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"(تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق))"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/MIL/17/15/42

١٩٢٢ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

٢٠٠ صفحة، ١٨ سم

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل


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
حول هذا السجل

أعد هذا المجلد لصالح هيئة الأركان العامة للقوات البريطانية في العراق وتم نشره في سنة ١٩٢٢. وهو يغطي منطقة شمال الجزيرة في العراق، إحدى المناطق العشر التي تغطيها المجلدات التي صدرت في السلسلة ذاتها. تغطي فصول الكتاب المختلفة عدة جوانب تخص شمال الجزيرة، وهي التاريخ، الجغرافيا، المناخ، الموارد الطبيعية، الإثنوغرافيا، لقبائل والشخصيات الهامة. يغطي المجلد أيضاً مجالات الاتصالات والبنية التحتية الاستراتيجية والتكتيكية للمنطقة. أعد المحتوى بغرض تزويد القوات العسكرية العاملة في العراق في ذلك الوقت بمعلومات الاستخبارات العسكرية الأساسية.


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
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
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
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MILITARY REPORT
ON
MESOPOTAMIA
(IRAQ)


Area 1 (NORTHERN JAZIRAH).
(Provisional)

Compiled by
THE GENERAL STAFF,
BRITISH FORCES IN IRAQ.

(1st Edition, 1922)

[A.02552-1]

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [ظ ٣] (٢٢٦/١١)



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
MILITARY REPORT ON MESOPOTAMIA (IRAQ).

- Area 1. Northern Jazirah .. *Published.*
Area 2. Euphrates Raqqah to Fallujah (both inclusive).
In Press.
Area 3. Tigris.. Mosul (inclusive) to Baghdad (exclusive).
Under preparation.
Area 4. Euphrates Fallujah (exclusive) to Darraji (inclusive).
Under preparation.
Area 5. Tigris.. Baghdad to Kut al Amarah (both inclu-
sive) with Lower Diyalah and Upper
Shatt al Hai. *Under preparation.*
Area 6. Euphrates Darraji to Qurnah and Gurmat Ali (all
exclusive) and Shatt al Hai downstream
of Kut al Hai (exclusive) with Shatt
al Arab right bank downstream of the
Persian frontier. *In Press.*
Area 7. Tigris.. Kut al Amarah (exclusive) to Qurnah
(inclusive) with Shatt al Arab. Qurnah
to the Persian frontier. *In Press.*
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Area 9. Central Kurdistan .. *Published.*
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
Key Map of Areas in pocket.

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥ظ] (٢٢٦/١٥)

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
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CHAPTER I.

HISTORY.

General.—The Northern Jazirah, a vast rolling plain broken by the Jabal Sinjar and Jabal Abd al Aziz hills, has never formed a complete political unit, except, perhaps, for a short period in the third century A.D., when it was subject to the shepherd Kings of Hatra. Since time immemorial it has constituted a debatable frontier territory, held with difficulty by one imperial power after another, and, as often as not, independent of these and given over to the faction and strife of lawless tribes. As a consequence, its individual and particular history is almost inseparable from that of the powers to which at various times it has belonged, although the basic matter for a regional history does exist in the folk-lore and legends of the tribes that now comprise its chief population. Generally it is possible to trace the chief events relative to its past in the old Babylonian records, the works of mediæval Arab historians, and from recent Turkish and British administration reports. Militarily, the important features in the history of Northern Jazirah are the various expeditions carried out by Turks and British against recalcitrant tribes. In order, however, to indicate what forces have produced the composition of the present inhabitants, a brief review of the main historical events that have occurred in or around Northern Jazirah is necessary.

Ancient.—The first recorded inhabitants of Northern Jazirah were descendants of a Turanian stock—the Sumerians—who appear to have been sufficiently civilized to develop the art of writing and an extensive commercial system. Successive Semitic invasions from Arabia eliminated or absorbed the Sumerian elements, and gave rise to the powers of Assyria and Babylon, which in time fell before the irruption of Aryan Persians under Cyrus in the sixth century B.C. With the fall of the Greek domination, established by Alexander the Great after his defeat of the Persians, Northern Jazirah became the cockpit of eastern and western civilizations, and passed on the changing tide of fortune into the power of Roman, Parthian, Sassanian and, for a brief while, of

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the meteoric kingdom of Palmyra. In A.D. 633 the devotees of Islam swung north from the barren steppes of Arabia and, except in a few secluded Christian communities, imposed upon the people of Northern Jazirah the religion of Muhammad, and gave its population the predominant Arab character which exists at the present day. The interesting features of the Arab invasion are that its effects have been permanent, and that, while the first three Semitic irruptions were immigrations of sedentary peoples, the last was nomadic herdsmen, hardened by hunger, unamenable to settled government and opposed to political restraint. The effects of the latter Seljuk invasion of the Middle Ages were transitory, and the only evidence of their conquests in these regions is a small Turcoman population in Tel Afar, now hardly to be differentiated from the neighbouring Arab tribes. In 1534 the district became part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Turks, until 1914, were never able to exercise more than a nominal control over the nomad tribes.

Modern.—It is advisable to consider under this heading events of a more parochial nature, and especially those which have necessitated military intervention. During the last three hundred years the event most fraught with political and military consequences was the arrival of the Shammar Jarba in the Jazirah. About the middle of the seventeenth century this great offshoot of the Shammar of Jabal Shammar began to migrate north from Najd into the Syrian desert, and, after a brief struggle, defeated the Muwali, then the most powerful tribe in those regions, and drove them northwards towards Aleppo. In the nineteenth century the Anizah, who had followed their hereditary enemies, the Shammar, from Arabia, forced them after a protracted struggle into the Jazirah, which, except for the Jabal Sinjar, they gradually occupied by ousting the Jubur, Baggarah, Hadidiyin, and lesser tribes from their habitats. Until the present time, the Jazirah has practically been the habitat of nomad tribes, engaged in bitter internecine strife and allowing the settled villages to cultivate their lands only on sufferance. The chief thorn in the side of the Turks has been the Shammar Jarba. Traditional rebels against the Ottoman government, the Shammar slipped between the fingers of the Mutassarif of Dair al Zor and the Wali of Mosul, paying taxes to neither. They exacted dues from caravans on all roads in the Northern Jazirah and frequently held up traffic on both

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road and river. In 1911 the cup of their iniquities having overflowed, Nizam Pasha, then Wali of Baghdad, sent an expedition against them under his chief of staff, Hasan Riza Beg. The latter conducted his campaign with great skill; the Shammar came to heel at Hatra without resistance; camel and sheep dues, many years in arrears, were collected, and the tribe's right to tribute definitely laid down. Al Asi, eldest son of Farhan, was recognized as paramount Shaikh and made responsible to the government for the behaviour of the tribe. The Shammar, while continuing their old ways of robbery and pillage, avoided open conflict with the Turkish troops till 1914, chiefly through the astute diplomacy of Asi.

There were two other centres of contra-government disaffection in Northern Jazirah—in the Jabal Sinjar, where the Yezidis lived in periodic but bitter rebellion, and round Veranshehr, where Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli engaged in sporadic attempts to further his ambitions of autonomy. The Yezidis, about whose origin there is a certain mystery but who are probably relics of a mediaeval Kurdish overflow, inhabit the Jabal Sinjar, which forms its dominant position astride the Dair al Zor-Mosul and Nisibin-Mosul routes, and is of primary strategic importance. Ardent followers of a religion which embraces elements of Islamism, the old dualistic religion of Persia, Christianity and paganism, they are bitter enemies of all Moslems, who reciprocate the hatred. Under Hammu Shiru, their chief, they carried out continual raids on their Moslem neighbours, and the Turks were forced on several occasions to send military expeditions against them. These expeditions were carried out with the usual ferocity and callous indifference of the Turks, and have engendered among the Yezidis a pitiless hatred of the Ottoman race and institutions. The Yezidis of the mountains were never thoroughly subdued, and during the war they not only manifested pro-British sympathies, but raided Turkish convoys and posts.

In the north of Northern Jazirah the Kurds, who have never been thoroughly tractable to the Ottoman yoke, were, in the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid, brought under partial control by the establishment of Hamidieh cavalry. The most important Kurdish chief, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli, was animated, however, by grandiose ideas of an independent Kurdistan governed by himself.

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After various vicissitudes, now victorious, now cast into a Turkish prison, he succeeded in establishing a tribal domain, subject practically only in name to the Turkish government.

During the war, despite a violently-preached Jihad, the tribal inhabitants of Northern Jazirah displayed little enthusiasm for the cause of Turkey. In some cases their sympathies were alienated by the wholesale appropriation of crops and animals, nor are they likely to forgive the starvation and misery caused by the activities of German agents, who, with the concurrence of the Turks, commandeered what food supplies were left by their allies and sent them to Germany.

With the occupation of Mosul, the British sphere of influence was extended to embrace a large part of Northern Jazirah. In the first few months of our occupation, the prestige derived from our victories over the Turks and the presence of large armed forces in Mosul district restrained the tribes from their customary lawlessness and predatory habits. The fall of Dair al Zor, however, in December, 1919, and our seeming military weakness and loss of prestige, consequent on abortive efforts to repress tribes on the Upper Euphrates, stirred to life the temporarily quiescent predilections of the Jazirah tribes for robbery and raid. In May, 1920, several convoys on the Mosul-Shergat lines of communication were looted and a train was derailed between Baiji and Shergat. In the same month the Arab authorities in Dair al Zor established a military post at Tel Fadgham on the Khabur River and a virulent pan-Arab propaganda was disseminated in the Jazirah. At the beginning of June Jamil Beg, with a Sharifian force of about 100 men, advanced on Tel Afar where the local gendarmerie, suborned from their loyalty by a disaffected officer, murdered the British Political authorities and handed the town over to Jamil Beg. The intention of the latter was to raise the local tribes and drive the British forces from Mosul. Actually the expedition was joined only by small elements of the Girgiriya, Tel Afaris, Shammar, Juhaish and Al Mutaiwid. The tribesmen showed very early that they had no desire to risk an engagement with British troops, but had set out under their old predatory instincts to sack Tel Afar and, if fortune favoured them, the City of Mosul. On the approach of a small mixed British force the tribesmen dispersed; the townsmen of Tel Afar fled beyond our frontier and the Sharifian force retired on Dair al Zor. Our material losses were

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insignificant but our political prestige was badly impaired. The punishment of the tribes and the re-establishment of our administration brought security to a large part of the district within our frontiers, but the situation has never been completely stabilized owing to our failure to eradicate robber bands, the open encouragement given to insurgents by the Turkish authorities, the atmosphere of uncertainty produced by the proposed substitution of a purely Arab in place of the British administration, and the provocative intrigues of Turkish Nationalist agents. At present British military intervention is governed by:—

(i) The subjection and control of the nomadic Shammar and Tai.

(ii) The attitude of Turkish Nationalists on the Iraq frontier.

Until further nomadic tribes are brought under effective control and satisfactory relations are established with the Turkish Nationalists, the seeds of trouble will always be present in Northern Jazirah.

CHAPTER II.

GEOGRAPHY.

Boundaries.—The boundaries of Northern Jazirah are as under:—

North.—From point where Wadi Suludjuk cuts Aleppo-Nisibin Railway along that railway to Nisibin, thence along Wadi Suwaidiyah to the River Tigris.

West.—From point where Wadi Suludjuk cuts Aleppo-Nisibin Railway along Balikh River to Raqqah, thence by a line running parallel a few miles inland from left bank of Euphrates to Tel Busairah.

South.—From Tel Busairah in a straight line to Hadhr.

East.—From Hadhr to Jabal Najmah, thence in a straight line to Eski Mosul and Tigris.

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Area.—The area of Northern Jazirah is estimated approximately at 19,480 square miles.

General Description.—Northern Jazirah within the above boundaries consists of rolling steppes broken by two main mountain ranges—Jabal Abd al Aziz and Jabal Sinjar—and diversified by occasional ranges of low hills and sporadic mounds. These latter, varying in height and dimensions, are the most characteristic feature of the surface. From the south it continues the Iraq basin northward to the Kurdish hills, which rise from the Jazirah in a clearly-defined geographical line.

The district is drained by streams, the majority of which flow from north to south and form tributaries of the two great rivers, and which disappear in the desert, or swell the saline waters of numerous large lakes in the Jazirah. During the summer many of the lesser streams dry up and water is only obtainable from wells, water-holes and stagnant pools. The soil, though rich and cultivable, only produces a minute fraction of what it is capable, owing to the marauding habits of desert nomads. In the winter season it provides unlimited grazing for flocks.

Altitude.—The mean altitude of Northern Jazirah, exclusive of the Jabal Sinjar, which rises to 4,700 feet in height, is 900 feet M.S.L.

Mountains.—There are only two ranges of any significance in Northern Jazirah—the Jabal Sinjar and Jabal Abd al Aziz. The former rises at Eski Mosul on the Tigris as a low range, the Jabal Shevket, skirts the Tel Afar-Mosul plain, and, 20 miles west of Tel Afar, climbs abruptly to its main mountain mass, which reaches a height of 4,700 feet and drops gradually to the Khabur River. The Jabal Sinjar proper, *i.e.*, from 20 miles west of Tel Afar to Samokho at its western extremity, forms a barrier to wheel communications, which are forced to use either the so-called Hogena Gate, 16 miles north-east of Tel Afar, or the western gate between Samokho and the Khabur. The southern and northern foothills of the Jabal Sinjar are plentifully supplied with water, and support a settled Yezidi population, which cultivates figs and vines on the hillsides and cereals in the Sinjar plain.

The Jabal Abd al Aziz, striking east to west, extends from the Khabur River to the Wadi Hama. It attains no great altitude and, unlike the Jabal Sinjar,

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maintains no settled population, but furnishes the nomad Tai, Jubur, Shammar, Chechens and Milli with excellent grazing ground. In times of stress both ranges form ideal havens of refuge for outlaws and rebels against the government.

Northern Jazirah is drained by two rivers, viz., the Balikh and the Khabur, each of which receives the waters of numerous small tributaries and eventually enters the Euphrates. The Khabur and Balikh are useless as regards navigation, but in their provision of irrigation for an otherwise barren desert may fitly be termed the life-blood of the western portion of Northern Jazirah. Numerous small perennial streams rising in the Jabal Sinjar flow south into Southern Jazirah and support a tolerable cultivation in Sinjar plain.

Towns and Villages.—There are only five places which have pretensions to the name town. As a rule the settled population lives in mud hovels or tents which offer no facilities for quartering troops.

BALAD SINJAR.—Balad Sinjar lies about 76 miles west of Mosul. The town with its dilapidated qishla huddles along and over the slopes of a spur from the Jabal Sinjar, dominating the valley to the south, and in its turn dominated by the main mountain mass to the north. West of the town a stream that rises from four sweet-watered springs flows in a southerly direction and separates the town from a suburb and the ruins of old Sinjar. On the stream lie extensive fig gardens. The streets with one exception are narrow depositories for filth. The one exception is a road that climbs the hill from the south, strays for 50 yards through the town as a respectable street and tumbles by a cobbled pavement into the stream. There are several large houses—all the houses are of stone—notably that of the Rais Baladiyah and Hammu Shiru, the Chief of the Yezidis. The chief public buildings are a dilapidated "qishla" or barracks set on the southern edge of the spur. Beside it is situated a modern school which provides good accommodation for stray travellers. The bazaar is small, but is growing daily under the energy of an enterprising Christian merchant, who hopes to make it an emporium for the desert tribes.

Modern Sinjar has little of the odour of antiquity about it, although it was a famous city in bygone days. According to Le Strange, "This in the 4th (10th) century was a walled town surrounded by a most fertile district.

Muhaddasi describes it as famous for its carpenters. Oranges, lemons, and the date-palm flourished abundantly here, and a large Friday Mosque stood in the midst of the town. Moslem tradition stated that the Ark first rested on the hill above Sinjar during the flood; but afterwards, continuing on its course, came finally to rest on Jabal Judi on the east side of the Tigris. Further, Yahut adds that Sinjar was also famous as the birthplace of Sultan Sinjar or Sanfar, the last of the great Saljuks, son of Malih Shah. According to Kazwini, Sinjar in the 7th (13th) century was remarkable for its bath-houses, which had beautiful mosaic floors, and ibn Baluthah, who passed through the place in the 8th (14th) century, refers to its fine Mosque. The town wall, 3,200 paces in circuit, was built, according to Mustafi, of mortared stone; most of the houses went step-fashion up the hill slope, and its gardens produced great quantities of grapes, olives and sumach.

Population.—The population of Balad Sinjar is about 2,500, composed of Yezidis, Moslems and Christians. The Yezidis and Christians form the majority of the population.

Commerce and Supplies.—The town is in the middle of a rich agricultural district and could be used as a collecting centre for cereals. The chief products of the Sinjar hills, dry figs and raisins, are largely exported to Mosul. Large numbers of sheep also graze in the vicinity. The principal merchant is Najm Abdullah, a Christian and Mayor of the town. It is estimated that the town could support an infantry brigade indefinitely.

Water.—Water is obtained from a stream on the west of the main town. It is only possible to water fifty animals at a time at present.

Grazing.—Grazing for flocks in the Sinjar plain and southwards in the Jazirah is unlimited between December and May. Camel grazing exists all the year round.

Transport.—Camels—500 obtainable from Mutaiwid, Tai and Juhaiash through agency of Najm Abdullah.

Mules—50.

Pack-horses—50.

Donkeys—50.

No wheeled transport is available, although town is accessible to wheels.

Communication.—(i) Road.—To Tel Afar and Mosul via Ain Ghazal; fit for L.A.M. cars in dry weather.

To Tel Afar—Mosul via Ain Sino and Khan Hararat; fit for pack.

To Dair al Zor; fit for Ford vans in dry weather.

To Nisibin via Samokho; fit for A.T. carts. Arab arabanas use this route frequently.

(ii) By Signal.—From hill north-east of town and from house in town, helio signalling to Political bungalow, Tel Afar, is possible.

There is no telegraph or post office.

Landing Grounds.—There is no space available for such in the immediate vicinity of the town. Possibly a landing ground could be made in plain south of gardens, about 1 mile south of town.

Camping Grounds.—Camping grounds exist for one cavalry regiment on threshing floors immediately south of town and for one cavalry regiment on hill north-west of town. Billets for one company are available in school and houses of town. South of gardens camping ground is unlimited about 2 miles from town.

Administration.—Until May, 1920, Balad Sinjar was headquarters of a nahiyah in the Tel Afar qadha. It has now been made headquarters of a qaimmaqam.

NISIBIN.—Nisibin is situated on the right bank of the Jaghjaghah Su, about 55 miles west-south-west of Jazirat-ibn-Omar. Nisibin in Roman times formed a most important outpost of their eastern empire. It bore high reputation for its river, gardens and cereals, but its amenities were somewhat overshadowed by the existence of numerous scorpions and mosquitoes.

The modern town is small and stands in the plain, though immediately north of it the surface rises gradually to foothills of the Tur 'Abdin plateau. South of Nisibin the Jaghjaghah flows in three channels, spanned by an old bridge of stone of twelve arches, serviceable but fit only for pack transport. West of the town is situated an ancient Jacobite church and to south-west the ruins of the old town. There are only a few stone houses, the majority being flat-roofed mud hovels. The Aleppo railway has its terminus in Nisibin, although recent reports indicate that most of this line has been either destroyed or dismantled. The station lies a few miles north of the town and is used by the Turkish military authorities as barracks. Railway communication has been suspended

since the beginning of 1920, but there are indications that the line is being repaired by the French, probably for a resumption of traffic.

Population.—The population of Nisibin is estimated at 5,000, of which the majority is Kurdish. There are also considerable Jewish and Christian communities and a sprinkling of Tai and other Arabs.

Water and Hygiene.—Water is obtained from wells and from the Rivers Jaghjaghah and Khinis (the latter being a stream which flows through the town north of the Jagjaghah). The water from these streams is not particularly pure at any time, and in summer is polluted and made undrinkable by rice-fields above the town. At that season only well water, which is not good, is available. Fever is prevalent in summer, and the place is infested by flies and scorpions.

Supplies.—The country in the neighbourhood of Nisibin, being well watered and fertile, can produce a large supply of cereals if security is established. Wheat, barley, rice and millet are grown. It is estimated that supplies to support a division for some time can be collected. Sheep, horses and camels are obtainable in large numbers from Shammar and other nomads who æstivate in vicinity of the town. There was considerable trade between Nisibin and Mosul, but this has diminished recently owing to activities of highway robbers and restrictions put on trade by Turkish authorities and a preference for the Aleppo route.

Grazing.—Details unknown, but it may be inferred from presence of nomads in vicinity of town during summer that it is unlimited throughout the year.

Transport.—Camels, mules and pack-horses are available from nomads. Wheeled transport plies between Mosul and Nisibin, but is sufficient only for local needs.

Communication.—(i) Road.—To Jazirah ibn Omar; passable for pack. It is reported, however, that field guns have traversed this route.
To Faishkhabur; passable for A.T. carts in dry weather.
To Balad Sinjar; passable for pack.
To Balad Sinjar via Samokho; said to be passable for arabanas.
To Dair al Zor; passable for pack.
To Ras al Ain; passable for pack.
To Mardin; passable for Ford vans.
To Midiat; passable for pack.

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(ii) Telegraphs.—To Diarbekr. Formerly it was connected to Mosul, but this line is now unused. There is a post and telegraph office.

Landing Grounds.—A landing ground used by Turks exists, but its location is unknown, believed north of the station.

Camping Grounds.—Unlimited round town. Billeting accommodation for 1,000 men exists in railway buildings north of town.

Administration.—Headquarters of qadha in the vilayet of Diarbekr. It is a military station with a normal garrison of one regiment.

RAQQAH.—Raqqah is situated on left bank of the Euphrates, 112½ miles by river above Dair al Zor.

Raqqah occupies the site of the ancient cities of Nicephorium and Callinicum, the latter of which was a stone fortress and important market on the frontier of the Roman empire. Raqqah is the Arabic term for "swampy land beside a river subject to periodical inundation" and the locality under survey was called Raqqah al Sawda—"the black"—in distinction to other places of the same name. According to Le Strange "When the Abbasides succeeded to the Caliphate, Raqqah, as one of the chief cities commanding the Syrian frontier, had to be secured, and for this purpose the Caliph Mansur in A.D. 772 proceeded to build some 300 wells from Raqqah, the town of Ar-Rafiqah (the companion), which was garrisoned by Khurasan troops entirely devoted to the new dynasty. Rafiqah is said to have been laid out on the plan of Baghdad and was a round city. Harun-al-Rashid added to the town and built himself a palace here called the Kasr as Salam (the Palace of Peace), for he at times resided in Raqqah when the climate of Baghdad was too hot. By the fourteenth century the town was a mere ruined field, the city probably having been destroyed by the Mongols. About fifty years ago the site was nearly unoccupied, but the place has been growing in size and importance during the last few years.

The present town consists of an Arab settlement and Circassian colony. The Arab settlement lies about one mile from the river in the south-west corner of a large semicircular enclosure, formed by an old brick wall with round bastions at intervals. In the middle of the enclosure are the remains of a mosque. To the west of the Arab village outside the enclosure and standing on high broken

ground is a Circassian colony. In the east of the enclosure containing the Arab village is another ruined field with a minaret rising from the centre.

Population.—The population, consisting of Arabs and Circassians, is roughly 2,000 Moslems.

Water and Hygiene.—Water is obtained from the river. Sanitary arrangements are conspicuous by their absence, and life in the town has been aptly described as "one foetid effluvium after another."

Commerce and Supplies.—There is a good deal of cultivation round the town and the local bazaar furnished a market for the surrounding Arabs. Probably supplies for a cavalry regiment could be obtained locally with several days notice.

Communication.—(i) By road.—To Baghdad via right bank of Euphrates; passable for Ford vans.

To Aleppo; passable for Ford vans.

To Meskenah via left bank; passable for pack.

To Anah; passable for pack.

To Harran; passable for pack.

To Hama via Rusafet; passable for pack.

(ii) By Telegraph.—To Aleppo.

(iii) By River.—To Baghdad; passable for shallow draught steamers in flood season.

To Meskenah; passable for shallow draught steamers in flood season.

Aerodrome.—Unknown.

Camping Grounds.—Unlimited round town.

Administration.—Raqqah is headquarters of a qadha and seat of a qaïmmaqam.

RAS AL AIN.—The town stands amid extensive ruins close to the source of the Khabur.

Le Strange gives the following description of old Ras al Ain:—

"Ras al Ain 'the Spring-head' near the source of the Khabur (the Roman Resaina, on the River Chaboras), was famous for its numerous springs, said to number 360 in all, and their waters made the surrounding country a great garden. Of these springs the 'Ain-az-Zahiriya' was supposed to be fathomless, and the stream flowing from this ran into the Khabur, by which pleasure-boats are described as travelling down from garden to garden from Ras al Ain to Karkisiyah on the Euphrates. Ras al Ain is described by Ibn Hawkal as a walled town, having

gardens and many mills within its circuit; and the arable fields stretched for 20 leagues beyond the houses. Mukaddasi described a small lake at the chief spring, two fathoms deep, with the water so clear that a silver piece could clearly be seen at the bottom. The buildings of Ras al Ain were of stone, well mortared, and Ibn Jubayr, who passed through the town in 580 (1184), mentions its two Friday Mosques and the fine colleges and bath-houses which stood along the banks of the Khabur. In his time the city apparently had no wall, though in the 8th (14th) century this must have been rebuilt, for Mustawfi described it as 5,000 paces in circuit. He adds that cotton, corn and grapes were grown here abundantly.

About forty years ago a large Circassian colony about 9,000 strong took up its residence in the neighbourhood of the town, which has gradually decayed. It is now a French military station.

Population.—The population is about 2,000, mostly Chechens or Circassians from the Caucasus.

Water and Hygiene.—Water is obtained from wells and springs, which are said to be slightly brackish and warm. Hygiene is on a par with that of most villages in Anatolia—non-existent.

Commerce and Supplies.—Unknown.

Communication.—(i) By Road.—To Raqqah; passable for pack.

To Urfah; passable for Ford vans (?).

To Mardin; passable for Ford vans.

(ii) By Railway.—To Aleppo; out of order May, 1922.

To Nisibin; out of order May, 1922.

(iii) Telegraph.—To Mardin and Nisibin by military telephone.

TEL AFAR.—Tel Afar lies about 47 miles by road west of Mosul. Little is known about the early history of Tel Afar, but it is stated to have been founded by Turcoman colonists of Tamorlane the Great. The only evidence for this statement is the Turanian character of the inhabitants, whose Shaikhs or Aghas babble incoherently of ancestral domains beyond the farthest Kurdish hills. The ruins of a castle that stands on the Qalah hill, and is known as Qalah or Qasr Marwan, appear to be Arabic of the tenth or eleventh century.

The modern town consists of nine suburbs, which lie on both sides of Tel Afar stream under the shadow of the

Qalah hill, which is conspicuous for miles around. East, south and north the town is surrounded by low ranges of hills, devoid of vegetation and distant 800 yards to a mile from the town. These hills rise about 500 feet above the surrounding country and dominate Tel Afar. To the west stretches the broad Sinjar plain bounded on the north-west by the elephantine ridge of the Jabal Sinjar. Tel Afar stream rises in the heart of the Qalah hill, flows by an artificial stone channel to a pump-house constructed at eastern edge of Qalah hill, and thence in a south-westerly direction to the extensive gardens west of the town. The Qalah hill, rising 200 feet above the stream and surrounding country, dominates the town. On it stand various government buildings, gendarme barracks and telegraph office. Of the suburbs, one lies on low ground immediately north of the Qalah, and was in 1918-19 partially used as billets for the British garrison and partially destroyed to give a field of fire; four lie north of the stream and west of the citadel on low-lying ground, and the remaining four are built on a bluff south of the stream and of the Qalah. The houses of the town are substantial buildings of stone, which is quarried in the neighbouring hills. The townspeople pride themselves on being tribesmen, and for this reason possess only a small bazaar, chiefly for the sale of cotton goods. There is a small vegetable market in summer. Several roads passable for L.A.M. cars radiate from the Qalah hill and military quarter, but the streets in the town are only passable for animal transport.

Population.—The population in May, 1920, was approximately 8,000, but at present it does not number more than 6,000. The people are mostly Turcomans, who speak a Turkish dialect amongst themselves, but generally are able to converse in Arabic and Kurdish. There are also small Christian, Arab and Kurd colonies in the town. The inhabitants all belong to one of the nine Tel Afar tribes, each of which inhabits a separate mohallah or quarter and are engaged practically to a man in agricultural work, in which they have a high reputation. During the ploughing season many of the inhabitants go out to various villages in the neighbourhood and remain there until the ploughing is finished.

In June, 1920, the people of Tel Afar, led by their Aghas, took part in a rising against the Government and were compelled to flee before a punitive column to the Wadi Suwaidiyah. On the submission of their

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Shaikhs, they were allowed to return to their homes and have been quiet ever since. It is estimated that 800 rifles are concealed in the houses of the town. The majority of the inhabitants are Sunnis, but there are also a few Shiahs.

Water and Hygiene.—Water is unlimited from Tel Afar stream, but is sulphurous and possessed of mildly aperient properties. A pump has been erected by British troops for pumping water to a tank on the Qalah hill and water troughs in the military quarter. The Tel Afaris are the most insanitary people in Iraq, and have taken hardly to any sanitary arrangements set up. About and in the town lie a dozen hills—the accumulated defæcations of seven centuries, the odour whereof is neither of sanctity nor of Hyblas' flowers.

Commerce and Supplies.—Tel Afar, although the centre of a rich agricultural district, suffers little from modern commercialism. The inhabitants pride themselves on their character and freedom from the taint of huckstering. Consequently, there are no shops and only parochial exchanges of wheat, meat, etc., in the small market places. What surplus of grain produced is taken to Mosul and bartered there for lamps, oil, clothes, etc. Provided full control is exercised in the district, a brigade of infantry could be maintained throughout the year on local supplies. The following is an approximate amount of various grains, etc., grown in the Tel Afar district during 1920:—

Wheat	8,500 tons.
Barley	6,600 "
Millet	40 "
Lentils	50 "
Beans	9 "
Mash	9 "
Cotton	18 "
Tobacco	1 "
Sesame	9 "
Peas	3 "
Vegetables	110 "
Fruit	360 "

There are between 200,000 to 300,000 sheep pasturing in the district.

Grazing.—Unlimited in spring for horses, cattle, sheep and camels.

Transport.—Camels—1,000 from the Juhaish, Shammar and Mutaiwid.

Mules—Nil.

Donkeys—100.

Carts or cars—Nil.

Communication.—(i) Road.—Tel Afar to Mosul via Maria; passable for all wheels.

To Mosul via Muwali and Sahaji; passable for Ford vans.

To Mosul via Tel Gonesiyah; passable for pack.

To Nisibin via Hogena; passable for L.A.M. cars.

To Eski Mosul; passable for Ford cars.

To Balad Sinjar; passable for L.A.M. cars.

To Dair al Zor; passable for L.A.M. cars.

To Zummar via Hogena; passable for Ford vans as far as Abu Wajnah.

(ii) Telegraph.—To Mosul via Hogena.

(iii) Visual.—From Political bungalow to Balad Sinjar and from hills north of Tel Afar to hills south of Dohuk.

Landing Grounds.—Non-existent. Ground 2 miles south-east of town has been chosen as a likely site—work required being 700 men-days.

Camping Grounds.—Unlimited south-east of town. Billeting accommodation for one battalion infantry is available in the military quarter and in the old gendarme barracks if essential. In ordinary times billets for one company or squadron should be obtainable.

Administration.—Headquarters of a qadha and a qaimmaqam.

CHAPTER III.

CLIMATE.

General.—The climatic conditions of Northern Jazirah approximate to those of a semi-tropical area which is situated at a considerable distance from any ocean. Although an appreciable amount of rain falls in the winter months (November to March), the long dry summer suggests semi-arid as the aptest descriptive term. The proximity of Northern Jazirah, however, to the montane region of Kurdistan, tends to moderate the summer

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temperature and to render it less unbearable than in areas nearer the Persian Gulf.

In winter the winds are variable, but the general direction is from the north-west. In summer there is a continuous current of air from the north-west, owing to the pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean being considerably higher than in the Persian Gulf during these months. This wind, descending from the Kurdish plateau as a dry scorching blast, is usually impregnated with dust and, in some districts, with sulphurous fumes distinctive of all forms of life. In the latter case it is known as the Simoom. The relative humidity of the atmosphere is extremely low, and even in the wet season the rainfall is very moderate.

Within the limits of Northern Jazirah no meteorological observations have been taken. All figures, therefore, are approximations derived by comparing results obtained in observation stations in Mosul and other contiguous districts.

Rainfall.—The average monthly rainfall and number of rain days per month are shown in the table below.

	Average monthly rainfall in inches.	Number of rain days per month.
January ..	2.56	8.0
February ..	2.85	10.1
March	3.14	10.3
April	1.64	9.2
May88	5.6
June08	.5
July	Nil.	Nil.
August	Nil.	Nil.
September ..	.28	.7
October37	2.8
November ..	1.86	6.9
December ..	2.32	8.2

From the above figures it is evident that during the six months, from May to October, an unappreciable quantity of rain falls in Northern Jazirah. During these months, agriculture is only possible in the irrigated districts on the banks of the Tigris, Jaghjaghah, Khabur, Balikh and various permanent streams between the Tigris and Jabal Sinjar. During the summer the rich grazing, which

springs up in the Jazirah after the winter rains and affords a wide pasturage to nomad tribes, quickly dries up, and forces the nomads to take their flocks under the lie of the Kurdish hills.

Rainfall accordingly has the following military effects:

(i) In summer, May to October, it practically denudes the Jazirah of nomad tribes, compelling them to settle on the banks of permanent streams, or more generally in the north of Northern Jazirah.

(ii) In winter, between October and May, it offers a rich pasturage for nomadic flocks, and consequently introduces a source of potential unrest on the Mosul-Shergat line of communication.

(iii) Communications are liable to interruption for several days at a time after rain between the months of October to May.

(iv) Between October and May, water-holes, water-courses and streams are more likely to contain drinkable water than in other months.

(v) The rainfall necessitates the ploughing and sowing of winter crops, which are harvested in May and June. Consequently between October and June most of the settled inhabitants are busily engaged in agriculture. After June there is a period of slackness, when the men are apt to become restless and easily susceptible to evil influences.

Temperature.—The table below indicates the chief facts about the temperature of Northern Jazirah.

	Mean temperatures.	Mean monthly maximum temperatures.	Absolute maximum temperatures.	Absolute minimum temperatures.
Jan.	40.7	56.6	60.8	?
Feb.	46.9	62.5	67.8	?
March	52.2	71.2	77.1	32.4
April	62.6	83.5	88.5	38.4
May	73.9	93.8	100.4	49.4
June	84.1	104.7	108.3	57.8
July	91.8	110.3	114.8	68.7
Aug.	91.1	109.6	113.1	67.1
Sept.	82.9	102.7	108.9	55.1
Oct.	71.6	91.8	93.3	48.6
Nov.	57.2	76.8	82.7	33.4
Dec.	47.1	63.0	66.7	?

The noteworthy point with regard to temperature is the wide range, viz., from freezing point to 115° F. From June to August the heat during the day is almost unbearable, but the nights are comparatively cool. Snow has been known to fall in winter to a depth of 10 inches (February, 1920).

