"سياسة عدن" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٦] (٨/٦)

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where I thought the Despatch went too far. But in the end I decided to
wait till the Government of India’s reply was received. I am glad, therefore,
to have this opportunity of stating my views.
I take no exception to the general warning contained in the Despatch to
he cautious, and to refrain from extending our responsibilities and from
interfering with the domestic affairs of the tribes. Not that I think that
the Government of India have ever had any desire to annex, or administer,
or to interfere unnecessarily with the tribal g wernment. But local officers
are sometimes inexperienced and occasionally indiscreet, and even the
Foreign Department may sometimes be inclined to make too much of
trifles. Such warnings, therefore, as the Despatch contains are always
useful and tend to keep the supervision of the Government of India alert
and vigilant. But the specific orders given in the Despatch seemed to me
to be too positive, and I think the apprehensions, on which they were based,
have been exaggerated.
In the first place the demarcation with Turkey of the boundary of our
sphere of influence had no connection with any so-called forward policy. I
was the Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, and I was not conscious of
any desire on the part of the Government of India to extend our respon
sibilities or to increase the measure of our interference. On the contrary
it was hoped that the demarcation would reduce our responsibilities bv
freeing us from the anxiety and the risk of frequent disputes, and of
possible conflict, with the Turks. In the circumstances of the time, the
demarcation was a measure of simple necessity if we were to retain any
sphere of influence at all, and I regard its successful accomplishment as a
very valuable political achievement. It is the latest application of a policy
which the Government of India has successfully pursued on many points of
the Indian frontier for the past 30 years, the policy, wherever practicable,
of fixing a limit both to their own ambitions and to the encroachments of
aggressive neighbours, by laying down treaty boundaries. Thus we fixed
the boundary of Persia and Baluchistan in 1872, of Russia and Afghanistan
in 1885, of ourselves and Afghanistan in 1896, of Tibet in 1891, and of
Burma and China by the Conventions of 1894 and 1897. At any rate, the
Aden demarcation is now an accomplished fact. It is clear from their
Despatch that the Government of India fully accept the view that ordinarily
questions of trespass across it by the Turks should be settled by way of
Constantinople. They also assert that they cordially subscribe to the view of
Lord Lansdowne and of His Majesty’s present Government that there is to
be no increase of interference with the internal and domestic affairs of the
tribes It seems to me, therefore, that the only question at issue is the
best method of dealing with the Chiefs and the tribes, in order to carry out
this policy with due regard to Treaty obligations, and with the least risk of
ow, short of annexation, or administration in some form without
annexation which no one desires, there are two methods of dealing with
frontier tribes m a position similar to that of the Aden tribes There is the
policy of absolute or almost absolute non-interference. That is the policy
which was pursued for nearly 60 years on the Punjab frontier with the
result as once described by Lord Lytton in a famous Despatch, that we
re orced into constant punitive expeditions, and that no British officer’s
i e was safe a mile beyond our own frontier. The other is the policy of
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