خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٢٤٨/٢٠٩)

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The Tehran Riots.
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7. Opposition to the Qawam culminated on the 8th and 9th December in an
attempt to unseat him by disorders in the streets. The exact causes of the
phenomena are under investigation by a special commission, and, as the most
diverse explanations are given, we may await its finding. What is certain is that
both police and army displayed, until it was too late, an amazing benevolence
upwards the disorderly crowds, not merely the students who made a vague
demonstration at the Majlis, but the mob which looted sugar depots and shops
and eventually plundered the Prime Minister’s house and destroyed all his
possessions.
8. Throughout the day the Shah seems to have been calling upon the Prime
Minister to resign—even after he had told His Majesty’s Minister, who saw him
in the afternoon, that he agreed to the retention of the Qawam provided that he
made certain changes in his Cabinet and got rid of certain men round him wdio
. are generally agreed to be corrupt. Those who think that the disorders were not
! displeasing to the Shah have some evidence on their side. There is no doubt
that in an interview with about a dozen Deputies, whom he had summoned the
day before the trouble, he spoke in favour of a revolution from above—to obviate
a revolution from below which he professed to fear. Moreover, General Jahanbani
of the Shah’s military Cabinet, who called on the Soviet Ambassador while the
disorders were in progress to ask him in the Shah’s name what he thought of the
position, also asked the ambassador how he would view it if the Shah and
the generals took public affairs in hand for a while, and, although the Shah
subsequently alleged that this latter question was thrown off by General
Jahanbani on his own account in the course of the casual conversation, this
explanation does not ring true or agree with the evidence. The Shah has, in fact,
come out of the affair very badly. In taking sides so openly and so violently
against a Prime Minister who was supported by the British, United States and
Soviet representatives, without consulting them, he has shown a surprising lack
of political wisdom : while his attempt to effect a military coup d’Etat illustrates
his dangerous passion for playing at soldiers. It is true that he has throughout
quoted democracy and his oath to preserve the Constitution as justifying his
support of the Majlis against the Prime Minister; but he announced his readiness
to dismiss the Majlis if a Government satisfactory to himself was formed and
they continued to give trouble, while his alliance with the military suggested that
he had in mind nothing particularly democratic, but some form of autocracy
resting on the army. It is quite possible that he is genuinely sceptical of the old
gang of some fifteen families who between them furnish nearly all the material
of every Government, and regards himself as the philosopher-king, destined to
bring justice and prosperity to the Persian people; but his youth, his inexperience
and his blindness to the faults of the army, make him unfitted for this role, while
j if those faults are reparable the untruthfulness and the talent for weak intrigue
which have come to light during the crisis are likely to be more lasting. For the
moment he professes to regret having made a mistake and to be prepared to
support the Qawam, but he used the strongest pressure to make the Prime
Minister consent to the reopening of the Majlis, and he shows no sign of giving
up his claim to be the active Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Credit must,
however, be given to him in one respect: he suggested two possible Ministers
whose admittance to the Government in the place of two men of no great value
would strengthen it, viz., Muhsin Rais and Mutamedi. The new Minister for
War, Sipahbod Ahmedi, will also strengthen the Government—possibly too much
for the Shah’s liking. He will certainly want to control the General Staff, and, as
he is a man of determined character and courage, a conflict is bound to arise.
9. In view of the apparent inability of the Persian Government and army
to maintain order, I thought it well to arrange for British troops to come to
Tehran from Qum, only three hours away. The arrival of a battalion of the
Seaforth Highlanders on the 9th December certainly had a calming effect, and
their bearing and turn-out have made a generally favourable impression. Indeed
I have not heard any criticism from any quarter: The Soviet Ambassador was
officially informed of this arrival and asked whether Soviet troops would also be
sent; he replied that there were none to spare.
10. For the moment the Prime Minister is established, but his revised
Cabinet is not yet published, and much as we hoped that the Majlis would be
given a prolonged holiday—“ for repairs ” would have been a reasonable pretext,
since some slight change was done to it during the disorders—the Majlis was
reopened on the 20th December. Meanwhile, a determined effort has been made
by interested parties to show that the Prime Minister himself was responsible for
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