The following deductions are made from the above facts, and the experience of columns operating in the district:—

(i) Between May and October the heat, combined with lack of rain, drives the nomad tribes to the north of Northern Jazirah, and this practically frees the Mosul-Shergat lines of communication from anything but long-distance raids.

(ii) Between May and October marches should be carried out during the night, or in the early morning or late evening.

(iii) Sun helmets and glare glasses are necessary to combat the heat in summer.

(iv) In winter, movement is possible by day and by night.

(v) British winter scale of clothing and blankets are necessary in winter months.

Winds.—The general direction of winds throughout the year is north-west. During the winter, however, and also in the summer, the wind occasionally veers to the south, and then it tends to be enervating. The prevailing wind, passing over the plateaux of Anatolia and Kurdistan, descends upon the Jazirah as a dry current of air, which rapidly heats up as it leaves the mountains. Calms are of unusual occurrence, and it is the general rule for the wind to attain its maximum velocity during the day.

During the summer sand-storms frequently occur, but are neither so uncomfortable nor so heavily laden as those in the south of Iraq. Another common phenomenon in summer is the mirage, which distorts the landscape, often with grotesque and unrecognizable shapes.

The following are the military effects of atmosphere and wind:—

(1) Conditions affecting Aviation.—(a) The air during the summer months is less dense in Northern Jazirah than in Europe or Northern Egypt, thereby reducing the performance of the machines. Machines climb more sluggishly and have to glide faster to maintain control. They can climb high enough, however, to clear most hills in the area even when loaded with bombs, Lewis guns and

S.A.A. (b) Observation is difficult in the summer, owing to haziness produced by the heat and dust.

(2) The wind, both in summer and winter, often stirs up dust-storms, which last from one or two minutes to twelve hours or more. While they last, such storms completely limit observation, and are often employed by the Arabs to cloak a surprise attack or raid. Columns operating in hostile country should invariably, on the approach of a sand-storm, halt and adopt a close defensive formation such as a hollow square with transport in the centre.

(3) Great care should be taken in the summer and autumn to prevent prairie fires, which, owing to the dry nature of the vegetation and persistent winds, may set the country side ablaze for miles. Such fires may also be used by tribesmen to hide their movements.

Medical Conditions.—There is practically no information available as to health conditions among the civil population. No outbreak of infectious diseases has occurred since our occupation, but serious epidemics, typhus, cholera and relapsing fever have been known to occur. Sanitation in villages is practically non-existent. During the spring and autumn, insects prove great pests, and nets should always be carried for protection against flies, sandflies, and mosquitoes. Flies abound even in the desert, especially in the area of former tribal camping grounds, and for this reason it is advisable to avoid such places as camping grounds. The mosquitoes' activities are confined to the Jabal Sinjar, Jabal Abd al Aziz, the upper reaches of the Jaghjaghah River and the Nisibin area. Lice and fleas infest most villages and it is quite common to find settled villagers living in tents in order to avoid these pests.

Troops in the open are exposed to great extremes of temperature—the difference between summer and winter temperatures and the difference between day and night temperatures. Sun and heat strokes are liabilities that must be guarded against in the hot weather.

No statistics are available to indicate the incidence of sickness in military columns during the various seasons, but, so long as proper precautions are taken, admissions to hospital should be small.

The evacuation of sick, except in the hills, will be possible by horse wagons or cars.

Water.—Water is the governing factor in Northern Jazirah in regard to marches and size of operating columns. In winter an infantry division will be able

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to operate in the vicinity of the main roads, but in the desert areas, except in particularly rainy seasons, water will ordinarily be sufficient for a cavalry regiment.

Wherever springs are used as a water supply, great care should be taken that these have not been contaminated by local caravans and Badawin. In case of wells, these should be thoroughly examined for decaying vegetation. At no time is it safe to utilize water, except after chlorination or other chemical treatment.

Conclusion.—Consideration of the foregoing indicates not only that the period of probable unrest lies between October and April, but that the most suitable period for military operations lies between these months.

CHAPTER IV.

RESOURCES.

1. *General.*—Northern Jazirah is an agricultural and pastoral district, which possesses few minerals, and these are not extensively worked. There are no manufactures on a large scale, while lack of surplus commodities and machinery for external trade renders the latter almost negligible. Its commerce is purely parochial—the interchange between its own sub-districts and with the larger towns of the actual necessities of life. Lack of labour, insecurity and antiquated methods of agriculture limit production to the actual requirements of food, clothes and shelter.

2. *Industry.*—A. *Labour.*

(a) *Supply.*—Outside the peasant-farmers, who are at one and the same time labourers and masters, there is practically no labour supply in Northern Jazirah. This follows from (1) sparseness of population resultant on insecurity, and the fact that a man often does not reap where he has sown; (2) the tribal system, which necessitates the partial unemployment of a large element and inculcates, at least amongst the Bedawin, the desire to avoid labour and gather the fruits of another's labour in raid and foray; (3) the system of land tenure, which has

given rise to small peasant proprietors living on their own produce and unable either to hire labour or to work for others.

(b) *Emigration and Immigration.*—The population of the district is practically stagnant, and is unlikely to increase until we have established complete security or encouraged immigration.

(c) The possibility of raising labour corps in Northern Jazirah is remote. It might be possible to get several hundred men to work in the vicinity of their homes, but an attempt to get them to work further afield is not likely to succeed. An effort was made to induce the inhabitants of Tel Afar to work at Hammam Ali in 1920, but failed. Local labour was available in 1920 at one rupee per diem.

B. Agriculture.

(a) *Products.*—The list hereunder shows the agriculture products and the amounts grown in 1919-1920, in the political district of Tel Afar, *i.e.*, the portion of Northern Jazirah in Iraq territory. It has not been possible to obtain figures for that portion of the Jazirah in Syrian or Turkish hands. Tel Afar district is roughly the area enclosed by the Wadi Suwaidiyah-Tel Rumailan-Tel Antar-Sinjar-Hadhra-Tel Afar-Zummar.

Wheat ...	8,500 tons.	Barley ...	6,600 tons.
Lentils ...	50 "	Peas ...	3 "
Maize ...	6 "	Simsim ...	9 "
Millet ...	35 "	Tobacco ...	1 "
Mash ...	9 "	Cotton ...	18 "
Beans ...	9 "	Vegetables.	350 "
		Fruits ...	110 "

Winter and summer crops are grown, but, except in Tel Afar, Balad Sinjar and irrigated patches on the Tigris and other rivers, the latter is of insignificant amount. There is no reason why, with a better use of flow-water from permanent streams such as Tel Afar, Ibra, Umm al Shababit, Ain Sino, Ain Ghazal, Abu Maria, Sinjar springs, Khabur and Jaghjaghah Su and the development of the water resources in Zargah (east of Tel Afar) and Sinjar plains by sinking artesian or other wells, saifi (summer) products, especially cotton, should not be considerably increased.

(b) *Methods.*—Cultivation is primitive, and beyond two or three threshing machines the only agricultural

apparatus in use is a wooden plough drawn by mules, oxen, or donkeys. The system of cultivation is analogous to that obtaining in manorial times in England, *i.e.*, the extensive system where each village annually ploughed and cross-ploughed about half its lands and left the other half fallow. To date, modern methods and implements have not been introduced, but many farmers are eager to acquire ploughing and threshing machinery hitherto unavailable. With these, improved tillage and crop rotation a considerable trading surplus of grain can be produced.

(c) *Land Tenure.*—It seems that originally cultivated lands beyond Crown properties belonged to peasant proprietors, who for various reasons—chiefly the need of protection and capital—have surrendered their lands into the hands of the Aghawat and absentee landlords. In many cases the lands are held as a benefice or fief under some such contract as follows:—"I shall continue to till the land and pay you a rent in money, in produce, in labour or in fighting, so long as you protect me from Badawin raids." In other cases various villages or a group of villagers possess legal "sanads" for pieces of land. Many of these "sanads" are held by several antagonistic groups for the same piece of land. In other cases there are constant disputes about particular pieces of land, as the demarcation of the land per "sanad" has taken transitory objects such as small mounds or nebulous streams as boundary marks. The Turks also sold many "sanads" for the same piece of land to different persons. The difficulties arising from Turkish jobbery is of some political consequence even now, as whole villages are often in arms against each other at the ploughing season and harvest over pieces of ground. A land commission would remove a very pressing source of discontent.

(d) *Forestry.*—The only so-called forest in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah is furnished by scrub on the Jabal Sinjar. The use of this for fuel and charcoal leads to a large annual diminution of the wood supply, and nothing so far has been attempted in the way of planting young trees to repair losses. At Tel Afar there is a large plantation of fig-trees. Wood supplies for a column in the district could be got from Sinjar.

(e) *Land Settlement.*—There are large areas of cultivable land at present unoccupied owing to lack of labour and insecurity. In the Tel Afar district alone it would be possible without expense on immigration to

produce from lands watered by winter rains an additional 18,000 tons of wheatstuffs. In the rest of Jazirah possibly three times this amount could be produced under favourable conditions.

Note.—The vegetables grown are onions, cucumbers, tomatoes, beans, peas, turnips, and a small quantity of potatoes. The common fruits are grapes and figs—chiefly from Sinjar and Tel Afar—melons from the Syria, Khabur, Tel Afar. Domestic animals are goats, cows, sheep, cattle, donkeys, buffaloes, horses. From cows, goats and buffaloes large quantities of sour and fresh milk are available. The sour milk called "Shaneena" is very refreshing.

(f) *Grass and Fodder.*—Grass is obtainable in unlimited quantities in Northern Jazirah between December and April. The Badawin feed their huge flocks of sheep on this. Camel thorn is also unlimited along the various roads and serves as fodder for camels. In the months April to October the grass turns to hay and can be used as forage.

3. *Minerals.*—The mineral resources of the district have never been properly investigated.

Coal.—Bituminous coal similar to that found at Zakho is said to exist in the Jabal Sinjar.

Salt.—Salt is found in unlimited quantities in the Wadi Tharthar and various salt lakes in the Jazirah, such as Ashqar and Khatuniyah.

Stone.—Stone is unlimited in the Tel Afar hills and Sinjar, and is used for making jars, mortar and houses.

So far oil deposits have not been found in Northern Jazirah. Motor transport and aeroplanes will, therefore, require to have depôts established in various centres during operations.

Manufactures.—Local handicrafts for the production of rough clothes, woollen mats, country shoes, tents, etc., exist in the various villages and tribes, but the manufactured articles are sufficient only for local needs. The only articles (which are manufactured locally) likely to be of military use are wool and tents made of camel and goat hair. Such tents are made in different sizes sufficient to house from ten to fifty persons.

Power.—It is not known how far the various permanent streams could be utilized to furnish water-power for electricity. At the moment they are used to drive mills.

4. Commerce.—A. Domestic.

(a) *Character of Trade.*—Commerce is limited to an interchange of commodities between Northern Jazirah and the larger towns. At the same time a large proportion of the trade between Iraq, Syria and Turkey passes through Northern Jazirah, and renders it of some commercial importance as a highway. Grain, etc., is carried into the towns and there bartered for Manchester goods, lamps, etc. Tobacco is brought to the district from Zakho, Jazirah ibn Omar. Since the advent of the British troops to the Mosul district the operations of contractors have not been beneficial to cultivators, but have shown the value of a surplus produce for trading purposes.

(b) *Markets.*—Mosul, Nisibin and Dair al Zor form the chief markets and supply centres for Northern Jazirah. The main commercial routes from Anatolia and Syria to Northern Iraq pass through Northern Jazirah between the three towns above mentioned. To prevent the tribes using these towns an arrangement would have to be made with Turkey and Syria. In case of war with these two countries, Iraq could establish a blockade on the Mosul-Nisibin and Mosul-Dair al Zor roads, but it is doubtful if such a blockade would materially hurt either power, provided they had free access to the Mediterranean. At the present there are no organizations to promote trade in Northern Jazirah, and foreign firms are unlikely to operate in these regions until a settlement has been arrived at between Turkey and the Allies, and the desert tribes have been subdued.

B. *Foreign.*—There are no reliable figures available to indicate the extent of the imports or exports of Northern Jazirah. The chief articles of export are wool, ghi, camels, horses, camel-hair and small quantities of figs and grain. The chief articles of import are Manchester goods and glass-ware. These articles are collected or distributed either by tribesmen, who periodically visit the main towns of supply, or by pedlars and traders, who wander among the tribes. The wandering pedlar leads a dangerous life and his gains, unless he is acquainted with the tribes, are liable to be *nil*. Many Jews find employment as pedlars.

The customs tariff in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah is that which obtains at Baghdad. The general principle is an import duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*

on everything with the exception of tobacco and spirits, on which special rates are levied. Export duty of 1 per cent. is levied in the same manner. In Turkish territories the Turks have manipulated their import tariff from 10 per cent. to 30 per cent. according to their need of money for government and chiefly military sources. Many merchants of Mardin during the period 1918-1921 carried their goods to the Mosul market, but the Nationalists in 1921 temporarily impaired this trade by imposing an export duty of 8 per cent.

So long as there are hostilities between the Allies and Turkey, the possibility of establishing a vigorous blockade of the Jazirah tribes is remote. Their exclusion from Mosul and other markets in Iraq would, however, tend to bring the Shammar to terms.

5. Finance.

(a) *Taxation*.—The old system of taxation obtaining in the Ottoman Empire, *i.e.*, one-tenth of all produce to Government, has been adopted with a few modifications in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah. At present, after crop estimation, *i.e.*, of all produce, taxes are farmed or collected direct according to whether the "iltizam" (auction) figure is higher or less than the estimated one. The sheep or "Koda" tax, 8 annas per sheep, and 1 rupee per camel, is collected direct. The system of farming the taxes is of political importance. The advantages and disadvantages of the various methods in vogue are enumerated below.

(1) *Iltizam* (Auctioneering).

(i) Leads to speculation.

(ii) Produces discontent and leads to persistent complaints from both multazims (tax-farmers) and tax-payers.

(iii) It is a form of government trading and tends to lower the dignity of the ruling power. Dignity is more estimable in Arab eyes than honesty.

(iv) The incidence of taxation rests more heavily on good than on bad farmers with equally good and commensurate pieces of soil. "A" by good farming produces 100 tighars (a local measure) and pays 10 tighars as revenue. "B" by indifferent farming produces 70 tighars and pays 7 tighars as revenue—in theory. In practice "A" is much more heavily penalized. The multazims know that he is a good

farmer and accordingly bid for his produce as likely to be profitable to themselves. "A" therefore pays as his revenue, say 10 tighars at the speculative price of 100 rupees per tighar, *i.e.*, 1,000 rupees. "B," the multizams will not speculate on, so "B" pays his 7 tighars at government conversion rates—always considerably less than speculative, say 75 rupees per tighar, *i.e.*, 450 rupees.

(v) It saves the government much labour in transport, storage, etc.

(vi) It has produced considerably more revenue than direct collection at present would yield.

(2) *Direct Collection as at present.*

(i) Estimation is bound to be inaccurate and leads to complaints against the estimators.

(ii) Difficulty of transport, storage, and sale by the government involves increase of staff and accommodation.

(iii) Paragraph (iii) of *iltazam* equally applies.

The present burden of taxation is not felt as heavy so much as uncertain, *i.e.*, in the Iraq districts. Thus, if high prices of wheat and barley obtain, the burden seems equable; if prices fall after the time of tax payment it will be considered a hardship. The settled inhabitants also fail to see why the nomad tribes should not only escape taxation but be subsidized in some cases and allowed in others to rob villages with impunity. The failure to tax the nomads is read as governmental weakness.

The estimated revenue from Tel Afar district in 1920-1921 was:—

	Rs.	
Summer grains ...	3,220	(probably Rs. 20,000 in ordinary years).
Winter grains ...	490,637	
Rent of Muqatasch	44,851	
Karads ...	587	
Vegetable and fruit	11,027	
Koda (sheep, etc., tax) ...	147,156	(<i>i.e.</i> , roughly 290,000 sheep, goats, cattle, camel in the Tel Afar district).
Stamps ...	800	
Political Miscellaneous ...	25,000	
Miscellaneous ...	4,600	
	727,878	

Banking.—In Northern Jazirah there are no banks, but Aleppo and Mosul possess branches of either or both of the Imperial Ottoman and Eastern Banks, which are used by the inhabitants of the district. The business of local banking is carried on by the Saraf (Shrof) or money-changer. He is the soul of local trading and functions as under :—

- (i) Arrays coins, both native and foreign.
- (ii) Issues and discounts bills.
- (iii) Acts as a banker.

The Sarafs in co-operation usually fix the rate of trade bills for the mercantile community, while in their individual relations they are often able to preserve the dignity of a customer by using suasion with a troublesome creditor. A local Saraf makes an excellent agent for a bank, where the bank is not otherwise represented.

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TABLE "A." SUPPLIES (Annually).

Item.	Tel Afar.		Sinjar.		Nisibin.		Ras al Ain.		Remarks.
	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military and commercial use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	
Wheat ..	6,500 tons	1,500 tons	2,000 tons	400 tons	No figures available.	The Turkish military authorities estimated the country round Nisibin could maintain a division throughout the year, i.e., say two brigades of infantry with all transport.	No figures available.	20 tons per week in harvest.	Time of sowing, December.
Barley ..	4,600 "	900 "	2,000 "	400 "				5 tons per week harvest.	Time of sowing, February. Time of harvest, July.
Lentils ..	50 "	10 "							Current prices in Tel Afar, 1921 (average):—
Atta ..	(a)								Wheat 300 rupees per ton.
Rice ..									Barley 280 rupees per ton.
Simsim ..	9 "								Vegetables 4 annas per lb.
Dhal ..			10 "	2 "					Fruits 8 annas per lb.
Mash ..			9 "	1 "					Ghee 1 rupee per lb.
Ghee ..	80 lb. daily.	20 lb. daily.	100 lb. daily.	40 lb. daily.					Butter Re. 1/4 per lb.
Butter ..									Milk 2 annas per lb.
Millet ..	35 tons								Charcoal Re. 1/8 per 27 lb.

(a) There are 4 mills in Tel Afar which can produce 2 to 3 tons of flour daily.

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TABLE "A." SUPPLIES (Annually)—continued.

Item.	Tel Afar.		Sinjar.		Nisibin.		Ras al Ain.		Remarks.
	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military and commercial use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	Total in tons, numbers, etc.	Available for military use.	
Milk ..	300 lb. daily in season.	60 lb. daily in season.	300 lb. daily in season.	60 lb. daily in season.	No figures available.	The Turkish military authorities could maintain a division throughout the year, i.e., say two brigades of infantry with all transport.	No figures available.	1,000 per week in summer.	Agents in Tel Afar districts are:— 1. Daud Effendi, who lives in Malka village and has a house in Mosul. 2. Najim Abdullah, is Mayor of Balad Sinjar, for both Tel Afar and Sinjar.
Bhoosa ..	25,000 tons	5,000 tons	8,000 tons	2,000 tons					
Vegetables	200 "	40 "	162 "	30 "					
Fuel (wood)	—	—	Unlimited	Unlimited					
Fruits ..	40	10	70 tons	12 tons					
Salt ..	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited					
Oxen ..	100	20	200	40					
Sheep ..	200,000	50,000	50,000	10,000					
Oil ..	—	—	—	—					
Petrol ..	—	—	—	—					
Cotton ..	18	—	—	—					
Charcoal	—	—	Unlimited	Unlimited					

Note—Tel Afar and Balad Sinjar, provided control of the surrounding districts is held, could supply one infantry brigade throughout the year.

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TABLE "B." TRANSPORT.

Item.	Tel Afar.		Balad Sinjar.		Nisibin.		Ras al Ain.		Remarks.
	Total.	Available for military use.	Total.	Available for military use.	Total.	Available for military use.	Total.	Available for military use.	
Horses ..	1,600	50	1,000	50	—	—	—	—	In Tel Afar and Sinjar districts the chiefs of Mutaiwid and Juhaihs can supply camel transport up to 500 camels. There are also several Shammar chiefs, notably Mutlaq and his sons, who are willing to carry out Government transport.
Mules ..	100	20	200	50	—	—	—	—	
Donkeys	600	100	500	50	—	—	—	—	
Camels ..	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	500	1,000	500	
Carts ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Motor cars	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
" lorries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Aircraft	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

CHAPTER V.

ETHNOGRAPHY.

General.—The population of Northern Jazirah comprises representatives of the Arab, Yezidi, Kurdish, Jew, Circassian and Turcoman races. The Yezidis form a solid block in the Jabal Sinjar; the Kurds exist north-east of Tel Afar as an outlier from the Anatolian highlands; the Circassians and Turcomans are solitary and small colonies planted in the midst of predominantly Arab population. There can be no question that in essence and characteristics the inhabitants are to be little differentiated from those of Southern Iraq.

Population.—No census figures are available, but a tentative maximum figure for the population is 150,000. The total numbers, however, in Northern Jazirah must vary with the changing seasons, as the great nomadic tribes immigrate southwards or northwards from the area. The maximum population is probably reached in late spring, when the Arabs number about 115,000; in winter this number will probably be reduced to about 90,000. The population is roughly analysed as under:—

Arab	115,000	Northern Jazirah.
Yezidi	16,000	Jabal Sinjar.
Turcoman	6,000	Tel Afar.
Kurd	3,500	N.E. Tel Afar.
Circassian	4,000	Ras al Ain and Raqqah.
(Chechens)		
Jew	1,500	Nisibin and the towns.
Christian	1,000	Nisibin, Sinjar, Ras al Ain.

The density of population is extremely low. As government control by any government over the area is practically confined to the various towns and district of Tel Afar, the possibility of finding recruits for the armies of the various nations concerned is remote—at least in the near future. The nomad tribes may be left out of calculation altogether. The Turks in the Nisibin and Ras al Ain districts could recruit up to about 1,000. The Iraq Government will possibly obtain in Tel Afar district about 500 recruits for local police or levies, but not more than 100 for the regular army. The Yezidis will not serve under the Iraq Government in any capacity, except in the Sinjar. Under conscription, the settled population

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of Tel Afar might provide 16,000 men capable of bearing arms, but the majority of these are required for local industry, such as it is. A modified scheme might furnish 1,000 recruits.

Arabs.—The characteristics of the settled Arab have been narrated sufficiently in other works, and require no description here, but as the Badawin, who preponderate in Northern Jazirah, differ from their settled brethren in several respects and constitute the chief military problem in the area, it is considered advisable to touch upon their main features here. Their outstanding characteristic is the restlessness of mind caused by their eternal wandering after pasturage. A search in reality for eternal spring. The Arab mind has been described as mercurial and imaginative, but the latter term is singularly inappropriate to that of the Badawin, who is of all things a creature of the day and hour. He has no constructive ability or application. Partial to money and a time-server, he possesses a strict code of hospitality, the obligations of which are always scrupulously fulfilled. He tends to be excitable in the pursuit of loot, but has a strongly developed sense of self-preservation derived from his hard fight with nature—a sense which keeps him, if not cowardly, at least wary in battle. It is unfair to classify all Badawins as brigands. The Badawin levy taxes on villages and caravans, and in return protect their taxees. Brigandage is the work of professional robbers, who often may be Badawin, but are just as often not. The nomad loathes commerce, but is shrewd in money deals. He is, however, still the son of Ishmael, a coarse, unrefined member of a savage group, subordinate to ends larger than himself, and with ideals purely directed towards the satisfaction of the primary physical instincts—hunger and carnal desire. The only authority in a Badawin tribe is that of the Shaikh, and the existence of shaikhly powers, often those of life and death, argues a strong disciplinary bond and the possibility of cultivating this in more settled conditions. Centuries of inter-tribal fighting have made the Badawin a good scout, and watchful in protection, both at rest and on the move. His aptitude for war is small, but for fighting and looting of lesser enemies instinctive. His trustworthiness is questionable, and his sense of loyalty dependent on his material prospects. Badawin physique is good, and renders him capable of enduring many hardships, but, like his town brother, he is incurably lazy and contemptuous of the labourer.

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Other Races.—The Yezidis, Chechens, and Kurds are adequately described under their respective headings in Chapter VI. The Jews and Christians are traders and artisans, pettifogging, little people, who are little less than thralls, and deserve no higher fate.

Religion.—The chief religions in Northern Jazirah are Muhammadanism and Yezidism. They can be briefly considered as under (i) main features of their beliefs; (ii) methods of preventing injury to religious susceptibilities; (iii) political factors dependent on religion; (iv) the state of feeling between different sects and religions.

(a) *Muhammadanism.*—(i) The Arabs, Turcomans and Chechens are Muhammadans of the Sunni persuasion, but have never displayed any fanaticism in their devotion to their religion; indeed, the Badawin still possess paganistic and traits of fetishism in their Islamism. Sunnism is too well known to require further description.

(ii) The chief method of preserving the religious susceptibilities of the Muhammadans, is to refrain from interference in their religious rites, and to maintain an unbiassed view in disputes between them, Yezidis and Christians. All mosques and holy places should be respected.

(iii) Politically, Sunnism is orientated towards Constantinople and the Turkish Caliphate. For this reason there is a sneaking, but unimportant, sympathy for the Turkish Nationalists. The Turks have striven to encourage this sympathy by propagandizing the tribes through Ahmad al Senussi and others, but self-preservation kept the Badawin tribes from taking anything but a casual interest in such propaganda.

(iv) The Sunnis have displayed no great bitterness against the Christian population as Christians, but they are fearful of any attempts to increase the political powers of the Christians. They hate the Yezidis, who reciprocate the hatred.

The Religion of the Yezidis.—This is described under the Yezidis in Chapter VI. The chief characteristic of their religion is the hatred inculcated of Muhammadanism and Muhammadans. The Yezidis have shown great sympathy at all times to Christians, and for this reason favour direct British rule in Iraq. Their holy places are sacrosanct and should be respected. Their religion also forbids the use of lettuce, cucumbers, etc., as food, and it is an insult to ask for such from a Yezidi. They also abominate all words beginning with SH, as they are supposed to be

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a reflection on Shaitan, or the devil. The use of Arabic or Kurdish words in SH should, therefore, be avoided in the presence of Yezidis.

Languages.—The following languages are spoken and written in Northern Jazirah: Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish. Among the Arab tribes the medium of official correspondence in Iraq territory is Arabic, but Turkish is also understood. In Tel Afar the more educated citizens talk and write Arabic, but Turkish dialect is the chief medium of conversation. The Kurds and Yezidis speak Northern Kurmanj, but the former also largely understand Arabic. A force operating in Northern Jazirah requires Kurdish, Turkish and Arab interpreters.

CHAPTER VI.

TRIBES.

General.—The tribes of Northern Jazirah comprise elements from the following divergent races: Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Turcoman and Circassian. The important characteristics of the various tribes are not the nature and origin of the tribal bond, whether they claim descent from a single family like the Tai, or they have merely assumed tribal form as feudal fiefs like the people of Tel Afar, but the nature of their existence and its relationship to law and order, *i.e.*, whether they are nomadic or sedentary. History has shown that local as well as universal upheavals have been invariably caused by the restlessness of a part of the local population. Owing to the existence of a number of migratory and consequently turbulent tribes, Northern Jazirah is a continuous and potential centre of unrest. Broadly speaking, the nomadic tribes comprise the Arab and Kurd population of the district under survey, while the settled population consists of Yezidis, Turcomans and Circassians. Although the latter are not absolutely amenable to government, they cause little trouble compared with the Badawin such as the Shammar Jarba.

Tribal Population and Armed Forces.—Any attempt to estimate the tribal population of Northern Jazirah must naturally be very tentative, owing to the lack of government control exercised in the area and of census figures. The following table shows roughly the tribal population and armed forces of Northern Jazirah.

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Tribe.	Horse.	Foot.	Total men Capable of bearing arms.	Modern Rifles.	Old but serviceable Rifles.	Total Rifles.
Agaidat ..	5	35	40	—	15	15
Bagarah ..	645	3,355	4,000	500	700	1,200
Chechens ..	400	800	1,200	300	250	550
Fadan, Section of Anizah ..	2,500	1,900	4,400	1,000	1,400	2,400
Girgiryah ..	60	540	600	60	140	200
Hassinan ..	70	730	800	100	440	540
Jubur of Khabur ..	655	4,645	5,300	910	915	1,825
Jubur of Tel Afar district ..	25	1,783	1,808	40	200	240
Juhaish ..	107	893	1,000	125	255	380
Mu ' Amara ..	80	120	200	80	80	160
Malawahah, Section of Hadidiyin ..	5	55	60	5	10	15
Mutaiwid ..	100	300	400	50	200	250
Rashkan (Yezidis) ..	20	60	80	—	30	30
Shammar Jarba ..	4,500	10,500	15,000	2,000	4,000	6,000
Sherabiyin ..	20	420	440	40	60	100
Tai ..	400	2,600	3,000	620	445	1,065
Tai of Tel Afar district ..	15	285	300	30	65	95
Tel Afaris ..	260	2,060	2,320	210	750	960
Yezidis ..	500	5,060	5,560	400	2,000	2,400
Totals ..	10,367	36,141	46,508	6,470	11,955	18,425

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Arms and Ammunition.—The tribesmen of Northern Jazirah possess no mean conception of the capability and usefulness of a rifle, and accordingly set a high value on the modern small-bore rifle. Before the war, the commonest rifle in tribal hands was the Martini, but since 1914 the various tribes have accumulated a large number of Turkish Mausers. There are also quite a number of modern British Lee-Enfields, which were captured by the Turks and either sold or given to the tribes. Mauser ammunition is plentiful, and likely in ordinary circumstances to furnish a supply of 100 rounds per Mauser for several years. British ammunition is hard to obtain and the Enfield is frequently used as a single loader with a Mauser cartridge. Martini ammunition is exhausted and the possessors of such weapons usually refill old cases with black powder and add the necessary lead. There also exist many old muzzle-loading shot-guns, French chassepots and blunderbusses.

Since 1920 the main supply of the tribes has come from the Turks or via Dair al Zor from Aleppo. In the event of a Turkish move on Mosul, the pro-Turkish tribes would be supplied from Nisibin. At present supplies of black powder are obtainable in Mosul. There seems no possibility of preventing the importation of arms from Aleppo, unless the French authorities co-operate with the authorities of Iraq.

Fighting Characteristics and Tactics.—The Badawin tribesman of Northern Jazirah is essentially a mounted soldier, if by soldier is understood merely fighting man. "Mounted" implies the possession of a horse, camel, or mule. In desert warfare the death of the beast usually means the death or capture of its rider, and great care is consequently taken to avoid close contact with superior mounted forces.

The inhabitants of Northern Jazirah have manifested little or no fanaticism as followers of the Prophet, and accordingly display little of the blind élan of their more impressionable brethren of Southern Iraq. They are little moved either by religion or politics, and are unlikely to turn out in large numbers where there is a risk of death, unless there is a chance of loot. Even in a family blood-feud, the death of a victim is not so much desired as his personal possessions. In an ordinary tribal fracas the Badawin evinces no great blood-lust. Casualties are few, and surrenders freely accepted. In warfare against "Mafirs" or infidels, prisoners are not likely to be taken.

Seldom have tribesmen displayed any desire for determined attack on columns of trained British soldiers.

They have preferred to attack detached posts, convoys and unprotected villages where there are prospects of loot. The chief characteristic is mobility, and ability of a large party to exist for at least seven days without the necessity of replenishing supplies. In event of an attack on a post or convoy, the Badawin tribes usually move their families and flocks to a secure retreat beyond the immediate scope of action against them by a small force, such as has been available, in parts on the Mosul-Shergat road. It is questionable, however, if he will be able to obtain security from the action of aeroplanes. Settled villagers, if in opposition to the Iraq authorities, will contrive to drive off their herds and produce, and leave their villages to be destroyed. The people of Tel Afar did this in the disturbances of 1920, but were only able to exist with difficulty away from Tel Afar for about a month.

Arab forces after about seven days, if unable to find subsistence on the countryside, will inevitably break up, as they have no arrangements for continuous supplies of either food or fodder. In the event of booty being captured, dispersal is equally inevitable. Thus a victory is often as disastrous as defeat, so far as the existence of a tribal force is concerned. Against mounted tribesmen, infantry are practically useless. All recent operations have demonstrated that the rôle of infantrymen in desert warfare is that of garrisoning detached posts, or for short-distance rounding up of villages within easy distance of defended posts. Cavalry, or, better still, mounted infantry, provide the only means of successfully defeating mounted Badawin. It is more than probable that a Camel Corps would prove the most efficacious means of policing Northern Jazirah. L.A.M. cars can traverse the main Nisibin and Dair al Zor-Mosul routes, but the radius of their action off these routes is impaired by the existence of cultivation and many large unbridged wadis. Further survey of Northern Jazirah may enlarge the scope of L.A.M. cars, but the ease with which they can be knocked out and their inability to hold ground, precludes their success by themselves. The success of Tanks without other support in desert country seems as remote as that of L.A.M. cars.

Aeroplanes are ideal for observation and for the temporary dispersal of hostile concentrations. The Arab has not yet learned to reply adequately to fire from the air, and the terrain of the Jazirah, except in summer and autumn, when it can be fired to conceal movement, offers no facilities for the concealment of a large body of

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mounted men. Aeroplanes by themselves are, however, unable to compel the surrender or defeat of hostile tribes. The effects of aeroplane action are chiefly moral in such country as the Jazirah, and the main task of defeating and breaking up a hostile gathering must ultimately rest with cavalry or mounted infantry.

Tribes in relation to possible Centres of Disturbance.

(i) *Dair al Zor*.—Dair al Zor is an important tribal centre and desert post, where various tribes from east and west of the Euphrates come to replenish their commissariat and sell their flocks. As it is now administered by the French, any contingency in its vicinity is only of indirect interest to the Government of Iraq. The Shammar Jarba regard the town as one of their chief market towns, while the Jubur and Khabur also use it as a supply centre. West of the Euphrates the chief tribal groups, who are interested in Dair al Zor, are the Anizah. It has been the policy of the French for some time to keep an Anizah Governor in the town, and it is questionable if the Shammar have for this reason been able to obtain their usual supplies from it. In the event of a disturbance in Dair al Zor, the Shammar Jarba, the Fadan section of the Anizah, the Tai, Jubur and Baggarah would all send contingents after loot. They would inevitably also fight amongst themselves. Combined French and British action from Dair al Zor and Mosul respectively would effectively bring the Shammar to heel, provided the Turks kept aloof.

(ii) *Balad Sinjar*.—Balad Sinjar, in the event of a Yezidi rising against the Arab Government of Iraq—not a remote possibility if the British influence is removed or withdrawn—would probably be the goal not only of repressive government troops, but also of the Shammar, Jarba, Tai, Tel Afar, Mutaiwid, Juhaish and Jubur of the Khabur.

The following would be the numbers involved:—

	Rifles.
Yezidis	2,400
Shammar	6,000
Tai	1,065
Tel Afaris	960
Mutaiwid	250
Juhaish	380
Jubur	1,825
	12,880

In such a contingency the Arab Government would be supported by all the tribes excepting perhaps the Tai, who might conceivably help the Yezidis. If, on the other hand, the Shammar made an attack on the latter, it would probably only have to deal with 6,000 rifles of the Shammar and be aided by the Tai and Tel Afaris.

