"تقارير إدارية ١٩٢٠-١٩٢٤" [و‎‎٧‎٤] (٤١٢/١٥٢)

PERSIAN GULF POLITICAL RESIDENCY, 1921.
41
Lynch Eoad.
"For the fourth year in succession the road has been safe for caravans
throughout the year. The average rate charged for goods carried from Ahwaz
to Ispahan was 12-36 per Shah Maund as compared with Krans 11-60 in 1920.
The maximum rate of hire was 16 Krans a Shah Maund compared with 17
Krans in 1920, and Krans 30 in 1919. Eates would have been considerably
cheaper had it not been for the total absence of fodder on the portion of the
road which lies between Bakhtiari territory and Ahwaz.
Bakhtiari.
Amir Mufakham IllKhani and Murteza Quli Khan IllBegi accompanied by
Amir Mujahid reached Ram Hormuz early in January. His Britannic Majesty's
Consul visited them at Behbehan in February and found them very much
perturbed by the threat of Bolshevism in Tehran.
Their attitude at this time is sufficiently indicated in the following
telegram which was despatched from Behbehan to His Britannic Majesty's
Minister on February 16th at their request:—
" I have now discussed Persian situation fully with the Khans whose
views may be considered representative not only of Khans as a
whole but of all saner elements in the country.
Their dominating anxiety is to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in
Persia. They feel that an emeute in Tehran should be fore
stalled at all costs but are reluctant themselves to march on
Tehran as this would dissipate their forces and lay them open to
suspicion of aiming at sovereignty with the help of the British.
If the Shah leaves Tehran they will concenlrate at Ispahan and
await developments but this may not prevent civil war between
North and South into which the Russians and ourselves would
inevitably be drawn directly or indirectly.
They wish to act throughout as trustees for the Persian constitution and
they can best do this by using all their influence to support a
policy which will at once be popuUr in Tehran, cut the ground
from under the feet of the Bolshevics and rehabilitate British
prestige in Persia.
Persia is at present much in the same position as in 1909 except that
the British Government now stands where Russian Government
stood then. This anomaly would only be aggravated if the Shah
retired to Kermanshah under our protection.
They consider that the only solution which will save Persia is the rein-
troduction of the Morgan-Shuster regime backed by an American
loan, and the abandonment of the Anglo-Persian agreement
pro tern.
The advantages of this course are as follows :—
Firstly. —It will provide an admirable counterblast to the projected
Russo-Persian agreement.
Secondly. —British altruism will be vindicated and an immediate
reaction in our favour will ensue.
Thirdly. —The Shah will remain afc Tehran.
Fourthly. —It will provide a rallying point for all sane elements in
Tehran and more especially enable the Bakhtiaris through
Samsames Sultan eh to take a strong line in support of the
constitution.
Persian administrative reform can still be carried out.
It may be regarded as axiomatic that the Khans will in any
circumstances do their utmost to protect our interests which
they feel acutely to be identical with their own and will not
move without fullest consultation with us. I venture to
submit that their views merit the most serious consideration."