Coy., Mule M.I. ... 3 mountain guns ... 2 field guns ... W./T. Section ...	700 (70 per cent. Turks). 300 ... ... ...	Shammar Arabs.
L. of C. units— Railway ...	...	Mohafiz Alai ... Regt., Camel Corps ...	300 ..	H.Q., Bneir; with 1 coy. and 2 guns; 1 coy. at Abu Naim; 1 coy. at Bowat (2 guns). Possibly 3 battalions, 162nd Regt. Arabs.
El Ula ...	...	1 bn., Turks ... Ageyl Camel Corps ...	... ...	...
Wejh ...	...	1 Gend. Bn....	800 (Turks)	Total—10,300 Infantry. 3,000 Camelry, &c. Note.—Mounted troops probably over estimated. Arrived about January, 1917.
H.E.F. area ...	?-1.17 ?-4.17	3/21st Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/55th Regt. ... 3/130th Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. ... 3/21st Regt. ... 3 coys., Engineers ... 20 machine guns ... 5—9 batteries, F.A. or M.A. 1—2 W./T. stations ... 25 aeroplanes ...	... ... ... ... 6,000 (? rifles) 20 machine guns 36 guns ...	...
	26.6.17	1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/55th Regt. ... 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. ... 3/130th Regt. ... 1/178th Regt. ... 3/21st Regt. ... Mule M.I. ... Camel Regt. ... 12 m.gs. 22 guns	... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...	Dividing point between Composite Force near Hadiyah. Total, 9,000 men, 5,000 rifles.
	1.7.18	...	...	From Maan to Medina 18 regular bns.— 3 bns. 42nd Regt. 4 (?) bns. 55th Regt. 2 (?) bns. 130th Regt. 1 bn. 161st Regt. 3 bns. 162nd Regt. 1 bn. 21st Regt. 2 bns. 129th Regt. 2 bns. 128th Regt. (?)

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
Date.	Composition.	Strengths.	Remarks.
19.7.17	...	...	Boundary between H.E.F. and Composite Force to be Akhdar. Reinforced by 12 guns.
16.8.17	...	...	Ibn Rashid with 1 000 men arrived Medain Saleh.
20.8.17	1, 2, 3/162nd } 3/21st ... } 58th Div. * 1/178th ... }	2,710	H.E.F. area divided as follows:— Muadhham—Hadiyah, 58th Division, O.C. Ali Nejb. Fakhri Pasha, O.C. Hef.
30.9.17	...	...	H.Q., 58th Division, transferred to Medain Saleh.
7.10.17	...	...	H.E.F. strength:—Rations, 13,000; horses, 1,714; camels, 1,599.
16.11.17	...	...	Strength, 14,000, 3,515 animals, 41 m.gs., 59 guns.
15.1.18	...	...	Total—Rations, 11,370; rifles, 5,119; horses, 1,778; camels, 1,446; oxen, 18; guns, 53; m.gs., 42.
27.2.18	1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. } Medina 1, 2, 3/55th Regt. } area.* 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. } El Ula 3/21st Regt. ... } area.* 1/178th Regt. ... }	3,214 rations 2,482 rifles 1,243 rations 1,061 rifles	Total (exclusive of L. of C. posts and supply depôts):—Rations, 10,159; rifles, 4,723; horses, 1,116; camels, 949; oxen, 18; guns, 58; m.gs., 41. Total—Rations, 2,019.
15.3.18	El Ula area ... 5 bns. as above ...	1,172 rations 893 rifles	Total—Rations, 11,808; rifles, 4,414.
20.3.18	11 bns. as above ...	...	Total—Rations, 11,808; rifles, 4,414.
13.4.18	1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. } Medina 1, 2, 3/55th Regt. } area.* 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. } El Ula 3/21st Regt. ... } area.* 1/178th Regt. ... }	2,914 rations 2,393 rifles 1,111 rations 883 rifles	6.4.18, H.E.F. absorbs 2nd Composite Force.
28.5.18	As above ...	...	Total rations:—Officers, 478; rank and file, 9,934; horses, 1,399; camels, 917 (less force at Tebuk).
9.7.18	...	...	Total—Animal strength: horses, 215; mules, 740; donkeys, 139; camels, 973.
30.8.18	1, 2, 3/42nd Regt. } Medina* 1, 2, 3/55th Regt. } 1, 2, 3/162nd Regt. } El Ula* 3/21st Regt. ... } 1/178th Regt. ... } Tebuk. Gendarmerie Bn. ... }	...	Total would appear to be:—12,000 rations†; guns, 71; m.gs., 53.

\* It would appear that troops of the H.E.F., north of Medina and south of the Tebuk area, are in the 53th Divisional area.

† For some time past the death rate from sickness has been about 20 per week, and the average number of men in hospital, 1,500.



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"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [خلفي] (٣٢/٣٢)