(iii) *Tel Afar*.—Tel Afar, conceivably as a result of Turkish intrigue, might rise against the Arab Government, if the desert tribes came in with the townsmen. In 1920, the tribal forces against the British were found from the Shammar, Jubur, Juhaish, and Girgiriya, but never numbered more than 250 rifles. In the event of a similar rising on a larger scale, the numbers involved would be:—

	Rifles.
Tel Afaris	960
Shammar	6,000
Mutaiwid	250
Juhaish	380
Girgiriya	200
Jubur (Khabur)	1,825
	9,615

It is probable, however, that the force to be encountered would never exceed 2,000 rifles. In this contingency the Yezidis and Tai might be employed in attacking hostile villages and raiding the Tel Afar-Sinjar roads.

(iv) *Nisibin*.—The chief tribes which visit Nisibin in Turkish territory are the Tai, Shammar and Jubur of the Khabur. The Tai are almost entirely dependent on Nisibin for supplies, while the Shammar not only use it as a winter market, but pasture their flocks near the town in that season. The Jubur are in a position to cut communications between Dair al Zor and Nisibin, so the Turks are consequently anxious to keep on friendly terms with them. Nisibin only indirectly concerns the Iraq authorities, but might prove of vital interest in case of a Turkish move on Mosul. In such case, it might be possible for the Arab Government to utilize the Shammar, Tai and Yezidis to attack the Turkish lines of communication. On the other hand, the Turks might induce the Tai and Shammar to throw in their lot with them, and the Yezidis would then alone be available for very hypothetical raids on the lines of communication.

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(ii) Pan-Islamism as a general policy for the unification of all Moslems makes no appeal to the semi-pagan Badawin, but it is not without effect in stirring up hatred of the "Kafirs" or Christians. Latterly, Ahmad, Shaikh al Senussi, has been employed by the Nationalist Turks to rouse a pro-Turkish feeling amongst the Jazirah tribes by upholding Nationalist Turkey as the defenders of the Moslem faith. The Badawin are not sufficiently fanatic to take much interest in, or be influenced by, the policy of the Senussi. He is, however, respected by the Tel Afar Saiyids.

(iii) Turkish intrigues have been persistent since the advent of General Nihad Pasha, as G.O.C. the Jazirah front in Diarbekr, and his successor, General Jawwad Pasha. They have consistently spread propaganda of an extremely anti-British nature amongst the tribes. The Nationalists have stated their intention of putting a son of the present or ex-Sultan of Turkey on the throne of Iraq, and have found no little sympathy for such a project in Mosul, which, however, cannot be taken as a reflection of the Jazirah attitude should the Nationalists overcome the Greeks and find themselves in a position to send armed forces to the Iraq frontier, for operations towards Mosul, there seems little doubt that most of the Jazirah tribes would join them. The Turkish sympathies of the people of Tel Afar are undoubted.

(iv) The future attitude of the Jazirah tribes within the Iraq frontier in reality depends upon the strength and power of assertion of the Arab Government in Iraq. A strong government will eventually compel the Shammar to settle down. The Tai and other nomads will ordinarily be out of reach of the arm of the law, and will remain nominally independent until Syria, Turkey and Iraq reach a definite and co-ordinated scheme of frontier control.

At the moment when control is exercised only in the neighbourhood of the chief towns and main roads, the policy of the tribes, at least the nomadic ones, is to avoid the attention of government tax collectors and forces of order. Geographically they are in an excellent position to carry out such a policy since the Shammar, if out of favour in Iraq, merely move north-west to Turkish territory, where they are sure of a welcome, and the Jubur of the Khabur, if out of favour with the Turks, will shift their mobile headquarters to Iraq territory. The Badawin do not desire any kind of government, but, if compelled to a choice, would prefer a weak authority unable to

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enforce its laws. Even the western tribes would be satisfied with an arrangement whereby they could place themselves under the patronage of the stronger or more virile tribes.

At present the Baggarah and part of the Anizah have declared for Syria under the French. The Jubur correspond affably with Iraq, Syria and Turkey; the Tai and Shammar contrive to keep on good terms with the Turkish and Arab Government; while the Yezidis, although dissatisfied, and settled inhabitants of the Tel Afar district are for the nonce inclined to favour Iraq and Faisal. A breath of wind will send them all sailing in different directions.

To a certain extent international politics are influenced by the attitude of certain tribes. Thus the Shammar and Anizah will never acknowledge the same governments as this would seem to be surrendering their ancient vendetta—much more important to either than the little troubles of great or small states.

Punitive Measures.—The prospects of a single large tribal force operating under a single individual are remote. Even if Turkish intrigues succeeded in urging the tribes to try a fall with the Arab Government, tribal jealousies would prevent any co-ordination of effort. The most likely contingency in the Jazirah for the Iraq Government will be raiding carried out by Shammar groups, perhaps joined by odd elements from various tribes. The characteristics of the Badawin and of the forces necessary to deal with them in revolt have been adequately described under the Shammar Jarba and elsewhere. To recapitulate, the essential of a punitive force is mobility, the ideal means for observation is the aeroplane, whilst for administering the *coup de grâce* mounted troops or camel corps are the best force.

As the greater part of the inhabitants of Northern Jazirah consist of herdsmen, certain large towns must necessarily be used by them for supplies. The complete subjugation of the Jazirah requires the occupation by one or several allied powers working in co-operation of the following towns: Mosul, Tel Afar, Nisibin, Ras al Ain, Raqqah and Dair al Zor. The occupation of these towns, together with a blockade of the main routes of commerce between Iraq, Syria and Anatolia, would ensure the ultimate control of the whole Jazirah population. For action against isolated tribes the necessary bases have been indicated in the notes on the various tribes.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٢٨ظ] (٢٢٦/٦١)

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
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
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5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
5	40	40	15		A few settled families of the Euphrates Agaidat, who have the same outlook as the Jubur villagers, amongst whom they live. Pro-British; of no significance.

THE BAGGARAH.

The Baggarah appear to have been one of the earliest emigrant tribes from Arabia. When the Shammar invasion rolled north from Najd in the seventeenth century, it found the Baggarah in much the same social and geographical conditions as they exist under to-day. At present the tribe illustrates the transition stage from nomadic to sedentary, with the resultant clashing of sections and lack of cohesion. A part of the tribe has settled in riverine villages, and practises a crude but self-sufficient agriculture, while the rougher and more contained portion—in this case the majority—still follow with their flocks the seasonal changes in grazing.

(1) *Mode of Life and Supplies.*—The sedentary Baggarah are settled along the left bank of the Euphrates above Dair al Zor, and from their fields irrigated by "Karrad" or lifts, produce annually about 500 tons of wheat and barley. The Baggarah grazing grounds extend along the right bank of the Khabur as far north as the Jabal Abd al Aziz. On a rough computation the pastoral sections possess 25,000 sheep, 700 horses and 1,000 camels. The usual migrating tracks of the herdsmen lie west of the Khabur in order to avoid encroachment on the grazing grounds of friendly Jubur. In the Jabal Abd al Aziz—during the winter—there is continuous conflict between the Baggarah and Chechens from Ras al Ain. Dair al Zor and Aleppo form the main supply base of the tribe, although Baggarah caravans often make their way via Tel Afar to Mosul.

(2) *Feuds and Alliances.*—Tribal strength is much impaired by internal feuds. Mahmud al Gahit and Thiab ibn Bishra, the two most important chiefs, have quarrelled over a marriage inheritance, to which both men have rather a shadowy claim. A further cause of ill-feeling arose from an ill-division of loot captured from the Anizah in 1920. The third section under Salih ibn Hasan maintains a strict neutrality. Externally the tribe carries on an annual struggle with the Chechens in the Jabal Abd al Aziz. The Jais often cross the Balikh and descend on Baggarah herds, while in the south-west the Anizah are a continual thorn in the flesh. The Baggarah maintain friendly relations with the Jubur and Tai, and, owing to their enmity with the Chechens and Anizah, are looked on as allies by the Milli and Shammar.

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Fighting Ability.—The sedentary Baggarah display no marked aptitude for fighting, but the rougher nomads are reputed warriors, second to none in long-distant camel raids. In their fighting methods they differ little from other Arab tribes.

Political Attitude.—The tribe at present is under the jurisdiction of the Syrian Government, and is controlled from Dair al Zor. It is said to have taken part in the Dair al Zor coup in December, 1919, when the British garrison was captured. Owing to its position, it is susceptible to Pan-Arab and Turkish propaganda, but is unlikely to move of its own accord against any government.

Rifles.—The tribe possessed, in 1920, 500 modern and 700 old but serviceable rifles. The predominating type is the Turkish Mauser. Sources of supply of both rifles and ammunition are Aleppo and Ras al Ain. There is also a certain amount of gun-running from the Syrian desert, and as there appears to be no adequate effort made to suppress this trade at its source, it is feasible to suppose the Baggarah have close on 1,000 modern rifles.

Religion and Language.—By religion the tribe is Sunni, and consequently inclines to favour the Turks. They speak Arabic.

Personalities.—There is no outstanding personality in the Baggarah, but Mahmud al Gahit, Thiab' al Bishra and Salih ibn Hasan control the tribe between them.

Punitive Measures.—(1) *Terrain.*—Riverine flats and the waterless desert cut by the Khabur.

(2) *Routes.*—The main Baghdad-Aleppo route lies on the right bank between Dair al Zor and Aleppo. There are also several lateral tracks between the Khabur and Euphrates passable for L.A.M. cars, but impracticable for infantry and cavalry. Along the Khabur there exist tracks fit for pack transport.

(3) The curtailment of supplies from Dair al Zor, the destruction of villages on the river, and action by L.A.M. cars and aeroplanes are indicated as punitive measures.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٢ ظ] (٢٢٦/٦٩)

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
BAGGARAH (divided into three main sections).	Mahmud al Gahit.. Thiab al Bishra .. Salih ibn Hasan ..	Left bank of Euphrates between Dair al Zor and Tigni. Nomadic sections feed their flocks on Jabal Abd al Aziz.	2,000
1st Section.	Mahmud al Gahit (Paramount).	900
Abu Hamdan ..	Wawi ibn Amtair	40
Abu Masa'ah ..	(Only 25 per cent.)	20
Al Rashid	30
Erfav	40
Shuwahir ..	Mahmud al Gahit	150
2nd Section.	Thiab ibn Bishra (Paramount).	175
Abu Masa'ah ..	(Only 75 per cent.).. Thiab ibn Bishra.	60
Abu M'ish ..	Atiat al Hasan	40
Al Ali ..	Sulaiman al Hasan..	25
Ubaidat ..	Thahir al Mahmud	50
3rd Section.	Salih ibn Hasan	130
Abu Cherim..	Salih ibn Hasan	30
Abu Badran ..	Salih ibn Jerad	100

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30
100

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BAGGARAH.

33

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
645	800	4,000	500	700	<i>Vide general note.</i>
340	495	1,800	200	350	
40	100	140	
20	25	45	
30	90	120	
40	80	120	
150	200	350	
175	195	370	
60	75	135	
40	60	100	
25	35	70	
50	25	75	
130	210	340	
30	100	130	
100	110	210	

THE CHECHENS (of Ras al Ain).

About 1870, a band of 4,000 Circassian Moslem families, after a protracted struggle with Russian troops, emigrated under Shaikh Shamil, their chief, from Vladikavkaz to Constantinople. The Turks, realizing that the existence of such a community in their territories might require considerable watching, decided to split it up into sections. Accordingly they planted Circassian colonies in Medina, Smyrna, Panderna, Sivas, Bitlis and Ras al Ain. The present Chechens under survey are the descendants of these emigrants.

The Chechens are wholly sedentary and engaged in agriculture. They also possess large flocks, which, owing to the scant grazing in the neighbourhood of Ras al Ain, have to be driven into the Jazirah as far south as the Jabal Abd al Aziz. Accurate figures are not available, but it is estimated that they possess 10,000 sheep, 500 horses, and produce 300 tons of foodstuffs per annum. The pastoral portion of the tribe moves to the Jabal Abd al Aziz about October, and remains there till April.


Internal cohesion is good, but the settlement has suffered much from external aggression. Their chief enemies are the Milli Kurds, the Baggarah and Jubur Arabs. The Turks are inclined to look on the Chechens with favour, especially as they act as a buffer against Milli outrages. During the war, Muhammad Fazil Pasha Daghestani led 200 Chechen cavalry to Erzerum against the Russians, doing well in the operations there.

The Chechens are excellent cavalry fighters. They are armed with 300 modern Mauser rifles and 250 old but serviceable weapons. Their principal source of supply is from the Turkish military authorities, who have formed a Chechen Cavalry Milice force under their chief, Timur Bey.

Owing to their isolation and good treatment by the Turks, the Chechens are thoroughly pro-Turk and anti-Russian. There is no reason to believe they are animated by anti-British sentiments.

The Chechens formerly were Christians, but are now devout Sunni Moslems, and for this reason are inclined to give their assistance and sympathy to the Turks in any dispute between them and other Moslem states. They speak Circassian amongst themselves, but the majority is acquainted with Turkish and Arabic.

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٤ ظ] (٢٢٦/٧٣)

56

1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
CHECHENS ..	Timur Bey (Para- mount).	In villages around Ras al Ain.	600
<i>Sections.</i> Elistokhoi	Timur Bey ..	As above	175
Ghalghai	Kamil Bey ibn Timur Bey. (Kamil is now at Diarbekr.)	As above	250
	Muhammad Amin ibn Ghazal Bey.		
Nakhshi ..	Mirza Bey. (Was a Bimbashi serving in the 12th Army Corps.)	As above	175

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٥] [٢٢٦/٧٤]

35

57

CHECHENS.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
400	145	1,200	300	250	Sedentary. Agriculturalists and herdsmen. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Good fighters. Chiefly cavalry. Timur Bey is chief of the Chechen Cavalry Milice Force. Armed by the Turks. <i>Political attitude.</i> —Influenced by religion. Anti-Russian under any circumstances. Pro-Turk but not necessarily Anti-British. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good, but it is remarkable how few relations they have with their countrymen in Raqqah. <i>External relations.</i> —Have no friends among the Arab and Kurd tribes. Usually hostile to Milli and Baggarah, and on visiting terms with the remainder. Pay no tribute. <i>Military action.</i> —The occupation of Ras al Ain assures their submission.
150	25	350	100	75	
125	70	500	125	75	
125	50	350	75	100	

FADAN.

(Section of the Anizah.)

The Anizah have played, and continue to play, a conspicuous part in desert politics. It is not proposed, however, to dilate at length on the whole tribe, but to consider briefly the Fadan section, which alone reacts upon the situation in Northern Jazirah.

(1) The Fadan range both banks of the Euphrates from Aleppo to Dair al Zor and up the Khabur Valley almost to Jabal Sinjar. Like the other sections of the Anizah, the dominant business of their lives is pursuit of the bitter and ancient feud against the Shammar Jarba. The most striking personality in the tribe and the guides of its political destinies is Hachim ibn Muhaid, who is possibly second only to Nuri al Shalan in the Anizah confederation. A man of about 45, he is vain, avaricious, and ostensibly Pan-Arab. When the French authorities drove Faisal from Syria, Hachim threw in his lot with the Turkish Nationalists and proceeded to annoy the French by raiding their columns and obstructing riverine traffic between Aleppo and Dair al Zor. In 1920 the French installed Mijhim ibn Muhaid, cousin of Hachim, as governor of Dair al Zor, a post he occupied till the spring of 1921. In June that year he apparently threw in his lot with Hachim and is now stated to be animated by anti-French sentiments. Apparently the Fadan are also anti-British, but they are unlikely to trouble our interests in Northern Jazirah, excepting by long-distance raids against the Shammar Jarba and raids on the Dair al Zor-Sinjar caravan route.

(2) *Rifles, etc.*—It is computed that the Fadan could put some 4,000 men in the field, of whom 1,000 would be armed with modern small-bore rifles. The commonest type of rifle is the Mauser, but a certain amount of British rifles is also found. There is every indication that the Turkish Nationalists have provided Hachim with numerous rifles and ammunition. In addition, considerable gun-running is being carried on from Syria. It is probably correct to assume, therefore, that Hachim could put 2,500 horsemen, well equipped with modern rifles, in the field.

(3) *Tribal Conditions.*—The Fadan are nomadic and usually roam from Aleppo to Dair al Zor in the summer and in the winter (October to April) move into Northern Jazirah towards the Khabur and into the Syrian desert. Covering such a huge expanse of territory, they follow no particular routes, but generally continue to levy toll on the river road.

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(4) Like all nomadic tribes, the Fadan practise no agriculture, and are pastoral. They are, therefore, compelled to follow grazing and depend largely for other supplies on towns such as Damascus, Aleppo and Dair al Zor. This restriction to certain supply depôts offers facilities for hitting the tribe in a vulnerable spot.

(5) *Feuds.*—The Fadan, like other Anizah sections, wages a bitter feud with the Shammar Jarba.

(6) *Combinations, etc.*—The Anizah as a whole do not cohere together. The Fadan, however, cling well together under Hachim and are likely to show a solid front against an enemy.

(7) The Fadan have a reputation as fighters, and in 1921 caused the French considerable perturbation by their lightning raids on townships in Syria. Noted horse-breeders, the tribe is naturally well mounted and adept at the desert game of "cut and run."

(8) The Fadan speak desert Arabic, which differs considerably from that of the towns.

(9) The Fadan are Sunnis, but their faith, like that of all desert tribes, is touched with paganism. In spite of this they are apt to become fanatical in times of "Jihad," and are inclined to follow the Turks rather than the Sharifian family.

(10) The dominant principle in any tribal movement will be the facility or otherwise of obtaining loot. At the same time, Turkish propaganda exercises considerable influence at the moment, and, in event of a Turkish move in force on Dair al Zor, the Fadan would inevitably take part.

(11) Tribal disturbances are liable to occur throughout the year, but more especially in the migration seasons or in a bad pasturage year.

(12) Punitive measures against the Fadan present many difficulties—expanse of terrain, waterless deserts, habitable country for tribes but impassable for regular troops, and the fact that Turkey offers a haven of refuge in Northern Jazirah. The main route, *i.e.*, Dair al Zor-Aleppo, could be kept clear by constant patrolling by armoured cars, but operations away from the river would have little success. As the Fadan have no villages, the destruction of immovable property is out of the question. The exclusion from the Dair al Zor and Aleppo markets, the seizure of flocks, and the defeat of whatever bodies of the tribe were met are the only punitive measures within the scope of land forces. It remains to be seen how far aerial action will prove successful against mobile tribesmen.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٦ ظ] (٢٢٦/٧٧)

60

1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
FADAN (Section of the Anizah).	Hachim ibn Muhaid (Paramount). H.Q, Raqqah.	<i>Summer.</i> —West of Dair al Zor and on banks of Khabur River. <i>Winter.</i> —Some sections with Amarat in desert west of Middle Euphrates but majority on both banks Euphrates between Dair al Zor and Aleppo.	2,500
Dhana Majid ..	Midrwad ibn Qu Aishish.	Ditto	1,200
Wulud	Mijhim ibn Muhaid (sometimes styled Mijhim ibn Turki).	Ditto	1,000

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٧و] [٢٢٦/٧٨]

37

61

FADAN.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
2,500	..	4,400	1,000	1,400	<i>Vide general note.</i>

GIRGIRIYAH.

According to one dubious tradition the Girgiriya Kurds were originally of Arab descent, but the tribe itself asserts its purely Kurdish ancestry. The grandfather of the present paramount chief, Sulaiman Agha, is supposed to have brought the tribe from Sulaimani about 100 years ago. Whatever their past history, the Girgiriya now exist as tent-dwelling agriculturists beyond the true limits of Kurdistan; Arab in mode of life and dress, but Kurdish in speech and tradition.

Before the outbreak of the war the Girgiriya played no conspicuous part in desert politics. During the war their looting activities were curtailed by a German supply company which was established at Hogena, the headquarters of Sulaiman Agha. After the British occupation of Mosul and the establishment of British administration in Tel Afar district, the Girgiriya showed themselves very well disposed towards the British. In June, 1920, however, probably forced by circumstances, the tribe threw in its lot with Jamil Beg and the Sharifian force, which attacked Tel Afar. It was in the camp of Sulaiman Agha that the attempt was made to capture the late Major Barlow, D.S.O., M.C., Political Officer of Tel Afar, and there seems no doubt that, though Sulaiman Agha did his best to warn Major Barlow of his danger in the last extreme, he could probably have saved the Political Officer's life, and, by making a stand, prevented the fall of Tel Afar. After the punitive expedition to that town the Girgiriya fled beyond our frontier, but the larger portion soon made submission; Sulaiman Agha was allowed to return to his habitat, but exhibited no great anxiety to pay his fine. Eventually, when he saw that the Turks, with whom he was in correspondence, were unable and unlikely to try their strength against the British authorities, he paid up his dues reluctantly. A portion of the tribe remained as outlaws in the Suwaidiyah under Haji Abdul Qadir, the cousin of Sulaiman Agha and the most important chief of the tribe after him.

In 1921 Sulaiman Agha was made responsible for the keeping of the Hogena Gate, and successfully prevented the inroads of Bilaibil and his robbers into our territories. Sulaiman's attitude to the Arab Government is non-committal. He is prepared to support it provided the British exercise a controlling power in its activities, but it seems certain that, from his geographical position

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on the Mosul-Nisibin road, any Turkish effort against a weak Arab Government would have his support.

The Girgiriya are semi-nomadic within the confines of the tribal habitat, *i.e.*, they cultivate their villages at the appropriate season and follow grazing with their flocks. A list of Girgiriya villages is given at the end of this note. The Girgiriya country is well watered, and the tribe produces annually about 500 tons of wheat and barley. It also possesses about 10,000 sheep and 200 mules and plough cattle. Supplies are obtained mostly from Mosul and partially from Nisibin and Jazirah ibn Omar. Tribal parties also make their way to the Kurdish hills above Dohuk, whence they bring back tobacco, wood, and fruit.

The Girgiriya before the Tel Afar outbreak were under the supreme control of Sulaiman Agha, but since he made submission a portion has been inclined to favour Haji Abdul Qadir—more in fear than with goodwill. It is not likely that Haji Abdul Qadir will be a serious rival of the present chief.

Externally the Girgiriya, though not at feud with the Shammar, pay the latter no tribute, and would probably support a force operating against them. Sulaiman Agha lives in friendly relationship with Haji Abdul Aziz of the Hassinan and with the people of Tel Afar, Jubur and Juhai. Formerly a great friend of Haji Naif Beg, of the Miran, Sulaiman Agha quarrelled with the latter in 1921 over the price of a mare.

The Girgiriya are good fighters and in an attempt to rout out the Bilaibil nest of robbers displayed considerable élan and bravery. They possess about 60 modern and 200 old but serviceable rifles—mostly German and Turkish Mausers. Since Sulaiman Agha submitted to Government he has been unable to acquire rifles from the Turks, who were his chief source of supply. In case of hostility to the British the most likely centre of rifle and ammunition supply would be Jazirah ibn Omar. A proportion of rifles also comes from the Syrian desert via the Tai and Jubur of the Khabur.

The tribe, being in close proximity to the Turkish frontier and Sunni by persuasion, is liable to Turkish intrigues. During 1920-1921 considerable interest was taken in Sulaiman Agha by the Turkish military authorities, chiefly because the tribal habitat lies across the main highway between Nisibin and Mosul.

The Girgiriya speak Northern Kurmanji, but many of the tribesmen are able to converse in both Arabic and Turkish.

The most outstanding personality in the tribe is Sulaiman Agha, the paramount chief. In 1921 his attitude was thoroughly pro-British. Placed in a difficult position, he is forced to keep a foot in both the Turkish and Arab camps. A genial personality, he is prepared to play a straight game if strongly supported by Government. Muhammad ibn Haji Qadir is the most influential personage after Sulaiman Agha. He took a prominent part in the Tel Afar disturbances, and has since proved intractable. In July, 1921, he was still with Bilaibil.

Punitive measures may be considered as under:—

(a) *Terrain*.—The Girgiriya country lies between Hogena and Zummar, rolling downs cut by low ranges of hills, and commanding the main Nisibin-Mosul road. At Hogena there is a gap in a low ridge of hills running from north-east to south-west, which is known as the Hogena Gate, and through which passes the Nisibin-Mosul road. A defensive position exists at this place, but it could be easily turned from either flank.

(b) *Routes*.—Girgiriya country is traversed by the Mosul-Nisibin road, which, though in need of repairs, is favourable for L.A.M. cars. A motor road fit for Ford vans also runs between Hogena and Zummar. In other parts of the territory tracks passable for pack and camel transport exist.

(c) *Water*.—Perennial supply for two cavalry regiments can be obtained at all villages. At Hogena there is enough throughout the year for one division. Facilities for watering horses must be carried by operating forces.

(d) *Tactical Points*.—The chief tactical point is the village of Hogena.


(e) *Punitive action* may therefore take the form of intensive bombing of villages and flocks on the occupation of Hogena and other villages. Supposing the Girgiriya alone were causing trouble, one regiment of cavalry would be sufficient to bring the tribe to heel.

GIRGIRIYAH VILLAGES.

Village.	Population.	Chief.
Hogena	255	Sulaiman Agha.
Mafri	300	Muhammad al Hana Qadir.
Tel Mus	180	Sulaiman Agha.
Kahriz	160	"
Girfar	100	"
Ain Hulwa	130	"
Qasr Seruj	315	"
Abu Wazna	150	"

(2241)

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٩ و] (٢٢٦/٨٢)



(C2241)

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٩ظ] (٢٢٦/٨٣)

66

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
GIRGIRIYAH .. (Qarqariyah).	Sulaiman Agha (Par- amount). H.Q., Hogena.	Hogena-Zummar (20 miles north of Tel Afar).	300
Mahmud Khan ..	Sulaiman Agha ..	Qasr Seruj-Hogena-Kahriz	150
MushGan	Tel Mus	36
Qarqan	Muhammad ibn Haji Abdul Qadir.	Mafri-Ain Hulwa ..	60
Tournan	Sulaiman Agha ..	Mafri	30
Zummar sections ..	Muhammad Asad	Zummar	24

Horse.

60

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(2241)

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٠] [٢٢٦/٨٤]

67 GIRGIRIYAH. 40

4. Families' Tents or houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
300	60	..	600	60	140	Sedentary agriculturists. Pro-British, good fighters. Chief is paramount. One section still out in Suwaidiyah under Muhammad Abdul Qadir.
150	30	..	300	40	70	Follows Sulaiman Agha in politics.
36	5	..	72	5	20	Follows Sulaiman Agha.
60	15	..	120	10	40	Part of this section follows Sulaiman Agha: the remainder, about 20 houses, is with Muhammad in the camp of Bilaibil (July, 1921).
30	5	..	60	3	5	Follows Sulaiman Agha.
24	5	..	48	2	5	Follows Sulaiman Agha.

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HASSINAN.

The Hassinan claim to have been originally a Kurdish tribe, in all probability a section of the Miran confederation. There is, however, another tradition that they formed originally part of the Hassinan or Rashqan Yezidis. They are now thoroughly Arabicized, though still speaking Northern Kurmanji.

Owing to his enmity with Naif Beg of the Miran, Haji Abdul Aziz, the paramount chief of the Hassinan, willingly accepted inclusion within the British sphere of influence after the armistice. He is said to have gone under compulsion to Tel Afar during the disturbances, but this is doubtful. Throughout the difficult times following the re-occupation of Tel Afar he loyally assisted the Government and did much to prevent raiders crossing the river. Along with Sulaiman Agha of the Girgiriya he has made himself responsible for the northern frontier from Shaikhuba to the Nisibin-Mosul road. The tribe is placed in a difficult position geographically, but there seems little doubt that so long as the feud with the Miran continues it will remain pro-British. A further inducement to this end is the possession of estates by Haji Abdul Aziz in the Dohuk area.

The Hassinan are settled cultivators in the north-east corner of the Nahiyah of Zummar. A few tribal villages also exist in Turkish territory north of the Wadi Suwaidiyah. The produce of Hassinan villages is about 200 tons of wheat and barley annually, while they possess about 10,000 head of sheep. The chief supply centre of the tribe is Mosul, but rice, fruit, tobacco, wood, etc., are also got from Zakho and Amadia districts.

Supreme control of the tribe is vested in Haji Abdul Aziz, who resides at Shaikhuba. The chief is a quiet, capable man, who seems to have a grievance, but is loyal and willing to help the Government. His chief enemy is Naif Beg of the Miran, whose father, Mustafa Agha, ousted Abdul Aziz's father from his territories. Yusuf Agha, the brother of the chief, is also a capable leader and loyal. In recent times a great friendship has sprung up between Sulaiman Agha of the Girgiriya and Haji Abdul Aziz.

The Hassinan possess very considerable fighting ability, and are continually trying to raid Miran villages. Though numerically less than their enemies, the Hassinan have contrived to carry off the larger spoils. The tribe

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is well armed, possessing 100 modern and 440 old but serviceable rifles. The latter are mostly Mausers. Ammunition is scarce, but in case of trouble would probably become available in Jazirah ibn Omar. Owing to its proximity to the Turkish frontier the tribe is susceptible to Turkish intrigues. It is probable, however, that so long as the British exercise control in the Mosul district the Hassinan will remain loyal.

The Hassinan speak Kurdish, but many of them can also speak Arabic and Turkish. By religion they are Sunnis, and so lean towards the Turks in religious matters.

Punitive measures against the tribe would probably drive them into Turkish territory.

(a) *Terrain*.—Hassinan country is a hilly tract south and north of the junction of the Tigris and Wadi Suwaidiyah. It is only passable for pack transport.

(b) *Routes*.—The Hassinan territories are accessible from Hogena and Eski Mosul directions and from the east bank of the Tigris. From Hogena a motor track leads to Zummar. From Eski Mosul there are only tracks fit for pack.

(c) *Water*.—The Tigris would supply unlimited water for a force of any size, *i.e.*, by the Eski Mosul route.

(d) *Tactical Points*.—The chief tactical point is the village of Haji Abdul Aziz.

(e) *Punitive action* might take the form of:—

(i) Intensive bombing, which would be difficult owing to the hilly nature of the ground.

(ii) Two columns operating one from the left bank of Tigris and the other from Hogena. Force necessary would be two regiments of cavalry and one battery of mountain guns.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤١ ظ] (٢٢٦/٨٧)

٧٠

1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
HASSINAN (Kurds)	Abdul Aziz Agha i bn Omar Agha (Par- amount).	Kifri Zaman and Shaikhuba	400

Horse.


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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٢ و] (٢٢٦/٨٨)


71 HASSINAN. (42)

4. Families' Tents or Houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
400	70	..	800	100	440	<p><i>Sedentary</i> cultivators in north-east corner of Zummar; few villages also in Turkish territory. Wheat and barley, 200 tons annually; 10,000 sheep.</p> <p><i>Politics.</i>—Pro-British; anti-Turk owing to Turkish support of the tribal enemy Naif Beg of Miran.</p> <p>Chief Abdul Aziz has helped various British political authorities.</p> <p><i>Tribe</i> fights well and is well armed with Mausers. S.A.A. is scarce.</p> <p><i>Punitive measures.</i>—Seizure of villages and bombing; chief villages are Shaikhuba and Kifri Zaman. Abdul Aziz's lands in Dohuk district could also be seized.</p>

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٢٤٤ ظ] (٢٢٦/٨٩)



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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٣ ظ] (٢٢٦/٩١)

74

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
JUBUR (Settled) .. Zummar.	Shaikh Shahir (Paramount). Shaikhs of vil- lages of Jamus, Shawaikh, Wawi and Wazeyin.	Zummar and vil- lages be- tween these and Eski Mosul.	904
(1) Homaidat	Ismail al Awwad. Hasan al Ali. Abdullah Ali Jadir.	A dozen villages in Nahi- yah of Homaidat be- tween Mosul and Tel Afar. Chief villages are Muwali, Tel Kashaf, Sahaji, Butaisha, Tauim, Hasan Kaif, Dibuna.	410

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٤ و] (٢٢٦/٩٢)

75 JUBUR.

4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
904	25	..	1,808	40	200	Sedentary cultivators, who live in settled villages between Zummar and Eski Mosul. Bad farmers. Produce 600 tons wheat and barley; 6,000 sheep. Chief supply centre Mosul. <i>Fighting value.</i> —Villagers are not over-keen fighters, and possess few rifles. Shaikh Shahir is chief Jubur Shaikh and acts as their representative. He was pro-British through Tel Afar disturbances. He is related to Muslat Pasha of the Khabur Jubur: loyal at heart but a time-server. Is not on good relations with Abdul Aziz, but is friendly with Sulaiman Agha of the Girgiryah. <i>Punitive measures</i> can be undertaken from left or right bank of Tigris; all villages are accessible to pack transport. Many of them can be shelled from left bank. One regiment cavalry could quell any local disturbance.
410	223	..	820	100	300	The Jubur of this district are settled cultivators, who follow their headmen in politics. They desire a fixed Government—British or Arab. During the Tel Afar disturbances, the villagers loyally supported the Government and resisted the Sharifian forces. For supplies, etc., <i>vide</i> Table A. <i>Punitive measures</i> should consist of seizure of villages accessible to L.A.M. cars from Mosul or Tel Afar.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٤ ظ] (٢٢٦/٩٣)

76

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
<i>Jubur—continued.</i>			
(2) Tel Afar	Hamad al Muslih. Khalaf al Ali.	Tamarat and other vil- lages 12 miles north- east of Tel Afar.	120

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٥و] [٢٢٦/٩٤]

77 JUBUR—contd.

45

4. Families' Tents or Houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	

JUBUR.

(Of the Khabur.)

The Jubur of the Khabur are closely allied to the numerous Jubur colonies scattered along the Tigris and to the Jubur al Khattab and Jubur al Wasir on the Euphrates. They appear to have emigrated very early from Arabia, and to have settled down to cultivation in the vicinity of Tel Busairah. According to tribal lore the cleavage in the Jubur took place as follows: Two hundred years ago the tribe was collected about the mouth of the Khabur under two brothers, Najad and Haichal, the sons of Omar. An unfortunate quarrel arose between the brothers and the tribe split into two factions. Najad's party, being the weaker, was driven south, and eventually settled on the Tigris and Euphrates, where their descendants exist to-day. Shortly after this quarrel, the Baggarah attacked the section of Haichal and drove it up the Khabur River, where it settled down to peaceful cultivation.

The Shammar Jarba on their arrival in the Jazirah harried the Jubur fields, and forced the tribe to pay substantial tribute to Al Hadi ibn Al Asi. In 1905, however, Al Asi quarrelled with his brother Jarullah, and in the struggle was materially helped by Jubur horsemen. Consequent on the success of Al Asi, the Jubur were freed from the payment of tribute, and have paid none till the present day to any Shammar shaikh.

During the war Muslat Pasha, the paramount Shaikh, developed Pan-Arab sentiments, and apparently did nothing to help the Turkish cause. When Maulud Pasha occupied Dair al Zor in December, 1919, he interviewed Muslat Pasha and tried to entice him to take up arms against the British. At the same time a Turkish mission appeared amongst the Jubur, and attempted to enlist tribal sympathies for the Nationalist cause. On the outbreak of lawlessness in the Tel Afar district in June, 1921, a few Jubur horsemen under a minor shaikh joined the Sharifian party under Jamil Beg. It is wrong to state, as was done, that Muslat Pasha personally took part in the rising. Likewise similar unfounded statements have been made accusing the Jubur of Yezidi robberies and raids on the Mosul lines of communication. Much of the adverse and malign statements on the character and attitude of Muslat Pasha are directly

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attributable to Hammu Shiru, the chief of the Yezidis, who hates Muslat Pasha with deadly enmity.

At present Muslat Pasha remains in a position of masterly neutrality, flattered by the Turks, threatened futilely by the French in Dair al Zor, and misunderstood by the Arab Government. He desires to gain as much as possible for his tribe, very cleverly keeps out of political and other broils, and waits before plunging *in medias res* till the present unstable situation is stabilized. He is at the moment probably inclined to favour the Turks, since they have shown their hand, and consequently is anti-British. His anti-British sentiments are not likely to alter so long as Hammu Shiru treats his offers of friendship with contempt. The French, after various vain efforts to bring him within their jurisdiction, are threatening to take punitive measures against him.

The Jubur consist of semi-nomadic herdsmen and settled cultivators, inhabiting both banks of the Khabur River from Tel Kaukab to Al Shaitah. They possess approximately 20,000 sheep, 2,000 camels, and some cattle. The semi-nomadic portions in bad grazing years are often compelled to move up the Jaghjaghah Su towards Nisibin, while during such moves fighting with the Tai generally takes place. The Jais of the Balikh River also are always ready to raid Jubur flocks, while the Jubur are not averse to forays on the Yezidis of Sinjar. The agricultural portion of the tribe produces wheat and barley, while the tribe, between harvest and ploughing, is occupied in collecting salt in the salt-marshes. The product is taken into Dair al Zor, Mosul and Ras al Ain. The Jubur depend very little on towns for their food supplies, but require cloth and other goods from them. Their chief markets are Dair al Zor, Aleppo, Ras al Ain and Mosul.

The chief enemies of the Jubur are the Jais, Anizah, Shammar, Tai, Baggarah and Yezidis, but in several cases the enmity is neither persistent nor deadly. The Jais from the Balikh River are the inveterate foes of the tribe, and fighting with them is of annual occurrence. In the Anizah, Hachim ibn Muhaid is a personal enemy of Muslat Pasha, and for this reason the Jubur incline to treat the whole Fadan section as unfriendly. Quarrels with the Tai and Shammar are infrequent and generally easily patched up. In 1920, when Asi saw fit to fight the Tai, both factions asked for help from Muslat Pasha, who indicated his willingness to aid Muhammad of the

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٦ ظ] (٢٢٦/٩٧)

80

Tai, but actually never took the field. Al Asi in consequence is not averse to action against the Jubur. The latter, however, owing to their strong internal cohesion and the able leadership of Muslat Pasha, have become such a power in Jazirah politics that both Shammar and Tai are doubtful of openly assailing them. Summed up, the attitude of the Jubur is that of "wait and see," an attitude that has made them rather isolated, but at the same time strong.

The Jubur are probably as good fighters as the ordinary Arab tribe—neither very brave nor skilful. They are well armed and well supplied with ammunition, both of which have been lavished on the tribe by the Turkish authorities in the Diarbekr area. The total tribal strength is probably 1,000 modern and 1,000 serviceable Mauser rifles.

The Jubur speak Arabic and are of the Sunni persuasion.

The most important personality in the tribe is Muslat Pasha, and following him, Ali ibn Sultan of the Albu Khattab. Both entertain on a lavish scale.

Punitive measures could be carried out either by land or from the air:—

(i) The settled villages of the Khabur are accessible to L.A.M. car attack from Dair al Zor. It is questionable, however, if such could operate except in large numbers. The country from Dair al Zor to the Khabur is open, waterless desert. From Tel Fadgham the Khabur is passable on both banks to infantry with pack transport, and likewise from the north.


The Jubur territory can also be reached via the Jabal Sinjar and Lake Khatunyah.

(ii) As water is limited to the Khabur and the route Sinjar-Khatunyah-Tel Khaukab, action by land forces would have to be by these routes.

(iii) The seizure of Tel Taban, the headquarters of Muslat, and a converging march from Tel Fadgham and Nisibin might succeed in destroying the immovable property of the tribe, but the semi-nomadic sections would find refuge in the desert.

(iv) Aeroplane action might succeed in destroying tents and flocks, but would never bring the tribe to heel.

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٧ ظ] (٢٢٦/٩٩)

82

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
JUBUR (Al Haichal)	Muslat Pasha, H.Q., Tel Taban, Salih ibn Milhim.	On both banks of the Khabur River, between Tel Kaukab and Al Shaitah.	2,650
<i>Sections :—</i>			
Bakka Agtha ..	Muslat Pasha ..	Tel Mutariyah ..	400
Al Haib	Ahmad ibn Hassuni	Al Shaitah	130
Hassun	?	?	300
Albu Hassuni } Al Subuh	Ajil ibn Khudr al Thathir.	Tel Shamshaniyah ..	100
Hazim	Jelaid	Between Tel Hamar and Tel Mutair.	150
Albu Khattab ..	Ali ibn Sultan ..	West of Tel Kaukab ..	350
Albu Mahannah ..	Ubaid al Shuwait Hishan	?	300
Al Mahasin ..	Hamid al Ibrahim Awaiyih al Faraj.	Tel Shedadah	320
Al Mamrah } Al Mamrah al Juana }	Ibn Ali al Azzawi Ibn Ali al Gharab.	Tel Lajimiyah Hasacha ..	300
Abu Maniyah ..	Husain al Amshi ..	Tel al Hamar	100
Albu Salamah ..	Ahmad al Abdullah	Tel Fadgham	200

5.	Armed	Horse.	Foot
		655	2,34
		60	400
		30	140
		50	300
		50	70
		30	150
		150	250
		150	200
		100	300
		80	250
		25	80
		200	200


"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٨ و] (٢٢٦/١٠٠)

83

JUBUR (Al Haichal).

48

5.			6.		7.
Armed Men.			Rifles.		
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	Notes.
655	2,340	5,300	910	915	Sedentary and Semi-nomadic. 15,000 sheep and 1,600 camels. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good. <i>External relations.</i> —Dislike Jais and Anizah. Pay no tribute to Shammar, and occasionally quarrel with Tai. <i>Propaganda.</i> —Exposed to Arab and Turk propaganda, which does not have much effect. <i>Politics.</i> —A "Wait and See" policy. In communication with Arabs, Turks and British. Probably prefer the Turks. <i>Military action.</i> —March down the Khabur from Nisibin to the Euphrates, destroying crops and seizing flocks. Later control requires a force of occupation.
60	400	460	200	150	1,000 sheep, 60 camels, 100 cattle. Muslat Pasha is paramount.
20	140	160	40	60	1,500 sheep, 300 cattle.
50	300	350	50	100	2,000 sheep, 150 camels. Salt-dealers and thieves.
50	70	120	30	50	3,000 sheep, 150 cattle, 70 camels.
30	150	180	60	40	1,000 sheep, 300 camels.
150	250	400	50	100	3,000 sheep, 400 camels. Ali ibn Sultan is an important Chief.
120	200	320	100	100	500 sheep, 50 camels.
100	300	400	200	150	2,000 sheep, 350 camels.
80	250	330	50	50	3,000 sheep, 150 camels, 1,000 cattle.
25	80	105	50	40	800 sheep, 100 camels.
200	200	300	50	75	2,000 sheep, 200 camels.



GENEALOGICAL TABLE—CHIEFS OF THE JUBUR.

This table does not pretend to be complete, but it gives all the important men.

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JUHAISH.

Juhaish appears as the name of at least three sections of large tribal groups—(i) of Ali Morrah, described as the fiercest Badawin in Eastern Arabia; (ii) of the Aslam branch of the Southern Shammar; (iii) of the Zubaid, sedentary cultivators on the middle reaches of the Euphrates. The Juhaish of Northern Jazirah claim to have belonged at one time to the Zubaid, but it is quite conceivable that they are the homologous representatives of the Aslam Juhaish in the Northern Shammar, which retain with few modifications the tribal and family divisions of their Arabian ancestors. The tribal chiefs state that the tribe formerly inhabited the area between the Jabal Sinjar and the southern edge of the Kurdish hills, and took to their present haunts in the eighteenth century.

The Juhaish have played an inconspicuous part in the history of Northern Jazirah, and in any case of anti-government action have usually followed the Shammar Jarba, to several of whose chiefs they pay annual tribute. During the Tel Afar disturbances in 1920, a large portion of the tribe under Salih, son of the paramount Chief, joined the Sharifian attacking force, but it is doubtful if Ahmad al Khudaiyir, the paramount Chief, favoured the escapade. During the fighting Salih was killed and the whole tribe fled north of the Iraq frontier. In time the various shaikhs made submission, and the tribe was allowed to resume its normal habitat with the exception of the Isnan and Ara Ara sections, which refused to come in. In December, 1920, Salmo, of the Ujan section, a thoroughly bad character, perpetrated several highway robberies and fled to the Wadi Suwaidiyah in order to escape punishment. In January, 1921, the Turks sent various anti-British letters to Ahmad al Khudaiyir, but the latter sent them into the A.P.O., Tel Afar. His action in doing so was to show his apparent loyalty to Government in order that his eldest son Muhammad might be freed from the security under which he had been placed in Tel Afar. Actually the Juhaish are incapable of action by themselves, and are inclined to settle down to peaceful ways under a strong government. They would, however, join any movement instigated by the Turks which looked like being successful.

The Juhaish are semi-nomadic, living partly in villages and partly in tents. During the ploughing

This table does not pretend to be complete, but it gives all the important men.

season and harvest they generally settle for a month or two in fixed habitats in order to sow and gather their crops. During the rest of the winter and summer they wander after grazing between the Jazirah, south of the Tel Afar-Sinjar road, and the Wadi Suwaidiyah. A list of villages inhabited by the Juhaish is given at the end of this note. The usual migration routes of the Juhaish are from (i) Wadi Suwaidiyah via Boga-Sino (between Tel Afar and Balad Sinjar) to the Jazirah; (ii) from Suwaidiyah via Tel Hogena-Abu Maria (between Tel Afar and Mosul) to the Jazirah and vice versa. The Juhaish produce sufficient grain to feed themselves and their animals in an emergency—perhaps 700 tons of wheat and barley. Their flocks total, roughly, 20,000 sheep, and they possess 1,000 camels, many of the latter in the non-migratory season available for land. The chief supply base of the tribe is Mosul.

Internal cohesion in 1920 seemed to be good, chiefly because Ahmad al Khudaiyir is looked up to with great reverence both in the tribe and in the Jazirah. At the same time there is an undercurrent of discontent in several sections, particularly in that part of the Ujan which follows Salmo, and a new section that collected round Ibrahim al Yusuf, known as Shaikh al Jadid. The latter section, which cultivates in Abu Maria district, is to all intents and purposes independent of the main tribe.

The Juhaish maintain friendly relations with the Tel Afaris and tribes in Tel Afar district. They pay tribute to Mutlaq al Farhan of the Shammar Jarba, and so come under his protection. With the Mutaiwid, which is often considered a section of the Juhaish, they are on excellent terms and, like them, bitterly hate the Yezidis of Balad Sinjar. A feud also exists between the Juhaish and the Jubur of the Khabur. In the event of trouble emanating from the Shammar, the Juhaish would probably join the latter, although they would be averse to risking the loss of their villages and crops.

The Juhaish, while willing to join in any lawlessness, have no reputation as fighters. They usually send a few horsemen with raiding parties such as those of Bilaibil, but are footpads rather than brigands. When fined for their part in the Tel Afar disturbance the Juhaish handed in 100 assorted and dilapidated rifles, mostly of Greek and French origin. There seems little doubt that they possess 100 to 200 Turkish and German Mausers

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and about 50 rounds per rifle. In the event of a movement fostered by the Turks the Juhaish would possess supply depôts for rifles and ammunition in Mardin and Nisibin.

The Juhaish speak Arabic differing slightly from that spoken by the inhabitants of Mosul. They profess the Sunni faith, and for this reason are susceptible to the religious influence of pro-Turk Mullahs and propagandists like the Shaikh al Senussi.

The leading personality in the tribe at present is Ahmad al Khudaiyir, an old man of 67, wracked with chronic asthma and given to pious invocations of the Deity. He is usually garbed in a filthy cloak, but, though one of the great unwashed, is looked up to with reverence by various tribes in the Jazirah. He is comparable to an elderly hawk which finds it hard to compete with younger birds. The Turks imagine he is a person of some political importance. His eldest surviving son is Muhammad, a man of about 24, pleasant, but not appearing of much ability. He seems to be under the influence of Salmo, the bad man of the tribe. Salmo is a big, bucolic bully, who wants thrashing badly. He is inclined to insolence, but like all bullies is a coward at heart. He controls a small section, the Ujan, but has apparently a malign influence with Ahmad, whose orders he refused to obey in January, 1921. He is a typical Arab blackguard and a valiant fighter against defenceless caravans. Another Juhaish tribesman, who has latterly become of some repute chiefly through the attentions of former political officers, is Ibrahim al Yusuf. He has been able to collect about 60 families of the tribe and has settled with them on lands near Abu Maria. He is a pleasant, cheerful fellow who plays a good game of polo and talks largely of his powers in battle. Under proper control he should prove a good sub-chief.

The Juhaish, since they are semi-nomadic, can in case of necessity move into Southern Jazirah or beyond the Iraq frontier. In the former case, owing to lack of water, troops could not operate with success, and aeroplane action is the only efficacious means of punishing the tribe. In event of migration into Turkey, no effective punishment can be carried out except seizing of villages (mentioned at the end of this note) and crops. In the usual area occupied by the tribe, it could be rounded up by forces based on Tel Afar-Hogena and Balad Sinjar. In the winter, when the tribe is generally


south of the Tel Afar-Sinjar road, the occupation of Sino and Tel Afar with patrols on the Tel Afar-Sinjar and Tel Afar-Mosul roads would prevent the tribe moving north. Water is available for a brigade on these routes.

Punitive measures should, therefore, be (i) bombing of villages and encampments; (ii) seizure of villages, destruction of these and of crops; confiscation of properties and flocks; (iii) prevention of supplies coming from Mosul.

List of Juhaish Villages.

Village.	Shaikh or Chief.	Houses.	Population.
Haruna	Salmo ibn Khulaif	60	300
Akhbagha	Ahmad al Khudaiyir	160	800; 100 tents.
Abu Maria	Ibrahim al Yusuf	80	400 tents.
Malali	Ali Na'aiyini	80	400 tents.
Ibra al Kebir	Ahmad Khan	60	300 tents, not in the actual village.
Abu Winni	Khalal al Tahir	80	400 tents.
Ain Sino	Ahmad al Khudaiyir	100	500 tents.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [١٥١] [٢٢٦/١٠٦]



"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [١٥ ظ] (٢٢٦/١٠٧)

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1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
JUHAISH	Ahmad al Khu- daiyir (Para- mount).	Summer.—Tel Afar—Wadi Suwaidiyah. Winter.— Tel Afar—Abu Maria—Sino—the Jazirah.	500
Ara Ara	Dhahir al Huwairi Hasan al Khidr.	Beyond the frontier, De- cember, 1921.	25
Aswad Dhiab	Muhammad al Hu- maiyyid.	Tribal	30
Al'u Assaf	Ibrahim al Yusuf	Abu Maria village ..	50
Al Azzam	Ahmad Khan ..	Tribal habital village Ibra al Kabir.	35
Hamud al Husain ..	Ahmad al Khu- daiyir.	Bagha and Sino	50
Isnan	Hadid	Were beyond Iraq frontier in July, 1921.	40
Jirdan	Saiyir al Jirdan ..	Tribal	30
Mansur	Haji Ahmad ..	Tribal	20
Matali	Sheikh Ibrahim ibn Mullah Jasim.	Tribal	35

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٢٥٢] (١٠٨/٢٢٦)

91 JUHAISH. (52)

4. Families' Tents or houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
500	107	..	1,000*	125	255	* Actual men capable of bearing arms.
25	7	..	50	7	20	This section really belongs to the Tai, but has settled with the Juhaish. They took a prominent part in the Tel Afar rising and with the Isnan refused to come in. They joined Bilaibil's band and took part in the raids.
30	5	..	60	5	20	
50	10	..	100	..	30	Semi-nomadic, cultivating the village of Abu Maria and feeding their flocks in Suwaidiyah and Jazirah according to the grazing. 4,000 sheep; 100 tons wheat. <i>Internal cohesion</i> good; is inclined to independence. <i>Punitive measures.</i> —Seizure of lands and crops at Abu Maria.
35	5	..	10	10	10	Cultivates Ibra Kabir, but does not stay in mud village of that name. 1,000 sheep; 50 tons wheat. Ahmad Khan has a reputation as a thief—a bad fellow. Seizure of lands at Ibra Kabir; punishment.
50	15	..	100	20	30	Follows the paramount Chief.
40	10	..	80	10	20	As for Ara Ara. Hadid has influence over both sections.
30	5	..	60	5	10	
20	5	..	40	5	10	
35	5	..	20	5	15	Shaikh Ibrahim is a religious dignitary who is generally found in company with Ahmad Khudaiyir. He possesses a strong influence in all sections.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٢٥٢ ظ] (١٠٩/٢٢٦)

92

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
<i>Juhaish—contd.</i>			
Na Aiyini ..	Ali al Na Aiyini Muhammad Ismail.	Tribal. Village Malali ..	30
Albu Saif	Khalaf al Tahir ..	Tribal. Village Abu Winni	10
Albu Salim ..	Muhammad al Kha- laf Ballo al Khalaf al Salih.	Tribal	70
Al Ujan	Salmo ibn Khalaf ..	Tribal. Village Haruna ..	70

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٥] [١١٠/٢٢٦]

93 JUHAISH—contd. (53)

4. Families' Tents or houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
30	6	..	60	6	20	<i>Punitive measures</i> should be directed against village of Malali.
10	2	..	20	2	8	Insignificant section which can be punished by seizure of lands at Abu Winni.
70	20	..	140	20	40	Similar to other sections.
70	20	..	140	30	30	Cultivate village of Haruna. Salmo is inclined to turbulence and highway robberies. In July, 1921, was beyond our frontier and refused to make submission. Defies Ahmad al Khudaiyir. Confiscation of crops and bombing are only forms of punishment likely to be effective.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٣٥٣ ظ] (٢٢٦/١١١)

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
1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
MALAWAHAH (Sec- tion of Hadidiyin).	Ahmad Wirshan ..	Batat—in Nahiyah of Zummar.	30


"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٥] (١١٢/٢٢٦)

95 MALAWAHAH. (54)

4. Families, Tents or houses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service- able.	
30	5	..	60	5	10	<p>Sedentary section of the famous shepherd tribe Hadidiyin. Cultivates one or two villages in Zummar Nayiyah.</p> <p><i>External relations.</i>—Has a feud with the Juhaiish over a theft of donkeys. Ahmad has some influence with Jubur villages. The chief, Ahmad Wirshan, wishes to be regarded as a cultivator and not a tribal shaikh. His section took part in the Tel Afar disturbances of 1920, but soon made submission. Pro-British now, but likely to join in with the winning side.</p> <p><i>Punitive measures.</i>—Seizure of villages and flocks.</p>

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤ هـ ظ] (٢٢٦/١١٣)





"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٥ ظ] (٢٢٦/١١٥)

98

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
MU'AMARAH (Arab).	Saiyid Khalil .. Muhammad ibn Saiyid Abdullah	Villages of Addaya and Harada, 15 miles south of Tel Afar in the Nahi- yah of Homaidat. Other villages are Al Jussa, Rahmaniyah, Tayniyah.	100

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٦] [٢٢٦/١١٦]

56

99

MU'AMARAH.


4. Families' Tents or Houses.
100

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
80	..	200	80	80	A sedentary tribe of Saiyids, who are troublesome but good farmers. 400 tons wheat and barley; 4,000 sheep. Villages lie in track of Shammar migrations and suffer accordingly. Tribe is pro-British and of very small political consequence. Chiefs are little else than village headmen and exert no influence in Tel Afar district. <i>Punitive measures.</i> — Bombing and seizure of villages by a small column from Tel Afar or Mosul. Strength, one regiment of cavalry.

The Mutawid are practically sedentary and partially semi-nomadic, i.e. while one part of the tribe is engaged in cultivation, the other part grazes the tribal flocks from Ain Ghazal to the Wadi Suwayid. They inhabit four villages, partly mud but partly tents—Ain Hissa, Um al Shabab, Khito and Ain Ghazal—all between Tel Afar and Balad Sajar. They produce annually about 300 tons of wheat and barley, while their livestock amounts to 6,000 sheep, 100 cattle and 300 camels. Internal cohesion in the tribe is good. In external relations they are friendly with the Jubalah and the people of Tel Afar, but are bitter enemies of the Sajar, Yezid and Jabur of the Khabar. They are bound to keep on friendly terms with the Shammar with whom they sometimes—or at least the more adventurous spirits—raid across and towards the Khabar. So long as the Yezid remain pro-British the Mutawid are not likely to join any anti-British movement, unless its primary purpose is to remove the Yezid menace from Mutawid villages. The tribe has no peculiar ability for a method of dubbing. It professes the Sunni word and talks the native Arabic.

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MUTAIWID.

The Mutaiwid appear to have been originally a section of the Juhaish, to which tribe they are closely allied and with which they wander periodically in search of grazing. Neither their numbers nor their reputation make them worthy of more than passing interest. In politics they are colourless, ready to join whatever force or government is at the moment dominant in the Jazirah. Under a strong government they should not relapse into evil ways, but they are always eager to join in Shammar raids. During the Tel Afar disturbances in June, 1920, a part of the Mutaiwid under Hamid al Haichal is supposed to have marched on Tel Afar. It is questionable, however, if their participation in that disturbance was not forced upon them by the raiding and wholesale looting of their villages by the Yezidis. At any rate, Hammu Shiru practically demanded their threshing floors and grazing grounds. Hamid al Haichal is so-called paramount Chief and guides tribal destinies such as they are. In 1921 he was decidedly pro-British in the hope that we should force Hammu to give up his ill-gotten gains.

The Mutaiwid are practically sedentary and partially semi-nomadic, *i.e.*, while one part of the tribe is engaged in cultivation, the other part grazes the tribal flocks from Ain Ghazal to the Wadi Suwaidiyah. They inhabit four villages, partly mud huts, partly tents—Ain Hisan, Umm al Shababit, Khilo and Ain Ghazal—all between Tel Afar and Balad Sinjar. They produce annually about 300 tons of wheat and barley, while their livestock amounts to 6,000 sheep, 100 cattle and 300 camels.

Internal cohesion in the tribe is good. In external relations they are friendly with the Juhaish and the people of Tel Afar, but are bitter enemies of the Sinjar Yezidis and Jubur of the Khabur. They are bound to keep on friendly terms with the Shammar with whom they sometimes—or at least the more adventurous spirits—raid across and towards the Euphrates. So long as the Yezidis remain pro-British the Mutaiwid are not likely to join any anti-British movement, unless its preliminary purpose is to remove the Yezidi menace from Mutaiwid villages.

The tribe has no peculiar ability for a method of fighting. It professes the Sunni creed and talks its native Arabic.

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The chief personality in the tribe is Hamid al Haichal, a cheerful, satyrić ruffian with a strain of negroid blood. He has a voice like Stentor and a reputation in the lists of Venus in keeping with his voice. He appears shrewd and capable, but in reality is rather bucolic. The only other personality worth recording is Jarullah, his brother, who is a quiet, unassuming man with a good business head—as a small farmer. He cultivates in Ain Ghazal, and has ideas of water-power.

Punitive measures can be effectively carried out from Tel Afar or Balad Sinjar. A note to Hammu Shiru that the extirpation of the Mutaiwid is desirable would see this result achieved. The village might also be bombed. In case a force were required to operate from Tel Afar, it could use the Tel Afar-Sinjar road, from which villages are easily accessible. Water supplies exist at Ain Hasan, Umm al Shababit and Ain Ghazal for one brigade throughout the year. The terrain is passable to movement of cavalry and infantry in all directions, but wheeled traffic would be confined to the main Tel Afar-Sinjar road.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٧ ظ] (٢٢٦/١١٩)

102


1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation. Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
MUTAIWID ..	Hamid al Haichal (Paramount).	Villages, Ain Hasan, Umm al Shababit, Ain Ghazal and Khilo.	200
<i>Sections :—</i>			
Albu Khalifah ..	Khidra ibn Isa .. J a r u l l a h a l Haichal.	Ain Ghazal	70
Al Masalikh ..	Hamid ibn Haichal	Ain al Hasan	50
Al Miri	Muhammad al Ballo	Umm al Shababit ..	50
Albu Uluwi ..	Hamid al Haichal. Khalaf al Kannu.	Khilo	30

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٨و] (٢٢٦/١٢٠)

103 MUTAIWID. (58)

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
100	..	400	50	200	
..	Jarullah is a brother of the paramount Chief. Village lies 7 miles from Balad Sinjar on main Tel Afar-Dair al Zor road. Section follows Jarullah. A gendarme post is established in barracks which could hold and stable one troop cavalry.
..	Village consists of tents about 2 miles south of Ain Hasan spring, which lies on Tel Afar-Sinjar road. Hamid is paramount and maintains order in whole tribe. Village is easily accessible to cavalry.
..	Village about 1 mile from main Tel Afar-Sinjar road. Good spring.
..	Village 1 mile from Tel Afar-Sinjar road.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٨ ظ] (٢٢٦/١٢١)



104

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
RASHKAN (Yezidis)	Ibrahim al Chalnik	Zummar	40

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٥٩و] (٢٢٦/١٢٢)

59

4. Families' Tents or Houses.
40

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
20	..	80	..	30	Semi-nomadic section of Yezidis who live with the Girgiriya and Hassinan. They are of no political importance and are quiet cultivators and shepherds. <i>Punitive measures.</i> —Seizure of flocks.

divisions and structures of the other tribes, but the Shammar as a whole do not offer united resistance to attack their common enemy the Anzak.

Small groups of the Shammar have not infrequently broken down to the Yezid, because while their Shammar occasionally visited the Rashkan, latterly there has also been a continuous Shammar infiltration from Rashkan to the Yezid, chiefly because of Anzak attacks and the evil days that have fallen on the family of the Rashkan.

Shammar lands territory lies between the Yezid and the Yezid, though occasionally small sections cross the Taurus in the region of the Lesser Zab. In the Yezid they come down south as far as the H. A. and extend east to Dar al-Najf which they regard as their special market. Thence they range north-east on the Khabar and wander over the lands deserted by the Yezid, south of the Yezid, and the affluent south of Yezid.

On the north-east they come within half of Mosul, their favourite pastures in this region being around the Yezid town of H. where their numerous sheep. Al. is usually to be found in the spring. During the winter they do not infrequently come down into the Yezid grounds between H. and H. and H. Traditional feuds against the Ottoman Government, they aligned between the Yezid of the Mesopotamian and the War of Mosul, being taxes to neither. They

of the Rashkan is one of the healthiest of the large Yezid sections. The Yezid of the Rashkan has no common enemy, there are no feuds between the Yezid and the Yezid, which the Yezid is free to attack, and the Yezid is free to attack.

SHAMMAR JARBA.

The Shammar Jarba belong ethnically to the Shammar of Central Arabia, and are termed Jarba* in order to differentiate them from their southern kinsmen. About the middle of the seventeenth century economic pressure compelled that portion of the Shammar, now called Jarba, to seek fresh grazing fields in the Syrian desert north of the Jabal Shammar. Several thousand families emigrated from the old pasture-lands and eventually came into conflict with the then most powerful tribe in the Syrian desert, the Muwali, who were driven north to the vicinity of Aleppo. Early in the nineteenth century a similar invasion from Central Arabia of the Anizah in turn forced the Shammar Jarba across the Euphrates into the Jazirah. They were thus cut off geographically and politically from their fellows in Najd, and have remained a distinct entity ever since. They still, however, retain practically the original subdivisions† and groupings of the mother tribe, but the Shammar as a whole do not offer united resistance to attack their common enemy the Anizah.

Small groups of the Shammar Jarba not infrequently go down to the Najd pasturage, while their Shaikhs occasionally visited Ibn Rashid. Latterly there has also been a continuous Shammar infiltration from Najd to the Jazirah, chiefly because of Akhwan attacks and the evil days that have fallen on the family of Ibn Rashid.

Shammar Jarba territory lies between the Euphrates and Tigris, though occasionally small sections cross the Tigris in the region of the Lesser Zab. In the Jazirah they come down south as far as the Hor Aqarquf, and extend east to Dair al Zor, which they regard as their special market. Thence they range north-east up the Khabur and wander over the fertile desert watered by the Jaghjaghah Su, and its affluents, south of Nisibin. On the north-east they come within hail of Mosul, their favourite pasturages in this region being round the Parthian ruins of Hatrah, where their paramount Shaikh Al Asi is usually to be found in the spring. During the winter they not infrequently come down into the Iraq grazing grounds between Hillah and Bughailah. Traditional rebels against the Ottoman Government, they slipped between the fingers of the Mutasarrif of Dair and the Wali of Mosul, paying taxes to neither. They

* Jarba is one of the Shaikhly families of the large Khurusah section.

† The Subhi of the Saiyah has no counterpart in Najd. There are also sub-sections like the Chidadah, Fadagha and Zoba, which are only found in Iraq. Several Najd sections are also not found in Iraq.

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exacted dues from caravans on the Tigris road between Tikrit and Mosul, and frequently held up the traffic both on the road and on the river. In 1911, the cup of their iniquities having overflowed, Nizam Pasha, then Wali of Baghdad, sent an expedition against them under his Chief of Staff, Hasan Riza Beg, an excellent officer who was murdered at Scutari in the following year. He conducted matters with great skill; the Shammar came in without resistance to his camp at Hatrah; camel and sheep dues, many years in arrears, were collected, and the rights of the tribe over the Mosul road defined. Al Asi, eldest of the many sons of Farhan, was recognized as paramount Shaikh and made responsible to the Government, though apparently the *de facto* command was understood to rest with his son Hachim. The fall of Nizam Pasha a month later and the resignation of Hasan Riza took the heart out of the agreement. In 1912 the Wali of Baghdad recognized Humaidi, a younger son of Farhan and always a jealous rival to Al Asi, as head of the tribe, a step which led to immediate conflict between the two brothers. In June, 1914, Humaidi, with a body of 160 horsemen, arrived in the Mosul vilayet from Baghdad, ostensibly under the orders of the Wali, to collect taxes from the Shammar. The Wali of Mosul sent 40 gendarmes to arrest him and bring him to Mosul, and also sent officers of his own to collect the taxes. Soon after the Shaikh's arrest orders arrived from Constantinople that he should be released. The Wali replied that he was a notorious robber, and had plundered people to the extent of £T15,000. Until the sum was forthcoming he declined to release him, and when the order was repeated he resigned his office. After the outbreak of the war Humaidi was in active co-operation with the Turks, but Al Asi seems to have taken no part.

Following the British occupation of Mosul, Al Asi was asked to become paramount Government Chief of the Shammar, but, declining the invitation, declared he had no aversion to the appointment of his grandson Daham al Hadi as such. This was eventually agreed on and Daham received 750 rupees *per mensem* in his official capacity. He was inclined to demur at the smallness of the sum, but his subsequent worth in restraining the lawlessness of his tribe is about 750 rupees less than he receives. During the Tel Afar disturbances in June, 1920, a few Shammar Shaikhs, Ajil al Yawar, Jarullah and his sons, Hacchim ibn Asi and others, sent a small

number of horsemen with Jamil Madfai more to find out what success he was likely to obtain and the prospects of loot than to join in a serious rising against the British. Al Asi with characteristic diplomacy kept a foot in either camp, but tried to dissuade the Sharifian forces from an attack on Tel Afar. During 1920 and 1921 various Shammar raids have been made on friendly villages between Mosul and Shergat, but nothing in the way of an organized raid has been carried out on British convoys or posts. Daham cannot altogether be characterized as a bold leader with a firm grip over his tribesmen. He rather lacks personality, while his influence is mainly attributable to his grandfather's support. Politically the Shammar have no particular preference for Turks, Arabs, or British. In the early part of 1922 Ajil al Yawar was appointed paramount Chief of the Shammar in the place of Daham by King Faisal, but Al Asi has so far opposed this change. Ajil's personal influence is not very great, and unless Al Asi changes his mind and determines to back him, it is unlikely that Ajil will be able to assume or retain the headship of the tribe. The position of their pasturelands demands ostensible friendship with both the Ottoman and Iraq Governments, while their chief desire is freedom to loot and live as they list. Ajil al Yawar and Daham both came into Baghdad in August, 1921, on the accession of Faisal as King of Iraq, ostensibly to offer their allegiance, but in reality to find out what they could make out of their new overlord.

In July, 1921, the Shammar were grouped as under according to political leanings:—

- (i) Al Asi.—Pro-Turk and pro-British according to the lie of his interests, but chiefly inclined to favour the British.
- (ii) Daham al Hadi.—Pro-British.
- (iii) Hachim al Asi.—Probably anti-British, but pro-Arab if his previous crimes are commuted.
- (iv) Ajil al Yawar.—Formerly anti-British, but now pro-Arab.
- (v) Humaid al Farhan.—Pro-Turkish, but said to be willing to come under the Iraq Government.
- (vi) Mudrad al Suqi and Dhiyab al Hasan.—Anti-British, but perhaps likely to prove amenable to an Arab Government.
- (vii) Mijwal al Faris.—Was Anti-British and came to terms with the French in Dair al Zor. He is said to have been raided by the Turks in August, 1921, for his pro-French sympathies.

The Shammar Jarba are essentially nomads, but the reported settlement of families at Ain Ghazal may adumbrate the operation of new and more civilized ideas in the tribe. They usually and in normal years spend the months April to August inclusive north of the Jabal Sinjar in the vicinity of Nisibin and the Wadi Suwaidiyah. In July, 1921, however, owing to dearth of grazing, many Shammar families moved south of the Jabal Sinjar and settled temporarily on the streams between Tel Afar and Sinjar and the larger water-holes in the Jazirah to the south. They usually spend the period between August and April in the Jazirah, south of the Jabal Sinjar. Their usual migrating routes are from the south via Hadhrah-Abu Maria-Boga, *i.e.*, along a line east of Tel Afar across the Mosul-Tel Afar roads; via Hadhrah-Ain Sino-Ibra-Boga, *i.e.*, a line west of Tel Afar across the Tel Afar-Sinjar roads and west of the Jabal Sinjar via Al Bidea-Abu Hamdha-Khatuniyah. Daham uses the two former routes and the latter is employed by Ajil al Yawar, Jarullah, Asi and Hachim. It has been estimated on a rough and tentative basis that the tribe can muster 6,000 horses, 4,000 cattle, 12,000 camels and 250,000 sheep. These constitute the wealth of the tribe, since from their mode of life they possess no immovable property. They have, however, other sources of income: (a) Tribute drawn from weaker tribes and settled villages. It is axiomatic that any tribe which is unable to resist Shammar demands must either suffer depredations or pay a price for immunity from such. It is usual for tribute of this kind to be paid to certain specified chiefs who make themselves responsible that others do not claim a like recompense. The Jubur, who formerly paid tribute to Al Asi, were released from their dues in 1905 because of the assistance they rendered to Asi against his brother Jarullah. The Girgiriya pay no tribute because their Chief, Sulaiman Agha, is related by marriage to the shaikhly family of the Shammar, and also because he is well able to resist their demands.

(b) Tribute drawn from caravans. The principle underlying this exaction is that as government is unable to protect its traders and travellers the Shammar undertake for a given price per animal and person to protect the caravan in their territories from further exactions and the attentions of freebooters. In the time of Farhan's leadership, this arrangement proved a boon to traders and others, but he unfortunately left 130 descendants who all claim to have a finger in the tribute

pie. The result is that caravans are charged and recharged by these greedy robbers and prices are naturally enhanced as follows:—

- (i) Al Asi.—“Huw,” *i.e.*, tribute on the Mosul-Baghdad road, the Sherabiyin Arabs and Khabur Jubur (this last discontinued since 1905).
- (ii) Abdul Rahman, brother of Farhan.—Tribute on all other roads. Al Asi usurped this.
- (iii) Mijwal al Faris.—Tribute on some settled Jubur on the Tigris and on cows and buffaloes coming from Baghdad.
- (iv) Abdul Aziz.—Tribute on the Baggarah.
- (v) Shallal and his sons.—Tribute on the Agaidat Isnan and Al Rashid.
- (vi) Faisal.—Tribute on the Aleppo sheep trade.
- (vii) Abdul Muhsin.—Tribute on the Mutaiwid.
- (viii) Jarullah.—Tribute on Jarnaf, a village south of Mosul.
- (ix) Mutlaq.—Tribute on the Qaiyarah Jubur and the Juhaish.

The usual procedure is for the needy dependent of Farhan to establish a post of 'abids (negro slaves) on a certain road, usually in proximity to a large town such as Mosul, and these ruffians then despoil any village trader who happens to come along. This system of petty robbery—since it amounts to nothing else—was stopped in the Tel Afar district in 1920 by a threat to confiscate Shammar camels.

The internal cohesion of the tribe, supposing no external cause is in operation to unify the tribe, is not good. Between the various sections and families there exist minor feuds, which, in the changing alliances and combinations of the Shaikhs, split the tribe into factions, whose attitude is hard to gauge at any particular moment. In 1921 the main inter-family feuds were as under:—

- (i) Daham with the followings of Hachim and Ajil al Yawar.
- (ii) Hachim—friendly with Ajil and hostile to Daham.
- (iii) Ajil—hostile to Daham.
- (iv) Humaidi—on bad terms with Daham. Friendly to Ajil, but inclined to play a lone hand.
- (v) Mudrad-al-Suqi—on good terms with Daham.
- (vi) Dhiyab al Hasan—on good terms with Daham.

Despite numerous petty inter-sectional quarrels, there is absolute unity amongst the Shammar in their feuds with their hereditary enemies the Anizah and tribes such as the Dulaim, the Baggarah and Milli. The Shammar hostility to the Anizah, of long standing and bitter, finds outlet in numerous raids and counter-raids across the Euphrates, in which the Shammar do not always come off best. It may be accepted that the greatest universal desire of the tribe is to defeat and plunder the Anizah. With the Dulaim, Baggarah, and Milli the Shammar are neither so hostile nor given to raiding. Local tribes of Northern Jazirah, at least the smaller ones, are numerically incapable of resisting the Shammar. The Tai, however, have latterly been asserting themselves, and there seems to be a growing reluctance on the part of the Shammar to interfere with this tribe. It is not beyond credence that the Tai may dispute the supremacy of Northern Jazirah with the Shammar in the near future.

The Shammar Jarba constitute, owing to the size of the tribe and its possession of numerous rifles, the most serious menace to the establishment of law and order in the Jazirah. They are a rough, turbulent lot who, owing to their frequent inter-sectional quarrels and constant warfare with the Anizah, have obtained considerable skill in tribal warfare. They are experts at long-distance raids, for which they have improvised a sort of emergency ration made out of hardened flour—not unlike an exaggerated ration biscuit—a piece of which about 6 inches square is sufficient food for three days. Their capacity of endurance is great, as they seem able to exist for a long period without water. They have been known to drink animal urine filtered through earth, and have also trained their horses to do without water in certain seasons for forty-eight hours. Commissariat difficulties, therefore, are inconsiderable for a fighting force of Shammar tribesmen. It is difficult to imagine the Shammar fighting as a disciplined body, but they have evolved a system of protection both at rest and in movement, and also recognize the value of flank and rear attacks. They are, however, unlikely to see an action through if there is any prospect of loot. Owing to their mobility and knowledge of desert paths and water-holes, infantry are useless to combat them. They possess about 2,000 modern and about 4,000 old but serviceable rifles. The majority of these are Mausers which were obtained during the war. Supplies at present are obtainable in

Turkish territories, chiefly from Mardin and Nisibin. Gun-running from Aleppo along the Euphrates probably furnishes the Shammar Shaikhs with a few rifles. In event of hostilities against the British, the Shammar would most certainly be supplied with arms and ammunition by the Turks.

The Shammar Jarba speak Arabic which is rather difficult to understand with an ear attuned to the Arabic of the Iraq town. By religion they are Sunnis, who still cling in part to the fetishism of their pagan days. Religious propaganda directed by Shaikh Ahmad al Senussi and the Turks has had little effect to date amongst the Shammar Shaikhs. Nor have the purely secular efforts of Ajaimi affected in any way the self-seeking ideals of the tribe. Summarized, the political attitude of the tribe depends entirely on the caprice of its leaders. Both Sharifian and Turkish propoganda affect the Shammar only in a remote degree. Loot is the lode-star of Shammar effort. Some shaikhs are pro-Turk, some pro-British, and most pro-Arab. It will be seen, therefore, that Shammar policy is a stone of many facets.

The extraordinary feature of tribal conditions amongst the Shammar Jarba is the existence of two shaikhly families of some fifty influential personages, no one of whom can command the permanent allegiance of a single section. Their families are the Al Muhammad or descendants of Farhan and the Al Amshat or descendants of Sufuk and his wife Al Amsha, a Tai woman (*vide* genealogical tables). The vacillating allegiance of sections may be understood from the following. At one time Humaidi was followed by the majority of the Abdah, who veered after a time to the side of Abdul Aziz and Ajil al Yawar. At another time Daham commanded a large Khurusah following, which gradually left him to make place for the Abdah. This lack of an outstanding personality makes the task of Government control very difficult as it is impossible to appoint thirty shaikhs all responsible to Government. The experiment of dealing with minor shaikhs direct in despite of the Al Muhammed may bring the tribesmen over more quickly to the side of the Iraq Government.

Punitive measures against the Shammar are extremely difficult owing to (a) the size of the tribe and the area of its wanderings; (b) the chaotic followings, some likely to be hostile and some friendly; (c) the existence of tribal grazing grounds in the governmental spheres of three nations—Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. It is practically

impossible as things exist at present to establish more than a temporary control over a few sections. The loss of Dair al Zor in 1919 grievously impaired British power over the Shammar, and it is questionable, unless an amicable arrangement is made with the French authorities in that place, if permanent control can ever be exercised over the tribe. Light armoured cars operating on the Mosul-Dair al Zor road in conjunction with aeroplanes were able to cut off the tribe from their summer or winter pasturages according to the season of the year. This can only be partially effected now between Mosul and the Jabal Sinjar. In that area Tel Afar is centrally situated as a base of operations. The establishment of posts on the line of hills between Eski Mosul and Jabal Sinjar would detect any attempt at migration southward or northward. At the moment the only feasible methods of attacking the tribe are (i) by aeroplanes in conjunction with the above; (ii) by cutting off Shammar from markets in Iraq.

(i) Aeroplane action has proved effective in recent months, but the damage has been moral rather than material. The Shammar have now learned to scatter on the approach of an aeroplane, and also to conceal their movements by firing the prairie grass in summer. Encampments can be quickly deserted and the loss of a few tents by fire-bombs is not an irremediable disaster. The killing of flocks would inconvenience the tribe.

(ii) The Shammar are largely dependent on the Dair al Zor, Baghdad and Mosul markets for wheat and dates. The tribe can be seriously hit by a blockade of these markets. The confiscation of Shammar caravans will always be possible in Mosul.

At present our geographical ignorance of the Jazirah and its watering places, the lack of supplies in Shammar terrain, and size of force required for operations against the tribes precludes the action of cavalry and infantry except in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mosul-Shergat, Mosul-Sinjar and Mosul-Tel Hawa roads.

Note.—It is obviously impossible to give all details of the Shammar Jarba in a general description such as the foregoing. In order to amplify the latter various appendices are attached. Further, owing to the chaotic and changeable nature of sections and followings, it is not possible to treat the Shammar according to the standard tribal lists. For the purpose of showing sections and followings several different methods of arrangement are therefore given

APPENDIX A.

SHAMMAR SECTIONS (July, 1921).

Section.	Sub-section.	Shaikhs.	Fami- lies.	Following.
Al Abdah ..	Afarit ..	Mubrad al Suji ..	900	Daham.
		Ibn Hithmi. Al Dhufairi. Ibn Haris.	300	
	Al Dugairat ..	Hawas ibn Hithmi.. Fulah al Doh. Garaidi ibn Suidi.	200	
		Al Jadi ..	Jaza al Anaizan ..	
Al Amud ..	Al Yahiyah..	Al Bameh.	..	Daham.
	Al Khaya ..	Halil al Ashram	
	..	Ibn Amud .. Chuchan ibn Masyul	500 ..	
Al Fadaghah	..	Hijar abu Antaid .. Azzu ibn Mahmud.	300	Ajil al Yawar.
Khurusah ..	Al Buraich ..	Gait ..	1,000	Hachim.
		Ibn Saadi. Bahiman. Ibn Faifi ..	260	
	Al Hadhbah	Ibn Falaj. Husaini ..	250	
		Al Ghashm..	Jedaan. Haiyim ibn Salih. Hawas ibn Asi ..	
	Al Aliyan ..	Jadi ibn Dais.	250	
Mathluthah	Al Chidadah	Hamisan ..	1,000	Hachim. Humaidi. Daham.
	Al Ramuth..	Shahaini ibn Matrud	300	
	Al Zuba	400	
Al Saiyah ..	Al Aslam al Iraq.	Dhiyab ibn Hasan..	800	Follow Dhiyab.
		Al Aslam al Badr.	300	
	Al Subhi ..	Dhiyab ibn Hasan..	200	
		Al Rawi ibn Baraitin	300	
Al Thabit	1,000	Daham. Hachim. Daham.
	Al Bagah	250	
	Al Jusim ..	Mitab al Hidab ..	250	
	Al Najm ..	Ibn al Radhi ..	250	
		Ibn Azzam. Ali ibn Jadyan.	..	
	Al Qamar ..	Saadu al Aji .. Al Rush. Mutlaf al Aji. Al Rush.	250	


Note.—Figures were received from various aghas and shaikhs in Tel Afar district and as such are to be considered inaccurate.

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[To face page 114.]

APPENDIX B.


TABLE SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE AL MUHAMMAD OR DESCENDANTS OF FARHAN PASHA.



Note.—Al Jazzah was a Shammar woman.
Al Durrah was from Tai.
Al Sarhah was from Zoba.
Al Artiyah was from Al Muhammad.
Al Girgiriyah was from Girgiriyah tribe. Her sister married Shallal, and was the mother of Mutni, Mishal, etc.

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
"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٤٦ ظ] (١٣٣/٢٢٦)




APPENDIX C.

AL AMSHAT.

1. The Amshat are the descendants of Sufuq, father of Farhan, by his wife Al Amshah, a Tai woman.



2. Table showing Shammar Jarba Genealogy exclusive of descendants of Farhan Pasha.



APPENDIX D.

Attached are two tribal lists compiled in different ways and by different authorities :—

1. The ordinary tribal list, in which it is not practicable to show particular followings.

2. A compilation giving the particulars absent in No. 1.

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LIST

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
SHAMMAR JARBA ..	Al Asi Daham al Hadi (Paramount).	<i>Summer.</i> —Nisibin area to Wadi Suwaidiyah. <i>Winter.</i> —Jazirah, south and west of Jabal Sinjar. The following is a rough guidance to locations:— Sinjarah—Khabur River. Saiyih—Hadhrah and left bank of Tigris. Faddagah—Chidadah and Zoba—partly on Euphrates north of Musaiyih, partly nomadic in the Jazirah. Daham:—(i) <i>Winter.</i> — Hadhrah to Lake Ashqar. (ii) <i>Summer.</i> —Wadi Su- waidiyah. Ajil:—Abu Hamdhah to Maghrubah. <i>Winter.</i> —Al Bidea. <i>Summer.</i> —Nisibin.	7,500
<i>Sections.</i> Abdah	Mubrad ibn Suqi ..	Between the Khabur and Hadhr.	2,500
<i>Sub-sections.</i> Afarit	Mubrad ibn Suqi
Dughairat	Suwailim elDhufairi. Hawas ibn al Hithmi Kuraid ibn Sadi.
Al Jadi	Jaza ibn Anaizan
Al Yahiyah ..	Hulail al Ashram
<i>Section.</i> Khurusah	3,500

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SHAMMAR JARBA.

١٣٦

No. 1.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
4,500	..	15,000	2,000	4,000	Nomad and pastoral. Camels, horses and sheep. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Powerful, quarrelsome tribe, living on tribute levied from caravans and weaker tribes. Well armed with Mausers and Martinis. <i>Politics.</i> —Neutral at present, but probably favour the weakest government, i.e., one conducive to lawlessness. <i>Propaganda.</i> —Turkish from Nisibin. No great results have been effected. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good in face of a common enemy, but intersectional disputes and quarrels among the chiefs are common. <i>External relations.</i> —Allied with no other tribes. Hostile to Anizah and take tribute from Sherabiyin, Juhaish, etc. Hostile to any tribe poaching on the road dues from caravans. <i>Military action.</i> —L.A.M.B.s at Mosul and on Euphrates can cut them off from southern pastures. Raiding of flocks is useful. Infantry are useless against Shammar.
1,500	500	5,000	500	1,000	Armed horsemen also include armed camelteers.
..	Subdivided into Al Fadhil, Al Qaud and Al Said.
..	Subdivided into Al Badu and Al Husain.
..	Subdivided into Marahlah and Al Tumah.
..	Subdivided into Al Fadhil, Al Hamil, Al Manasir and Ghaniman Al Yahiyah are also called Al Haya.
2,500	500	3,000	1,000	2,500	Armed horsemen also include armed camelteers.

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1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
Shammar Jarba— <i>continued.</i>			
<i>Sub-sections.</i>			
Al Aliyan	Hawas ibn Subaih Jadi ibn Dais.	Spent winter of 1919 at Hadhr.	200
Al Amud	Muslat ibn Amud ..	Ditto	300
Al Buraich	S a b a h i b n Buhaiman.	Ditto	1,500
Chidadah	Shifan al Kuwait. Hamisan el Zuwaitif	Many are settled on the Euphrates, but a small nomad party stays with the main Khurusah.	100
Al Ghashm	Husain el Fawaz	300
Al Hadhbah	Hail ibn Salim. Ubaid ibn Khadan	300
Al Mathluthah	Sultan ibn Fallaj. Shahin ibn Matrud	700
Al Zoba	?	Downstream on the banks of the Euphrates. They do not enter Upper Jazirah except for a small nomad party.	..
<i>Section.</i>			
Sinjarah	Sons of Hadab ..	Usually remain in the vicinity of the Khabur.	1,500
<i>Sub-sections.</i>			
Al Fadaghah	Hajar abu Taid ..	A large part of the Faddaghah is settled on the Euphrates, but the nomads follow the main Sinjarah.	..
Al Thabit	Mitab al Hadab

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119 SHAMMAR JARBA—contd.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
..	Subdivided into Al Aswad, Al Jasim and Al Muhammad.
..	Subdivided into Al Ghudhaibah and Al Khalaf.
..	The largest section of the Khurusah. Subdivided into three sub-sections.
..	One authority considers the Chidadah to be a sub-section of the Mathluthah.
..	Subdivided into Al Mulahim, Al Sabaha and Al Wasil.
..	Subdivided into Chidayah and Al Suwaihan.
..	One authority considers the Mathluthah to be a section equal to the Abdah, Khurusah and Sinjarah, and subdivides them into Chidadah, and Al Zoba.
..	One authority considers Al Zoba a sub-section of Abdah; another considers them a sub-section of Mathluthah. Semi-nomad on the Euphrates.
500	1,000	1,500	500	500	Being partly settled the Sinjarah have not the usual number of horsemen.
..	Subdivided into six divisions, of which Al Ghuraib are the most important.
..	Subdivided into ten divisions, of which Al Jasim are the ruling house.

LIST No. 2.

Following.	Section and Sub-section.	Shaikhs.	Al Muhammad with following.	Location in October, 1920.	Houses.	Men.	Feuds.	Political Attitude.
1. Daham al Hadi.	1. Mathluthah al Zoba.	..	Mijwal ibn Farhan and his sons.	West of Wadi Tharthar.	250	500	1. Tribal, i.e., affecting whole of Shammar with Dulaim, Anizah, Baggarah, and Milli. 2. Sectional with Hachim's and Ajil's followings.	Friendly.
	2. Al Abdah ..	Hawas ibn Hithmi.	..	Ditto ..	150	300		
	Al Dughairat	Fulah al Doh .. Kuraidi ibn Sadi	..	Sections are scattered about at various grazing grounds, but Daham's camp is headquarters of the whole.				
	Al Jadi ..	Jaza al Anizan	200	400		
	3. Al Thabit. Al Bagah. Al Jusim. Al Najm.	Kinsan al Ajdaid; Mitab al Hidib Ibn al Radhi	120 100 50	240 200 100		
	4. Others, sections unknown	100	200		

2. Kinsan al Ajdaid ..
1. Eshim al ..
2. Sh. ..
3. Fadhlan ..
Ayyad ibn Asl. ..
Mubgat. ..
Main camp at ..
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500
Hachim does not like Daham. ..
This section was off

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2. Hachim al Asi.	1. Sh. Gayf 2. Saadi. 3. Bahiman.	Arvadah ibn Asi. Nait ibn Asi. Mithgal. Haiyis and sons. Abdul Muhsin and sons. Sultan and son.	Main camp at Al Bidea. About 300 tents. The others scattered out south and west of Jabal Sinjar.	250	500	Hachim does not like Daham, and is friendly with Ajil.	This section was originally Anizah, but has been with Shammar for forty years.
1. K h u r u s a h al Buraich.	Hamisan	250	500		
2. Mathluthah al Chidadah.	Ibn Azzam. Ali ibn Jadyan Saadu al Ajil al Rush. Mutiaq al Ajilhal al Rush.	50 120	100 240		
3. Al Thabit		
3. Ajil	1. K h u r u s a h al Hadbbah. Al Ghashm	Madlul ibn Asi. Shabib ibn Asi. Sons of Jarullah and Jarullah. All sons of Abdul Aziz. Watban ibn Faisal. All sons of Shallal	West of Jabal Sinjar from Abu Hamdha to Jerahi. Some of sections are out on their own, but all will follow Ajil in war.	250	500	Ajil has a feud with Daham, but is friendly with Hachim and hostile to British.	Hostile.
	Husaini. Jadan. Haiyim ibn Salih	200	400		
	Hijar ibn Antaid A z z u i b n Mahmud. Ibn Amud.* Chuchan ibn Masyul.	100 ..	200 ..		* Mishal al Faris gets his following from Amud.
	2. Al Fadaghah 3. Al Amud.	450	900		

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List No. 2—continued.

Following.	Section and Sub-section.	Shaikhs.	Al Muhammad with following.	Location in October, 1920.	Houses.	Men.	Fends.	Political Attitude.
4. Humaidi ..	1. K h u r u s a h al Aliyan.	Hawai ibn Asi Jadi ibn Dais.	Humaidi and his brothers.	Between Nisibin and Jazirah ibn Omar.	200	400	On bad terms with Daham and good terms with Ajil. Plays a lone hand.	Hostile.
5. Mubrad al Suji.	1. Al A b d a h Afarit. 2. Al Khayah...	Mubrad al Suji ibn Haris. Al Bamah Huail al Ashran.	Ditto ..	South of Hadhr ..	200	400	On good terms with Daham but not under his influence.	Hostile.
6. Dhiyab ibn Hasan.	1. Al Saiyah .. Al Aslam al Iraq. Al Aslam al Badr.	Dhiyab. Al Subhi Al Rawi ibn Barailim.	Said to be across Tigris. Mandalali ..	400 100	800 200	On good terms with Daham. ..	Hostile.

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SHERABIYIN.

Originally the Sherabiyin formed part of the famous Zubaid tribe of Iraq. Two hundred years ago they migrated northwards and eventually settled as nomads in the area Jazirah ibn Omar-Jabal Abd al Aziz.

The Sherabiyin have played an insignificant part in desert politics, and are looked down upon as the weakest tribe in Northern Jazirah. During the Tel Afar disturbances in 1920 one or two tribal horsemen joined in the wholesale looting that took place. Eventually part of the tribe joined Bilaibil's band, and in an air raid the chief's daughter was killed.

The Sherabiyin are nomadic, wandering between the Musharah Dagh and the Jabal Abd al Aziz. They possess considerable herds—5,000 sheep, 1,100 cattle—and are for this reason forced to follow grazing far afield.

The tribe pays tribute to Al Asi, Daham al Hadi and Mijwal al Faris, all of the Shammar Jarba, with whom they generally winter. The two sections of the Sherabiyin, viz., Ubaid and Tahat, are under the patronage respectively of the Jubur and Muhammad, Shaikh of the Tai. They would appear to act as brigands for their respective tribes.

The tribe is only accessible to aeroplane action, as it has no fixed abode and has the whole Jazirah in which to wander. In winter their tents usually lie north of the Wadi Suwaidiyah between the Wadi Safna and Musharah Dagh. In the summer they are scattered in little encampments between the latter place and the Jabal Abd al Aziz.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٦٩ظ] (٢٢٦/١٤٣)

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1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
SHERABIYIN ..	No paramount Chief	<i>Summer.</i> —Jaghjaghah and Khabur Rivers to Jabal Abd al Aziz. <i>Winter.</i> —Musharah Dagh.	220
<i>Sections.</i> Ubaid	Ali ibn Said ..	<i>Summer.</i> —Jaghjaghah Su- Jabal Abd al Aziz. <i>Winter.</i> —Musharah Dagh.	130
Tahat	Khalaf ibn Mansur	On the Jaghjaghah Su ..	90

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SHERABIYIN.

٦٥

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
20	270	440	40	60	Nomadic. Pastoral, with very little agriculture. 5,000 sheep; 1,100 cattle. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Trained thieves who frequently fight the battles of the Tai and Jubur for them. Good fighters, but very weak. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Divided into two sections, which are attached to different powerful tribes. <i>External relations.</i> —Pay tribute to Shammar. Commit robberies on behalf of their patrons, the Tai and Jubur. <i>Military action.</i> —Make a sudden raid on their herds. The tribe will probably flee to the west over Khabur.
10	150	160	20	30	Nomadic. Grow a little maize. 3,000 sheep; 600 cattle. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Robbers, who steal on behalf of the Jubur. <i>External relations.</i> —Pay tribute to Al Asi and Daham. Clients of the Jubur.
10	120	130	20	30	Semi-nomadic. 2,000 sheep; 500 cattle. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Robbers who steal on behalf of the Tai. <i>External relations.</i> —Pay tribute to Mijwal al Faris. Clients of the Tai.

TAI.

Early in the second century after Christ, three Arab tribes from the Yemen, compelled by the periodic pressure of over-population and lack of grazing in Central Arabia, migrated to Northern Jazirah. The first, under Bekir ibn Wail, settled round the town of Amed, now called Diarbekr; the second, by name the Rabiyah, pitched their tents between Nisibin and Mosul; while the third, the Mathri, from whom the modern Tai trace their descent, settled in the country between Raqqah and Seruj.

The Tai appear to have remained in the vicinity of Raqqah until the middle of the seventeenth century, when the great Shammar invasion occurred. In common with other weaker tribes the Tai were forced to find a dwelling-place in the middle or eastern portion of Northern Jazirah. The alteration in habitat and the nature of their new conditions wrought a material change in the character of the Tai, who, from a settled, agricultural tribe, degenerated into so many nomadic herdsmen. The attacks of marauding Shammar from the west and Kurdish tribes from the north rendered the peaceful tillage of cornlands impossible.

In recent years the Tai have begun to regain some of their primitive power in Northern Jazirah. A series of weak chieftains, unable to exercise adequate control of the various sections, had brought tribal prestige into a low condition. The advent of Muhammad, the present paramount Shaikh, who has shown himself to be possessed in a high degree of Badawin diplomacy, has rendered the tribe of some importance in questions affecting the Iraq-Turkish frontier. During the war the Tai contented themselves with replenishing their stock of arms and ammunition either as a price for their goodwill from the Turks or from Turkish convoys. At all times the Tai, who pay no tribute to the Shammar Jarba, have lived on comparatively good terms with the latter, but have never aspired to rival them in the scope of their looting or levy of tribute. At the end of 1919 there occurred an incident which was only satisfactorily settled in the closing days of 1920. Al Asi, the paramount Shaikh of the Shammar Jarba, accused Muhammad of the Tai of an infringement of Shammar grazing rights. As a result of the quarrel that supervened, two sections of the Tai, the Jawalah and Rashid,

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deserted *en bloc* to the Shammar Jarba and bad blood arose between the two main tribes. In April, 1920, the quarrel was accentuated by a dispute over caravan tolls. A few men were killed in an affray between tribal parties, but a temporary peace was patched up by the Turkish authorities in Nisibin. Eventually Muhammad was able to conciliate the Jawalah and Rashid, both of which returned to the allegiance of the chief. The Tai, owing to their geographical position and the necessity to them of the Nisibin market, have been peculiarly susceptible to Turkish propaganda. Their importance was also easily realized by Sharifian agitation, and in the spring of 1919 Muhammad received the first-known propaganda letter of the Sherif of Mecca in Northern Jazirah. The Tai, however, refrained from moving in the Tel Afar disturbances, and, though canvassed continually by Turks and discontented persons of Iraq, have undertaken no hostilities against the British. In December, 1920, Muhammad asked permission to bring part of his tribe south of the Jabal Sinjar. It is conceivable that so long as grazing south and west of the Sinjar is necessary to Tai flocks, they will do nothing to offend the Iraq authorities. In the event of a big Turkish move on Mosul, the Tai would seem to have no option but to remain neutral or join in hostilities against the Arab Government. Muhammad is a past master in the art of diplomacy and knows to a moment when to offer or refuse his allegiance to the Turks. He is conserving all his tribal energies for the inevitable struggle with the Shammar Jarba for supremacy in Northern Jazirah. The Tai are now wholly nomadic and wander between the Jabal Sinjar and the Jabal Abd al Aziz. Occasionally they move within the precincts of Nisibin. If the last few years are any guide to their normal procedure, it is usual for them to spend the winter north and west of the Jabal Sinjar and the summer months between Nisibin and the Wadi al Hol. In their migrations they employ no given routes, and their tents are scattered far and wide in the large area of their wanderings. Their flocks probably total 20,000 to 30,000 head and their camels 1,500. Their chief supply bases are Nisibin and Mardin, but Tai caravans frequently find their way into Mosul. This has been common of late owing to the scarcity of supplies in Turkish territory. A fair amount of money is collected annually from caravans using the Nisibin-Sinjar-Mosul route.

The cohesion of the tribe is ably maintained by the paramount Shaikh Muhammad Abdul Rahman. Externally, though not at actual feud with the Shammar Jarba, the Tai are by no means over-friendly with them. Amicable relations are maintained with Hammu Shiru of the Yezidis, and in October, 1920, Muhammad paid a visit to Balad Sinjar. This friendship has been of considerable use in the past to the British authorities in Tel Afar, since it enabled them to hold a check in some degree over indiscriminate movements of the Shammar. Muhammad expressed his willingness to undertake operations against Muslat Pasha of the Jubur, provided we helped him with rifles and ammunition. It may be assumed, therefore, that he has no particular love of the Jubur. It might be possible in case of untoward action by the Turks to form a Yezidi-Tai combination to harry the Nisibin-Mosul line of communication.

The tribe has a good reputation for courage and fighting ability, comparing favourably with the best Arab tribes. They can put over 1,000 well-armed men in the field, of whom two-fifths are mounted. The rifles in their possession are mostly Turkish Mausers, which have latterly been available in Nisibin. Supplies of rifles and ammunition are mostly derived from Nisibin, although arms are also trickling into Tai country from Aleppo.

The Tai speak Arabic, and by religion are Sunnis. For the latter reason, under certain circumstances, the tribe might show sympathy with the projects and propaganda of Shaikh Ahmad al Senussi.

The chief and most important personality in the tribe is Muhammad Abdul Rahman, a man who realizes the necessity of tribal cohesion, and sees that the incoherence in the Shammar Jarba may give the Tai an opportunity of gaining the ascendancy in Jazirah politics. He has on all occasions shown a friendly spirit to the British, probably because he hopes to find fresh pasturage for his flocks south of Jabal Sinjar. The only other personality of note is Hasan al Dandakh, who is chief of the Jawalah section and possesses a high reputation as a fighting leader. He severed his connection with Muhammad for some time and joined the Shammar Jarba, but he is now back with the Tai.

Punitive measures against the Tai are only possible at present from British territories by aeroplanes. For the complete subjugation of the tribe the occupation of

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Nisibin is essential. A concerted move of cavalry, supported by L.A.M. cars, from Nisibin and Tel Afar and Sinjar would probably bring the tribe to heel. The Tai terrain is well watered in winter and passable in most places for wheels. Three regiments of cavalry would be necessary in such an operation, but this would only be sufficient if the Shammar Jarba were friendly or neutral. The most effective form of punishment would be bombing of tents and flocks. It might also be possible to seize Tai caravans in Mosul and Sinjar.

(C2241)

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٢ ظ] (١٤٩/٢٢٦)

130

1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
Tai	Muhammad ibn Abdul Rahman (Paramount), and his brothers :- Sulaiman. Thalal. Abdul Muhsin. Naif.	Between Nisibin, Sinjar and the Jabal Abd al Aziz.	1,500
<i>Sections.</i>			
Abu Asi	Naif ibn Abdul Rahman.	Nomad between Nisibin, Sinjar and the Jabal Abd al Aziz.	60
Flasah	Mutlaq	As above	100
Ghanamah	Yusuf ibn Abdullah Ali Hayawi.	As above	180
Halajmah	Ahmad al Kutub..	As above	120
Jawalah	Hasan al Dandakh Humaiyid ibn Ismail	As above	200
<i>Sub-sections.</i>			
Huraith	Ahmad ibn Nahab		
Ubaidat	Ahmad ibn Nahab		
Kharb	Abid ibn Haji Ayub	As above	200
Rashid	Abdullah al Hassu	As above	300

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٣ و] (٢٢٦/١٥٠)

131 TAI. (73)

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
400	..	3,000	620	445	<i>Religion.</i> —Sunni. <i>Occupation.</i> —Nomadic herdsmen 20,000 sheep and 1,500 camels. <i>Fighting ability.</i> —Up to good Arab standard. Ammunition and rifles from Nisibin. <i>Politics.</i> —Inclined to favour British. Non-committal in 1921. <i>Propaganda.</i> —Recipients of Turk and Sharifian propaganda. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good under the chief. <i>External relations.</i> —Hostile to Shammar and Jubur. Collect tribute from travellers and sedentary Kurd tribes. Friendly with Yezidis. <i>Punitive action.</i> —Tribe cannot be controlled until Nisibin is occupied. Flocks can be raided from Sinjar as a base. L.A.M. cars are useful, but the country demands cavalry as well.
20	30	120	25	25	The chief is the brother of the paramount Chief. This section clings closely to the main body of the tribe.
20	40	200	40	20	Closely allied to the Rashid section, but still remain with the main body of the Tai.
30	100	360	70	60	Allied to the main body of Tai.
20	60	240	50	30	As above.
50	80	400	100	30	Hasan al Dandakh is a powerful fighting leader. Left the Tai in 1919, but now with them again.
80	60	400	70	70	Allied to the main body of the Tai.
150	100	600	200	50	A well-armed fighting section. Abdullah al Hassu deserted the main Tai and joined Al Asi of the Shammar, but has rejoined Muhammad again.

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٣ظ] (٢٢٦/١٥١)

132

1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
TAI—continued. Sections.			
Bani Saba	Muhammad al Ghanam (Ubaid branch).	Nomad between Nisibin, Sinjar and the Jabal Abd al Aziz.	200
Sharabi	Sultan ibn Muhammad (Abungin branch) Batran	As above	150
Zubaid	Muhammad al Faris	As above	50
Tai. (Families of Tel Afar district.)	Husain al Abdullah Haji Muhammad. Hauran.	Tel Afar and Homaidat districts; chief village Tel Kashaf (23 miles east of Tel Afar).	150

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٤ و] (١٥٢/٢٢٦)

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133

TAI—contd.

5.			6.		7.
Armed Men.			Rifles.		
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
20	100	400	60	60	The Bani Saba are divided into two closely allied branches. The section remains with the main body of the Tai.
10	120	300	30	100	The poorest section of the Tai. They remain with the main tribe.
..	35	100	15	20	Remaining with the main Tai.
15	..	300	30	65	Settled cultivators, who have left the main Tai tribe and become small farmers. They have no ties with their old tribe and are closely allied with Jubur villagers. Chief village is Tel Khashaf, 5 miles east of Muwali. <i>Politics.</i> —Pro-British (1921). <i>Punitive measures.</i> —Seizure of Tel Khashaf, which lies on cart-road between Mosul and Tel Afar.

TEL AFARIS (Turcoman).

The inhabitants of Tel Afar and a dozen villages in the vicinity are of Turcoman origin and claim to be considered as members of certain tribes rather than townsmen. It would seem that the population is descended from a Turkish colony planted by Tamerlane the Great, but there is really no authoritative evidence to show that they are other than Turkish settlers from Anatolia.

The population has always been given to turbulence, both amongst its own component parts and against its neighbours and the Government. In Turkish times the various aghas existed as so many brigand chiefs. While they themselves lived to all intents and purposes in peace and quiet in Tel Afar, their henchmen were carrying out wholesale robberies on the several highways that pass near the town. During the war the Tel Afaris aided the Turkish forces against Hammu Shiru and the Yezidis, consequently there is now bad blood between the latter and Tel Afaris. In 1918, on the British occupation of Mosul, Tel Afar was placed under British administration and apparently appreciated this till June, 1920. At that time Sharifian agitators from Syria and disaffected officers in the local gendarmerie induced the local aghas to join in a rising against the British authorities. On the arrival of a small Arab force and tribesmen the Tel Afaris threw in their lot with the enemy and murdered the British Political Officer and other Britishers in the town. On the approach of a punitive column from Mosul the whole population of the town fled beyond our frontier. A quarter of the town and the houses of the chief men were destroyed. Eventually most of the aghas surrendered and were allowed to return to their homes after paying a suitable fine. A British garrison was established in Tel Afar in July, 1920, and remained there till September, 1921.

There seems no doubt that the aghas joined the Sharifian forces because of the promises of aggrandisement held out to them. It would appear also that they quickly realized the error of their ways, and are unlikely in future to join any attack on the Government unless it is made by strong Turkish forces supported by guns. With a British garrison in Tel Afar, the aghas proved amenable to the ways of settled government. It is

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certain, however, that they continued in correspondence with both Turkish and Syrian agitators. In event of a Turkish move on Mosul, the Tel Afaris, from their Turcoman origin and undoubted Turkish sympathies, would join the Turks.

Their activities would, however, depend on the attitude of the Shammar Jarba. If the latter took up a pro-Arab attitude, the Tel Afaris would probably, almost certainly, remain quiet. Tel Afar, lying right in the track of Shammar migrations, cannot afford to offend the nomads.

The population of Tel Afar consists of nine tribes dwelling in their respective quarters of the town. They are settled cultivators, who plough the lands for a radius of 15 miles round the city and have gained a reputation for farming and hard work. The district is very fertile and produces about 10,000 tons of wheat and barley annually. With effectual security, about twice this amount could be produced. The inhabitants also possess about 20,000 sheep and 400 horses.

The chief supply base of the town is Mosul, but, when the Dair al Zor-Mosul route is open, supplies are also available from the Euphrates. Tobacco, fruit, wood, etc., are obtained from the Kurdish hills above Dohuk and Zakho. It is questionable if a blockade of the Mosul-Tel Afar road would seriously affect the Tel Afaris, as their chief supplies are grown locally.

The various tribes follow various aghas, who exist as so many parasites on the Fallahin, or cultivators. The latter would seem to hold their lands as a benefice or fief under some such contract as under, "I shall continue to till the land and pay you a rent in produce or in labour or in fighting so long as you protect me from Badawin raids." The various sections were formally at bitter feud with each other, and internecine murders were almost a daily occurrence. It was quite common for two neighbouring quarters of the town to carry out a regular battle from the housetops. Each house is a miniature fort still. With the advent of British administration murder was extirpated and cases of assault even reduced to a minimum. The aghas or chiefs are thoroughly jealous of each other, and contrive to score off one another as often as possible. Mutual jealousies would soon wreck the cohesion of the Tel Afaris in any prolonged rebellion.

The chief aghas are Haji Yunus Agha, Saiyid Abdullah, Haji Ali and Abdul Rahman Effendi. The

first-named, with his son Ibrahim Agha, has latterly tried hard to win favour with the British Political Officer, and is not averse to running down the other aghas. Saiyid Abdullah and Haji Ali, from their religious dignities, probably are the most powerful men in the town. Abdul Rahman Effendi alone remained out after the town made submission. He is a picturesque brigand, who would probably work for the Government if properly handled.

The Tel Afaris are not openly enemies of the Shammar Jarba, but they do not exactly love them. They are, however, too frightened to do anything against them. With the neighbouring tribes—the Juhaish, Girgiryah and Jubur—they exist on friendly terms. The Yezidis bitterly hate the Tel Afaris and this hatred is reciprocated. It reached a head in 1921, when Hammu Shiru refused to allow Tel Afaris to come to the Sinjar for fuel, etc. A temporary truce was patched up, but the Yezidis are never likely to look on the Turcoman population with anything but hostility.

The Tel Afaris are fairly good fighters, possess several hundred horsemen and a good supply of Mauser rifles and ammunition. It has been stated that each house possesses at least one rifle. Rifles and ammunition, in case of a Turkish move on Mosul, would be supplied from Jazirah ibn Omar and Nisibin. Two or three hundred of the townsmen have been gendarmes in British and Turkish service and have some knowledge of discipline and open warfare.


Owing to their origin, the Tel Afaris are peculiarly susceptible to Turkish influences. They ostensibly are prepared to support the Arab Government, but covertly their sympathies are with the Turks and the proposed suzerainty of a Turkish prince in Iraq. Shaikh al Senussi undoubtedly possesses influence in Tel Afar mainly through his pro-Turkish propaganda.

The Tel Afaris all speak a Turkish dialect, but many can also speak Arabic. By religion Sunnis, they are for this reason supporters of the Turkish Caliphate.

Punitive measures against the Tel Afaris would be:
(i) bombing of Tel Afar town, which consists of 2,000 to 3,000 stone houses and is an easy mark for aeroplanes;
(ii) occupation of Tel Afar and, as in 1920, destruction of properties, crops, flocks, etc., of the inhabitants. The town is accessible by several roads from Mosul, two of them, viz., that via Homaidat and Abu Maria and that via Sahaji and Muwali being passable for Ford vans

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"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٦ و] (١٥٦/٢٢٦)



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and L.A.M. cars. The force necessary for occupation of the town would vary with conditions, but should never be less than one cavalry regiment, one battalion of infantry and one battery of guns. A force of this size could be maintained in the town for an indefinite period providing supplies were normal. In seeking to effect destruction of crops and seizure of arms, search parties should carefully examine the inside walls of all houses and tap all courtyards, as these are favourable hiding-places for grain, arms, etc.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٦ظ] (١٥٧/٢٢٦)

1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
TEL AFARIS ..	Saiyid Abdullah .. Haji Ali. Haji Yunus Agha. Saiyid Mutalib. Saiyid Riza. Ibrahim Agha. Sulaiman Agha. Haji Mahmud. Abdul Rahman Effendi. Abdul Rahman Agha.	Tel Afar and various villages in Tel Afar district.	1,160

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٧٧و] (٢٢٦/١٥٨)

٦٦

139 TEL AFARIS.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Serviceable.	
260	..	2,320	210	750	<p>Turcomans, said to be descendants of Tarmerlane the Great's soldiers. Townsmen and villagers are divided into nine tribes or sections, which follow the various aghas. A turbulent lot but good farmers.</p> <p><i>Political.</i>—Anti-British during Tel Afar rebellion 1920, but in 1921 pro-British rather than pro-Arab. Not to be trusted. Chief aghas are Saiyid Abdullah, Haji Ali and Haji Yunus Agha.</p> <p><i>Internal cohesion.</i>—Do not hang together well and always fighting with each other.</p> <p><i>Punitive measures.</i>—Destruction of Tel Afar and villages.</p>

YEZIDIS (of Sinjar).

The Yezidis, popularly said to be worshippers of the Devil, exist in Central Asia as several scattered communities, but only concern Northern Jazirah by their residence in the Jabal Sinjar. They trace their origin somewhat tortuously to the religious followers of Shaikh Adi, a native of Aleppo, who died about 580 after the Hejira (A.D. 1212). By some they are supposed to be one of the lost tribes of Israel, by others to be merely a Kurdish tribe, which in a southern immigration came upon a mountain, such as they loved, in a desert plain, and lived there ever afterwards. From their customs, appearance, religion, and language they would appear to be of Kurdish extraction, and were conceivably a Kurdish tribe converted to the tenets of Shaikh Adi, who was probably a Moslem with a predilection for outworn creeds and religions.

As their political outlook is largely dependent upon the form of their religion, it is perhaps better to describe it in the first place. The Yezidi religion is not a harmonious system, but a curious, almost incomprehensible, blend of pre-Muhammad paganism, Hebraism, Islamism, Christianity and various relics from a dozen dead, oriental religions. The central article of their creed is the propitiation of the Evil Principle—called the Malik Taus, a Peacock King—a conception probably derived from the Persian Dualists.

The Yezidis have a regular hierarchy of seven orders:—

(i) *Mir*.—The Mir is the keeper of Shaikh Adi's shrine, and he alone can give decisions in religious matters.

(ii) *Shaikhs*.—The Shaikhs are religious leaders and teachers, who can give political, as differentiated from religious, decisions.

(iii) *Pirs*.—The Pirs are highly revered dignitaries, who should, according to the Book, give their days to fasting and meditation.

(iv) *Rahwal*.—The Rahwal beat the drum and sing songs before the Malik Taus.

(v) *Kochik*.—The Kochik shroud corpses for coffining, and interpret dreams.

(vi) *Faqirs*.—The Faqirs are lay brothers, dressed habitually in black.

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(vii) *Mullahs*.—The Mullahs teach the young and keep the secret, religious books of the Yezidis.

The Yezidis are also divided into seven sects, in which it is believed endogamy is practised: (i) Shaikh Adi, (ii) Shaikh Shams, (iii) Malik Taus, (iv) Malik Farah-ud-Din, (v) Shaikh Sharif-ud-Din, (vi) and (vii) Unknown. They possess two sacred books: (i) Kitab al Aswad, or Black Book, commonly supposed to be the Koran with the word Shaitan scored out, but in reality a collection of semi-historical tales, religious rites, and moral maxims derived from various sources; (ii) Kitab al Jilwah, the book of enlightenment.

Tenacious of their strange creed, which urges the destruction of all Moslems, the Yezidis have suffered much persecution at the hands of Arab and Turk. Their holy book reads "It is forbidden for a Yezidi to hear a Moslem pray or stand where a Moslem has prayed, since the Moslem when he prays abuses the Peacock. If any Yezidi hears a Moslem in prayer he should kill the Moslem or commit suicide."

The Yezidis seem to have been at one time a harmless sedentary people, who from long years of Turkish and Arab oppression have developed into a race of brave and hardy fighters. During the Ottoman government of Iraq they were inveterate robbers, who lived in a state of semi-defiance of their Turkish overlords. About 1894 the Turks became obsessed with the intention to convert the Yezidis by force to Islam, and for this purpose an expedition was sent against Sinjar under Ferid Wahabi Pasha. Many Turkish soldiers were killed, the Yezidi villages on the lower foothills were burned, but the main Yezidi population took refuge in the inaccessible portions of the mountain, and the expedition proved a singular failure. For many years the Yezidis were left in a sort of semi-independence, broken by several and unavailing efforts to bring them under government control. During the Great War they exhibited considerable friendship to the many Christian refugees from Turkish territory, whom they sheltered from their oppressors. In the late summer of 1918 a Turkish force of all arms, including two 5.9 inch guns—hopeless weapons in country which is barely accessible to pack transport—was sent against Hammu Shiru, who had been active against the Turkish communications between Nisibin and Mosul. Although successful in occupying Balad Sinjar, the Turkish troops were unable to penetrate into the hills to which the

Yezidis retreated. In the mountains the Turks were easily held, and the expedition proved a failure.

All Yezidis, who are tractable and amenable to ways of a just and stable government, are enthusiastic supporters of a British administration in Iraq. They hate equally Turks and Arabs, but might be inclined to stand by an Arab Government provided the British remained in an advisory capacity. In 1921 the Turks, recognizing the strategic importance of the Jabal Sinjar, which threatens the main routes between Dair al Zor, Nisibin and Mosul, have attempted to win over several Yezidi aghas, who have been dissatisfied with the regime of the present Chief, Hammu Shiru. The success of such propaganda is, however, unlikely owing to the traditional Yezidi hatred of all Moslems, particularly of the Ottoman type.

In the Jabal Sinjar Hammu Shiru has long been the autocratic temporal head of the Yezidis. Formerly the adviser of the paramount Chief, he was able, thanks to a successful raid, to acquire supreme power and became head of the Fuqara, a religious caste. His will at all times has been harsh to his enemies, but it has undoubtedly kept the Yezidis together, and prevented their disruption and defeat at the hands of Badawin tribes. Owing to his autocratic ways, Hammu Shiru has alienated the sympathies of some half-dozen aghas, the chief of whom is Husain Burgess, the grandson of the old paramount Chief. In 1920 Husain Burgess, Daud al Daud of Mihrkhan, Ahmad Muto of Samoko and several others were said to have received seditious letters before the Tel Afar disturbances, but there seems no reason to believe, as Hammu Shiru believed, that these men ever intended to help the enemies of the British. There can be little doubt that the Yezidi chief is harsh and unjust to his Yezidi enemies, but the circumstances of his life and people must be considered in this connection. Hammu and his people are but little removed from savagery. His life, with its struggle for tribal supremacy, his constant warfare with Turk and Arab, his splendid isolation and lack of intercourse with the outside world, all combine to keep him chained to barbarianism. He rules by fear and with an iron rod, but, like all who do so, he dreads an arrow in the dark. That is his reason for fearing Husain Burgess, and the few who would oppose his despotic sway. It may possibly be correct to think that despotism holds no place in modern civilization, but here it must be realized that it

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is amongst the Yezidis a temporary cure for a worse disease—anarchy. If Hammu Shiru's power be weakened, the Yezidis will split into small groups at the mercy of the desert tribes.

The Yezidis are a settled agricultural people who cultivate cereals in the Sinjar plain and practise viticulture and fig-growing on the Jabal Sinjar. Formerly a fair amount of tobacco was grown, but this has been discontinued. Yezidi villages lie in the foothills south and north of the Jabal and also in the heart of the mountain itself. Annually they produce about 3,000 tons of wheat and barley and possess about 30,000 sheep. They obtain other supplies from Mosul and Nisibin, the latter through the courtesy of Muhammad, Shaikh of the Tai.

The internal cohesion of the Yezidis is good, but has been slightly impaired recently by Hammu's injustice. Samoko and other villages on the north of the Jabal are inclined to follow Husain Burgess, but in any trouble with the Muhammadan tribes all the Yezidis would follow Hammu Shiru. The Yezidi Chief indulges in friendly correspondence with Al Asi of the Shammar, but is not inclined to look on the tribe with aught but suspicion. He is peculiarly averse to Hachim ibn al Asi. The Tai are looked upon as friends, and in October, 1920, the Tai Chief visited Hammu Shiru in Balad Sinjar, where an exchange of presents took place. Hammu also allows certain Tai sections to graze between Samoko and Kiran—largely to preclude hostile Shammar from attacks on outlying Yezidi villages. Of the Juhaish the Yezidis are rather contemptuous, and towards the Mutaiwid bear a frank loathing. Hammu cleared out the Mutaiwid's villages during the Tel Afar rebellion in 1920. There is no love lost between Yezidis and Tel Afaris, and in 1920-1921 it was only with difficulty that the Chief of Sinjar could be persuaded to allow the Tel Afaris to obtain firewood and charcoal in the Sinjar. Hammu Shiru also hates Muslat Pasha of the Jubur, whom he accuses of being the main instigator of the Tel Afar disturbances. Muslat has made overtures of friendship, but these have always been turned down. It is probable that Muslat enjoys the privilege of being Hammu Shiru's most hated enemy.

The whole Yezidi population is brave, hardy and warlike. It has no fear for its Badawin enemies, and in the Jabal Sinjar has proved more than a match for Turkish regular troops. Hammu Shiru can raise about 2,400 armed men, of whom 500 would be mounted on horses

and mules. Of the rifles, about 50 are British 1914 pattern, for which he has 100 rounds per rifle, and the remainder are Mausers, for which he has roughly about 50 rounds per rifle. In the event of a Turkish advance Hammu would require Mauser ammunition from the Iraq Government before he could make any move on Turkish lines of communication and convoys.

As already stated and described, the leading personality in the tribe is Hammu Shiru. It is advisable to add that, so far as the temporal policy of the Sinjar Yezidis is concerned, the spiritual head of the Yezidis, who lives in Baidri, north of Mosul, has no influence at all. Hammu Shiru, who is the Government Chief of the Sinjar, is to all intents and purposes an autocratic king. Another prominent personality is Daud al Daud, who is Chief of Mihrkhan, where he resides. He was formerly a bitter enemy of Hammu Shiru, but latterly is reported to have become reconciled to him. He is much respected by Moslem tribes and Tel Afaris. Another man of note is Husain, the Wakil of Hammu Shiru. He appears to be intelligent and in favour of accentuating rather than moderating the despotism of his master. Husain ibn Burgess ibn Sufuk is the principal lay agha of Jabal Sinjar, and bitterly opposed to the present Chief of the Yezidis. He was Chief of the Musarah tribe until deposed by Hammu Shiru in favour of Sufuk ibn Saidu, though people still recognize Husain as Chief. In spite of his bitterness to Hammu Shiru, he is loyal to Government. Another personality, who is not a Yezidi but exercises considerable influence among them, is Najim ibn Abdullah Suhaq, who was appointed Mayor of Balad Sinjar by the British. He is a Christian merchant, who was very loyal to the British and punished by the Turks as a spy. He is rich, possesses considerable influence over Hammu Shiru, but does not always give disinterested advice.

Punitive measures against the Yezidis are never likely to be necessary, but, if they were, would require the use of large forces skilled in mountain warfare. The preliminary step from the Iraq side would be the occupation of Balad Sinjar, which lies about 75 miles west of Mosul and is accessible to L.A.M. cars and Ford vans from that city. From Balad Sinjar it would be easy to destroy the Yezidi villages in the southern foothills, and cut them off from the large wheat-growing area in the Sinjar plain. The effective occupation of the Jabal would, however, require at least two brigades of infantry

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
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with pack transport and mountain guns. It should be possible to establish a series of posts from Balad Sinjar to the northern foothills—posts which would cut off the western from the eastern Yezidis. In this way the latter could be dealt with consecutively. The chief difficulty in such operations would be the water supply in hot weather. In the winter water is plentiful from streams, which carry off the melted snow falling yearly on the mountain top.

FAMILY OF HAMMU SHIRU.

Hammu Shiru—4 wives.



"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٨٠ ظ] (٢٢٦/١٦٥)

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1. Confederation, Tribe or Section.	2. Chiefs.	3. Habitat.	4. Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
YEZIDIS	Hammu Shiru .. (Paramount.) H.Q., Bardakhli and also Balad Sinjar.	The Jabal Sinjar ..	2,780
<i>Sections.</i> Alidina	Kolo	Alidina	200
Bakran	Sulaiman	Bakran and Yusufan ..	150
Delkan	Murad Abdi	Bana al Tappah	70
Al Douchi	Ashui	Kursi	100
Fuqarah	Hammu Shiru .. H.Q., Bardakhli.	Bardakhli, Maniah in the Bardakhli Valley.	120
Hababah	Ato ibn Ali Khudr Kahnyah.	In Balad Sinjar	400
Haskan	Ammi	Haskan	200
Kiran	Abbas Qasim	Mashmaniyah	500

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٨١ و] (٢٢٦/١٦٦)

147 YEZIDIS. ٨١

4. tribes and uses.	5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
	Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
80	500	..	5,560	400	2,000	The total population is estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000.
90	10	150	160	Sedentary and agricultural with a few shepherds. Formerly at feud with Hammu Shiru, but now under his control.
50	5	100	105	Sedentary and agricultural. Formerly at feud with Hammu Shiru, but now under his control.
0	10	80	90	Sedentary and agricultural. <i>External relations.</i> —Followers of Hammu Shiru. Have a feud with the Hababat Kurds, a few Kurdish families living in Balad Sinjar, who murdered Abdi, the father of the present chief.
	10	80	90	<i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good. <i>External relations.</i> —Pesh Imam Ibrahim, spiritual head of the Fuqara, belongs to this section and has influence with other sections.
	10	100	110	Sedentary and agricultural. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good. Hammu Shiru is the paramount chief. <i>External relations.</i> —At feud with Husain Burgess of the Muskora section.
	20	300	320	Sedentary and agricultural.
	25	150	175	Semi-nomadic and sedentary. Agricultural and pastoral. <i>External relations.</i> —Shaikh Nasir a spiritual head of the Yezidis, lives in Haskan. Section is subordinate to Hammu Shiru.
	60	400	460	Semi-nomadic and pastoral. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Chief is a new man. Shaikh Khudr was deported in 1919. Abbas Qasim is bound by marriage to Hammu Shiru, and section is obedient to chief.

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٨١ ظ] (٢٢٦/١٦٧)

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1.	2.	3.	4.
Confederation, Tribe or Section.	Chiefs.	Habitat.	Fami- lies' Tents or Houses.
Yezidis— <i>continued</i> . Sections— <i>continued</i> . Mendikan	Karim ibn Jirdu Bashokh.	Mandikan, also called Bashokh Khan. In the plains.	160
Mihrkhan	Daud ibn Daud .. H.Q., Zerwan.	Mihrkhan	130
Muskorah	Husain Burgess .. (deposed). Sufuq ibn Saidu.	North of Jabal Sinjar in the villages of— Taraf. Kuwaiti. Adika.	150
Samokhah	Ahmad Muttu ..	Samokhah and in tents near the Jubur.	600

"تقرير عسكري عن بلاد الرافدين (العراق)" [٨٢و] (٢٢٦/١٦٨)

149

YEZIDIS—contd.

5. Armed Men.			6. Rifles.		7. Notes.
Horse.	Foot.	Total.	Modern.	Old, but Service-able.	
20	100	120	Sedentary and agricultural. <i>Religion.</i> —Half Moslem and half Yezidi. <i>External relations.</i> —Obedient to Hammu Shiru.
5	100	105	Sedentary. Shepherds and gardeners. Daud ibn Daud was imprisoned for a short time by Hammu Shiru, but was released by the Political Officer, Mosul. He had a feud with Hammu Shiru and was said to indulge in much intrigue. He is now on good terms with Hammu.
15	120	135	Sedentary and agricultural. Cultivate grapes, figs, wheat and barley. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Yezidis, mixed with a fifth part of Kurds. Grandfather of Husain Burgess was paramount chief. Hammu Shiru deposed Husain Burgess, but tribe still regards him as chief.
50	450	500	Semi-nomadic and pastoral. <i>Internal cohesion.</i> —Good. No feuds, and Ahmad Muttu exercises strong control. <i>External relations.</i> —Do not get on with their Arab neighbours. Subordinate to Hammu Shiru, but Ahmad Muttu dislikes the chief, and is said to intrigue with the Turks.

CHAPTER VII.

PERSONALITIES.

ABDUL AZIZ IBN UMAR MISTO, HAJI.

Chief of the Hassinan tribe (Kurdish) on river at extreme north of Tel Afar district. At feud with the Miran, his father having been ousted by Mustafa Agha, father of the present Miran Chief. Went to Sharifian forces in Tel Afar in June, 1920, but probably under compulsion, and has shown himself on the whole loyal to us. Raided Miran in September, 1920. A quiet, solemn fellow who nurses a grievance. On good terms with Sulaiman Agha of the Girgiriya, and is said to have helped rebels of that tribe in the Suwaidiyah. His brother Yusuf Agha is a virile type; both of them being good fighters.

ABDUL KARIM BEG.

A scion of one of the leading Mardin families, who frequently comes to Mosul for the purposes of trade and generally has some good information to impart. Says, which is probably true, that he is rather suspected in Mardin owing to his visits to officials here. Seems very pro-British. An uncouth youth, which gives him the appearance of bad manners. Has a penchant for the gay life. His father is a Kurdish Committee man.

ABDUL RAHMAN AGHA OF TEL AFAR DISTRICT.

See Ali Agha, Haji.

ABDUL RAHMAN EFFENDI IBN USMAN EFFENDI.

Is always known as Effendi to differentiate him from Abdul Rahman Agha of Shaikh Ibrahim. One of the leading Tel Afar Aghas, by extraction from Diarbekr. Ran a robber band in Turkish times. He took part in the Tel Afar coup of June, 1920, but was not a leading spirit. Went over the Turkish frontier and joined Bilaibil (*q.v.*) in raiding our territories, but made submission at Tel Afar in July, 1921. Is an insolent blackguard, but a bit of a sportsman.

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ABDULLAH IBN SAIYID WAHAD, SAIYID.

Is the head of the Tel Afar Saiyids (Shi'ah), the chief members being besides himself Muttalib, Ali Sulaiman and Saiyid Riza. Is opposed more particularly to the family of Haji Yunus Agha. A morose, moody man, who could have great influence. Continually intriguing against the aghas. Showed himself friendly towards us and sat on Municipal Council. His part in the Tel Afar rising in 1920 is not clear, but he went over the border on our occupation. His house was destroyed. He made submission on payment of a light fine. Professes great loyalty and is vouched for by Mustafa Sirri of Mosul.

AHMAD AL KHUDAIYIR.

Of Tel Afar district. Shaikh of the Juhaish. Very old and infirm. In Turkish times frequently in trouble with the Government owing to the rather turbulent character of the Juhaish. Until the Tel Afar coup the Juhaish gave us a little trouble, but certain elements joined with the Sharifian forces, and Salih, Ahmad al Khudaiyir's son, was killed attacking the A.P.O.'s house at Tel Afar, a sore blow to the old man. He made submission, was very slow in fulfilling the terms, but finally paid up in December, 1920. Much respected; does not control all the Juhaish, especially the Ujjan, and the associated Tai sections. Suffers from chronic asthma: had certain influence in Tel Afar, but is getting too old to do anything else but invoke the Deity. The Turks sent him several intriguing letters in December, 1920.

AHMAD AL SENUSSI, SHAIKH.

After his defeat in Western Egypt early in the war, went to Constantinople. After the war he left on an alleged journey to Mecca. He made no secret of his partiality for the cause of the Turkish Nationalists, and attended the Sivas Conference in October, 1919. On December 13th, 1920, he was given a brilliant reception at Angora, and it is reported that Mustafa Kemal offered him the Califate, which he refused. Said to have been sent subsequently to Diarbekr by Mustafa Kemal, who is using him as the leader of Islamic anti-British propaganda. Has

great influence with Moslems by reason of his religious authority. In the summer of 1921 Shaikh al Senussi was in the Mardin district disseminating propaganda amongst the Jazirah tribes in the interests of the Turkish Nationalists. He then moved to the neighbourhood of Urfah. Is said to have great influence amongst the Kurdish tribes in Anatolia, but this appears to be on the wane. At least his mission of stirring up the border tribes has been singularly unsuccessful. His agent is Mansur Beg (*q.v.*).

AHMAD WIRSHAN.

Of Mosul district. Shaikh of the Malawah section of Hadidiyin. Lives and cultivates at Batat. Did not succeed in keeping his section quiet in June, 1920, but made an honest endeavour to recover as much as possible of the loot. Wishes to be regarded as a cultivator and not as a tribal shaikh. Now farms in the Zummar Nahiyah. Has a feud with the Juhaish, who stole several of his donkeys. No great following, but has a certain popularity amongst the Jubur.

AJAIMI PASHA AL SADUN.

A leading Sadun shaikh, who has been in firm opposition to us ever since our arrival in this country. Was heavily subsidized by Preusser and the Turks on the Euphrates, 1917-1918. Visited Syria in 1919 in an attempt to be allowed to return. Attended Sivas Conference in October, 1919. Was at Mardin most of 1920 and lately has been very active in attempting with Turkish or Bolshevik funds to raise a tribal attack against Mosul. Sent his lieutenant, Abdul Jabbar Hilmi Beg, to Mosul in April, 1920, with a message to the Civil Commissioner to negotiate his return. Abdul Jabbar was arrested and imprisoned in the prisoners of war camp at Baghdad, from which he escaped very soon afterwards and is now back with Ajaimi. His intelligence officer was the Naqib of Samarra, who in August, 1921, returned to Iraq, while Ajaimi, who is said to have quarrelled with his Turkish masters, was stated to be awaiting news of the Naqib's reception before returning to Iraq.

AKIF BEG.

Commander of the Turkish Second Division, Headquarters at Sairt. Visited Jazirah and district in the middle of 1920, and seems to have done his best to incite the tribes against us. Kemalist and anti-British, appointed August, 1920, in succession to the quiescent Ali Beg, who appears to have tried to keep the tribes on our frontier in order. In 1920 he visited the Tel Afar rebels in the Wadi Suwaidiyah area. Is still engaged in anti-British activities.

AJIL AL YAWAR IBN ABDUL AZIZ.

Reputed to be one of the ablest of the younger Shammar Jarba Chiefs. Before the war interested in cultivation at Najmah in partnership with Muhammad al Anjaifi. Came in soon after our occupation, and was ordered to remain in Mosul for some days pending settlement of various questions. Took fright, probably owing to intrigue in Mosul, and bolted. Did not definitely go out against us till about April, 1920, since when, and until recently, he has shown himself consistently hostile. He, however, did not take part in the Tel Afar rising. Came to Baghdad on the accession of King Faisal in August, 1921. In the early part of 1922, Faisal appointed him paramount Chief of the Shammar Jarba, but his position as such has not yet been recognized.

ALI AGHA, HAJI.

One of the chief Tel Afar aghas and head of the Albu Dola. Very wealthy and sat on the Municipal Council. Was held to be implicated in the Tel Afar rising; made his peace and has returned. His brother, Abdul Rahman Agha of village Shaikh Ibrahim, abstained from the rising, and, after the fight between the cavalry and the Abdah and Sayih, brought in the British officer's body, for which the 11th Lancers presented him with an abba. Keeps in with Haji Yunis. Is tall, squint-eyed, and dignified. Ambitious and cunning.

AQUB IBN YUSUF.

Mosul district. One of the leading men of the Albu Hamad, a rival of Bilaiibil (*q.v.*) and of a shady reputation before the war. Made early submission

after the Tel Afar disturbances and was appointed Shaikh of the tribe vice Bilaibil, since when he has done well in setting claims against his tribe. Has had trouble with Jamad; is not of the real shaikhly house of Fadhil, the representative of which is Husain, who seems weak and useless. Is related by marriage to Ajil al Yawar (*q.v.*). Is a nasty, morose man.

ASI IBN FARHAN PASHA.

Eldest son of Farhan Pasha and the leading figure among the Shammar. Very old, probably about 90.

Has a great reputation for sagacity, and is the one man to whom the Shammar pay some heed. Has not visited Mosul since the occupation owing to the fact that some years ago, having come in on safe conduct and been imprisoned by the Turks, he swore by the divorce never to set foot in Mosul again. Declined our appointment as paramount Shaikh, but nominated his favourite grandson, Daham (*q.v.*). Has shown great astuteness in keeping a foot in both the English and Turkish camps by means of his various sons and grandsons, who are legion. Is said to have warned Jamil Madfa'i that the Tel Afar coup of 1920 was foredoomed to failure. Is friendly with Hammu Shiru (*q.v.*).

BILAIBIL (BILAL AGHA).

Of Mosul district. Shaikh of the Albu Badr section of the Albu Hamad. A negro and originally a slave, but a man of brains, character and wit. Once saved the life of Sulaiman Nadhif Pasha, the Wali of Mosul, and owes his success in life largely to this act. Was an officer in the Hamidiyah. His son Yunis went to school in Mosul and was in the gendarmerie. On our arrival we confirmed him as Shaikh of the tribe, though this gave us a good deal of trouble owing to the hatred some of the sections had of him. After the Tel Afar rising his tribe remained quiet for some days. Then his son, Yunis, raided the dairy farm, Mosul, but later Bilaibil sent back practically all the cattle and was expected to make submission; but, owing probably to backstairs intrigue in Mosul, he suddenly changed his attitude and went over the border to the Wadi Suwaiyah. Making this his base and with Turkish support he raided (*a*) the Tel Afar road, killing a Christian contractor; (*b*) the

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Dohuk road, getting a lot of loot; (c) the Sharqat-Mosul road near Shurah, killing Daud Bethun and Sharif Farukhi. His son, Yunis, is a bold raider. His encampments were heavily bombed in January, 1921. At the end of 1921 Bilaibil was reported to have been imprisoned by the Turks for looting caravans.

BUNYAN IBN SHALLASH.

Of the Durra Shammar. Consistently hostile and author of several raids against us, notably near Shurah in June, 1920, where a convoy was cut up.

DAHAM IBN AL HADI IBN AL ASI.

The favourite grandson of Al Asi and nominated by him for position of (British) paramount Shaikh of the Shammar Jarba. Al Hadi was killed by the Faddaghah in a war which rent the Shammar some years ago. Daham was appointed by us after the Tel Afar coup in 1920, as we had to have somebody, in spite of a fine outstanding against him which had not been paid. While admitting that he is in a difficult position owing (a) to his extreme youth, (b) to the fact that he stands for law and order to turbulent spirits who dislike both intensely, he has so far been an absolute failure from our point of view. He has not asserted himself in the slightest and has not tried to. Has taken Khawah very heavily and must have become wealthy, although the large number of slaves he keeps undoubtedly eats up a good deal. In December, 1920, many of the slaves were enrolled by us as a garrison for Najmah. On return he relieved them of their rifles and has not given them all back in spite of frequent promises. With Ajil al Yawar (q.v.), Daham came to Baghdad on the accession of King Faisal. In the early part of 1922 Faisal nominated Ajil as paramount Chief of the Shammar Jarba in the place of Daham. Al Asi, however, has refused to recognize Ajil as such, and so far Daham's position remains as formerly.

DAUD AL DAUD.

A chief of the Yezidis, lives at Mirkhan. Owing to his enmity with Hammu Shiru (q.v.), the paramount Chief of the Yezidis, he was suspected of having a pro-Turkish bias, but in reality is a good fellow and as pro-British as Hammu Shiru himself. In March, 1921, he and Hammu became reconciled. Is much respected in the Tel Afar district.

DHIYAB AL HISSAN.

Shaikh of the Shammar Sayih. His tribe was concerned in the affray with the 11th Lancers in September; anti-British, but now probably pro-Arab.

FADHIL EFFENDI, HAJI.

Mayor of Dair al Zor. Now appointed Mutassarif by the French. Reported, nevertheless, to be pro-British and to have sent to welcome a British column at Sinjar which was believed to be moving to Dair al Zor, October, 1920. He veers with every wind.

HACHIM IBN AL ASI.

Shammar. Took part in the Tel Afar coup, 1920; made overtures of submission in October, 1920.

HACHIM AL MUHAID.

With Mujhim ibn Turki, is joint chief of the Fadan Anizah; reported by Nurshirwan, who stayed with him, to be very anti-French and very pro-British, and to have set up a desert government with its capital at Raqqah. Attacked the French force from Raqqah October, 1920, reported to have been supported by Kemalist troops. French reported he had been attacked, bombed heavily and driven out, but early in 1921 he advanced eastwards and occupied Mambij. He was defeated by the French south-east of Aleppo on February 4th and withdrew to Raqqah. Was at feud with Mijhim, who was set up in the Dair al Zor liwah by the French, but in April, 1921, a reconciliation was effected between them, with the result that the Dair-Aleppo road became comparatively safe.

HAMID EFFENDI AL DIBUNI.

Of Mosul. Aged about 27. Gunner officer in Turkish army, served in Dardanelles. Shortly after our occupation of Mosul was appointed by us as D.A.P.O., Tel Afar. Was very unsuccessful and had to be replaced; lived henceforth in Mosul which he left in May, 1920, and went to Dair al Zor. Was sent to Tel Afar by Jamil Madfa'i just before the attack and at a meeting of the Aghawat called by Jamil Yuzbashi urged the Aghawat to rise. Subsequently went to Dair al Zor and Mardin and was employed by Turks as artillery Yuzbashi. Commanded artillery in attack on Dair al Zor in February, 1921, and lost

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three guns. Salih Effendi Dibuni, his father, lives in Mosul and has property in Sinjar. This property is now in the hands of Hammu Shiru.

HAMMU SHIRU.

Paramount Chief of the Yezidis of Jabal Sinjar. Residence Bardakhil in the Jabal. A Faqir (minor Yezidi religious order). Ten years ago he deposed by force Sufuk Agha, the Chief of the Jabal, since which he has reigned supreme. Bitterly anti-Turkish. Owing to raids on convoys, etc., the Turks in 1916 took a large expedition with guns against the Jabal and reduced it, which the Yezidis say was due to their pro-British attitude. In 1918 he assisted Captain Hudson, who visited Sinjar on a mission. Appointed head of the Jabal by us in 1918. Age about 70. At first sight he appears a quiet and venerable old gentleman, dressed in black and with long flowing beard. In reality he is an ignorant and despotic old savage who by means of his faqirs rules the Jabal by fear. The keys to his character are avarice and an intense hatred of Islam, which makes his information almost impossible to act upon, because it is so sweeping. Very outspoken and immensely pro-British. There is a danger that his iron sway will drive the other aghas into sedition. At the time of the Tel Afar coup (June, 1920) he organized a force but was unable to get into touch with us and failed to intercept the Sharifian retreat. His eldest son, Darwish (about 40), is a more reconciliatory character. His second son, Khudaidah, is an attractive personality. In spite of his age extremely vigorous. Receives Rs. 600 *per mensem* from Government. Generally on good terms with Shaikh Muhammad of the Tai and in March, 1921, also with Haiyis ibn Farhan of the Shammar.

HAMID AL HAICHAL IBN ALI.

Of Tel Afar district. One of the Mutaiwid shaikhs, village Ain al Hasan. Had always been very loyal. Joined Sharifian forces at Tel Afar in June, 1920, but with no great following, and it was probably largely through fright. Hammu Shiru (*q.v.*) looted the Mutaiwid villages. Hamid was allowed to return. Is a cheery ruffian, who would take any side for the sake of loot.

HUMAIDI IBN FARHAN PASHA.

In Turkish times was Government Chief of the Shammar. We continued his appointment and paid him Rs. 250 *per mensem*. About April, 1920, his conduct became very unsatisfactory, and in June he threw off the cloak and became with his son, Dhahir, one of the ringleaders in the Tel Afar coup. Is brother of Faisal. Syphilitic.

HUSAIN IBN BURJIS IBN SUFUK.

The principal lay agha of Jabal Sinjar. Chief of the Musara tribe until deposed by Hammu Shiru in favour of Sufuk ibn Saidu, though people still recognize Husain as chief. His grandfather, Kusto, was paramount Chief. Husain is loyal to Government, but hostile to Hammu Shiru. Lives in Haskan village. Husain is a cynical, moody man, but has a certain influence north of the Jabal Sinjar.

IBRAHIM YUSUF, SHAIKH AL JADID.

A young shaikh of a section of the Juhaiish. Cultivates at Abu Maria. A mild, cheerful fellow, who has helped various Assistant Political Officers at Tel Afar. Wants keeping in hand, but is otherwise a good fellow.

JAMIL BEG MADFA'I OR NAINAWI.

An ex-Turkish officer and a native of Mosul, who was the leader of the Sharifian expedition against Tel Afar. Subsequently retired to Damascus, where he styled himself "Deputy of the Higher Committee for Mesopotamian Societies." Was instrumental in sending a telegram in March, 1921, to the Secretary of the League of Nations protesting against the Mesopotamian Mandate. He was excluded from the general amnesty of May, 1921.

JAMIL EFFENDI YUZHASHI IBN MUHAMMAD.

Formerly gendarme Yuzbashi at Sinjar, where he seemed very efficient and satisfactory. Owing to Hammu Shiru's inveterate dislike and suspicion of him (which he was never able to support by facts), he was transferred to Tel Afar early in June, 1920. In June, when the Sharifian forces were approaching, he held a meeting of the Tel Afar chiefs, urging them to rise at once. On their preferring to wait

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until they knew whether there was any backing behind the movement, he deserted and went to Qubuk. There he met Jamil Madfa'i (*q.v.*) and brought him into Tel Afar. Subsequently escaped to Dair al Zor. Just before the French occupation went to Mardin, where he was employed by the Turks as a chatta officer. Is a good soldier.

MANSUR BEG.

Agent of Shaikh Ahmad al Senussi. Approached Shaikh of the Tai in February, 1921, and told him to be prepared to collect his tribes for an advance on Mosul.

MIJWAL AL FARIS.

Shammar. Cousin of Al Asi. Probably the most loyal of the Shammar, but with no great following amongst them. His chief influence is with the Haddidiyin. Obtained the camel transport contract from Sharqat to Mosul.

MUDRAD AL SUQL.

Principal Chief of the Abdah Shammar. His tribe took part in the affray with the 11th Lancers. Has been a continual nuisance.

MUHAMMAD, SHAIKH OF THE TAI.

Has on the whole preserved neutrality towards us. On good terms with Hammu Shiru, whom he visited November, 1920. Was visited by Lieut. Curtin about April, 1920, but received him coldly. In January, 1920, forwarded to us through Hammu Shiru an anti-British letter sent to him by the Sharifian Mudi at Hashichah. In February, 1921, also sent us news through Hammu Shiru of Turkish intrigues.

MUHAMMAD ALI EFFENDI IBN HUSAIN.

Was gendarme mulazim at Tel Afar at the time of the Sharifian attack. Shot Captain Stuart with his own hand shortly before the arrival of the Sharifian forces. Now employed by the Turks.

MUHAMMAD AL ANJAIFI, HAJI.

Of Mosul. Large landowner at Nimrud, etc., and of great influence among the Sarli, Shebek and Tai tribes of the Zab. Married a Shammar wife and is

well in touch with the Jazirah. Raised large numbers of irregulars for service in the Turkish expedition against Nijris ibn Qa'ud. Rich, rather vain, extremely tenacious of his rights, and certainly a power in the tribal world. Reputed to have obtained much of his land by sharp practice. Would spend £100 to get even with anyone who had done him out of sixpence. Hates the Turks. One of the most interesting characters in Mosul. His dyed moustache makes him look less than his years. Is not to be trusted in tribal matters, and should be allowed to interfere as little as possible. Hates Nuri Effendi Waiso, O/C 1-6th Turkish Regiment, whom he believes to be responsible for the bombardment of Salamiyah in 1918, in which some of his relations were killed. At the end of 1920 asked permission to go to Jazirah with three or four men to kill him. Is believed to be thoroughly anti-Turk. At the beginning of 1921 lent Daham £T500.

MUHAMMAD IBN HAJI QADIR.

Of the Girgiriya, the most influential personage next to Sulaiman Agha (*q.v.*). Took part in the Tel Afar coup, and has since shown himself intractable, having joined Bilaibil. Has taken a number of the Girgiriyan with him. His father, Haji Qadir, was killed by our aeroplanes in 1921.

MUHAMMAD SULTAN EFFENDI.

Until recently was Qaimmaqam of Jazirah. Belongs to the Jubur and is a nephew of Muslat Pasha (*q.v.*). Lost no possible opportunity of stirring up the tribes against us. Was dismissed about August, 1920, and fled for refuge to Muslat. Was educated at the Shaikh's college, Constantinople.

MUJHIM IBN TURKI.

With Hachim ibn Muhaid (*q.v.*) is joint Chief of the Fadan section of the Anizah. Became Governor of Dair al Zor in French interests in October, 1920. Defeated attacks by Ramadhan al Shallash in February and April, 1921. Reported in May to have effected a reconciliation with Hachim and to have retired to Aleppo, being dissatisfied with conditions at Dair.

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MUSLAT PASHA.

Paramount Shaikh of the Khabur Jubur. Visited Mosul September, 1919. Always appeared very pro-British until the evacuation of Dair al Zor, after which his attitude grew increasingly hostile. It was he who really made the Tel Afar coup possible. Is now in correspondence with Ajaimi and the Kemalists with a view to action either against the French or ourselves. At feud with Jabal Sinjar, largely through the implacable attitude of Hammu Shiru (*q.v.*).

NAIF BEG.

Shaikh of the Miran. Generally on good terms with Sulaiman, Agha of the Girgiryah. Took no part in the Tel Afar rising. At the beginning of 1921 his tribe was engaged in attacking Kelleks from Zakho, and he has allowed Bilaibil in his territory. To a certain extent is under the influence of Abdul Rahman, Agha of Shernakh. Has a long-standing feud with Haji Abdul Aziz of the Hassinan. His tribe massacred 90 persons in Faishkhabur in 1916, and he has always been apprehensive of retaliation. On the whole appears to wish to stand well with us. Told in February, 1921, that as long as he sheltered Bilaibil and shared in the loot from Kelleks his caravans could not be allowed in Mosul.

NAJM IBN ABDULLAH SUHAQ.

Mayor of Balad Sinjar. A Christian merchant; very loyal to Government; was punished by the Turks as being a spy. Has considerable influence with Hammu Shiru. His advice is not always disinterested.

NIMRUD RASSAM.

Of Mosul. Chaldean, late British Vice-Consul. Is son of Hormuz Rassam, Layard's assistant, and has figured considerably himself in the Assyriological world. Rather old and feeble but of fiery temper. Believed to be suffering from a grievance over non-recognition of his consular services. His son Yusuf Rassam (*q.v.*) was assistant to A.P.O., Mosul town. There is a branch of this family in England.

QUDUR BEG.

Mayor of Nisibin. Made Qaimmaqam October, 1920. Has on one or two occasions given us good information, and has asked for asylum in case he should

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have to fly from the Turks. Said to have been appointed prospective Wali of Mosul by the Turks in February, 1921.

RAMADHAN AL SHALLASH.

Mukhtar of the Albu Sarai, near Dair al Zor. Educated at Madrasat al Ashair in Constantinople, and subsequently entered the military school and army. He was at Mosul when the Sharif's revolt began in 1916 and asked to be transferred to Madinah, whence he escaped to the Sharif. Was disliked by the Amir Ali and King Faisal, who found him insubordinate. Imprisoned for a period at Mecca. After the occupation of Syria he went to Damascus, where he joined the extremists headed by Yasin Pasha. Appointed Qaimmaqam of Raqqah in October, 1919. Attacked Dair in December and held the British officers there prisoners, but treated them well. Faisal repudiated his action. He was recalled to Damascus in January, 1920, replaced at Dair by Maulud and retired to his tribe at Tibni, where he remained after the French occupied Dair. He attacked Dair with a band of irregulars (chatta) in February, 1921, but was repulsed by Mujhim ibn Muhaid. In April, after a second attack on Dair, he made submission to Hachim al Muhaid at Raqqah.

SA'ID BEG IBN ALI BEG.

Of Mosul district. Mir of the Yezidis. Lives at Ba'idra. Age about 35. Very weak character, almost feeble-minded. Drinks heavily. Most well-meaning and loyal. Is run by his mother Maiyan, who has the reputation of being very capable and strong-minded. We allow him to adjudicate in religious or marital matters among the Yeidis, to assist him in which he has a small committee.

His cousin, Ismail Beg, who had been turned out of Shaikhan owing to family quarrels, appeared in Baghdad in 1918 and gave us to understand that he was the real Mir. After our occupation an attempt was made to divide the Mirship between them. It was unsuccessful, and, owing to his persistence in petty intrigue, Ismail was sent to Baghdad and not allowed to return till March, 1921. He has travelled a lot, especially in Russia, and is a taking person at first sight, but a shallow knave in fact. Has now returned to Sinjar.

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SA'ID IBN HAJI THABIT.

Moslim of Mosul. Aged about 35. By occupation a merchant. Was undoubtedly a prominent member of the Ahd and fell into suspicion as being connected with the posting up of seditious notices. In July, 1920, was found harbouring Muhiuddin ibn Mustafa, a very suspicious character from Kirkuk. Orders were given for his arrest, but he escaped to Mardin, where he has been since. Under pseudonym of Qahtan was probably the writer of the seditious letter seized in January. Has a brother in Mosul, Taufiq ibn Haji Thabit, a shoemaker, who is probably also a channel of communication.

SALMO IBN KHALAF.

Of Tel Afar district. Chief of the Ujjan section of the Juhaish. A turbulent character who took part in the Tel Afar rising in 1920. Sued for terms, but has not yet paid his fine and has been obviously trying to make up his mind to go over to the Turks. Ahmad al Khudhaiyir has not much authority over him. The bad man of the Juhaish.

SHAHIR IBN SULAIMAN.

Of Tel Afar district. Shaikh of the Jamus Jubur (Zunmar) and related to Muslat Pasha and Muhammad Sultan, the late Qaimmaqam of Jazirah. Really loyal at heart, but a time-server. Went to Tel Afar in 1920 with practically no following, and has taken the trouble to write to Bilaibil assuring him of his friendship. Very jovial and happy-go-lucky. Enjoys a joke, and devoted to his small son Farman. Golden hair and beard.

SULAIMAN AGHA IBN AHMAD IBN SA'DUN.

Chief of the Arabicized Kurdish tribe of Girgiriya. His grandfather, Sa'dun Agha, is supposed to have brought the tribe from Sulaimani about 100 years ago. Lives at Huqinah, and is supposed to be keeper of the Huqinah Gate. Before the Tel Afar rising in 1920 appeared loyal, but not always straight. It was his encampment at Kuquq that the attempt to capture Major Barlow was made. Although he had kept quiet as to what was in the wind he probably did his best to give Major Barlow a good start.

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Went to Tel Afar, but with no great following and soon made submission; much delay in paying his fine. Related by marriage to Humaidi of the Shammar (*q.v.*). Is not on friendly terms with Naif Beg of the Miran.

USMAN EFFENDI.

Rais Baladiyah of Jazirah. Believed to be in connection with Abdul Rahman Agha of Shernakh and may, therefore, be a certain degree friendly to us, though he was at one time a prominent anti-British figure.

WATBAN IBN FAISAL.

Son of Faisal ibn Farhan, the brother of Humaidi. Took a very prominent part in the raids in Mosul Division in 1920, while his father remained in Samarra Division enjoying a British allowance.

YUSUF RASSAM.

A son of Nimrud Rassam (*q.v.*). Formerly an assistant to the A.P.O., Mosul town, in which position he did very well. In March, 1921, he was appointed Qaimmaqam of Sinjar, but it is unlikely that he possesses sufficient strength to resist Hammu Shiru, the Yezidi Chief.

CHAPTER VIII.

COMMUNICATIONS.

General.—The important factor in the movement of troops in Northern Jazirah is not the existence of roads but of water. Main roads passable for wheels are few and far between, and Northern Jazirah is largely traversed by camel and donkey tracks known only to the inhabitants. Where roads do not exist at present, the nature of the ground will usually permit the movement of both troops and wheeled transport. It may be necessary to spend a day or two in levelling down wadi banks, but otherwise there should be no insurmountable obstacles.

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Two main roads are passable for all arms and L.A.M. cars:—

- (i) Mosul-Dair al Zor via Ain Ghazal.
- (ii) Mosul-Nisibin via Hogena and Demir Kapu Khan.

A very important caravan route, passable to pack and largely utilized by merchants in 1920 when the activities of Bilaibil rendered the Nisibin-Mosul road unsafe, is that between Sinjar and Nisibin.

Routes of minor, but of military importance are:—

- (i) Nisibin to Dair al Zor along the Jaghjaghah and Khabur Rivers. This is passable for pack and was used by a Chatta force in 1920.
- (ii) Sinjar to Dair al Zor via Shadadi.
- (iii) Raqqah to the railway line along the Balikh River.

The road surfaces are generally of soft friable earth, in many places thickly covered with pebbles. In summer they tend to cut up dustily and marching is rendered unpleasant. In winter a few hours' rain will convert the roads into muddy tracks impassable for several days for wheels. The best season for the movement of troops by road is during the end of April and throughout May. Dust is absent; the heat is not excessive; grazing is plentiful and the roads will wear as long as there is any grass to bind the surface.

Methods of Travel.—The Badawin employ camels, horses and donkeys for pack purposes, and camels and horses for riding. The only railway in Northern Jazirah is a portion of that between Nisibin and Aleppo, and at present this is not in running order. Mechanical transport was introduced into the district in 1919, but has not been widely utilized. A few motor cars are available in Mosul for journeys across the Jazirah, but are very expensive. A large use is made of the four-wheeled arabana drawn by two or three horses. The light variety of this vehicle will carry three passengers and 100 lb. of baggage each; the heavy variety, which resembles a G.S. wagon, should carry at least 1½ tons under active service conditions.

Travellers who cannot afford wheeled transport usually hire animals in Mosul or Nisibin, and proceed with a regular caravan to their destination. Owing to the existing insecurity, it is practically impossible for a traveller to move singly by horse, cart, or car. Caravans are always formed under a "caravanbashi" or leader, and sometimes number 200 arabanas. All caravans pay toll to the shaikh of the district through

which they pass, while he in return provides protection in his particular district.

There are very few "Khans" or resting places even on the main routes. Between Sinjar and Dair al Zor there is no shelter on the road, while between Mosul and Nisibin there are only ruined Khans at Tel Awainat and Demir Kapu Khan. Hospitality may always be obtained in the various villages, while in British territory the headmen of villages are responsible for the security of such caravans as apply for it.

Railways.—The only existing railway is the portion of the Baghdad-Aleppo Railway between Nisibin and a point about half-way between Ras al Ain and Jerablus. From Jerablus to Ras al Ain the track is laid and ballasted, although the fine bridge at Jerablus was destroyed during the fighting between the French and the Turkish Nationalists in 1920, thus severing the line completely. From Ras al Ain to Nisibin the track is laid, and has been used regularly by trains. The Nisibin portion is continued to Nametli, but from that place to Mosul only portions of the embankment and a few buildings have been constructed. The trace of the part between Nisibin and Mosul is still visible. As no work has been done on the railway since the armistice, the track and stock have both deteriorated so much through neglect and the depreciation of adjacent tribes that a large expenditure will be necessary to put the existent portion in running order. In the beginning of 1920 the line was cut near Tel Abyadh, and no rolling stock, excepting three broken locomotives, exists east of the break.

The line is of 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge, with German locomotives of about 120 tons weight. The speed of trains varied from 7 miles per hour by night to 15 miles per hour by day. The low speeds were due to the use of wood fuel and the bad condition of the track.

According to the terms of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 1921, the greater part of the Nisibin-Aleppo line was again brought within the Turkish boundary with the proviso that it should be run by the French. Although recent reports indicate that work on the reconstruction of the Jerablus bridge by French engineers is in progress, there are no signs of any resuscitation of the line to the east of that place, and it is doubtful whether this portion will again be in running order for many years.

A branch line, leaving the main line at Derbisayah, between Ras al Ain and Nisibin, runs north to Izzat Pasha. During 1921 this branch line was used for the

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porterage of wood fuel. The main line has been out of action since the beginning of 1920.

In case it were required to undertake operations against the Turkish Nationalists in Nisibin, and the construction of a supply railway were necessary from Mosul, the existing German work could be utilized and expanded. Light railways could be constructed anywhere in Northern Jazirah except in the hills.

Inland Water.—Excepting the Tigris, the rivers in Northern Jazirah cannot be used for conveyance of transport. The Tigris between the Wadi Suwaidiyah and Mosul has already been described in Area 9 (Central Kurdistan).

Telegraphs.—Northern Jazirah is practically devoid of telegraphic communication. There was formerly a telegraph line between Mosul and Nisibin via Hogena. In 1921 this was out of use between Hogena and Nisibin. Tel Afar is connected to Mosul via Hogena. There is, however, no telegraphic communication between Sinjar and Tel Afar. In Turkish territory Nisibin and Ras al Ain are military stations and possess telegraphic and telephonic communication with each other. Ras al Ain is connected to Aleppo, but the line is out of order. Mardin and Jazirah ibn Omar are connected with Nisibin by telegraph. Very little work is required to establish telegraphic communication between Mosul and Nisibin.

Postal Services.—There is an Iraq postal service between Mosul and Sinjar via Tel Afar. The mail is carried twice a week by pack-horses escorted by gendarmes. The charge for letters is 3 annas each. Below are the parcel rates for Iraq Inland Postal Service:—

Tolas.	Rs.	Ans.
80	—	10
160	1	0
240	1	6
320	1	12
400	2	2
480	2	8
560	2	14
640	3	4
720	3	10
800	4	0

Between Nisibin and Aleppo the postal service was maintained over the railway in pre-war days, but this has now been discontinued. In 1921 there was a strict

ensorship of all letters going to and emanating from Turkish territories, but this has now been abolished.

Visual Communication.—Owing to the nature of the ground visual signalling by helio is the most efficient for long distance. Tel Afar can communicate by helio with Dohuk and Balad Sinjar. Other observations have not been made.

Wireless.—There are no wireless stations, including Turkish and French, known to be existent in the area under review.

Aerodromes.—An aeroplane can land with safety in most parts of Northern Jazirah, so that a pilot flying at 4,000 feet should have no difficulty in selecting a suitable landing place in the event of a forced landing. The following sites are believed satisfactory as landing grounds:—

Nametli.—On the old German aerodrome; size unknown.

Nisibin.—North of the railway station; size unknown.

Balad Sinjar.—One mile south of town; 600 yards by 600 yards.

Tel Afar.—Two miles south-west of town; 600 yards by 600 yards.

Principal Routes.—

1. MOSUL-DAIR AL ZOR VIA TEL AFAR, AIN GHAZAL AND TEL SUWAR.

General.—The road is passable throughout in dry weather for L.A.M. cars. The surface is hard, but tends to cut up dustily after much traffic. Rain, which may fall between November and March, generally closes the road to wheels for one or two days.

Water.—

Homaidat	... Mile	8.	Sufficient for 1 division.
Abu Maria	... "	28	" " 1 "
Tel Afar	... "	37	" " 1 "
Ibra Khalil	... "	43	" " 1 "
Ibra Kabir	... "	45	" " 1 "
Ain Hisan	... "	52	" " 1 brigade.
Umm al Shababit	.. "	56	" " 1 "
Ain Ghazal	... "	68	" " 1 "
Al Bidea	... "	96	" " 1 cavalry regt.
Fadhgham	... "	128	" " 1 brigade.
Mile 128-160.	Follow Khabur River.		

Water for 1 division.

Tel Suwar	... Mile	160	" " 1 "
Dair al Zor	... "	191	" " 1 "

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The distance between water after Ain Ghazal renders the route difficult for infantry. From Tel Suwar the Khabur may be followed to its junction with the Euphrates and thence by the Euphrates to Dair al Zor. A cavalry force moving in echelons of one or two regiments from Ain Ghazal could use the whole route.

Supplies.—

Tel Afar, mile 37. For one brigade with 7-10 days' notice.

Ain Ghazal, mile 68. Ditto from Balad Sinjar, which is 7 miles north-west of Ain Ghazal.

From Ain Ghazal no supplies are available.

Transport.—Tel Afar, mile 37, and Ain Ghazal, mile 68. 1,000 camels at each place.

Fuel.—*Nil*, except at Ain Ghazal, where it is unlimited from Jabal Sinjar.

Grazing.—Unlimited for horses and camels throughout in spring.

Obstacles.—Certain large wadis and the Khabur River constitute surpassable obstacles.

Camping Grounds.—Unlimited at each stage.

Communications.—Various tracks lead off north and south of the road. There is a telegraph line to Tel Afar.

Inhabitants.—

Mosul-Tel Afar. Jubur and Tel Afaris. Friendly.

Tel Afar-Ain Ghazal. Tel Afaris, Juhaish, Mutaiwid and Yezidis. Friendly.

Ain Ghazal-Dair al Zor. Shammar Jarba. Hostile and friendly.

Rain and Floods.—Rain between November and March may render road impassable for wheels for one or two days at a time. Wadis will not be passable for several days after heavy rain.

Tactical.—Between Mosul and Tel Afar the road is commanded from hills about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to 1 mile on either flank. From Tel Afar to the Khabur the road is commanded from the Jabal Sinjar.

Aerodrome.—Tel Afar, 2 miles south-west of town.

Landing Grounds.—Between Tel Afar and the Khabur landing is possible on various stretches of absolutely flat ground.

Stages.—	Mile.
(1) Homaidat	8
(2) Abu Maria	28
(3) Tel Afar	37
(4) Ain Hisan	52
(5) Ain Ghazal	68
(6) Al Bidea	96
(7) Fadhgham	128
(8) Khabur	142
(9) Tel Suwar	160
(10) Busairah	190
(11) Dair al Zor	214

It will be seen that the route is passable for an infantry force up to a division as far as Ain Ghazal, while from there to Balad Sinjar, which is 7 miles to the north-west. From Ain Ghazal, the route is only passable to L.A.M. cars and two cavalry regiments at the most.

2. MOSUL TO TEL AFAR.

- (i) Via Homaidat and Abu Maria as for Route 1.
- (ii) Via Jabal Atshan and Muwaili.

General.—This route is passable with difficulty throughout for Ford vans. The only difficult portion is that through the Jabal Atshan, where a week's labour on a small pass about 1 mile long would render the whole road passable for wheels.

Water.—Muwaili, mile 13, sufficient for two cavalry regiments.

Tel Afar, mile 34, sufficient for one division. Water for one cavalry regiment could be obtained at Tel Mujarinah, mile 22.

Supplies.—*Nil.*

Transport.—*Nil.*

Fuel.—*Nil.*

Obstacles.—Pass in Jabal Atshan, mile 8 to 9; 700 day-men to remove stones and widen track.

Grazing.—*Nil*, owing to cultivation.

Camps.—For one brigade at each stage.

Inhabitants.—Friendly Jubur tribesmen and Tel Afaris.

Tactical.—The chief feature is the pass through the Jabal Atshan, which can be turned on either flank.

Stages.—

	<i>Mile.</i>
(1) Muwaili	13
(2) Tel Mujarinah	22
(3) Tel Afar	34

This is the shortest route between Tel Afar and Mosul and could be used by a cavalry force of two regiments. The distance between Tel Afar and Mosul was covered by a small gendarme force in six hours in 1920.

(4) Mosul to Tel Afar via Sahaji, 42 miles. Passable for Ford vans.

3. MOSUL TO NISIBIN VIA HOGENA AND DEMIR KAPU KHAN.

General.—The road, although unmetalled, is passable throughout for L.A.M. cars and Ford vans from the middle of April to the middle of November, but becomes too soft during rainy season, when it is only negotiable by pack transport. After three or four days' continuous rain even pack transport is difficult. Sandy in dry weather, which is improved by small amount of rain. Except near Mosul an average speed of 10 miles can be maintained by cars.

Water.—In November water is plentiful from wadis and wells except between Tel Ismail (mile 66) and Demir Kapu Khan (mile 89), a distance of 23 miles, where there is none.

Supplies.—Supplies are not obtainable on the route, but ample amounts can often be obtained from nomadic tribes. From February to June there is a plentiful supply of milk, curds and fresh cheese.

Transport.—*Nil.*

Bridges.—Between Mosul and Taruz (mile 18) bridges are incomplete and temporarily impassable. West of Demir Kapu Khan (mile 99), roadways of wood over stone foundations.

Fuel.—Extremely scarce. No trees until within a few miles of Nisibin.

Grazing.—Good throughout. Coarse grass along the whole route.

Obstacles.—Nil.

Camping Grounds.—Good and unlimited.

Communications.—

(a) Mosul-Jazirah ibn Omar; passable. Mosul-Tel Afar; passable L.A.M. cars. Mosul-Balad Sinjar; passable wheeled transport.

(b) Tel Uqnah-Tel Afar; passable pack transport.

(c) Demir Kapu Khan-Jazirah ibn Omar; passable wheeled transport.

(d) Nisibin-Jazirah ibn Omar; passable wheeled transport. Nisibin-Mardin; passable wheeled transport. Nisibin-Midiat; passable pack transport. Nisibin-Faishkhabur; passable wheeled transport.

Nisibin-Tel Afar via Balad Sinjar; appears passable wheeled transport except over Shillo Pass.

Nisibin-Tel Afar via Samokha; passability doubtful.

Inhabitants.—

Taruz (mile 18), Kurds.

Kasik Kupri (mile 27), Kurds.

Tel Uqnah (mile 35), Kurds.

Demir Kapu Khan (mile 89), Kurds.

Dugir (mile 109)-Nisibin, Arabs.

Climate.—Between November and March snow sometimes lies on the plain for weeks. Spring (March-May): Herbage growing everywhere. Summer (May-September): Heat intense; sandstorms.

Tactical.—Road could be rendered impassable for wheeled transport by destroying all bridges. There is a pass between Mosul and Taruz (mile 18) which could be blocked.

Aerodromes and Landing Grounds.—No definite information is available, but it seems probable that, in view of the excellence of the camping ground, there will be no lack of landing grounds.

Stages.

	<i>Inter.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
(1) Sanasil	20	20
(2) Tel Uqnah (Hogena, 36½)	15	35
(3) Tel Awainat	15	50
(4) Tel Ismail	16	66
(5) Demir Kapu Khan	23	89
(6) Dugir	20	109
(7) Nisibin	17	126

4. TEL AFAR TO BALAD SINJAR.

- (i) Via Ain Ghazal. As for Route 1—mile 38½.
(ii) Ain Sino, 32½ miles.

General.—Passable as far as Ibra Kabir (mile 9½) for L.A.M. cars. From Ibra Kabir it is a camel track, which requires one month's labour with one company of sappers to make it fit for Ford vans.

Water.—

Tel Afar	Sufficient for 1 division.
Ibra Kabir	...	Mile 9½	" 1 "
Ain Sino	...	" 16	" 1 "
Balad Sinjar	...	" 32½	" 1 "

Supplies.—

Tel Afar.—For one brigade with 7 to 10 days' notice.
Balad Sinjar.—Fair amount of supplies available.

Transport.—Tel Afar: 1,000 camels.

Fuel.—Obtainable from Balad Sinjar.

Grazing.—Good for all animals in season.

Obstacles.—A few large wadis, all passable.

Camping Grounds.—Unlimited.

Inhabitants.—Tel Afaris, Juhaish, Mutaiwid and Yezidis. Friendly.

Climate.—Rain between November and March may render the route impassable for wheels for one or two days at a time. Wadis will not be passable for several days after heavy rain.

Aerodrome.—Tel Afar, 2 miles south-west of the town.

Stages.—

	Mile.
(1) Ain Sino	16
(2) Balad Sinjar	32½

5. TEL AFAR TO ZUMMAR VIA HOGENA.

This would be the road used for any punitive measures against the Girgiryah or Hassinan. Distance 35 miles. Water is sufficient throughout for one cavalry brigade. Road is passable from Tel Afar to Abu Wajnah, mile 26, for Ford vans, thence only for pack.

6. There are various camel tracks from Mosul and Tel Afar into the Shammar grazing grounds via Hadhra, but the water supplies are so little known that movement of troops is not possible along them until a proper reconnaissance has been made. This has not so far been possible owing to Shammar hostility.

7. BALAD SINJAR TO DAIR AL ZOR VIA SHEDADAH.

General.—Passable to pack transport, but requires only a little work to render it negotiable throughout for cart traffic.

Water.—Wurdi, mile $7\frac{1}{2}$, one large spring of good water. Where the road follows the Khabur River drinking water is unlimited.

Between Sekenik (mile 19) and Shedadah (mile 77) and between Tel Sawwar (mile 116) and Dair al Zor (mile 147) water is scarce and reported to be brackish.

Supplies.—There is no appreciable quantity of supplies anywhere.

Transport.—Between Tel Sawwar-Busairah, 2,200 camels available from Jubur Arabs.

Fuel.—Obtainable from Balad Sinjar only

Grazing.—Good for all animals in spring in Khabur Valley.

Obstacles.—None insuperable, although there are several wadis which would probably be difficult to negotiate during the rains.

Camping Grounds.—Good at any stages for any size force, but dependable on the water supply.

Communications.—Tel Sawwar, a ford across the Khabur. From Tel Sawwar a track, reported passable to all arms, strikes west across the desert to Dair al Zor.

Inhabitants.—

Balad Sinjar, Yezidis.

Wadi al Dhiab, Jubur of the Khabur.

Climate.—During the rainy season, December to March, wadis are flooded and the ground heavy. Snow in December and January.

Tactical.—The Jabal Sinjar commands the whole of the surrounding country, and it would be necessary to hold this if a force were marching along this route.

Stages.—

- (1) Wurd
- (2) Seken
- (3) Al Si
- (4) Al Go
- (5) Wadi
- (6) Mile
- (7) Tel S
- (8) Al Sh
- (9) Tel S
- (10) Dair

8.

General.—A hot weather p from Balad S rated, but rat from the for abundant. F Bara Valley, stream flowing north-west ac way to Nisibin

Water.—

Balad Sinja
Wurdi ...

Kolang Hat
Mile $29\frac{1}{4}$ to

Mile 37 to 1

Mile $70\frac{1}{4}$

Nisibin ...

Supplies.—

Balad Sinj
Nisibin.—E

Stages.—	Inter.	Total.
(1) Wurdi	7½	7½
(2) Sekenik	11½	19
(3) Al Sihl	16	35
(4) Al Goneh	19	54
(5) Wadi al Dhiab	9	63
(6) Mile 78½	15½	78½
(7) Tel Shemsaniyah	13	91½
(8) Al Sheriah	13½	105
(9) Tel Sawwar	11½	116½
(10) Dair al Zor	31	147½

8. BALAD SINJAR TO NISIBIN.

General.—A caravan route in common use during the hot weather passable for pack transport only. The track from Balad Sinjar to the Shillo Pass runs over a cultivated, but rather stony, plain keeping from ½ to 2 miles from the foot of the Toq Hills. Water good and abundant. From the Shillo Pass the track descends the Bara Valley, following the course of Huwair Khalid, a stream flowing northwards, until at mile 37 it runs north-north-west across a large plain, which extends the whole way to Nisibin.

Water.—

Balad Sinjar.

Wurdi Mile 7½ One large spring of good water.

Kolang Hafzah ,, 20 Fine, good wells.

Mile 29¼ to mile 33½ ... Track follows Huwair Khalid wadi.

Mile 37 to mile 50 ... Plain fairly well watered by streams. Reported abundant in January.

Mile 70¼ ... Fair-sized stream in deep-cut channel.

Nisibin Mile 80¼ Water fairly abundant from wells, but quality not good at any time, and is polluted in summer by the rice fields.

Supplies.—

Balad Sinjar.—Fair amount of supplies available.

Nisibin.—Estimated supplies for one division.

Transport.—Nisibin. Large number of horses and camels obtainable in the neighbourhood.

Fuel.—Balad Sinjar. Ample supplies.

Grazing.—Mile 37 to mile 70. Grassy plain; fair grazing in season.

Obstacles.—A number of streams to be found on the large plain between mile 37 to Nisibin form awkward obstacles in wet weather. Mile $70\frac{1}{4}$, there is a fair-sized stream flowing between banks which may be difficult to ford in January.

Camping Grounds.—The plain of Nisibin affords excellent camping grounds with abundance of water and good grazing.

Bridges.—Nisibin is reached by a twelve-arched stone bridge over the River Jaghjaghah.

Communications.—

(a) Balad Sinjar-Mosul; passable for wheeled transport. Balad Sinjar-Dair al Zor; passable for pack transport.

(b) Nisibin-Jazirah ibn Omar; passable for wheeled transport. Nisibin-Mardin; passable for wheeled transport. Nisibin-Midiat; passable for wheeled transport. Nisibin-Faish-
khabur; passable for wheeled transport.

Inhabitants.—Practically all Yezidis, with small Arab villages at miles $7\frac{1}{2}$, 10, and in the vicinity of Mosul. Nisibin: Half Kurds, the rest Jews and Christians, with a few Turks and Tai Arabs.

Climate.—Nisibin is not healthy in summer. Liability to fever; water polluted.

Tactical.—For the first 30 miles the route is commanded by the Toq Hills and the Jabal Sinjar.

Stages.—

				<i>Inter.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
(1) Wurdi	$7\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{1}{2}$
(2) Kolang Hafzah	$12\frac{1}{2}$	20
(3) Mile $33\frac{1}{2}$	$13\frac{1}{2}$	$33\frac{1}{2}$
(4) Rud Su	$16\frac{1}{2}$	50
(5) Mile $70\frac{1}{4}$	$20\frac{1}{4}$	70
(6) Nisibin	10	80

9. DAIR AL ZOR TO RAS AL AIN VIA RIGHT BANK OF THE KHABUR. (Distance 169 miles in twelve stages.)

General.—General direction north, but starting east by north for 25 miles across the desert to Tel Sawwar on the right bank of the Khabur River; thence north for 80 miles, then north-west for 54 miles, following the right bank all the way.

Passability.—Passable throughout for L.A.M. cars in dry weather. During the rainy season, from December to mid-May, it may become impassable owing to rain softening the surface and rendering the many wadis crossed temporarily impassable.

Water.—From the Khabur River at all stages. Unlimited, and fit for men and animals. There is no water for 35 miles in Stage 1 between Dair al Zor and Tel Sawwar. At some stages buckets would be necessary for watering animals.

Camping Grounds.—Sufficient for one brigade at each stage, near the river.

Supplies.—Dair al Zor. In summer 2,000 sheep could be collected in a week, also at harvest time 200 tons of wheat and 50 tons of barley, provided the tribes were friendly and price paid was high.

Ras al Ain: 1,000 sheep, 20 tons of wheat and 5 tons of barley per week.

En route sheep in large numbers obtainable from the Chechens and Sherabiyin Arabs on the left bank of the river, between Sicha and Ras al Ain. Small amounts of grain obtainable at certain stages mentioned below.

Grazing.—Excellent between Ras al Ain and Tel Taban.

Fuel.—Nil en route.

Obstacles and work necessary. A large number of wadis, dry in May, 1919, are crossed. These are passable in dry weather for L.A.M. cars, *i.e.*, from May to December, but would become impassable after heavy rain, which is possible at any time from December to mid-May. Work at the following points is necessary to make the road fit for regular and sustained wheel traffic.

Total.

7½

20

33½

50

70

80

Miles from Dair al Zor.	Man hours.	Nature of work.
53	10	Wadi crossing.
101	10	" "
102	40	" "
104½	10	Rough road.
106	10	Wadi crossing.
115½	400	Very bad wadi crossing.
116½	10	Ramping wadi crossing.
123½	40	" " "
131	20	" " "
138½	20	" " "
148½	10	" " "

Communications.—

(a) Dair al Zor is on main Baghdad-Aleppo route; passable L.A.M. cars.

Dair al Zor-Mosul via Tel Busairah, where the route crosses Khabur River by a stone bridge, thence up the left bank to Tel Fadgham, thence via Al Bidea, Ain Ghazal and Tel Afar; passable L.A.M. cars.

(b) Tel Fadgham to Hasaqah up the left bank of Khabur River.

(c) Hasaqah to Hamidi (2 miles south of Tel al Dehad). Distance 40 miles. Passable all arms in dry weather. Wadi west of Tel Aswad al Fauqani requires bridging for wheeled traffic in winter. Span, 60 feet.

Stages.—

	Inter.	Total.
(1) Tel Sawwar	35	35
(2) Point 4 miles south of Tel Margadah	16	51
(3) Tel Fadgham	15	66
(4) Tel Shadadah	13½	79½
(5) Tel Ajalat	14	93½
(6) Tel Taban	9¾	103¾
(7) Sicha	10¾	114
(8) 4½ miles east-south-east of Tel Majdal	5	119
(9) Tel al Rumman	13	132
(10) A Wadi	16½	148½
(11) Khabur River (right bank)	10½	159
(12) Ras al Ain	10	169

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CHAPTER IX.

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL.

Garrisons.—At present there is only one military garrison in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah, and that consists of one squadron (strength about 75 sabres) of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, Iraq Army, stationed at Tel Afar. The garrison of this place is, however, shortly to be increased to one complete cavalry regiment.

The Iraq Army are clothed in the ordinary khaki uniform (serge in winter and drill in summer), with native headgear similar to that worn by the Hejaz troops. They are armed with the short Lee-Enfield rifle and Mark VII ammunition. This army is at present merely in its infancy, having only been raised towards the latter part of 1921, and has not yet been tried in even minor operations of any kind.

Barracks exist in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah at places and for troops as under:—

- | | | |
|-------------------|------|------------------------|
| (i) Tel Afar | ... | 1 company or squadron. |
| (ii) Hogena | ... | 1 platoon. |
| (iii) Ain Ghazal | ... | 1 ,, |
| (iv) Balad Sinjar | 1 ,, | or 1 troop. |

The towns of Nisibin and Ras al Ain are garrison towns occupied by Turkish and French troops respectively. The distribution and strength of the Jazirah front, of which the Nisibin garrison is a part, will be dealt with in the military report of Western Kurdistan. In addition the French have at present small garrisons at Hasichah, Sawar (on the River Khabur) and Raqqah consisting of gendarmerie, whose chief duty is police work.

Forts, magazines, or arsenals do not exist in the Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah, nor does the water supply allow of manœuvres on a large scale of more than an infantry division, and that only in the area Mosul-Tel Afar-Hogena-Eski Mosul.

Military Contingencies.—From the Iraq point of view, military contingencies which may possibly arise are exclusive of operations against hostile or recalcitrant tribes, which have been dealt with in Chapter VI. Wars

against Syria and Nationalist Turkey may be briefly considered from a defensive and offensive point of view:

Syria.—(a) Defensive.—The possibility of a large mixed force operating with Dair al Zor as a base against Mosul is remote. The water supply on the only route possible for wheels precludes the existence of more than a striking force of two cavalry regiments. It might be possible to move echelons of cavalry regiments from water supply to water supply, but the first place where such echelons could form a striking force of more than two regiments would be in the area of Balad Sinjar–Ain Ghazal, some 120 miles from Dair al Zor. Balad Sinjar lies 75 miles west of Mosul and is accessible by a route passable for wheels and with water supplies sufficient for one division at all stages. The Jabal Sinjar commands the route from Dair al Zor and offers a position from which to develop, with security to the attacking force, flank attacks on any force moving along the road. The continuation of the Jabal Sinjar to Eski Mosul confers further powers of flank attacks on the defenders. The Jabal Sinjar–Ain Ghazal area is then obviously the outstanding strategic feature in operations with Syria, and gives the defence supreme advantages over an offending force from that country. As Balad Sinjar is the centre of a large supply area capable of maintaining a brigade indefinitely and a division for at least two months, it gives the defensive force another great advantage. The occupation of Balad Sinjar by a brigade would probably defeat any attempt at attack on Mosul from the west. Assuming the occupation of Sinjar by a Syrian force, there still remain defensive positions across the Jabal Eski Mosul–Jabal Atshan–Jabal Mahalabiyah, which would entail an offensive force of at least two divisions and a defensive force of one division.

(b) Offensive.—An offensive from Balad Sinjar towards Dair al Zor is only possible by a small mounted force. It might be possible to concentrate a cavalry brigade on the Khabur, but the line of communications after Balad Sinjar would be liable to attack from Badawin. Such a force might occupy Dair al Zor if it were lightly held, but a supporting offensive from the region of Abu Kemal would be necessary to open up a line of supply from Baghdad.

Turkey.—(a) Defensive.—There are, if we omit the movement of troops via the left bank of the Tigris, two possible roads for troops from Nisibin–Mardin area, viz.,

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the Nisibin-Mosul route via Hogena and that via Balad Sinjar. The latter is impassable to wheels and would not furnish water for more than one regiment, while the forcing of the Jabal Sinjar against a small force entails at least a division skilled in mountain warfare. There remains the route via Hogena. Hogena, known by the tribes as the "Hogena Gate," lies in a pass between two small ranges of hills and is the first place where anything more than one cavalry regiment could operate. Between Demir Kapu Khan and Hogena there is a large waterless stretch, which can only be crossed by one cavalry regiment at a time owing to the water supply. The line of hills from east of Hogena to Eski Mosul on the Tigris and continued westward to Tel Afar and Jabal Sinjar constitute a defensive position which could be held by a division, and would require two to three divisions for a successful offensive. The Hogena Gate is, therefore, of strategic importance and especially favours the defensive, since it is accessible to wheel transport and has no difficulties in the way of water supply. Tel Afar and Mosul are incidentally the centres of one of the richest wheat areas in Iraq. The Jabal Sinjar is of minor strategic importance, but could be employed, as it was during the war, as a flank position from which to attack and raid forces and convoys coming from Nisibin. It would not require much labour to lay a light railway along the Mosul-Nisibin embankment constructed by the Germans in 1918. The advantages of inner lines, supplies, water, and movement of transport all favour the defensive.

(b) *Offensive.*—An offensive against Nisibin is impossible on a large scale without the construction of the Mosul-Nisibin Railway.

In considering Northern Jazirah, it must be remembered that its military problems, so far as they concern the Iraq Government, cannot be considered apart from those of Iraq as a whole. Assuming then that adequate arrangements have been made for the remainder of Iraq, it is necessary to delimit (i) strategical positions, (ii) number of troops required for defence, and (iii) the type and characteristics of such troops in Northern Jazirah.

The Jazirah consists of rolling downlands and desert cut by the Jabal Sinjar (3,000 to 4,700 feet high), an effective bastion flanking the approaches from Dair al Zor and Nisibin. Both are the chief highways of commerce and suitable approaches for a force of all arms towards Mosul under certain circumstances. The forces

likely to be met with are at most one cavalry brigade from Dair al Zor and one division of infantry and cavalry from Nisibin, and most probably two cavalry regiments on either route. In addition, the support of a tribal force, say 2,000 strong, may be given to the hostile forces.

The most serious action of such a tribal force would materialize as strong, rapid raids on lines of communications, on weak detachments, and on such unprotected towns as offer prospects of loot.

From the above the following deductions appear:—

- (i) The occupation of Mosul by a central, mobile striking force.
- (ii) Establishment of strong posts on the Shergat-Mosul lines of communication.
- (iii) The establishment of a desert control post and a centre of desert intelligence.
- (iv) The extreme mobility of the forces to be employed.
- (v) The governing factors in the estimate of forces required is the possibility of raids by 3,000 tribesmen, either by themselves or in conjunction with two regiments of regular Syrian or Turkish cavalry on the main routes. The truth of these deductions was borne out in 1920 during the Arab rising.

The defence of Northern Jazirah—assuming the establishment of a striking force in Mosul—demands above all else a desert control centre and an outpost toward the Syrian and Turkish frontiers. The considerations in the first part of the chapter and its central position both in respect to Shammar migrators and the defensive sector mentioned, indicate Tel Afar as the most suitable control centre. The establishment of a mobile force there will ensure the immunity of the district from the Shammar raids and render the occupation of the Sinjar-Ain Ghazal and the Hogena-Eski Mosul positions a matter of extreme difficulty. The strategic centre, therefore, of Northern Jazirah from the Iraq point of view is Tel Afar. It is estimated that two cavalry regiments with outposts at Hogena and Ain Ghazal would either efficiently carry out the defence of Northern Jazirah or hold the defensive positions at Ain Ghazal and Hogena long enough to enable the mobile column at Mosul to take its position in their places.

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CHAPTER X.
ADMINISTRATION.

The administration of Northern Jazirah will be very briefly considered under three heads, viz., Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

(1) *Iraq*.—That portion of Iraq which is in Northern Jazirah is administered in precisely the same manner as the remainder of the kingdom. Full details of this system are given in the Handbook of Mesopotamia, Vol. I. The Iraq portion of Northern Jazirah comes under the Mutassariflik of Mosul and is divided into two "qadhas," namely, Sinjar and Tel Afar, both governed by Qaimmaqams. The present holders of these offices are:—

Mutassarif of Mosul.—Rashid Beg al Khota.
Divisional Adviser.—L. F. Nalder, Esq., C.I.E.,
C.B.E.

Qaimmaqam of Sinjar.—Yusuf Effendi Rassam.
Qaimmaqam of Tel Afar.—Ibrahim Bakir Effendi.

(2) *Syria*.—The greater part of Northern Jazirah now consists of Syrian territory under the French Mandate, which, with the exception of the Qadha of Raqqah, is contained within the boundaries of the Dair al Zor Liwah. The Qadha of Raqqah is in the Aleppo Liwah. That portion of the Dair al Zor Liwah in Northern Jazirah comprises the Qadha of Hasichah (which in turn controls the nahiyah of Ras al Ain) and the nahiyah of Sawar, which is directly under Dair al Zor. The present officials of these various districts are:—

Mutassarif of Dair al Zor.—Khalil al Ishaq.
Qaimmaqam of Hasichah (Acting).—Mahmud Beg.
Mudir of Ras al Ain.—Lieut. Jasir Effendi.
Mudir of Sawar.—Muhammad Effendi.

(3) *Turkey*.—The town of Nisibin is the only part of Northern Jazirah in Turkish territory. Nisibin is the headquarters of a qadha of the same name, which belongs to the Vilayet of Diarbekr. The Diarbekr province has for some time been under the military governorate of the G.O.C., 13th Turkish Army Corps, and the later appellation of G.O.C., Jazirah Front, viz., Major-General Jevad Pasha. Similarly the Qaimmaqam of Nisibin is a military man, usually the senior officer of the garrison there.

APPENDIX A.

GLOSSARY OF TOPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER TERMS.

(A.)=Arabic. (P.)=Persian. (K.)=Kurdish.
(T.)=Turkish. (S.)=Syriac. (H.)=Hindustani.

A.

- Ab (P.) Water, river.
'Aba (A.) (Arab. 'abā Arab cloak.
or 'abā'ah)
Ābād (P.).. .. Town, plain.
Abu (Abū) (A.) Father (often used in the genitive relation to denote possession, and also as a prefix to the name of an Arab tribe).
Abyadh (A.) White.
Agha (T.) Chief.
Aghāj (T.) Tree.
Ahmar (A.) (fem. sing. Red.
Hamrā)
Ain (A.) Spring (of water).
Āl (A.) Tribe; Bū, in the expression āl Bū (occurring in many tribal names), is an abbreviation of Abū (see Abu).
Alai (T.) A regiment, corresponds to a British infantry or artillery brigade.
Ambār (Anbār) (A.) .. Storehouse.
'Ami, Am (A.) Blind (used of dry stream-beds).
Aq, Aqcheh (T.) White.
Arabeh, Arāba (T.) .. Four-wheeled cart or carriage.
Arid (A.) A small desert plant eaten by camels.
Arzan (P.) Millet.
Ashāghi (T.) Lower.
Ashireh (in genitive relation, Ashiret) (A.) Kindred, family, tribe; used of the tribes paying taxation through their own heads.
Asiyāb (P.) Water-mill.
Atīq (A.) Ancient.
Av (K.) Water, river.

B.

- Bāb (A.) Gate.
Badawin (A.) Nomadic Arabs.
Bādgir (P.) Wind-scoop; house ventilator.
Badu (A.) A member of a nomad tribe.
Baghaleh (A.) Big cargo-boat, sometimes of 200-300 tons burthen.
Bāghcheh (T.) Garden.
Bahr (A.).. .. Sea, lake.
Balad (A.) Town, or district.

Banāt (A.)
Bandar (P.)
Bani (A.)
Bāsh (T.)
Beg, Bey (T.)
Beit (A.) ..
Bel (T.) ..
Bellam (A.)

Bhusa (H.)
Bimbashi (T.)
Bin (A.) ..
Bint (plural)
Bir (Bī's) (A.)
Birkeh (in genitive relation, Birke)
Boghaz (T.)
Boyun (T.)
Bund (P.)
Büyük (T.)

Chai (T.) ..
Cham (K.)
Chemen (P.)
Chenār (P.)
Cherrad (Ch.)
(A.)
Chiftlik (T.)
Chöl (K.) Ch

Diagh (T.)
Dā'irat al Sa

Dānak (A.)

Dār (A.) ..
Darb (A.) ..

Deh (P.)
Deir (A.) ..

Derband (T.)
Dereh (T.)

Desht (Dasht)
Dereh (T.)

Dhalūl, Dhal
Dirah ..

Durra (H.)
Düz (T.)

Banāt (A.)	see Bint.
Bandar (P.)	Port.
Bani (A.)	Sons of (plur. in genitive relation, of Ibn, <i>q.v.</i>).
Bāsh (T.)	Head, summit.
Beg, Bey (T.)	Title given to persons of distinction.
Beit (A.)	House.
Bel (T.)	Pass.
Bellam (A.)	Long narrow boat used on the rivers and marshes of Southern Iraq.
Bhusa (H.)	Chopped straw.
Bimbashi (T.)	Major (literally : head of one thousand).
Bin (A.)	Son ; variant form of Ibn (<i>q.v.</i>).
Bint (plural Banāt) (A.)	Girl, daughter.
Bīr (Bi's) (A.)	Well.
Birkeh (in genitive relation, Birket) (A.)	Pool, cistern, tank.
Boghaz (T.)	Pass, defile (lit. neck, throat).
Boyun (T.)	Col, ridge (lit. nape of neck).
Bund (P.)	Dam.
Büyük (T.)	Great.

C.

Chai (T.)	Stream.
Cham (K.)	Meadowland, field (in T.—pine).
Chemen (P.)	Meadowland, field.
Chenār (P.) (A. Sinār)	Plane-tree (<i>platanus orientalis</i>).
Cherrad (Churd or Karad) (A.)	Water-hoist of skins, drawn by animals.
Chiftlik (T.)	Farm.
Chöl (K.) Chöl (T.)	Desert.

D.

Dāgh (T.)	Mountain.
Dā'irat al Saniyah (A.)	The name of the Government department which manages the Turkish Crown lands.
Dānak (A.)	Flat-bottomed boat of a kind used on marshes of Southern Iraq.
Dār (A.)	House.
Darb (A.)	Road.
Deh (P.)	Village.
Deir (A.)	Monastery.
Derband (T.)	Pass (pronounced devrent).
Dereh (T.)	Stream-bed, valley.
Desht (Dasht) (P.)	Plain, plateau, desert.
Deveh (T.)	Camel.
Dhalül, Dhelül (A.)	Riding camel.
Dirah	Area within which a nomad tribe usually moves and has grazing rights.
Durra (H.)	Millet (<i>Sorghum vulgare</i>).
Düz (T.)	Level, plain.

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E.

- Effendi (T.) Esquire. A Turkish title borne by the middle classes.
Emir (A.) Ruler, prince, commander.
Eski (T.) Old.

F.

- Fātihah (in genitive relation, Fātiḥat) (A.) Opening.
Fethah (A.) Opening.
Firqaḥ (T.) Division (military). Also used for "section" of a tribe.

G.

- Gardan (P.) Pass.
Gavvan (P.) Small prickly shrub used for firewood.
Gechid (T.) Fort, pass.
Gedik (T.) Pass.
Gharb (A.) West.
Gharbi (A.) Western.
Ghi (H.) Clarified butter.
Girik (K.) Hill.
Gok (T.) Blue.
Gol (T.) Lake.
Goz (T.) Fountain ; arch of bridge (lit. eye).
Gumbet (T.) Small domed shrine.
Gund (K.) Village.
Gurmah (in genitive relation, Gurmat) (A.) Canal, channel.

H.

- Hadrah (N.) Commercial mission.
Haji (A.) The title assumed by a Moslem who has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Haj (A.) The pilgrimage to Mecca ; pilgrim caravan.
Hamād (A.) Barren (region), used of the Syrian desert.
Hammām (plural Hammāmān) (A.) Bath.
Hamrin (A.) Red ; plural of Ahmar (*q.v.*).
Hawi (A.) Used in Tigris Valley for a flat foreshore between the river and the side of the valley.
Hisar (T.) Castle.
Howeir (A.) (Khuwair) Diminutive of Khōr (*q.v.*).

Ibn (A.) ..
Idrah (A.) ..
Imām (A.) ..
Imāmzādeh
Irnak (T.)

Jami' (A.) ..
Jahā (A.) ..
Jazirah (A.) ..
relation, J
Jir (Jurf) (A.) ..
Jirib (A.) ..
Jisr (A.) ..
Juss (A.) ..

Kani (K.) ..
Kapan (T.) ..
Karez (P.) ..
Kebir (A.) ..
Kefr (A.) ..
Kelek (A., et

Keli, Kel (K.) ..
Kesik (T.) ..
Kabraḥ (A.) ..
Khāchiyeh (A.) ..
Khān (A., P.,

Khān (P.) ..
Kharāb (A.) ..
Khāḥr (A.) ..
Khūrbeh (A.) ..
Khūrbeh, ..
relation, KI
Khōr (A.) ..

Kiliseh (T.) ..
Kināseh, Kun ..
Kirk (T.) ..
Koi (T.) ..
Köprü (T.) ..

I.

Ibn (A.)	Son.
Idrah (A.)	Mealies.
Imām (A.)	Religious leader ; tomb of Imām.
Imāmzādeh (P.)	Tomb of Imām.
Irmak (T.)	River.

J.

Jami' (A.)	Friday mosque.
Jabal (A.)	Hill, mountain.
Jazirah (A.) (in genitive relation, Jazirat)	Island ; Mesopotamia.
Jirf (Jurf) (A.)	Cliff.
Jirjib (A.)	Stream-bed dry in summer.
Jisr (A.)	Bridge.
Juss (A.)	Gypsum ; gypsum mortar.

K.

Kani (K.)	Spring, well.
Kapau (T.)	Gate.
Karez (P.)	Underground water channel.
Kebir (A.)	Great.
Kefr (A.)	Village.
Kelek (A., etc.)	Raft of beams and branches, supported on inflated skins, of a kind used on rivers of Northern Mesopotamia (especially the Middle Tigris).
Keli, Kel (K.)	Pass.
Kesik (T.)	Broken.
Kabrah (A.)	Depression in which rainwater collects.
Khāchiyeh (A.)	Light summer cloak.
Khān (A., P., etc.)	Inn, caravanserai (spelt "khan" except with names).
Khān (P.)	Lord, chief.
Kharāb (A.)	Ruin.
Khidhr (A.)	Prophet (used of Elias and a few others).
Khirbeh (A.) (pronounced Khūrbeh, in genitive relation, Khirbet)	Ruin.
Khōr (A.)	Sheet of water, bay, inlet, marsh ; also used by Bedouins to denote salt-encrusted ground.
Kilisseh (T.)	Church.
Kināseh, Kunāseh (A.)	Shoal or sandbank.
Kirk (T.)	40, numerous.
Kōi (T.)	Village.
Kōprü (T.)	Bridge.

Küchük (T.)	Little.
Küh (P.)	Mountain.
Küt (A.)	Fort.
Kutal (Khotal) (P.)	Col.

L.

Lira (T.)	A Turkish gold coin equivalent to 16s. 8d.
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M.

Mā, often pronounced Water.

Moi (A.)	Metal, mine.
Ma'den (T.)	River sailing craft of large size used in Iraq.
Mahailah (A.)	Open space, plain.
Maidan (A.)	A revenue official.
Mal Mudir (A.)	King, chief.
Malik (A.)	Turkish subordinate departmental official.
Mamur	Lord, master.
Mār (S.)	A kind of vetch or pea.
Māsh	A light reed or plank canoe covered with bitumen used on the marshes of Southern Iraq.
Mashhūf (A.)	Place of prayer; small mosque.
Masjid (A.)	Shrine.
Mazār (A.)	City.
Medineh (A.) (plural, Medū'in)	A Turkish silver coin equal to one-fifth of a lira.
Mejidiéh (T.)	Headquarters.
Merkez (A.)	An irregular military formation (militia).
Milice (T.)	Colonel (literally, commander of a regiment).
Miralai (T.)	Administrator of a nahiyah (q.v.).
Mudir (T.)	Shiah religious authority.
Mujtahid (A., etc.)	The headman of a village or quarter of a town.
Mukhtar (A.)	A subaltern.
Mulazzim (T.)	A sanjaq.

N.

Nahiyah (T.)	Turkish administrative district, sub-division of a qaza (q.v.).
Nahr (A.)	River, canal.
Naqib (A.)	Leader, head of community, local head of saiyids (q.v.).
Naqibzadeh (A.)	Son of a naqib.
Naur (Nā'ur) (A.)	Water-wheel, used in irrigation.
Nizam (T.)	Turkish regular troops.
Nullah (H.)	Watercourse.
Nuqtah (A.)	Police post.

Pā (P.) ..
Pir (P.) ..
Pul (P.) ..
Punār (T.) ..
Piastre (T.) ..

Qabr (A.) ..
Qaimmaqam ..
Qaimmaqam ..
Qal'ah (in ..
tion, Qal' ..
Qanat (Qanā ..
awāt) (A.) ..
Qanātir (A.) ..
Qantareh (p ..
(A.) ..
Qara (T.) ..
Qasr (A.) ..
Qaza (T.) ..
Qislaq (A., e ..
Qubbeh (A.) ..
Quffah (A.) ..
Quru (T.) ..
Qiyū (T.) ..

Rais (Ra'is) ..
Bas (Ba's) ..
Rayah ..

Reāl (A. Riyā ..

Redif (A.) ..
Resh (K.) ..
Ribāt (P.) ..
Rūdār (Ru ..

Safineh (A.) ..

Saghir (A.) ..

P.

Pā (P.)	Foot.
Pir (P.)	Old.
Pul (P.)	Bridge.
Punār (T.)	Spring.
Piastre (T.)	A Turkish coin equivalent to twopence.

Q.

Qabr (A.).. ..	Tomb.
Qaimmaqam (T.)	Lieut-colonel, also the governor of a qaza.
Qaimmaqamlik (T.)	Qaza.
Qāl'ah (in genitive relation, Qal'at) (A.)	Fort.
Qanat (Qanāh, plur. Qanawāt) (A.)	Canal, water channel, subterranean conduit.
Qanātir (A.)	See Qantareh.
Qantareh (plur. Qanātir) (A.)	Bridge.
Qara (T.)	Black, great.
Qasr (A.)	Palace, castle, fortress, walled village.
Qaza (T.)	An administrative division of a sanjaq.
Qislāq (A., etc.)	Barracks.
Qubbeh (A.)	Dome, cupola; small domed shrine.
Quffah (A.)	Coracle used on rivers of Central Mesopotamia.
Quru (T.).. ..	Dry.
Qūyū (T.)	Spring, well.

R.

Rais (Ra'is) (A., etc.)	Chief.
Ras (Ra's) (A.)	Head, promontory.
Rayah	Subject; used to denote that part of the population of the Turkish empire which pays taxes direct to the Imperial Government (<i>cf.</i> Ashireh, above).
Reāl (A. Riyāl)	The Maria Theresa dollar, worth about 2s. These coins, though still being minted, all bear the date 1788. They are the usual medium of circulation in Arabia.
Redif (A.)	Turkish reserve force.
Resh (K.)	Black.
Ribāt (P.)	Inn, caravanserai.
Rūdbār (Rubar) (S.K.)	River.

S.

Safineh (A.)	Large-sized sailing craft, used on Lower Tigris and Euphrates.
Saghir (A.)	Small.

Saiyid (A.)	Moslem claiming descent from the Prophet.	
Sājeḥ (A.)	Small boat.	
Sanjaq (T.)	Turkish administrative district, usually a subdivision of a vilayet (<i>q.v.</i>).	Umm (A.)
Sarifeh (A.)	Reed and mud hut of marsh Arabs.	
Ser (Sar) (P.)	Head, summit.	
Serai (Serā'i, Serāyeh)	Used in Mesopotamia of Government buildings; in India and Persia it is used to mean caravanserai.	Veiran (T.) Vilayet (T.)
Serdāb (A.)	Underground room (for protection against the heat of summer).	
Sha'ir (A.)	Barley.	
Shakhtūr (A.)	Large flat-bottomed boat used for downstream navigation on Middle Euphrates.	Wādī (A.)
Shamal (A.)	North, north wind.	
Shāmiyeh (A.)	Used of the left bank of the Middle Euphrates (towards Esh-Shām, Damascus).	Waqf (A.)
Sharq (A.)	East.	Wazir (A.)
Sharqi (A.)	Eastern.	
Shatt (A.)	River bank, river.	
Shaikh (A.)	Chief of tribe (or sub-tribe); also used of religious leaders.	Yāllā (T.) Yeni (T.) Yuqāri (T.) Yuzbashi (T.)
Shiah (A.)	<i>Adj.</i> , professing or pertaining to Shiism, one of the two great divisions of Islam.	
Shōk (A.)	Camel-thorn.	
Shu'aib, Sha'ib, Shi'b,	Ravine, small watercourse.	
Shāib (A.)	Plural of shaikh (<i>q.v.</i>).	
Shuyukh (A.)	White.	
Spi (K.)	Path built out from or cut in the rock, in the form of steps.	Zaptieh (T.) Ziyāret (P.)
Stanga (?)	Water, river.	
Su (T.)	Dyke, embankment.	Zozan (K.)
Sudd (A.)	<i>Adj.</i> , professing or pertaining to Sunnism, one of the two great divisions of Islam.	
Sunni	Market.	
Sûq (A.)		

T.

Tabur (T.)	Battalion.	
Tang (P.)	Defile, gorge.	
Tāsh (T.)	Stone.	
Tekiyeh (A.)	Hostel for pilgrims.	
Tel (Tell) (A.)	Mound, hill.	
Telkhanah (A.)	Telegraph office.	
Tepeh (T.)	Hill.	
Tezek	Cow or other dung used for fuel.	
Tibbin (Tibn)	Straw.	
Tulul (A.)	Plural of tel (<i>q.v.</i>).	
Tura (Tur) (S.)	Mountain.	

Weight.—
1 Waqia
1 Huqq
1 Rotel
1 Old Q
1 New Q
The old
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In trad
or 3-28 kg.

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U.

Umm (A.) Mother (used in genitive relation, to denote possession).

V.

Veiran (T.) Ruined, ruin.

Vilayet (T.) Province of Turkish empire, under a Vali.

W.

Wādi (A.) Watercourse, bed of stream, river, valley (spelt wadi except with names).

Waqf (A.) Property held (actually or nominally) in trust for religious purposes.

Wazir (A.) Chief minister or ruler.

Y.

Yāilā (T.) Summer pasture grounds.

Yeni (T.) New.

Yuqāri (T.) Upper.

Yuzbashi (T.) Captain (literally, head of one hundred).

Z.

Zaptieh (T.) Member of armed police force.

Ziyāret (P., etc.) Pilgrimage, place of pilgrimage, sanctuary, usually a tomb.

Zozan (K.) Summer pastures.

APPENDIX B.

WEIGHTS, MEASURES AND COINAGE.

Dair al Zor.

Weight.—

1 Waqiah = 100 Dirhems or .71 lb. or .32 kilos.

1 Huqqah = 4 Waqiahs ,, 2.82 ,, ,, 1.26 ,,

1 Rotel = 2½ Huqqahs ,, 7.05 ,, ,, 3.15 ,,

1 Old Qantar = 200 Huqqahs ,, 564.00 ,, ,, 252.00 ,,

1 New Qantar = 250 Huqqahs ,, 705.00 ,, ,, 315.00 ,,

The old qantar is used when weighing goods for transport, the new qantar when weighing goods for sale.

In trade with Aleppo only the rotel equals 1,017 dirhems or 7.25 lb. or 3.28 kg.

Length.—

1 Dra = 16 akds or 66 cm.
1 "Yard" = from 75 to 90 cm.

The "Yard" is estimated as the width of a roll of Manchester cotton goods, and thus varies according to the size of the bale.

Ras al Ain.

Weight.—

1 Waqiah = 200 Dirhems or 1.42 lb. or .64 kilos.
1 Huqqah = 2 Waqiahs ,, 2.84 ,, ,, 1.28 ,,
1 Rotel = 6 Huqqahs ,, 17.04 ,, ,, 7.68 ,,
1 Qantar = 30 Rotels ,, 511.20 ,, ,, 230.40 ,,

Length.—

1 Dra = 70 cm.
1 "Yard" = from 75 to 90 cm. (see note above).

Nisibin.

Weight.—

The same as in Ras al Ain.
The huqqah is spoken of as 400 dirhems, not 2 waqiahs.

Tel Afar District.

Weight.—

1 Dirhem = 3.2 grammes.
40 Dirhems = 1 Waqqah.
16 Waqqahs = 1 Huqqah = 2.2 kilos.
The price of articles is always given per huqqah and waznah.
6 Huqqahs = 1 Waznah = 13.5 kilos.
20 Waznahs = 1 Tighar = 266 ,,

BRITISH COINAGE.

Gold None in common circulation.
Silver 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ rupee pieces.
 2 anna pieces.
Nickel 2, 1 anna pieces.
Copper $\frac{1}{4}$ anna pieces.
Paper 100, 50, 10, 5, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 rupee notes.

British paper money is worth its face value. There is an import trade in sovereigns from Aleppo, but these are not in common circulation.

TURKISH COINAGE.

Gold 5, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ lira pieces.

The first two are rarely met with. The lira and the half-lira are in common use. The lira is worth 100 nominal gold piastres, and 108 actual silver piastres.

Silver ..
Nickel ..
Copper ..

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Silver 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ mejidieh pieces.
2, 1 piastre pieces.
Nickel 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre pieces.
Copper Copper coins are not now accepted in the bazaars.

ARAB COINAGE.

See Turkish Coinage.

EXCHANGE VALUE.

The value of the gold lira varies from district to district. At present a good average value is Rs. 13·8. The silver mejidieh is worth approximately Rs. 1·14, although there are nominally only five mejidiehs in the lira. The value of Turkish paper money fluctuates from time to time from one-third to one-sixth of its face value. The favourite coins among the local population are liras and rupees. Small change is disliked.

APPENDIX C.

THE ARAB CALENDAR.

The Arab Calendar is a lunar calendar reckoned from the date of the flight of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, which took place in A.D. 622. The months are of 29 or 30 days each, and the year is 11 days shorter than the British.

To convert an Arab date exactly it is necessary to express it in years and decimals of a year. Multiply these figures by 970,225 and add 621·54 to the product. The result will be correct to a day. Conversely, to convert a European date to the Arab equivalent, it is necessary to subtract 621·54 and to divide by 970225.

The names of the months are—

Muharram.	Rajab.
Safar.	Sha'ban.
Rabi al Awwal.	Ramadhan.
Rabi al Thani.	Shauwal.
Jumadi al Awwal.	Dhul Qa'dah.
Jumadi al Thani.	Dhul Hijjah.

THE NEW TURKISH OFFICIAL CALENDAR, MARCH, 1917.

Until March, 1917, the Turkish official calendar was counted from the flight of Muhammad. March was the first month of the year, and every date was thirteen days behind the corresponding date of our calendar. This was a solar calendar which superseded the Arab calendar in Turkish official business.

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In March, 1917, a change was made. March was made the third month in the year, and the 28th February, 1332, was followed by the 14th March, 1333. The Turkish official calendar is now the same as the British, except that the year remains 584 behind it.

The names of the months are—

Kanûn Thanî.	Tamûz.
Shabât.	Āghustus or Ab.
Ādhâr.	Ēlûl.
Nîsan.	Tishrîn Awwal.
Mayis or Āyâr.	Tishrîn Thanî.
Hazîran.	Kanûn Awwal.

The Jews possess a calendar giving a year of 12 months of 29 or 30 days each, with an additional month added every third year.

The Christians use our calendar, naming the months as in the Turkish official calendar.

In the Arab and Turkish calendars the day is understood to begin a few minutes after sunset; thus at the time of the equinoxes the local time is six hours behind European time, e.g., 6 o'clock to an Arab is noon or midnight for a European. Also Monday night to an Arab is Sunday night to a European, because in the Arab system the night precedes the day.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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